190a. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way of acquiring sight or hearing. Lach. Truly spoken, Socrates.Soc. And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons’ souls, and so make them better?Lach. Yes, indeed,Soc. Then our first requisite is to know what virtue is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?
190a. ΣΩ. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι ὄψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἷοί τʼ ἐσμὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ μηδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀκοή, σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὤτων, ὅντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν κάλλιστʼ ἂν κτήσαιτό τις. ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον τοῖς ὑέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειε;ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτό γʼ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ που μηδʼ ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθʼ ἂν ὁτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;
190c. Lach. I certainly think not, Socrates.
190c. ΛΑ. οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.
ΣΩ. φαμὲν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔστιν.
Lach. I suppose we must.
ΛΑ. φαμὲν μέντοι.
Soc. And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε ἴσμεν, κἂν εἴποιμεν δήπου τί ἐστιν.
Lach. To be sure.
ΛΑ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see ifwe are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it.
ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα—πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον—ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥᾴων ἡ σκέψις ἔσται.
190d. In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.Lach. Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?Lach. Yes, it generally is, to be sure.Soc. Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it, in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies.
190d. ΛΑ. ἀλλʼ οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.ΣΩ. τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἦ γάρ;ΛΑ. καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτʼ ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις παραγένοιτο, καθʼ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι.
190e. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.
190e. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.
Lach. On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous.
ΛΑ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη.
Soc. Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else.
ΣΩ. εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον.
Lach. What do you mean by that, Socrates?
ΛΑ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
191a. Soc. I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy.
191a. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ἀνδρεῖός που οὗτος, ὃν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις.
Lach. I, for one, agree to that.
ΛΑ. ἐγὼ γοῦν φημι.
Soc. Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying?
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν φεύγων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;
Lach. How fleeing?
ΛΑ. πῶς φεύγων;
Soc. Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas’ horses, that they knewhow to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way;
ΣΩ. ὥσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἧττον φεύγοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ὅμηρός που ἐπαινῶν τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππουςκραιπνὰ μάλʼ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι·
191b. and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling himprompter of fright.
191b. καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰνείαν κατὰ τοῦτʼ ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναιμήστωρα φόβοιο.
Lach. And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting but with men-at-arms it is as I state it.
ΛΑ. καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἁρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε. καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἱππέων πέρι λέγεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἱππικὸν [τὸ ἐκείνων] οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὁπλιτικὸν [τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων], ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.
Soc. Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans.
ΣΩ. πλήν γʼ ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. Λακεδαιμονίους γάρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γερροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφομένους ὥσπερ ἱππέας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην.
191c. For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks weree broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle.Lach. What you say is true.Soc. And so this is what I meant just now by sayng that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly. For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures, whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.
191c. ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην—βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ
191e. Lach. Very much so, Socrates.Soc. Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things.Lach. To be sure.Soc. What either of them is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning?Lach. Not very well.
191e. μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες καὶ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι—ΛΑ. καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δʼ ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δʼ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, οἱ δʼ ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν κέκτηνται· οἱ δέ γʼ οἶμαι δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. τί ποτε ὂν ἑκάτερον τούτων; τοῦτο ἐπυνθανόμην. πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον τί ὂν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἢ οὔπω καταμανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;ΛΑ. οὐ πάνυ τι.
192a. Soc. I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so?
192a. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἠρώτων τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας· ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ λέγεις;
Lach. Yes, to be sure.
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness?
ΣΩ. εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο· ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι; εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τἆλλα πάντα.
192b. My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances.Lach. Your statement would be quite correct.Soc. So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage?Lach. Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all.
192b. ΛΑ. ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν τίς οὖσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.ΛΑ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων [περὶ ἀνδρείας] πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.
192c. Soc. Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other’s actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities.
192c. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται· οὔτι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγῇ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
Lach. Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain.
ΛΑ. εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.
Soc. And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία καλὴ κἀγαθή;
Lach. Very much so.
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
192d. Soc. But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous?
192d. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἡ μετʼ ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τοὐναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;
Soc. And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful?
ΣΩ. καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὂν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν;
Lach. Not with any justice, Socrates.
ΛΑ. οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ καλή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλόν ἐστιν.
Lach. That is true.
ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage.
ΣΩ. ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
Lach. Apparently.
ΛΑ. ἔοικεν.
192e. Soc. Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous?
192e. ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δή, ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλέον ἐκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρεῖον καλοῖς ἄν;
Lach. On my word, not I.
ΛΑ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
193. Soc. Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?
193. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οἷον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὤν, περιπλευμονίᾳ τοῦ ὑέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ;
193a. Lach. That is no case of it, in any sense, either.
193a. ΛΑ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν οὐδʼ αὕτη.
Soc. Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθʼ ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;
193b. Lach. The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.Soc. But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.Lach. That is true.Soc. So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.Lach. Yes, I think so.
193b. ΛΑ. τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου καρτερία.ΛΑ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.ΣΩ. καὶ τὸν μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἄρα ἱππικῆς καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἱππομαχίᾳ ἧττον φήσεις ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.ΛΑ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.ΣΩ. καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.
193c. Soc. And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.Lach. To be sure.Soc. And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.Lach. Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?Soc. Nothing, provided one thinks so.Lach. But I do think it.Soc. And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.Lach. Evidently.
193c. ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἔν τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδρειοτέρους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.ΛΑ. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;ΣΩ. οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἴοιτό γε οὕτως.ΛΑ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε.ΣΩ. καὶ μήν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσίν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.ΛΑ. φαίνονται.
193d. Soc. Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?
193d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὖσα καὶ βλαβερά;
Lach. Quite so.
ΛΑ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. But courage was admitted to be something noble.
ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλόν τι εἶναι.
Lach. Yes, it was.
ΛΑ. ὡμολογεῖτο γάρ.
Soc. Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.
ΣΩ. νῦν δʼ αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
Lach. Apparently.
ΛΑ. ἐοίκαμεν.
Soc. Then do you think our statement is correct?
ΣΩ. καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;
Lach. On my word, Socrates, not I.
ΛΑ. μὰ τὸν Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.
Soc. Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches, are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δωριστὶ ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης·
193e. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.
193e. τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δʼ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.
Lach. That is very true.
ΛΑ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Soc. Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;
Lach. Not by any means.
ΛΑ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.
Soc. Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;
Lach. To what point do you mean, and what statement?
ΛΑ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;
194a. Soc. That which enjoins endurance. And, if you please, let us too be steadfast and enduring in our inquiry, so as not to be ridiculed by courage herself for failing to be courageous in our search for her, when we might perchance find after all that this very endurance is courage.
194a. ΣΩ. τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει. εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτὴ ἡ καρτέρησίς ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.
Lach. For my part I am ready, Socrates, to continue without faltering; and yet I am unaccustomed to discussions of this sort. But a certain ambitious ardour has got hold of me at hearing what has been said, and I am truly vexed at finding myself unable to express offhand what I think.
ΛΑ. ἐγὼ μὲν ἕτοιμος, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ προαφίστασθαι. καίτοι ἀήθης γʼ εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων· ἀλλά τίς με καὶ φιλονικία εἴληφεν πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τʼ εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν.
194b. For I feel that I conceive in thought what courage is, but somehow or other she has given me the slip for the moment, so that I fail to lay hold of her in speech and state what she is.
194b. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅτι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δʼ ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ συλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν.
Soc. Well, my dear sir, the good huntsman must follow the hounds and not give up the chase.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.
Lach. Yes, indeed, by all means.
ΛΑ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Then do you agree to our inviting Nicias here to join in our hunt? He may be more resourceful than we are.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἴ τι ἡμῶν εὐπορώτερός ἐστιν;
194c. Lach. I agree, of course.
194c. ΛΑ. βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. Come now, Nicias, and use what powers you have to assist your friends, who are caught in a storm of argument and are quite perplexed. You see the perplexity of our case; you must now tell us what you think courage is, and so at once set us free from our perplexity and give your own thoughts the stability of speech.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν βοήθησον, εἴ τινα ἔχεις δύναμιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡμέτερα ὁρᾷς ὡς ἄπορα· σὺ δʼ εἰπὼν ὅτι ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἔκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἃ νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι.
Nic. Well, for some time I have been thinking, Socrates, that you two are not defining courage in the right way; for you are not acting upon an admirable remark which I have formerly heard you make.
ΝΙ. δοκεῖτε τοίνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἤδη καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τούτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.
Soc. What is that, Nicias?
ΣΩ. ποίῳ δή, ὦ Νικία;
194d. Nic. I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned.
194d. ΝΙ. πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός.
Soc. Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ μέντοι νὴ Δία λέγεις, ὦ Νικία.
Nic. And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise.
ΝΙ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν.
Soc. Do you hear him, Laches?
ΣΩ. ἤκουσας, ὦ Λάχης;
Lach. I do, without understanding very well what he says.
ΛΑ. ἔγωγε, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.
Soc. But I think I understand it: our friend appears to me to mean that courage is a kind of wisdom.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καί μοι δοκεῖ ἁνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν.
Lach. What kind of wisdom, Socrates?
ΛΑ. ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;
194e. Soc. Well, will you put that question to your friend here?
194e. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;
Soc. Come now, tell him, Nicias, what kind of wisdom courage may be, by your account. Not that, I presume, of flute-playing.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, αὐτῷ εἰπέ, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. οὐ γάρ που ἥ γε αὐλητική.
Nic. Not at all.
ΝΙ. οὐδαμῶς.
Soc. Nor yet that of harping.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ κιθαριστική.
Soc. But what is this knowledge then, or of what?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ αὕτη ἢ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;
Lach. I must say you question him quite correctly, Socrates, so let him just tell us what he thinks it is.
ΛΑ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.
195. Nic. I say, Laches, that it is this—the knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared, either in war or in anything else.
195. ΝΙ. ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
195a. Lach. How strangely he talks, Socrates!
195a. ΛΑ. ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. What is it that makes you say that, Laches?
ΣΩ. πρὸς τί τοῦτʼ εἶπες βλέψας, ὦ Λάχης;
Lach. What is it? Why, surely wisdom is distinct from courage.
ΛΑ. πρὸς ὅτι; χωρὶς δήπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας.
Soc. Well, Nicias denies that.
ΣΩ. οὔκουν φησί γε Νικίας.
Lach. He does indeed, to be sure: that is where he just babbles.
ΛΑ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία· ταῦτά τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.
Soc. Then let us instruct and not abuse him.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν.
Nic. No, it seems to me, Socrates, that Laches wants to have it proved that I am talking nonsense, because he was proved a moment ago to be in the same case himself.
ΝΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν κἀμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτός τις ἐφάνη.
195b. Lach. Quite so, Nicias, and I will try to make it evident. You are talking nonsense: for instance, do not doctors know what is to be dreaded in disease? Or do you suppose that the courageous know this? Or do you call doctors courageousNic. No, not at all.Lach. Nor, I fancy, farmers either. And yet they, I presume, know what is to be dreaded in farming, and every other skilled worker knows what is to be dreaded and dared in his own craft; but they are none the more courageous for that.
195b. ΛΑ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις. ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστανται; ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρείους καλεῖς;ΝΙ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.ΛΑ. οὐδέ γε τοὺς γεωργοὺς οἶμαι. καίτοι τά γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ οὗτοι δήπου ἐπίστανται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν τέχναις δεινά τε καὶ θαρραλέα ἴσασιν·
195c. Soc. What is Laches saying, in your opinion, Nicias? There does seem to be something in it.Nic. Yes, there is something, only it is not true.Soc. How so?Nic. Because he thinks that doctors know something more, in treating sick persons, than how to tell what is healthy and what diseased. This, I imagine, is all that they know: but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness, —do you suppose, Laches, that this is within a doctor’s knowledge? Do you not think that for many it is better that they should never arise from their bed of sickness?
195c. ἀλλʼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὗτοι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν.ΣΩ. τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικεν μέντοι λέγειν τι.ΝΙ. καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.ΣΩ. πῶς δή;ΝΙ. ὅτι οἴεται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰπεῖν οἷόν τε καὶ νοσῶδες. οἱ δὲ δήπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν· εἰ δὲ δεινόν τῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμνειν, ἡγῇ σὺ τουτί, ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἴει ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἰπέ·
195d. Pray tell me, do you say that in every case it is better to live? Is it not often preferable to be dead?
195d. σὺ πᾶσι φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς κρεῖττον τεθνάναι;
Lach. I do think that is so.
ΛΑ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε τοῦτό γε.
Nic. And do you think that the same things are to be dreaded by those who were better dead, as by those who had better live?
ΝΙ. οἷς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταὐτὰ οἴει δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οἷς ζῆν;
Lach. No, I do not.
ΛΑ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Nic. Well, do you attribute the judgement of this matter to doctors or to any other skilled worker except him who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man whom I call courageous?
ΝΙ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἰατροῖς γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δημιουργῷ πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ;
Soc. Do you comprehend his meaning, Laches?
ΣΩ. κατανοεῖς, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι λέγει;
195e. Lach. I do: it seems to be the seers whom he calls the courageous: for who else can know for which of us it is better to be alive than dead? And yet, Nicias, do you avow yourself to be a seer, or to be neither a seer nor courageous?
195e. ΛΑ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους· τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σύ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος;
Nic. What! Is it now a seer, think you, who has the gift of judging what is to be dreaded and what to be dared?
ΝΙ. τί δέ; μάντει αὖ οἴει προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γιγνώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα;
Lach. That is my view: who else could it be?
ΛΑ. ἔγωγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ;
196. Nic. Much rather the man of whom I speak, my dear sir: for the seer’s business is to judge only the signs of what is yet to come—whether a man is to meet with death or disease or loss of property, or victory or defeat in war or some other contest; but what is better among these things for a man to suffer or avoid suffering, can surely be no more for a seer to decide than for anyone else in the world.
196. ΝΙ. ὧι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, εἴτε νίκη εἴτε ἧττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας·
196a. Lach. Well, I fail to follow him, Socrates, or to see what he is driving at; for he points out that neither a seer nor a doctor nor anybody else is the man he refers to as the courageous, unless perchance he means it is some god. Now it appears to me that Nicias is unwilling to admit honestly that he has no meaning at all, but dodges this way and that in the hope of concealing his own perplexity.
196a. ὅτι δέ τῳ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντει προσήκει κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν;ΛΑ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τούτου οὐ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι βούλεται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὅντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπορίαν·
196b. Why, you and I could have dodged in the same way just now, if we wished to avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. Of course, if we were arguing in a law-court, there would be some reason for so doing; but here, in a meeting like this of ours, why waste time in adorning oneself with empty words?Soc. I agree that it is out of place, Laches: but let us see:
196b. καίτοι κἂν ἡμεῖς οἷοί τε ἦμεν ἄρτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν· νῦν δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν συνουσίᾳ τοιᾷδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κοσμοῖ;
196c. perhaps Nicias thinks he does mean something, and is not talking just for the sake of talking. So let us ask him to explain more clearly what is in his mind; and if we find that he means something, we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.Lach. Then, Socrates, if you would like to ask him, please do so: I daresay I have done enough asking.Soc. Well, I see no objection, since the question will be on behalf of us both.Lach. Very well, then.Soc. Now tell me, Nicias, or rather, tell us—for Laches and I are sharing the argument between us—do you say that courage is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared?
196c. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλʼ ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυθώμεθα τί ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἐάν τι φαίνηται λέγων, συγχωρησόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, διδάξομεν.ΛΑ. σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνου· ἐγὼ δʼ ἴσως ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι.ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδέν με κωλύει· κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.ΛΑ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Νικία—μᾶλλον δʼ ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγώ τε καὶ Λάχης τὸν λόγον—τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῂς δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων εἶναι;
196d. Nic. I do.
196d. ΝΙ. ἔγωγε.
Soc. And that it is not every man that knows it, since neither a doctor nor a seer can know it, and cannot be courageous unless he add this particular knowledge to his own? This was your statement, was it not?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι, ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γνώσεται μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ· οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;
Nic. Yes, it was.
ΝΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Soc. And so in fact this is not a thing which, as the proverb says, “any pig would know”; and thus a pig cannot be courageous.
ΣΩ. κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὗς γνοίη οὐδʼ ἂν ἀνδρεία γένοιτο.
Nic. I think not.
ΝΙ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
196e. Soc. Indeed it is obvious, Nicias, that you at least do not believe that even the Crommyonian sow could have been courageous. I say this not in jest, but because I conceive it is necessary for him who states this theory to refuse courage to any wild beast, or else to admit that a beast like a lion or a leopard or even a boar is so wise as to know what only a few men know because it is so hard to perceive. Why, he who subscribes to your account of courage must needs agree that a lion, a stag, a bull, and a monkey have all an equal share of courage in their nature.
196e. ΣΩ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ συγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γνῶναι, ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἤ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι· ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθʼ ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.
197a. Lach. Heavens, Socrates, how admirably you argue! Now answer us sincerely, Nicias, and say whether those animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are wiser than we are; or whether you dare, in contradiction of everyone else, describe them as not even courageous.
197a. ΛΑ. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῂς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾷς μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν;
Nic. No, Laches, I do not describe animals, or anything else that from thoughtlessness has no fear of the dreadful, as courageous, but rather as fearless and foolish. Or do you suppose I describe all children as courageous, that have no fear because they are thoughtless?
ΝΙ. οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλʼ ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἴει με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ διʼ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν;
197b. I rather hold that the fearless and the courageous are not the same thing. In my opinion very few people are endowed with courage and forethought, while rashness, boldness, and fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great number of men, women, children, and animals. So you see, the acts that you and most people call courageous, I call rash, and it is the prudent acts which I speak of that are courageous.
197b. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ, ἀνδρεῖα δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.
197c. Lach. Mark you, Socrates, how finely, as he fancies, my friend decks himself out with his words! And how he attempts to deprive of the distinction of courage those whom everyone admits to be courageous!
197c. ΛΑ. θέασαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὅδε ἑαυτὸν δή, ὡς οἴεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· οὓς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.
Nic. I am not referring to you, Laches, so do not be fiightened: for I grant that you, and Lamachus also, are wise, since you are courageous, and I say the same of numerous other Athenians.
ΝΙ. οὔκουν σέ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.
Lach. I will not say what I could say in answer to that, lest you call me a true son of Aexone.
ΛΑ. οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μή με φῇς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰξωνέα εἶναι.
197d. Soc. No, say nothing, Laches: for in fact you seem to me to have failed to perceive that he has acquired his wisdom from Damon, our good friend; and Damon constantly associates with Prodicus, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these.
197d. ΣΩ. μηδέ γε εἴπῃς, ὦ Λάχης· καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ ᾐσθῆσθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου παρείληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.
Lach. Yes, for it is more suitable, Socrates, for a sophist to make a show of such refinements than for a man whom the State thinks worthy to govern her.
ΛΑ. καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὑτῆς προεστάναι.
197e. Soc. Indeed it is suitable, I presume, my amiable friend, for a man in the highest seat of government to be gifted with the highest degree of wisdom. But it seems to me that Nicias is worthy of further attention, so that we may learn in what connexion he uses this word “courage.”
197e. ΣΩ. πρέπει μέν που, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν· δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοὔνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.
Lach. Then attend to him yourself, Socrates.
ΛΑ. αὐτὸς τοίνυν σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. That is what I propose to do, my good sir: still, you are not to think that I will release you from your due share of the argument. No, you must put your mind to it and join in weighing well what is said.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε· μὴ μέντοι οἴου με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.
Lach. Well, so be it, if you think that I ought.
ΛΑ. ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.
198. Soc. Indeed I do. Now, Nicias, please go back to the beginning and answer us:
198. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς·
198a. you know we started our discussion by considering courage as a part of virtue?
198a. οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατʼ ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;
Nic. Quite so.
ΝΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And you joined in this answer,—that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὄντων δὴ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ σύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;
Nic. Why, of course.
ΝΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. Now, do you mean the same as I do by these? Besides courage, I refer to temperance, justice, and other similar qualities. And you also, do you not?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἅπερ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρείᾳ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλʼ ἄττα τοιαῦτα. οὐ καὶ σύ;
198b. Nic. Certainly I do.
198b. ΝΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. So much for that; thus far we agree: but let us pass on to what is to be dreaded and what to be dared, and make sure that you and we do not take two different views of these. Let me tell you our view of them, and if you do not agree with it, you shall instruct us. We hold that the dreadful are things that cause fear, and the safely ventured are those that do not; and fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil. You are of the same mind with us in this, are you not, Laches?
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλʼ ἄττα ἡγῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα. ἃ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἡγούμεθα, φράσομέν σοι· σὺ δὲ ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇς, διδάξεις. ἡγούμεθα δʼ ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει—δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ—ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης;
198c. Lach. Yes, entirely so, Socrates.Soc. So there you have our view, Nicias,—that coming evils are to be dreaded, and things not evil, or good things, that are to come are to be safely dared. Would you describe them in this way, or in some other?Nic. I would describe them in this way.Soc. And the knowledge of these things is what you term courage?Nic. Precisely.Soc. There is still a third point on which we must see if you are in agreement with us.
198c. ΛΑ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακά φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ ἄλλῃ περὶ τούτων λέγεις;ΝΙ. ταύτῃ ἔγωγε.ΣΩ. τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;ΝΙ. κομιδῇ γε.ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ συνδοκεῖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν.ΝΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;
198d. Nic. What point is that?Soc. I will tell you. It seems to your friend and me that, to take the various subjects of knowledge, there is not one knowledge of how a thing has happened in the past, another of how things are happening in the present, and another of how a thing that has not yet happened might or will happen most favorably in the future, but it is the same knowledge throughout. For example, in the case of health, it is medicine always and alone that surveys present, past, and future processes alike;
198d. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷδε, περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλʼ ἡ αὐτή. οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἰατρική, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα ὅπῃ γενήσεται·
198e. and farming is in the same position as regards the productions of the earth.
198e. καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἡ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει·
199. Soc. And in matters of war; I am sure you yourselves will bear me out when I say that here generalship makes the best forecasts on the whole, and particularly of future results, and is the mistress rather than the servant of the seer’s art, because it knows better what is happening or about to happen in the operations of war; whence the law ordains that the general shall give orders to the seer, and not the seer to the general.
199. ΣΩ. καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρτυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἴεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα·
199a. May we say this, Laches?
199a. καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης;
Lach. We may.
ΛΑ. φήσομεν.
Soc. Well now, do you agree with us, Nicias, that the same knowledge has comprehension of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, σύμφῃς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπαΐειν;
Nic. I do, for that is my own opinion, Socrates.
ΝΙ. ἔγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. And courage, my good friend, is knowledge of what is to be dreaded and dared, as you say, do you not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων, ὡς φῄς·
199b. Nic. Yes.Soc. And things to be dreaded and things to be dared have been admitted to be either future goods or future evils?Nic. Certainly.Soc. And the same knowledge is concerned with the same things, whether in the future or in any particular stage?Nic. That is so.Soc. Then courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, for it comprehends goods and evils not merely in the future, but also in the present and the past and in any stage, like the other kinds of knowledge.
199b. ἦ γάρ;ΝΙ. ναί.ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὡμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.ΝΙ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. ἡ δέ γʼ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.ΝΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.ΣΩ. οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαΐει, ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι.
199c. Nic. Apparently.
199c. ΝΙ. ἔοικέν γε.
Soc. So the answer that you gave us, Nicias, covers only about a third part of courage; whereas our question was of what courage is as a whole. And now it appears, on your own showing, that courage is knowledge not merely of what is to be dreaded and what dared, but practically a knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage;
ΣΩ. μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἠρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὅτι εἴη. καὶ νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.
199d. such is your present account of what courage must be. What do you say to this new version, Nicias?
199d. οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;
Nic. I accept it, Socrates.
ΝΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Now do you think, my excellent friend, there could be anything wanting to the virtue of a man who knew all good things, and all about their production in the present, the future, and the past, and all about evil things likewise? Do you suppose that such a man could be lacking in temperance, or justice, and holiness, when he alone has the gift of taking due precaution, in his dealings with gods and men, as regards what is to be dreaded and what is not, and of procuring good things, owing to his knowledge of the right behaviour towards them?
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἄν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τοῦτον οἴει ἂν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὁσιότητος, ᾧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξευλαβεῖσθαί τε τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ μή, καὶ τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;
199e. Nic. I think, Socrates, there is something in what you say.
199e. ΝΙ. λέγειν τὶ ὦ Σώκρατές μοι δοκεῖς.
Soc. Hence what you now describe, Nicias, will be not a part but the whole of virtue.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή.
Nic. Apparently.
ΝΙ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. But, you know, we said that courage is one of the parts of virtue.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἓν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Nic. Yes, we did.
ΝΙ. ἔφαμεν γάρ.
Soc. And what we now describe is seen to be different.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.
Nic. So it seems.
ΝΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
Soc. Thus we have failed to discover, Nicias, what courage really is.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅτι ἔστιν.
Nic. Evidently.
ΝΙ. οὐ φαινόμεθα.
200. Lach. And I, in fact, supposed, my dear Nicias, that you were going to discover it, when you showed such contempt for the answers I made to Socrates: indeed I had very great hopes that the wisdom you derived from Damon would avail you for the discovery.
200. ΛΑ. καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Νικία, ᾤμην σε εὑρήσειν, ἐπειδὴ ἐμοῦ κατεφρόνησας Σωκράτει ἀποκριναμένου·
200a. Nic. That is all very fine, Laches; you think you can now make light of the fact that you were yourself shown just now to know nothing about courage; when my turn comes to be shown up in the same light, that is all you care, and now it will not matter to you at all, it seems, if I share your ignorance of things whereof any self-respecting man ought to have knowledge. You really strike me, indeed, as following the average man’s practice of keeping an eye on others rather than on oneself: but I fancy that for the present I have said as much as could be expected on the subject of our discussion, and that later on I must make good any defects in my statement upon it with the help of Damon—whom I know you choose to ridicule, and that without ever having seen the actual Damon—and with others’ help besides.
200a. πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον, ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ αὐτὴν ἀνευρήσεις.ΝΙ. εὖ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἴει σὺ ἔτι πρᾶγμα εἶναι ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρείας πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς, ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος ἀναφανήσομαι, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει, ὡς ἔοικε, σοὶ μετʼ ἐμοῦ μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν προσήκει ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τὶ εἶναι. σὺ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πρᾶγμα ἐργάζεσθαι οὐδὲ πρὸς σαυτὸν βλέπειν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους·
200b. And when I have settled the matter I will enlighten you, in no grudging spirit: for I think you are in very great need of instruction.
200b. ἐγὼ δʼ οἶμαι ἐμοὶ περὶ ὧν ἐλέγομεν νῦν τε ἐπιεικῶς εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, ὕστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος—οὗ σύ που οἴει καταγελᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἰδὼν πώποτε τὸν Δάμωνα—καὶ μετʼ ἄλλων· καὶ ἐπειδὰν βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ, καὶ οὐ φθονήσω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν.
Lach. You are a man of wisdom, I know, Nicias. But still I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to dismiss you and me, and to retain our friend Socrates as I said at first, for the education of your boys: were my own sons old enough, I should do the same thing too.
ΛΑ. σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἶ, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐγὼ Λυσιμάχῳ τῷδε καὶ Μελησίᾳ συμβουλεύω σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν νεανίσκων χαίρειν ἐᾶν, Σωκράτη δὲ τουτονί, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, μὴ ἀφιέναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ παῖδες, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτʼ ἐποίουν.
Nic. For my part I agree; if Socrates will consent to take charge of these young people, I will seek for no one else.
ΝΙ. ταῦτα μὲν κἀγὼ συγχωρῶ· ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ Σωκράτης τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, μηδένα ἄλλον ζητεῖν. ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐγὼ τὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος·
200d. I should be only too glad to entrust him with Niceratus, if he should consent: but when I begin to mention the matter to him, he always recommends other men to me and refuses himself. Just see, Lysimachus, if Socrates will give you a more favorable hearing.
200d. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἑκάστοτε συνίστησιν, ὅταν τι αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου μνησθῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλει. ἀλλʼ ὅρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης.
Lys. It is only right that he should, Nicias, for indeed I would be willing to do many things for him which I would not do for a great many others. Well, what do you say, Socrates? Will you comply, and lend your endeavours for the highest improvement of these boys?
ΛΥ. δίκαιόν γέ τοι, ὦ Νικία, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πολλὰ ἂν ἐθελήσαιμι ποιεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις πάνυ πολλοῖς ἐθέλοιμι. πῶς οὖν φῄς, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑπακούσῃ τι καὶ συμπροθυμήσῃ ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι τοῖς μειρακίοις;
200e. Soc. Why, how strange it would be, Lysimachus, to refuse to lend one’s endeavours for the highest improvement of anybody! Now if in the debates that we have just held I had been found to know what our two friends did not know, it would be right to make a point of inviting me to take up this work: but as it is, we have all got into the same difficulty, so why should one of us be preferred to another?
200e. ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τοῦτό γε, μὴ ἐθέλειν τῳ συμπροθυμεῖσθαι ὡς βελτίστῳ γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις τοῖς ἄρτι ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφάνην εἰδώς, τώδε δὲ μὴ εἰδότε, δίκαιον ἂν ἦν ἐμὲ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον παρακαλεῖν, νῦν δʼ ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα· τί οὖν ἄν τις ἡμῶν τίνα προαιροῖτο;
201. Soc. In my own opinion, none of us should; and this being so, perhaps you will allow me to give you a piece of advice. I tell you, gentlemen—and this is confidential—that we ought all alike to seek out the best teacher we can find, first for ourselves—for we need one—and then for our boys, sparing neither expense nor anything else we can do: but to leave ourselves as we now are, this I do not advise. And if anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal to Homer, who said thatshame is no good mate for a needy man.
201. ΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ οὐδένα· ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, σκέψασθε ἄν τι δόξω συμβουλεύειν ὑμῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι χρῆναι, ὦ ἄνδρες —οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔκφορος λόγος—κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλον ὡς ἄριστον—δεόμεθα γάρ—ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς μειρακίοις, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε ἄλλου μηδενός· ἐᾶν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ὡς νῦν ἔχομεν οὐ συμβουλεύω. εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, ὅτι τηλικοίδε ὄντες εἰς διδασκάλων ἀξιοῦμεν φοιτᾶν, τὸν Ὅμηρον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι προβάλλεσθαι, ὃς ἔφη οὐκἀγαθὴνεἶναιαἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι.
201b. So let us not mind what anyone may say, but join together in arraging for our own and the boys’ tuition.
201b. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐάσαντες χαίρειν εἴ τίς τι ἐρεῖ, κοινῇ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησώμεθα.
Lys. I gladly approve of your suggestions, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, so I am the most eager to have lessons with the young ones. Now this is what I ask you to do:
ΛΥ. ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρέσκει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐθέλω, ὅσῳπερ γεραίτατός εἰμι, τοσούτῳ προθυμότατα μανθάνειν μετὰ τῶν νεανίσκων. ἀλλά μοι οὑτωσὶ ποίησον· αὔριον ἕωθεν ἀφίκου οἴκαδε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἵνα βουλευσώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν διαλύσωμεν.
201c. come to my house tomorrow at daybreak; be sure not to fail, and then we shall consult on this very matter. For the present, let us break up our meeting.Soc. I will not fail, Lysimachus, to come to you tomorrow, God willing.
201c. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ταῦτα, καὶ ἥξω παρὰ σὲ αὔριον, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.