--- title: "Gorgias · Γοργίας" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 2 of 7 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-gorgias/2/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Gorgias · Γοργίας, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-gorgias/2/" --- # Gorgias · Γοργίας *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* Rhetoric, power and justice: is it better to suffer wrong than to do it? > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg023, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg023.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 2. 458e–470d Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-gorgias/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-gorgias/2/#p-N [¶0] Soc. Why, Callicles, I assure you there is no hindrance on my side, if Gorgias is willing. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας. [¶1] Gorg. After that, Socrates, it would be shameful indeed if I were unwilling, when it was I who challenged everybody to ask what questions they pleased. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλεται. [¶2] 458e. But if our friends here are so minded, go on with the conversation and ask me anything you like. > Greek: 458e. ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει. [¶3] Soc. Hark you then, Gorgias, to what surprises me in your statements: to be sure, you may possibly be right, and I may take your meaning wrongly. You say you are able to make a rhetorician of any man who chooses to learn from you? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τʼ εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν; [¶4] Gorg. Yes. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. ναί. [¶5] 459. Soc. Now, do you mean, to make him carry conviction to the crowd on all subjects, not by teaching them, but by persuading? > Greek: 459. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστʼ ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα; [¶6] 459a. Gorg. Certainly I do. Soc. You were saying just now, you know, that even in the matter of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor. Gorg. Yes, indeed, I was—meaning, to the crowd. Soc. And “to the crowd” means “to the ignorant?” For surely, to those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor. Gorg. You are right. Soc. And if he is to be more convincing than the doctor, he thus becomes more convincing than he who knows? Gorg. Certainly. Soc. Though not himself a doctor, you agree? > Greek: 459a. ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ. ΓΟΡ. καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. [¶7] 459b. Gorg. Yes. Soc. But he who is not a doctor is surely without knowledge of that whereof the doctor has knowledge. Gorg. Clearly. Soc. So he who does not know will be more convincing to those who do not know than he who knows, supposing the orator to be more convincing than the doctor. Is that, or something else, the consequence? Gorg. In this case it does follow. Soc. Then the case is the same in all the other arts for the orator and his rhetoric: there is no need to know the truth of the actual matters, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do not know to know better than those who know. > Greek: 459b. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. δῆλον ὅτι. ΣΩ. ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς ηὑρηκέναι ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων. [¶8] 459c. Gorg. Well, and is it not a great convenience, Socrates, to make oneself a match for the professionals by learning just this single art and omitting all the others? > Greek: 459c. ΓΟΡ. οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; [¶9] Soc. Whether the orator is or is not a match for the rest of them by reason of that skill, is a question we shall look into presently, if our argument so requires: for the moment let us consider first whether the rhetorician is in the same relation to what is just and unjust, base and noble, good and bad, as to what is healthful, and to the various objects of all the other arts; he does not know what is really good or bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with these matters so as to appear to those who, like himself, do not know to know better than he who knows. Or is it necessary to know, and must anyone who intends to learn rhetoric have a previous knowledge of these things when he comes to you? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν [¶10] 459e. Or if not, are you, as the teacher of rhetoric, to teach the person who comes to you nothing about them—for it is not your business—but only to make him appear in the eyes of the multitude to know things of this sort when he does not know, and to appear to be good when he is not? Or will you be utterly unable to teach him rhetoric unless he previously knows the truth about these matters? Or what is the real state of the case, Gorgias? > Greek: 459e. μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον —ποιήσεις δʼ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσῃ αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; [¶11] 460a. For Heaven’s sake, as you proposed just now, draw aside the veil and tell us what really is the function of rhetoric. > Greek: 460a. καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθʼ ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν. [¶12] 460. Gorg. Why, I suppose, Socrates, if he happens not to know these things he will learn them too from me. Soc. Stop there: I am glad of that statement. If you make a man a rhetorician he must needs know what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from you. Gorg. Quite so. > Greek: 460. ΓΟΡ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρʼ ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται. ΣΩ. ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. [¶13] 460b. Soc. Well now, a man who has learnt building is a builder, is he not? Gorg. Yes. Soc. And he who has learnt music, a musician? Gorg. Yes. Soc. Then he who has learnt medicine is a medical man, and so on with the rest on the same principle; anyone who has learnt a certain art has the qualification acquired by his particular knowledge? Gorg. Certainly. Soc. And so, on this principle, he who has learnt what is just is just? Gorg. Absolutely, I presume. Soc. And the just man, I suppose, does what is just. Gorg. Yes. > Greek: 460b. ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; ΓΟΡ. ναί. ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει. ΓΟΡ. ναί. [¶14] 460c. Soc. Now the just man must wish to do what is just? > Greek: 460c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; [¶15] Gorg. Apparently. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. φαίνεταί γε. [¶16] Soc. Hence the just man will never wish to act unjustly? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. [¶17] Gorg. That must needs be so. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. ἀνάγκη. [¶18] Soc. But it follows from our statements that the rhetorician must be just. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. [¶19] Gorg. Yes. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. ναί. [¶20] Soc. Hence the rhetorician will never wish to do wrong. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν. [¶21] Gorg. Apparently not. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. οὐ φαίνεταί γε. [¶22] Soc. Then do you remember saying a little while ago that we ought not to complain against the trainers or expel them from our cities, if a boxer makes not merely use, but an unfair use, of his boxing? > Greek: ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδʼ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; [¶23] 460d. So in just the same way, if an orator uses his rhetoric unfairly, we should not complain against his teacher or banish him from our city, but the man who does the wrong and misuses his rhetoric. Was that said or not? Gorg. It was. > Greek: 460d. ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. ἐρρήθη. ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. [¶24] 460e. Soc. But now we find that this very person, the rhetorician, could never be guilty of wrongdoing, do we not? Gorg. We do. Soc. And in our first statements, Gorgias, we said that rhetoric dealt with speech, not on even and odd, but on the just and unjust, did we not? Gorg. Yes. > Greek: 460e. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. ναί. [¶25] 461. Soc. Well then, I supposed at the time when you were saying this that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since the speeches it made were always about justice but when a little later you told us that the orator might make even an unjust use of his rhetoric, that indeed surprised me, and thinking the two statements were not in accord I made those proposals,—that if, like myself, you counted it a gain to be refuted, it was worth while to have the discussion, but if not, we had better have done with it. > Greek: 461. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γʼ ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν. [¶26] 461a. And now that we have come to examine the matter, you see for yourself that we agree once more that it is impossible for the rhetorician to use his rhetoric unjustly or consent to do wrong. Now, to distinguish properly which way the truth of the matter lies will require, by the Dog, Gorgias, no short sitting. > Greek: 461a. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι. [¶27] 461b. Pol. How is this, Socrates? Is that really your opinion of rhetoric, as you now express it? Or, think you, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit your point that the rhetorician knows what is just and noble and good, and will himself teach these to anyone who comes to him without knowing them; and then from this admission I daresay there followed some inconsistency in the statements made—the result that you are so fond of—when it was yourself who led him into that set of questions! > Greek: 461b. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει—ὅτι Γοργίας ᾐσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρʼ αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—τοῦτο ⟨ὃ⟩ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα—ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; [¶28] 461c. For who do you think will deny that he has a knowledge of what is just and can also teach it to others? I call it very bad taste to lead the discussion in such a direction. > Greek: 461c. —ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶν τοὺς λόγους. [¶29] Soc. Ah, sweet Polus, of course it is for this very purpose we possess ourselves of companions and sons, that when the advance of years begins to make us stumble, you younger ones may be at hand to set our lives upright again in words as well as deeds. So now if Gorgias and I are stumbling in our words, you are to stand by and set us up again—it is only your duty; and for my part I am willing to revoke at your pleasure anything that you think has been wrongly admitted, if you will kindly observe one condition. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ ὑεῖς, ἵνα ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου— δίκαιος δʼ εἶ—καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς. [¶30] 461d. Pol. What do you mean by that? > Greek: 461d. ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶31] Soc. That you keep a check on that lengthy way of speaking, Polus, which you tried to employ at first. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢν καθέρξῃς, ᾗ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι. [¶32] Pol. Why, shall I not be at liberty to say as much as I like? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι; [¶33] 461e. Soc. It would indeed be a hard fate for you, my excellent friend, if having come to Athens, where there is more freedom of speech than anywhere in Greece, you should be the one person there who could not enjoy it. > Greek: 461e. ΣΩ. δεινὰ μεντἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. [¶34] 462. Soc. But as a set-off to that, I ask you if it would not be just as hard on me, while you spoke at length and refused to answer my questions, not to be free to go away and avoid listening to you. > Greek: 462. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; [¶35] 462a. No, if you have any concern for the argument that we have carried on, and care to set it on its feet again, revoke whatever you please, as I suggested just now; take your turn in questioning and being questioned, like me and Gorgias; and thus either refute or be refuted. For you claim, I understand, that you yourself know all that Gorgias knows, do you not? > Greek: 462a. ἀλλʼ εἴ τι κήδῃ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὔ; [¶36] Pol. I do. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶37] Soc. Then are you with him also in bidding us ask at each point any questions we like of you, as one who knows how to answer? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; [¶38] Pol. Certainly I am. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶39] 462b. Soc. So now, take whichever course you like: either put questions, or answer them. Pol. Well, I will do as you say. So answer me this, Socrates: since you think that Gorgias is at a loss about rhetoric, what is your own account of it? Soc. Are you asking what art I call it? Pol. Yes. Soc. None at all, I consider, Polus, if you would have the honest truth. Pol. But what do you consider rhetoric to be? > Greek: 462b. ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι; ΣΩ. ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. πρᾶγμα ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων. [¶40] 462c. Soc. A thing which you say—in the treatise which I read of late—“made art.” Pol. What thing do you mean? Soc. I mean a certain habitude. Pol. Then do you take rhetoric to be a habitude? Soc. I do, if you have no other suggestion. Pol. Habitude of what? Soc. Of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure. Pol. Then you take rhetoric to be something fine—an ability to gratify people? Soc. How now, Polus? Have you as yet heard me tell you what I say it is, that you ask what should follow that—whether I do not take it to be fine? > Greek: 462c. ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. ΠΩΛ. ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. ΠΩΛ. τίνος ἐμπειρία; ΣΩ. χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. ΠΩΛ. οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; [¶41] 462d. Pol. Why, did I not hear you call it a certain habitude? Soc. Then please—since you value “gratification”—be so good as gratify me in a small matter. Pol. I will. Soc. Ask me now what art I take cookery to be. Pol. Then I ask you, what art is cookery? Soc. None at all, Polus. Pol. Well, what is it? Tell me. > Greek: 462d. ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι; ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία; ΣΩ. οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι. ΣΩ. φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις. ΠΩΛ. τίς; φάθι. ΣΩ. φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. [¶42] 462e. Soc. Then I reply, a certain habitude. Pol. Of what? Tell me. Soc. Then I reply, of production of gratification and pleasure, Polus. Pol. So cookery and rhetoric are the same thing? Soc. Not at all, only parts of the same practice. Pol. What practice do you mean? > Greek: 462e. ΠΩΛ. ταὐτὸν ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική; ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον. ΠΩΛ. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; [¶43] 463. Soc. I fear it may be too rude to tell the truth; for I shrink from saying it on Gorgias’ account, lest he suppose I am making satirical fun of his own profession. Yet indeed I do not know whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias practices, for from our argument just now we got no very clear view as to how he conceives it; but what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain business which has nothing fine about it. > Greek: 463. ΣΩ. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται—ὃ δʼ ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. [¶44] 463a. Gorg. What is that, Socrates? Tell us, without scruple on my account. > Greek: 463a. ΓΟΡ. τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ· μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῇς. [¶45] Soc. It seems to me then, Gorgias, to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery. > Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. [¶46] 463b. This practice, as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery; which appears indeed to be an art but, by my account of it, is not an art but a habitude or knack. I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry—four branches of it for four kinds of affairs. So if Polus would inquire, let him inquire: he has not yet been informed to what sort of branch of flattery I assign rhetoric; but without noticing that I have not yet answered that, he proceeds to ask whether I do not consider it a fine thing. > Greek: 463b. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. [¶47] 463c. But I am not going to reply to the question whether I consider rhetoric a fine or a base thing, until I have first answered what it is; for it would not be fair, Polus: but if you want the information, ask me what sort of branch of flattery I assert rhetoric to be. Pol. I ask you then; so answer, what sort of branch it is. Soc. Now, will you understand when I answer? Rhetoric, by my account, is a semblance of a branch of politics. > Greek: 463c. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι ὁποῖον μόριον. [¶48] 463d. Pol. Well then, do you call it a fine or a base thing? Soc. A base one, I call it—for all that is bad I call base—since I am to answer you as though you had already understood my meaning. Gorg. Nor do I myself, upon my word, Socrates, grasp your meaning either. > Greek: 463d. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; ΣΩ. αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω. ΓΟΡ. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις. [¶49] 463e. Soc. And no wonder, Gorgias, for as yet my statement is not at all clear; but Polus here is so young and fresh! > Greek: 463e. ΣΩ. εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς. [¶50] Gorg. Ah, do not mind him; but tell me what you mean by rhetoric being a semblance of a branch of politics. > Greek: ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δʼ εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν. [¶51] 464. Soc. Well, I will try to express what rhetoric appears to me to be: if it is not in fact what I say, Polus here will refute me. There are things, I suppose, that you call body and soul? > Greek: 464. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο, πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. [¶52] 464a. Gorg. Of course. Soc. And each of these again you believe to have a good condition? Gorg. I do. Soc. And again, a good condition that may seem so, but is not? As an example, let me give the following: many people seem to be in good bodily condition when it would not be easy for anyone but a doctor, or one of the athletic trainers, to perceive that they are not so. Gorg. You are right. Soc. Something of this sort I say there is in body and in soul, which makes the body or the soul seem to be in good condition, though it is none the more so in fact. > Greek: 464a. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δʼ οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. [¶53] 464b. Gorg. Quite so. > Greek: 464b. ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶54] Soc. Now let me see if I can explain my meaning to you more clearly. There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, though I cannot give you a single name for it offhand, is all one business, the tendance of the body, which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine. Under politics I set legislation in the place of gymnastic, and justice to match medicine. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. [¶55] 464c. In each of these pairs, of course—medicine and gymnastic, justice and legislation—there is some intercommunication, as both deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences. Now these four, which always bestow their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which, I do not say with knowledge, but by speculation, divides herself into four parts, and then, insinuating herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which she has crept, and cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value. > Greek: 464c. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη —οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. [¶56] 464d. Thus cookery assumes the form of medicine, and pretends to know what foods are best for the body; so that if a cook and a doctor had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, as to which of the two, the doctor or the cook, understands the question of sound and noxious foods, the doctor would starve to death. > Greek: 464d. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστʼ εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. [¶57] 465. Soc. Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace, Polus—for here I address you—because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art, but a habitude, since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. > Greek: 465. ΣΩ. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· [¶58] 465a. I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is irrational: if you dispute my views, I am ready to give my reasons. However, as I put it, cookery is flattery disguised as medicine; and in just the same manner self-adornment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colors, polish and dress so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic. Well, to avoid prolixity, I am willing to put it to you like a geometer —for by this time I expect you can follow me: > Greek: 465a. τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει ὁποῖʼ ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθῆσιν ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵνʼ οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις—ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. [¶59] 465c. as self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice. But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them. For indeed, if the soul were not in command of the body, but the latter had charge of itself, and so cookery and medicine were not surveyed and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself were the judge, forming its own estimate of them by the gratifications they gave it, we should have a fine instance of what Anaxagoras described, my dear Polus,—for you are versed in these matters: everything would be jumbled together, without distinction as between medicinal and healthful and tasty concoctions. > Greek: 465c. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δʼ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. [¶60] 465d. Well now, you have heard what I state rhetoric to be—the counterpart of cookery in the soul, acting here as that does on the body. It may, indeed, be absurd of me, when I do not allow you to make long speeches, to have extended mine to so considerable a length. > Greek: 465d. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. [¶61] 465e. However, I can fairly claim indulgence: for when I spoke briefly you did not understand me; you were unable to make any use of the answer I gave you, but required a full exposition. > Greek: 465e. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἥν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἷός τʼ ἦσθα, ἀλλʼ ἐδέου διηγήσεως. [¶62] 466. Soc. Now if I on my part cannot tell what use to make of any answers you may give me, you shall extend your speech also; > Greek: 466. ΣΩ. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· [¶63] 466a. but if I can make some use of them, allow me to do it; that will only be fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer of mine, do so. > Greek: 466a. δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ. [¶64] Pol. Then what is it you say? Do you take rhetoric to be flattery? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική; [¶65] Soc. Well, I said rather a branch of flattery. Why, at your age, Polus, have you no memory? What will you do later on? > Greek: ΣΩ. κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλʼ οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις; [¶66] Pol. Then do you think that good orators are considered to be flatterers in their cities, and so worthless? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; [¶67] 466b. Soc. Is that a question you are asking, or are you beginning a speech? Pol. I am asking a question. Soc. To my mind, they are not considered at all. Pol. How not considered? Have they not the chief power in their cities? Soc. No, if you mean power in the sense of something good for him who has it. Pol. Why, of course I mean that. Soc. Then, to my thinking, the orators have the smallest power of all who are in their city. > Greek: 466b. ΣΩ. ἐρώτημα τοῦτʼ ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις; ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν. ΠΩΛ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγω γε. ΣΩ. ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; [¶68] 466c. Pol. What? Are they not like the despots, in putting to death anyone they please, and depriving anyone of his property and expelling him from their cities as they may think fit? Soc. By the Dog, I fear I am still in two minds, Polus, at everything you say, as to whether this is a statement on your own part, and a declaration of your own opinion, or a question you are putting to me. Pol. Why, I am asking you. Soc. Very well, my friend then are you asking me two things at once? Pol. How two? > Greek: 466c. ΣΩ. νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφʼ ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ. ΣΩ. εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς; ΠΩΛ. πῶς δύο; ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· ἦ οὐχὶ ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; [¶69] 466d. Soc. Were you not this moment saying something like this: Is it not the case that the orators put to death anyone they wish, like the despots, and deprive people of property and expel them from their cities as they may think fit? Pol. I was. Soc. Then I tell you that there are two questions here, and I will give you answers to them both. For I say, Polus, that the orators and the despots alike have the least power in their cities, as I stated just now; since they do nothing that they wish to do, practically speaking, though they do whatever they think to be best. > Greek: 466d. ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτʼ ἐστιν τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. [¶70] 466e. Pol. Well, and is not that a great power to have? > Greek: 466e. ΠΩΛ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι; [¶71] Soc. No, judging at least by what Polus says. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔχ, ὥς γέ φησιν πῶλος. [¶72] Pol. I say no! Pardon me, I say yes. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε. [¶73] Soc. No, by the ————, you do not; for you said that great power is a good to him who has it. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. [¶74] Pol. Yes, and I maintain it. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. [¶75] Soc. Then do you regard it as a good, when a man does what he thinks to be best, without having intelligence? Is that what you call having a great power? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ μέγα δύνασθαι; [¶76] Pol. No, I do not. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶77] 467. Soc. Then will you prove that the orators have intelligence, and that rhetoric is an art, not a flattery, and so refute me? > Greek: 467. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; [¶78] 467a. Else, if you are going to leave me unrefuted, the orators who do what they think fit in their cities, and the despots, will find they have got no good in doing that, if indeed power is, as you say, a good, but doing what one thinks fit without intelligence is—as you yourself admit, do you not?—an evil. > Greek: 467a. εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, ἡ δὲ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὔ; [¶79] Pol. Yes, I do. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶80] Soc. How then can the orators or the despots have great power in their cities, unless Socrates is refuted by Polus, and admits that they do what they wish? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; [¶81] 467b. Pol. Hark at the man————! Soc. I deny that they do what they wish: there, refute me. Pol. Did you not admit just now that they do what they think best? Soc. Yes, and I admit it now. Pol. Then do they not do what they wish? Soc. I say no. Pol. When they do what they think fit? Soc. Yes. Pol. What shocking, nay, monstrous answers, Socrates! > Greek: 467b. ΠΩΛ. οὗτος ἀνήρ— ΣΩ. οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μʼ ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, [τούτου πρόσθεν]; ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; ΣΩ. οὔ φημι. ΠΩΛ. ποιοῦντες ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. φημί. ΠΩΛ. σχέτλιά γε λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. μὴ κακηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· [¶82] 467c. Soc. Spare your invective, peerless Polus—if I may address you in your own style: but if you have a question to ask me, expose my error otherwise, make answer yourself. Pol. Well, I am ready to answer, in order that I may know what you mean. Soc. Then is it your view that people wish merely that which they do each time, or that which is the object of their doing what they do? For instance, do those who take medicine by doctor’s orders wish, in your opinion, merely what they do,—to take the medicine and suffer the pain of it,—or rather to be healthy, which is the object of their taking it? > Greek: 467c. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθʼ ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν; ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. [¶83] 467d. Pol. To be healthy, without a doubt. Soc. And so with seafarers and such as pursue profit generally in trade; what they wish is not what they are doing at each moment—for who wishes to go on a voyage, and incur all its danger and trouble? It is rather, I conceive, the object of their voyage—to get wealth; since it is for wealth that they go on it. Pol. Certainly. Soc. And is it not just the same in every case? If a man does something for an object, he does not wish the thing that he does, but the thing for which he does it. > Greek: 467d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματʼ ἔχειν;) ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσιν. ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει; [¶84] 467e. Pol. Yes. > Greek: 467e. ΠΩΛ. ναί. [¶85] Soc. Now is there any existent thing that is not either good or bad or between these—neither good nor bad? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γʼ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν; [¶86] Pol. Most assuredly nothing, Socrates. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶87] Soc. Well, do you call wisdom and health and wealth and everything else of that kind good, and their opposites bad? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων; [¶88] Pol. I do. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶89] 468. Soc. And by things neither good nor bad do you mean such things as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither—for example, sitting, walking, running, and sailing, or again, stones and sticks and anything else of that sort? > Greek: 468. ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶90] 468a. These are what you mean, are they not? Or are there other things that you describe as neither good nor bad? > Greek: 468a. οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; [¶91] Pol. No, these are what I mean. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα. [¶92] Soc. Then do people do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the intermediate? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; [¶93] Pol. The intermediate, I presume, for the good. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. [¶94] 468b. Soc. Thus it is in pursuit of the good that we walk, when we walk, conceiving it to be better; or on the contrary, stand, when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, the good: is it not so? > Greek: 468b. ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ; [¶95] Pol. Yes. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ναί. [¶96] Soc. And so we put a man to death, if we do put him to death, or expel him or deprive him of his property, because we think it better for us to do this than not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; [¶97] Pol. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶98] Soc. So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. [¶99] Pol. I agree. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. φημί. [¶100] Soc. And we have admitted that when we do things for an object, we do not wish those things, but the object for which we do them? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; [¶101] 468c. Pol. Quite so. > Greek: 468c. ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα. [¶102] Soc. Then we do not wish to slaughter people or expel them from our cities or deprive them of their property as an act in itself, but if these things are beneficial we wish to do them, while if they are harmful, we do not wish them. For we wish what is good, as you say; but what is neither good nor bad we do not wish, nor what is bad either, do we? Is what I say true in your opinion, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; [¶103] Pol. It is true. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ. [¶104] 468d. Soc. Then, as we agree on this, if a man puts anyone to death or expels him from a city or deprives him of his property, whether he does it as a despot or an orator, because he thinks it better for himself though it is really worse, that man, I take it, does what he thinks fit, does he not? Pol. Yes. Soc. Now is it also what he wishes, supposing it to be really bad? Why do you not answer? Pol. No, I do not think he does what he wishes. > Greek: 468d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; [¶105] 468e. Soc. Can such a man then be said to have great power in that city, if to have great power is something good, according to your admission? Pol. He cannot. Soc. Then I spoke the truth when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he thinks fit in a city and yet not to have great power nor to do what he wishes. Pol. As if you, Socrates, would not accept the liberty of doing what you think fit in your city rather than not, and would not envy a man whom you observed to have put some one to death as he thought fit, or deprived him of his property or sent him to prison! Soc. Justly, do you mean, or unjustly? > Greek: 468e. ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν. ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΠΩΛ. ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα. ΣΩ. δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως; [¶106] 469a. Pol. Whichever way he does it, is it not enviable in either case? > Greek: 469a. ΠΩΛ. ὁπότερʼ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; [¶107] Soc. Hush, Polus! > Greek: ΣΩ. εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε. [¶108] Pol. Why? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. τί δή; [¶109] Soc. Because we ought not to envy either the unenviable or the wretched, but pity them. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλʼ ἐλεεῖν. [¶110] Pol. What! Is that the state in which you consider those people, of whom I speak, to be? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων; [¶111] Soc. Yes, for so I must. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶112] Pol. Then do you consider that a man who puts another to death as he thinks fit, and justly puts him to death, is wretched and pitiable? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός; [¶113] Soc. Not I; but not enviable either. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. [¶114] Pol. Did you not say just now that he was wretched? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι; [¶115] 469b. Soc. Only he who unjustly put some one to death, my friend, and I called him pitiable as well: if he acted justly, then he is unenviable. > Greek: 469b. ΣΩ. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον. [¶116] Pol. I suppose, at any rate, the man who is put to death unjustly is both pitiable and wretched. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν. [¶117] Soc. Less so than he who puts him to death, Polus, and less so than he who is put to death justly. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων. [¶118] Pol. In what way can that be, Socrates? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶119] Soc. In this, that to do wrong is the greatest of evils. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. [¶120] Pol. What, is this the greatest? Is not to suffer wrong a greater? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον; [¶121] Soc. By no means. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἥκιστά γε. [¶122] Pol. Then would you wish rather to suffer wrong than to do it? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; [¶123] 469c. Soc. I should wish neither, for my own part; but if it were necessary either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it. > Greek: 469c. ΣΩ. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. [¶124] Pol. Then you would not accept a despot’s power? > Greek: ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο; [¶125] Soc. No, if you mean by a despot’s power the same as I do. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ. [¶126] Pol. Why, what I mean is, as I did just now, the liberty of doing anything one thinks fit in one’s city—putting people to death and expelling them and doing everything at one’s own discretion. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν. [¶127] Soc. My gifted friend, let me speak, and you shall take me to task in your turn. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. [¶128] 469d. Suppose that in a crowded market I should hide a dagger under my arm and then say to you: “Polus, I have just acquired, by a wonderful chance, the power of a despot; for if I should think fit that one of those people whom you see there should die this very instant, a dead man he will be, just as I think fit; or if I think fit that one of them shall have his head broken, broken it will be immediately; or to have his cloak torn in pieces, torn it will be: so great is my power in this city.” > Greek: 469d. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται—οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει, εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια· [¶129] 469e. Then suppose that on your disbelieving this I showed you my dagger; I expect when you saw it you would say: “Socrates, at this rate every one would have great power, for any house you thought fit might be set ablaze on these methods, and the Athenian arsenals also, and the men-of-war and all the rest of the shipping, both public and private.” But surely this is not what it is to have great power—merely doing what one thinks fit. Or do you think it is? > Greek: 469e. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; [¶130] Pol. Oh no, not in that way. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε. [¶131] Soc. Then can you tell me why you disapprove of this kind of power? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; [¶132] Pol. I can. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. [¶133] Soc. Why, then? Tell me. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δή; λέγε. [¶134] Pol. Because it is inevitable that he who acts thus will be punished. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν. [¶135] Soc. And is it not a bad thing to be punished? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; [¶136] Pol. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶137] Soc. So, my remarkable friend, you have come round again to the view that if doing what one thinks fit is attended by advantage in doing it, this is not merely a good thing but at the same time, it seems, the possession of great power; otherwise it is a bad thing and means little power. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, [τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι] πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. [¶138] 470b. And let us consider another point besides; do we not admit that sometimes it is better to do those things that we were mentioning just now—to put people to death and banish them and deprive them of property—while sometimes it is not? > Greek: 470b. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ; [¶139] Pol. To be sure. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. [¶140] Soc. Then here is a point, it seems, that is admitted both on your side and on mine. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. [¶141] Pol. Yes. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. ναί. [¶142] Soc. Then when do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me where you draw the line. > Greek: ΣΩ. πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ. [¶143] Pol. Nay, I would rather that you, Socrates, answered that. > Greek: ΠΩΛ. σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι [ταὐτὸ] τοῦτο. [¶144] 470c. Soc. Well then I say, Polus, if you prefer to hear it from me, that it is better when these things are done justly, and worse when unjustly. Pol. So hard to refute you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could do it, could he not, and prove your words are untrue? Soc. Then I shall be most grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery. Come, do not grow weary in well-doing towards your friend, but refute me. > Greek: 470c. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον. ΠΩΛ. χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις; ΣΩ. πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· [¶145] 470d. Pol. Well, to be sure, Socrates, there is no need to refute you with ancient instances; for those happenings of but a day or two ago are enough to refute you, and prove that many a wrongdoer is happy. Soc. What sort of thing do you mean? Pol. I suppose you see that Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, is ruler of Macedonia? Soc. Well, if I do not, at any rate I hear it. Pol. Do you consider him happy or wretched? Soc. I do not know, Polus; I have never met the man. > Greek: 470d. τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν. ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΛ. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος; ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.