493d. Now, am I at all prevailing upon you to change over to the view that the orderly people are happier than the licentious or will no amount of similar fables that I might tell you have any effect in changing your mind?Call. The latter is more like the truth, Socrates.Soc. Come now, let me tell you another parable from the same school as that I have just told. Consider if each of the two lives, the temperate and the licentious, might be described by imagining that each of two men had a number of jars, and those of one man were sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and various others of various things, and that the sources of each of these supplies were scanty and difficult and only available through much hard toil:
493d. ΚΑΛ. τοῦτʼ ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα·
494. Soc. well, one man, when he has taken his fill, neither draws off any more nor troubles himself a jot, but remains at ease on that score; whilst the other finds, like his fellow, that the sources are possible indeed, though difficult, but his vessels are leaky and decayed, and he is compelled to fill them constantly, all night and day, or else suffer extreme distress.
494. ΣΩ. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτʼ ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλʼ ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δʼ ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δʼ ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δʼ ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας·
494a. If such is the nature of each of the two lives, do you say that the licentious man has a happier one than the orderly? Do I, with this story of mine, induce you at all to concede that the orderly life is better than the licentious, or do I fail?
494a. ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;
Call. You fail, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone, when one has filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain.
ΚΑΛ. οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτʼ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον.
494b. But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.
494b. ἀλλʼ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν.
Soc. Well then, if the inflow be large, must not that which runs away be of large amount also, and must not the holes for such outflow be of great size?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γʼ, ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλʼ ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Then it is a plover’s life you are describing this time, not that of a corpse or a stone. Now tell me, is the life you mean something like feeling hunger and eating when hungry?
ΣΩ. χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλʼ οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;
Call. Yes, it is.
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
494c. Soc. And feeling thirst and drinking when thirsty?
494c. ΣΩ. καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;
Call. Yes, and having all the other desires, and being able to satisfy them, and so with these enjoyments leading a happy life.
ΚΑΛ. λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.
Soc. Bravo, my fine fellow! Do go on as you have begun, and mind you show no bashfulness about it. I too, it seems, must try not to be too bashful. First of all, tell me whether a man who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.
ΣΩ. εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῇ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδʼ ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.
494d. Call. What an odd person you are, Socrates—a regular stump-orator!
494d. ΚΑΛ. ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.
Soc. Why, of course, Callicles, that is how I upset Polus and Gorgias, and struck them with bashfulness; but you, I know, will never be upset or abashed; you are such a manly fellow. Come, just answer that.
ΣΩ. τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου μόνον.
Call. Then I say that the man also who scratches himself will thus spend a pleasant life.
ΚΑΛ. φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
Soc. And if a pleasant one, a happy one also?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
494e. Soc. Is it so if he only wants to scratch his head? Or what more am I to ask you? See, Callicles, what your answer will be, if you are asked everything in succession that links on to that statement; and the culmination of the case, as stated—the life of catamites—is not that awful, shameful, and wretched? Or will you dare to assert that these are happy if they can freely indulge their wants?
494e. ΣΩ. πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ—ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινῇ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος, οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;
Call. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion into such topics?
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;
495. Soc. What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves, with whatever kind of enjoyment, are happy, and draws no distinction between the good and bad sorts of pleasure?
495. ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί;
495a. But come, try again now and tell me whether you say that pleasant and good are the same thing, or that there is some pleasure which is not good.
495a. ἀλλʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;
Call. Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same.
ΚΑΛ. ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι.
Soc. You are spoiling your first statements, Callicles, and you can no longer be a fit partner with me in probing the truth, if you are going to speak against your own convictions.
ΣΩ. διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς.
495b. Call. Why, you do the same, Socrates.
495b. ΚΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides.
ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτʼ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
Call. In your opinion, that is, Socrates.
ΚΑΛ. ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is?
ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ;
495c. Soc. Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view?Call. Oh yes, to be sure.Soc. Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge?Call. Yes.Soc. And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it?Call. Yes, I was.Soc. And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge?Call. Quite so.
