--- title: "Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 2 of 2 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/2/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/2/" --- # Lesser Hippias · Ἱππίας ἐλάττων *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* Is the man who lies on purpose better than the one who lies unwillingly? > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg026, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg026.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 2. Pages 370–376 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-lesser-hippias/2/#p-N [¶0] 370. For he begins by speaking these lines which you just quoted: For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another, and a little later says that he would not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon and would not stay at Troy at all, but,— Tomorrow, after sacrificing to Zeus and all the gods, (he says), I will load my ships well and drag them into the sea; then you shall see, if you like and if it interests you, early in the morning my ships sailing the fishy Hellespont “and my men eagerly rowing in them; and if the glorious Earthshaker should grant me a fair voyage, on the third day I should come to fertile Phthia.” And even before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said: And now I shall go to Phthia, since it is far better to go home with my beaked ships, and I do not intend to stay here without honor, “and heap up wealth and riches for you.” After he has said these things, at one time in the presence of the whole army and at another before his own comrades, he is nowhere found to have either prepared or attempted to drag down his ships to sail home, but he shows quite superb disregard of truthspeaking. Now I, Hippias, asked my question in the first place because I was perplexed as to which of the two men is represented as better by the poet, and because I thought both were very good, and it was hard to decide which was better, both in regard to falsehood and truth and to virtue in general; for both are similar in this matter. Hipp. That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design. Soc. You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus. > Greek: 370. ψεύδεται γοῦν. προειπὼν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη, ἅπερ καὶ σὺ εἶπες ἄρτι— ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀίδαο πύλῃσιν, ὅς χʼ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγει ὡς οὔτʼ ἂν ἀναπεισθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως τε καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος οὔτε μένοι τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ, ἀλλʼ— αὔριον ἱρὰ Διὶ ῥέξας, φησί, καὶ πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, νηήσας εὖ νῆας, ἐπὴν ἅλαδε προερύσσω, ὄψεαι, αἴ κʼ ἐθέλῃσθα καὶ αἴ κέν τοι τὰ μεμήλῃ, ἦρι μάλʼ Ἑλλήσποντον ἐπʼ ἰχθυόεντα πλεούσας νῆας ἐμάς, ἐν δʼ ἄνδρας ἐρεσσέμεναι μεμαῶτας· εἰ δέ κεν εὐπλοΐην δώῃ κλυτὸς Ἐννοσίγαιος, ἤματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην. ἔτι δὲ πρότερον τούτων πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα λοιδορούμενος εἶπεν— νῦν δʼ εἶμι Φθίηνδʼ, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ λώϊόν ἐστιν οἴκαδʼ ἴμεν σὺν νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὐδέ σʼ ὀίω ἐνθάδʼ ἄτιμος ἐὼν ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν. ταῦτα εἰπὼν τοτὲ μὲν ἐναντίον τῆς στρατιᾶς ἁπάσης, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἑταίρους, οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται οὔτε παρασκευασάμενος οὔτʼ ἐπιχειρήσας καθέλκειν τὰς ναῦς ὡς ἀποπλευσούμενος οἴκαδε, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίως ὀλιγωρῶν τοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρόμην ἀπορῶν ὁπότερος τούτοιν τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἀμείνων πεποίηται τῷ ποιητῇ, καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀμφοτέρω ἀρίστω εἶναι καὶ δύσκριτον ὁπότερος ἀμείνων εἴη καὶ περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο παραπλησίω ἐστόν. ΙΠ. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς σκοπεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ψεύδεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαίνεται ψευδόμενος ἀλλʼ ἄκων, διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν τὴν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀναγκασθεὶς καταμεῖναι καὶ βοηθῆσαι· ἃ δὲ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, ἑκών τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς. ΣΩ. ἐξαπατᾷς με, ὦ φίλτατε Ἱππία, καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα μιμῇ. [¶1] 371. Hipp. Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer? Soc. That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it; at any rate Odysseus does not appear to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood. Hipp. What is this that you say, Socrates? Soc. Don’t you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different? Hipp. Where, pray? Soc. Where he says: For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam’s son, “the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt.” Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood? Hipp. No, I do not agree, Socrates; but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise. Soc. Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles. Hipp. Not in the least, Socrates. Soc. How is that? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily? Hipp. And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily and designedly do harm be better than those who do so involuntarily? > Greek: 371. ΙΠ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες· λέγεις δὴ τί καὶ πρὸς τί; ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φῂς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ψεύδεσθαι, ὃς ἦν οὕτω γόης καὶ ἐπίβουλος πρὸς τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ, ὡς πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως τοσοῦτον φαίνεται φρονεῖν πλέον πρὸς τὸ ῥᾳδίως λανθάνειν αὐτὸν ἀλαζονευόμενος, ὥστε ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐτόλμα ἐναντία λέγειν καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· οὐδὲν γοῦν φαίνεται εἰπὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοῦ ψευδομένου ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς. ΙΠ. ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι λέγων ὕστερον ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ἔφη ἅμα τῇ ἠοῖ ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα οὐκ αὖ φησιν ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα λέγει; ΙΠ. ποῦ δή; ΣΩ. ἐν οἷς λέγει— οὐ γὰρ πρὶν πολέμοιο μεδήσομαι αἱματόεντος, πρίν γʼ υἱὸν Πριάμοιο δαΐφρονος, Ἕκτορα δῖον, Μυρμιδόνων ἐπί τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἱκέσθαι κτείνοντʼ Ἀργείους, κατά τε φλέξαι πυρὶ νῆας· ἀμφὶ δέ μιν τῇ ʼμῇ κλισίῃ καὶ νηῒ μελαίνῃ Ἕκτορα καὶ μεμαῶτα μάχης σχήσεσθαι ὀίω. σὺ δὴ οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, πότερον οὕτως ἐπιλήσμονα οἴει εἶναι τὸν τῆς Θέτιδός τε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Χείρωνος πεπαιδευμένον, ὥστε ὀλίγον πρότερον λοιδοροῦντα τοὺς ἀλαζόνας τῇ ἐσχάτῃ λοιδορίᾳ αὐτὸν παραχρῆμα πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα φάναι ἀποπλευσεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Αἴαντα μενεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπιβουλεύοντά τε καὶ ἡγούμενον ἀρχαῖον εἶναι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ τεχνάζειν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι περιέσεσθαι; ΙΠ. οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑπὸ εὐνοίας ἀναπεισθεὶς πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα ἄλλα εἶπεν ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· ὁ δὲ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἅ τε ἀληθῆ λέγει, ἐπιβουλεύσας ἀεὶ λέγει, καὶ ὅσα ψεύδεται, ὡσαύτως. ΣΩ. ἀμείνων ἄρʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς Ἀχιλλέως. ΙΠ. ἥκιστά γε δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. τί δέ; οὐκ ἄρτι ἐφάνησαν οἱ ἑκόντες ψευδόμενοι βελτίους ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες; ΙΠ. καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ἑκόντες ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι βελτίους ἂν εἶεν τῶν ἀκόντων, οἷς πολλὴ δοκεῖ συγγνώμη εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ εἰδώς τις ἀδικήσῃ ἢ ψεύσηται ἢ ἄλλο τι κακὸν ποιήσῃ; [¶2] 372. And there seems to be good reason to forgive a man who unwittingly does wrong or speaks falsehood or does any other evil. And the laws surely are much more severe towards those who do evil and tell falsehoods voluntarily, than towards those who do so involuntarily. Soc. Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men? And this is probably the only good thing about me, as I am otherwise quite worthless; for I am all wrong about facts, and do not know the truth about them. And it is to me sufficient proof of the truth of this, that when I come into contact with one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am found to know nothing; for there is hardly a single thing about which you and I have the same opinion; and yet what greater proof of ignorance is there than when one disagrees with a wise man? But I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation; for I am not afraid to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers, and I never failed in gratitude to anyone; for when I have learned anything I have never denied it, pretending that the information was a discovery of my own; but I praise the wisdom of him who instructed me and proclaim what I learned from him. And so now I do not agree with what you say, but disagree very strongly; and I know very well that this is my own fault, because I am the sort of man I am—not to give myself any greater title. For my opinion, Hippias, is the exact opposite of what you say; I think that those who injure people and do wrong and speak falsehood and cheat and err voluntarily, not involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. Sometimes, however, the opposite of this seems to me to be the case, and I am all astray about these matters, evidently because I am ignorant; but now at the present moment a sort of paroxysm of my disease has come upon me, and those who err in respect to anything voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. And I lay the blame for my present condition upon our previous argument, which causes those who do any of these things involuntarily to appear to me at this moment worse than those who do them voluntarily. Soc. So please do me a favour and do not refuse to cure my soul; for you will be doing me much more good if you cure my soul of ignorance, than if you were to cure my body of disease. > Greek: 372. καὶ οἱ νόμοι δήπου πολὺ χαλεπώτεροί εἰσι τοῖς ἑκοῦσι κακὰ ἐργαζομένοις καὶ ψευδομένοις ἢ τοῖς ἄκουσιν. ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, λέγων ὡς λιπαρής εἰμι πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις τῶν σοφῶν; καὶ κινδυνεύω ἓν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, τἆλλα ἔχων πάνυ φαῦλα· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ᾗ ἔχει ἔσφαλμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπῃ ἐστί. τεκμήριον δέ μοι τούτου ἱκανόν, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν συγγένωμαί τῳ ὑμῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ οἷς οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες μάρτυρές εἰσι τῆς σοφίας, φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς· οὐδὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. καίτοι τί μεῖζον ἀμαθίας τεκμήριον ἢ ἐπειδάν τις σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι διαφέρηται; ἓν δὲ τοῦτο θαυμάσιον ἔχω ἀγαθόν, ὅ με σῴζει· οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ πυνθάνομαι καὶ ἐρωτῶ καὶ χάριν πολλὴν ἔχω τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε ἀπεστέρησα χάριτος. οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἔξαρνος ἐγενόμην μαθών τι, ἐμαυτοῦ ποιούμενος τὸ μάθημα εἶναι ὡς εὕρημα· ἀλλʼ ἐγκωμιάζω τὸν διδάξαντά με ὡς σοφὸν ὄντα, ἀποφαίνων ἃ ἔμαθον παρʼ αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἃ σὺ λέγεις οὐχ ὁμολογῶ σοι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρομαι πάνυ σφόδρα· καὶ τοῦτʼ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι διʼ ἐμὲ γίγνεται, ὅτι τοιοῦτός εἰμι οἷόσπερ εἰμί, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμαυτὸν μεῖζον εἴπω. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται, ὦ Ἱππία, πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις· οἱ βλάπτοντες τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀδικοῦντες καὶ ψευδόμενοι καὶ ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἑκόντες ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντες, βελτίους εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες. ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ τοὐναντίον δοκεῖ μοι τούτων καὶ πλανῶμαι περὶ ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι· νυνὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ παρόντι μοι ὥσπερ κατηβολὴ περιελήλυθεν, καὶ δοκοῦσί μοι οἱ ἑκόντες ἐξαμαρτάνοντες περί τι βελτίους εἶναι τῶν ἀκόντων. αἰτιῶμαι δὲ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος παθήματος τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους αἰτίους εἶναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς ἄκοντας τούτων ἕκαστα ποιοῦντας πονηροτέρους ἢ τοὺς ἑκόντας. ΣΩ. σὺ οὖν χάρισαι καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχήν μου· πολὺ γάρ τοι μεῖζόν με ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσῃ ἀμαθίας παύσας τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ νόσου τὸ σῶμα. [¶3] 373. Now if you choose to deliver a long speech, I tell you beforehand that you would not cure me—for I could not follow you—but if you are willing to answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I think you yourself will not be injured, either. And I might fairly call upon you also, son of Apemantus, for help; for you stirred me up to converse with Hippias; so now, if Hippias is unwilling to answer me, ask him in my behalf to do so. Eud. Well, Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need no asking from us; for that is not what he announced; he announced that he would not avoid the questioning of any man. How is that, Hippias? Is not that what you said? Hipp. Yes, I did; but Socrates, Eudicus, always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to want to make trouble. Soc. Most excellent Hippias, I do not do these voluntarily at all—for then I should be wise and clever, according to you—but involuntarily, so forgive me; for you say, too, that he who does evil involuntarily ought to be forgiven. Eud. And do not refuse, Hippias; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you. Hipp. Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like. Soc. I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner? Hipp. I do. Soc. And a bad one? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one; is it not so? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well? Hipp. Yes. Soc. In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil. Hipp. Why, of course. Soc. Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily? Hipp. He who does it voluntarily. Soc. Well, then, is not running doing something? Hipp. Yes, it is doing. Soc. And if doing, is it not also performing some act? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race? Hipp. Yes, a bad act of course. Soc. But he runs badly who runs slowly? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily? Hipp. So it seems. Soc. In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily? Hipp. Yes, in running. > Greek: 373. μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ ʼθέλεις λέγειν, προλέγω σοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄν με ἰάσαιο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκολουθήσαιμι —ὥσπερ δὲ ἄρτι εἰ ʼθέλεις μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, πάνυ ὀνήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδʼ αὐτὸν σὲ βλαβήσεσθαι. δικαίως δʼ ἂν καὶ σὲ παρακαλοίην, ὦ παῖ Ἀπημάντου· σὺ γάρ με ἐπῆρας Ἱππίᾳ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ νῦν, ἐὰν μή μοι ἐθέλῃ Ἱππίας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, δέου αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ΕΥ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι οὐδὲν δεήσεσθαι Ἱππίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας δεήσεως· οὐ γὰρ τοιαῦτα αὐτῷ ἐστι τὰ προειρημένα, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἂν φύγοι ἀνδρὸς ἐρώτησιν. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Ἱππία; οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ ἔλεγες; ΙΠ. ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ὦ Εὔδικε, ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουργοῦντι. ΣΩ. ὦ βέλτιστε Ἱππία, οὔτι ἑκών γε ταῦτα ἐγὼ ποιῶ— σοφὸς γὰρ ἂν ἦ καὶ δεινὸς κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον—ἀλλὰ ἄκων, ὥστε μοι συγγνώμην ἔχε· φῂς γὰρ αὖ δεῖν, ὃς ἂν κακουργῇ ἄκων, συγγνώμην ἔχειν. ΕΥ. καὶ μηδαμῶς γε, ὦ Ἱππία, ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων σοι λόγων ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἄν σε ἐρωτᾷ Σωκράτης. ΙΠ. ἀλλʼ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, σοῦ γε δεομένου. ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν σφόδρα γε ἐπιθυμῶ, ὦ Ἱππία, διασκέψασθαι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον, πότεροί ποτε ἀμείνους, οἱ ἑκόντες ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνοντες. οἶμαι οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν ὧδε ἐλθεῖν. ἀλλʼ ἀπόκριναι· καλεῖς τινα δρομέα ἀγαθόν; ΙΠ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. καὶ κακόν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁ εὖ θέων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ κακῶς; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ βραδέως θέων κακῶς θεῖ, ὁ δὲ ταχέως εὖ; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα καὶ τῷ θεῖν τάχος μὲν ἀγαθόν, βραδυτὴς δὲ κακόν; ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; ΣΩ. πότερος οὖν ἀμείνων δρομεύς, ὁ ἑκὼν βραδέως θέων ἢ ὁ ἄκων; ΙΠ. ὁ ἑκών. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ποιεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ θεῖν; ΙΠ. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ ποιεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαί τι; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ὁ κακῶς ἄρα θέων κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐν δρόμῳ τοῦτο ἐργάζεται; ΙΠ. κακόν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. κακῶς δὲ θεῖ ὁ βραδέως θέων; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δρομεὺς ἑκὼν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἄκων; ΙΠ. ἔοικέν γε. ΣΩ. ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα πονηρότερος ὁ ἄκων κακὰ ἐργαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἑκών; [¶4] 374. Soc. And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems. Soc. But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one’s opponent? Hipp. To be thrown. Soc. In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily. Hipp. So it seems. Soc. And how is it in every other bodily exercise? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine, so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily? Hipp. That seems to be the case in matters of strength also. Soc. And how about grace, Hippias? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily? Or what is your opinion? Hipp. That is my opinion. Soc. Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body, but when involuntary with faultiness. Hipp. Apparently. Soc. And what do you say about the voice? Which do you say is the better? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. That which does it voluntarily. Soc. And that which does it involuntarily is the worse? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Would you choose to possess good or bad things? Hipp. Good ones. Soc. Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. Voluntarily. Soc. But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. Those with which one would do so voluntarily. Soc. Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily? Hipp. Yes; that is, in matters of that sort. Soc. Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses —that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good. Hipp. I think so. Soc. Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily? Hipp. One with which he will do so voluntarily. Soc. And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest? Hipp. Quite true. > Greek: 374. ΙΠ. ἐν δρόμῳ γε. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν πάλῃ; πότερος παλαιστὴς ἀμείνων, ὁ ἑκὼν πίπτων ἢ ὁ ἄκων; ΙΠ. ὁ ἑκών, ὡς ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. πονηρότερον δὲ καὶ αἴσχιον ἐν πάλῃ τὸ πίπτειν ἢ τὸ καταβάλλειν; ΙΠ. τὸ πίπτειν. ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν πάλῃ ἄρα ὁ ἑκὼν τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἐργαζόμενος βελτίων παλαιστὴς ἢ ὁ ἄκων. ΙΠ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ τῇ τοῦ σώματος χρείᾳ; οὐχ ὁ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα δύναται ἀμφότερα ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ, καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ καλά· ὥστε ὅταν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πονηρὰ ἐργάζηται, ἑκὼν ἐργάζεται ὁ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα, ὁ δὲ πονηρότερος ἄκων; ΙΠ. ἔοικεν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν οὕτως ἔχειν. ΣΩ. τί δὲ κατʼ εὐσχημοσύνην, ὦ Ἱππία; οὐ τοῦ βελτίονος σώματός ἐστιν ἑκόντος τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ πονηρὰ σχήματα σχηματίζειν, τοῦ δὲ πονηροτέρου ἄκοντος; ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ; ΙΠ. οὕτως. ΣΩ. καὶ ἀσχημοσύνη ἄρα ἡ μὲν ἑκούσιος πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀκούσιος πρὸς πονηρίας σώματος. ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. τί δὲ φωνῆς πέρι λέγεις; ποτέραν φῂς εἶναι βελτίω, τὴν ἑκουσίως ἀπᾴδουσαν ἢ τὴν ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. τὴν ἑκουσίως. ΣΩ. μοχθηροτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. δέξαιο δʼ ἂν πότερον τἀγαθὰ κεκτῆσθαι ἢ τὰ κακά; ΙΠ. τἀγαθά. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἂν δέξαιο πόδας κεκτῆσθαι ἑκουσίως χωλαίνοντας ἢ ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. ἑκουσίως. ΣΩ. χωλεία δὲ ποδῶν οὐχὶ πονηρία καὶ ἀσχημοσύνη ἐστίν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀμβλυωπία οὐ πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ποτέρους οὖν ἂν βούλοιο ὀφθαλμοὺς κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ποτέροις συνεῖναι; οἷς ἑκὼν ἄν τις ἀμβλυώττοι καὶ παρορῴη ἢ οἷς ἄκων; ΙΠ. οἷς ἑκών. ΣΩ. βελτίω ἄρα ἥγησαι τῶν σαυτοῦ τὰ ἑκουσίως πονηρὰ ἐργαζόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. τὰ γοῦν τοιαῦτα. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πάντα, οἷον καὶ ὦτα καὶ ῥῖνας καὶ στόμα καὶ πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις, εἷς λόγος συνέχει, τὰς μὲν ἀκόντως κακὰ ἐργαζομένας ἀκτήτους εἶναι ὡς πονηρὰς οὔσας, τὰς δὲ ἑκουσίως κτητὰς ὡς ἀγαθὰς οὔσας. ΙΠ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ὀργάνων ποτέρων βελτίων ἡ κοινωνία, οἷς ἑκών τις κακὰ ἐργάζεται ἢ οἷς ἄκων; οἷον πηδάλιον ᾧ ἄκων κακῶς τις κυβερνήσει βέλτιον ἢ ᾧ ἑκών; ΙΠ. ὧι ἑκών. ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ τόξον ὡσαύτως καὶ λύρα καὶ αὐλοὶ καὶ τἆλλα σύμπαντα; [¶5] 375. Soc. Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. Voluntarily. Soc. Then that spirit is better. Hipp. Yes. Soc. Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily? Hipp. Certainly. Soc. And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark, or that which does so involuntarily? Hipp. That which does so voluntarily. Soc. Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily? Hipp. Yes, in the case of archery. Soc. And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients’ bodies voluntarily the more scientific? Hipp. Yes. Soc. In this art, then, this mind is better than the other. Hipp. It is better. Soc. Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute, and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse? Hipp. Apparently. Soc. And surely we should prefer to possess slaves of such minds that they voluntarily commit errors and do mischief, rather than such as do so involuntarily; we should think them better fitted for their duties. Hipp. Yes. Soc. Well now, should we not wish to possess our own mind in the best possible condition? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Will it, then, be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, or involuntarily? Hipp. But it would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do wrong voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily. Soc. But surely they appear, at least, to be so, from what has been said. Hipp. Not to me. Soc. I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me: Is not justice either a sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or must not justice inevitably be one or other of these? Hipp. Yes. Soc. Then injustice is a power of the soul, the more powerful soul is the more just, is it not? For we found, my friend, that such a soul was better. Hipp. Yes, we did. Soc. And what if it be knowledge? Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Hipp. Yes. Soc. And what if it be both? Is not the soul which has both, power and knowledge, more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Is that not inevitably the case? Hipp. It appears to be. Soc. This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not? > Greek: 375. ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ψυχὴν κεκτῆσθαι ἵππου, ᾗ ἑκών τις κακῶς ἱππεύσει, ἄμεινον ἢ ⟨ᾗ⟩ ἄκων; ΙΠ. ἧι ἑκών. ΣΩ. ἀμείνων ἄρα ἐστίν. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τῇ ἀμείνονι ἄρα ψυχῇ ἵππου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ ἑκουσίως ἂν ποιοῖ, τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ κυνὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πάντων; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἐκτῆσθαι τοξότου ἄμεινόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἑκουσίως ἁμαρτάνει τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἢ ἥτις ἀκουσίως; ΙΠ. ἥτις ἑκουσίως. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὕτη ἀμείνων εἰς τοξικήν ἐστιν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνουσα πονηροτέρα ἢ ἑκουσίως; ΙΠ. ἐν τοξικῇ γε. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν ἰατρικῇ; οὐχὶ ἡ ἑκοῦσα κακὰ ἐργαζομένη περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρικωτέρα; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἀμείνων ἄρα αὕτη ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μὴ [ἰατρικῆς]. ΙΠ. ἀμείνων. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡ κιθαριστικωτέρα καὶ αὐλητικωτέρα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας τε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, οὐχὶ ἡ ἀμείνων ἑκοῦσα τὰ κακὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνει, ἡ δὲ πονηροτέρα ἄκουσα; ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που τάς γε τῶν δούλων ψυχὰς κεκτῆσθαι δεξαίμεθʼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὰς ἑκουσίως ἢ τὰς ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτανούσας τε καὶ κακουργούσας, ὡς ἀμείνους οὔσας εἰς ταῦτα. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν οὐ βουλοίμεθʼ ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν βελτίων ἔσται, ἐὰν ἑκοῦσα κακουργῇ τε καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, ἢ ἐὰν ἄκουσα; ΙΠ. δεινὸν μεντἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονταί γε ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ΙΠ. οὔκουν ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δʼ ᾤμην, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ σοὶ φανῆναι. πάλιν δʼ ἀπόκριναι· ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἢ δύναμίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀμφότερα; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕν γέ τι τούτων εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δυνατωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα ἐστί; βελτίων γάρ που ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ τοιαύτη. ΙΠ. ἐφάνη γάρ. ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἐπιστήμη; οὐχ ἡ σοφωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα; ΙΠ. ⟨ναί.⟩ ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἀμφότερα; οὐχ ἡ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δύναμιν, δικαιοτέρα, ἡ δʼ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα; οὐχ οὕτως ἀνάγκη ἔχειν; ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη ἀμείνων οὖσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν; [¶6] 376. Hipp. Yes. Soc. Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of justice. Hipp. So it seems. Soc. And doing injustice is doing evil acts, and not doing injustice is doing good acts. Hipp. Yes. Soc. Will not, then, the more powerful and better soul, when it does injustice, do it voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? Hipp. Apparently. Soc. Is not, then, a good man he who has a good soul, and a bad man he who has a bad one? Hipp. Yes. Soc. It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul. Hipp. But surely he has. Soc. Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man. Hipp. I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that. Soc. Nor I with myself, Hippias; but that appears at the moment to be the inevitable result of our argument; however, as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same opinion; and that I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising; but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us also, if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying. > Greek: 376. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐργάζηται, ἑκοῦσα ἐργάζεται διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην· ταῦτα δὲ δικαιοσύνης φαίνεται, ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον. ΙΠ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μέν γε ἀδικεῖν κακὰ ποιεῖν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καλά. ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ψυχή, ὅτανπερ ἀδικῇ, ἑκοῦσα ἀδικήσει, ἡ δὲ πονηρὰ ἄκουσα; ΙΠ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ τὴν κακήν; ΙΠ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἀγαθοῦ μὲν ἄρα ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖν, κακοῦ δὲ ἄκοντα, εἴπερ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει. ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει γε. ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα ποιῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, εἴπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός. ΙΠ. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι συγχωρήσω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Ἱππία· ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον οὕτω φαίνεσθαι νῦν γε ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. ὅπερ μέντοι πάλαι ἔλεγον, ἐγὼ περὶ ταῦτα ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτά μοι δοκεῖ. καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πλανᾶσθαι οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἰδιώτην· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς πλανήσεσθε οἱ σοφοί, τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ ἡμῖν δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἀφικόμενοι παυσόμεθα τῆς πλάνης.