Men. Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα;
Soc. I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire.
ΣΩ. μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ—οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως—οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει.
81. Men. Now does it seem to you to be a good argument, Socrates?
81. ΜΕΝ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;
Soc. It does not.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
Men. Can you explain how not?
ΜΕΝ. ἔχεις λέγειν ὅπῃ;
Soc. I can; for I have heard from wise men and women who told of things divine that—Men. What was it they said?
ΣΩ. ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα— ΜΕΝ. τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;
Soc. Something true, as I thought, and admirable.
ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.
Men. What was it? And who were the speakers?
ΜΕΝ. τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;
Soc. They were certain priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry; and Pindar also and many another poet of heavenly gifts. As to their words, they are these: mark now, if you judge them to be true. They say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. Consequently one ought to live all one’s life in the utmost holiness.“For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong, the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them arise” “glorious kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time are they called holy heroes amongst mankind.” Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and other things. For as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing—an act which men call learning—discover everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search; since, it would seem, research and learning are wholly recollection. So we must not hearken to that captious argument: it would make us idle, and is pleasing only to the indolent ear, whereas the other makes us energetic and inquiring. Putting my trust in its truth, I am ready to inquire with you into the nature of virtue.
ΣΩ. οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις τʼ εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτί ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν—ὃ δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δʼ οὐδέποτε· δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον· οἷσιν γὰρ ἂν—Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεοςδέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν,ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶκαὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοιἄνδρες αὔξοντʼ· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται.ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τʼ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα—ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ· οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς μαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ ἐργατικούς τε καὶ ζητητικοὺς ποιεῖ· ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν.
Men. Yes, Socrates, but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is recollection? Can you instruct me that this is so?
ΜΕΝ. ναί, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; ἔχεις με τοῦτο διδάξαι ὡς οὕτως ἔχει;
Soc. I remarked just now, Meno, that you are a rogue and so here you are asking if I can instruct you, when I say there is no teaching but only recollection: you hope that I may be caught contradicting myself forthwith.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἄρτι εἶπον, ὦ Μένων, ὅτι πανοῦργος εἶ, καὶ νῦν ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ἔχω σε διδάξαι, ὃς οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἀνάμνησιν, ἵνα δὴ εὐθὺς φαίνωμαι αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγων.
82. Men. I assure you, Socrates; that was not my intention I only spoke from habit. But if you can somehow prove to me that it is as you say, pray do so.
82. ΜΕΝ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ἀλλʼ εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι.
Soc. It is no easy matter, but still I am willing to try my best for your sake. Just call one of your own troop of attendants there, whichever one you please, that he may serve for my demonstration.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι μὲν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὅμως δὲ ἐθέλω προθυμηθῆναι σοῦ ἕνεκα. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὅντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.
Men. Certainly. You, I say, come here.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε. δεῦρο πρόσελθε.
Soc. He is a Greek, I suppose, and speaks Greek?
ΣΩ. Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι καὶ ἑλληνίζει;
Men. Oh yes, to be sure—born in the house.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα, οἰκογενής γε.
Soc. Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as learning from me.
ΣΩ. πρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν ὁπότερʼ ἄν σοι φαίνηται, ἢ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἢ μανθάνων παρʼ ἐμοῦ.
Men. I will.
ΜΕΝ. ἀλλὰ προσέξω.
Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a square figure is like this?Boy. I do.
ΣΩ. εἰπὲ δή μοι, ὦ παῖ, γιγνώσκεις τετράγωνον χωρίον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν; ΠΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
Soc. Now, a square figure has these lines, four in number, all equal?Boy. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν τετράγωνον χωρίον ἴσας ἔχον τὰς γραμμὰς ταύτας πάσας, τέτταρας οὔσας; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And these, drawn through the middle, are equal too, are they not?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ ταυτασὶ τὰς διὰ μέσου ἐστὶν ἴσας ἔχον; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. And a figure of this sort may be larger or smaller?Boy. To be sure.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴη ἂν τοιοῦτον χωρίον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Now if this side were two feet and that also two, how many feet would the whole be? Or let me put it thus: if one way it were two feet, and only one foot the other, of course the space would be two feet taken once?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν εἴη αὕτη ἡ πλευρὰ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ αὕτη δυοῖν, πόσων ἂν εἴη ποδῶν τὸ ὅλον; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· εἰ ἦν ταύτῃ δυοῖν ποδοῖν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἑνὸς ποδὸς μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἅπαξ ἂν ἦν δυοῖν ποδοῖν τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. But as it is two feet also on that side, it must be twice two feet?Boy. It is.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ δυοῖν ποδοῖν καὶ ταύτῃ, ἄλλο τι ἢ δὶς δυοῖν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. γίγνεται.
Soc. Then the space is twice two feet?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. δυοῖν ἄρα δὶς γίγνεται ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Well, how many are twice two feet? Count and tell me.Boy. Four, Socrates.
ΣΩ. πόσοι οὖν εἰσιν οἱ δύο δὶς πόδες; λογισάμενος εἰπέ. ΠΑΙ. τέτταρες, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. And might there not be another figure twice the size of this, but of the same sort, with all its sides equal like this one?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν γένοιτʼ ἂν τούτου τοῦ χωρίου ἕτερον διπλάσιον, τοιοῦτον δέ, ἴσας ἔχον πάσας τὰς γραμμὰς ὥσπερ τοῦτο; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Then how many feet will it be?Boy. Eight.
ΣΩ. πόσων οὖν ἔσται ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώ.
Soc. Come now, try and tell me how long will each side of that figure be. This one is two feet long: what will be the side of the other, which is double in size?Boy. Clearly, Socrates, double.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πειρῶ μοι εἰπεῖν πηλίκη τις ἔσται ἐκείνου ἡ γραμμὴ ἑκάστη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε δυοῖν ποδοῖν· τί δὲ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ διπλασίου; ΠΑΙ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι διπλασία.
Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but merely asking him each time? And now he supposes that he knows about the line required to make a figure of eight square feet; or do you not think he does?
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μένων, ὡς ἐγὼ τοῦτον οὐδὲν διδάσκω, ἀλλʼ ἐρωτῶ πάντα; καὶ νῦν οὗτος οἴεται εἰδέναι ὁποία ἐστὶν ἀφʼ ἧς τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γενήσεται· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;
Soc. Well, does he know?
ΣΩ. οἶδεν οὖν;
Men. Certainly not.
ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. He just supposes it, from the double size required?
ΣΩ. οἴεται δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας;
Soc. Now watch his progress in recollecting, by the proper use of memory. Tell me, boy, do you say we get the double space from the double line?
ΣΩ. θεῶ δὴ αὐτὸν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον ἐφεξῆς, ὡς δεῖ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι.σὺ δέ μοι λέγε· ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας γραμμῆς φῂς τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον γίγνεσθαι;
83. The space I speak of is not long one way and short the other, but must be equal each way like this one, while being double its size—eight square feet. Now see if you still think we get this from a double length of line.Boy. I do.Soc. Well, this line is doubled, if we add here another of the same length?Boy. Certainly.
83. τοιόνδε λέγω, μὴ ταύτῃ μὲν μακρόν, τῇ δὲ βραχύ, ἀλλὰ ἴσον πανταχῇ ἔστω ὥσπερ τουτί, διπλάσιον δὲ τούτου, ὀκτώπουν· ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ ἔτι σοι ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας δοκεῖ ἔσεσθαι. ΠΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διπλασία αὕτη ταύτης γίγνεται, ἂν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην προσθῶμεν ἐνθένδε; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And you say we shall get our eight-foot space from four lines of this length?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ ταύτης δή, φῄς, ἔσται τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον, ἂν τέτταρες τοσαῦται γένωνται; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Then let us describe the square, drawing four equal lines of that length. This will be what you say is the eight-foot figure, will it not?Boy. Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἀναγραψώμεθα δὴ ἀπʼ αὐτῆς ἴσας τέτταρας. ἄλλο τι ἢ τουτὶ ἂν εἴη ὃ φῂς τὸ ὀκτώπουν εἶναι; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And here, contained in it, have we not four squares, each of which is equal to this space of four feet?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ταυτὶ τέτταρα, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴσον τούτῳ ἐστὶν τῷ τετράποδι; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Then how large is the whole? Four times that space, is it not?Boy. It must be.
ΣΩ. πόσον οὖν γίγνεται; οὐ τετράκις τοσοῦτον; ΠΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
Soc. And is four times equal to double?Boy. No, to be sure.
ΣΩ. διπλάσιον οὖν ἐστιν τὸ τετράκις τοσοῦτον; ΠΑΙ. οὐ μὰ Δία.