495c. ΣΩ. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα.ΣΩ. ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;ΚΑΛ. ἔλεγον γάρ.ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον;
495d. Soc. Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different?Call. Different, I presume, O sage of sages.Soc. And courage too, is that different from pleasure?Call. Of course it is.Soc. Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good.Call. And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it?
495d. ΚΑΛ. ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς;ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;
495e. Soc. He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off?Call. I do.Soc. Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together.Call. How do you mean?
495e. ΣΩ. οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι;ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου.ΚΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει.
496a. Soc. Take, for instance, any part of the body you like by itself, and consider it. A man, I suppose, may have a disease of the eyes, called ophthalmia?Call. Certainly.Soc. Then I presume he is not sound also at that time in those same eyes?Call. By no conceivable means.Soc. And what say you, when he gets rid of his ophthalmia? Does he at that time get rid too of the health of his eyes, and so at last is rid of both things together?Call. Far from it.Soc. Because, I imagine, this would be an astonishing and irrational result, would it not?
496a. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;ΚΑΛ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται; ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;ΚΑΛ. ἥκιστά γε.ΣΩ. θαυμάσιον γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται·
496b. Call. Very much so.Soc. Whereas, I take it, he gets and loses either turn?Call. I agree.Soc. And so with strength and weakness in just the same way?Call. Yes.Soc. And speed and slowness?Call. Certainly.Soc. And so too with good things and happiness and their opposites—bad things and wretchedness—does one take on each of these in turn, and in turn put it off?Call. Absolutely, I presume.
496b. ἦ γάρ;ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;ΚΑΛ. φημί.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;ΚΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου;ΚΑΛ. πάντως δήπου.
496c. Soc. Then if we find any things that a man puts off and retains at one and the same moment, clearly these cannot be the good and the bad. Do we admit this? Now consider very carefully before you answer.
496c. ΣΩ. ἐὰν εὕρωμεν ἄρα ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.
Call. Oh, I admit it down to the ground.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.
Soc. So now for our former admissions: did you say that being hungry was pleasant or painful? I mean, hunger itself.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδὺ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.
Call. Painful, I said; though eating when one is hungry I call pleasant.
ΚΑΛ. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδὺ λέγω.
496d. Soc. I see: but at all events hunger itself is painful, is it not?
496d. ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;
Soc. And so too with thirst?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;
Call. Quite so.
ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.
Soc. Then am I to ask you any further questions, or do you admit that all want and desire is painful?
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;
Call. I admit it; no, do not question me further.
ΚΑΛ. ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.
Soc. Very good: but drinking when one is thirsty you surely say is pleasant?
ΣΩ. εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι;
Soc. Now, in this phrase of yours the words “when one is thirsty,” I take it, stand for “when one is in pain”?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν;
496e. Call. Yes.
496e. ΚΑΛ. ναί.
Soc. But drinking is a satisfaction of the want, and a pleasure?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή;
Soc. So in the act of drinking, you say, one has enjoyment?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;
Call. Quite so.
ΚΑΛ. μάλιστα.
Soc. When one is thirsty?
ΣΩ. διψῶντά γε.
Soc. That is, in pain?
ΣΩ. λυπούμενον;
Soc. Then do you perceive the conclusion,—that you say one enjoys oneself, though in pain at the same moment, when you say one drinks when one is thirsty? Or does this not occur at once, at the same place and time—in either soul or body, as you please? For I fancy it makes no difference. Is this so or not?
ΣΩ. αἰσθάνῃ οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὔ;
Soc. But further, you say it is impossible to be badly off, or to fare ill, at the same time as one is faring well.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῂς εἶναι.
497. Call. Yes, I do.
497. ΚΑΛ. φημὶ γάρ.
Soc. But to enjoy oneself when feeling pain you have admitted to be possible.
ΣΩ. ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὡμολόγηκας.
Call. Apparently.
ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Hence enjoyment is not faring well, nor is feeling pain faring ill, so that the pleasant is found to be different from the good.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
Call. I cannot follow these subtleties of yours, Socrates.
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδʼ ἅττα σοφίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. You can, but you play the innocent, Callicles. Just go on a little further, that you may realize how subtle is your way of reproving me.
ΣΩ. οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόιθί γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, [ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς] ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὤν με νουθετεῖς.
497b. Does not each of us cease at the same moment from thirst and from the pleasure he gets by drinking?
497b. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;
Call. I cannot tell what you mean.
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.
Gorg. No, no, Callicles, you must answer him, for our sakes also, that the arguments may be brought to a conclusion.
ΓΟΡ. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.
Call. But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias he keeps on asking petty, unimportant questions until he refutes one.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.
Gorg. Why, what does that matter to you? In any case it is not your credit that is at stake, Callicles; just permit Socrates to refute you in such manner as he chooses.
ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλʼ ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται.
497c. Call. Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours, since Gorgias is so minded.
497c. ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.
Soc. You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little: I did not think that was the proper thing. So go on answering where you left off—as to whether each of us does not cease to feel thirst and pleasure at the same time.
ΣΩ. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.
Call. I grant it.
ΚΑΛ. φημί.
Soc. And so, with hunger and the rest, does he cease to feel the desires and pleasures at the same time?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
Call. That is so.
ΚΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Soc. And also ceases to feel the pains and pleasures at the same time?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;
497d. Call. Yes.
497d. ΚΑΛ. ναί.
Soc. But still he does not cease to have the good and bad at the same time, as you agreed; and now, you do not agree?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;
Call. I do; and what then?
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δή;
Soc. Only that we get the result, my friend, that the good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful. For with the one pair the cessation is of both at once, but with the other two it is not, since they are distinct. How then can pleasant things be the same as good, or painful things as bad? Or if you like, consider it another way—for I fancy that even after that you do not admit it. Just observe: do you not call good people good owing to the presence of good things, as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present?
ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων· πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδε ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι·
497e. Call. I do.Soc. Well now, do you give the name of good men to fools and cowards? It was not they just now but brave and wise men whom you so described. Or is it not these that you call good?Call. To be sure it is.Soc. And now, have you ever seen a silly child enjoying itself?Call. I have.Soc. And have you never seen a silly man enjoying himself?Call. I should think I have; but what has that to do with it?Soc. Nothing; only answer.Call. I have seen one.
497e. ἄθρει δέ) τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;ΣΩ. οὐδέν· ἀλλʼ ἀποκρίνου.ΚΑΛ. εἶδον.
498. Soc. And again, a man of sense in a state of pain or enjoyment?Call. Yes.Soc. And which sort are more apt to feel enjoyment or pain, the wise or the foolish?Call. I should think there is not much difference.Soc. Well, that will suffice. In war have you ever seen a coward?Call. Of course I have.Soc. Well now, when the enemy withdrew, which seemed to you to enjoy it more, the cowards or the brave?
498. ΣΩ. τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;ΚΑΛ. φημί.ΣΩ. πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε [μᾶλλον]·
498b. Call. Both did, I thought; or if not that, about equally.Soc. No matter. Anyhow, the cowards do enjoy it?Call. Very much.Soc. And the fools, it would seem.Call. Yes.Soc. And when the foe advances, do the cowards alone feel pain, or the brave as well?Call. Both.Soc. Alike?Call. More, perhaps, the cowards.Soc. And when the foe withdraws, do they not enjoy it more?Call. Perhaps.Soc. So the foolish and the wise, and the cowardly and the brave, feel pain and enjoyment about equally, according to you, but the cowardly more than the brave?
498b. εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.ΣΩ. οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δʼ οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.ΚΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι.ΣΩ. ἆρα ὁμοίως;ΚΑΛ. μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.ΣΩ. ἀπιόντων δʼ οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;
498c. Call. I agree.
498c. ΚΑΛ. φημί.
Soc. But further, are the wise and brave good, and the cowards and fools bad?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;
Soc. Then the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain about equally?
ΣΩ. παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;
Soc. Then are the good and the bad about equally good and bad? Or are the bad in some yet greater measure good and bad?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί] εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;
498d. Call. Why, upon my word, I cannot tell what you mean.
498d. ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις.
Soc. You are aware, are you not, that you hold that the good are good by the presence of good things, and that the bad are so by the presence of bad things? And that the pleasures are the good things, and the pains bad things?
ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;
Call. Yes, I am.
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
Soc. Hence in those who have enjoyment the good things—the pleasures—are present, so long as they enjoy?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;
Call. Of course.
ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. Then, good things being present, those who enjoy are good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;
Soc. Well now, in those who feel pain are not bad things present, namely pains?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;
Call. They are.
ΚΑΛ. πάρεστιν.
498e. Soc. And it is by the presence of bad things, you say, that the bad are bad? Or do you no longer say so?
498e. ΣΩ. κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς;
Call. I do say so.
ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
Soc. Then whoever enjoys is good, and whoever is pained, bad?
ΣΩ. ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. You mean, those more so who feel these things more, and those less who feel less, and those about equally who feel about equally?
ΣΩ. οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἳ δʼ ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;
Soc. Now you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the brave, feel enjoyment and pain about equally, or the cowards even more?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς;
499. Soc. Then just help me to reckon up the results we get from our admissions for you know they say:That which seemeth well,’tis well twice and also thrice to tell,and to examine too.
499. ΣΩ. συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετʼ ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.
499a. We say that the wise and brave man is good, do we not?
499a. ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;
Soc. And that the foolish and cowardly is bad?
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And again, that he who enjoys is good?
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;
Soc. And that he who feels pain is bad?
ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;
Call. Necessarily.
ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
Soc. And that the good and the bad feel enjoyment and pain in a like manner, or perhaps the bad rather more?
ΣΩ. ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;
Soc. Then is the bad man made bad or good in a like manner to the good man, or even good in a greater measure?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός;
499b. Does not this follow, along with those former statements, from the assumption that pleasant things and good things are the same? Must not this be so, Callicles?
499b. οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐτὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;
Call. Let me tell you, Socrates, all the time that I have been listening to you and yielding you agreement, I have been remarking the puerile delight with which you cling to any concession one may make to you, even in jest. So you suppose that I or anybody else in the world does not regard some pleasures as better, and others worse!
ΚΑΛ. πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχῃ ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.
Soc. Oh ho, Callicles, what a rascal you are, treating me thus like a child—now asserting that the same things are one way, now another, to deceive me!
ΣΩ. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καί μοι ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με.
499c. And yet I started with the notion that I should not have to fear any intentional deception on your part, you being my friend; but now I find I was mistaken, and it seems I must, as the old saying goes, e’en make the best of what I have got, and accept just anything you offer. Well then, what you now state, it seems, is that there are certain pleasures, some good, and some bad; is not that so?Call. Yes.
499c. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἦ γάρ;
499d. Soc. Then are the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad?Call. Certainly.Soc. And are those beneficial which do some good, and those evil which do some evil?Call. I agree.Soc. Now are these the sort you mean—for instance, in the body, the pleasures of eating and drinking that we mentioned a moment ago? Then the pleasures of this sort which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily excellence,—are these good, and those which have the opposite effects, bad?Call. Certainly.
499d. ΚΑΛ. ναί.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι;ΚΑΛ. φημί.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, ἦ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί;
499e. Soc. And similarly in the case of pains, are some worthy and some base?Call. Of course.Soc. So it is the worthy pleasures and pains that we ought to choose in all our doings?Call. Certainly.Soc. And the base ones not?Call. Clearly so.
499e. ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δή.
500. Soc. Because, you know, Polus and I, if you recollect, decided. that everything we do should be for the sake of what is good. Do you agree with us in this view—that the good is the end of all our actions, and it is for its sake that all other things should be done, and not it for theirs?
500. ΣΩ. ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων;
500a. Do you add your vote to ours, and make a third?
500a. σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;
Soc. Then it is for the sake of what is good that we should do everything, including what is pleasant, not the good for the sake of the pleasant.
ΣΩ. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Now is it in every man’s power to pick out which sort of pleasant things are good and which bad, or is professional skill required in each case?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;
Call. Professional skill.
ΚΑΛ. τεχνικοῦ.
Soc. Then let us recall those former points I was putting to Polus and Gorgias. I said, if you remember, that there were certain industries, some of which extend only to pleasure, procuring that and no more, and ignorant of better and worse; while others know what is good and what bad.
ΣΩ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν·
500b. And I placed among those that are concerned with pleasure the habitude, not art, of cookery, and among those concerned with good the art of medicine. Now by the sanctity of friendship, Callicles, do not on your part indulge in jesting with me, or give me random answers against your conviction, or again, take what I say as though I were jesting. For you see that our debate is upon a question which has the highest conceivable claims to the serious interest even of a person who has but little intelligence—namely, what course of life is best; whether it should be that to which you invite me, with all those manly pursuits of speaking in Assembly and practicing rhetoric and going in for politics after the fashion of you modern politicians, or this life of philosophy; and what makes the difference between these two. Well, perhaps it is best to do what I attempted a while ago, and distinguish them; and then, when we have distinguished them and come to an agreement with each other as to these lives being really two, we must consider what is the difference between them and which of them is the one we ought to live.
500b. καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδʼ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτʼ αὖ τὰ παρʼ ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτω διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν.
500d. Now I daresay you do not yet grasp my meaning.
500d. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.
Call. No, I do not.
ΚΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. Well, I will put it to you more plainly. Seeing that we have agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as “good,” and such a thing as “pleasant,” and that the pleasant is other than the good, and that for the acquisition of either there is a certain practice or preparation—the quest of the pleasant in the one case, and that of the good in the other—but first you must either assent or object to this statement of mine:
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή.
500e. do you assent?
500e. σύμφῃς;
Call. I am with you entirely.
ΚΑΛ. οὕτως φημί.
501. Soc. Then try and come to a definite agreement with me on what I was saying to our friends here, and see if you now find that what I then said was true. I was saying, I think, that cookery seems to me not an art but a habitude, unlike medicine, which, I argued, has investigated the nature of the person whom she treats and the cause of her proceedings, and has some account to give of each of these things; so much for medicine: whereas the other, in respect of the pleasure to which her whole ministration is given, goes to work there in an utterly inartistic manner, without having investigated at all either the nature or the cause of pleasure, and altogether irrationally—with no thought, one may say, of differentiation, relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result; and that is how she is enabled to provide her pleasures.
501. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἐμπειρία, ἡ δʼ ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική· ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σῳζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς.
501b. Now consider first whether you think that this account is satisfactory, and that there are certain other such occupations likewise, having to do with the soul; some artistic, with forethought for what is to the soul’s best advantage, and others making light of this, but again, as in the former case, considering merely the soul’s pleasure and how it may be contrived for her, neither inquiring which of the pleasures is a better or a worse one, nor caring for aught but mere gratification, whether for better or worse.
501b. ταῦτʼ οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δʼ αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον.
501c. For I, Callicles, hold that there are such, and for my part I call this sort of thing flattery, whether in relation to the body or to the soul or to anything else, whenever anyone ministers to its pleasure without regard for the better and the worse; and you now, do you support us with the same opinion on this matter, or do you gainsay us?
501c. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἄν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς;
Call. Not I; I agree with you, in order that your argument may reach a conclusion, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.
501d. Soc. And is this the case with only one soul, and not with two or many?
501d. ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;
Call. No, it is also the case with two or many.
ΚΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς.
Soc. Then is it possible also to gratify them all at once, collectively, with no consideration of what is best?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἁθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
Call. I should think it is.
ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
Soc. Then can you say what are the pursuits which effect this? Or rather, if you like, when I ask you, and one of them seems to you to be of this class, say yes, and when one does not, say no. And first let us consider flute-playing. Does it not seem to you one of this sort, Callicles, aiming only at our pleasure, and caring for naught else?
ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἣ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἣ δʼ ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι.
501e. Call. It does seem so to me.Soc. And so too with all similar pursuits, such as harp-playing in the contests?Call. Yes. Soc. And what of choral productions and dithyrambic compositions? Are they not manifestly, in your view, of the same kind? Or do you suppose Cinesias, son of Meles, cares a jot about trying to say things of a sort that might be improving to his audience, or only what is likely to gratify the crowd of spectators?
501e. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;ΚΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῇ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;
502a. Call. Clearly the latter is the case, Socrates, with Cinesias.
502a. ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε πέρι.
Soc. And what of his father Meles? Did he ever strike you as looking to what was best in his minstrelsy? Or did he, perhaps, not even make the pleasantest his aim? For his singing used to be a pain to the audience. But consider now: do you not think that all minstrelsy and composing of dithyrambs have been invented for the sake of pleasure?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἦ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἠνία γὰρ ᾁδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἥ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ηὑρῆσθαι;
502b. Soc. Then what of the purpose that has inspired our stately and wonderful tragic poetry? Are her endeavor and purpose, to your mind, merely for the gratification of the spectators, or does she strive hard, if there be anything pleasant and gratifying, but bad for them, to leave that unsaid, and if there be anything unpleasant, but beneficial, both to speak and sing that, whether they enjoy it or not? To which of these two aims, think you, is tragic poetry devoted?
502b. ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφʼ ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ᾖ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει καὶ ᾁσεται, ἐάντε χαίρωσιν ἐάντε μή; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;
Call. It is quite obvious, in her case, Socrates, that she is bent rather upon pleasure and the gratification of the spectators.
ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.
502c. Soc. Well now, that kind of thing, Callicles, did we say just now, is flattery?
502c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Pray then, if we strip any kind of poetry of its melody, its rhythm and its meter, we get mere speeches as the residue, do we not?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;
Call. That must be so.
ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
Soc. And those speeches are spoken to a great crowd of people?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι;
Soc. Hence poetry is a kind of public speaking.
ΣΩ. δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική.
502d. Call. Apparently.
502d. ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Then it must be a rhetorical public speaking or do you not think that the poets use rhetoric in the theaters?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;
Call. Yes, I do.
ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.
Soc. So now we have found a kind of rhetoric addressed to such a public as is compounded of children and women and men, and slaves as well as free; an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one.
ΣΩ. νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ηὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι.
Call. To be sure.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Very well; but now, the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian people, or to the other assemblies of freemen in the various cities—what can we make of that?
ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν;
502e. Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what is best, with the single aim of making the citizens as good as possible by their speeches, or are they, like the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the common weal to their own personal interest, behave to these assemblies as to children, trying merely to gratify them, nor care a jot whether they will be better or worse in consequence?
502e. πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὑτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
503. Call. This question of yours is not quite so simple; for there are some who have a regard for the citizens in the words that they utter, while there are also others of the sort that you mention.
503. ΚΑΛ. οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις.
Soc. That is enough for me. For if this thing also is twofold, one part of it, I presume, will be flattery and a base mob-oratory, while the other is noble—the endeavor, that is, to make the citizens’ souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one’s hearers.
ΣΩ. ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.
503b. But this is a rhetoric you never yet saw; or if you have any orator of this kind that you can mention, without more ado let me know who he is!
503b. ἀλλʼ οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;
Call. No, upon my word, I cannot tell you of anyone, at least among the orators of today.
ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.
Soc. Well then, can you mention one among those of older times whom the Athenians have to thank for any betterment that started at the time of his first harangues, as a change from the worse state in which he originally found them? For my part, I have no idea who the man is.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος.
503c. Call. Why, do you hear no mention of Themistocles and what a good man he was, and Cimon and Miltiades and the great Pericles, who has died recently, and whom you have listened to yourself?
503c. ΚΑΛ. τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;
Soc. Yes, Callicles, if that which you spoke of just now is true virtue—the satisfaction of one’s own and other men’s desires; but if that is not so, and the truth is—as we were compelled to admit in the subsequent discussion—that only those desires which make man better by their satisfaction should be fulfilled, but those which make him worse should not, and that this is a special art, then I for one cannot tell you of any man so skilled having appeared among them.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν—ὅτι αἳ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἳ δὲ χείρω, μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἴη—τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ [γεγονέναι] οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.
503d. Call. Ah, but if you search properly you will find one.
503d. ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς, εὑρήσεις.
Soc. Then let us just consider the matter calmly, and see if any of them has appeared with that skill. Come now: the good man, who is intent on the best when he speaks, will surely not speak at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object?
ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἀποβλέπων πρός τι;
503e. He is just like any other craftsman, who having his own particular work in view selects the things he applies to that work of his, not at random, but with the purpose of giving a certain form to whatever he is working upon.
503e. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ [βλέποντες] πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει [πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν,] ἀλλʼ ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται.
504. Soc. You have only to look, for example, at the painters, the builders, the shipwrights, or any of the other craftsmen, whichever you like, to see how each of them arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit with another, until he has combined the whole into a regular and well-ordered production; and so of course with all the other craftsmen, and the people we mentioned just now, who have to do with the body—trainers and doctors; they too, I suppose, bring order and system into the body.
504. ΣΩ. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα·
504a. Do we admit this to be the case, or not?
504a. καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτʼ ἔχειν ἢ οὔ;
Call. Let it be as you say.
ΚΑΛ. ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.
Soc. Then if regularity and order are found in a house, it will be a good one, and if irregularity, a bad one?
ΣΩ. τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;
Soc. And it will be just the same with a ship?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;
504b. Call. Yes.
504b. ΚΑΛ. ναί.
Soc. And further, with our bodies also, can we say?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;
Call. Certainly.
ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And what of the soul? If it shows irregularity, will it be good, or if it has a certain regularity and order?
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
Call. Our former statements oblige us to agree to this also.
ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.
Soc. Then what name do we give to the effect of regularity and order in the body?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;
Call. Health and strength, I suppose you mean.
ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.
504c. Soc. I do. And what, again, to the effect produced in the soul by regularity and order? Try to find the name here, and tell it me as before.
504c. ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα.
Call. Why not name it yourself, Socrates?
ΚΑΛ. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. Well, if you prefer it, I will; and do you, if I seem to you to name it rightly, say so; if not, you must refute me and not let me have my way. For it seems to me that any regularity of the body is called healthiness, and this leads to health being produced in it, and general bodily excellence. Is that so or not?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
504d. Soc. And the regular and orderly states of the soul are called lawfulness and law, whereby men are similarly made law-abiding and orderly; and these states are justice and temperance. Do you agree or not?
504d. ΣΩ. ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δʼ ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῂς ἢ οὔ;
Call. Be it so.
ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.
Soc. Then it is this that our orator, the man of art and virtue, will have in view, when he applies to our souls the words that he speaks, and also in all his actions, and in giving any gift he will give it, and in taking anything away he will take it, with this thought always before his mind— how justice may be engendered in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and how injustice may be removed; how temperance may be bred in them and licentiousness cut off; and how virtue as a whole may be produced and vice expelled.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ.
504e. Do you agree to this or not?
504e. συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὔ;
Call. I agree.
ΚΑΛ. συγχωρῶ.
Soc. For what advantage is there, Callicles, in giving to a sick and ill-conditioned body a quantity of even the most agreeable things to eat and drink, or anything else whatever, if it is not going to profit thereby any more, let us say, than by the opposite treatment, on any fair reckoning, and may profit less? Is this so?
ΣΩ. τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθʼ ὅτι πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον κατά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;
505a. Call. Be it so.
505a. ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.
Soc. Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;
Soc. And so the satisfaction of one’s desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one’s fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτʼ ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ;