894e. Clin. What do you mean?
894e. ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
Ath. This: when we find one thing changing another, and this in turn another, and so on,—of these things shall we ever find one that is the prime cause of change? How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of the things that cause change? It is impossible.
ΑΘ. ὧδε. ὅταν ἕτερον ἄλλο ἡμῖν μεταβάλῃ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἕτερον ἀεί, τῶν τοιούτων ἆρα ἔσται ποτέ τι πρῶτον μεταβάλλον; καὶ πῶς, ὅταν ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινῆται, τοῦτʼ ἔσται ποτὲ τῶν ἀλλοιούντων πρῶτον; ἀδύνατον γάρ.
895. Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?
895. ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ἄλλο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ χίλια ἐπὶ μυρίοις γίγνηται τὰ κινηθέντα, μῶν ἀρχή τις αὐτῶν ἔσται τῆς κινήσεως ἁπάσης ἄλλη πλὴν ἡ τῆς αὐτῆς αὑτὴν κινησάσης μεταβολή;
895a. Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.
895a. ΚΛ. κάλλιστα εἶπες, συγχωρητέα τε τούτοις.
Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand.
ΑΘ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖσιν. εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίνʼ ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων;
895b. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.Clin. Most true.Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, here is a question we may answer.
895b. τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν· ὑπʼ ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μήποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσιν γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν τὴν αὑτὴν κινοῦσαν φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολὴν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφʼ ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα δευτέραν.ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
895c. Clin. What is it?Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as “alive” when it moves itself?Ath. Yes.Clin. It is alive, to be sure.Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?Clin. We must.
895c. ΑΘ. ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα.ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;ΑΘ. ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ συμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος εἶναι;ΚΛ. μῶν ἄρα με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ;ΑΘ. ναί.ΚΛ. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΑΘ. τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ; ζῆν ὁμολογητέον;ΚΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.
895d. Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?Clin. What do you mean?Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.Clin. How two?Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?Ath. Of what kind?
895d. ΑΘ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν;ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;ΑΘ. ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ ὄνομα· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.ΚΛ. πῶς δύο;ΑΘ. τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν;ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;
895e. Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is “the even,” and the definition is “a number divisible into two equal parts.”Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name “even,” and by the definition “a number divisible into two halves”?Clin. Most certainly.
895e. ΑΘ. ἔστιν που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ· τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δέ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.ΚΛ. ναί.ΑΘ. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἄντε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄντε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, προσαγορεύοντες ταὐτὸν ὄν;ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
896. Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name “soul”?
896. ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νυνδὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὑτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν;
896a. Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—“the motion able to move itself”?Clin. Do you assert that “self-movement” is the definition of that very same substance which has “soul” as the name we universally apply to it?Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?
896a. ΚΛ. τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἥνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν;ΑΘ. φημί γε· εἰ δʼ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν;
896b. Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.
896b. ΚΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.
Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχ ἡ διʼ ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, δευτέρα τε, καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν, τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή;
Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.
ΑΘ. ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἶμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.
896c. Clin. Yes, most veracious.Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.Clin. Certainly we do.
896c. ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς, εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα.ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΑΘ. τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος.
896d. Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.Clin. Necessarily.Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?Clin. Of course we must.Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?
896d. ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;ΑΘ. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι;
896e. Clin. Yes.
896e. ΚΛ. τί μήν;
Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—“several.” Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.
ΑΘ. μίαν ἢ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.
Clin. You are perfectly right.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.
897. Ath. Very well, then. Soul drives all things in Heaven and earth and sea by its own motions, of which the names are wish, reflection, forethought, counsel, opinion true and false, joy, grief, confidence, fear, hate, love, and all the motions that are akin to these or are prime-working motions; these, when they take over the secondary motions of bodies, drive them all to increase and decrease and separation and combination, and, supervening on these, to heat and cold, heaviness and lightness,
897. ΑΘ. εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατʼ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας θερμότητας ψύξεις, βαρύτητας κουφότητας, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν, λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὐστηρὸν
897b. hardness and softness, whiteness and blackness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those qualities which soul employs, both when it governs all things rightly and happily as a true goddess, in conjunction with reason, and when, in converse with unreason, it produces results which are in all respects the opposite. Shall we postulate that this is so, or do we still suspect that it may possibly be otherwise?
897b. καὶ γλυκύ, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαβοῦσα ἀεὶ θεὸν ὀρθῶς θεοῖς, ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ συγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει;
Clin. By no means.
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Ath. Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which has neither quality?
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φῶμεν; τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες, ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον;
897c. To this shall we make reply as follows?
897c. βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα;
Ath. If, my good sir, we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course, which is of the kind described.
ΑΘ. εἰ μέν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ σύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ συγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην.
Clin. You are right.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς.
897d. Ath. But the bad soul, if it proceeds in a mad and disorderly way.
897d. ΑΘ. εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κακήν.
Clin. That also is right.
ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς.
Ath. Then what is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely; consequently, it is fitting that you should now call me in to assist you with the answer.
ΑΘ. τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει; τοῦτο ἤδη χαλεπόν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως· διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τὰ νῦν προσλαμβάνειν.
Clin. Very good.
ΚΛ. εὖ λέγεις.
Ath. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully;
ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτε θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς·
897e. the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.
897e. πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.
Clin. How do you mean?
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
Ath. Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles; reminding ourselves of which I, along with you, will make answer.
ΑΘ. ἧι προσέοικεν κινήσει νοῦς τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων, τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν· ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι.
Clin. You will probably speak admirably.
ΚΛ. κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις.
Ath. Do we still recollect thus much about the things then described, that we assumed that, of the total, some were in motion, others at rest?
ΑΘ. μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τῶν τότε ἔτι τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τῶν πάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν;
898. Ath. And further, that, of those in motion, some move in one place, others move in several places?
898. ΑΘ. τῶν δʼ αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐν πλείοσιν φερόμενα.
898a. Clin. That is so.
898a. ΚΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Ath. And that, of these two motions, the motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and that this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason?
ΑΘ. τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινησέοιν τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόρνων οὖσαν μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.
Clin. How do you mean?
ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
Ath. If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.
ΑΘ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων.
898b. Clin. Most true.Ath. On the other hand, will not the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule—will not this motion be akin to absolute unreason?
898b. ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥ γε μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μηδὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτὰ μηδὲ πρὸς ταὐτὰ μηδʼ ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένη μηδʼ ἐν κόσμῳ μηδʼ ἐν τάξει μηδὲ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις ἀνοίας ἂν ἁπάσης εἴη συγγενής;ΚΛ. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα.
898c. Clin. It will, in very truth.Ath. So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of either the best soul or its opposite.Clin. But, Stranger, judging by what has now been said, it is actually impious to make any other assertion than that these things are driven round by one or more souls endowed with all goodness.Ath. You have attended to our argument admirably, Clinias.
898c. ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαρρήδην εἰπεῖν ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν.ΚΛ. ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων οὐδʼ ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά.ΑΘ. κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι.
898d. Now attend to this further point.Clin. What is that?Ath. If soul drives round the sum total of sun, moon and all other stars, does it not also drive each single one of them?Clin. Certainly.Ath. Then let us construct an argument about one of these stars which will evidently apply equally to them all.Clin. About which one?Ath. The sun’s body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, has grown round all the senses of the body, and is an object of reason alone.
898d. ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρʼ οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον;ΚΛ. τί μήν;ΑΘ. περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἡμῖν ἄστρα ἁρμόττοντες φανοῦνται.ΚΛ. τίνος;ΑΘ. Ἡλίου πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδείς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθνῄσκοντος τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς πολλὴ τὸ παράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δʼ εἶναι.
898e. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—Clin. What fact?Ath. If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.Clin. What things?
898e. νῷ μόνῳ δὴ καὶ διανοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε.ΚΛ. ποῖον;ΑΘ. Ἥλιον εἴπερ ἄγει ψυχή, τριῶν αὐτὴν ἓν λέγοντες δρᾶν σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα.ΚΛ. τίνων;
899. Ath. That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside;
899. ΑΘ. ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ σώματι πάντῃ διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντῃ περιφέρει· ἤ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὑτῇ πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα·
899a. or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body.
899a. ἢ τρίτον αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας θαύματι, ποδηγεῖ.
Clin. Yes, it must necessarily be the case that soul acts in one of these ways when it propels all things.
ΚΛ. ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι δρῶσαν ψυχὴν πάντα διάγειν.
Ath. Here, I pray you, pause. This soul,—whether it is by riding in the car of the sun, or from outside, or otherwise, that it brings light to us all—every man is bound to regard as a god. Is not that so?
ΑΘ. αὐτοῦ δὴ ἄμεινον ταύτην τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτε ἐν ἅρμασιν ἔχουσα ἡμῖν ἥλιον ἄγει φῶς τοῖς ἅπασιν, εἴτε ἔξωθεν, εἴθʼ ὅπως εἴθʼ ὅπῃ, θεὸν ἡγεῖσθαι χρεὼν πάντα ἄνδρα. ἢ πῶς;
899b. Clin. Yes; everyone at least who has not reached the uttermost verge of folly.
899b. ΚΛ. ναί, τόν γέ που μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀφιγμένον ἀνοίας.
Ath. Concerning all the stars and the moon, and concerning the years and months and all seasons, what other account shall we give than this very same,—namely, that, inasmuch as it has been shown that they are all caused by one or more souls, which are good also with all goodness, we shall declare these souls to be gods, whether it be that they order the whole heaven by residing in bodies, as living creatures, or whatever the mode and method? Is there any man that agrees with this view who will stand hearing it denied thatall things are full of gods?
ΑΘ. ἄστρων δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ζῷα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσιν πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως; ἔσθʼ ὅστις ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ὑπομενεῖ μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;
899c. Clin. There is not a man, Stranger, so wrong-headed as that.
899c. ΚΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ὦ ξένε, παραφρονῶν οὐδείς.
Ath. Let us, then, lay down limiting conditions for the man who up till now disbelieves in gods, O Megillus and Clinias, and so be quit of him.
ΑΘ. τῷ μὲν τοίνυν μὴ νομίζοντι θεοὺς ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, εἰπόντες ὅρους ἀπαλλαττώμεθα.
Clin. What conditions?
ΚΛ. τίνας;
Ath. That either he must teach us that we are wrong in laying down that soul is of all things the first production, together with all the consequential statements we made,—or, if he is unable to improve on our account, he must believe us, and for the rest of his life live in veneration of the gods.
ΑΘ. ἢ διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγομεν τιθέμενοι ψυχὴν γένεσιν ἁπάντων εἶναι πρώτην, καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσα τούτων συνεπόμενα εἴπομεν, ἢ μὴ δυνάμενον βέλτιον λέγειν ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν θεοὺς ἡγούμενον εἰς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον.
899d. Let us, then, consider whether our argument for the existence of the gods addressed to those who disbelieve in them has been stated adequately or defectively.
899d. ὁρῶμεν οὖν εἴτε ἱκανῶς ἤδη τοῖς οὐχ ἡγουμένοις θεοὺς εἰρήκαμεν ὡς εἰσὶν θεοί, εἴτε ἐπιδεῶς.
Clin. Anything rather than defectively, Stranger.
ΚΛ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ ξένε, πάντων ἐπιδεῶς.
Ath. Then let our argument have an end, in so far as it is addressed to these men. But the man who holds that gods exist, but pay no regard to human affairs,—him we must admonish. “My good sir,” let us say, “the fact that you believe in gods is due probably to a divine kinship drawing you to what is of like nature, to honor it and recognize its existence; but the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both private and public,—which, though not really happy, are excessively and improperly lauded as happy by public opinion,—drive you to impiety by the wrong way in which they are celebrated, not only in poetry, but in tales of every kind.”
ΑΘ. τούτοις μὲν τοίνυν ἡμῖν τὸ λόγων τέλος ἐχέτω· τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον. ὦ ἄριστε δὴ φῶμεν, ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεούς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ σύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐμμελῶς, ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις.
900. Ath. “Or again, when you see men attaining the goal of old age, and leaving behind them children’s children in the highest offices, very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability
900. ΑΘ. ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιούς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τὸ νῦν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδών, ἢ διʼ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης, προστυχὴς πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισίν, διʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ συγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεούς, εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστʼ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτούς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων.
900b. to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.”
900b. ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλʼ ἐάν πως οἷον ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοί, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ᾧ πρὸς τὸν τὸ παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τὰ νῦν προσχρήσασθαι.
900c. And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.
900c. σὺ δʼ, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἂν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐμπίπτῃ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῷν ὥσπερ νυνδὴ δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν.
Clin. A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.
ΚΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ, ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις.
Ath. Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.
ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσιν θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δέ, ἢ τῶν μεγέθει διαφερόντων.
900d. Clin. Most certainly he heard that.Ath. Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?Clin. We do say so.Ath. And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?Clin. Certainly.
900d. ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νυνδὴ λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.ΚΛ. καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουεν.ΑΘ. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαί φαμεν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία κακίας;ΚΛ. φαμέν.
900e. Ath. And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?Clin. Necessarily.Ath. And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?Clin. To this, too, everyone would assent.Ath. Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?Clin. How could we?Ath. As the opposite, then?Clin. Yes.
900e. ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας;ΚΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΑΘ. καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν;ΚΛ. ἀνάγκη.ΑΘ. καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν;ΚΛ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν.ΑΘ. τί δέ; ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;ΚΛ. καὶ πῶς;ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον;ΚΛ. ναί.
901a. Ath. And the opposites of these as of the opposite quality of soul?Clin. Of the opposite quality.Ath. What then? He who is indolent, careless and idle will be in our eyes what the poet described —a man most like to sting-less drones?Clin. A most true description.Ath. That God has such a character we must certainly deny, seeing that he hates it; nor must we allow anyone to attempt to say so.Clin. We could not possibly allow that.Ath. When a person whose duty it is especially to act and care for some object has a mind that cares for great things, but neglects small things, on what principle could we praise such a person without the utmost impropriety?
901a. ΑΘ. τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον;ΚΛ. τοὐναντίον.ΑΘ. τί οὖν δή; τρυφῶν καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν [ὁ] τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν;ΚΛ. ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών.ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον, ὅ γέ τοι αὐτὸς μισεῖ, τῷ τέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.ΚΛ. οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
901b. Let us consider the matter in this way: the action of him who acts thus, be he god or man, takes one of two forms, does it not?Clin. What forms?Ath. Either because he thinks that neglect of the small things makes no difference to the whole, or else, owing to laziness and indolence, he neglects them, though he thinks they do make a difference.
901b. ΑΘ. ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινός, ὁ δὲ τούτου γε νοῦς τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ, κατὰ τίνα ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτʼ ἄνθρωπος;ΚΛ. ποίω δὴ λέγομεν;ΑΘ. ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ.
901c. Or is there any other way in which neglect occurs? For when it is impossible to care for all things, it will not in that case be neglect of great things or small when a person—be he god or common man—fails to care for things which he lacks the power and capacity to care for.
901c. ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων, μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.
Clin. Of course not.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ath. Now to us three let these two men make answer, of whom both agree that gods exist, but the one asserts that they can be bribed, and the other that they neglect the small.
ΑΘ. νῦν δὴ δύʼ ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν οἱ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἅτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν.
901d. First, you both assert that the gods know and hear and see all things, and that nothing of all that is apprehended by senses or sciences can escape their notice; do you assert that this is so, or what?
901d. πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γιγνώσκειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι· ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;
Clin. That is what we assert.
ΚΛ. οὕτως.
Ath. And further, that they can do all that can be done by mortal or immortal?
ΑΘ. τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστιν θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις;
Clin. They will, of course, admit that this also is the case.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;
901e. Ath. And it is undeniable that all five of us agreed that the gods are good, yea, exceeding good.
901e. ΑΘ. καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς γε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πέντε ὄντες.
Clin. Most certainly.
ΚΛ. σφόδρα γε.
Ath. Being, then, such as we agree, is it not impossible to allow that they do anything at all in a lazy and indolent way? For certainly amongst us mortals idleness is the child of cowardice, and laziness of idleness and indolence.
ΑΘ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους ὁμολογοῦμεν; δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.
Clin. Very true.
ΚΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Ath. None, then, of the gods is neglectful owing to idleness and laziness, seeing that none has any part in cowardice.
ΑΘ. ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας.
Clin. You are very right.
ΚΛ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
902a. Ath. Further, if they do neglect the small and scant things of the All, they will do so either because they know that there is no need at all to care for any such things or—well, what other alternative is there except the opposite of knowing?
902a. ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπόν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γιγνώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο, ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν πλὴν τῷ γιγνώσκειν τοὐναντίον;
Clin. There is none.
ΚΛ. οὐδέν.
Ath. Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care,—or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?
ΑΘ. πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γιγνώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν ὧν δὴ πράττουσιν, διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν;
902b. Clin. Impossible.
902b. ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ath. Do not human affairs share in animate nature, and is not man himself, too, the most god-fearing of all living creatures?
ΑΘ. οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζῴων ἄνθρωπος;
Clin. That is certainly probable.
ΚΛ. ἔοικε γοῦν.
Ath. We affirm that all mortal creatures are possessions of the gods, to whom belongs also the whole heaven.
ΑΘ. θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.
Clin. Of course.
ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ath. That being so, it matters not whether a man says that these things are small or great in the eyes of the gods; for in neither case would it behove those who are our owners to be neglectful, seeing that they are most careful and most good.
ΑΘ. ἤδη τοίνυν σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς·
902c. For let us notice this further fact—Clin. What is it?Ath. In regard to perception and power,—are not these two naturally opposed in respect of ease and difficulty?Clin. How do you mean?Ath. It is more difficult to see and hear small things than great; but everyone finds it more easy to move, control and care for things small and few than their opposites.
902c. οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.ΚΛ. τὸ ποῖον;ΑΘ. τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πεφυκότε;ΚΛ. πῶς λέγεις;ΑΘ. ὁρᾶν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα, φέρειν δὲ αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων.
902d. Clin. Much more.
902d. ΚΛ. καὶ πολύ γε.
Ath. When a physician is charged with the curing of a whole body, if, while he is willing and able to care for the large parts, he neglects the small parts and members, will he ever find the whole in good condition?
ΑΘ. ἰατρῷ δὲ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν, βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελοῦντι, ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν;
Clin. Certainly not.
ΚΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
Ath. No more will pilots or generals or house-managers, nor yet statesmen or any other such persons, find that the many and great thrive apart from the few and small; for even masons say that big stones are not well laid without little stones.
ΑΘ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδʼ οἰκονόμοις, οὐδʼ αὖ τισὶν πολιτικοῖς οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ σμικρῶν πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι.
902e. Clin. They cannot be.
902e. ΚΛ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
903. Ath. Let us never suppose that God is inferior to mortal craftsmen who, the better they are, the more accurately and perfectly do they execute their proper tasks, small and great, by one single art,—or that God, who is most wise, and both willing and able to care, cares not at all for the small things which are the easier to care for—like one who shirks the labor because he is idle and cowardly,—but only for the great.
903. ΑΘ. μὴ τοίνυν τόν γε θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὑτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσιν, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον βουλόμενόν τʼ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναι σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων.
903a. Clin. By no means let us accept such an opinion of the gods, Stranger: that would be to adopt a view that is neither pious nor true at all.
903a. ΚΛ. μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτʼ ἀληθὲς τὸ διανόημα διανοοίμεθʼ ἄν.
Ath. And now, as I think, we have argued quite sufficiently with him who loves to censure the gods for neglect.
ΑΘ. δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη μάλιστα μετρίως διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν.
Ath. And it was by forcing him by our arguments to acknowledge that what he says is wrong.
ΑΘ. τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς·
903b. But still he needs also, as it seems to me, some words of counsel to act as a charm upon him.