Soc. But how much is it?Boy. Fourfold.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ ποσαπλάσιον; ΠΑΙ. τετραπλάσιον.
Soc. Thus, from the double-sized line, boy, we get a space, not of double, but of fourfold size.Boy. That is true.
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τῆς διπλασίας ἄρα, ὦ παῖ, οὐ διπλάσιον ἀλλὰ τετραπλάσιον γίγνεται χωρίον. ΠΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. And if it is four times four it is sixteen, is it not?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. τεττάρων γὰρ τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα. οὐχί; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. What line will give us a space of eight feet? This one gives us a fourfold space, does it not?Boy. It does.
ΣΩ. ὀκτώπουν δʼ ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; οὐχὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης τετραπλάσιον; ΠΑΙ. φημί.
Soc. And a space of four feet is made from this line of half the length?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. τετράπουν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμισέας ταυτησὶ τουτί; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Very well; and is not a space of eight feet double the size of this one, and half the size of this other?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὸ δὲ ὀκτώπουν οὐ τοῦδε μὲν διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ ἥμισυ; ΠΑΙ. ⟨ναί.⟩ ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν μείζονος ἔσται ἢ τοσαύτης γραμμῆς, ἀπὸ ἐλάττονος δὲ ἢ τοσησδί; ἢ οὔ; ΠΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω.
Soc. Will it not be made from a line longer than the one of these, and shorter than the other?Boy. I think so.
ΣΩ. καλῶς· τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. καί μοι λέγε· οὐχ ἥδε μὲν δυοῖν ποδοῖν ἦν, ἡ δὲ τεττάρων; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Excellent: always answer just what you think. Now tell me, did we not draw this line two feet, and that four?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμὴν μείζω μὲν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς δίποδος, ἐλάττω δὲ τῆς τετράποδος. ΠΑΙ. δεῖ.
Soc. Then the line on the side of the eight-foot figure should be more than this of two feet, and less than the other of four?Boy. It should.
ΣΩ. πειρῶ δὴ λέγειν πηλίκην τινὰ φῂς αὐτὴν εἶναι. ΠΑΙ. τρίποδα.
Soc. Try and tell me how much you would say it is.Boy. Three feet.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄνπερ τρίπους ᾖ, τὸ ἥμισυ ταύτης προσληψόμεθα καὶ ἔσται τρίπους; δύο μὲν γὰρ οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ ἐνθένδε ὡσαύτως δύο μὲν οἵδε, ὁ δὲ εἷς· καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὃ φῄς. ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Then if it is to be three feet, we shall add on a half to this one, and so make it three feet? For here we have two, and here one more, and so again on that side there are two, and another one; and that makes the figure of which you speak.Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἂν ᾖ τῇδε τριῶν καὶ τῇδε τριῶν, τὸ ὅλον χωρίον τριῶν τρὶς ποδῶν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. φαίνεται.
Soc. Now if it be three this way and three that way, the whole space will be thrice three feet, will it not?Boy. So it seems.
ΣΩ. τρεῖς δὲ τρὶς πόσοι εἰσὶ πόδες; ΠΑΙ. ἐννέα.
Soc. And thrice three feet are how many?Boy. Nine.
ΣΩ. ἔδει δὲ τὸ διπλάσιον πόσων εἶναι ποδῶν; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώ.
Soc. And how many feet was that double one to be?Boy. Eight.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρʼ ἀπὸ τῆς τρίποδός πω τὸ ὀκτώπουν χωρίον γίγνεται. ΠΑΙ. οὐ δῆτα.
Soc. So we fail to get our eight-foot figure from this three-foot line.Boy. Yes, indeed.Soc. But from what line shall we get it? Try and tell us exactly;
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀπὸ ποίας; πειρῶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβῶς· καὶ εἰ μὴ βούλει ἀριθμεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖξον ἀπὸ ποίας.
84. and if you would rather not reckon it out, just show what line it is.Boy. Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know.Soc. There now, Meno, do you observe who progress he has already made in his recollection? At first he did not know what is the line that forms the figure of eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think he knows.
84. ΠΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ οἶδα.ΣΩ. ἐννοεῖς αὖ, ὦ Μένων, οὗ ἐστιν ἤδη βαδίζων ὅδε τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι; ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ᾔδει μὲν οὔ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὀκτώποδος χωρίου γραμμή, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ νῦν πω οἶδεν, ἀλλʼ οὖν ᾤετό γʼ αὐτὴν τότε εἰδέναι, καὶ θαρραλέως ἀπεκρίνετο ὡς εἰδώς, καὶ οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἀπορεῖν· νῦν δὲ ἡγεῖται ἀπορεῖν ἤδη, καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδεν, οὐδʼ οἴεται εἰδέναι.
Men. That is true.
ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ οὐκ ᾔδει;
Men. I think that too is so.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ.
Soc. Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo’s shock, have we done him any harm?
ΣΩ. ἀπορεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ποιήσαντες καὶ ναρκᾶν ὥσπερ ἡ νάρκη, μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν;
Men. I think not.
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times, that the double space must have a line of double the length for its side.
ΣΩ. προὔργου γοῦν τι πεποιήκαμεν, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει· νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ζητήσειεν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς, τότε δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἂν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις ᾤετʼ ἂν εὖ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ διπλασίου χωρίου, ὡς δεῖ διπλασίαν τὴν γραμμὴν ἔχειν μήκει.
Men. It seems so.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know?
ΣΩ. οἴει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι;
Men. I think not, Socrates.
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then the torpedo’s shock was of advantage to him?
ΣΩ. ὤνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας;
Men. I think so.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι.
Soc. Now you should note how, as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions and do not teach him; and be on the watch to see if at any point you find me teaching him or expounding to him, instead of questioning him on his opinions. Tell me, boy: here we have a square of four feet, have we not? You understand?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετʼ ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα.λέγε γάρ μοι σύ· οὐ τὸ μὲν τετράπουν τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστι χωρίον; μανθάνεις; ΠΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
Soc. And here we add another square equal to it?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἕτερον δὲ αὐτῷ προσθεῖμεν ἂν τουτὶ ἴσον; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. And here a third, equal to either of them?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ τρίτον τόδε ἴσον ἑκατέρῳ τούτων; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Now shall we fill up this vacant space in the corner?Boy. By all means.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν προσαναπληρωσαίμεθʼ ἂν τὸ ἐν τῇ γωνίᾳ τόδε; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. So here we must have four equal spaces? BOY. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν γένοιτʼ ἂν τέτταρα ἴσα χωρία τάδε; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. Well now, how many times larger is this whole space than this other?Boy. Four times.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; τὸ ὅλον τόδε ποσαπλάσιον τοῦδε γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. τετραπλάσιον.
Soc. But it was to have been only twice, you remember?Boy. To be sure.
ΣΩ. ἔδει δέ γε διπλάσιον ἡμῖν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ΠΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And does this line, drawn from corner to corner, cut in two each of these spaces?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐστιν αὕτη γραμμὴ ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν [τινὰ] τέμνουσα δίχα ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν χωρίων;
85. Boy. Yes.Soc. And have we here four equal lines containing this space?Boy. We have.
85. ΠΑΙ. ναί.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τέτταρες αὗται γίγνονται γραμμαὶ ἴσαι, περιέχουσαι τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. γίγνονται γάρ.
Soc. Now consider how large this space is.Boy. I do not understand.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δή· πηλίκον τί ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον; ΠΑΙ. οὐ μανθάνω.
Soc. Has not each of the inside lines cut off half of each of these four spaces?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐχὶ τεττάρων ὄντων τούτων ἥμισυ ἑκάστου ἑκάστη ἡ γραμμὴ ἀποτέτμηκεν ἐντός; ἢ οὔ; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. And how many spaces of that size are there in this part?Boy. Four.
ΣΩ. πόσα οὖν τηλικαῦτα ἐν τούτῳ ἔνεστιν; ΠΑΙ. τέτταρα.
Soc. And how many in this?Boy. Two.
ΣΩ. πόσα δὲ ἐν τῷδε; ΠΑΙ. δύο.
Soc. And four is how many times two?Boy. Twice.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν τί ἐστιν; ΠΑΙ. διπλάσια.
Soc. And how many feet is this space?Boy. Eight feet.
ΣΩ. τόδε οὖν ποσάπουν γίγνεται; ΠΑΙ. ὀκτώπουν.
Soc. From what line do we get this figure?Boy. From this.
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς; ΠΑΙ. ἀπὸ ταύτης.
Soc. From the line drawn corner-wise across the (our-foot figure?Boy. Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ γωνίας εἰς γωνίαν τεινούσης τοῦ τετράποδος; ΠΑΙ. ναί.
Soc. The professors call it the diagonal: so if the diagonal is its name, then according to you, Meno’s boy, the double space is the square of the diagonal.Boy. Yes, certainly it is, Socrates.
ΣΩ. καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί· ὥστʼ εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον. ΠΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. What do you think, Meno? Was there any opinion that he did not give as an answer of his own thought?
ΣΩ. τί σοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων; ἔστιν ἥντινα δόξαν οὐχ αὑτοῦ οὗτος ἀπεκρίνατο;
Men. No, they were all his own.
ΜΕΝ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ἑαυτοῦ.
Soc. But you see, he did not know, as we were saying a while since.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ᾔδει γε, ὡς ἔφαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον.
Men. That is true.
ΜΕΝ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Soc. Yet he had in him these opinions, had he not?
ΣΩ. ἐνῆσαν δέ γε αὐτῷ αὗται αἱ δόξαι· ἢ οὔ;
Soc. So that he who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions on such matters, about which he knows nothing?
ΣΩ. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε;
Men. Apparently.
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
Soc. And at this moment those opinions have just been stirred up in him, like a dream; but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in a variety of forms, you know he will have in the end as exact an understanding of them as anyone.
ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.
Men. So it seems.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Without anyone having taught him, and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλʼ ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;
Soc. And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection?
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί ἐστιν;
Men. Certainly.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἣν νῦν οὗτος ἔχει, ἤτοι ἔλαβέν ποτε ἢ ἀεὶ εἶχεν;
Soc. Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων· εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν; οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων. ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.
Men. Well, I know that no one has ever taught him.
ΜΕΝ. ἀλλʼ οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐδίδαξεν.
Soc. And has he these opinions, or has he not?
ΣΩ. ἔχει δὲ ταύτας τὰς δόξας, ἢ οὐχί;
Men. He must have them, Socrates, evidently.
ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται.
Soc. And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once that he had them and learnt them during some other time?
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;
86. Men. Apparently.
86. ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
Soc. And this must have been the time when he was not a human being?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὗτός γέ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ὅτʼ οὐκ ἦν ἄνθρωπος;
Soc. So if in both of these periods—when he was and was not a human being—he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge, his soul must have had this cognizance throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ὅν τʼ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
Men. Evidently.
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.
Soc. And if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember—you must endeavor to search out and recollect?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος—ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι;
Men. What you say commends itself to me, Socrates, I know not how.
ΜΕΝ. εὖ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως.
Soc. And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know, nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων. καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην· ὅτι δʼ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.
Men. There also I consider that you speak aright, Socrates.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο μέν γε δοκεῖς μοι εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Then since we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know, do you agree to our attempting a joint inquiry into the nature of virtue?
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀρετή;
Men. By all means. But still, Socrates, for my part I would like best of all to examine that question I asked at first, and hear your view as to whether in pursuing it we are to regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature to mankind, or as arriving to them in some other way which I should be glad to know.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.
Soc. Had I control over you, Meno, as over myself, we should not have begun considering whether virtue can or cannot be taught until we had first inquired into the main question of what it is. But as you do not so much as attempt to control yourself—you are so fond of your liberty— and both attempt and hold control over me, I will yield to your request—what else am I to do? So it seems we are to consider what sort of thing it is of which we do not yet know what it is! Well, the least you can do is to relax just a little of your authority, and allow the question—whether virtue comes by teaching or some other way—to be examined by means of hypothesis.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδʼ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι—τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν; —ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν. εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν.
Soc. I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them; for example, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle: they reply—“I cannot yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows: If this area is such that when you apply it to the given line of the circle you find it falls short by a space similar to that which you have just applied, then I take it you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other.
ΣΩ. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι, εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε·
87. Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not.” In the same way with regard to our question about virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be, we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not? In the first place, if it is something dissimilar or similar to knowledge, is it taught or not—or, as we were saying just now, remembered? Let us have no disputing about the choice of a name: is it taught? Or is not this fact plain to everyone—that the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge?Men. I agree to that.
87. εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν. ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή. οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθʼ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες· εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν; πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα—ἀλλʼ ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge, clearly it must be taught?
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ ἀρετή, δῆλον ὅτι διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη.
Men. Certainly.
ΜΕΝ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. So you see we have made short work of this question—if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable, and if to another, it is not.
ΣΩ. τούτου μὲν ἄρα ταχὺ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, ὅτι τοιοῦδε μὲν ὄντος διδακτόν, τοιοῦδε δʼ οὔ.
Men. To be sure.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. The next question, it would seem, that we have to consider is whether virtue is knowledge, or of another kind than knowledge.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
Men. I should say that is the next thing we have to consider.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἶναι.
Soc. Well now, surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not, and our hypothesis stands, that it is good?
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις μένει ἡμῖν, ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι;
Men. Certainly we do.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. Then if there is some good apart and separable from knowledge, it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that is not embraced by knowledge, our suspicion that virtue is a kind of knowledge would be well founded.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχʼ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τινʼ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιΜΕΝ.
Men. Quite so.
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Soc. Now it is by virtue that we are good?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀρετῇ γʼ ἐσμὲν ἀγαθοί;
Soc. And if good, profitable; for all good things are profitable, are they not?
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ ἀγαθοί, ὠφέλιμοι· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;
Soc. So virtue is profitable?
ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὴ ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν;
Men. That must follow from what has been admitted.
ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων.
Soc. Then let us see, in particular instances, what sort of things they are that profit us. Health, let us say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth—these and their like we call profitable, do we not?
ΣΩ. σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή· ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. οὐχί;
88. Soc. But these same things, we admit, actually harm us at times; or do you dispute that statement?
88. ΣΩ. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν· ἢ σὺ ἄλλως φῂς ἢ οὕτως;
Men. No, I agree.
ΜΕΝ. οὐκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
Soc. Consider now, what is the guiding condition in each case that makes them at one time profitable, and at another harmful. Are they not profitable when the use of them is right, and harmful when it is not?
ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει; ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;
Men. To be sure.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Then let us consider next the goods of the soul: by these you understand temperance, justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity, and so forth?
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
Soc. Now tell me; such of these as you think are not knowledge, but different from knowledge—do they not sometimes harm us, and sometimes profit us? For example, courage, if it is courage apart from prudence, and only a sort of boldness: when a man is bold without sense, he is harmed; but when he has sense at the same time, he is profited, is he not?
ΣΩ. σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλʼ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ; οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλʼ οἷον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
Soc. And the same holds of temperance and intelligence: things learnt and coordinated with the aid of sense are profitable, but without sense they are harmful?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνη ὡσαύτως καὶ εὐμαθία· μετὰ μὲν νοῦ καὶ μανθανόμενα καὶ καταρτυόμενα ὠφέλιμα, ἄνευ δὲ νοῦ βλαβερά;
Men. Most certainly.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ σφόδρα.
Soc. And in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δʼ εἰς τοὐναντίον;
Men. So it seems.
ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν.
Soc. Then if virtue is something that is in the soul, and must needs be profitable, it ought to be wisdom, seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable nor harmful, but are made either one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly; and hence, by this argument, virtue being profitable must be a sort of wisdom.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τινʼ εἶναι.
Men. I agree.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. Then as to the other things, wealth and the like, that we mentioned just now as being sometimes good and sometimes harmful—are not these also made profitable or harmful by the soul according as she uses and guides them rightly or wrongly: just as, in the case of the soul generally, we found that the guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά, οὕτως αὖ καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;
Men. Certainly.
ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. And the wise soul guides rightly, and the foolish erroneously?
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡ ἔμφρων ἡγεῖται, ἡμαρτημένως δʼ ἡ ἄφρων;
Men. That is so.
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
Soc. Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι·
89. Men. Certainly.
89. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον· φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Hence we conclude that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
ΣΩ. φρόνησιν ἄρα φαμὲν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἤτοι σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι;
Men. It seems to me that your statement, Socrates, is excellent.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ λεγόμενα.
Soc. Then if this is so, good men cannot be good by nature.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί.
Men. I think not.
ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.
Soc. No, for then, I presume, we should have had this result: if good men were so by nature, we surely should have had men able to discern who of the young were good by nature, and on their pointing them out we should have taken them over and kept them safe in the citadel, having set our mark on them far rather than on our gold treasure, in order that none might have tampered with them, and that when they came to be of age, they might be useful to their country.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδʼ ἦν· εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι.
Men. Yes, most likely, Socrates.
ΜΕΝ. εἰκός γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. So since it is not by nature that the good become good, is it by education?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, ἆρα μαθήσει;
Men. We must now conclude, I think, that it is; and plainly, Socrates, on our hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, it must be taught.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.
Soc. Yes, I daresay; but what if we were not right in agreeing to that?
ΣΩ. ἴσως νὴ Δία· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;
Men. Well, it seemed to be a correct statement a moment ago.
ΜΕΝ. καὶ μὴν ἐδόκει γε ἄρτι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.
Soc. Yes, but not only a moment ago must it seem correct, but now also and hereafter, if it is to be at all sound.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.
Men. Why, what reason have you to make a difficulty about it, and feel a doubt as to virtue being knowledge?
ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή; πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς μὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ᾖ ἡ ἀρετή;
Soc. I will tell you, Meno. I do not withdraw as incorrect the statement that it is taught, if it is knowledge; but as to its being knowledge, consider if you think I have grounds for misgiving. For tell me now: if anything at all, not merely virtue, is teachable, must there not be teachers and learners of it?
ΣΩ. ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι· ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν. τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ· εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;
Men. I think so.
ΜΕΝ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Soc. Then also conversely, if a thing had neither teachers nor learners, we should be right in surmising that it could not be taught?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
Men. That is so: but do you think there are no teachers of virtue?
ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι;
Soc. I must say I have often inquired whether there were any, but for all my pains I cannot find one. And yet many have shared the search with me, and particularly those persons whom I regard as best qualified for the task. But look, Meno: here, at the very moment when he was wanted, we have Anytus sitting down beside us, to take his share in our quest.
ΣΩ. πολλάκις γοῦν ζητῶν εἴ τινες εἶεν αὐτῆς διδάσκαλοι, πάντα ποιῶν οὐ δύναμαι εὑρεῖν. καίτοι μετὰ πολλῶν γε ζητῶ, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν οἴωμαι ἐμπειροτάτους εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὦ Μένων, εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἄνυτος ὅδε παρεκαθέζετο, ᾧ μεταδῶμεν τῆς ζητήσεως.
90. And we may well ask his assistance; for our friend Anytus, in the first place, is the son of a wise and wealthy father, Anthemion, who became rich not by a fluke or a gift—like that man the other day, Ismenias the Theban, who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates —but as the product of his own skill and industry; and secondly, he has the name of being in general a well-conducted, mannerly person, not insolent towards his fellow-citizens or arrogant and annoying; and further, he gave his son a good upbringing and education, as the Athenian people think, for they choose him for the highest offices. This is the sort of man to whom one may look for help in the inquiry as to whether there are teachers of virtue or not, and who they may be. So please, Anytus, join with me and your family-friend Meno in our inquiry about this matter—who can be the teachers. Consider it thus: if we wanted Meno here to be a good doctor, to whom should we send him for instruction? Would it not be to the doctors?An. Certainly.Soc. And if we wanted him to become a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?An. Yes.
90. εἰκότως δʼ ἂν μεταδοῖμεν· Ἄνυτος γὰρ ὅδε πρῶτον μέν ἐστι πατρὸς πλουσίου τε καὶ σοφοῦ Ἀνθεμίωνος, ὃς ἐγένετο πλούσιος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲ δόντος τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ νῦν νεωστὶ εἰληφὼς τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα Ἰσμηνίας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὑτοῦ σοφίᾳ κτησάμενος καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐχ ὑπερήφανος δοκῶν εἶναι πολίτης οὐδὲ ὀγκώδης τε καὶ ἐπαχθής, ἀλλὰ κόσμιος καὶ εὐσταλὴς ἀνήρ· ἔπειτα τοῦτον εὖ ἔθρεψεν καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, ὡς δοκεῖ Ἀθηναίων τῷ πλήθει· αἱροῦνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. δίκαιον δὴ μετὰ τοιούτων ζητεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι διδασκάλους, εἴτʼ εἰσὶν εἴτε μή, καὶ οἵτινες. σὺ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἄνυτε, συζήτησον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σαυτοῦ ξένῳ Μένωνι τῷδε, περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τίνες ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι. ὧδε δὲ σκέψαι· εἰ βουλοίμεθα Μένωνα τόνδε ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι, παρὰ τίνας ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν διδασκάλους; ἆρʼ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς; ΑΝ. πάνυ γε.ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ σκυτοτόμον ἀγαθὸν βουλοίμεθα γενέσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐ παρὰ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους; ΑΝ. ναί.