---
title: "Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Harold North Fowler"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 1 of 2
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/1/
cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/1/"
---

# Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων

*Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler*

Is the man who lies on purpose better than the one who lies unwillingly?

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg026, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Pages 363–369

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/1/#p-N

[¶0] 363. Eud. Why, then, are you silent, Socrates, when Hippias has been delivering such a fine display? Why do you not join us in praising some part of his speech, or else, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, refute him—especially now that we who might best claim to have a share in philosophical discussion have been left to ourselves?
Soc. Indeed, Eudicus, there are some points in what Hippias was just now saying of Homer, about which I should like to question him. For I used to hear your father Apemantus say that Homer’s Iliad was a finer poem than the Odyssey, and just as much finer as Achilles was finer than Odysseus for he said that one of these poems was made with Odysseus; the other with Achilles as its subject. So that is a point about which, if it is agreeable to Hippias, I should like to ask—what he thinks about these two men, which of them he says is the better; for he has told us in his exhibition many other things of sorts about Homer and other poets.
Eud. It is plain enough that Hippias will not object answering if you ask him a question. Oh, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer? or what will you do?
Hipp. Why, Eudicus, it would be strange conduct on my part, if I, who always go up to Olympia to the festival of the Greeks from my home at Elis, and entering the sacred precinct, offer to speak on anything that anyone chooses of those subjects which I prepared for exhibition, and to answer any questions that anyone asks—should now avoid being questioned by Socrates.

> Greek: 363. ΕΥ. σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, Ἱππίου τοσαῦτα ἐπιδειξαμένου, καὶ οὐχὶ ἢ συνεπαινεῖς τι τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ καὶ ἐλέγχεις, εἴ τί σοι μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖ εἰρηκέναι; ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ λελείμμεθα, οἳ μάλιστʼ ἂν ἀντιποιησαίμεθα μετεῖναι ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς. ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Εὔδικε, ἔστι γε ἃ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην Ἱππίου ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγεν περὶ Ὁμήρου. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπημάντου ἤκουον ὅτι ἡ Ἰλιὰς κάλλιον εἴη ποίημα τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, τοσούτῳ δὲ κάλλιον, ὅσῳ ἀμείνων Ἀχιλλεὺς Ὀδυσσέως εἴη· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὀδυσσέα ἔφη πεποιῆσθαι, τὸ δʼ εἰς Ἀχιλλέα. περὶ ἐκείνου οὖν ἡδέως ἄν, εἰ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν Ἱππίᾳ, ἀναπυθοίμην ὅπως αὐτῷ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τούτοιν, πότερον ἀμείνω φησὶν εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου. ΕΥ. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ φθονήσει Ἱππίας, ἐάν τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία, ἐάν τι ἐρωτᾷ σε Σωκράτης, ἀποκρινῇ; ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις; ΙΠ. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὰ ποιοίην, ὦ Εὔδικε, εἰ Ὀλυμπίαζε μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν, ὅταν τὰ Ὀλύμπια ᾖ, ἀεὶ ἐπανιὼν οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἤλιδος εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται ὧν ἄν μοι εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρεσκευασμένον ᾖ, καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις ἐρωτᾷ, νῦν δὲ τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρώτησιν φύγοιμι.

[¶1] 364. Soc. You are in a state of blessedness, Hippias, if at every Olympiad you come to the sanctuary with fair hopes concerning your soul and its wisdom; and I should be surprised if any of the physical athletes when he goes to that same place to take part in the contests, has such fearless confidence in his body as you have in your intellect.
Hipp. Naturally, Socrates, I am in this state: for since I began to contend at the Olympic games, I never yet met anyone better than myself in anything.
Soc. That is splendid, Hippias! Your reputation will be a monument of wisdom for the city of Elis and your parents. But now what do you say about Achilles and Odysseus? Which do you say is the better and in what respect? For when there were many of us in the room, and you were making your exhibition, I could not keep up with what you were saying: for I hesitated to ask questions, because there was a great crowd in the room, also for fear of hindering your exhibition by doing so; but now, since we are fewer and Eudicus here urges me to question you, speak and tell us clearly what you said about these two men; how did you distinguish them?
Hipp. Why I am glad, Socrates, to explain to you still more clearly what I say about these and others also. For I say that Homer made Achilles the bravest man of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.
Soc. Oh dear, Hippias! Would you do me the favour not to laugh at me if I find it hard to understand what you say, and keep asking questions over and over? Please try to answer me gently and courteously.
Hipp. Of course; for it would be a disgrace, Socrates, if I, who teach others good manners and charge them money for it, should not myself, when questioned by you, be considerate and reply gently.
Soc. That is excellent. For when you said that the poet made Achilles the bravest of men, and Nestor the wisest, I thought I understood what you meant; but when you said that he made Odysseus the wiliest, to tell you the truth, I do not in the least know what you mean by that. Now tell me, and perhaps it may result in my understanding better. Has not Homer made Achilles wily?
Hipp. Not at all, Socrates; he made him most simple; for in The Prayers, when he depicts them talking with one another, he makes Achilles say to Odysseus:

> Greek: 364. ΣΩ. μακάριόν γε, ὦ Ἱππία, πάθος πέπονθας, εἰ ἑκάστης Ὀλυμπιάδος οὕτως εὔελπις ὢν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν ἀφικνῇ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν· καὶ θαυμάσαιμʼ ἂν εἴ τις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀθλητῶν οὕτως ἀφόβως τε καὶ πιστευτικῶς ἔχων τῷ σώματι ἔρχεται αὐτόσε ἀγωνιούμενος, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς τῇ διανοίᾳ. ΙΠ. εἰκότως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοῦτο πέπονθα· ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἦργμαι Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐνέτυχον. ΣΩ. καλόν γε λέγεις, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ τῇ Ἠλείων πόλει τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα τὴν δόξαν εἶναι τὴν σὴν καὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι τοῖς σοῖς. ἀτὰρ τί δὴ λέγεις ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τε καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως; πότερον ἀμείνω καὶ κατὰ τί φῂς εἶναι; ἡνίκα μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ ἔνδον ἦμεν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἐπίδειξιν ἐποιοῦ, ἀπελείφθην σου τῶν λεγομένων—ὤκνουν γὰρ ἐπανερέσθαι, διότι ὄχλος τε πολὺς ἔνδον ἦν, καὶ μή σοι ἐμποδὼν εἴην ἐρωτῶν τῇ ἐπιδείξει—νυνὶ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐλάττους τέ ἐσμεν καὶ Εὔδικος ὅδε κελεύει ἐρέσθαι, εἰπέ τε καὶ δίδαξον ἡμᾶς σαφῶς, τί ἔλεγες περὶ τούτοιν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν; πῶς διέκρινες αὐτούς; ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐθέλω ἔτι σαφέστερον ἢ τότε διελθεῖν ἃ λέγω καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ ἄλλων. φημὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρον πεποιηκέναι ἄριστον μὲν ἄνδρα Ἀχιλλέα τῶν εἰς Τροίαν ἀφικομένων, σοφώτατον δὲ Νέστορα, πολυτροπώτατον δὲ Ὀδυσσέα. ΣΩ. βαβαῖ, ὦ Ἱππία· ἆρʼ ἄν τί μοι χαρίσαιο τοιόνδε, μή μου καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν μόγις μανθάνω τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πολλάκις ἀνερωτῶ; ἀλλά μοι πειρῶ πρᾴως τε καὶ εὐκόλως ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΙΠ. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄλλους μὲν αὐτὰ ταῦτα παιδεύω καὶ ἀξιῶ διὰ ταῦτα χρήματα λαμβάνειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρωτώμενος μὴ συγγνώμην τʼ ἔχοιμι καὶ πρᾴως ἀποκρινοίμην. ΣΩ. πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἡνίκα μὲν ἄριστον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἔφησθα πεποιῆσθαι, ἐδόκουν σου μανθάνειν ὅτι ἔλεγες, καὶ ἡνίκα τὸν Νέστορα σοφώτατον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα εἶπες ὅτι πεποιηκὼς εἴη ὁ ποιητὴς πολυτροπώτατον, τοῦτο δʼ, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι, παντάπασιν οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις. καί μοι εἰπέ, ἄν τι ἐνθένδε μᾶλλον μάθω· ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐ πολύτροπος τῷ Ὁμήρῳ πεποίηται; ΙΠ. ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἁπλούστατος καὶ ἀληθέστατος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν Λιταῖς, ἡνίκα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιεῖ αὐτοὺς διαλεγομένους, λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα— διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχανʼ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
χρὴ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν,
ὥσπερ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀίω·

[¶2] 365. Zeus-born son of Laertes, wily Odysseus, I must speak out the word without refraining, as I shall act and think will be accomplished [and pray do not mutter in discord sitting here beside me]. For hateful to me as the gates of Hades
“is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another. But I shall speak that which shall be accomplished.” In these lines he makes plain the character of each of the men, that Achilles is true and simple, and Odysseus wily and false for he represents Achilles as saying these lines to Odysseus.
Soc. Now at last, Hippias, I think I understand what you mean; you mean that the wily man is false, apparently.
Hipp. Certainly, Socrates; for Homer represents Odysseus as that sort of a man in many passages of both Iliad and Odyssey.
Soc. Homer, then, as it seems, thought that a true man was one man and a false man another, but not the same.
Hipp. Of course he did, Socrates.
Soc. And do you think so yourself, Hippias?
Hipp. Most assuredly; for it would be strange if I did not.
Soc. Then let us drop Homer, since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he made those verses; but since you come forward to take up his cause, and agree in this which you say is his meaning, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common.
Hipp. Very well; ask briefly whatever you like.
Soc. Do you say that the false are, like the sick, without power to do anything, or that they have power to do something?
Hipp. I say that they have great power to do many things, and especially to deceive people.
Soc. They are, then, powerful, according to you, and wily, are they not?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. But are they wily and deceivers by reason of simplicity and folly, or by reason of shrewdness and a sort of intelligence?
Hipp. By shrewdness, most assuredly, and intelligence.
Soc. They are intelligent, then, as it seems.
Hipp. Yes, by Zeus, too much so.
Soc. And being intelligent, do they know what they are doing, or do they not know?
Hipp. Yes, they know very well; that is why they do harm.
Soc. And knowing these things which they know, are they ignorant, or wise?

> Greek: 365. ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,
ὅς χʼ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται.
ἐν τούτοις δηλοῖ τοῖς ἔπεσιν τὸν πρότον ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς εἴη ἀληθής τε καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς πολύτροπός τε καὶ ψευδής· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα λέγοντα ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη. ΣΩ. νῦν ἤδη, ὦ Ἱππία, κινδυνεύω μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις· τὸν πολύτροπον ψευδῆ λέγεις, ὥς γε φαίνεται. ΙΠ. μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες· τοιοῦτον γὰρ πεποίηκεν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἰλιάδι καὶ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ. ΣΩ. ἐδόκει ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερος μὲν εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀληθής, ἕτερος δὲ ψευδής, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. ΙΠ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἱππία; ΙΠ. πάντων μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ μή. ΣΩ. τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον τοίνυν ἐάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη· σὺ δʼ ἐπειδὴ φαίνῃ ἀναδεχόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ ταῦτα ἅπερ φῂς Ὅμηρον λέγειν, ἀπόκριναι κοινῇ ὑπὲρ Ὁμήρου τε καὶ σαυτοῦ. ΙΠ. ἔσται ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα ἔμβραχυ ὅτι βούλει. ΣΩ. τοὺς ψευδεῖς λέγεις οἷον ἀδυνάτους τι ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντας, ἢ δυνατούς τι ποιεῖν; ΙΠ. δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν ἀνθρώπους. ΣΩ. δυνατοὶ μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον καὶ πολύτροποι· ἦ γάρ; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. πολύτροποι δʼ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπατεῶνες ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητος καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἢ ὑπὸ πανουργίας καὶ φρονήσεώς τινος; ΙΠ. ὑπὸ πανουργίας πάντων μάλιστα καὶ φρονήσεως. ΣΩ. φρόνιμοι μὲν ἄρα εἰσίν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ΙΠ. ναὶ μὰ Δία, λίαν γε. ΣΩ. φρόνιμοι δὲ ὄντες οὐκ ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν, ἢ ἐπίστανται; ΙΠ. καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ἐπίστανται· διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κακουργοῦσιν. ΣΩ. ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ ἐπίστανται πότερον ἀμαθεῖς εἰσιν ἢ σοφοί; ΙΠ. σοφοὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτά γε ταῦτα, ἐξαπατᾶν.

[¶3] 366. Hipp. Wise, surely, in just this, deception.
Soc. Stop. Let us recall what you say. You say that the false are powerful and intelligent, and knowing and wise in those things in which they are false?
Hipp. Yes, I do.
Soc. And that the true and the false are different and complete opposites of one another?
Hipp. I do.
Soc. Well, then, the false are among the powerful and the wise, according to your statement.
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. And when you say that the false are powerful and wise for falsehood, do you mean that they have power to utter falsehoods if they like, or that they are powerless in respect to the falsehoods which they utter?
Hipp. That they have power.
Soc. In short, then, the false are those who are wise and powerful in uttering falsehoods.
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. A man, then, who has not the power to utter falsehoods and is ignorant would not be false.
Hipp. That is true.
Soc. Well, but every man has power who does what he wishes at the time when he wishes; I am not speaking of one who is prevented by disease or that sort of thing, but as I might say of you that you have power to write my name when you wish or do you not say that a man has power who is in such a condition?
Hipp. Yes, I do.
Soc. Tell me, then, Hippias, are you not skillful in arithmetical calculations?
Hipp. Most assuredly, Socrates.
Soc. Then if some one were to ask you what the product of three times seven hundred is, you could, if you wished, tell him the truth about that more quickly and better than anyone else?
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. Because you are the most powerful and wisest of men in these matters?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. Are you, then, merely wisest and most powerful, or are you also best in those matters in which you are most powerful and wisest, namely calculations?
Hipp. Best also, to be sure, Socrates.
Soc. Then you would have the greatest power to tell the truth about these things, would you not?
Hipp. I think so.
Soc. But what of falsehoods about these same things? And please answer this with the same splendid frankness as my previous questions, Hippias. If some one were to ask you how much three times seven hundred is, would you have the most power to tell falsehoods and always uniformly to say false things about these matters, if you wished to tell falsehoods and never to reply truly;

> Greek: 366. ΣΩ. ἔχε δή· ἀναμνησθῶμεν τί ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις. τοὺς ψευδεῖς φῂς εἶναι δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονίμους καὶ ἐπιστήμονας καὶ σοφοὺς εἰς ἅπερ ψευδεῖς; ΙΠ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. ἄλλους δὲ τοὺς ἀληθεῖς τε καὶ ψευδεῖς, καὶ ἐναντιωτάτους ἀλλήλοις; ΙΠ. λέγω ταῦτα. ΣΩ. φέρε δή· τῶν μὲν δυνατῶν τινες καὶ σοφῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰσὶν οἱ ψευδεῖς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΙΠ. μάλιστά γε. ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ λέγῃς δυνατοὺς καὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ψευδεῖς εἰς αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πότερον λέγεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, ἢ ἀδυνάτους εἰς ταῦτα ἅπερ ψεύδονται; ΙΠ. δυνατοὺς ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἄρα εἰρῆσθαι, οἱ ψευδεῖς εἰσιν οἱ σοφοί τε καὶ δυνατοὶ ψεύδεσθαι. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἀδύνατος ἄρα ψεύδεσθαι ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀμαθὴς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψευδής. ΙΠ. ἔχει οὕτως. ΣΩ. δυνατὸς δέ γʼ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται, ὅταν βούληται· οὐχ ὑπὸ νόσου λέγω ἐξειργόμενον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ σὺ δυνατὸς εἶ γράψαι τοὐμὸν ὄνομα ὅταν βούλῃ, οὕτω λέγω. ἢ οὐχ, ὃς ἂν οὕτως ἔχῃ, καλεῖς σὺ δυνατόν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ σὺ μέντοι ἔμπειρος εἶ λογισμῶν καὶ λογιστικῆς; ΙΠ. πάντων μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ καί τίς σε ἔροιτο τὰ τρὶς ἑπτακόσια ὁπόσος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός, εἰ βούλοιο, πάντων τάχιστα καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴποις τἀληθῆ περὶ τούτου; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἆρα ὅτι δυνατώτατός τε εἶ καὶ σοφώτατος κατὰ ταῦτα; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοφώτατός τε εἶ καὶ δυνατώτατος μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἄριστος ταῦτα ἅπερ δυνατώτατός τε καὶ σοφώτατος, τὰ λογιστικά; ΙΠ. καὶ ἄριστος δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀληθῆ σὺ ἂν δυνατώτατα εἴποις περὶ τούτων· ἦ γάρ; ΙΠ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί δὲ τὰ ψευδῆ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων; καί μοι, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα, γενναίως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Ἱππία· εἴ τίς σε ἔροιτο τὰ τρὶς ἑπτακόσια πόσα ἐστί, πότερον σὺ ἂν μάλιστα ψεύδοιο καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ψευδῆ λέγοις περὶ τούτων, βουλόμενος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ ὁ ἀμαθὴς εἰς λογισμοὺς δύναιτʼ ἂν σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου;

[¶4] 367. or would he who is ignorant of calculations have more power to tell falsehoods than you, if you wished to do so? Or would the ignorant man often, when he wished to tell falsehoods, involuntarily tell the truth, if it so happened, because he did not know, whereas you, the wise man, if you wished to tell falsehoods, would tell them always and uniformly?
Hipp. Yes, it is as you say.
Soc. Is the false man, then, false about other things, but not about number, and would he not tell falsehoods when dealing with number?
Hipp. He is false about number also, by Zeus.
Soc. Shall we, then, assume this also, that there is such a person as a man who is false about calculation and number?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. Now who would that man be? Must he not, as you just now agreed, have power to tell falsehoods, if he is to be false? For it was said by you, if you recollect, that he who has not the power to tell falsehoods would never be false.
Hipp. Yes, I recollect, that was said.
Soc. And just now you were found to have most power to tell falsehoods about calculations, were you not?
Hipp. Yes, that also was said.
Soc. Have you, then, also most power to tell the truth about calculations?
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. Then the same man has most power to speak both falsehood and truth about calculations; and this man is the one who is good in respect to them, namely the calculator.
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. Who, then, becomes false in respect to calculation, Hippias, other than the good man? For the same man is also powerful and he is also true.
Hipp. So it appears.
Soc. You see, then, that the same man is both false and true in respect to these matters, and the true is in no wise better than the false? For he is indeed the same man, and the two are not utter opposites, as you thought just now.
Hipp. Apparently not, at least in this field.
Soc. Shall we, then, investigate elsewhere?
Hipp. If you like.
Soc. Well, then, are you expert in geometry also?
Hipp. I am.
Soc. Well, has not the same man most power to speak falsehood and truth about geometry, namely the geometrician?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. In respect to that, then, is any other good than he?
Hipp. No, no other.
Soc. The good and wise geometrician, then, has the most power in both respects, has he not? And if anyone is false in respect to diagrams, it would be this man, the good geometrician? For he has the power, and the bad one was powerless, to speak falsehood; so that he who has no power to speak falsehood would not become false, as has been agreed.
Hipp. That is true.
Soc. Let us, then, investigate also the third man, the astronomer, whose art you think you know even better than those of the previous ones;

> Greek: 367. ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς πολλάκις ἂν βουλόμενος ψευδῆ λέγειν τἀληθῆ ἂν εἴποι ἄκων, εἰ τύχοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, σὺ δὲ ὁ σοφός, εἴπερ βούλοιο ψεύδεσθαι, ἀεὶ ἂν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψεύδοιο; ΙΠ. ναί, οὕτως ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις. ΣΩ. ὁ ψευδὴς οὖν πότερον περὶ μὲν τἆλλα ψευδής ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι περὶ ἀριθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμῶν ἂν ψεύσαιτο; ΙΠ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν. ΣΩ. θῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Ἱππία, περὶ λογισμόν τε καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τινα ἄνθρωπον ψευδῆ; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη οὗτος; οὐχὶ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, εἴπερ μέλλει ψευδὴς ἔσεσθαι, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις, δυνατὸν εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι; ὁ γὰρ ἀδύνατος ψεύδεσθαι, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέγετο ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ψευδὴς γένοιτο. ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι καὶ ἐλέχθη οὕτως. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι ἐφάνης σὺ δυνατώτατος ὢν ψεύδεσθαι περὶ λογισμῶν; ΙΠ. ναί, ἐλέχθη γέ τοι καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ δυνατώτατος εἶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ λογισμῶν δυνατώτατος· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τούτων, ὁ λογιστικός. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ψευδὴς περὶ λογισμὸν γίγνεται, ὦ Ἱππία, ἄλλος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ καὶ δυνατός· οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἀληθής. ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀμείνων ὁ ἀληθὴς τοῦ ψευδοῦς; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ δήπου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα ἔχει, ὥσπερ σὺ ᾤου ἄρτι. ΙΠ. οὐ φαίνεται ἐνταῦθά γε. ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν σκεψώμεθα καὶ ἄλλοθι; ΙΠ. εἰ [ἄλλως] γε σὺ βούλει. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειρος εἶ; ΙΠ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ οὕτως ἔχει· ὁ αὐτὸς δυνατώτατος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγειν περὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων, ὁ γεωμετρικός; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. περὶ ταῦτα οὖν ἀγαθὸς ἄλλος τις ἢ οὗτος; ΙΠ. οὐκ ἄλλος. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς γεωμέτρης δυνατώτατός γε ἀμφότερα; καὶ εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ψευδὴς περὶ διαγράμματα, οὗτος ἂν εἴη, ὁ ἀγαθός; οὗτος γὰρ δυνατός, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀδύνατος ἦν ψεύδεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδὴς ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι, ὡς ὡμολόγηται. ΙΠ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὸν τρίτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τὸν ἀστρονόμον, ἧς αὖ σὺ τέχνης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἴει εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

[¶5] 368. do you not, Hippias?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. Are not the same things true in astronomy also?
Hipp. Probably, Socrates.
Soc. Then in astronomy also, if anyone is false, the good astronomer will be false, he who has power to speak falsehood. For he who has not power will not for he is ignorant.
Hipp. So it appears.
Soc. The same man, then, in astronomy will be true and false.
Hipp. So it seems.
Soc. Come now, Hippias, consider generally in this way concerning all the sciences, whether this is the case, or not. Certainly you are the wisest of men in the greatest number of arts, as I once heard you boast, recounting your great and enviable wisdom in the market-place at the tables of the moneychangers. You said that once, when you went to Olympia, everything you had on your person was your own work; first the ring—for you began with that— which you had was your own work, showing that you knew how to engrave rings, and another seal was your work, and a strigil and an oil-flask were your works; then you said that you yourself had made the sandals you had on, and had woven your cloak and tunic; and, what seemed to every one most unusual and proof of the most wisdom, was when you said that the girdle you wore about your tunic was like the Persian girdles of the costliest kind, and that you had made it yourself. And in addition you said that you brought with you poems, both epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many writings of all sorts composed in prose; and that you were there excelling all others in knowledge of the arts of which I was speaking just now, and of the correctness of rhythms and harmonies and letters, and many other things besides, as I seem to remember; and yet I forgot your art of memory, as it seems, in which you think you are most brilliant; and I fancy I have forgotten a great many other things. But, as I say, look both at your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and at those of others, and tell me if you find, in accordance with the agreements you and I have reached, any point where one man is true and another false, where they are separate and not the same. Look for this in any branch whatsoever of wisdom or shrewdness or whatever you choose to call it;

> Greek: 368. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν; ΙΠ. εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἄρα εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ψευδής, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀστρονόμος ψευδὴς ἔσται, ὁ δυνατὸς ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ὅ γε ἀδύνατος· ἀμαθὴς γάρ. ΙΠ. φαίνεται οὕτως. ΣΩ. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδὴς ἔσται. ΙΠ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, ὦ Ἱππία, ἀνέδην οὑτωσὶ ἐπίσκεψαι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, εἴ που ἔστιν ἄλλως ἔχον ἢ οὕτως. πάντως δὲ πλείστας τέχνας πάντων σοφώτατος εἶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ σου ἤκουον μεγαλαυχουμένου, πολλὴν σοφίαν καὶ ζηλωτὴν σαυτοῦ διεξιόντος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. ἔφησθα δὲ ἀφικέσθαι ποτὲ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἃ εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἅπαντα σαυτοῦ ἔργα ἔχων· πρῶτον μὲν δακτύλιον—ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἤρχου—ὃν εἶχες σαυτοῦ ἔχειν ἔργον, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίους γλύφειν, καὶ ἄλλην σφραγῖδα σὸν ἔργον, καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ λήκυθον ἃ αὐτὸς ἠργάσω· ἔπειτα ὑποδήματα ἃ εἶχες ἔφησθα αὐτὸς σκυτοτομῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον ὑφῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον· καὶ ὅ γε πᾶσιν ἔδοξεν ἀτοπώτατον καὶ σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ζώνην ἔφησθα τοῦ χιτωνίσκου, ἣν εἶχες, εἶναι μὲν οἷαι αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν, ταύτην δὲ αὐτὸς πλέξαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ποιήματα ἔχων ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἔπη καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ διθυράμβους, καὶ καταλογάδην πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ παντοδαποὺς συγκειμένους· καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὴ ὧν ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ἐπιστήμων ἀφικέσθαι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ὀρθότητος, καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλά, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μνημονεύειν· καίτοι τό γε μνημονικὸν ἐπελαθόμην σου, ὡς ἔοικε, τέχνημα, ἐν ᾧ σὺ οἴει λαμπρότατος εἶναι· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα ἐπιλελῆσθαι. ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ εἰς τὰς σαυτοῦ τέχνας βλέψας—ἱκαναὶ δέ—καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄλλων εἰπέ μοι, ἐάν που εὕρῃς ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοί, ὅπου ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθής, ὁ δὲ ψευδής, χωρὶς καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός; ἐν ᾗτινι βούλει σοφίᾳ τοῦτο σκέψαι ἢ πανουργίᾳ ἢ ὁτιοῦν χαίρεις ὀνομάζων·

[¶6] 369. but you will not find it, my friend, for it does not exist; just tell me.
Hipp. But I cannot, Socrates, at least, not now offhand.
Soc. And you never will be able to tell me, I fancy; but if what I say is true, Hippias, you remember what results from our argument.
Hipp. I do not at all understand what you mean, Socrates.
Soc. No, for perhaps you are not using your art of memory; for you evidently think it is not necessary; but I will remind you. Do you remember that you said that Achilles was true and Odysseus was false and wily?
Hipp. Yes.
Soc. Do you now, then, perceive that the same man has been found to be false and true, so that if Odysseus was false, he becomes also true, and if Achilles was true, he becomes also false, and the two men are not different from one another, nor opposites, but alike?
Hipp. Socrates, you are always making intricate arguments of this sort, and, picking out the most difficult part of the argument, you stick to it in detail, and you do not discuss the whole subject with which the argument deals; for now, if you like, I will prove to you by satisfactory argument based on many pieces of evidence, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and free from falsehood, and Odysseus crafty and a teller of many falsehoods and inferior to Achilles. And, if you like, do you oppose argument to argument, maintaining that the other is better; and these gentlemen here will determine which of us speaks better.
Soc. Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I; but it is always my custom to pay attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise; and because I desire to learn what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and compare the things he says, in order that I may learn. But if the speaker seems to me to be worthless, I neither ask questions nor care what he says. And by this you will recognize whom I regard as wise; for you will find me persistently asking such a man questions about what he says, in order that I may profit by learning something.
Soc. And so now I noticed when you were speaking, that in the lines which you repeated just now to show that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as to a deceiver, it seems to me very strange, if what you say is true, that Odysseus the wily is nowhere found to have spoken falsely, but Achilles is found to be a wily sort of person, according to your argument; at any rate, he speaks falsely.

> Greek: 369. ἀλλʼ οὐχ εὑρήσεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε— οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν—ἐπεὶ σὺ εἰπέ. ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτως. ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἕξεις, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μέμνησαι ὃ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ὦ Ἱππία. ΙΠ. οὐ πάνυ τι ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ λέγεις. ΣΩ. νυνὶ γὰρ ἴσως οὐ χρῇ τῷ μνημονικῷ τεχνήματι— δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἴει δεῖν—ἀλλὰ ἐγώ σε ὑπομνήσω. οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὲν Ἀχιλλέα ἔφησθα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα ψευδῆ καὶ πολύτροπον; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. νῦν οὖν αἰσθάνῃ ὅτι ἀναπέφανται ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθής, ὥστε εἰ ψευδὴς ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἦν, καὶ ἀληθὴς γίγνεται, καὶ εἰ ἀληθὴς ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ ψευδής, καὶ οὐ διάφοροι ἀλλήλων οἱ ἄνδρες οὐδʼ ἐναντίοι, ἀλλʼ ὅμοιοι; ΙΠ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχῃ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ ἀγωνίζῃ τῷ πράγματι περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, ἐπὶ πολλῶν τεκμηρίων ἀποδείξω σοι ἱκανῷ λόγῳ Ὅμηρον Ἀχιλλέα πεποιηκέναι ἀμείνω Ὀδυσσέως καὶ ἀψευδῆ, τὸν δὲ δολερόν τε καὶ πολλὰ ψευδόμενον καὶ χείρω Ἀχιλλέως. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σὺ αὖ ἀντιπαράβαλλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὡς ὁ ἕτερος ἀμείνων ἐστί· καὶ μᾶλλον εἴσονται οὗτοι ὁπότερος ἄμεινον λέγει. ΣΩ. ὦ Ἱππία, ἐγώ τοι οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ μὴ οὐχὶ σὲ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἢ ἐμέ· ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ εἴωθα, ἐπειδάν τις λέγῃ τι, προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι δοκῇ σοφὸς εἶναι ὁ λέγων, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν μαθεῖν ὅτι λέγει διαπυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐπανασκοπῶ καὶ συμβιβάζω τὰ λεγόμενα, ἵνα μάθω· ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος δοκῇ μοι εἶναι ὁ λέγων, οὔτε ἐπανερωτῶ οὔτε μοι μέλει ὧν λέγει. καὶ γνώσῃ τούτῳ οὓς ἂν ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι σοφοὺς εἶναι· εὑρήσεις γάρ με λιπαρῆ ὄντα περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τούτου καὶ πυνθανόμενον παρʼ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μαθών τι ὠφεληθῶ. ΣΩ. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐννενόηκα σοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν οἷς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἐνδεικνύμενος τὸν Ἀχιλλέα εἰς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα λέγειν ὡς ἀλαζόνα ὄντα, ἄτοπόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ψευσάμενος, ὁ πολύτροπος, ὁ δὲ Ἀχιλλεὺς πολύτροπός τις φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον·