203a. I was making my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, by the road outside the town wall,—just under the wall; and when I reached the little gate that leads to the spring of Panops, I chanced there upon Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus of Paeania, and some other youths with them, standing in a group together. Then Hippothales, as he saw me approaching, said: Socrates, whither away, and whence?
203a. ἐπορευόμην μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺ Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὑπʼ αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος· ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐγενόμην κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα ᾗ ἡ Πάνοπος κρήνη, ἐνταῦθα συνέτυχον Ἱπποθάλει τε τῷ Ἱερωνύμου καὶ Κτησίππῳ τῷ Παιανιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις μετὰ τούτων νεανίσκοις ἁθρόοις συνεστῶσι. καί με προσιόντα ὁ Ἱπποθάλης ἰδών, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ποῖ δὴ πορεύῃ καὶ πόθεν;
203b. From the Academy, I replied, on my way straight to the Lyceum. Come over here, he said, straight to us. You will not put in here? But you may as well. Where do you mean? I asked; and what is your company? Here, he said, showing me there, just opposite the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open. We pass our time there, he went on; not only we ourselves, but others besides,—a great many, and handsome.
203b. ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺ Λυκείου. δεῦρο δή, ἦ δʼ ὅς, εὐθὺ ἡμῶν. οὐ παραβάλλεις; ἄξιον μέντοι. ποῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις, καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς; δεῦρο, ἔφη, δείξας μοι ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ τοῦ τείχους περίβολόν τέ τινα καὶ θύραν ἀνεῳγμένην. διατρίβομεν δέ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, αὐτόθι ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί.
204a. And what, pray, is this place, and what your pastime? A wrestling school, he said, of recent construction; and our pastime chiefly consists of discussions, in which we should be happy to let you have a share. That is very good of you, I said; and who does the teaching there? Your own comrade, he replied, and supporter, Miccus. Upon my word, I said, he is no slight person, but a qualified professor. Then will you please come in with us, he said, so as to see for yourself the company we have there?
204a. ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ διατριβή; παλαίστρα, ἔφη, vνεωστὶ ᾠκοδομημένη· ἡ δὲ διατριβὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις, ὧν ἡδέως ἄν σοι μεταδιδοῖμεν. καλῶς γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιοῦντες· διδάσκει δὲ τίς αὐτόθι; σὸς ἑταῖρός γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ ἐπαινέτης, Μίκκος. μὰ Δία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ φαῦλός γε ἁνήρ, ἀλλʼ ἱκανὸς σοφιστής. βούλει οὖν ἕπεσθαι, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς τοὺς ὄντας αὐτόθι [αὐτοῦ];
204b. I should be glad to hear first on what terms I am to enter, and which is the handsome one. Each of us, he replied, has a different fancy, Socrates. Well, and which is yours, Hippothales? Tell me that. At this question he blushed; so I said: Ah, Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need not trouble to tell me whether you are in love with somebody or not: for I know you are not only in love, but also far advanced already in your passion. In everything else I may be a poor useless creature, but there is one gift that I have somehow from heaven,—to be able to recognize quickly a lover or a beloved.
204b. πρῶτον ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμʼ ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ εἴσειμι καὶ τίς ὁ καλός. ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ ἡμῶν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. σοὶ δὲ δὴ τίς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες; τοῦτό μοι εἰπέ. καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἠρυθρίασεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου Ἱππόθαλες, τοῦτο μὲν μηκέτι εἴπῃς, εἴτε ἐρᾷς του εἴτε μή· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐρᾷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρω ἤδη εἶ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. εἰμὶ δʼ ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος καὶ ἄχρηστος, τοῦτο δέ μοί πως ἐκ θεοῦ δέδοται, ταχὺ οἵῳ τʼ εἶναι γνῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον.
204c. When he heard this, he blushed much more than ever. Then Ctesippus remarked: Quite charming, the way you blush, Hippothales, and shrink from telling Socrates the name; yet, if he spends but a little time with you, he will find you a regular torment, as he hears you repeat it again and again. He has deafened our ears, I can tell you, Socrates, by cramming them with “Lysis”:
204c. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. ὁ οὖν Κτήσιππος, Ἀστεῖόν γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, καὶ ὀκνεῖς εἰπεῖν Σωκράτει τοὔνομα· ἐὰν δʼ οὗτος καὶ σμικρὸν χρόνον συνδιατρίψῃ σοι, παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος. ἡμῶν γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος·
204d. let him be a trifle in liquor, and as likely as not we start out of our sleep fancying we hear the name of Lysis. The descriptions he gives us in conversation, though dreadful enough, are not so very bad: it is when he sets about inundating us with his poems and prose compositions. More dreadful than all, he actually sings about his favorite in an extraordinary voice, which we have the trial of hearing. And now, at a question from you, he blushes! Lysis apparently, I said, is somebody quite young:
204d. ἂν μὲν δὴ καὶ ὑποπίῃ, εὐμαρία ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγρομένοις Λύσιδος οἴεσθαι τοὔνομα ἀκούειν. καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὅ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾁδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, ἣν ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθριᾷ.
204e. this I infer from the fact that I did not recognize the name when I heard it. That is because they do not usually call him by his name, he replied; he still goes by his paternal title, as his father is so very well known. You must, I am sure, be anything but ignorant of the boy’s appearance: that alone would be enough to know him by. Let me hear, I said, whose son he is. The eldest son, he replied, of Democrates of Aexone.
204e. ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ Λύσις νέος τις, ὡς ἔοικε· τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι ἀκούσας τοὔνομα οὐκ ἔγνων. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ, ἔφη, τὶ αὐτοῦ τοὔνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἔτι πατρόθεν ἐπονομάζεται διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γιγνώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι πολλοῦ δεῖς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γιγνώσκεσθαι. λεγέσθω, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὗτινος ἔστιν. Δημοκράτους, ἔφη, τοῦ Αἰξωνέως ὁ πρεσβύτατος ὑός.
205. Ah well, I said, Hippothales, what an altogether noble and gallant love you have discovered there! Now please go on and give me a performance like those that you give your friends here, so that I may know whether you understand what a lover ought to say of his favorite to his face or to others.
205. εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, ὡς γενναῖον καὶ νεανικὸν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα πανταχῇ ἀνηῦρες· καί μοι ἴθι ἐπίδειξαι ἃ καὶ τοῖσδε ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ἵνα εἰδῶ εἰ ἐπίστασαι ἃ χρὴ ἐραστὴν περὶ παιδικῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους λέγειν.
205a. Do you attach any weight, Socrates, he asked, to anything you have heard this fellow say? Tell me, I said; do you deny being in love with the person he mentions? Not I, he replied; but I do deny that I make poems and compositions on my favorite. He is in a bad way, said Ctesippus; why, he raves like a madman! Then I remarked: Hippothales, I do not want to hear your verses, or any ode that you may have indited to the youth; I only ask for their purport, that I may know your manner of dealing with your favorite.
205a. τούτων δέ τι, ἔφη, σταθμᾷ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν ὅδε λέγει; πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἔξαρνος εἶ οὗ λέγει ὅδε; οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ συγγράφειν. οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ τε καὶ μαίνεται. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἴ τι πεποίηκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρῃ πρὸς τὰ παιδικά.
205b. I expect this fellow will tell you, he replied: he has an accurate knowledge and recollection of them, if there is any truth in what he says of my having dinned them so constantly in his ears. Quite so, on my soul, said Ctesippus; and a ridiculous story it is too, Socrates. To be a lover, and to be singularly intent on one’s boy, yet to have nothing particular to tell him that a mere boy could not say, is surely ridiculous:
205b. ὅδε δήπου σοι, ἔφη, ἐρεῖ· ἀκριβῶς γὰρ ἐπίσταται καὶ μέμνηται, εἴπερ, ὡς λέγει, ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἀεὶ ἀκούων διατεθρύληται. νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, πάνυ γε. καὶ γάρ ἐστι καταγέλαστα, ὦ Σώκρατες. τὸ γὰρ ἐραστὴν ὄντα καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τῷ παιδὶ ἴδιον μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν λέγειν ὃ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς εἴποι, πῶς οὐχὶ καταγέλαστον;
205c. but he only writes and relates things that the whole city sings of, recalling Democrates and the boy’s grandfather Lysis and all his ancestors, with their wealth and the horses they kept, and their victories at Delphi, the Isthmus, and Nemea, with chariot-teams and coursers, and, in addition, even hoarier antiquities than these. Only two days ago he was recounting to us in some poem of his the entertainment of Hercules,—how on account of his kinship with Hercules their forefather welcomed the hero, being himself the offspring of Zeus and of the daughter of their deme’s founder; such old wives’ tales, and many more of the sort, Socrates,—these are the things he tells and trolls, while compelling us to be his audience.
205c. ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾁδει περὶ Δημοκράτους καὶ Λύσιδος τοῦ πάππου τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ πάντων πέρι τῶν προγόνων, πλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι, ταῦτα ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα. τὸν γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμὸν πρῴην ἡμῖν ἐν ποιήματί τινι διῄει, ὡς διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν ὑποδέξαιτο τὸν Ἡρακλέα, γεγονὼς αὐτὸς ἐκ Διός τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρός, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾁδουσι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες·
205d. When I heard this I said: Oh, you ridiculous Hippothales, do you compose and chant a triumph song on yourself, before you have won your victory? It is not on myself, Socrates, he replied, that I either compose or chant it. You think not, I said. Then what is the truth of it? he asked.
205d. ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἃ οὗτος λέγων τε καὶ ᾁδων ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες, πρὶν νενικηκέναι ποιεῖς τε καὶ ᾁδεις εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον; ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰς ἐμαυτόν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε ποιῶ οὔτε ᾁδω. οὐκ οἴει γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχει; ἔφη.
205e. Most certainly, I replied, it is you to whom these songs refer.
205e. πάντων μάλιστα, εἶπον, εἰς σὲ τείνουσιν αὗται αἱ ᾠδαί.
206. For if you prevail on your favorite, and he is such as you describe, all that you have spoken and sung will be so much glory to you, and a veritable eulogy upon your triumph in having secured such a favorite as that: whereas if he eludes your grasp, the higher the terms of your eulogy of your favorite, the greater will seem to be the charms and virtues you have lost, and you will be ridiculed accordingly. Hence anyone who deals wisely in love-matters, my friend, does not praise his beloved until he prevails, for fear of what the future may have in store for him.
206. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἕλῃς τὰ παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα, κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ᾀσθέντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐγκώμια ὥσπερ νενικηκότι, ὅτι τοιούτων παιδικῶν ἔτυχες· ἐὰν δέ σε διαφύγῃ, ὅσῳ ἂν μείζω σοι εἰρημένα ᾖ ἐγκώμια περὶ τῶν παιδικῶν, τοσούτῳ μειζόνων δόξεις καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐστερημένος καταγέλαστος εἶναι.
206a. And besides, these handsome boys, when so praised and extolled, become full of pride and haughtiness: do you not think so? I do, he said. And then, the haughtier they are, the harder grows the task of capturing them? Yes, apparently. And what do you think of a hunter who should scare away his quarry in hunting and make it harder to catch? Clearly he would be a poor one.
206a. ὅστις οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὦ φίλε, σοφός, οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὶν ἂν ἕλῃ, δεδιὼς τὸ μέλλον ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται. καὶ ἅμα οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ, φρονήματος ἐμπίμπλανται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας· ἢ οὐκ οἴει; ἔγωγε, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἂν μεγαλαυχότεροι ὦσιν, δυσαλωτότεροι γίγνονται; εἰκός γε. ποῖός τις οὖν ἄν σοι δοκεῖ θηρευτὴς εἶναι, εἰ ἀνασοβοῖ θηρεύων καὶ δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν ποιοῖ;
206b. And hence to use speech and song, not for charming but for driving wild, would be gross fatuity, would it not? I think so. Then take care, Hippothales, not to make yourself guilty of all these things by your verse-making; and yet I fancy you will not like to allow that a man who damages himself by poetry can be a good poet, so long as he is damaging to himself. On my soul, no, he said; of course it would be most absurd. But this is the very reason, Socrates, why I impart my feelings to you, and ask you for any useful advice you can give as to what conversation or conduct will help to endear one to one’s favorite.
206b. δῆλον ὅτι φαῦλος. καὶ μὲν δὴ λόγοις τε καὶ ᾠδαῖς μὴ κηλεῖν ἀλλʼ ἐξαγριαίνειν πολλὴ ἀμουσία· ἦ γάρ; δοκεῖ μοι. σκόπει δή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, ὅπως μὴ πᾶσι τούτοις ἔνοχον σαυτὸν ποιήσεις διὰ τὴν ποίησιν· καίτοι οἶμαι ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ποιήσει βλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἄν σε ἐθέλειν ὁμολογῆσαι ὡς ἀγαθός ποτʼ ἐστὶν ποιητής, βλαβερὸς ὢν ἑαυτῷ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη. ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνακοινοῦμαι, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις, συμβούλευε τίνα ἄν τις λόγον διαλεγόμενος ἢ τί πράττων προσφιλὴς παιδικοῖς γένοιτο.
206c. That is not an easy thing to tell, I replied; but if you will agree to get him to have a talk with me, I daresay I could show you an example of the conversation you should hold with him, instead of those things that your friends say you speak and sing. There is no difficulty about that, he said. If you will go in with Ctesippus here, and take a seat and talk, I think he will come to you of his own accord; he is singularly fond of listening, Socrates, and besides, they are keeping the Hermaea, so that the youths and boys are all mingled together.
206c. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν· ἀλλʼ εἴ μοι ἐθελήσαις αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν, ἴσως ἂν δυναίμην σοι ἐπιδεῖξαι ἃ χρὴ αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντὶ τούτων ὧν οὗτοι λέγειν τε καὶ ᾁδειν φασί σε. ἀλλʼ οὐδέν, ἔφη, χαλεπόν. ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃς μετὰ Κτησίππου τοῦδε καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ, οἶμαι μὲν καὶ αὐτός σοι πρόσεισι—φιλήκοος γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, διαφερόντως ἐστίν, καὶ ἅμα, ὡς Ἑρμαῖα ἄγουσιν, ἀναμεμειγμένοι ἐν ταὐτῷ εἰσιν οἵ τε νεανίσκοι καὶ οἱ παῖδες—πρόσεισιν οὖν σοι.
206d. So he will come to you but if he does not, Ctesippus is intimate with him, as being a cousin of Menexenus; for Lysis has chosen Menexenus for his particular friend. So let Ctesippus call him if you find that he does not come of himself. That is what I must do, I said. Whereupon I took Ctesippus with me into the wrestling school, and the others came after us.
206d. εἰ δὲ μή, Κτησίππῳ συνήθης ἐστὶν διὰ τὸν τούτου ἀνεψιὸν Μενέξενον· Μενεξένῳ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντων μάλιστα ἑταῖρος ὢν τυγχάνει. καλεσάτω οὖν οὗτος αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ προσίῃ αὐτός. ταῦτα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, χρὴ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἅμα λαβὼν τὸν Κτήσιππον προσῇα εἰς τὴν παλαίστραν·
206e. When we got inside, we found that the boys had performed the sacrifice in the place and, as the ceremonial business was now almost over, they were all playing at knuckle-bones and wearing their finest attire. Most of them were playing in the court out-of-doors; but some were at a game of odd-and-even in a corner of the undressing room, with a great lot of knuckle-bones which they drew from little baskets; and there were others standing about them and looking on.
206e. οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι ὕστεροι ἡμῶν ᾖσαν. εἰσελθόντες δὲ κατελάβομεν αὐτόθι τεθυκότας τε τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερεῖα σχεδόν τι ἤδη πεποιημένα, ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δὴ καὶ κεκοσμημένους ἅπαντας. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἔπαιζον ἔξω, οἱ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ ἠρτίαζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις, ἐκ φορμίσκων τινῶν προαιρούμενοι· τούτους δὲ περιέστασαν ἄλλοι θεωροῦντες.
207. Among these was Lysis: he stood among the boys and youths with a garland on his head, a distinguished figure, deserving not merely the name of well-favored, but also of well-made and well-bred.
207. ὧν δὴ καὶ ὁ Λύσις ἦν, καὶ εἱστήκει ἐν τοῖς παισί τε καὶ νεανίσκοις ἐστεφανωμένος καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφέρων, οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλʼ ὅτι καλός τε κἀγαθός.
207a. As for us, we went and sat apart on the opposite side—for it was quiet there—and started some talk amongst ourselves. The result was that Lysis ever and anon turned round to observe us, and was obviously eager to join us. For a while, however, he hesitated, being too shy to approach us alone;
207a. καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ ἀποχωρήσαντες ἐκαθεζόμεθα—ἦν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἡσυχία—καί τι ἀλλήλοις διελεγόμεθα. περιστρεφόμενος οὖν ὁ Λύσις θαμὰ ἐπεσκοπεῖτο ἡμᾶς, καὶ δῆλος ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν προσελθεῖν. τέως μὲν οὖν ἠπόρει τε καὶ ὤκνει μόνος προσιέναι, ἔπειτα ὁ Μενέξενος ἐκ τῆς αὐλῆς μεταξὺ παίζων εἰσέρχεται, καὶ ὡς εἶδεν ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν Κτήσιππον, ᾔει παρακαθιζησόμενος·
207b. till Menexenus stepped in for a moment from his game in the court and, on seeing me and Ctesippus, came to take a seat beside us. When Lysis saw him, he came along too and sat down with Menexenus. Then all the others came to us also; and I must add that Hippothales, when he saw a good many of them standing there, stood so as to be screened by them, in a position where he thought Lysis would not catch sight of him, as he feared that he might irritate him; in this way he stood by and listened. Then I, looking at Menexenus, asked him: Son of Demophon, which is the elder of you two? It is a point in dispute between us, he replied.
