Soc. And what is love of gain? What can it be, and who are the lovers of gain?
ΣΩ. τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδές; τί ποτέ ἐστιν, καὶ τίνες οἱ φιλοκερδεῖς;
Fr. In my opinion, they are those who think it worth while to make gain out of things of no worth.
ΕΤ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν οἳ ἂν κερδαίνειν ἀξιῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.
Soc. Is it your opinion that they know those things to be of no worth, or do not know? For if they do not know, you mean that the lovers of gain are fools.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι οὐδενός ἐστιν ἄξια, ἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; εἰ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦντες, ἀνοήτους λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.
Fr. No, I do not mean they are fools, but rascals who wickedly yield to gain, because they know that the things out of which they dare to make their gain are worthless, and yet they dare to be lovers of gain from mere shamelessness.
ΕΤ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνοήτους λέγω, ἀλλὰ πανούργους καὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἥττους τοῦ κέρδους, γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀφʼ ὧν τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν, ὅμως τολμᾶν φιλοκερδεῖν διʼ ἀναισχυντίαν.
Soc. Well now, do you mean by the lover of gain such a man, for instance, as a farmer who plants something which he knows is a worthless herb, and thinks fit to make gain out of it when he has reared it up? Is that the sort of man you mean?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τοιόνδε λέγεις τὸν φιλοκερδῆ, οἷον ἐὰν φυτεύων γεωργὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον τὸ φυτόν, ἀξιοῖ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐκτραφέντος κερδαίνειν; ἆρα τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν λέγεις;
Fr. The lover of gain, as such, Socrates, thinks he ought to make gain from everything.
ΕΤ. ἀπὸ παντὸς ὅ γε φιλοκερδής, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴεται δεῖν κερδαίνειν.
Soc. Please do not speak so recklessly, as though you had been wronged by someone, but give me your attention and answer just as you would if I were beginning my questions over again. Do you not admit that the lover of gain has knowledge of the worth of the thing from which he thinks it worth while to make gain?
ΣΩ. μή μοι οὕτως εἰκῇ, ὥσπερ τι ἠδικημένος ὑπό τινος, ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἐμοὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀπόκριναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ἠρώτων· οὐχὶ ὁμολογεῖς τὸν φιλοκερδῆ ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τῆς ἀξίας τούτου ὅθεν κερδαίνειν ἀξιοῖ;
Soc. Then who has knowledge of the worth of plants, and of the sort of season and soil in which they are worth planting—if we too may throw in one of those artful phrases which adroit pleaders use to trick out their speeches in the law courts?
ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἐπιστήμων περὶ φυτῶν τῆς ἀξίας, ἐν ὁποίᾳ ἄξια φυτευθῆναι καὶ ὥρᾳ καὶ χώρᾳ; ἵνα τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τῶν σοφῶν ῥημάτων ἐμβάλωμεν, ὧν οἱ δεξιοὶ περὶ τὰς δίκας καλλιεποῦνται.
Fr. For my part, I should say a farmer.
ΕΤ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι γεωργόν.
Soc. And by “think it worth while to make gain” do you mean aught but “thinking one ought to make gain”?
ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν ἀξιοῦν κερδαίνειν ἄλλο τι λέγεις ἢ οἴεσθαι δεῖν κερδαίνειν;
Fr. I mean that.
ΕΤ. τοῦτο λέγω.
Soc. Then do not attempt to deceive me, who am now quite an elderly person, and you so young, by making, as you did just now, an answer that is not even your own thought; but tell me in all truth, do you suppose that any man who was taking up farming and who knew it was a worthless plant that he was planting, could think to make gain from it?
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν με ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν, ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ἤδη οὕτω νέος ὤν, ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἃ οὐδʼ αὐτὸς οἴει, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπέ· ἆρʼ ἔστιν ὅντινα οἴει γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα γιγνόμενον, καὶ γιγνώσκοντα ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιον φυτεύει τὸ φυτόν, οἴεσθαι ἀπὸ τούτου κερδαίνειν;
Fr. Upon my word, I do not.
ΕΤ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Soc. Or again, take a horseman who knows that he is providing worthless food for his horse; do you suppose he is unaware that he is destroying his horse?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἱππικὸν ἄνδρα γιγνώσκοντα ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξια σιτία τῷ ἵππῳ παρέχει, ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν οἴει ὅτι τὸν ἵππον διαφθείρει;
Fr. I do not.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Soc. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless food.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἴεταί γε ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν τῶν σιτίων τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.
Soc. Or again, take a navigator who has furnished his ship with worthless spars and ropes; do you think he is unaware that he will suffer for it, and will be in danger of being lost himself, and of losing the ship and all her cargo?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; κυβερνήτην μηδενὸς ἄξια ἱστία καὶ πηδάλια τῇ νηὶ παρεσκευασμένον ἀγνοεῖν οἴει ὅτι ζημιωθήσεται καὶ κινδυνεύσει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολέσθαι καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἃ ἂν ἄγῃ πάντα;
Fr. I do not.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Soc. So he does not think to make gain from that worthless tackle?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἴεταί γε κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.
Fr. No, indeed.
ΕΤ. οὐ γάρ.
Soc. But does a general, who knows that his army has worthless arms, think to make gain, or think it worth while to make gain, from them?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὅπλα ἔχει, οἴεται ἀπὸ τούτων κερδαίνειν καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν;
Fr. By no means.
ΕΤ. οὐδαμῶς.
Soc. Or does a flute-player who has worthless flutes, or a harper with a lyre, a bowman with a bow, or anyone else at all, in short, among ordinary craftsmen or sensible men in general, with any implement or other equipment of any sort that is worthless, think to make gain from it?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ αὐλητὴς αὐλοὺς οὐδενὸς ἀξίους ἔχων ἢ κιθαριστὴς λύραν ἢ τοξότης τόξον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν συλλήβδην τῶν δημιουργῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν μηδενὸς ἄξια ὄργανα ἢ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἡντιναοῦν ἔχων ἀπὸ τούτων οἴεται κερδαίνειν;
Fr. To all appearance, no.
ΕΤ. οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε.
Soc. Then whoever can they be, your lovers of gain? For I presume they are not the people whom we have successively mentioned, but people who know their worthless things, and yet think they are to make gain from them. But in that case, by what you say, remarkable sir, no man alive is a lover of gain Fr.
ΣΩ. τίνας οὖν ποτε λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς; οὐ γάρ που τούτους γε οὓς διεληλύθαμεν, ⟨ἀλλʼ⟩ οἵτινες γιγνώσκοντες τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια ἀπὸ τούτων οἴονται δεῖν κερδαίνειν· ἀλλʼ οὕτω μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐκ ἔστʼ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς φιλοκερδής.
Well, Socrates, I should like to call those lovers of gain who from insatiable greed consumedly long for things that are even quite petty and of little or no worth, and so love gain, in each case.
ΕΤ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τούτους φιλοκερδεῖς εἶναι, οἳ ἑκάστοτε ὑπὸ ἀπληστίας καὶ πάνυ σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς γλίχονται ὑπερφυῶς καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.
Soc. Not knowing, of course, my excellent friend, that the things are worthless; for we have already convinced ourselves by our argument that this is impossible.
ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ βέλτιστε, γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιά ἐστιν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ ἐξηλέγξαμεν ὅτι ἀδύνατον.
Fr. I agree.
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. And if not knowing this, clearly they are ignorant of it, but think that those worthless things are worth a great deal.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ γιγνώσκοντες, δῆλον ὅτι ἀγνοοῦντες, οἰόμενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι.
Fr. Apparently.
ΕΤ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Now, of course lovers of gain must love gain?
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν οἵ γε φιλοκερδεῖς φιλοῦσι τὸ κέρδος;
Soc. And by gain you mean the opposite of loss?
ΣΩ. κέρδος δὲ λέγεις ἐναντίον τῇ ζημίᾳ;
Soc. And is it a good thing for anyone to suffer loss?
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅτῳ ἀγαθόν ἐστι ζημιοῦσθαι;
Fr. For no one.
ΕΤ. οὐδενί.
Soc. Rather an evil?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακόν;
Soc. So mankind are harmed by loss.
ΣΩ. βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι.
Fr. They are harmed.
ΕΤ. βλάπτονται.
Soc. Then loss is an evil.
ΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα ἡ ζημία.
Soc. And gain is the opposite of loss.
ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος.
Fr. The opposite.
ΕΤ. ἐναντίον.
Soc. So that gain is a good.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρδος.
Soc. Hence it is those who love the good that you call lovers of gain.
ΣΩ. τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς.
Fr. So it seems.
ΕΤ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. At least there is nothing mad, my friend, about lovers of gain, as you describe them. But tell me, do you yourself love, or not love, whatever is good?
ΣΩ. οὐ μανικούς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς. ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς πότερον φιλεῖς ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ᾖ, ἢ οὐ φιλεῖς;
Soc. And is there anything good that you do not love, or must it then be evil?
ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐ φιλεῖς, ἀλλὰ κακόν;
Fr. Upon my word, nothing.
ΕΤ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Soc. In fact, I expect you love all good things.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσως φιλεῖς.
Soc. Well now, ask me on my side whether I do not likewise: for I shall agree with you, for my part, that I love good things. But besides you and me, do you not think that all the rest of mankind love good things, and hate evil things?
ΣΩ. ἐροῦ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ· ὁμολογήσω γὰρ καὶ ἐγώ σοι φιλεῖν τἀγαθά. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι ἅπαντες οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι τἀγαθὰ φιλεῖν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ μισεῖν;
Fr. It appears so to me.
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε φαίνεται.
Soc. And we admitted that gain is good?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν;
Soc. On this new showing, everyone appears to be a lover of gain; whereas, by our former way of arguing, no one was a lover of gain. So on which of the two arguments are we to rely, in order to avoid error?
ΣΩ. πάντες αὖ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ὃν δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεὶς ἦν φιλοκερδής. ποτέρῳ οὖν ἄν τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι;
Fr. What has to be done, I think, Socrates, is to conceive the lover of gain rightly. The right view of the lover of gain is that he is one who concerns himself with, and thinks fit to make gain from, things from which honest men do not dare to make gain.
ΕΤ. εἴ τις, ὦ Σώκρατες οἶμαι ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ. ὀρθῶς δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι φιλοκερδῆ, ὃς ἂν σπουδάζῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ἀφʼ ὧν οἱ χρηστοὶ οὐ τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν.
Soc. But you see, my sweet sir, we have just admitted that making gain is being benefited.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι.
Fr. Well, what of that?
ΕΤ. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;
Soc. There is the further point we have admitted in addition to this—that all men wish for good things always.
ΣΩ. ὅτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας καὶ ἀεί.
Soc. Then good men likewise wish to have all gains, if these are good things.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστιν.
Fr. Not those gains from which they are bound, Socrates, to suffer harm.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἀφʼ ὧν γε μέλλουσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, βλαβήσεσθαι τῶν κερδῶν.
Soc. By “suffer harm” do you mean “suffer loss,” or something else?
ΣΩ. βλαβήσεσθαι δὲ λέγεις ζημιώσεσθαι ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Fr. No, I mean just “suffer loss.”
ΕΤ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ζημιώσεσθαι λέγω.
Soc. Well, do men suffer loss from gain or from loss?
ΣΩ. ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους οὖν ζημιοῦνται ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄνθρωποι;
Fr. From both; for they suffer loss from loss and from wicked gain.
ΕΤ. ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ζημιοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους τοῦ πονηροῦ.
Soc. Pray now, do you consider that any useful and good thing is wicked?
ΣΩ. ἦ δοκεῖ οὖν τί σοι χρηστὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα πονηρὸν εἶναι;
Fr. I do not.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Soc. And we admitted a little while ago that gain is the opposite of loss, which is an evil.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον τὸ κέρδος τῇ ζημίᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἐναντίον εἶναι;
Soc. And that, being the opposite of an evil, it is good?
ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὲ ὂν κακῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;
Fr. That was our admission.
ΕΤ. ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ.
Soc. So you see, you are attempting to deceive me, for you deliberately contradict what we agreed to just now.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπίτηδες ἐναντία λέγων οἷς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν.
Fr. No, on my honor, Socrates; on the contrary, it is you who are deceiving me, by twisting this way and that so perplexingly in your talk.
ΕΤ. οὐ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σύ με ἐξαπατᾷς καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.
Soc. Hush, hush! Why, surely it would be wrong of me not to obey a good and wise person.
ΣΩ. εὐφήμει· οὐ μεντἂν καλῶς ποιοίην οὐ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ.
Fr. Who is that? And to what are you referring now?
ΕΤ. τίνι τούτῳ; καὶ τί μάλιστα;
Soc. I mean my and your fellow-citizen, Pisistratus’s son Hipparchus, of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of Pisistratus’s sons, and who, among the many goodly proofs of wisdom that he showed, first brought the poems of Homer into this country of ours, and compelled the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea to recite them in relay, one man following on another, as they still do now. He dispatched a fifty-oared galley for Anacreon of Teos, and brought him into our city. Simonides of Ceos he always had about him, prevailing on him by plenteous fees and gifts. All this he did from a wish to educate the citizens, in order that he might have subjects of the highest excellence; for he thought it not right to grudge wisdom to any, so noble and good was he. And when his people in the city had been educated and were admiring him for his wisdom, he proceeded next, with the design of educating those of the countryside, to set up figures of Hermes for them along the roads in the midst of the city and every district town; and then, after selecting from his own wise lore, both learnt from others and discovered for himself, the things that he considered the wisest, he threw these into elegiac form and inscribed them on the figures as verses of his own and testimonies of his wisdom, so that in the first place his people should not admire those wise Delphic legends of “Know thyself” and “Nothing overmuch”, and the other sayings of the sort, but should rather regard as wise the utterances of Hipparchus; and that in the second place, through passing up and down and reading his words and acquiring a taste for his wisdom, they might resort hither from the country for the completion of their education.
ΣΩ. πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ, Πεισιστράτου δὲ ὑεῖ τοῦ ἐκ Φιλαϊδῶν, Ἱππάρχῳ, ὃς τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος, ὃς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διιέναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἵδε ποιοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπʼ Ἀνακρέοντα τὸν Τήιον πεντηκόντορον στείλας ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, Σιμωνίδην δὲ τὸν Κεῖον ἀεὶ περὶ αὑτὸν εἶχεν, μεγάλοις μισθοῖς καὶ δώροις πείθων· ταῦτα δʼ ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνʼ ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἅτε ὢν καλός τε κἀγαθός. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτῷ οἱ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν πολιτῶν πεπαιδευμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἐπιβουλεύων αὖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς παιδεῦσαι ἔστησεν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τῶν δήμων ἑκάστων, κἄπειτα τῆς σοφίας τῆς αὑτοῦ, ἥν τʼ ἔμαθεν καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν, ἐκλεξάμενος ἃ ἡγεῖτο σοφώτατα εἶναι, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ἐντείνας εἰς ἐλεγεῖον αὑτοῦ ποιήματα καὶ ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας ἐπέγραψεν, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζοιεν οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ, τό τε γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ Ἱππάρχου ῥήματα μᾶλλον σοφὰ ἡγοῖντο, ἔπειτα παριόντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες καὶ γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας φοιτῷεν ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παιδευθησόμενοι.
Soc. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:
ΣΩ. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο τὠπιγράμματε· ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπʼ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιγέγραπται λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἕστηκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιά— μνῆμα τόδʼ Ἱππάρχου·
The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria road, in which he says:
στεῖχε δίκαια φρονῶνφησίν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις Ἑρμαῖς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα· ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῇ Στειριακῇ ὁδῷ, ἐν ᾧ λέγει— μνῆμα τόδʼ Ἱππάρχου·
The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus.
μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα.ἐγὼ οὖν σὲ ἐμοὶ ὄντα φίλον οὐ δήπου τολμῴην ἂν ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ ἐκείνῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι ἀπιστεῖν, οὗ καὶ ἀποθανόντος τρία ἔτη ἐτυραννεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἱππίου, καὶ πάντων ἂν τῶν παλαιῶν ἤκουσας ὅτι ταῦτα μόνον τὰ ἔτη τυραννὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὸν δʼ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγύς τι ἔζων Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύοντος. λέγεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι οὐ διʼ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ᾠήθησαν, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀτιμίαν τῆς κανηφορίας—ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες—ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν Ἁρμόδιον γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ὑπʼ ἐκείνου, μέγα δʼ ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον. ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἁρμόδιον τυγχάνειν ἐρῶντά τινος τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ γενναίων τῶν τότε—καὶ λέγουσι τοὔνομα αὐτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι—τὸν οὖν νεανίσκον τοῦτον τέως μὲν θαυμάζειν τόν τε Ἁρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα ὡς σοφούς, ἔπειτα συγγενόμενον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ καταφρονῆσαι ἐκείνων, καὶ τοὺς περιαλγήσαντας ταύτῃ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ οὕτως ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον.
Fr. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.
ΕΤ. κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἤ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι Ἱππάρχῳ· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς—οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινα μέντοι τρόπον— ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.
Soc. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων, ἵνα μὴ οἴῃ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι. πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι;
Fr. No, thank you.
ΕΤ. μή μοί γε.
Soc. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ κακόν;
Fr. No, thank you.
ΕΤ. μή μοί γε.
Soc. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ κέρδος καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἐναντίον;
Fr. Nor that either.
ΕΤ. μηδὲ τοῦτο.
Soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κερδαίνειν;
Fr. Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.
ΕΤ. οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.
Soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ ἄρα σοι, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν.
Soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?
ΣΩ. ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ κέρδος τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον κέρδος τι κακόν. κέρδος δέ γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν· ἦ γάρ;
Fr. What do you mean by this question?
ΕΤ. πῶς με ἐρωτᾷς;
Soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ φράσω. σιτίον ἐστίν τι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν;
Soc. And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μᾶλλόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου σιτίον, ἢ ὁμοίως τοῦτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφότερα καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ᾗ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν;
Soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῶν ὄντων ταὐτὰ ὄντα τὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, οὐδὲν ἐκείνῃ γε διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ᾗ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος δήπου ὁ μὲν χρηστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ πονηρός.
Soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπός γε οἶμαι οὐδέτερος οὐδετέρου οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττόν ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ χρηστὸς τοῦ πονηροῦ οὔτε ὁ πονηρὸς τοῦ χρηστοῦ.
Fr. What you say is true.
ΕΤ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κέρδους διανοώμεθα, ὡς κέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστόν;
Fr. Necessarily.
ΕΤ. ἀνάγκη.
Soc. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει ὁ τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος ἔχων ἢ τὸ πονηρόν· οὔκουν μᾶλλόν γε κέρδος φαίνεται οὐδέτερον ὄν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν.
Soc. For neither of them has addition of either more or less.
ΣΩ. οὐδετέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον πρόσεστιν.
Fr. No, indeed.
ΕΤ. οὐ γὰρ δή.
Soc. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?
ΣΩ. τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ πράγματι πῶς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πάσχοι, ᾧ μηδέτερον τούτων προσείη;
Fr. Impossible.
