--- title: "Meno · Μένων" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Meno · Μένων. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/" --- # Meno · Μένων *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* Can virtue be taught? A slave boy discovers geometry, and learning turns out to be recollection. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg024, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## Contents 1. [Pages 70–80](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1.md) 2. [Pages 80–90](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/2.md) 3. [Pages 90–100](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3.md) ## 1. Pages 70–80 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/#p-N [¶0] 70. Men. Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way? > Greek: 70. ΜΕΝ. ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλʼ ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ; [¶1] Soc. Meno, of old the Thessalians were famous and admired among the Greeks for their riding and their riches; but now they have a name, I believe, for wisdom also, especially your friend Aristippus’s people, the Larisaeans. For this you have to thank Gorgias: for when he came to that city he made the leading men of the Aleuadae—among them your lover Aristippus—and the Thessalians generally enamored of wisdom. Nay more, he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know: for he sets the example of offering himself to be questioned by any Greek who chooses, and on any point one likes, and he has an answer for everybody. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφʼ ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. [¶2] Soc. Now in this place, my dear Meno, we have a contrary state of things: > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρʼ ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. [¶3] 71. a drought of wisdom, as it were, has come on; and it seems as though wisdom had deserted our borders in favour of yours. You have only to ask one of our people a question such as that, and he will be sure to laugh and say: Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal, to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one: so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all. And I myself, Meno, am in the same case; I share my townsmen’s poverty in this matter: I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be? Or do you imagine it possible, if one has no cognizance at all of Meno, that one could know whether he is handsome or rich or noble, or the reverse of these? Do you suppose that one could? Men. Not I. But is it true, Socrates, that you do not even know what virtue is? Are we to return home with this report of you? > Greek: 71. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι—ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθʼ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι—ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τʼ εἶναι; ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς οὐδʼ ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν; [¶4] Soc. Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across anybody who did know, in my opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. [¶5] Men. What? You did not meet Gorgias when he was here? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δέ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν; [¶6] Soc. I did. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. [¶7] Men. And you didn’t consider that he knew? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι; [¶8] Soc. I have not a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell at the moment how he struck me then. It may be that he did know, and that you know what he said: remind me therefore how he expressed it; or if you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his views. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε· ἀνάμνησον οὖν με πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ. [¶9] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε. [¶10] Soc. Then let us pass him over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven’s name, what is your own account of virtue. Speak out frankly, that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood, if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it, while I have said that I never yet came across anyone who had. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι. [¶11] Men. Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man’s virtue is this—that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman’s virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue—one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men—one, if you like, for freemen, and yet another for slaves. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δʼ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. [¶12] 72. Men. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice. > Greek: 72. ΜΕΝ. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν· καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία. [¶13] Soc. I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm, suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee, and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees, and I rejoined: Do you say it is by being bees that they are of many and various kinds and differ from each other, or does their difference lie not in that, but in something else—for example, in their beauty or size or some other quality? Tell me, what would be your answer to this question? > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς; [¶14] Men. Why, this—that they do not differ, as bees, the one from the other. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τοῦτʼ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας. [¶15] Soc. And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων· ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι; εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν; [¶16] Men. I could. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶17] Soc. And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is. You take my meaning, do you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν διʼ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω; [¶18] Men. My impression is that I do; but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. [¶19] Soc. Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally, in a man or in anyone else? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ; [¶20] Men. I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός. [¶21] Soc. Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength; by “the same” I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any difference? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί. ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν; [¶22] Men. I do not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶23] 73. Soc. And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man? > Greek: 73. ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί; [¶24] Men. I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις. [¶25] Soc. Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν; [¶26] Men. I was. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶27] Soc. And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα; [¶28] Men. Surely not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶29] Soc. Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν; [¶30] Men. That must be. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη. [¶31] Soc. Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης. [¶32] Men. Evidently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνονται. [¶33] Soc. And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο; [¶34] Men. Surely not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶35] Soc. Only if they are temperate and just? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι; [¶36] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶37] Soc. So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the same qualities. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάντες ἄρʼ ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται. [¶38] Men. So it seems. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικε. [¶39] Soc. And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν. [¶40] Men. No, indeed. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶41] Soc. Seeing then that it is the same virtue in all cases, try and tell me, if you can recollect, what Gorgias—and you in agreement with him—say it is. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετʼ ἐκείνου. [¶42] Men. Simply that it is the power of governing mankind— if you want some single description to cover all cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί ἄλλο γʼ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων. [¶43] Soc. That is just what I am after. But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων; [¶44] Men. I should say certainly not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶45] Soc. No, indeed, it would be unlikely, my excellent friend. And again, consider this further point: you say it is “to be able to govern”; shall we not add to that—“justly, not unjustly”? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει. ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή; [¶46] Men. Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν. [¶47] Soc. Virtue, Meno, or a virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις; [¶48] Men. What do you mean by that? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶49] Soc. What I would in any other case. To take roundness, for instance; I should call it a figure, and not figure pure and simple. And I should name it so because there are other figures as well. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα. [¶50] Men. You would be quite right—just as I say there are other virtues besides justice. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς. [¶51] 74. Soc. What are they? Tell me. In the same way as I can tell you of other figures, if you request me, so do you tell me of other virtues. > Greek: 74. ΣΩ. τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς. [¶52] Men. Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and loftiness of mind; and there are a great many others. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι. [¶53] Soc. Once more, Meno, we are in the same plight: again we have found a number of virtues when we were looking for one, though not in the same way as we did just now; but the one that runs through them all, this we are not able to find. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν. [¶54] Men. No, for I am not yet able, Socrates, to follow your line of search, and find a single virtue common to all, as one can in other cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. [¶55] Soc. And no wonder; but I will make an effort, so far as I can, to help us onward. You understand, of course, that this principle of mine applies to everything: if someone asked you the question I put to you just now: What is figure, Meno? and you replied: Roundness; and then he said, as I did: Is roundness figure or a figure? I suppose you would answer: A figure. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰκότως γε· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τʼ ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι; εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι. [¶56] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶57] Soc. And for this reason—that there are other figures as well? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν σχήματα; [¶58] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶59] Soc. And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were, you would tell him? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν; [¶60] Men. I would. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶61] Soc. And if he asked likewise what color is, and on your answering “white” your questioner then rejoined: Is “white” color or a color? your reply would be: A color; because there are other colors besides. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν· πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα; [¶62] Men. It would. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶63] Soc. And if he bade you mention other colors, you would tell him of others that are colors just as much as white? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ; [¶64] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶65] Soc. Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things, but let me have no more of that: since you call these many things by one single name, and say they are figures, every one of them, even when they are opposed to one another, tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure— including straight equally with round under that term. For that is your statement, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, ὅτι ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; [¶66] Men. It is. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶67] Soc. And in making it, do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight, or straight no more straight than round? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον; [¶68] Men. No, to be sure, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶69] Soc. What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου. [¶70] Men. Quite right. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶71] Soc. Then what can this thing be, which bears the name of figure? Try and tell me. Suppose that, on being asked this question by someone, either about figure or about color, you had replied: Why, I don’t so much as understand what you want, sir, or even know what you are saying: he might well have shown surprise, and said: Do you not understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ σχῆμα; [¶72] 75. Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were approached on other terms, and were asked: What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures—the same in all? Try and tell me it will be good practice for your answer about virtue. Men. No, it is you who must answer, Socrates. > Greek: 75. πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις, ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν. ΜΕΝ. μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. [¶73] Soc. You wish me to do you the favour? > Greek: ΣΩ. βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι; [¶74] Men. By all means. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶75] Soc. And then you will agree to take your turn and answer me on virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς; [¶76] Men. I will. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶77] Soc. Well then, I must make the effort, for it is worth our while. > Greek: ΣΩ. προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ. [¶78] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶79] Soc. Come now, let me try and tell you what figure is. Just consider if you accept this description of it: figure, let us say, is the only existing thing that is found always following color. Are you satisfied, or are you looking for something different? I am sure I should be content with a similar account of virtue from you. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις. [¶80] Men. But it is such a silly one, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶81] Soc. How do you mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶82] Men. Well, figure, as I understand by your account, is what always follows color. Very good; but if some one said he did not know color, and was in the same difficulty about it as about figure, what answer do you suppose would have come from you? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι; [¶83] Soc. The truth, from me; and if my questioner were a professor of the eristic and contentious sort, I should say to him: I have made my statement; if it is wrong, your business is to examine and refute it. But if, like you and me on this occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion together, I should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic. The more dialectical way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows. And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you. Tell me, is there something you call an end? Such a thing, I mean, as a limit, or extremity—I use all these terms in the same sense, though I daresay Prodicus might quarrel with us. But you, I am sure, refer to a thing as terminated or ended: something of that sort is what I mean—nothing complicated. > Greek: ΣΩ. τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον—πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δʼ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι—τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον. [¶84] Men. Yes, I do, and I think I grasp your meaning. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις. [¶85] 76. Soc. Well then, you speak of a surface, and also of a solid—the terms employed in geometrical problems? > Greek: 76. ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις; [¶86] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε καλῶ. [¶87] Soc. So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I mean by figure. In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends; and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid.” > Greek: ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτʼ εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι. [¶88] Men. And what do you say of color, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶89] Soc. How overbearing of you, Meno, to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue! > Greek: ΣΩ. ὑβριστής γʼ εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι. [¶90] Men. When you have answered my question, Socrates, I will answer yours. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτʼ εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι. [¶91] Soc. One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers. > Greek: ΣΩ. κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν. [¶92] Men. Why so? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δή; [¶93] Soc. Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay, made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. [¶94] Men. You must certainly indulge me. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι. [¶95] Soc. Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias, which you would find easiest to follow? > Greek: ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις; [¶96] Men. I should like that, of course. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶97] Soc. Do not both of you say there are certain effluences of existent things, as Empedocles held? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα; [¶98] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. σφόδρα γε. [¶99] Soc. And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ διʼ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται; [¶100] Men. To be sure. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶101] Soc. And some of the effluences fit into various passages, while some are too small or too large? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι; [¶102] Men. That is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶103] Soc. And further, there is what you call sight? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι; [¶104] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶105] Soc. So now “conceive my meaning,” as Pindar says: color is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. [¶106] Men. Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι. [¶107] Soc. Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar; and at the same time I fancy you observe that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are, and numerous other things of the kind. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται· καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων. [¶108] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶109] Soc. It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno, and so more agreeable to you than that about figure. > Greek: ΣΩ. τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος. [¶110] Men. Yes, it is. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε. [¶111] Soc. But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two; and I believe you also would prefer it, if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, and could stay awhile and be initiated. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη βελτίων· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλʼ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης. [¶112] 77. Men. But I should stay, Socrates, if you would give me many such answers. > Greek: 77. ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμʼ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις. [¶113] Soc. Well then, I will spare no endeavor, both for your sake and for my own, to continue in that style; but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level. But come now, you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise by telling me what virtue is in a general way; and you must stop producing a plural from the singular, as the wags say whenever one breaks something, but leave virtue whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλʼ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλʼ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρʼ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας. [¶114] Men. Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet’s words, “to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them”; and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι. [¶115] Soc. Do you say that he who desires the honorable is desirous of the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι; [¶116] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. μάλιστά γε. [¶117] Soc. Implying that there are some who desire the evil, and others the good? Do not all men, in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν; [¶118] Men. I think not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶119] Soc. There are some who desire the evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν; [¶120] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶121] Soc. Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognizing it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν; [¶122] Men. Both, I believe. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν. [¶123] Soc. Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil, and still desires it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν; [¶124] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. μάλιστα. [¶125] Soc. What do you mean by “desires”? Desires the possession of it? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ; [¶126] Men. Yes; what else could it be? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; [¶127] Soc. And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he know that it harms him who has it? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ; [¶128] Men. There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει. [¶129] Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν; [¶130] Men. I do not think that at all. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε. [¶131] Soc. Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ; [¶132] Men. It would seem to be so in their case. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε. [¶133] Soc. Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it? Men. They needs must. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν; ΜΕΝ. [¶134] 78. Soc. But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable in proportion to the harm they suffer? > Greek: 78. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθʼ ὅσον βλάπτονται; [¶135] Men. That too must be. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη. [¶136] Soc. And are not the miserable ill-starred? > Greek: ΣΩ. τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας; [¶137] Men. I think so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶138] Soc. Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι; [¶139] Men. I do not suppose there is, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶140] Soc. No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι; [¶141] Men. It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά. [¶142] Soc. Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι; [¶143] Men. Yes, I was. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἶπον γάρ. [¶144] Soc. One part of the statement—the desire—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων; [¶145] Men. Apparently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶146] Soc. But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in the ability. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων. [¶147] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶148] Soc. Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to procure goods. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά. [¶149] Men. I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις. [¶150] Soc. Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι; [¶151] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶152] Soc. And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον; [¶153] Men. Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honors and offices. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς. [¶154] Soc. Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods? > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶155] Men. No, I refer only to everything of that sort. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα. [¶156] Soc. Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King. Tell me, do you add to such procuring, Meno, that it is to be done justly and piously, or is this indifferent to you, but even though a man procures these things unjustly, do you call them virtue all the same? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς; [¶157] Men. Surely not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶158] Soc. Rather, vice. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακίαν. [¶159] Men. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάντως δήπου. [¶160] Soc. Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things; otherwise it will not be virtue, though it provides one with goods. > Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά. [¶161] Men. Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτʼ ἄν; [¶162] Soc. And not to procure gold and silver, when it would be unjust—what we call the want of such things—is virtue, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία; [¶163] Men. Apparently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶164] Soc. So the procuring of this sort of goods will be no more virtue than the want of them; but it seems that whatever comes accompanied by justice will be virtue, and whatever comes without any such quality, vice. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δʼ ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία. [¶165] 79. Men. I agree that it must be as you say. > Greek: 79. ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις. [¶166] Soc. And were we saying a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue—justice and temperance and the rest of them? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶167] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶168] Soc. And here you are, Meno, making fun of me? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με; [¶169] Men. How so, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶170] Soc. Because after my begging you not to break up virtue into small change, and giving you a pattern on which you should answer, you have ignored all this, and now tell me that virtue is the ability to procure good things with justice; and this, you tell me, is a part of virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθʼ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι; [¶171] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶172] Soc. Then it follows from your own admission that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue is itself virtue; for you say that justice is a part of virtue, and so is each of such qualities. You ask the meaning of my remark. It is that after my requesting you to speak of virtue as a whole, you say not a word as to what it is in itself, but tell me that every action is virtue provided that it is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me what virtue is in the whole, and I must understand it forthwith—when you are really splitting it up into fragments! I think therefore that you must face the same question all over again, my dear Meno—What is virtue?—if we are to be told that every action accompanied by a part of virtue is virtue; for that is the meaning of the statement that every action accompanied by justice is virtue. Or do you not agree that you have to meet the same question afresh? Do you suppose that anyone can know a part of virtue when he does not know virtue itself? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλʼ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα; [¶173] Men. No, I do not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶174] Soc. And I daresay you remember, when I answered you a while ago about figure, how we rejected the sort of answer that attempts to proceed in terms which are still under inquiry and has not yet been admitted. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτʼ ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. [¶175] Men. Yes, and we were right in rejecting it, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶176] Soc. Well then, my good sir, you must not in your turn suppose that while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry you will explain it to anyone by replying in terms of its parts, or by any other statement on the same lines: you will only have to face the same question over again—What is this virtue, of which you are speaking all the time? Or do you see no force in what I say? > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις· ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; [¶177] Men. I think what you say is right. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν. [¶178] Soc. Then answer me again from the beginning: what do both you and your associate say that virtue is? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου; [¶179] Men. Socrates, I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also: and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· [¶180] 80. And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people—and very good speeches they were, so I thought—but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. You are well advised, I consider, in not voyaging or taking a trip away from home; for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city you would very likely be taken up for a wizard. Soc. You are a rogue, Meno, and had almost deceived me. > Greek: 80. καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, [ναρκᾶν]· ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδʼ ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχʼ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης. ΣΩ. πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με. [¶181] Men. How is that, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶182] Soc. I perceive your aim in thus comparing me. > Greek: ΣΩ. γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ᾔκασας. [¶183] Men. What was it? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τίνος δὴ οἴει; [¶184] Soc. That I might compare you in return. One thing I know about all handsome people is this—they delight in being compared to something. They do well over it, since fine features, I suppose, must have fine similes. But I am not for playing your game. As for me, if the torpedo is torpid itself while causing others to be torpid, I am like it, but not otherwise. For it is not from any sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt: it is from being in more doubt than anyone else that I cause doubt in others. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες—ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν. ## 2. Pages 80–90 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/2/#p-N [¶0] Men. Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα; [¶1] Soc. I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire. > Greek: ΣΩ. μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ—οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως—οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει. [¶2] 81. Men. Now does it seem to you to be a good argument, Socrates? > Greek: 81. ΜΕΝ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶3] Soc. It does not. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶4] Men. Can you explain how not? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ; [¶5] Soc. I can; for I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine that— Men. What was it they said? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα— ΜΕΝ. τίνα λόγον λεγόντων; [¶6] Soc. Something true, as I thought, and admirable. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν. [¶7] Men. What was it? And who were the speakers? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες; [¶8] Soc. They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry; and Pindar also and many another poet of heavenly gifts. As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true. They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. Consequently one ought to live all one’s life in the utmost holiness.“For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong, the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them arise” “glorious kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time are they called holy heroes amongst mankind.” Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. For as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing—an act which men call learning—discover everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search; since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection. So we must not hearken to that captious argument: it would make us idle, and is pleasing only to the indolent ear, whereas the other makes us energetic and inquiring. Putting my trust in its truth, I am ready to inquire with you into the nature of virtue. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις τʼ εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν—ὃ δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δʼ οὐδέποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον· οἷσιν γὰρ ἂν— Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι ἄνδρες αὔξοντʼ· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται. ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τʼ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα—ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργατικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν. [¶9] Men. Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is recollection? Can you instruct me that this is so? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει; [¶10] Soc. I remarked just now, Meno, that you are a rogue and so here you are asking if I can instruct you, when I say there is no teaching but only recollection: you hope that I may be caught contradicting myself forthwith. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων. [¶11] 82. Men. I assure you, Socrates; that was not my intention I only spoke from habit. But if you can somehow prove to me that it is as you say, pray do so. > Greek: 82. ΜΕΝ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλʼ εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι. [¶12] Soc. It is no easy matter, but still I am willing to try my best for your sake. Just call one of your own troop of attendants there, whichever one you please, that he may serve for my demonstration. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὅντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι. [¶13] Men. Certainly. You, I say, come here. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε. [¶14] Soc. He is a Greek, I suppose, and speaks Greek? > Greek: ΣΩ. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει; [¶15] Men. Oh yes, to be sure—born in the house. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής γε. [¶16] Soc. Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as learning from me. > Greek: ΣΩ. πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν ὁπότερʼ ἄν σοι φαίνηται, ἢ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρʼ ἐμοῦ. [¶17] Men. I will. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ προσέξω. [¶18] Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a square figure is like this? Boy. I do. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν; ΠΑΙ. ἔγωγε. [¶19] Soc. Now, a square figure has these lines, four in number, all equal? Boy. Certainly. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶20] Soc. And these, drawn through the middle, are equal too, are they not? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶21] Soc. And a figure of this sort may be larger or smaller? Boy. To be sure. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶22] Soc. Now if this side were two feet and that also two, how many feet would the whole be? Or let me put it thus: if one way it were two feet, and only one foot the other, of course the space would be two feet taken once? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶23] Soc. But as it is two feet also on that side, it must be twice two feet? Boy. It is. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. γίγνεται. [¶24] Soc. Then the space is twice two feet? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶25] Soc. Well, how many are twice two feet? Count and tell me. Boy. Four, Socrates. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες; λογισάμενος εἰπέ. ΠΑΙ. τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶26] Soc. And might there not be another figure twice the size of this, but of the same sort, with all its sides equal like this one? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν γένοιτʼ ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶27] Soc. Then how many feet will it be? Boy. Eight. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώ. [¶28] Soc. Come now, try and tell me how long will each side of that figure be. This one is two feet long: what will be the side of the other, which is double in size? Boy. Clearly, Socrates, double. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου; ΠΑΙ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία. [¶29] Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but merely asking him each time? And now he supposes that he knows about the line required to make a figure of eight square feet; or do you not think he does? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλʼ ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφʼ ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; [¶30] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε. [¶31] Soc. Well, does he know? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶδεν οὖν; [¶32] Men. Certainly not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶33] Soc. He just supposes it, from the double size required? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας; [¶34] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶35] Soc. Now watch his progress in recollecting, by the proper use of memory. Tell me, boy, do you say we get the double space from the double line? > Greek: ΣΩ. θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι.σὺ δέ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι; [¶36] 83. The space I speak of is not long one way and short the other, but must be equal each way like this one, while being double its size—eight square feet. Now see if you still think we get this from a double length of line. Boy. I do. Soc. Well, this line is doubled, if we add here another of the same length? Boy. Certainly. > Greek: 83. τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι. ΠΑΙ. ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶37] Soc. And you say we shall get our eight-foot space from four lines of this length? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῄς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶38] Soc. Then let us describe the square, drawing four equal lines of that length. This will be what you say is the eight-foot figure, will it not? Boy. Certainly. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπʼ αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶39] Soc. And here, contained in it, have we not four squares, each of which is equal to this space of four feet? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶40] Soc. Then how large is the whole? Four times that space, is it not? Boy. It must be. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον; ΠΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶41] Soc. And is four times equal to double? Boy. No, to be sure. > Greek: ΣΩ. διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον; ΠΑΙ. οὐ μὰ Δία. [¶42] Soc. But how much is it? Boy. Fourfold. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον; ΠΑΙ. τετραπλάσιον. [¶43] Soc. Thus, from the double-sized line, boy, we get a space, not of double, but of fourfold size. Boy. That is true. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον. ΠΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶44] Soc. And if it is four times four it is sixteen, is it not? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα. οὐχί; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶45] Soc. What line will give us a space of eight feet? This one gives us a fourfold space, does it not? Boy. It does. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀκτώπουν δʼ ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον; ΠΑΙ. φημί. [¶46] Soc. And a space of four feet is made from this line of half the length? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶47] Soc. Very well; and is not a space of eight feet double the size of this one, and half the size of this other? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ; ΠΑΙ. ⟨ναί.⟩ ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί; ἢ οὔ; ΠΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω. [¶48] Soc. Will it not be made from a line longer than the one of these, and shorter than the other? Boy. I think so. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶49] Soc. Excellent: always answer just what you think. Now tell me, did we not draw this line two feet, and that four? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος. ΠΑΙ. δεῖ. [¶50] Soc. Then the line on the side of the eight-foot figure should be more than this of two feet, and less than the other of four? Boy. It should. > Greek: ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι. ΠΑΙ. τρίποδα. [¶51] Soc. Try and tell me how much you would say it is. Boy. Three feet. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῄς. ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶52] Soc. Then if it is to be three feet, we shall add on a half to this one, and so make it three feet? For here we have two, and here one more, and so again on that side there are two, and another one; and that makes the figure of which you speak. Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. φαίνεται. [¶53] Soc. Now if it be three this way and three that way, the whole space will be thrice three feet, will it not? Boy. So it seems. > Greek: ΣΩ. τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες; ΠΑΙ. ἐννέα. [¶54] Soc. And thrice three feet are how many? Boy. Nine. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώ. [¶55] Soc. And how many feet was that double one to be? Boy. Eight. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρʼ ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γίγνεται. ΠΑΙ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶56] Soc. So we fail to get our eight-foot figure from this three-foot line. Boy. Yes, indeed. Soc. But from what line shall we get it? Try and tell us exactly; > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας. [¶57] 84. and if you would rather not reckon it out, just show what line it is. Boy. Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know. Soc. There now, Meno, do you observe who progress he has already made in his recollection? At first he did not know what is the line that forms the figure of eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think he knows. > Greek: 84. ΠΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα. ΣΩ. ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ᾔδει μὲν οὔ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλʼ οὖν ᾤετό γʼ αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδʼ οἴεται εἰδέναι. [¶58] Men. That is true. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶59] Soc. And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ᾔδει; [¶60] Men. I think that too is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ. [¶61] Soc. Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo’s shock, have we done him any harm? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν; [¶62] Men. I think not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶63] Soc. And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times, that the double space must have a line of double the length for its side. > Greek: ΣΩ. προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις ᾤετʼ ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει. [¶64] Men. It seems so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν. [¶65] Soc. Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι; [¶66] Men. I think not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶67] Soc. Then the torpedo’s shock was of advantage to him? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὤνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας; [¶68] Men. I think so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι. [¶69] Soc. Now you should note how, as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions and do not teach him; and be on the watch to see if at any point you find me teaching him or expounding to him, instead of questioning him on his opinions. Tell me, boy: here we have a square of four feet, have we not? You understand? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετʼ ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον; μανθάνεις; ΠΑΙ. ἔγωγε. [¶70] Soc. And here we add another square equal to it? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶71] Soc. And here a third, equal to either of them? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶72] Soc. Now shall we fill up this vacant space in the corner? Boy. By all means. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθʼ ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶73] Soc. So here we must have four equal spaces? BOY. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτʼ ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία τάδε; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶74] Soc. Well now, how many times larger is this whole space than this other? Boy. Four times. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. τετραπλάσιον. [¶75] Soc. But it was to have been only twice, you remember? Boy. To be sure. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔδει δέ γε διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶76] Soc. And does this line, drawn from corner to corner, cut in two each of these spaces? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν [τινὰ] τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων; [¶77] 85. Boy. Yes. Soc. And have we here four equal lines containing this space? Boy. We have. > Greek: 85. ΠΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. γίγνονται γάρ. [¶78] Soc. Now consider how large this space is. Boy. I do not understand. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δή· πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. οὐ μανθάνω. [¶79] Soc. Has not each of the inside lines cut off half of each of these four spaces? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὔ; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶80] Soc. And how many spaces of that size are there in this part? Boy. Four. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν; ΠΑΙ. τέτταρα. [¶81] Soc. And how many in this? Boy. Two. > Greek: ΣΩ. πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε; ΠΑΙ. δύο. [¶82] Soc. And four is how many times two? Boy. Twice. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν; ΠΑΙ. διπλάσια. [¶83] Soc. And how many feet is this space? Boy. Eight feet. > Greek: ΣΩ. τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώπουν. [¶84] Soc. From what line do we get this figure? Boy. From this. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; ΠΑΙ. ἀπὸ ταύτης. [¶85] Soc. From the line drawn corner-wise across the (our-foot figure? Boy. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος; ΠΑΙ. ναί. [¶86] Soc. The professors call it the diagonal: so if the diagonal is its name, then according to you, Meno’s boy, the double space is the square of the diagonal. Boy. Yes, certainly it is, Socrates. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί· ὥστʼ εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον. ΠΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶87] Soc. What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο; [¶88] Men. No, they were all his own. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτοῦ. [¶89] Soc. But you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον. [¶90] Men. That is true. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶91] Soc. Yet he had in him these opinions, had he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι· ἢ οὔ; [¶92] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶93] Soc. So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing? > Greek: ΣΩ. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε; [¶94] Men. Apparently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶95] Soc. And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as anyone. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων. [¶96] Men. So it seems. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν. [¶97] Soc. Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλʼ ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; [¶98] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶99] Soc. And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί ἐστιν; [¶100] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶101] Soc. And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν; [¶102] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶103] Soc. Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται. [¶104] Men. Well, I know that no one has ever taught him. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν. [¶105] Soc. And has he these opinions, or has he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί; [¶106] Men. He must have them, Socrates, evidently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται. [¶107] Soc. And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once that he had them and learnt them during some other time? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει; [¶108] 86. Men. Apparently. > Greek: 86. ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶109] Soc. And this must have been the time when he was not a human being? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ὅτʼ οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος; [¶110] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶111] Soc. So if in both of these periods—when he was and was not a human being—he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge, his soul must have had this cognizance throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ὅν τʼ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. [¶112] Men. Evidently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶113] Soc. And if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember—you must endeavor to search out and recollect? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος—ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι; [¶114] Men. What you say commends itself to me, Socrates, I know not how. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως. [¶115] Soc. And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know, nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δʼ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ. [¶116] Men. There also I consider that you speak aright, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶117] Soc. Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know, do you agree to our attempting a joint inquiry into the nature of virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀρετή; [¶118] Men. By all means. But still, Socrates, for my part I would like best of all to examine that question I asked at first, and hear your view as to whether in pursuing it we are to regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature to mankind, or as arriving to them in some other way which I should be glad to know. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς. [¶119] Soc. Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself—you are so fond of your liberty— and both attempt and hold control over me, I will yield to your request—what else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question—whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way—to be examined by means of hypothesis. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδʼ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι—τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; —ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν. [¶120] Soc. I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them; for example, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle: they reply—“I cannot yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows: If this area is such that when you apply it to the given line of the circle you find it falls short by a space similar to that which you have just applied, then I take it you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other. > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε· [¶121] 87. Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not.” In the same way with regard to our question about virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be, we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not? In the first place, if it is something dissimilar or similar to knowledge, is it taught or not—or, as we were saying just now, remembered? Let us have no disputing about the choice of a name: is it taught? Or is not this fact plain to everyone—that the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge? Men. I agree to that. > Greek: 87. εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν. ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθʼ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα—ἀλλʼ ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην; ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶122] Soc. Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge, clearly it must be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη. [¶123] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶124] Soc. So you see we have made short work of this question—if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable, and if to another, it is not. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δʼ οὔ. [¶125] Men. To be sure. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶126] Soc. The next question, it would seem, that we have to consider is whether virtue is knowledge, or of another kind than knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης. [¶127] Men. I should say that is the next thing we have to consider. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι. [¶128] Soc. Well now, surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not, and our hypothesis stands, that it is good? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι; [¶129] Men. Certainly we do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶130] Soc. Then if there is some good apart and separable from knowledge, it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that is not embraced by knowledge, our suspicion that virtue is a kind of knowledge would be well founded. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τινʼ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιΜΕΝ. [¶131] Men. Quite so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶132] Soc. Now it is by virtue that we are good? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γʼ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί; [¶133] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶134] Soc. And if good, profitable; for all good things are profitable, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί; [¶135] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶136] Soc. So virtue is profitable? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν; [¶137] Men. That must follow from what has been admitted. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων. [¶138] Soc. Then let us see, in particular instances, what sort of things they are that profit us. Health, let us say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth—these and their like we call profitable, do we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί; [¶139] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶140] 88. Soc. But these same things, we admit, actually harm us at times; or do you dispute that statement? > Greek: 88. ΣΩ. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως; [¶141] Men. No, I agree. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως. [¶142] Soc. Consider now, what is the guiding condition in each case that makes them at one time profitable, and at another harmful. Are they not profitable when the use of them is right, and harmful when it is not? > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει; [¶143] Men. To be sure. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶144] Soc. Then let us consider next the goods of the soul: by these you understand temperance, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and so forth? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶145] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶146] Soc. Now tell me; such of these as you think are not knowledge, but different from knowledge—do they not sometimes harm us, and sometimes profit us? For example, courage, if it is courage apart from prudence, and only a sort of boldness: when a man is bold without sense, he is harmed; but when he has sense at the same time, he is profited, is he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλʼ οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται; [¶147] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶148] Soc. And the same holds of temperance and intelligence: things learnt and coordinated with the aid of sense are profitable, but without sense they are harmful? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά; [¶149] Men. Most certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ σφόδρα. [¶150] Soc. And in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον; [¶151] Men. So it seems. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν. [¶152] Soc. Then if virtue is something that is in the soul, and must needs be profitable, it ought to be wisdom, seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable nor harmful, but are made either one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly; and hence, by this argument, virtue being profitable must be a sort of wisdom. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τινʼ εἶναι. [¶153] Men. I agree. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶154] Soc. Then as to the other things, wealth and the like, that we mentioned just now as being sometimes good and sometimes harmful—are not these also made profitable or harmful by the soul according as she uses and guides them rightly or wrongly: just as, in the case of the soul generally, we found that the guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά; [¶155] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶156] Soc. And the wise soul guides rightly, and the foolish erroneously? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δʼ ἡ ἄφρων; [¶157] Men. That is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶158] Soc. Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· [¶159] 89. Men. Certainly. > Greek: 89. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶160] Soc. Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι; [¶161] Men. It seems to me that your statement, Socrates, is excellent. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα. [¶162] Soc. Then if this is so, good men cannot be good by nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί. [¶163] Men. I think not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. [¶164] Soc. No, for then, I presume, we should have had this result: if good men were so by nature, we surely should have had men able to discern who of the young were good by nature, and on their pointing them out we should have taken them over and kept them safe in the citadel, having set our mark on them far rather than on our gold treasure, in order that none might have tampered with them, and that when they came to be of age, they might be useful to their country. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδʼ ἦν· εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι. [¶165] Men. Yes, most likely, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶166] Soc. So since it is not by nature that the good become good, is it by education? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, ἆρα μαθήσει; [¶167] Men. We must now conclude, I think, that it is; and plainly, Socrates, on our hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, it must be taught. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν. [¶168] Soc. Yes, I daresay; but what if we were not right in agreeing to that? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν; [¶169] Men. Well, it seemed to be a correct statement a moment ago. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι. [¶170] Soc. Yes, but not only a moment ago must it seem correct, but now also and hereafter, if it is to be at all sound. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι. [¶171] Men. Why, what reason have you to make a difficulty about it, and feel a doubt as to virtue being knowledge? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή; [¶172] Soc. I will tell you, Meno. I do not withdraw as incorrect the statement that it is taught, if it is knowledge; but as to its being knowledge, consider if you think I have grounds for misgiving. For tell me now: if anything at all, not merely virtue, is teachable, must there not be teachers and learners of it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι; [¶173] Men. I think so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶174] Soc. Then also conversely, if a thing had neither teachers nor learners, we should be right in surmising that it could not be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι; [¶175] Men. That is so: but do you think there are no teachers of virtue? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι; [¶176] Soc. I must say I have often inquired whether there were any, but for all my pains I cannot find one. And yet many have shared the search with me, and particularly those persons whom I regard as best qualified for the task. But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest. > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως. [¶177] 90. And we may well ask his assistance; for our friend Anytus, in the first place, is the son of a wise and wealthy father, Anthemion, who became rich not by a fluke or a gift—like that man the other day, Ismenias the Theban, who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates —but as the product of his own skill and industry; and secondly, he has the name of being in general a well-conducted, mannerly person, not insolent towards his fellow-citizens or arrogant and annoying; and further, he gave his son a good upbringing and education, as the Athenian people think, for they choose him for the highest offices. This is the sort of man to whom one may look for help in the inquiry as to whether there are teachers of virtue or not, and who they may be. So please, Anytus, join with me and your family-friend Meno in our inquiry about this matter—who can be the teachers. Consider it thus: if we wanted Meno here to be a good doctor, to whom should we send him for instruction? Would it not be to the doctors? An. Certainly. Soc. And if we wanted him to become a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers? An. Yes. > Greek: 90. εἰκότως δʼ ἂν μεταδοῖμεν· Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτʼ εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρʼ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς; ΑΝ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους; ΑΝ. ναί. ## 3. Pages 90–100 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/#p-N [¶0] Soc. And in the same way with every other trade? An. Certainly. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως; ΑΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶1] Soc. Now let me ask you something more about these same instances. We should be right, we say, in sending him to the doctors if we wanted him to be a doctor. When we say this, do we mean that we should be wise in sending him to those who profess the art rather than those who do not, and to those who charge a fee for the particular thing they do, as avowed teachers of anyone who wishes to come and learn of them? If these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him? An. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἆρʼ ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἆρʼ οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν; ΑΝ. ναί. [¶2] Soc. And the same would hold in the case of flute-playing, and so on with the rest? What folly, when we wanted to make someone a flute-player, to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee, and to bother with requests for instruction other people who neither set up to be teachers nor have a single pupil in that sort of study which we expect him, when sent, to pursue! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable? An. Yes, on my word, I do, and stupid to boot. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν παρὰ τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτʼ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρʼ αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωΜΕΝ. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι; ΑΝ. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός. [¶3] Soc. Quite right. And now there is an opportunity of your joining me in a consultation on my friend Meno here. > Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετʼ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουῒ Μένωνος. [¶4] 91. He has been declaring to me ever so long, Anytus, that he desires to have that wisdom and virtue whereby men keep their house or their city in good order, and honor their parents, and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers as befits a good man. Now tell me, to whom ought we properly to send him for lessons in this virtue? Or is it clear enough, from our argument just now, that he should go to these men who profess to be teachers of virtue and advertise themselves as the common teachers of the Greeks, and are ready to instruct anyone who chooses in return for fees charged on a fixed scale? An. To whom are you referring, Socrates? Soc. Surely you know as well as anyone; they are the men whom people call sophists. An. For heaven’s sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them. > Greek: 91. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιΜΕΝ. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους; ΑΝ. καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς. ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν γʼ ἐμῶν μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων. [¶5] Soc. What is this, Anytus? Of all the people who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption to anyone placed in their hands? And is it for doing this that they openly claim the payment of fees? For my part I cannot bring myself to believe you; for I know of one man, Protagoras, who amassed more money by his craft than Pheidias—so famous for the noble works he produced—or any ten other sculptors. And yet how surprising that menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes should not be able to go undetected thirty days if they should return the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them, and that such doings on their part would quickly starve them to death, while for more than forty years all Greece failed to notice that Protagoras was corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them! For I believe he died about seventy years old, forty of which he spent in the practice of his art; Soc. and he retains undiminished to this day the high reputation he has enjoyed all that time—and not only Protagoras, but a multitude of others too: some who lived before him, and others still living. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅτι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἠργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν. καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθʼ ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλʼ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη— οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα— ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες. [¶6] 92. Now are we to take it, according to you, that they wittingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they were themselves unconscious of it? Are we to conclude those who are frequently termed the wisest of mankind to have been so demented as that? An. Demented! Not they, Socrates: far rather the young men who pay them money, and still more the relations who let the young men have their way; and most of all the cities that allow them to enter, and do not expel them, whether such attempt be made by stranger or citizen. Soc. Tell me, Anytus, has any of the sophists wronged you? What makes you so hard on them? An. No, heaven knows I have never in my life had dealings with any of them, nor would I let any of my people have to do with them either. > Greek: 92. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λεληθέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσομεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι; ΑΝ. πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων, τούτων δʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός. ΣΩ. πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ; ΑΝ. οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδʼ ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα. [¶7] Soc. Then you have absolutely no experience of those persons? An. And trust I never may. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄπειρος ἄρʼ εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν; ΑΝ. καὶ εἴην γε. [¶8] Soc. How then, my good sir, can you tell whether a thing has any good or evil in it, if you are quite without experience of it? An. Easily: the fact is, I know what these people are, whether I have experience of them or not. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης; ΑΝ. ῥᾳδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν, εἴτʼ οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή. [¶9] Soc. You are a wizard, perhaps, Anytus; for I really cannot see, from what you say yourself, how else you can know anything about them. But we are not inquiring now who the teachers are whose lessons would make Meno wicked; let us grant, if you will, that they are the sophists: I only ask you to tell us, and do Meno a service as a friend of your family by letting him know, to whom in all this great city he should apply in order to become eminent in the virtue which I described just now. An. Why not tell him yourself? > Greek: ΣΩ. μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμʼ ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐπιζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρʼ οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο—οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί—ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον φράσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἄξιος λόγου. ΑΝ. τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας; [¶10] Soc. I did mention to him the men whom I supposed to be teachers of these things; but I find, from what you say, that I am quite off the track, and I daresay you are on it. Now you take your turn, and tell him to whom of the Athenians he is to go. Give us a name—anyone you please. An. Why mention a particular one? Any Athenian gentleman he comes across, without exception, will do him more good, if he will do as he is bid, than the sophists. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς· καὶ ἴσως τὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει. ΑΝ. τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι. [¶11] Soc. And did those gentlemen grow spontaneously into what they are, and without learning from anybody are they able, nevertheless, to teach others what they did not learn themselves? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρʼ οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον; [¶12] 93. An. I expect they must have learnt in their turn from the older generation, who were gentlemen: or does it not seem to you that we have had many good men in this city? Soc. Yes, I agree, Anytus; we have also many who are good at politics, and have had them in the past as well as now. But I want to know whether they have proved good teachers besides of their own virtue: that is the question with which our discussion is actually concerned; not whether there are, or formerly have been, good men here amongst us or not, but whether virtue is teachable; this has been our problem all the time. And our inquiry into this problem resolves itself into the question: Did the good men of our own and of former times know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good, or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another? That is the question I and Meno have been discussing all this time. Well, just consider it in your own way of speaking: would you not say that Themistocles was a good man? An. I would, particularly so. > Greek: 93. ΑΝ. καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες; ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν· οὐκ εἰ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδʼ εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοποῦΜΕΝ. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρʼ ἄλλου· τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων. ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου· Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα. [¶13] Soc. And if any man ever was a teacher of his own virtue, he especially was a good teacher of his? An. In my opinion, yes, assuming that he wished to be so. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι; ΑΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε. [¶14] Soc. But can you suppose he would not have wished that other people should become good, honorable men—above all, I presume, his own son? Or do you think he was jealous of him, and deliberately refused to impart the virtue of his own goodness to him? Have you never heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could keep his balance standing upright on horseback, and hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, so as to make him skilled in all that could be learnt from good masters. Surely you must have heard all this from your elders? An. I have. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ; ἢ οἴει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἠργάζετο ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο· ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων; ΑΝ. ἀκήκοα. [¶15] Soc. Then there could be no complaints of badness in his son’s nature? An. I daresay not. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατʼ ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν. ΑΝ. ἴσως οὐκ ἄν. [¶16] Soc. But I ask you—did you ever hear anybody, old or young, say that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, had the same goodness and accomplishments as his father? An. Certainly not. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου; ΑΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶17] Soc. And can we believe that his father chose to train his own son in those feats, and yet made him no better than his neighbors in his own particular accomplishments—if virtue, as alleged, was to be taught? An. On my word, I think not. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ὑὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ΑΝ. ἴσως μὰ Δίʼ οὔ. [¶18] Soc. Well, there you have a fine teacher of virtue who, you admit, was one of the best men of past times. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου· [¶19] 94. Let us take another, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus: do you not admit that he was a good man? An. I do, absolutely, of course. Soc. Well, did he not train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that masters could teach him? And in the result, do you consider he has turned out better than anyone else? You have been in his company, I know, and you see what he is like. Or take another example— the splendidly accomplished Pericles: he, as you are aware, brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus. An. Yes. > Greek: 94. ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσε, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περικλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶20] Soc. And, you know as well as I, he taught them to be the foremost horsemen of Athens, and trained them to excel in music and gymnastics and all else that comes under the head of the arts; and with all that, had he no desire to make them good men? He wished to, I imagine, but presumably it is not a thing one can be taught. And that you may not suppose it was only a few of the meanest sort of Athenians who failed in this matter, let me remind you that Thucydides’ also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and that besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus—masters who, I should think, had the name of being the best exponents of the art. You remember them, do you not? An. Yes, by hearsay. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μέν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων—τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δέ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν—ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ. [¶21] Soc. Well, is it not obvious that this father would never have spent his money on having his children taught all those things, and then have omitted to teach them at no expense the others that would have made them good men, if virtue was to be taught? Will you say that perhaps Thucydides was one of the meaner sort, and had no great number of friends among the Athenians and allies? He, who was of a great house and had much influence in our city and all over Greece, so that if virtue were to be taught he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good, whether one of our own people or a foreigner, were he himself too busy owing to the cares of state! Ah no, my dear Anytus, it looks as though virtue were not a teachable thing. An. Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one; > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή. ΑΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ· [¶22] 95. I think you know that yourself. Soc. Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what “speaking ill” means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know. Now you must answer me: are there not good and honorable men among your people also? > Greek: 95. οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρʼ ὑμῖν εἰσιν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; [¶23] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶24] Soc. Well then, are they willing to put themselves forward as teachers of the young, and avow that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν; [¶25] Men. No, no, Socrates, I assure you: sometimes you may hear them refer to it as teachable, but sometimes as not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ. [¶26] Soc. Then are we to call those persons teachers of this thing, when they do not even agree on that great question? > Greek: ΣΩ. φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται; [¶27] Men. I should say not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶28] Soc. Well, and what of the sophists? Do you consider these, its only professors, to be teachers of virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς; [¶29] Men. That is a point, Socrates, for which I admire Gorgias: you will never hear him promising this, and he ridicules the others when he hears them promise it. Skill in speaking is what he takes it to be their business to produce. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς. [¶30] Soc. Then you do not think the sophists are teachers of virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι; [¶31] Men. I cannot say, Socrates. I am in the same plight as the rest of the world: sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ. [¶32] Soc. And are you aware that not only you and other political folk are in two minds as to whether virtue is to be taught, but Theognis the poet also says, you remember, the very same thing? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθʼ ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει; [¶33] Men. In which part of his poems? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν; [¶34] Soc. In those elegiac lines where he says— Eat and drink with these men; sit with them, and be pleasing unto them, who wield great power; for from the good wilt thou win thee lessons in the good; but mingle with the bad, “and thou wilt lose even the sense that thou hast.” Do you observe how in these words he implies that virtue is to be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει— καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις. ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπʼ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον. οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει; [¶35] Men. He does, evidently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεταί γε. [¶36] Soc. But in some other lines he shifts his ground a little, saying— Could understanding be created and put into a man (I think it runs thus) “many high rewards would they obtain” “for he would have followed the precepts of wisdom: but not by teaching wilt thou ever make the had man good” You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,— εἰ δʼ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα, λέγει πως ὅτι— πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ— οὔ ποτʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός, πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. [¶37] 96. Men. Apparently. > Greek: 96. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθόν. ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῳ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τἀναντία λέγει; ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶38] Soc. Well, can you name any other subject in which the professing teachers are not only refused recognition as teachers of others, but regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and indeed as inferior in the very quality of which they claim to be teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as men of worth and honor say at one time that it is teachable, and at another that it is not? When people are so confused about this or that matter, can you say they are teachers in any proper sense of the word? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι; [¶39] Men. No, indeed, I cannot. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶40] Soc. Well, if neither the sophists nor the men who are themselves good and honorable are teachers of the subject, clearly no others can be? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε; [¶41] Men. I agree. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. [¶42] Soc. And if there are no teachers, there can be no disciples either? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; [¶43] Men. I think that statement is true. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις. [¶44] Soc. And we have admitted that a thing of which there are neither teachers nor disciples cannot be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι; [¶45] Men. We have. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὡμολογήκαΜΕΝ. [¶46] Soc. So nowhere are any teachers of virtue to be found? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι; [¶47] Men. That is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶48] Soc. And if no teachers, then no disciples? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί; [¶49] Men. So it appears. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται οὕτως. [¶50] Soc. Hence virtue cannot be taught? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν; [¶51] Men. It seems likely, if our investigation is correct. And that makes me wonder, I must say, Socrates, whether perhaps there are no good men at all, or by what possible sort of process good people can come to exist? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδʼ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων. [¶52] Soc. I fear, Meno, you and I are but poor creatures, and Gorgias has been as faulty an educator of you as Prodicus of me. So our first duty is to look to ourselves, and try to find somebody who will have some means or other of making us better. I say this with special reference to our recent inquiry, in which I see that we absurdly failed to note that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good; and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive by what means good men can be produced. > Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει· λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. [¶53] Men. To what are you alluding, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶54] Soc. I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that this must needs be so? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι· [¶55] 97. Men. Yes. > Greek: 97. ἦ γάρ; ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶56] Soc. And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν; [¶57] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶58] Soc. But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν. [¶59] Men. What do you mean by that? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς δὴ [ὀρθῶς] λέγεις; [¶60] Soc. I will tell you. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ⟨εἰ⟩ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο; [¶61] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶62] Soc. Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδʼ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο; [¶63] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶64] Soc. And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἕως γʼ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος. [¶65] Men. Just as good. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐδὲν γάρ. [¶66] Soc. Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue, when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής. [¶67] Men. So it seems. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικέ γε. [¶68] Soc. Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης. [¶69] Men. With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ. [¶70] Soc. How do you mean? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right, so long as he opines rightly? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι; [¶71] Men. It appears to me that he must; and therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, and why they should be two distinct and separate things. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ διʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. [¶72] Soc. Well, do you know why it is that you wonder, or shall I tell you? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν διʼ ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω; [¶73] Men. Please tell me. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γʼ εἰπέ. [¶74] Soc. It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus. But perhaps there are none in your country. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδʼ ἔστιν παρʼ ὑμῖν. [¶75] Men. What is the point of your remark? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶76] Soc. That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away; but, if fastened, they stay where they are. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει. [¶77] Men. Well, what of that? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή; [¶78] Soc. To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinion. For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, and effect all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον —οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντʼ ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· [¶79] 98. And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as in our previous talk we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends the other by its trammels. Men. Upon my word, Socrates, it seems to be very much as you say. > Greek: 98. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. ΜΕΝ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί. [¶80] Soc. And indeed I too speak as one who does not know but only conjectures: yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δʼ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα. [¶81] Men. Yes, and you are right, Socrates, in so saying. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις. [¶82] Soc. Well, then, am I not right also in saying that true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη; [¶83] Men. There again, Socrates, I think you speak the truth. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. [¶84] Soc. So that right opinion will be no whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be inferior to him who has knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην. [¶85] Men. That is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶86] Soc. And you know that the good man has been admitted by us to be useful. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι. [¶87] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶88] Soc. Since then it is not only because of knowledge that men will be good and useful to their country, where such men are to be found, but also on account of right opinion; and since neither of these two things—knowledge and true opinion—is a natural property of mankind, being acquired—or do you think that either of them is natural? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον διʼ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, οὔτʼ ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι; [¶89] Men. Not I. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶90] Soc. Then if they are not natural, good people cannot be good by nature either. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν. [¶91] Men. Of course not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶92] Soc. And since they are not an effect of nature, we next considered whether virtue can be taught. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν. [¶93] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶94] Soc. And we thought it teachable if virtue is wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή; [¶95] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶96] Soc. And if teachable, it must be wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι; [¶97] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶98] Soc. And if there were teachers, it could be taught, but if there were none, it could not? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν; [¶99] Men. Quite so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὕτω. [¶100] Soc. But surely we acknowledged that it had no teachers? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους; [¶101] Men. That is true. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶102] Soc. Then we acknowledged it neither was taught nor was wisdom? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι; [¶103] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶104] Soc. But yet we admitted it was a good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι; [¶105] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶106] Soc. And that which guides rightly is useful and good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον; [¶107] Men. Certainly. Soc. And that there are only two things— true opinion and knowledge—that guide rightly and a man guides rightly if he have these; for things that come about by chance do not occur through human guidance; but where a man is a guide to what is right we find these two things—true opinion and knowledge. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶108] 99. Men. I agree. > Greek: 99. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται— τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται—ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη. ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. [¶109] Soc. Well now, since virtue is not taught, we no longer take it to be knowledge? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή; [¶110] Men. Apparently not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ φαίνεται. [¶111] Soc. So of two good and useful things one has been rejected: knowledge cannot be our guide in political conduct. > Greek: ΣΩ. δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών. [¶112] Men. I think not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. [¶113] Soc. Therefore it was not by any wisdom, nor because they were wise, that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their states—Themistocles and the rest of them, to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago. For this reason it was that they were unable to make others like unto themselves—because their qualities were not an effect of knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν· διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ διʼ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι. [¶114] Men. The case is probably as you say, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις. [¶115] Soc. And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion. This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states, and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners; for these people utter many a true thing when inspired, but have no knowledge of anything they say. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν. [¶116] Men. I daresay that is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν. [¶117] Soc. And may we, Meno, rightly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a great deed and word? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι; [¶118] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶119] Soc. Then we shall be right in calling those divine of whom we spoke just now as soothsayers and prophets and all of the poetic turn; and especially we can say of the statesmen that they are divine and enraptured, as being inspired and possessed of God when they succeed in speaking many great things, while knowing nought of what they say. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρʼ ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν. [¶120] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶121] Soc. And the women too, I presume, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they eulogize a good man, say—“He is a divine person.” > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος. [¶122] Men. And to all appearance, Socrates, they are right; though perhaps our friend Anytus may be annoyed at your statement. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι. [¶123] Soc. For my part, I care not. As for him, Meno, we will converse with him some other time. At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it, unless there should be somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν. [¶124] 100. And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—“He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades.” In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows. Men. I think you put it excellently, Socrates. > Greek: 100. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν. ΜΕΝ. κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶125] Soc. Then the result of our reasoning, Meno, is found to be that virtue comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come. But the certainty of this we shall only know when, before asking in what way virtue comes to mankind, we set about inquiring what virtue is, in and by itself. It is time now for me to go my way, but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded, so as to put him in a gentler mood; for if you can persuade him, you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρᾳότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.