207b. ἰδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσις εἵπετο καὶ συμπαρεκαθέζετο μετὰ τοῦ Μενεξένου. προσῆλθον δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἱπποθάλης, ἐπειδὴ πλείους ἑώρα ἐφισταμένους, τούτους ἐπηλυγισάμενος προσέστη ᾗ μὴ ᾤετο κατόψεσθαι τὸν λύσιν, δεδιὼς μὴ αὐτῷ ἀπεχθάνοιτο· καὶ οὕτω προσεστὼς ἠκροᾶτο. καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν Μενέξενον ἀποβλέψας, ὦ παῖ Δημοφῶντος, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πότερος ὑμῶν πρεσβύτερος;
207c. Then you must also be at variance, I said, as to which is the nobler. Yes, to be sure, he said. And moreover, which is the more beautiful, likewise. This made them both laugh. But of course I shall not ask, I said, which of you is the wealthier; for you are friends, are you not? Certainly we are, they replied. And, you know, friends are said to have everything in common, so that here at least there will be no difference between you, if what you say of your friendship is true. They agreed.
207c. ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁπότερος γενναιότερος, ἐρίζοιτʼ ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πάνυ γε, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν ὁπότερός γε καλλίων, ὡσαύτως. ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω. οὐ μὴν ὁπότερός γε, ἔφην, πλουσιώτερος ὑμῶν, οὐκ ἐρήσομαι· φίλω γάρ ἐστον. ἦ γάρ; πάνυ γʼ, ἐφάτην. οὐκοῦν κοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται, ὥστε τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν διοίσετον, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ περὶ τῆς φιλίας λέγετον. συνεφάτην.
207d. After that I was proceeding to ask them which was the juster and wiser of the two, when I was interrupted by somebody who came and fetched away Menexenus, saying that the wrestling-master was calling him: I understood that he was taking some part in the rites. So he went off; and then I asked Lysis: I suppose, Lysis, your father and mother are exceedingly fond of you? Yes, to be sure, he replied. Then they would like you to be as happy as possible?
207d. ἐπεχείρουν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶν ὁπότερος δικαιότερος καὶ σοφώτερος αὐτῶν εἴη. μεταξὺ οὖν τις προσελθὼν ἀνέστησε τὸν Μενέξενον, φάσκων καλεῖν τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἱεροποιῶν τυγχάνειν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ᾤχετο· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν λύσιν ἠρόμην, ἦ που, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ;—πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—οὐκοῦν βούλοιντο ἄν σε ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι;— πῶς γὰρ οὔ;—δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων τε καὶ ᾧ μηδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῖ;—μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν εἴ σε φιλεῖ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εὐδαίμονά σε ἐπιθυμοῦσι γενέσθαι, τοῦτο παντὶ τρόπῳ δῆλον ὅτι προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης.—πῶς γὰρ οὐχί;
207e. Yes, of course. Do you consider that a man is happy when enslaved and restricted from doing everything he desires? Not I, on my word, he said. Then if your father and mother are fond of you, and desire to see you happy, it is perfectly plain that they are anxious to secure your happiness. They must be, of course, he said. Hence they allow you to do what you like, and never scold you, or hinder you from doing what you desire? Yes, they do, Socrates, I assure you: they stop me from doing a great many things. How do you mean? I said: they wish you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like?
207e. ἔφη.—ἐῶσιν ἄρα σε ἃ βούλει ποιεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιπλήττουσιν οὐδὲ διακωλύουσι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς;—ναὶ μὰ Δία ἐμέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα γε πολλὰ κωλύουσιν.— πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. βουλόμενοί σε μακάριον εἶναι διακωλύουσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν βούλῃ;
208a. But answer me this: suppose you desire to ride in one of your father’s chariots and hold the reins in some race; they will not allow you, but will prevent you? That is so, to be sure, he said; they will not allow me. But whom would they allow? There is a driver, in my father’s pay. What do you say? A hireling, whom they trust rather than you, so that he can do whatever he pleases with the horses; and they pay him besides a salary for doing that!
208a. ὧδε δέ μοι λέγε. ἢν ἐπιθυμήσῃς ἐπί τινος τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ἁρμάτων ὀχεῖσθαι λαβὼν τὰς ἡνίας, ὅταν ἁμιλλᾶται, οὐκ ἂν ἐῷέν σε ἀλλὰ διακωλύοιεν;—μὰ Δίʼ οὐ μέντοι ἄν, ἔφη, ἐῷεν.—ἀλλὰ τίνα μήν;—ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μισθὸν φέρων.—πῶς λέγεις; μισθωτῷ μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἢ σοὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται περὶ τοὺς ἵππους, καὶ προσέτι αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀργύριον τελοῦσιν;—ἀλλὰ τί μήν;
208b. Why, of course, he said. Well, but they trust you with the control of the mule-cart, and if you wanted to take the whip and lash the team, they would let you? Nothing of the sort, he said. Why, I asked, is nobody allowed to lash them? Oh yes, he said, the muleteer. Is he a slave, or free? A slave, he replied. So it seems that they value a slave more highly than you, their son, and entrust him rather than you with their property, and allow him to do what he likes, while preventing you?
208b. ἔφη.—ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀρικοῦ ζεύγους οἶμαι ἐπιτρέπουσίν σοι ἄρχειν, κἂν εἰ βούλοιο λαβὼν τὴν μάστιγα τύπτειν, ἐῷεν ἄν.—πόθεν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἐῷεν;—τί δέ; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐδενὶ ἔξεστιν αὐτοὺς τύπτειν;—καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τῷ ὀρεοκόμῳ.—δούλῳ ὄντι ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ;—δούλῳ, ἔφη.—καὶ δοῦλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡγοῦνται περὶ πλείονος ἢ σὲ τὸν ὑόν, καὶ ἐπιτρέπουσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ σοί, καὶ ἐῶσιν ποιεῖν ὅτι βούλεται, σὲ δὲ διακωλύουσι;
208c. And now there is one thing more you must tell me. Do they let you control your own self, or will they not trust you in that either? Of course they do not, he replied. But some one controls you? Yes, he said, my tutor here. Is he a slave? Why, certainly; he belongs to us, he said. What a strange thing, I exclaimed; a free man controlled by a slave! But how does this tutor actually exert his control over you? By taking me to school, I suppose, he replied. And your schoolmasters, can it be that they also control you?
208c. καί μοι ἔτι τόδε εἰπέ. σὲ αὐτὸν ἐῶσιν ἄρχειν σεαυτοῦ, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι;—πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν;—ἀλλʼ ἄρχει τίς σου;—ὅδε, παιδαγωγός, ἔφη.—μῶν δοῦλος ὤν;—ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἡμέτερός γε, ἔφη.—ἦ δεινόν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐλεύθερον ὄντα ὑπὸ δούλου ἄρχεσθαι. τί δὲ ποιῶν αὖ οὗτος ὁ παιδαγωγός σου ἄρχει;—ἄγων δήπου, ἔφη, εἰς διδασκάλου.—μῶν μὴ καὶ οὗτοί σου ἄρχουσιν, οἱ διδάσκαλοι;—πάντως δήπου.—παμπόλλους ἄρα σοι δεσπότας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν ὁ πατὴρ ἐφίστησιν.
208d. I should think they do! Then quite a large number of masters and controllers are deliberately set over you by your father. But when you come home to your mother, she surely lets you do what you like, that she may make you happy, either with her wool or her loom, when she is weaving? I take it she does not prevent you from handling her batten, or her comb, or any other of her wool-work implements. At this he laughed and said: I promise you, Socrates, not only does she prevent me, but I should get a beating as well, if I laid hands on them. Good heavens! I said; can it be that you have done your father or mother some wrong? On my word, no, he replied.
208d. ἀλλʼ ἆρα ἐπειδὰν οἴκαδε ἔλθῃς παρὰ τὴν μητέρα, ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, ἵνʼ αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔρια ἢ περὶ τὸν ἱστόν, ὅταν ὑφαίνῃ; οὔ τι γάρ που διακωλύει σε ἢ τῆς σπάθης ἢ τῆς κερκίδος ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν ὀργάνων ἅπτεσθαι.—καὶ ὃς γελάσας, μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μόνον γε διακωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τυπτοίμην ἂν εἰ ἁπτοίμην.—Ἡράκλεις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μῶν μή τι ἠδίκηκας τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα;—μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
209. Well, what reason can they have for so strangely preventing you from being happy and doing what you like? Why do they maintain you all day long in constant servitude to somebody, so that, in a word, you do hardly a single thing that you desire? And thus, it would seem, you get no advantage from all your great possessions— nay, anyone else controls them rather than you—nor from your own person, though so well-born, which is also shepherded and managed by another; while you, Lysis, control nobody, and do nothing that you desire.
209. ἀλλʼ ἀντὶ τίνος μὴν οὕτω σε δεινῶς διακωλύουσιν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι καὶ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ διʼ ἡμέρας ὅλης τρέφουσί σε ἀεί τῳ δουλεύοντα καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὀλίγου ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς οὐδὲν ποιοῦντα; ὥστε σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε τῶν χρημάτων τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδὲν ὄφελος, ἀλλὰ πάντες αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἄρχουσιν ἢ σύ, οὔτε τοῦ σώματος οὕτω γενναίου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλος ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει·
209a. It is because I am not yet of age, Socrates, he said. That can hardly be the hindrance, son of Democrates, since there is a certain amount, I imagine, that your father and mother entrust to you without waiting until you come of age. For when they want some reading or writing done for them, it is you, I conceive, whom they appoint to do it before any others of the household.
209a. σὺ δὲ ἄρχεις οὐδενός, ὦ Λύσι, οὐδὲ ποιεῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς.—οὐ γάρ πω, ἔφη, ἡλικίαν ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες.—μὴ οὐ τοῦτό σε, ὦ παῖ Δημοκράτους, κωλύῃ, ἐπεὶ τό γε τοσόνδε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ σοι ἐπιτρέπουσιν καὶ οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχῃς. ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται αὑτοῖς τινα ἀναγνωσθῆναι ἢ γραφῆναι, σέ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πρῶτον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τάττουσιν.
209b. Is it not so? Quite so, he replied. And you are free there to choose which letter you shall write first and which second, and you have a like choice in reading. And, I suppose, when you take your lyre, neither your father nor your mother prevents you from tightening or slackening what string you please, or from using your finger or your plectrum at will: or do they prevent you? Oh, no. Then whatever can be the reason, Lysis, why they do not prevent you here, while in the matters we were just mentioning they do?
209b. ἦ γάρ;—πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν ἔξεστί σοι ἐνταῦθʼ ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ πρῶτον τῶν γραμμάτων γράφειν καὶ ὅτι ἂν δεύτερον· καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡσαύτως ἔξεστιν. καὶ ἐπειδάν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιτεῖναί τε καὶ ἀνεῖναι ἣν ἂν βούλῃ τῶν χορδῶν, καὶ ψῆλαι καὶ κρούειν τῷ πλήκτρῳ. ἢ διακωλύουσιν;—οὐ δῆτα.—τί ποτʼ ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Λύσι, τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσι;—ὅτι οἶμαι, ἔφη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκεῖνα δʼ οὔ.—εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε·
209c. I suppose, he said, because I understand these things, but not those others. Very well, I said, my excellent friend: so it is not your coming of age that your father is waiting for, as the time for entrusting you with everything; but on the day when he considers you to have a better intelligence than himself, he will entrust you with himself and all that is his. Yes, I think so, he said. Very well, I went on, but tell me, does not your neighbor observe the same rule as your father towards you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his house, as soon as he considers you to have a better idea of its management than himself, or will he direct it himself?
209c. οὐκ ἄρα τὴν ἡλικίαν σου περιμένει ὁ πατὴρ ἐπιτρέπειν πάντα, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἡγήσηταί σε βέλτιον αὑτοῦ φρονεῖν, ταύτῃ ἐπιτρέψει σοι καὶ αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ.—οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.—εἶεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· τί δέ; τῷ γείτονι ἆρʼ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ὅσπερ τῷ πατρὶ περὶ σοῦ;
209d. I should say he would entrust it to me. Well then, do you not think that the Athenians will entrust you with their affairs, when they perceive that you have sufficient intelligence? I do. Ah, do let me ask this, I went on: what, pray, of the Great King? Would he allow his eldest son, heir-apparent to the throne of Asia, to put what he chose into the royal stew, or would he prefer us to do it, supposing we came before him and convinced him that we had a better notion than his son of preparing a tasty dish?
209d. πότερον οἴει αὐτὸν ἐπιτρέψειν σοι τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οἰκονομεῖν, ὅταν σε ἡγήσηται βέλτιον περὶ οἰκονομίας ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἐπιστατήσειν;—ἐμοὶ ἐπιτρέψειν οἶμαι.—τί δʼ; Ἀθηναίους οἴει σοι οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν τὰ αὑτῶν, ὅταν αἰσθάνωνται ὅτι ἱκανῶς φρονεῖς;—ἔγωγε.—πρὸς Διός, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τί ἄρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; πότερον τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ ὑεῖ, οὗ ἡ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἑψομένων κρεῶν [ἐμβάλλειν] ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ζωμόν, ἢ ἡμῖν, εἰ ἀφικόμενοι παρʼ ἐκεῖνον ἐνδειξαίμεθα αὐτῷ ὅτι ἡμεῖς κάλλιον φρονοῦμεν ἢ ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας;—ἡμῖν δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη.—καὶ τὸν μέν γε οὐδʼ ἂν σμικρὸν ἐάσειεν ἐμβαλεῖν·
209e. Clearly he would prefer us, he said. And he would not allow the prince to put in the smallest bit, whereas he would let us have our way even if we wanted to put in salt by the handful. Why, of course. Again, if his son has something the matter with his eyes, would he let him meddle with them himself, if he considered him to be no doctor, or would he prevent him?
209e. ἡμᾶς δέ, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα δραξάμενοι τῶν ἁλῶν, ἐῴη ἂν ἐμβαλεῖν.—πῶς γὰρ οὔ;— τί δʼ εἰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῖ, ἆρα ἐῴη ἂν αὐτὸν ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ
210a. He would prevent him. But if he supposed us to have medical skill, he would not prevent us, I imagine, even though we wanted to pull the eyes open and sprinkle them with ashes, so long as he believed our judgement to be sound. That is true. So he would entrust us, rather than himself or his son, with all his other affairs besides, wherever he felt we were more skilled than they? Necessarily, he said, Socrates. The case then, my dear Lysis, I said, stands thus: with regard to matters in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust us with them, whether Greeks or foreigners, men or women and in such matters we shall do as we please, and nobody will care to obstruct us. Nay, not only shall we ourselves be free and have control of others in these affairs, but they will also belong to us, since we shall derive advantage from them; whereas in all those for which we have failed to acquire intelligence, so far will anyone be from permitting us to deal with them as we think fit, that everybody will do his utmost to obstruct us— not merely strangers, but father and mother and any more intimate person than they; and we on our part shall be subject to others in such matters, which will be no concern of ours, since we shall draw no advantage from them.
210a. ὀφθαλμῶν, μὴ ἰατρὸν ἡγούμενος, ἢ κωλύοι ἄν;>—κωλύοι ἄν.—ἡμᾶς δέ γε εἰ ὑπολαμβάνοι ἰατρικοὺς εἶναι, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα διανοίγοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐμπάσαι τῆς τέφρας, οἶμαι οὐκ ἂν κωλύσειεν, ἡγούμενος ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν.—ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέποι ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ, περὶ ὅσων ἂν δόξωμεν αὐτῷ σοφώτεροι ἐκείνων εἶναι;—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὕτως ἄρα ἔχει, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Λύσι· εἰς μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν φρόνιμοι γενώμεθα, ἅπαντες ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψουσιν, Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, ποιήσομέν τε ἐν τούτοις ὅτι ἂν βουλώμεθα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἑκὼν εἶναι ἐμποδιεῖ, ἀλλʼ αὐτοί τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται—ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν—εἰς ἃ δʼ ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα, οὔτε τις ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψει περὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἐμποδιοῦσι
210c. Do you agree to this account of the case? I agree. Then will anyone count us his friends or have any affection for us in those matters for which we are useless? Surely not, he said. So now, you see, your father does not love you, nor does anyone love anyone else, so far as one is useless. Apparently not, he said. Then if you can become wise, my boy, everybody will be your friend, every one will be intimate with you, since you will be useful and good; otherwise, no one at all, not your father, nor your mother, nor your intimate connections, will be your friends.
210c. πάντες καθʼ ὅτι ἂν δύνωνται, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἀλλότριοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εἴ τι τούτων οἰκειότερόν ἐστιν, αὐτοί τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα. συγχωρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν;—συγχωρῶ.—ἆρʼ οὖν τῳ φίλοι ἐσόμεθα καί τις ἡμᾶς φιλήσει ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς;—οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος.—οὐκ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.—ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένῃ, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται—χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσῃ—εἰ δὲ μή, σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ φίλος ἔσται οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ οὔτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι.
210d. Now is it possible, Lysis, to have a high notion of yourself in matters of which you have as yet no notion? Why, how can I? he said. Then if you are in need of a teacher, you have as yet no notion of things? True. Nor can you have a great notion of yourself, if you are still notionless. Upon my word, Socrates, he said, I do not see how I can.
210d. οἷόν τε οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Λύσι, μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς τις μήπω φρονεῖ;—καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη.—εἰ δʼ ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέῃ, οὔπω φρονεῖς.—ἀληθῆ.—οὐδʼ ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ, εἴπερ ἄφρων ἔτι.—μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
210e. On hearing him answer this, I glanced at Hippothales, and nearly made a blunder, for it came into my mind to say: This is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your favorite, humbling and reducing him, instead of puffing him up and spoiling him, as you do now.
210e. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἀπέβλεψα πρὸς τὸν Ἱπποθάλη, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξήμαρτον· ἐπῆλθε γάρ μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὕτω χρή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα.
211. Well, I noticed that he was in an agony of embarrassment at what we had been saying, and I remembered how, in standing near, he wished to hide himself from Lysis.
211. κατιδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιῶντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων, ἀνεμνήσθην ὅτι καὶ προσεστὼς λανθάνειν τὸν λύσιν ἐβούλετο· ἀνέλαβον οὖν ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἐπέσχον τοῦ λόγου.
211a. So I checked myself and withheld this remark. In the meantime, Menexenus came back, and sat down by Lysis in the place he had left on going out. Then Lysis, in a most playful, affectionate manner, unobserved by Menexenus, said softly to me: Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been saying to me. To which I replied: You shall tell it him yourself, Lysis; for you gave it your closest attention. I did, indeed, he said. Then try, I went on, to recollect it as well as you can, so that you tell him the whole of it clearly: but if you forget any of it, mind that you ask me for it again when next you meet me.
211a. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Μενέξενος πάλιν ἧκεν, καὶ ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τὸν λύσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ἐξανέστη. ὁ οὖν Λύσις μάλα παιδικῶς καὶ φιλικῶς, λάθρᾳ τοῦ Μενεξένου, σμικρὸν πρός με λέγων ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἅπερ καὶ ἐμοὶ λέγεις, εἰπὲ καὶ Μενεξένῳ. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ταῦτα μὲν σὺ αὐτῷ ἐρεῖς, ὦ Λύσι· πάντως γὰρ προσεῖχες τὸν νοῦν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πειρῶ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀπομνημονεῦσαι αὐτὰ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἵνα τούτῳ σαφῶς πάντα εἴπῃς·
211b. I will do so, Socrates, he said, by all means, I assure you. But tell him something else, that I may hear it too, until it is time to go home. Well, I must do so, I said, since it is you who bid me. But be ready to come to my support, in case Menexenus attempts to refute me. You know what a keen disputant he is. Yes, on my word, very keen; that is why I want you to have a talk with him.
211b. ἐὰν δέ τι αὐτῶν ἐπιλάθῃ, αὖθίς με ἀνερέσθαι ὅταν ἐντύχῃς πρῶτον. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ σφόδρα, εὖ ἴσθι. ἀλλά τι ἄλλο αὐτῷ λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἕως ἂν οἴκαδε ὥρα ᾖ ἀπιέναι. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σὺ κελεύεις. ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, ἐάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστιν; ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε· διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαί σε αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι.
211c. So that I may make myself ridiculous? I said. No, no, indeed, he replied; I want you to trounce him. How can I? I asked. It is not easy, when the fellow is so formidable—a pupil of Ctesippus. And here—do you not see?—is Ctesippus himself. Take no heed of anyone, Socrates, he said; just go on and have a talk with him. I must comply, I said. Now, as these words passed between us,—What is this feast, said Ctesippus, that you two are having by yourselves, without allowing us a share in your talk?
211c. ἵνα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καταγέλαστος γένωμαι; οὐ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ ἵνα αὐτὸν κολάσῃς. πόθεν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον· δεινὸς γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Κτησίππου μαθητής. πάρεστι δέ τοι αὐτός—οὐχ ὁρᾷς; — Κτήσιππος. μηδενός σοι, ἔφη, μελέτω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἴθι διαλέγου αὐτῷ. διαλεκτέον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. ταῦτα οὖν ἡμῶν λεγόντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τί ὑμεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων;
211d. Well, well, I replied, we must give you a share. My friend here fails to understand something that I have been saying, but tells me he thinks Menexenus knows, and he urges me to question him. Why not ask him then? said he. But I am going to, I replied. Now please answer, Menexenus, whatever question I may ask you. There is a certain possession that I have desired from my childhood, as every one does in his own way. One person wants to get possession of horses, another dogs, another money, and another distinctions: of these things I reck little, but for the possession of friends I have quite a passionate longing, and would rather obtain a good friend than the best quail or cock in the world; yes, and rather, I swear, than any horse or dog.
211d. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μεταδοτέον. ὅδε γάρ τι ὧν λέγω οὐ μανθάνει, ἀλλά φησιν οἴεσθαι Μενέξενον εἰδέναι, καὶ κελεύει τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν. τί οὖν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἐρωτᾷς; ἀλλʼ ἐρήσομαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Μενέξενε, ὃ ἄν σε ἔρωμαι. τυγχάνω γὰρ ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιθυμῶν κτήματός του, ὥσπερ ἄλλος ἄλλου. ὁ μὲν γάρ τις ἵππους ἐπιθυμεῖ κτᾶσθαι, ὁ δὲ κύνας, ὁ δὲ χρυσίον, ὁ δὲ τιμάς·
211e. I believe, indeed, by the Dog, that rather than all Darius’s gold I would choose to gain a dear comrade—far sooner than I would Darius himself, so fond I am of my comrades. Accordingly, when I see you and Lysis together, I am quite beside myself, and congratulate you on being able, at such an early age, to gain this possession so quickly and easily; since you, Menexenus, have so quickly and surely acquired his friendship, and he likewise yours: whereas I am so far from acquiring such a thing, that I do not even know in what way one person becomes a friend of another, and am constrained to ask you about this very point, in view of your experience. Now tell me: when one person loves another, which of the two becomes friend of the other— the loving of the loved, or the loved of the loving?
211e. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα πρᾴως ἔχω, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς, καὶ βουλοίμην ἄν μοι φίλον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὄρτυγα ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνα, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἢ ἵππον τε καὶ κύνα—οἶμαι δέ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι δεξαίμην πολὺ πρότερον ἑταῖρον, μᾶλλον ⟨δὲ⟩ ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—οὕτως ἐγὼ φιλέταιρός τίς εἰμι. ὑμᾶς οὖν ὁρῶν, σέ τε καὶ Λύσιν, ἐκπέπληγμαι καὶ εὐδαιμονίζω ὅτι οὕτω νέοι ὄντες οἷοι τʼ ἐστὸν τοῦτο τὸ κτῆμα ταχὺ καὶ ῥᾳδίως κτᾶσθαι, καὶ σύ τε τοῦτον οὕτω φίλον ἐκτήσω ταχύ τε καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ αὖ οὗτος σέ· ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος, ὥστε οὐδʼ ὅντινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου οἶδα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δὴ αὐτά σε βούλομαι ἐρέσθαι ἅτε ἔμπειρον. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπειδάν τίς τινα φιλῇ, πότερος ποτέρου φίλος γίγνεται, ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος·
212b. Or is there no difference? There is none, he replied, in my opinion. How is that? I said; do you mean that both become friends mutually, when there is only one loving the other? Yes, I think so, he replied. But I ask you, is it not possible for one loving not to be loved by him whom he loves? It is. But again, may he not be even hated while loving? This, I imagine, is the sort of thing that lovers do sometimes seem to incur with their favorites:
212b. ἢ οὐδὲν διαφέρει;—οὐδέν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.—πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀμφότεροι ἄρα ἀλλήλων φίλοι γίγνονται, ἐὰν μόνος ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον φιλῇ;—ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.—τί δέ; οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ;—ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἆρα ἔστιν καὶ μισεῖσθαι φιλοῦντα; οἷόν που ἐνίοτε δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πάσχειν πρὸς τὰ παιδικά· φιλοῦντες γὰρ ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα οἱ μὲν οἴονται οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ μισεῖσθαι.
212c. they love them with all their might, yet they feel either that they are not loved in return, or that they are actually hated. Or do you not think this is true? Very true, he replied. Now in such a case, I went on, the one loves and the other is loved? Yes. Which of the two, then, is a friend of the other? Is the loving a friend of the loved, whether in fact he is loved in return or is even hated, or is the loved a friend of the loving? Or again, is neither of them in such a case friend of the other, if both do not love mutually?
212c. ἢ οὐκ ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο;—σφόδρα γε, ἔφη, ἀληθές.—οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται;—ναί.—πότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου, ἐάντε καὶ ἀντιφιλῆται ἐάντε καὶ μισῆται, ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; ἢ οὐδέτερος αὖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐδετέρου φίλος ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀλλήλους φιλῶσιν;—ἔοικε γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν.—ἀλλοίως ἄρα νῦν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ ἢ πρότερον ἔδοξεν.
212d. At any rate, he said, it looks as if this were so. So you see, we now hold a different view from what we held before. At first we said that if one of them loved, both were friends: but now, if both do not love, neither is a friend. It looks like it, he said. So there is no such thing as a friend for the lover who is not loved in return. Apparently not. And so we find no horse-lovers where the horses do not love in return, no quail-lovers, dog-lovers, wine-lovers, or sport-lovers on such terms, nor any lovers of wisdom if she returns not their love. Or does each person love these things, while yet failing to make friends of them, and was it a lying poet who said—Happy to have your children as friends, and your trampling horses,Scent-snuffing hounds, and a host when you travel abroad?
212d. τότε μὲν γάρ, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλω εἶναι ἄμφω· νῦν δέ, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδέτερος φίλος.—κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.—οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν.—οὐκ ἔοικεν.—οὐδʼ ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδʼ αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ. ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα ἕκαστοι, οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεθʼ ὁ ποιητής, ὃς ἔφη—ὄλβιος, ᾧ παῖδές τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποικαὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός;
212e. I do not think so, he said. But do you think he spoke the truth? Yes. Then the loved object is a friend to the lover, it would seem, Menexenus, alike whether it loves or hates: for instance, new-born children, who have either not begun to love, or already hate, if punished by their mother or their father, are yet at that very moment, and in spite of their hate, especially and pre-eminently friends to their parents. I think, he said, that is the case. Then this argument shows that it is not the lover who is a friend, but the loved. Apparently. And it is the hated who is an enemy, not the hater. Evidently. Then people must often be loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and be friends to their enemies and enemies to their friends, if the loved object is a friend rather than the loving agent.
212e. —οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.—ἀλλʼ ἀληθῆ δοκεῖ λέγειν σοι;—ναί.— τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Μενέξενε, ἐάντε φιλῇ ἐάντε καὶ μισῇ· οἷον καὶ τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παιδία, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζηται ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων μάλιστά ἐστι τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα.—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν.—οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλʼ ὁ φιλούμενος.—ἔοικεν.—καὶ ὁ μισούμενος ἐχθρὸς ἄρα, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁ μισῶν.—φαίνεται.—πολλοὶ ἄρα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν φιλοῦνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φίλων μισοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς
213b. And yet it is a gross absurdity, my dear friend—I should say rather, an impossibility—that one should be an enemy to one’s friend and a friend to one’s enemy. You appear to be right there, Socrates, he said. Then if that is impossible, it is the loving that must be a friend of the loved. Evidently. And so the hating, on the other hand, will be an enemy of the hated. Necessarily. Hence in the end we shall find ourselves compelled to agree to the same statement as we made before, that frequently a man is a friend of one who is no friend, and frequently even of an enemy, when he loves one who loves not, or even hates; while frequently a man may be an enemy of one who is no enemy or even a friend, when he hates one who hates not, or even loves.
213b. μὲν ἐχθροῖς φίλοι εἰσίν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἐχθροί, εἰ τὸ φιλούμενον φίλον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ φιλοῦν. καίτοι πολλὴ ἀλογία, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, μᾶλλον δὲ οἶμαι καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῷ τε φίλῳ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι.—ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, ἔοικας λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.—οὐκοῦν εἰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον, τὸ φιλοῦν ἂν εἴη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου.—φαίνεται.—τὸ μισοῦν ἄρα πάλιν ἐχθρὸν τοῦ μισουμένου.—ἀνάγκη.—οὐκοῦν ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν συμβήσεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον, πολλάκις φίλον εἶναι μὴ φίλου, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐχθροῦ, ὅταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῇ ἢ καὶ μισοῦν φιλῇ·