858. Ath. This,—that there is no need to legislate, but only to become students ourselves, and endeavor to discern in regard to every polity how the best form might come about, and how that which is the least elaborate possible.
858. ΑΘ. τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην εἶναι νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὺς ἐν σκέψει γενομένους περὶ πάσης πολιτείας πειρᾶσθαι κατιδεῖν τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον, τίνα τρόπον ἂν γιγνόμενον γίγνοιτο.
858a. Moreover, we are now allowed, as it seems, to study, if we choose, the best form of legislation, or, if we choose, the least elaborate. So let us make our choice between these two.
858a. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ μὲν βουλόμεθα, τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀναγκαιότατον περὶ νόμων· αἱρώμεθα οὖν πότερον δοκεῖ.
Clin. The choice we propose, Stranger, is an absurd one: we should be acting like legislators who were driven by some overpowering necessity to pass laws on the spot, because it is impossible for them to do so on the morrow.
ΚΛ. γελοίαν, ὦ ξένε, προτιθέμεθα τὴν αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κατεχομένοις νομοθέταις ὅμοιοι γιγνοίμεθʼ ἂν ὑπὸ μεγάλης τινὸς ἀνάγκης ἤδη νομοθετεῖν, ὡς οὐκέτʼ ἐξὸν εἰς αὔριον·
858b. But for us (if Heaven will) it is quite possible to do as bricklayers do, or men starting on any other kind of construction,—that is, to collect material piecemeal, from which we may select what is suitable for the edifice we intend to build, and, what is more, select it at our leisure. Let us assume, then, that we are not now building under compulsion, but that we are still at leisure, and engaged partly in collecting material and partly in putting it together; so that we may rightly say that our laws are being in part already erected and in part collected.
858b. ἡμῖν δʼ—εἰπεῖν σὺν θεῷ—ἔξεστι, καθάπερ ἢ λιθολόγοις ἢ καί τινος ἑτέρας ἀρχομένοις συστάσεως, παραφορήσασθαι χύδην ἐξ ὧν ἐκλεξόμεθα τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ μελλούσῃ γενήσεσθαι συστάσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἐκλέξασθαι. τιθῶμεν οὖν ἡμᾶς νῦν εἶναι μὴ τοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἰκοδομοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἔτι τὰ μὲν παρατιθεμένους, τὰ δὲ συνιστάντας· ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ μὲν ἤδη τῶν νόμων λέγειν ὡς τιθέμενα, τὰ δʼ ὡς παρατιθέμενα.
858c. Ath. In this way, Clinias, our survey of laws will at any rate follow nature’s course more closely. Now let us consider, I adjure you, the following point about legislators.
858c. ΑΘ. γένοιτο γοῦν ἄν, ὦ Κλεινία, κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἡ σύνοψις τῶν νόμων. ἴδωμεν γὰρ οὖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ νομοθετῶν.
Clin. What point?
ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
Ath. We have in our States not only the writings and written speeches of many other people, but also the writings and speeches of the lawgiver.
ΑΘ. γράμματα μέν που καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰσὶ πολλῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι.
Clin. Certainly.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. Are we, then, to pay attention to the compositions of the others— poets, and all who, either with or without meter, have composed and put on record their counsels concerning life,—but to pay no attention to those of the lawgivers?
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων συγγράμμασιν, ποιητῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἄνευ μέτρων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων τὴν αὑτῶν εἰς μνήμην συμβουλὴν περὶ βίου κατέθεντο συγγράψαντες, προσέχωμεν τὸν νοῦν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν νομοθετῶν μὴ προσέχωμεν;
858d. Or should we not attend to them above all others?
858d. ἢ πάντων μάλιστα;
Clin. Yes, far above all.
ΚΛ. πολύ γε.
Ath. But we surely do not mean that the lawgiver alone of all the writers is not to give counsel about what is noble, good and just, teaching what these are, and how those who intend to be happy must practice them.
ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα οὐ χρὴ τὸν νομοθέτην μόνον τῶν γραφόντων περὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων συμβουλεύειν, διδάσκοντα οἷά τέ ἐστι καὶ ὡς ἐπιτηδευτέον αὐτὰ τοῖς μέλλουσιν εὐδαίμοσιν ἔσεσθαι;
Clin. Of course he must do so.
ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς οὔ;
858e. Ath. Well then, is it more disgraceful on the part of Homer and Tyrtaeus and the rest of the poets to lay down in their writings bad rules about life and its pursuits, and less disgraceful on the part of Lycurgus and Solon and all the legislators who have written?
858e. ΑΘ. ἀλλὰ αἰσχρὸν δὴ μᾶλλον Ὁμήρῳ τε καὶ Τυρταίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιηταῖς περὶ βίου τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κακῶς θέσθαι γράψαντας, Λυκούργῳ δὲ ἧττον καὶ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅσοι δὴ νομοθέται γενόμενοι γράμματα ἔγραψαν;
859. Ath. Or rather, is it not right that, of all the writings which exist in States, those which concern laws should be seen, when unrolled, to be by far the fairest and best, and all other writings to be either modelled on them or, if disagreeing with them, contemptible?
859. ΑΘ. ἢ τό γε ὀρθόν, πάντων δεῖ γραμμάτων τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους γεγραμμένα φαίνεσθαι διαπτυττόμενα μακρῷ κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ κατʼ ἐκεῖνα συνεπόμενα, ἢ διαφωνοῦντα αὐτοῖς εἶναι καταγέλαστα;
859a. Are we to conceive that the written laws in our States should resemble persons moved by love and wisdom, such as a father or a mother, or that they should order and threaten, like some tyrant and despot, who writes his decree on the wall, and there is an end of it? So let us now consider whether we are going to try to discuss laws with this intention—showing zeal, at any rate, whether or not we may prove successful; and if, in proceeding on this course, we must meet with mishap, so be it.
859a. οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς σχήμασι φιλούντων τε καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων φαίνεσθαι τὰ γεγραμμένα, ἢ κατὰ τύραννον καὶ δεσπότην τάξαντα καὶ ἀπειλήσαντα γράψαντα ἐν τοίχοις ἀπηλλάχθαι; σκοπῶμεν οὖν δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμεῖς πότερα ταύτῃ πειρώμεθα λέγειν διανοηθέντες περὶ νόμων, εἴτʼ οὖν δυνάμεθα εἴτε μή, ἀλλʼ οὖν τό γε πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι·
859b. Yet we pray that it may be well with us, and if God wills, it shall be well.
859b. καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἰόντες, ἂν ἄρα τι καὶ δέῃ πάσχειν, πάσχωμεν. ἀγαθὸν δʼ εἴη τε, καὶ ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ταύτῃ.
Clin. You are right: let us do as you say.
ΚΛ. καλῶς εἴρηκας, ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.
Ath. First of all, since we have started on it, we must examine closely the law about temple-robbers and all forms of thieving and wrongdoing; nor should we be vexed by the fact that, although we enacted some points while legislating, there are some points still under consideration: for we are in process of becoming lawgivers, and may perhaps become so, but we are not lawgivers as yet.
ΑΘ. διασκεπτέον ἄρα πρῶτον, ὥσπερ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν, ἀκριβῶς τὸν περὶ τῶν τε ἱεροσυλούντων καὶ κλοπῆς πάσης πέρι καὶ ἀδικημάτων συμπάντων, καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον εἰ μεταξὺ νομοθετοῦντες τὰ μὲν ἔθεμεν, τῶν δʼ ἔτι διασκοποῦμεν πέρι·
859c. So if we agree to consider the matters I have mentioned in the way I have mentioned, let us so consider them.
859c. νομοθέται γὰρ γιγνόμεθα ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐσμέν πω, τάχα δὲ ἴσως ἂν γενοίμεθα. εἰ δὴ δοκεῖ περὶ ὧν εἴρηκα ὡς εἴρηκα σκοπεῖσθαι, σκοπώμεθα.
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. In respect of goodness and justice as a whole, let us try to discern this,—how far we now agree with ourselves, and how far we differ (for we should certainly say that we desire, if nothing else, to differ at least from the majority of men), and how far also the majority agree or differ among themselves.
ΑΘ. περὶ δὴ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων συμπάντων πειρώμεθα κατιδεῖν τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν νῦν καὶ ὅπῃ διαφερόμεθα ἡμεῖς τε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, οἳ δὴ φαῖμεν ἂν προθυμεῖσθαί γε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, διαφέρειν τῶν πλείστων, οἱ πολλοί τε αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς αὖ.
859d. Clin. What differences of ours have you in mind?
859d. ΚΛ. τὰς ποίας δὲ δὴ διαφορὰς ἡμῶν ἐννοηθεὶς λέγεις;
Ath. I will try to explain. Concerning justice in general, and men, things, or actions that are just, we all agree that these are all beautiful, so that no one would be regarded as saying what was wrong even if he should maintain that just men, however ugly in body, are quite beautiful in respect of their very just character.
ΑΘ. ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράζειν. περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅλως καὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ πράξεων πάντες πως συνομολογοῦμεν πάντα εἶναι ταῦτα καλά, ὥστε οὐδʼ εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο εἶναι τοὺς δικαίους ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες αἰσχροὶ τὰ σώματα, κατʼ αὐτό γε τὸ δικαιότατον ἦθος ταύτῃ παγκάλους εἶναι, σχεδὸν οὐδεὶς ἂν λέγων οὕτω πλημμελῶς δόξειε λέγειν.
859e. Clin. Would not that be right?
859e. ΚΛ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;
Ath. Perhaps; but let us observe this,—that if all things which belong to justice are beautiful, that “all” includes for us passions nearly as much as actions.
ΑΘ. ἴσως· ἴδωμεν δὲ ὡς, εἰ πάντʼ ἐστὶν καλὰ ὅσα δικαιοσύνης ἔχεται, τῶν πάντων τοι καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἡμῖν ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἴσα.
Clin. Well, what then?
ΚΛ. τί οὖν δή;
Ath. Every just action, in so far as it shares in justice, practically in the same degree partakes of beauty.
ΑΘ. ποίημα μέν, ὅπερ ἂν ᾖ δίκαιον, σχεδὸν ὅσονπερ ἂν τοῦ δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχον ἐστί.
860. Ath. It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.
860. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάθος ὅπερ ἂν δικαίου κοινωνῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον γίγνεσθαι καλὸν ὁμολογούμενον, οὐκ ἂν διαφωνοῦντα παρέχοι τὸν λόγον;
860a. Clin. True.
860a. ΚΛ. ἀληθῆ.
Ath. But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.
ΑΘ. ἐὰν δέ γε δίκαιον μὲν ὁμολογῶμεν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἶναι πάθος, διαφωνήσει τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλόν, λεχθέντων τῶν δικαίων αἰσχίστων εἶναι.
Clin. What do you mean by that?
ΚΛ. πῶς τοῦτο εἴρηκας;
Ath. It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.
ΑΘ. οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν ἐννοεῖν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν τεθέντες ἡμῖν νόμοι πάντων ἐναντιώτατα παραγγέλλειν δόξειαν ἂν τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις.
Clin. What statements?
ΚΛ. ποίοις;
860b. Ath. We laid it down that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?
860b. ΑΘ. τὸν ἱερόσυλόν που ἐτίθεμεν δικαίως ἂν ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ τὸν τῶν εὖ κειμένων νόμων πολέμιον, καὶ μέλλοντες δὴ νόμιμα τοιαῦτα τιθέναι πάμπολλα ἐπέσχομεν, ἰδόντες ὡς ταῦτα ἐστὶν μὲν ἄπειρα παθήματα πλήθει καὶ μεγέθεσιν, δικαιότατα δὲ πάντων παθημάτων καὶ συμπάντων αἴσχιστα. μῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἡμῖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ὡς ταὐτὰ σύμπαντα, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς ἐναντιώτατα φανεῖται;
Clin. I am afraid so.
ΚΛ. κινδυνεύει.
860c. Ath. Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.
860c. ΑΘ. τοῖς μὲν τοίνυν πολλοῖς οὕτω περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀσυμφώνως τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια διερριμμένα προσαγορεύεται.
Clin. It certainly seems so, Stranger.
ΚΛ. φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ ξένε.
Ath. Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.
ΑΘ. τὸ τοίνυν ἡμέτερον, ὦ Κλεινία, πάλιν ἴδωμεν πῶς αὖ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔχει τῆς συμφωνίας.
Clin. What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?
ΚΛ. ποίας δὴ πρὸς ποίαν;
Ath. I believe that I expressly stated in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—Clin. What?
ΑΘ. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις οἶμαι διαρρήδην ἐμὲ εἰρηκέναι πως, εἰ δʼ οὖν μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ νῦν ὡς λέγοντα τίθετε—ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
860d. Ath. That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.
860d. ΑΘ. ὡς οἱ κακοὶ πάντες εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί· τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀνάγκη που τούτῳ συνέπεσθαι τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον.
Clin. What statement do you mean?
ΚΛ. τίνα λέγεις;
Ath. This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who, through contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements?
ΑΘ. ὡς ὁ μὲν ἄδικός που κακός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων τοιοῦτος. ἀκουσίως δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐκ ἔχει πράττεσθαί ποτε λόγον· ἄκων οὖν ἐκείνῳ φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ἀδικεῖν ὁ ἀδικῶν τῷ τὴν ἀδικίαν ἀκούσιον τιθεμένῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ὁμολογητέον ἐμοί· σύμφημι γὰρ ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας—εἰ καί τις φιλονικίας ἢ φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα ἄκοντας μὲν ἀδίκους εἶναί φησιν, ἀδικεῖν μὴν ἑκόντας πολλούς, ὅ γʼ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐκεῖνος ἀλλʼ οὐχ οὗτος—τίνα οὖν αὖ τρόπον ἔγωγε συμφωνοίην ἂν τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ λόγοις;
860e. Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—“If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not?” “Legislate by all means,” I shall reply.
860e. εἴ με, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἐρωτῷτε· εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντά ἐστιν, ὦ ξένε, τί συμβουλεύεις ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας τῇ τῶν Μαγνήτων πόλει; πότερον νομοθετεῖν ἢ μή; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; φήσω.
861. Ath. “Will you make a distinction, then, between voluntary and involuntary wrongdoings, and are we to enact heavier penalties for the crimes and wrongdoings that are voluntary, and lighter penalties for the others?
861. ΑΘ. διοριεῖς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀκούσιά τε καὶ ἑκούσια ἀδικήματα, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἑκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων τε καὶ ἀδικημάτων μείζους τὰς ζημίας θήσομεν, τῶν δʼ ἐλάττους;
861a. Or shall we enact equal penalties for all, on the view that there is no such thing as a voluntary act of injustice?”Clin. What you say, Stranger, is quite right: so what use are we to make of our present arguments?Ath. A very proper question! The use we shall make of them, to begin with, is this—Clin. What?Ath. Let us recall how, a moment ago, we rightly stated that in regard to justice we are suffering from the greatest confusion and inconsistency. Grasping this fact, let us again question ourselves,—“As to our perplexity about these matters, since we have neither got it clear nor defined the point of difference between those two kinds of wrongdoing, voluntary and involuntary, which are treated as legally distinct in every State by every legislator who has ever yet appeared,—as to this, is the statement we recently made to stand, like a divine oracle, as a mere ex cathedra statement, unsupported by any proof, and to serve as a kind of master-enactment?”
861a. ἢ πάντων ἐξ ἴσης, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων ἀδικημάτων τὸ παράπαν ἑκουσίων;ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι λέγεις, ὦ ξένε· καὶ τούτοις δὴ τί χρησόμεθα τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις;ΑΘ. καλῶς ἤρου. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖς τόδε χρησώμεθα.ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;ΑΘ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὡς ἔμπροσθεν νυνδὴ καλῶς ἐλέγομεν ὅτι περὶ τὰ δίκαια εἴη παμπόλλη τις ἡμῶν ταραχή τε καὶ ἀσυμφωνία. τοῦτο δὲ λαβόντες πάλιν ἐρωτῶμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἆρʼ οὖν περὶ τὴν τούτων ἀπορίαν οὔτʼ ἐξευπορήσαντες οὔτε διορισάμενοι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, ἃ δὴ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν πάντων τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ὡς δύο εἴδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταύτῃ καὶ νομοθετεῖται· ὁ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος, ὥσπερ παρὰ θεοῦ λεχθείς, τοσοῦτον μόνον εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάξεται, δοὺς δὲ οὐδένα λόγον ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηκεν, κατανομοθετήσει τινὰ τρόπον;
861c. That is impossible; and before we legislate we are bound first to make it clear somehow that these wrong-doings are two-fold, and wherein their difference consists, in order that when we impose the penalty on either kind, everyone may follow our rules, and be able to form some judgment regarding the suitability or otherwise of our enactments.
861c. οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη πως ταῦτα ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νομοθετεῖν δηλῶσαι δύο τε ὄντα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἄλλην, ἵνα, ὅταν ἑκατέρῳ τις τὴν δίκην ἐπιτιθῇ, πᾶς ἐπακολουθῇ τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ δυνατὸς ᾖ τό τε πρεπόντως τεθὲν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ κρῖναι καὶ τὸ μή.
Clin. What you say, Stranger, appears to us to be excellent: we ought to do one of two things,—either not assert that all unjust acts are involuntary, or else make our distinctions first, then prove the correctness of that assertion.
ΚΛ. καλῶς ἡμῖν φαίνῃ λέγειν, ὦ ξένε· δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἡμᾶς χρεών, ἢ μὴ λέγειν ὡς πάντα ἀκούσια τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἢ τοῦτο ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηται πρῶτον διορίσαντας δηλῶσαι.
861d. Ath. Of these alternatives the first is to me quite intolerable—namely, not to assert what I hold to be the truth,—for that would be neither a lawful thing to do nor a pious. But as to the question how such acts are two-fold,—if the difference does not lie in that between the voluntary and the involuntary, then we must try to explain it by means of some other distinction.
861d. ΑΘ. τούτοιν τοίνυν τοῖν δυοῖν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐμοὶ πάντως που γίγνεσθαι, τό γε δὴ μὴ λέγειν, οὕτως οἰόμενον ἔχειν τἀληθές—οὐ γὰρ ἂν νόμιμον οὐδʼ ὅσιον ἂν εἴη—κατὰ τίνα δὲ τρόπον ἐστὸν δύο, εἰ μὴ τῷ τε ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τῷ ἑκουσίῳ διαφέρετον ἑκάτερον; ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δή ποτε πειρατέον ἁμῶς γέ πως δηλοῦν.
Clin. Well, certainly, Stranger, about this matter there is no other plan we can possibly adopt.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως πως ἡμᾶς διανοηθῆναι.
861e. Ath. It shall be done. Come now, in dealings and intercourse between citizens, injuries committed by one against another are of frequent occurrence, and they involve plenty of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary.
861e. ΑΘ. ταῦτα ἔσται. φέρε δή, βλάβαι μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλήλων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις τε καὶ ὁμιλίαις πολλαὶ γίγνονται, καὶ τό γε ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον ἐν αὐταῖς ἄφθονόν ἐστι.
Clin. To be sure!
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
862. Ath. Let no one put down all injuries as acts of injustice and then regard the unjust acts involved as two-fold in the way described, namely, that they are partly voluntary and partly involuntary (for, of the total, the involuntary injuries are not less than the voluntary either in number or in magnitude);
862. ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τις τὰς βλάβας πάσας ἀδικίας τιθείς, οὕτως οἴηται καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἐν αὐταῖσι ταύτῃ γίγνεσθαι διπλᾶ, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια δή, τὰ δʼ ἀκούσια—βλάβαι γὰρ ἀκούσιοι τῶν πάντων οὔτʼ ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε μεγέθεσιν ἐλάττους εἰσὶ τῶν ἑκουσίων—σκοπεῖσθε δὲ εἴτε τι λέγω λέγων ἃ μέλλω λέγειν, εἴτε καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν.
862a. but consider whether in saying what I am now going to say I am speaking sense or absolute nonsense. For what I assert, Megillus and Clinias, is not that, if one man harms another involuntarily and without wishing it, he acts unjustly though involuntarily, nor shall I legislate in this way, pronouncing this to be an involuntary act of injustice, but I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice at all, whether it be a greater injury or a less. And, if my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of a benefit wrongly done commits an injustice;
862a. οὐ γάρ φημι ἔγωγε, ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, εἴ τίς τινά τι πημαίνει μὴ βουλόμενος ἀλλʼ ἄκων, ἀδικεῖν μέν, ἄκοντα μήν, καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ νομοθετήσω, τοῦτο ὡς ἀκούσιον ἀδίκημα νομοθετῶν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ἀδικίαν τὸ παράπαν θήσω τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην, οὔτε ἂν μείζων οὔτε ἂν ἐλάττων τῳ γίγνηται· πολλάκις δὲ ὠφελίαν οὐκ ὀρθὴν γενομένην τὸν τῆς ὠφελίας αἴτιον ἀδικεῖν φήσομεν, ἐὰν ἥ γʼ ἐμὴ νικᾷ.
862b. for as a rule, my friends, neither when a man gives some material object to another, nor when he takes it away, ought one to term such an act absolutely just or unjust, but only when a man of just character and disposition does any benefit or injury to another,—that is what the lawgiver must look at; he must consider these two things, injustice and injury, and the injury inflicted he must make good so far as possible by legal means; he must conserve what is lost, restore what has been broken down, make whole what is wounded or dead; and when the several injuries have been atoned for by compensation, he must endeavor always by means of the laws to convert the parties who have inflicted them and those who have suffered them from a state of discord to a state of amity.
862b. σχεδὸν γάρ, ὦ φίλοι, οὔτʼ εἴ τίς τῳ δίδωσίν τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτʼ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἄδικον χρὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἤθει καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτό ἐστιν τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην, καὶ τὸ μὲν βλαβὲν ὑγιὲς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ποιητέον, τό τε ἀπολόμενον σῴζοντα καὶ τὸ πεσὸν ὑπό του πάλιν ἐξορθοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωθὲν ἢ τρωθέν, ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ ἀποίνοις ἐξιλασθὲν τοῖς δρῶσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ἑκάστας τῶν βλάψεων, ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλίαν πειρατέον ἀεὶ καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.
862c. Clin. He will be right in doing that.Ath. As regards unjust injuries and gains, in case one man causes another to gain by acting unjustly towards him, all such cases as are curable we must cure, regarding them as diseases of the soul. And we should affirm that our cure for injustice lies in this direction—Clin. What direction?
862c. ΚΛ. καλῶς ταῦτά γε.ΑΘ. τὰς τοίνυν ἀδίκους αὖ βλάβας καὶ κέρδη δέ, ἐάν τις ἀδικῶν τινα κερδαίνειν ποιῇ, τούτων ὁπόσα μὲν ἰατά, ὡς οὐσῶν ἐν ψυχῇ νόσων, ἰᾶσθαι· τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰάσεως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀδικίας τῇδε ῥέπειν χρὴ φάναι.ΚΛ. πῇ;
862d. Ath. In this,—that whenever any man commits any unjust act, great or small, the law shall instruct him and absolutely compel him for the future either never willingly to dare to do such a deed, or else to do it ever so much less often, in addition to paying for the injury. To effect this, whether by action or speech, by means of pleasures and pains, honors and dishonors, money-fines and money-gifts, and in general by whatsoever means one can employ to make men hate injustice and love (or at any rate not hate) justice,—this is precisely the task of laws most noble.
862d. ΑΘ. ὅπως ὅτι τις ἂν ἀδικήσῃ μέγα ἢ σμικρόν, ὁ νόμος αὐτὸν διδάξει καὶ ἀναγκάσει τὸ παράπαν εἰς αὖθις τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ μηδέποτε ἑκόντα τολμῆσαι ποιεῖν ἢ διαφερόντως ἧττον πολύ, πρὸς τῇ τῆς βλάβης ἐκτίσει. ταῦτα εἴτε ἔργοις ἢ λόγοις, ἢ μεθʼ ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἢ τιμῶν ἢ ἀτιμιῶν, καὶ χρημάτων ζημίας ἢ καὶ δώρων, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ ποιήσει τις μισῆσαι μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν, στέρξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ μισεῖν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν, αὐτό ἐστιν τοῦτο ἔργον τῶν καλλίστων νόμων.
862e. But for all those whom he perceives to be incurable in respect of these matters, what penalty shall the lawgiver enact, and what law?
862e. ὃν δʼ ἂν ἀνιάτως εἰς ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἴσθηται νομοθέτης, δίκην τούτοισι καὶ νόμον θήσει τίνα;
863. Ath. The lawgiver will realize that in all such cases not only is it better for the sinners themselves to live no longer, but also that they will prove of a double benefit to others by quitting life—since they will both serve as a warning to the rest not to act unjustly, and also rid the State of wicked men, —and thus he will of necessity inflict death as the chastisement for their sins, in cases of this kind, and of this kind only.
863. ΑΘ. γιγνώσκων που τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσιν ὡς οὔτε αὐτοῖς ἔτι ζῆν ἄμεινον, τούς τε ἄλλους ἂν διπλῇ ὠφελοῖεν ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τοῦ βίου, παράδειγμα μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι, ποιοῦντες δὲ ἀνδρῶν κακῶν ἔρημον τὴν πόλιν, οὕτω δὴ τῶν τοιούτων πέρι νομοθέτῃ κολαστὴν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων θάνατον ἀνάγκη νέμειν, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς.
863a. Clin. What you have said seems very reasonable; but we should be glad to hear a still clearer statement respecting the difference between injury and injustice, and how the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary applies in these cases.
863a. ΚΛ. ἔοικε μέν πως λέγεσθαι τὰ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ μάλα μετρίως, ἥδιον δʼ ἂν ἔτι σαφέστερον ἀκούσαιμεν ταῦτα ῥηθέντα, τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεποίκιλται.
Ath. I must endeavor to do as you bid me, and explain the matter.
ΑΘ. πειρατέον τοίνυν ὡς κελεύετε δρᾶν, καὶ λέγειν.
863b. No doubt in conversing with one another you say and hear said at least thus much about the soul, that one element in its nature (be it affection or part) is “passion,” which is an inbred quality of a contentious and pugnacious kind, and one that overturns many things by its irrational force.
863b. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοσόνδε γε περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λέγετε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀκούετε, ὡς ἓν μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὢν ὁ θυμός, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, ἀλογίστῳ βίᾳ πολλὰ ἀνατρέπει.
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Ath. Moreover, we distinguish “pleasure” from passion, and we assert that its mastering power is of an opposite kind, since it effects all that its intention desires by a mixture of persuasion and deceit.
ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονήν γε οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ αὐτῷ φαμεν ῥώμης δυναστεύουσαν, πειθοῖ μετὰ ἀπάτης βιαίου πράττειν πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ.
Clin. Exactly.
ΚΛ. καὶ μάλα.
863c. Ath. Nor would it be untrue to say that the third cause of sins is ignorance. This cause, however, the lawgiver would do well to subdivide into two, counting ignorance in its simple form to be the cause of minor sins, and in its double form—where the folly is due to the man being gripped not by ignorance only, but also by a conceit of wisdom, as though he had full knowledge of things he knows nothing at all about,—counting this to be the cause of great and brutal sins when it is joined with strength and might, but the cause of childish and senile sins when it is joined with weakness; and these last he will count as sins and he will ordain laws, as for sinners, but laws that will be, above all others, of the most mild and merciful kind.
863c. ΑΘ. τρίτον μὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο· διχῇ μὴν διελόμενος αὐτὸ ὁ νομοθέτης ἂν βελτίων εἴη, τὸ μὲν ἁπλοῦν αὐτοῦ κούφων ἁμαρτημάτων αἴτιον ἡγούμενος, τὸ δὲ διπλοῦν, ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν, μετὰ μὲν ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης ἑπομένης μεγάλων καὶ ἀμούσων ἁμαρτημάτων τιθεὶς αἴτια τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀσθενείας δὲ ἑπομένης, παίδειά τε ἁμαρτήματα καὶ πρεσβυτέρων γιγνόμενα θήσει μὲν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν νόμους τάξει, πρᾳοτάτους γε μὴν πάντων καὶ συγγνώμης πλείστης ἐχομένους.
863d. Clin. That is reasonable.
863d. ΚΛ. εἰκότα λέγεις.
Ath. And pretty well everyone speaks of one man being “superior,” another “inferior,” to pleasure or to passion; and they are so.
ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ θυμοῦ λέγομεν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὡς ὁ μὲν κρείττων ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστίν· καὶ ἔχει ταύτῃ.
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. But we have never heard it said that one man is “superior,” another “inferior,” to ignorance.
ΑΘ. ἀγνοίας δέ γε ὡς ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κρείττων, ὁ δὲ ἥττων, οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν πώποτε.
863e. Clin. Quite true.
863e. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα.
Ath. And we assert that all these things urge each man often to go counter to the actual bent of his own inclination.
ΑΘ. πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταῦτά φαμεν εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον ἕκαστον εἰς τἀναντία πολλάκις ἅμα.
Clin. Very frequently.
ΚΛ. πλειστάκις μὲν οὖν.
864. Ath. Now I will define for you, clearly and without complication, my notion of justice and injustice. The domination of passion and fear and pleasure and pain and envies and desires in the soul, whether they do any injury or not, I term generally “injustice”; but the belief in the highest good— in whatsoever way either States or individuals think they can attain to it,—if this prevails in their souls and regulates every man, even if some damage be done, we must assert that everything thus done is just, and that in each man the part subject to this governance is also just, and best for the whole life of mankind, although most men suppose that such damage is an involuntary injustice. But we are not now concerned with a verbal dispute.
864. ΑΘ. νῦν δή σοι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, ὅ γε ἐγὼ λέγω, σαφῶς ἂν διορισαίμην οὐδὲν ποικίλλων. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ φόβου καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης καὶ φθόνων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα, ἐάντε τι βλάπτῃ καὶ ἐὰν μή, πάντως ἀδικίαν προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἔσεσθαι τούτων ἡγήσωνται πόλις εἴτε ἰδιῶταί τινες, ἐὰν αὕτη κρατοῦσα ἐν ψυχαῖς διακοσμῇ πάντα ἄνδρα, κἂν σφάλληταί τι, δίκαιον μὲν πᾶν εἶναι φατέον τὸ ταύτῃ πραχθὲν καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς γιγνόμενον ὑπήκοον ἑκάστων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον ἄριστον, δοξάζεσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην. ἡμῖν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν τὰ νῦν ὀνομάτων πέρι δύσερις λόγος, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων τρία εἴδη δεδήλωται γιγνόμενα, ταῦτα εἰς μνήμην πρῶτον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀναληπτέον.
864b. Since, however, it has been shown that there are three kinds of sinning, we must first of all recall these still more clearly to mind. Of these, one kind, as we know, is painful; and that we term passion and fear.
864b. λύπης μὲν οὖν, ἣν θυμὸν καὶ φόβον ἐπονομάζομεν, ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν ἐστιν.
Clin. Quite so.
ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ath. The second kind consists of pleasure and desires; the third, which is a distinct kind, consists of hopes and untrue belief regarding the attainment of the highest good. And when this last kind is subdivided into three, five classes are made, as we now assert; and for these five classes we must enact distinct laws, of two main types.
ΑΘ. ἡδονῆς δʼ αὖ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον, ἐλπίδων δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἔφεσις τρίτον ἕτερον. τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τρία διχῇ τμηθέντος πέντε εἴδη γέγονεν, ὡς νῦν φαμεν·
864c. Clin. What are they?Ath. The one concerns acts done on each occasion by violent and open means, the other acts done privily under cover of darkness and deceit, or sometimes acts done in both these ways,—and for acts of this last kind the laws will be most severe, if they are to prove adequate.Clin. Naturally.Ath. Let us revert next to that point from which we digressed, and proceed with our enactment of the laws.
864c. οἷς νόμους διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων πέντε εἴδεσιν θετέον ἐν δυοῖν γένεσιν.ΚΛ. τίσιν τούτοις;ΑΘ. τὸ μὲν διὰ βιαίων καὶ συμφανῶν πράξεων πραττόμενον ἑκάστοτε, τὸ δὲ μετὰ σκότους καὶ ἀπάτης λαθραίως γιγνόμενον, ἔστιν δʼ ὅτε καὶ διʼ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν πραχθέν· ᾧ δὴ καὶ νόμοι τραχύτατοι γίγνοιντο ἄν, εἰ τὸ προσῆκον μέρος ἔχοιεν.ΚΛ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.ΑΘ. ἴωμεν δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκεῖσε ὁπόθεν ἐξέβημεν δεῦρο, περαίνοντες τὴν θέσιν τῶν νόμων. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν κείμενα περί τε τῶν συλώντων, οἶμαι, τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰ περὶ προδοτῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν τοὺς νόμους διαφθειρόντων ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς παρούσης πολιτείας.
864d. We had, I believe, laid down the laws dealing with those who plunder the gods and with traitors, and also with those who wreck the laws with intent to overthrow the existing constitution. An act of this kind a man might commit when mad, or when suffering from some disease or from excessive senility, or in a state of childishness, whereby he is no better than a madman. If any case of this kind is ever brought to the notice of the selected judges, either on the information of the doer of the act or on that of him who is pleading for the doer, and if it be judged that he was in this state of madness when he broke the law, then he shall certainly pay for the damage he has done, but only the exact sum, and he shall be acquitted of the other charges, unless it be that he has killed a man and has not purged his hands from blood: in this case he shall depart into another country and place, and dwell there as an exile for a year; and should he return within the time fixed by the law or set foot at all within his own country, he shall be put in the public jail by the Law-wardens for the space of two years,
864d. τούτων δή τις ἂν ἴσως πράξειέν τι μανείς, ἢ νόσοις ἢ γήρᾳ ὑπερμέτρῳ συνεχόμενος, ἢ παιδίᾳ χρώμενος, οὐδέν πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων· ὧν ἂν γίγνηταί τι φανερὸν τοῖς ἐκλεχθεῖσιν ἑκάστοτε δικασταῖς, ἀναφέροντος τοῦ δράσαντος ἢ τοῦ σκηπτομένου ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, κριθῇ δὲ οὕτω διατεθεὶς παρανομῆσαι, τὴν μὲν βλάβην ἣν ἄν τινα καταβλάψῃ πάντως ἁπλῆν ἀποτινέτω, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιωμάτων ἀφείσθω, πλὴν ἂν ἄρα τινὰ ἀποκτείνας μὴ καθαρὸς ᾖ τὰς χεῖρας φόνου· οὕτω δʼ εἰς ἄλλην χώραν καὶ τόπον ἀπελθὼν οἰκείτω τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκδημῶν, πρότερον δὲ ἐλθὼν τοῦ χρόνου ὃν ὁ νόμος ὥρισεν, ἢ καὶ πάσης ἐπιβὰς τῆς οἰκείας χώρας, ἐν δημοσίῳ δεσμῷ δεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν νομοφυλάκων δύο ἐνιαυτούς, οὕτως ἀπαλλαττέσθω τῶν δεσμῶν.
865a. and not let out of jail until after that time.Ath. We need not hesitate to enact laws about every class of murder on similar lines, now that we have made a beginning. First we shall deal with the cases that are violent and involuntary. If a man has killed a friend in a contest or in public games—whether his death has been immediate or as the after-effect of wounds,—or similarly if he has killed him in war or in some action of training for war, either when practicing javelin-work without armor or when engaged in some warlike maneuver in heavy armor,—then, when he has been purified as the Delphic rule on this matter directs, he shall be accounted pure.
865a. ΑΘ. φόνου δὴ καθάπερ ἠρξάμεθα, πειρώμεθα διὰ τέλους παντὸς εἴδους πέρι φόνου θεῖναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βίαια καὶ ἀκούσια λέγωμεν. εἴ τις ἐν ἀγῶνι καὶ ἄθλοις δημοσίοις ἄκων, εἴτε παραχρῆμα εἴτε καὶ ἐν ὑστέροις χρόνοις ἐκ τῶν πληγῶν, ἀπέκτεινέν τινα φίλιον, ἢ κατὰ πόλεμον ὡσαύτως ἢ κατὰ μελέτην τὴν πρὸς πόλεμον, ποιουμένων ἄσκησιν [τῶν ἀρχόντων] ψιλοῖς σώμασιν ἢ μετά τινων ὅπλων ἀπομιμουμένων τὴν πολεμικὴν πρᾶξιν, καθαρθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομισθέντα περὶ τούτων νόμον ἔστω καθαρός·
865b. So too with respect to all doctors, if the patient dies against the will of his doctor, the doctor shall be accounted legally pure. And if one man kills another of his own act, but involuntarily,—whether it be with his own unarmed body, or by a tool or a weapon, or by a dose of drink or of solid food, or by application of fire or of cold, or by deprivation of air, and whether he does it himself with his own body or by means of other bodies,— in all cases it shall be accounted to be his own personal act, and he shall pay the following penalties.
865b. ἰατρῶν δὲ πέρι πάντων, ἂν ὁ θεραπευόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀκόντων τελευτᾷ, καθαρὸς ἔστω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μέν, ἄκων δὲ ἀποκτείνῃ τις ἕτερος ἕτερον, εἴτε τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ψιλῷ εἴτε ὀργάνῳ ἢ βέλει ἢ πώματος ἢ σίτου δόσει ἢ πυρὸς ἢ χειμῶνος προσβολῇ ἢ στερήσει πνεύματος, αὐτὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι ἢ διʼ ἑτέρων σωμάτων, πάντως ἔστω μὲν ὡς αὐτόχειρ, δίκας δὲ τινέτω τὰς τοιάσδε·
865c. If he kill a slave, he shall secure the master against damage and loss, reckoning as if it were a slave of his own that had been destroyed, or else he shall be liable to a penalty of double the value of the dead man,—and the judges shall make an assessment of his value,—and he must also employ means of purification greater and more numerous than those employed by persons who kill a man at games, and those interpreters whom the oracle names shall be in charge of these rites; but if it be a slave of his own that he has killed, he shall be set free after the legal purification.
865c. ἐὰν μὲν δοῦλον κτείνῃ, νομίζων τὸν ἑαυτοῦ διειργάσθαι τὸν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος δεσπότην ἀβλαβῆ παρεχέτω καὶ ἀζήμιον, ἢ δίκην εἰς τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος ὑπεχέτω διπλῆν, τῆς δὲ ἀξίας οἱ δικασταὶ διάγνωσιν ποιείσθωσαν, καθαρμοῖς δὲ χρήσασθαι μείζοσίν τε καὶ πλείοσι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἆθλα ἀποκτεινάντων, τούτων δʼ ἐξηγητὰς εἶναι κυρίους οὓς ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἀνέλῃ·
865d. And if anyone kill a free man involuntarily, he shall undergo the same purifications as the man that has killed a slave; and there is an ancient tale, told of old, to which he must not fail to pay regard. The tale is this,—that the man slain by violence, who has lived in a free and proud spirit, is wroth with his slayer when newly slain, and being filled also with dread and horror on account of his own violent end, when he sees his murderer going about in the very haunts which he himself had frequented, he is horror-stricken; and being disquieted himself, he takes conscience as his ally, and with all his might disquiets his slayer—both the man himself and his doings.
865d. ἐὰν δὲ αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, καθηράμενος ἀπαλλαττέσθω τοῦ φόνου κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐλεύθερον ἄκων ἀποκτείνῃ, τοὺς μὲν καθαρμοὺς τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρθήτω τῷ τὸν δοῦλον ἀποκτείναντι, παλαιὸν δέ τινα τῶν ἀρχαίων μύθων λεγόμενον μὴ ἀτιμαζέτω. λέγεται δὲ ὡς ὁ θανατωθεὶς ἄρα βιαίως, ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ φρονήματι βεβιωκώς, θυμοῦταί τε τῷ δράσαντι νεοθνὴς ὤν, καὶ φόβου καὶ δείματος ἅμα διὰ τὴν βίαιον πάθην αὐτὸς πεπληρωμένος, ὁρῶν τε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φονέα ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συνηθείας ἀναστρεφόμενον, δειμαίνει, καὶ ταραττόμενος αὐτὸς ταράττει κατὰ δύναμιν πᾶσαν τὸν δράσαντα, μνήμην σύμμαχον ἔχων, αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτοῦ.
865e. Wherefore it is right for the slayer to retire before his victim for a full year, in all its seasons, and to vacate all the spots he owned in all parts of his native land;
865e. διὸ δὴ χρεών ἐστιν ἄρα ὑπεξελθεῖν τῷ παθόντι τὸν δράσαντα τὰς ὥρας πάσας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ἐρημῶσαι πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους συμπάσης τῆς πατρίδος·
866. Ath. and if the dead man be a Stranger, he shall be barred also from the Stranger’s country for the same period.
866. ΑΘ. ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ὁ τελευτήσας ᾖ, καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου χώρας εἰργέσθω τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους.
866a. If a man willingly obeys this law, he that is nearest of kin to the dead man, having the supervision of the performance of all these rules, shall pardon him and live at peace with him, and in doing so he will be acting with perfect propriety; but if a man disobeys, and dares, in the first place, to approach the altars and to do sacrifice while still unpurified, and if he refuses, further, to fulfil the times appointed in exile, then the next of kin to the dead man shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and in case of conviction all the penalties shall be doubled.
866a. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ νόμῳ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηταί τις, ὁ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γένει ἐγγύτατα, ἐπίσκοπος ὢν τούτων πάντων γενομένων, ἐχέτω συγγνώμην τε καὶ ἄγων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰρήνην μέτριος ἂν εἴη πάντως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀκάθαρτος ὢν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τολμᾷ πορεύεσθαι καὶ θύειν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς χρόνους μὴ ἐθέλῃ πληροῦν ἀποξενούμενος τοὺς εἰρημένους, ὁ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γένει ἐγγύτατα ἐπεξίτω μὲν φόνου τῷ κτείναντι, διπλᾶ δὲ πάντα ἔστω τὰ τιμωρήματα τῷ ὀφλόντι.
866b. And should the nearest relative fail to prosecute for the crime, it shall be as though the pollution had passed on to him, through the victim claiming atonement for his fate; and whoso pleases shall bring a charge against him, and compel him by law to quit his country for five years. And if a Stranger involuntarily kills a Stranger who is resident in the State, whoso pleases shall prosecute him under the same laws;
866b. ἐὰν δʼ ὁ προσήκων ἐγγύτατα μὴ ἐπεξίῃ τῷ παθήματι, τὸ μίασμα ὡς εἰς αὐτὸν περιεληλυθός, τοῦ παθόντος προστρεπομένου τὴν πάθην, ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπεξελθὼν τούτῳ δίκην, πέντε ἔτη ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς αὑτοῦ πατρίδος ἀναγκαζέτω κατὰ νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἄκων ξένον κτείνῃ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐπεξίτω μὲν ὁ βουλόμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις, μέτοικος δὲ ὢν ἀπενιαυτησάτω, ξένος δὲ ἂν ᾖ παντάπασιν, πρὸς τῷ καθαρμῷ, ἐάντε ξένον ἐάντε μέτοικον ἐάντε ἀστὸν κτείνῃ, τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τῆς χώρας τῆς τῶν νόμων τῶνδε κυρίας εἰργέσθω·
866c. and if he be a resident alien, he shall be exiled for a year, while if he be altogether a Stranger—whether the man slain be a Stranger or resident alien or citizen—in addition to the purifications imposed, he shall be barred for all his life from the country which ordains these laws; and if he transgresses the law, and comes back to it, the Law-wardens shall punish him with death; and if he has any property, they shall hand it over to the next of kin of the victim.
866c. ἐὰν δʼ ἔλθῃ παρανόμως, οἱ νομοφύλακες θανάτῳ ζημιούντων αὐτόν, καὶ ἐὰν ἔχῃ οὐσίαν τινά, τῷ τοῦ παθόντος ἐγγύτατα γένει παραδιδόντων. ἐὰν δὲ ἄκων ἔλθῃ, ἂν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκπίπτῃ πρὸς τὴν χώραν, σκηνησάμενος ἐν θαλάττῃ τέγγων τοὺς πόδας πλοῦν ἐπιφυλαττέτω, κατὰ γῆν δὲ ἂν βίᾳ ὑπό τινων ἀχθῇ, ἡ πρώτη προστυχοῦσα ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει λύσασα, εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἐκπεμπέτω ἄσυλον.
866d. And should he come back unwillingly, in case he be shipwrecked off the coast of the country, he shall camp with his feet in the sea, and watch for a ship to take him off; or in case he be brought in by people forcibly by land, the first magistrate of the State that meets with him shall loose him, and send him out over the border unharmed. If a person with his own hand kills a free man, and the deed be done in passion, in a case of this kind we must begin by making a distinction between two varieties of the crime. For murder is committed in passion by those who, on a sudden and without intent to kill, destroy a man by blows or some such means in an immediate attack, when the deed is at once followed by repentance; and it is also a case of murder done in passion whenever men who are insulted by shameful words or actions seek for vengeance, and end by killing a man with deliberate intent to kill, and feel no repentance for the deed.
866d. ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, θυμῷ δὲ ᾖ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπραχθέν, διχῇ δεῖ πρῶτον τὸ τοιοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῷ γὰρ δὴ πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι ἂν ἐξαίφνης μὲν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτως τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ διαφθείρωσί τινα παραχρῆμα τῆς ὁρμῆς γενομένης, μεταμέλειά τε εὐθὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένου γίγνηται, θυμῷ δὲ καὶ ὅσοι προπηλακισθέντες λόγοις ἢ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, μεταδιώκοντες τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὕστερον ἀποκτείνωσί τινα βουληθέντες κτεῖναι καὶ τὸ πεπραγμένον αὐτοῖς ἀμεταμέλητον γίγνηται.
867. Ath. We must lay it down, as it seems, that these murders are of two kinds, both as a rule done in passion, and most properly described as lying midway between the voluntary and the involuntary.
867. ΑΘ. διττοὺς μὲν δὴ τοὺς φόνους, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀμφοτέρους θυμῷ γεγονότας, μεταξὺ δέ που τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου δικαιότατʼ ἂν λεγομένους.
867a. None the less, each of these kinds tends to resemble one or other of these contraries; for the man who retains his passion and takes vengeance, not suddenly on the spur of the moment, but after lapse of time, and with deliberate intent, resembles the voluntary murderer; whereas the man who does not nurse his rage, but gives way to it at once on the spur of the moment and without deliberate intent, has a likeness to the involuntary murderer; yet neither is he wholly involuntary, but bears a resemblance thereto.
867a. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰκών ἐσθʼ ἑκάτερος· ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἐξαίφνης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος ἑκουσίῳ ἔοικεν, ὁ δὲ ἀταμιεύτως ταῖς ὀργαῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα εὐθὺς χρώμενος ἀπροβουλεύτως ὅμοιος μὲν ἀκουσίῳ, ἔστι δὲ οὐδʼ οὗτος αὖ παντάπασιν ἀκούσιος ἀλλʼ εἰκὼν ἀκουσίου.
867b. Thus murders done in passion are difficult to define,—whether one should treat them in law as voluntary or involuntary. The best and truest way is to class them both as resemblances, and to distinguish them by the mark of deliberate intent or lack of intent, and to impose more severe penalties on those who slay with intent and in anger, and milder penalties on those who do so without intent and on a sudden. For that which resembles a greater evil must be more heavily punished, that which resembles a lesser evil more lightly.
867b. διὸ χαλεποὶ διορίζειν οἱ τῷ θυμῷ πραχθέντες φόνοι, πότερον ἑκουσίους αὐτοὺς ἤ τινας ὡς ἀκουσίους νομοθετητέον, βέλτιστον μὴν καὶ ἀληθέστατον εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἄμφω θεῖναι, τεμεῖν δὲ αὐτὼ χωρὶς τῇ ἐπιβουλῇ καὶ ἀπροβουλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετʼ ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ ὀργῇ κτείνασιν τὰς τιμωρίας χαλεπωτέρας, τοῖς δὲ ἀπροβουλεύτως τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης πρᾳοτέρας νομοθετεῖν· τὸ γὰρ εἰκὸς μείζονι κακῷ μειζόνως, τὸ δʼ ἐλάττονι τιμωρητέον ἐλαττόνως.
867c. So our laws also must do likewise.
867c. ποιητέον δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις νόμοις οὕτω.
Clin. They must, most certainly.
ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ath. Returning, then, to our task, let us make this pronouncement:—If a man with his own hand slay a free man, and the deed be done in rage without deliberate intent, he shall suffer such other penalties as it is proper for the man to suffer who has slain without passion, and he shall be compelled to go into exile for two years, thereby chastising his own passion.
ΑΘ. πάλιν ἐπανελθόντες τοίνυν λέγωμεν· ἂν ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ἀπροβουλεύτως ὀργῇ τινι γένηται πραχθέν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθάπερ ἄνευ θυμοῦ κτείναντι προσῆκέν τῳ πάσχειν, πασχέτω, δύο δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔτη φευγέτω κολάζων τὸν αὑτοῦ θυμόν. ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μέν, μετʼ ἐπιβουλῆς δὲ κτείνας τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν πρόσθεν αὖ, τρία δὲ ἔτη, καθάπερ ἅτερος ἔφευγεν τὰ δύο, φευγέτω, μεγέθει θυμοῦ πλείω τιμωρηθεὶς χρόνον.
867d. And he that slays in passion and with deliberate intent shall be treated in other respects like the former, but shall be exiled for three years—instead of two, like the other,—receiving a longer period of punishment because of the greatness of his passion. As regards the return home, in such cases it shall be on this wise. (It is a difficult matter to legislate for with exactness; for sometimes the more dangerous of the two murderers in the eye of the law might prove the more gentle and the gentler the more dangerous, and the latter might have committed the murder more savagely, the former more gently; though as a rule matters turn out in the way we have stated:
867d. καθόδου δὲ πέρι τούτοις ὧδε ἔστω. χαλεπὸν μὲν ἀκριβῶς νομοθετεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτοιν ὁ τῷ νόμῳ ταχθεὶς χαλεπώτερος ἡμερώτερος ἄν, ὁ δὲ ἡμερώτερος χαλεπώτερος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν φόνον ἀγριωτέρως ἂν πράξειεν, ὁ δὲ ἡμερωτέρως· ὡς δὲ τὸ πολὺ κατὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.
867e. so, regarding all these regulations the Law-wardens must act as supervisors). When the period of exile in each case has elapsed, they must send twelve of their number to the borders of the country to act as judges—they having made during the interval a still closer investigation into the actions of the exiles;
867e. τούτων οὖν πάντων ἐπιγνώμονας εἶναι χρὴ νομοφύλακας, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ὁ χρόνος ἔλθῃ τῆς φυγῆς ἑκατέρῳ, πέμπειν αὐτῶν δικαστὰς δώδεκα ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῆς χώρας, ἐσκεμμένους ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ τὰς τῶν φυγόντων πράξεις ἔτι σαφέστερον, καὶ τῆς αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ καταδοχῆς τούτων δικαστὰς γίγνεσθαι, ΑΘ.
868. Ath. and these men shall serve also as judges in regard to the matter of giving them pardon and admitting them back; and the exiles must abide by the verdicts of these magistrates. And if either of them, after his return, again yields to rage and commits the same act, he shall be exiled, and never again return; and if he returns, he shall suffer the same fate as the returned Stranger. He that slays a slave of his own shall purify himself; and if he kill another man’s slave in rage, he shall pay to the owner twice the damage. And if anyone of all these types of slayers disobeys the law and, being unpurified, defiles the market and the games and other sacred assemblies, whoso pleases shall prosecute both that member of the dead man’s kindred who permits this and the slayer himself, and shall compel the one of them to exact, and the other to pay, double the amount of the money-fines and of the other exactions; and the sum so paid he shall keep for himself as the law directs.
868. τοὺς δὲ αὖ τοῖς δικασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρχόντων ἐμμένειν. ἐὰν δʼ αὖθίς ποτε κατελθὼν ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν ἡττηθεὶς ὀργῇ πράξῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, φυγὼν μηκέτι κατέλθῃ, κατελθὼν δέ, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ξένου ἄφιξιν ταύτῃ πασχέτω. δοῦλον δʼ ὁ κτείνας ἑαυτοῦ μὲν καθηράσθω, ἐὰν δὲ ἀλλότριον θυμῷ, διπλῇ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτεισάτω τῷ κεκτημένῳ. ὅστις δʼ ἂν τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων πάντων μὴ πείθηται τῷ νόμῳ, ἀλλʼ ἀκάθαρτος ὢν ἀγοράν τε καὶ ἆθλα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἱερὰ μιαίνῃ, ὁ βουλόμενος, τόν τε ἐπιτρέποντα τῶν προσηκόντων τῷ τελευτήσαντι καὶ τὸν ἀποκτείναντα εἰς δίκην καταστήσας, τὴν διπλασίαν χρημάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων ἀναγκαζέτω πράττειν τε καὶ ἐκτίνειν, τὸ δὲ ἔκτεισμα αὐτὸς αὑτῷ κομιζέσθω κατὰ τὸν νόμον.
868b. If a slave kills his own master in rage, the kindred of the dead man shall treat the slayer how they please,—save that they must not in any wise let him live,—and shall be held guiltless.
868b. ἐὰν δέ τις θυμῷ δοῦλος δεσπότην αὑτοῦ κτείνῃ, τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ τελευτήσαντος χρωμένους τῷ κτείναντι χρείαν ἣν ἂν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ζωγροῦντας, καθαροὺς εἶναι·
868c. And if a slave kill a free man (other than his master) in rage, his masters shall hand over the slave to the kindred of the dead man, and they shall be compelled to put the criminal to death, doing so in whatever manner they choose. If in a fit of rage a father or mother slays a son or daughter by means of blows or some kind of violence,—an occurrence which, though rare, does sometimes happen,—the slayer must make the same purifications as the other slayers, and be exiled for three years;
868c. ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλος τις δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀποκτείνῃ θυμῷ, παραδιδόντων οἱ δεσπόται τὸν δοῦλον τοῖς προσήκουσι τοῦ τελευτήσαντος, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν θανατωσάντων τὸν δράσαντα, τρόπῳ δὲ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν. ἂν δʼ, ὃ γίγνεται μέν, ὀλιγάκις δέ, διὰ θυμὸν πατὴρ ἢ μήτηρ ὑὸν ἢ θυγατέρα πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τρόπῳ βιαίῳ κτείνῃ, καθάρσεις μὲν τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις καθαιρέσθω καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς ἀπενιαυτεῖν, κατελθόντων δὲ τῶν κτεινάντων, ἀπαλλάττεσθαι γυναῖκά τε ἀπʼ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπὸ γυναικός, καὶ μή ποτʼ ἔτι κοινῇ παιδοποιήσασθαι, μηδὲ συνέστιον ὧν ἔκγονον ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἀπεστέρηκε γίγνεσθαί ποτε μηδὲ κοινωνὸν ἱερῶν·
868d. and when the slayers have returned, the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child, nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the slayer has robbed of child or brother, nor shall they take part in their worship; he that is disobedient and impious concerning this matter shall be liable to an action for impiety at the hands of whoso pleases. And if a husband in a fit of rage kills his wedded wife, or if a wife in like manner kills her husband, they must undergo the same purifications, and remain exiled for three years.
868d. ὁ δὲ ἀσεβῶν τε περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἀπειθῶν ὑπόδικος ἀσεβείας γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι. γυναῖκα δὲ γαμετὴν ἐὰν ἀνὴρ διʼ ὀργὴν κτείνῃ τινά τις, ἢ γυνὴ ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἐργάσηται, καθαίρεσθαι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρμούς, τριετεῖς δὲ ἀπενιαυτήσεις διατελεῖν.
868e. And when one who has committed such a crime returns, he shall never take part in worship with his children, nor sit at table with them; and if either the parent or the child disobeys, he shall be liable to a charge of impiety at the hands of whoso pleases.
868e. κατελθὼν δὲ ὅ τι τοιοῦτον δράσας, τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνείτω μηδὲ ὁμοτράπεζος γιγνέσθω ποτέ· ἀπειθῶν δὲ ὁ γεννήτωρ ἢ ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἀσεβείας αὖ ὑπόδικος γιγνέσθω τῷ ἐθέλοντι.
869. Ath. And if in rage a brother kill a brother or a sister, or a sister kill a brother or a sister, it shall be declared that they must undergo the same purifications and banishment as have been ordained for parents and children,—namely, that the homicide shall never share in the house or in the worship of those brothers or parents whom he has robbed of brothers or of children;
869. ΑΘ. καὶ ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφήν, ἢ ἀδελφὴ ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφὴν θυμῷ κτείνῃ, τὰ μὲν τῶν καθαρμῶν καὶ ἀπενιαυτήσεων ὡσαύτως, καθάπερ εἴρηται τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, εἰρήσθω δεῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τούτοις—ὧν ἀδελφούς τε ἀδελφῶν καὶ γονέας ἐστέρηκε παίδων, τούτοις δὲ συνέστιος αὐτοῖς μηδέποτε γιγνέσθω μηδὲ κοινωνὸς ἱερῶν—ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπειθῇ, τῷ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἀσεβείας εἰρημένῳ νόμῳ ὑπόδικος ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνοιτο μετὰ δίκης.
869a. and if anyone disobeys, he will rightly and justly be liable to the law laid down concerning such cases of impiety. If any man gets into such an uncontrollable rage with his parents as actually to dare to kill a parent in the madness of his rage, then, in case the dead person before dying voluntarily acquits the culprit of murder, he shall be held pure, after he has purified himself in the same manner as those who have committed an involuntary murder, and done as they in all other respects; but in case the dead person does not so acquit him, then he that has done such a deed is liable to a number of laws: for outrage he will be liable to most heavy penalties, and likewise for impiety and temple-robbing, since he has robbed his parent of life; so that if “to die a hundred deaths” were possible for any one man, that a parricide or a matricide, who did the deed in rage, should undergo a hundred deaths would be a fate most just.
869a. ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα τις εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ γίγνηται πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ὥστε μανίαις ὀργῆς τῶν γεννητόρων τολμῆσαι κτεῖναί τινα, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ τελευτήσας πρὶν τελευτῆσαι τὸν δράσαντα φόνου ἀφιῇ ἑκών, καθάπερ οἱ τὸν ἀκούσιον φόνον ἐξεργασάμενοι καθαρθείς, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσαπερ ἐκεῖνοι πράξας, καθαρὸς ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀφῇ, πολλοῖς ἔνοχος ἔστω νόμοις ὁ δράσας τι τοιοῦτον·
869b. Since every law will forbid the man to kill father or mother, the very authors of his existence, even for the sake of saving his own life, and will ordain that he must suffer and endure everything rather than commit such an act,— in what other way than this can such a man be fittingly dealt with by law, and receive his due reward? Be it enacted, therefore, that for the man who in rage slays father or mother the penalty is death. If a brother kill a brother in fight during a civil war, or in any such way, acting in self-defence against the other, who first started the brawl, he shall be counted as one who has slain an enemy, and be held guiltless; so too, when a citizen has killed a citizen in like manner, or a Stranger a Stranger.
869b. καὶ γὰρ αἰκίας δίκαις ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἔνοχος ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ ἀσεβείας ὡσαύτως καὶ ἱεροσυλίας, τὴν τοῦ γεννητοῦ ψυχὴν συλήσας, ὥστʼ εἴπερ οἷόν τʼ ἦν τὸ πολλάκις ἀποθνῄσκειν τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ τὸν πατροφόνον ἢ μητροκτόνον, ἐξεργασάμενον θυμῷ τοῦτο, δικαιότατον θανάτων πολλῶν ἦν τυγχάνειν. ᾧ γὰρ μόνῳ οὐδʼ ἀμυνομένῳ θάνατον, μέλλοντι ὑπὸ τῶν γονέων τελευτήσεσθαι, παρέξει νόμος οὐδεὶς κτεῖναι τὸν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα, τοὺς εἰς φῶς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν ἀγαγόντας, ἀλλʼ ὑπομείναντα τὰ πάντα πάσχειν πρίν τι δρᾶν τοιοῦτον νομοθετήσει, πῶς τούτῳ δίκης γε ἄλλως προσῆκον τυγχάνειν ἂν γίγνοιτο ἐν νόμῳ; κείσθω δὴ τῷ πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ἀποκτείναντι θυμῷ θάνατος ἡ ζημία. ἀδελφὸς δὲ ἂν ἀδελφὸν κτείνῃ ἐν στάσεσι μάχης γενομένης ἤ τινι τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, καθάπερ πολέμιον ἀποκτείνας ἔστω καθαρός, καὶ ἐὰν πολίτης πολίτην, ὡσαύτως, ἢ ξένος ξένον.