ΕΤ. ἀδύνατον.
Soc. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κέρδη μὲν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα καὶ κερδαλέα, τουτὶ δὴ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκέψασθαι, διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς, τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ [ἃ] σύ με ἠρώτας τὰ νυνδή, διὰ τί ποτε καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν σιτίον καὶ τὸ κακὸν σιτίον ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα σιτία καλῶ, εἶπον ἄν σοι διότι ἀμφότερα ξηρὰ τροφὴ σώματός ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι σιτίον κἂν σύ που ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῖς. ἦ γάρ;
Soc. And so too about drink the answer would be on the same lines, that the wet sustenance of the body, whether it be wholesome or pernicious, has this name of drink; and likewise with the rest. Try therefore on your part to imitate my method of answering. When you say that virtuous gain and wicked gain are both gain, what is it that you see to be the same in them, judging it to be the actual element of gain? And if again you are yourself unable to answer, just let me put it for your consideration, whether you describe as gain every acquisition that one has acquired either with no expense, or as a profit over and above one’s expense.
ΣΩ. καὶ περὶ ποτοῦ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν τρόπος εἴη τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρᾷ τροφῇ, ἐάντε χρηστὴ ἐάντε πονηρὰ ᾖ, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά ἐστι, ποτόν· καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως. πειρῶ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι οὕτως ἀποκρινόμενον. τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν κέρδος κέρδος φῂς ἀμφότερον εἶναι τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κέρδος ἐστίν; εἰ δʼ αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει· ἆρα κέρδος λέγεις πᾶν κτῆμα ὃ ἄν τις κτήσηται ἢ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἢ ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ;
Fr. I believe that is what I call gain.
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος.
Soc. Do you include a case where, after enjoying a banquet at which one has had much good cheer without any expense, one acquires an illness?
ΣΩ. ἆρα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐάν τις ἑστιαθείς, μηδὲν ἀναλώσας ἀλλʼ εὐωχηθείς, νόσον κτήσηται;
Fr. Upon my word, not I.
ΕΤ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Soc. And if one acquired health from attending a banquet, would one acquire gain or loss?
ΣΩ. Ὑγίειαν δὲ κτησάμενος ἀπὸ ἑστιάσεως κέρδος ἂν κτήσαιτο ἢ ζημίαν;
Soc. Hence gain is not just acquiring any acquisition.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό γέ ἐστι κέρδος, τὸ ὁτιοῦν κτῆμα κτήσασθαι.
Fr. No, indeed.
ΕΤ. οὐ μέντοι.
Soc. Do you mean, not if it is evil? Or will one acquire no gain even if one acquires something good?
ΣΩ. πότερον οὔκ, ἐὰν κακόν; ἢ οὐδʼ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὁτιοῦν κτήσηται, οὐ κέρδος κτήσεται;
Fr. Apparently one will, if it is good.
ΕΤ. φαίνεται, ἐάν γε ἀγαθόν.
Soc. And if it is evil, will not one acquire loss?
ΣΩ. ἐὰν δὲ κακόν, οὐ ζημίαν κτήσεται;
Fr. I think so.
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. You see, then, how you are running round again to the same old point? Gain is found to be good, and loss evil.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς πάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό; τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ ζημία κακόν.
Fr. For my part, I cannot tell what to say.
ΕΤ. ἀπορῶ ἔγωγε ὅτι εἴπω.
Soc. And not without good reason, sir. Now answer this further question: you say that if one acquires more than the amount one has spent, it is gain?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀδίκως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι· ἐάν τις ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον κτήσηται, φῂς κέρδος εἶναι;
Fr. I do not mean, when it is evil, but if one gets more gold or silver than one has spent.
ΕΤ. οὔτι κακόν γε λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ.
Soc. Now, I am just going to ask you about that. Tell me, if one spends half a pound of gold and gets double that weight in silver, has one got gain or loss?
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέλλω τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, ἐάν τις χρυσίου σταθμὸν ἥμισυν ἀναλώσας διπλάσιον λάβῃ ἀργυρίου, κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν εἴληφεν;
Fr. Loss, I presume, Socrates for one’s gold is reduced to twice, instead of twelve times, the value of silver.
ΕΤ. ζημίαν δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀντὶ δωδεκαστασίου γὰρ διστάσιον αὐτῷ καθίσταται τὸ χρυσίον.
Soc. But you see, one has got more; or is double not more than half?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πλέον γʼ εἴληφεν· ἢ οὐ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος;
Fr. Not in worth, the one being silver and the other gold.
ΕΤ. οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου.
Soc. So gain, it seems, must have this addition of worth. At least, you now say that silver, though more than gold, is not worth as much, and that gold, though less, is of equal worth.
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι, τὴν ἀξίαν. νῦν γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον πλέον ὂν τοῦ χρυσίου οὐ φῂς ἄξιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἔλαττον ὂν ἄξιον φῂς εἶναι.
Fr. Assuredly, for that is the case.
ΕΤ. σφόδρα· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως.
Soc. Then the valuable is what produces gain, whether it be small or great, and the valueless produces no gain.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἄρα κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ἐάντε σμικρὸν ᾖ ἐάντε μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον ἀκερδές.
Soc. And by the valuable you mean simply, valuable to possess?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι;
Fr. Yes, to possess.
ΕΤ. ναί, κεκτῆσθαι.
Soc. And again, by what is valuable to possess, do you mean the unprofitable or the profitable?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἄξιον αὖ λέγεις κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;
Fr. The profitable, I presume.
ΕΤ. τὸ ὠφέλιμον δήπου.
Soc. And the profitable is good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;
Soc. And so, most valiant of men, have we not here once more, for the third or fourth time, the admission that what produces gain is good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων, οὐ τὸ κερδαλέον ἀγαθὸν αὖ πάλιν τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἥκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον;
Fr. So it seems.
ΕΤ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Then do you remember the point from which this discussion of ours arose?
ΣΩ. μνημονεύεις οὖν ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν;
Fr. I think I do.
ΕΤ. οἶμαί γε.
Soc. In case you do not, I will remind you. You maintained against me that good men do not wish to make all sorts of gain, but only those gains that are good, and not those that are wicked.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγώ σε ὑπομνήσω. ἠμφεσβήτησάς μοι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς μὴ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλεσθαι κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν κερδῶν τἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ πονηρὰ μή.
Soc. And now the argument has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains, both small and great, are good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκακε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;
Fr. Yes, it has compelled me, at least, Socrates, rather than persuaded me.
ΕΤ. ἠνάγκακε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.
Soc. Well, later on, perhaps, it might also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded or whatever is your feeling, you at least agree with me that all gains are good, both small and great ones.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειεν ἄν· νῦν δʼ οὖν, εἴτε πέπεισαι εἴτε ὁπωσδὴ ἔχεις, σύμφῃς γοῦν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα.
Fr. Yes, I do admit it.
ΕΤ. ὁμολογῶ γὰρ οὖν.
Soc. And you admit that virtuous men all wish for all good things, do you not?
ΣΩ. τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπαντα ἅπαντας· ἢ οὔ;
Soc. But, you know, you stated yourself that wicked men love both small and great gains.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ τούς γε πονηροὺς αὐτὸς εἶπες ὅτι καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κέρδη φιλοῦσιν.
Soc. And so, by your account, all men will be lovers of gain, whether they be virtuous or wicked.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοκερδεῖς ἂν εἶεν, καὶ οἱ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἱ πονηροί.
Fr. Apparently.
ΕΤ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Hence it is not right to reproach anybody with being a lover of gain: for he who makes this reproach is actually such an one himself.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει, εἴ τίς τῳ ὀνειδίζει φιλοκερδεῖ εἶναι· τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ὤν.