903b. ἐπῳδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν.
Clin. What kind of words, my good sir?
ΚΛ. ποίων, ὠγαθέ;
Ath. Let us persuade the young man by our discourse that all things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World—all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof also each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it. To each of these parts, down to the smallest fraction, rulers of their action and passion are appointed to bring about fulfillment even to the uttermost fraction; whereof thy portion also, O perverse man, is one, and tends therefore always in its striving towards the All, tiny though it be.
ΑΘ. πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντʼ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δʼ εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι·
903c. But thou failest to perceive that all partial generation is for the sake of the Whole, in order that for the life of the World-all blissful existence may be secured,—it not being generated for thy sake, but thou for its sake. For every physician and every trained craftsman works always for the sake of a Whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part;
903c. ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν συντείνει βλέπον ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν, σὲ δὲ λέληθεν περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίγνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δʼ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συντεῖνον βέλτιστον μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται·
903d. but thou art vexed, because thou knowest not how what is best in thy case for the All turns out best for thyself also, in accordance with the power of your common origin. And inasmuch as soul, being conjoined now with one body, now with another, is always undergoing all kinds of changes either of itself or owing to another soul, there is left for the draughts-player no further task,—save only to shift the character that grows better to a superior place, and the worse to a worse, according to what best suits each of them, so that to each may be allotted its appropriate destiny.
903d. σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ συμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἢ διʼ ἑτέραν ψυχήν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γιγνόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, κατὰ τὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, ἵνα τῆς προσηκούσης μοίρας λαγχάνῃ.
903e. Clin. In what way do you mean?
903e. ΚΛ. πῇ λέγεις;
904. Ath. The way I am describing is, I believe, that in which supervision of all things is most easy for the gods. For if one were to shape all things, without a constant view to the Whole, by transforming them (as, for instance, fire into water), instead of merely converting one into many or many into one, then when things had shared in a first, or second, or even third generation, they would be countless in number in such a system of transformations; but as things are, the task before the Supervisor of the All is wondrous easy.
904. ΑΘ. ἧιπερ ἂν ἔχοι ῥᾳστώνης ἐπιμελείας θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀεὶ βλέπων πλάττοι τις μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον, καὶ μὴ σύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνὸς ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα πλήθεσιν ἄπειρʼ ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως·
904a. Clin. How do you mean?Ath. Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal, as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, there would never have been generation of living creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to injure,—observing all this, He designed a location for each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most completely, easily, and well.
904a. νῦν δʼ ἔστι θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ.ΚΛ. πῶς αὖ λέγεις;ΑΘ. ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί—γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου—καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς, διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν·
904b. For this purpose He has designed the rule which prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions; but the causes of the generation of any special kind he left to the wills of each one of us men.
904b. ταῦτα πάντα συνιδών, ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετήν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστʼ ἂν καὶ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα. μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἕδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας.
904c. For according to the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.
904c. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.
Clin. That is certainly probable.
ΚΛ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός.
Ath. All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change, and in changing they move according to the law and order of destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is the movement over surface in space, but when the change is great and towards great iniquity, then they move towards the deep and the so-called lower regions, regarding which—under the names of Hades and the like—men are haunted by most fearful imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from their bodies.
ΑΘ. μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθʼ ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν, μεταβάλλοντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον· σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα μεταπεσόντα, εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων, ὅσα Ἅιδην τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσιν ζῶντες διαλυθέντες τε τῶν σωμάτων.
904d. And whenever the soul gets a specially large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force of its own will and the influence of its intercourse growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and moves to an eminent region, being transported by a holy road to another and a better region;
904d. μείζω δὲ δὴ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταλάβῃ διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμείξασα γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλεν τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον·
904e. whereas, if the opposite is the case, it changes to the opposite the location of its life’s abode.
904e. ὅταν δὲ τἀναντία, ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεθιδρύσασα τὸν αὑτῆς βίον.
905. Ath.This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,O thou child and stripling who thinkest thou art neglected by the gods,—the decree that as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the company of the worse souls, and as thou becomest better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and in every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest what it is befitting that like should do towards like.
905. ΑΘ.αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν,ὦ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν, κακίω μὲν γιγνόμενον πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχάς, ἀμείνω δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον, ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις πάσχειν τε ἃ προσῆκον δρᾶν ἐστι τοῖς προσφερέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς καὶ ποιεῖν.
905a. From this decree of Heaven neither wilt thou nor any other luckless wight ever boast that he has escaped; for this decree is one which the gods who have enjoined it have enjoined above all others, and meet it is that it should be most strictly observed. For by it thou wilt not ever be neglected, neither if thou shouldest dive, in thy very littleness, into the depths of the earth below, nor if thou shouldest soar up to the height of Heaven above; but thou shalt pay to the gods thy due penalty, whether thou remainest here on earth, or hast passed away to Hades, or art transported to a region yet more fearsome.
905a. ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μή ποτε οὔτε εἰ ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς γενόμενος ἐπεύξηται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν· ἣν πασῶν δικῶν διαφερόντως ἔταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες χρεών τε ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπʼ αὐτῆς· οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδʼ ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ, τείσεις δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν εἴτʼ ἐνθάδε μένων εἴτε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου διαπορευθεὶς εἴτε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἀγριώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς τόπον.
905b. And the same rule, let me tell thee, will apply also to those whom thou sawest growing to great estate from small after doing acts of impiety or other such evil,—concerning whom thou didst deem that they had risen from misery to happiness, and didst imagine, therefore, that in their actions, as in mirrors, thou didst behold the entire neglect of the gods, not knowing of their joint contribution and how it contributes to the All.
905b. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη, τῶν οὓς σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ σμικρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας ἀνοσιουργήσαντας ἤ τι τοιοῦτον πράξαντας ᾠήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι, κᾆτα ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡγήσω καθεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν, οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ συμβάλλεται.
905c. And surely, O most courageous of men, thou canst not but suppose that this is a thing thou must needs learn. For if a man learns not this, he can never see even an outline of the truth, nor will he be able to contribute an account of life as regards its happiness or its unhappy fortune. If Clinias here and all our gathering of elders succeed in convincing thee of this fact, that thou knowest not what thou sayest about the gods, then God Himself of His grace will aid thee; but shouldest thou still be in need of further argument, give ear to us while we argue with the third unbeliever, if thou hast sense at all.
905c. γιγνώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἥν τις μὴ γιγνώσκων οὐδʼ ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. ταῦτα εἰ μέν σε πείθει Κλεινίας ὅδε καὶ σύμπασα ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λέγεις, καλῶς ἄν σοι θεὸς αὐτὸς συλλαμβάνοι· εἰ δʼ ἐπιδεὴς ἔτι λόγου τινὸς ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε, εἰ νοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις.
905d. For we have proved, as I would maintain, by fairly sufficient argument that the gods exist and care for men; the next contention, that the gods can be won over by wrongdoers, on the receipt of bribes, is one that no one should admit, and we must try to refute it by every means in our power.
905d. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ θεοί τʼ εἰσὶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελοῦνται, ἔγωγε οὐ παντάπασιν φαύλως ἂν φαίην ἡμῖν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι· τὸ δὲ παραιτητοὺς αὖ θεοὺς εἶναι τοῖσιν ἀδικοῦσι, δεχομένους δῶρα, οὔτε τινὶ συγχωρητέον παντί τʼ αὖ κατὰ δύναμιν τρόπῳ ἐλεγκτέον.
Clin. Admirably spoken: let us do as you say.
ΚΛ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες, ποιῶμέν τε ὡς λέγεις.
Ath. Come now, in the name of these gods themselves I ask—in what way would they come to be seduced by us, if seduced they were?
ΑΘ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν αὐτῶν, τίνα τρόπον παραιτητοὶ γίγνοιντʼ ἂν ἡμῖν, εἰ γίγνοιντο αὖ;
905e. Being what in their essence and character? Necessarily they must be rulers, if they are to be in continual control of the whole heaven.
905e. καὶ τίνες ἢ ποῖοί τινες ὄντες; ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν που γίγνεσθαι τούς γε διοικήσοντας τὸν ἅπαντα ἐντελεχῶς οὐρανόν.
906. Ath. But to which kind of rulers are they like? Or which are like to them, of those rulers whom we can fairly compare with them, as small with great? Would drivers of rival teams resemble them, or pilots of ships? Or perhaps they might be likened to rulers of armies; or possibly they might be compared to physicians watching over a war against bodily disease, or to farmers fearfully awaiting seasons of wonted difficulty for the generation of plants, or else to masters of flocks.
906. ΑΘ. ἀλλʼ ἄρα τίσιν προσφερεῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων; ἢ τίνες τούτοις, ὧν δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἀπεικάζουσι τυγχάνειν μείζοσιν ἐλάττονας; πότερον ἡνίοχοί τινες ἂν εἶεν τοιοῦτοι ζευγῶν ἁμιλλωμένων ἢ πλοίων κυβερνῆται; τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀπεικασθεῖεν στρατοπέδων ἄρχουσί τισιν· εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ νόσων πόλεμον εὐλαβουμένοις ἰατροῖς ἐοικέναι περὶ σώματα, ἢ γεωργοῖς περὶ φυτῶν γένεσιν εἰωθυίας ὥρας χαλεπὰς διὰ φόβων προσδεχομένοις, ἢ καὶ ποιμνίων ἐπιστάταις.
906a. For seeing that we have agreed among ourselves that the heaven is full of many things that are good, and of the opposite kind also, and that those not good are the more numerous, such a battle, we affirm, is undying, and needs a wondrous watchfulness,—the gods and daemons being our allies, and we the possession of the gods and daemons; and what destroys us is iniquity and insolence combined with folly, what saves us, justice and temperance combined with wisdom, which dwell in the animate powers of the gods, and of which some small trace may be clearly seen here also residing in us.
906a. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐσθʼ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη, σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ κτῆμα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων· φθείρει δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδικία καὶ ὕβρις μετὰ ἀφροσύνης, σῴζει δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἐν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐμψύχοις οἰκοῦσαι δυνάμεσιν, βραχὺ δέ τι καὶ τῇδε ἄν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐνοικοῦν ἡμῖν σαφὲς ἴδοι.
906b. But there are certain souls that dwell on earth and have acquired unjust gain which, being plainly bestial, beseech the souls of the guardians—whether they be watch-dogs or herdsmen or the most exalted of masters—trying to convince them by fawning words and prayerful incantations that (as the tales of evil men relate) they can profiteer among men on earth without any severe penalty: but we assert that the sin now mentioned, of profiteering or “over-gaining,” is what is called in the case of fleshly bodies “disease,” in that of seasons and years “pestilence,” and in that of States and polities, by a verbal change, this same sin is called “injustice.”
906b. ψυχαὶ δέ τινες ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκοῦσαι καὶ ἄδικον λῆμμα κεκτημέναι δῆλον ὅτι θηριώδεις, πρὸς τὰς τῶν φυλάκων ψυχὰς ἄρα κυνῶν ἢ τὰς τῶν νομέων ἢ πρὸς τὰς τῶν παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν προσπίπτουσαι, πείθουσιν θωπείαις λόγων καὶ ἐν εὐκταίαις τισὶν ἐπῳδαῖς, ὡς αἱ φῆμαί φασιν αἱ τῶν κακῶν, ἐξεῖναι πλεονεκτοῦσιν σφίσιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πάσχειν μηδὲν χαλεπόν·
906c. Clin. Certainly.Ath. Such must necessarily be the account of the matter given by the man who says that the gods are always merciful to unjust men and those who act unjustly, provided that one gives them a share of one’s unjust gains; it is just as if wolves were to give small bits of their prey to watch-dogs, and they being mollified by the gifts were to allow them to go ravening among the flocks.
906c. φαμὲν δʼ εἶναί που τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα, τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ πολιτείαις τοῦτο αὐτό, ῥήματι μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν.ΚΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.ΑΘ. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὸν λέγοντα ὡς εἰσὶν συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ·