--- title: "Meno · Μένων" author: "Plato" translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 1 of 3 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/ cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Meno · Μένων, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/" --- # Meno · Μένων *Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb* Can virtue be taught? A slave boy discovers geometry, and learning turns out to be recollection. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg024, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 1. Pages 70–80 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/1/#p-N [¶0] 70. Men. Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way? > Greek: 70. ΜΕΝ. ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλʼ ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ; [¶1] Soc. Meno, of old the Thessalians were famous and admired among the Greeks for their riding and their riches; but now they have a name, I believe, for wisdom also, especially your friend Aristippus’s people, the Larisaeans. For this you have to thank Gorgias: for when he came to that city he made the leading men of the Aleuadae—among them your lover Aristippus—and the Thessalians generally enamored of wisdom. Nay more, he has given you the regular habit of answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those who know: for he sets the example of offering himself to be questioned by any Greek who chooses, and on any point one likes, and he has an answer for everybody. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφʼ ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι. τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας· ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος. [¶2] Soc. Now in this place, my dear Meno, we have a contrary state of things: > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν· ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρʼ ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία. [¶3] 71. a drought of wisdom, as it were, has come on; and it seems as though wisdom had deserted our borders in favour of yours. You have only to ask one of our people a question such as that, and he will be sure to laugh and say: Stranger, you must think me a specially favoured mortal, to be able to tell whether virtue can be taught, or in what way it comes to one: so far am I from knowing whether it can be taught or not, that I actually do not even know what the thing itself, virtue, is at all. And I myself, Meno, am in the same case; I share my townsmen’s poverty in this matter: I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be? Or do you imagine it possible, if one has no cognizance at all of Meno, that one could know whether he is handsome or rich or noble, or the reverse of these? Do you suppose that one could? Men. Not I. But is it true, Socrates, that you do not even know what virtue is? Are we to return home with this report of you? > Greek: 71. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι—ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθʼ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι—ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω· συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τʼ εἶναι; ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς οὐδʼ ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν; [¶4] Soc. Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across anybody who did know, in my opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. [¶5] Men. What? You did not meet Gorgias when he was here? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δέ; Γοργίᾳ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες ὅτε ἐνθάδε ἦν; [¶6] Soc. I did. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. [¶7] Men. And you didn’t consider that he knew? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἶτα οὐκ ἐδόκει σοι εἰδέναι; [¶8] Soc. I have not a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell at the moment how he struck me then. It may be that he did know, and that you know what he said: remind me therefore how he expressed it; or if you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his views. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε· ἀνάμνησον οὖν με πῶς ἔλεγεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ. [¶9] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε. [¶10] Soc. Then let us pass him over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven’s name, what is your own account of virtue. Speak out frankly, that I may find myself the victim of a most fortunate falsehood, if you and Gorgias prove to have knowledge of it, while I have said that I never yet came across anyone who had. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν· σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι; εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι. [¶11] Men. Why, there is no difficulty, Socrates, in telling. First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man’s virtue is this—that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman’s virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue—one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men—one, if you like, for freemen, and yet another for slaves. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δʼ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν. εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός. καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου. [¶12] 72. Men. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice. > Greek: 72. ΜΕΝ. καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν· καθʼ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία. [¶13] Soc. I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping. Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm, suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee, and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees, and I rejoined: Do you say it is by being bees that they are of many and various kinds and differ from each other, or does their difference lie not in that, but in something else—for example, in their beauty or size or some other quality? Tell me, what would be your answer to this question? > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον. ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην· ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων; εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς; [¶14] Men. Why, this—that they do not differ, as bees, the one from the other. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τοῦτʼ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας. [¶15] Soc. And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα· τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων· ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι; εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν; [¶16] Men. I could. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶17] Soc. And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is. You take my meaning, do you not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν διʼ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀρετή· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω; [¶18] Men. My impression is that I do; but still I do not yet grasp the meaning of the question as I could wish. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκῶ γέ μοι μανθάνειν· οὐ μέντοι ὡς βούλομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. [¶19] Soc. Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think, Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health for a man, and another for a woman? Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally, in a man or in anyone else? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός; ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ ὑγίεια ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ; [¶20] Men. I think that health is the same, both in man and in woman. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἡ αὐτή μοι δοκεῖ ὑγίειά γε εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός. [¶21] Soc. Then is it not so with size and strength also? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and the same strength; by “the same” I mean that strength does not differ as strength, whether it be in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is any difference? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται; τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί. ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν; [¶22] Men. I do not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶23] 73. Soc. And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man? > Greek: 73. ΣΩ. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί; [¶24] Men. I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις. [¶25] Soc. Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν; [¶26] Men. I was. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶27] Soc. And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα; [¶28] Men. Surely not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶29] Soc. Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως διοικῶσιν, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ διοικήσουσιν; [¶30] Men. That must be. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη. [¶31] Soc. Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης. [¶32] Men. Evidently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνονται. [¶33] Soc. And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ παῖς καὶ πρεσβύτης; μῶν ἀκόλαστοι ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοι ἀγαθοὶ ἄν ποτε γένοιντο; [¶34] Men. Surely not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶35] Soc. Only if they are temperate and just? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ σώφρονες καὶ δίκαιοι; [¶36] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶37] Soc. So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the same qualities. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάντες ἄρʼ ἄνθρωποι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀγαθοί εἰσιν· τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τυχόντες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται. [¶38] Men. So it seems. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικε. [¶39] Soc. And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν. [¶40] Men. No, indeed. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα. [¶41] Soc. Seeing then that it is the same virtue in all cases, try and tell me, if you can recollect, what Gorgias—and you in agreement with him—say it is. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετʼ ἐκείνου. [¶42] Men. Simply that it is the power of governing mankind— if you want some single description to cover all cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί ἄλλο γʼ ἢ ἄρχειν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων; εἴπερ ἕν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων. [¶43] Soc. That is just what I am after. But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλʼ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων; [¶44] Men. I should say certainly not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶45] Soc. No, indeed, it would be unlikely, my excellent friend. And again, consider this further point: you say it is “to be able to govern”; shall we not add to that—“justly, not unjustly”? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει. ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή; [¶46] Men. Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν. [¶47] Soc. Virtue, Meno, or a virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις; [¶48] Men. What do you mean by that? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; [¶49] Soc. What I would in any other case. To take roundness, for instance; I should call it a figure, and not figure pure and simple. And I should name it so because there are other figures as well. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα. [¶50] Men. You would be quite right—just as I say there are other virtues besides justice. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς. [¶51] 74. Soc. What are they? Tell me. In the same way as I can tell you of other figures, if you request me, so do you tell me of other virtues. > Greek: 74. ΣΩ. τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς. [¶52] Men. Well then, courage, I consider, is a virtue, and temperance, and wisdom, and loftiness of mind; and there are a great many others. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι. [¶53] Soc. Once more, Meno, we are in the same plight: again we have found a number of virtues when we were looking for one, though not in the same way as we did just now; but the one that runs through them all, this we are not able to find. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν· πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή· τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν. [¶54] Men. No, for I am not yet able, Socrates, to follow your line of search, and find a single virtue common to all, as one can in other cases. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. [¶55] Soc. And no wonder; but I will make an effort, so far as I can, to help us onward. You understand, of course, that this principle of mine applies to everything: if someone asked you the question I put to you just now: What is figure, Meno? and you replied: Roundness; and then he said, as I did: Is roundness figure or a figure? I suppose you would answer: A figure. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰκότως γε· ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τʼ ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι; εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι. [¶56] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶57] Soc. And for this reason—that there are other figures as well? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστιν σχήματα; [¶58] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶59] Soc. And if he went on to ask you of what sort they were, you would tell him? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ γε προσανηρώτα σε ὁποῖα, ἔλεγες ἄν; [¶60] Men. I would. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶61] Soc. And if he asked likewise what color is, and on your answering “white” your questioner then rejoined: Is “white” color or a color? your reply would be: A color; because there are other colors besides. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν· πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι; εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα; [¶62] Men. It would. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶63] Soc. And if he bade you mention other colors, you would tell him of others that are colors just as much as white? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ; [¶64] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶65] Soc. Now suppose that, like me, he pursued the argument and said: We are always arriving at a variety of things, but let me have no more of that: since you call these many things by one single name, and say they are figures, every one of them, even when they are opposed to one another, tell me what is that which comprises round and straight alike, and which you call figure— including straight equally with round under that term. For that is your statement, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, ὅτι ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; [¶66] Men. It is. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶67] Soc. And in making it, do you mean to say that round is no more round than straight, or straight no more straight than round? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον; [¶68] Men. No, to be sure, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶69] Soc. What you mean is that the round shape is no more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου. [¶70] Men. Quite right. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶71] Soc. Then what can this thing be, which bears the name of figure? Try and tell me. Suppose that, on being asked this question by someone, either about figure or about color, you had replied: Why, I don’t so much as understand what you want, sir, or even know what you are saying: he might well have shown surprise, and said: Do you not understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element in all these things? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί ποτε οὖν τοῦτο οὗ τοῦτο ὄνομά ἐστιν, τὸ σχῆμα; [¶72] 75. Or would you still be unable to reply, Meno, if you were approached on other terms, and were asked: What is it that is common to the round and the straight and everything else that you call figures—the same in all? Try and tell me it will be good practice for your answer about virtue. Men. No, it is you who must answer, Socrates. > Greek: 75. πειρῶ λέγειν. εἰ οὖν τῷ ἐρωτῶντι οὕτως ἢ περὶ σχήματος ἢ χρώματος εἶπες ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μανθάνω ἔγωγε ὅτι βούλει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις, ἴσως ἂν ἐθαύμασε καὶ εἶπεν· οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τούτοις ταὐτόν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Μένων, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τίς σε ἐρωτῴη· τί ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στρογγύλῳ καὶ εὐθεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἃ δὴ σχήματα καλεῖς, ταὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν. ΜΕΝ. μή, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ. [¶73] Soc. You wish me to do you the favour? > Greek: ΣΩ. βούλει σοι χαρίσωμαι; [¶74] Men. By all means. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶75] Soc. And then you will agree to take your turn and answer me on virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς; [¶76] Men. I will. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶77] Soc. Well then, I must make the effort, for it is worth our while. > Greek: ΣΩ. προθυμητέον τοίνυν· ἄξιον γάρ. [¶78] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶79] Soc. Come now, let me try and tell you what figure is. Just consider if you accept this description of it: figure, let us say, is the only existing thing that is found always following color. Are you satisfied, or are you looking for something different? I am sure I should be content with a similar account of virtue from you. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πειρώμεθά σοι εἰπεῖν τί ἐστιν σχῆμα. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τόδε ἀποδέχῃ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἢ ἄλλως πως ζητεῖς; ἐγὼ γὰρ κἂν οὕτως ἀγαπῴην εἴ μοι ἀρετὴν εἴποις. [¶80] Men. But it is such a silly one, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶81] Soc. How do you mean? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶82] Men. Well, figure, as I understand by your account, is what always follows color. Very good; but if some one said he did not know color, and was in the same difficulty about it as about figure, what answer do you suppose would have come from you? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὅτι σχῆμά πού ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ὃ ἀεὶ χρόᾳ ἕπεται. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ τὴν χρόαν τις μὴ φαίη εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποροῖ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τί ἂν οἴει σοι ἀποκεκρίσθαι; [¶83] Soc. The truth, from me; and if my questioner were a professor of the eristic and contentious sort, I should say to him: I have made my statement; if it is wrong, your business is to examine and refute it. But if, like you and me on this occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion together, I should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic. The more dialectical way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows. And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you. Tell me, is there something you call an end? Such a thing, I mean, as a limit, or extremity—I use all these terms in the same sense, though I daresay Prodicus might quarrel with us. But you, I am sure, refer to a thing as terminated or ended: something of that sort is what I mean—nothing complicated. > Greek: ΣΩ. τἀληθῆ ἔγωγε· καὶ εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρᾳότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαλεκτικώτερον μὴ μόνον τἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος. πειράσομαι δὴ καὶ ἐγώ σοι οὕτως εἰπεῖν. λέγε γάρ μοι· τελευτὴν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἷον πέρας καὶ ἔσχατον—πάντα ταῦτα ταὐτόν τι λέγω· ἴσως δʼ ἂν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο, ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι καὶ τετελευτηκέναι—τὸ τοιοῦτον βούλομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον. [¶84] Men. Yes, I do, and I think I grasp your meaning. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ καλῶ, καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ λέγεις. [¶85] 76. Soc. Well then, you speak of a surface, and also of a solid—the terms employed in geometrical problems? > Greek: 76. ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ στερεόν, οἷον ταῦτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς γεωμετρίαις; [¶86] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε καλῶ. [¶87] Soc. So now you are able to comprehend from all this what I mean by figure. In every instance of figure I call that figure in which the solid ends; and I may put that more succinctly by saying that figure is “limit of solid.” > Greek: ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν ἂν μάθοις μου ἐκ τούτων σχῆμα ὃ λέγω. κατὰ γὰρ παντὸς σχήματος τοῦτο λέγω, εἰς ὃ τὸ στερεὸν περαίνει, τοῦτʼ εἶναι σχῆμα· ὅπερ ἂν συλλαβὼν εἴποιμι στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι. [¶88] Men. And what do you say of color, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶89] Soc. How overbearing of you, Meno, to press an old man with demands for answers, when you will not trouble yourself to recollect and tell me what account Gorgias gives of virtue! > Greek: ΣΩ. ὑβριστής γʼ εἶ, ὦ Μένων· ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ πράγματα προστάττεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτε λέγει Γοργίας ἀρετὴν εἶναι. [¶90] Men. When you have answered my question, Socrates, I will answer yours. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ ἐπειδάν μοι σὺ τοῦτʼ εἴπῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρῶ σοι. [¶91] Soc. One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers. > Greek: ΣΩ. κἂν κατακεκαλυμμένος τις γνοίη, ὦ Μένων, διαλεγομένου σου, ὅτι καλὸς εἶ καὶ ἐρασταί σοι ἔτι εἰσίν. [¶92] Men. Why so? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δή; [¶93] Soc. Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay, made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπιτάττεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραννεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ὦσιν, καὶ ἅμα ἐμοῦ ἴσως κατέγνωκας ὅτι εἰμὶ ἥττων τῶν καλῶν· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. [¶94] Men. You must certainly indulge me. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν χάρισαι. [¶95] Soc. Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias, which you would find easiest to follow? > Greek: ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ᾗ ἂν σὺ μάλιστα ἀκολουθήσαις; [¶96] Men. I should like that, of course. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶97] Soc. Do not both of you say there are certain effluences of existent things, as Empedocles held? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα; [¶98] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. σφόδρα γε. [¶99] Soc. And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ διʼ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται; [¶100] Men. To be sure. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶101] Soc. And some of the effluences fit into various passages, while some are too small or too large? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν ἀπορροῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι; [¶102] Men. That is so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶103] Soc. And further, there is what you call sight? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὄψιν καλεῖς τι; [¶104] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶105] Soc. So now “conceive my meaning,” as Pindar says: color is an effluence of figures, commensurate with sight and sensible. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ τούτων δὴ σύνες ὅ τοι λέγω, ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. [¶106] Men. Your answer, Socrates, seems to me excellently put. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἰρηκέναι. [¶107] Soc. Yes, for I expect you find its terms familiar; and at the same time I fancy you observe that it enables you to tell what sound and smell are, and numerous other things of the kind. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ σοι κατὰ συνήθειαν εἴρηται· καὶ ἅμα οἶμαι ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἔχοις ἂν ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν καὶ φωνὴν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων. [¶108] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶109] Soc. It is an answer in the high poetic style, Meno, and so more agreeable to you than that about figure. > Greek: ΣΩ. τραγικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὦ Μένων, ἡ ἀπόκρισις, ὥστε ἀρέσκει σοι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ περὶ τοῦ σχήματος. [¶110] Men. Yes, it is. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε. [¶111] Soc. But yet, son of Alexidemus, I am inclined to think the other was the better of the two; and I believe you also would prefer it, if you were not compelled, as you were saying yesterday, to go away before the mysteries, and could stay awhile and be initiated. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ Ἀλεξιδήμου, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη βελτίων· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν σοὶ δόξαι, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ χθὲς ἔλεγες, ἀναγκαῖόν σοι ἀπιέναι πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων, ἀλλʼ εἰ περιμείναις τε καὶ μυηθείης. [¶112] 77. Men. But I should stay, Socrates, if you would give me many such answers. > Greek: 77. ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ περιμένοιμʼ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ μοι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοις. [¶113] Soc. Well then, I will spare no endeavor, both for your sake and for my own, to continue in that style; but I fear I may not succeed in keeping for long on that level. But come now, you in your turn must try and fulfil your promise by telling me what virtue is in a general way; and you must stop producing a plural from the singular, as the wags say whenever one breaks something, but leave virtue whole and sound, and tell me what it is. The pattern you have now got from me. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προθυμίας γε οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω, καὶ σοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, λέγων τοιαῦτα· ἀλλʼ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλʼ ἴθι δὴ πειρῶ καὶ σὺ ἐμοὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀποδοῦναι, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ παῦσαι πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι ἑκάστοτε οἱ σκώπτοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐάσας ὅλην καὶ ὑγιῆ εἰπὲ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή. τὰ δέ γε παραδείγματα παρʼ ἐμοῦ εἴληφας. [¶114] Men. Well, in my view, Socrates, virtue is, in the poet’s words, “to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them”; and that, I say, is virtue—to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι· καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετήν, ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι πορίζεσθαι. [¶115] Soc. Do you say that he who desires the honorable is desirous of the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὸν τῶν καλῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι; [¶116] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. μάλιστά γε. [¶117] Soc. Implying that there are some who desire the evil, and others the good? Do not all men, in your opinion, my dear sir, desire the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἳ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἑτέρων δὲ οἳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; οὐ πάντες, ὤριστε, δοκοῦσί σοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν; [¶118] Men. I think not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε. [¶119] Soc. There are some who desire the evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλά τινες τῶν κακῶν; [¶120] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶121] Soc. Thinking the evil to be good, do you mean, or actually recognizing it to be evil, and desiring it nevertheless? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, λέγεις, ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν αὐτῶν; [¶122] Men. Both, I believe. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀμφότερα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν. [¶123] Soc. Do you really believe, Meno, that a man knows the evil to be evil, and still desires it? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ δοκεῖ τίς σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν; [¶124] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. μάλιστα. [¶125] Soc. What do you mean by “desires”? Desires the possession of it? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί ἐπιθυμεῖν λέγεις; ἦ γενέσθαι αὐτῷ; [¶126] Men. Yes; what else could it be? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. γενέσθαι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; [¶127] Soc. And does he think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he know that it harms him who has it? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γένηται, ἢ γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι βλάπτει ᾧ ἂν παρῇ; [¶128] Men. There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἰσὶ μὲν οἳ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἳ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι βλάπτει. [¶129] Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι γιγνώσκειν τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν οἱ ἡγούμενοι τὰ κακὰ ὠφελεῖν; [¶130] Men. I do not think that at all. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε. [¶131] Soc. Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν οὐ τῶν κακῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά· ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ἢ οὔ; [¶132] Men. It would seem to be so in their case. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύουσιν οὗτοί γε. [¶133] Soc. Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it? Men. They needs must. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; οἱ τῶν κακῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ὡς φῂς σύ, ἡγούμενοι δὲ τὰ κακὰ βλάπτειν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἂν γίγνηται, γιγνώσκουσιν δήπου ὅτι βλαβήσονται ὑπʼ αὐτῶν; ΜΕΝ. [¶134] 78. Soc. But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable in proportion to the harm they suffer? > Greek: 78. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς βλαπτομένους οὗτοι οὐκ οἴονται ἀθλίους εἶναι καθʼ ὅσον βλάπτονται; [¶135] Men. That too must be. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη. [¶136] Soc. And are not the miserable ill-starred? > Greek: ΣΩ. τοὺς δὲ ἀθλίους οὐ κακοδαίμονας; [¶137] Men. I think so. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε. [¶138] Soc. Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι; [¶139] Men. I do not suppose there is, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶140] Soc. No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα βούλεται, ὦ Μένων, τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς, εἴπερ μὴ βούλεται τοιοῦτος εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἄθλιον εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν τε τῶν κακῶν καὶ κτᾶσθαι; [¶141] Men. It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐδεὶς βούλεσθαι τὰ κακά. [¶142] Soc. Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ καὶ δύνασθαι; [¶143] Men. Yes, I was. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. εἶπον γάρ. [¶144] Soc. One part of the statement—the desire—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων; [¶145] Men. Apparently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶146] Soc. But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in the ability. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι εἴπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων ἄλλος ἄλλου, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἂν εἴη ἀμείνων. [¶147] Men. Certainly. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. [¶148] Soc. Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to procure goods. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀρετή, δύναμις τοῦ πορίζεσθαι τἀγαθά. [¶149] Men. I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς σὺ νῦν ὑπολαμβάνεις. [¶150] Soc. Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εὖ λέγοις. τἀγαθὰ φῂς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι πορίζεσθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι; [¶151] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶152] Soc. And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγίειάν τε καὶ πλοῦτον; [¶153] Men. Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honors and offices. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς. [¶154] Soc. Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods? > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ ἄλλʼ ἄττα λέγεις τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶155] Men. No, I refer only to everything of that sort. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα. [¶156] Soc. Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King. Tell me, do you add to such procuring, Meno, that it is to be done justly and piously, or is this indifferent to you, but even though a man procures these things unjustly, do you call them virtue all the same? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· χρυσίον δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀργύριον πορίζεσθαι ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὥς φησι Μένων ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως πατρικὸς ξένος. πότερον προστιθεῖς τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ, ὦ Μένων, τὸ δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως, ἢ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀδίκως τις αὐτὰ πορίζηται, ὁμοίως σὺ αὐτὰ ἀρετὴν καλεῖς; [¶157] Men. Surely not, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶158] Soc. Rather, vice. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακίαν. [¶159] Men. Yes, of course. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάντως δήπου. [¶160] Soc. Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things; otherwise it will not be virtue, though it provides one with goods. > Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ δικαιοσύνην ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ ὁσιότητα προσεῖναι, ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον ἀρετῆς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετή, καίπερ ἐκπορίζουσα τἀγαθά. [¶161] Men. Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων ἀρετὴ γένοιτʼ ἄν; [¶162] Soc. And not to procure gold and silver, when it would be unjust—what we call the want of such things—is virtue, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐκπορίζειν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον, ὅταν μὴ δίκαιον ᾖ, μήτε αὑτῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ, οὐκ ἀρετὴ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία; [¶163] Men. Apparently. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται. [¶164] Soc. So the procuring of this sort of goods will be no more virtue than the want of them; but it seems that whatever comes accompanied by justice will be virtue, and whatever comes without any such quality, vice. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ πόρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ ἀπορία ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀλλά, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ μὲν ἂν μετὰ δικαιοσύνης γίγνηται, ἀρετὴ ἔσται, ὃ δʼ ἂν ἄνευ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, κακία. [¶165] 79. Men. I agree that it must be as you say. > Greek: 79. ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὡς λέγεις. [¶166] Soc. And were we saying a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue—justice and temperance and the rest of them? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτων ἕκαστον ὀλίγον πρότερον μόριον ἀρετῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶167] Men. Yes. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί. [¶168] Soc. And here you are, Meno, making fun of me? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὦ Μένων, παίζεις πρός με; [¶169] Men. How so, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶170] Soc. Because after my begging you not to break up virtue into small change, and giving you a pattern on which you should answer, you have ignored all this, and now tell me that virtue is the ability to procure good things with justice; and this, you tell me, is a part of virtue? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι ἄρτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ δόντος παραδείγματα καθʼ ἃ δέοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλησας, λέγεις δέ μοι ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τἀγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· τοῦτο δὲ φῂς μόριον ἀρετῆς εἶναι; [¶171] Men. I do. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔγωγε. [¶172] Soc. Then it follows from your own admission that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue is itself virtue; for you say that justice is a part of virtue, and so is each of such qualities. You ask the meaning of my remark. It is that after my requesting you to speak of virtue as a whole, you say not a word as to what it is in itself, but tell me that every action is virtue provided that it is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me what virtue is in the whole, and I must understand it forthwith—when you are really splitting it up into fragments! I think therefore that you must face the same question all over again, my dear Meno—What is virtue?—if we are to be told that every action accompanied by a part of virtue is virtue; for that is the meaning of the statement that every action accompanied by justice is virtue. Or do you not agree that you have to meet the same question afresh? Do you suppose that anyone can know a part of virtue when he does not know virtue itself? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν σὺ ὁμολογεῖς, τὸ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττειν ὅτι ἂν πράττῃ, τοῦτο ἀρετὴν εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγω; ὅτι ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτὴν μὲν πολλοῦ δεῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστίν, πᾶσαν δὲ φῂς πρᾶξιν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πράττηται, ὥσπερ εἰρηκὼς ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἤδη γνωσομένου ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐὰν σὺ κατακερματίζῃς αὐτὴν κατὰ μόρια. δεῖται οὖν σοι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τί ἐστιν ἀρετή, εἰ μετὰ μορίου ἀρετῆς πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν λέγειν, ὅταν λέγῃ τις, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πρᾶξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πάλιν δεῖσθαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐρωτήσεως, ἀλλʼ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα; [¶173] Men. No, I do not. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. [¶174] Soc. And I daresay you remember, when I answered you a while ago about figure, how we rejected the sort of answer that attempts to proceed in terms which are still under inquiry and has not yet been admitted. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μέμνησαι, ὅτʼ ἐγώ σοι ἄρτι ἀπεκρινάμην περὶ τοῦ σχήματος, ἀπεβάλλομέν που τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω ὡμολογημένων ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. [¶175] Men. Yes, and we were right in rejecting it, Socrates. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἀπεβάλλομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶176] Soc. Well then, my good sir, you must not in your turn suppose that while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under inquiry you will explain it to anyone by replying in terms of its parts, or by any other statement on the same lines: you will only have to face the same question over again—What is this virtue, of which you are speaking all the time? Or do you see no force in what I say? > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, μηδὲ σὺ ἔτι ζητουμένης ἀρετῆς ὅλης ὅτι ἐστὶν οἴου διὰ τῶν ταύτης μορίων ἀποκρινόμενος δηλώσειν αὐτὴν ὁτῳοῦν, ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ λέγων, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς δεήσεσθαι ἐρωτήσεως, τίνος ὄντος ἀρετῆς λέγεις ἃ λέγεις· ἢ οὐδέν σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; [¶177] Men. I think what you say is right. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν. [¶178] Soc. Then answer me again from the beginning: what do both you and your associate say that virtue is? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπόκριναι τοίνυν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρός σου; [¶179] Men. Socrates, I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also: and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity. > Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν· [¶180] 80. And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people—and very good speeches they were, so I thought—but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. You are well advised, I consider, in not voyaging or taking a trip away from home; for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city you would very likely be taken up for a wizard. Soc. You are a rogue, Meno, and had almost deceived me. > Greek: 80. καὶ νῦν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάττεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπᾴδεις, ὥστε μεστὸν ἀπορίας γεγονέναι. καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἆλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τὸν ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντα καὶ ἁπτόμενον ναρκᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ σὺ δοκεῖς μοι νῦν ἐμὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πεποιηκέναι, [ναρκᾶν]· ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαί σοι. καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν. καί μοι δοκεῖς εὖ βουλεύεσθαι οὐκ ἐκπλέων ἐνθένδε οὐδʼ ἀποδημῶν· εἰ γὰρ ξένος ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει τοιαῦτα ποιοῖς, τάχʼ ἂν ὡς γόης ἀπαχθείης. ΣΩ. πανοῦργος εἶ, ὦ Μένων, καὶ ὀλίγου ἐξηπάτησάς με. [¶181] Men. How is that, Socrates? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶182] Soc. I perceive your aim in thus comparing me. > Greek: ΣΩ. γιγνώσκω οὗ ἕνεκά με ᾔκασας. [¶183] Men. What was it? > Greek: ΜΕΝ. τίνος δὴ οἴει; [¶184] Soc. That I might compare you in return. One thing I know about all handsome people is this—they delight in being compared to something. They do well over it, since fine features, I suppose, must have fine similes. But I am not for playing your game. As for me, if the torpedo is torpid itself while causing others to be torpid, I am like it, but not otherwise. For it is not from any sureness in myself that I cause others to doubt: it is from being in more doubt than anyone else that I cause doubt in others. So now, for my part, I have no idea what virtue is, whilst you, though perhaps you may have known before you came in touch with me, are now as good as ignorant of it also. But none the less I am willing to join you in examining it and inquiring into its nature. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἵνα σε ἀντεικάσω. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο οἶδα περὶ πάντων τῶν καλῶν, ὅτι χαίρουσιν εἰκαζόμενοι—λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς· καλαὶ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες—ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀντεικάσομαί σε. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἡ νάρκη αὐτὴ ναρκῶσα οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖ ναρκᾶν, ἔοικα αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. οὐ γὰρ εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν. καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀρετῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδα, σὺ μέντοι ἴσως πρότερον μὲν ᾔδησθα πρὶν ἐμοῦ ἅψασθαι, νῦν μέντοι ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι. ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ σκέψασθαι καὶ συζητῆσαι ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν.