---
title: "Meno · Μένων"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 3 of 3
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/
cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Meno · Μένων, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/"
---

# Meno · Μένων

*Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb*

Can virtue be taught? A slave boy discovers geometry, and learning turns out to be recollection.

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg024, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg024.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Pages 90–100

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-meno/3/#p-N

[¶0] Soc. And in the same way with every other trade?
An. Certainly.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως; ΑΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶1] Soc. Now let me ask you something more about these same instances. We should be right, we say, in sending him to the doctors if we wanted him to be a doctor. When we say this, do we mean that we should be wise in sending him to those who profess the art rather than those who do not, and to those who charge a fee for the particular thing they do, as avowed teachers of anyone who wishes to come and learn of them? If these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him?
An. Yes.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε δή μοι πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰπέ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, φαμέν, πέμποντες τόνδε καλῶς ἂν ἐπέμπομεν, βουλόμενοι ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι· ἆρʼ ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν, ὅτι παρὰ τούτους πέμποντες αὐτὸν σωφρονοῖμεν ἄν, τοὺς ἀντιποιουμένους τε τῆς τέχνης μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς μή, καὶ τοὺς μισθὸν πραττομένους ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῦ βουλομένου ἰέναι τε καὶ μανθάνειν; ἆρʼ οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα βλέψαντες καλῶς ἂν πέμποιμεν; ΑΝ. ναί.

[¶2] Soc. And the same would hold in the case of flute-playing, and so on with the rest? What folly, when we wanted to make someone a flute-player, to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee, and to bother with requests for instruction other people who neither set up to be teachers nor have a single pupil in that sort of study which we expect him, when sent, to pursue! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable?
An. Yes, on my word, I do, and stupid to boot.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα; πολλὴ ἄνοιά ἐστι βουλομένους αὐλητήν τινα ποιῆσαι παρὰ μὲν τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην καὶ μισθὸν πραττομένους μὴ ἐθέλειν πέμπειν, ἄλλοις δέ τισιν πράγματα παρέχειν, ζητοῦντα μανθάνειν παρὰ τούτων, οἳ μήτε προσποιοῦνται διδάσκαλοι εἶναι μήτʼ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μαθητὴς μηδεὶς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος ὃ ἡμεῖς ἀξιοῦμεν μανθάνειν παρʼ αὐτῶν ὃν ἂν πέμπωΜΕΝ. οὐ πολλή σοι δοκεῖ ἀλογία εἶναι; ΑΝ. ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔμοιγε, καὶ ἀμαθία γε πρός.

[¶3] Soc. Quite right. And now there is an opportunity of your joining me in a consultation on my friend Meno here.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις. νῦν τοίνυν ἔξεστί σε μετʼ ἐμοῦ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ξένου τουτουῒ Μένωνος.

[¶4] 91. He has been declaring to me ever so long, Anytus, that he desires to have that wisdom and virtue whereby men keep their house or their city in good order, and honor their parents, and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers as befits a good man. Now tell me, to whom ought we properly to send him for lessons in this virtue? Or is it clear enough, from our argument just now, that he should go to these men who profess to be teachers of virtue and advertise themselves as the common teachers of the Greeks, and are ready to instruct anyone who chooses in return for fees charged on a fixed scale?
An. To whom are you referring, Socrates?
Soc. Surely you know as well as anyone; they are the men whom people call sophists.
An. For heaven’s sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them.

> Greek: 91. οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρός με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιΜΕΝ. ἢ δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὑτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους; ΑΝ. καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς. ΑΝ. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες. μηδένα τῶν γʼ ἐμῶν μήτε οἰκείων μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστὸν μήτε ξένον, τοιαύτη μανία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντα λωβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε φανερά ἐστι λώβη τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.

[¶5] Soc. What is this, Anytus? Of all the people who set up to understand how to do us good, do you mean to single out these as conveying not merely no benefit, such as the rest can give, but actually corruption to anyone placed in their hands? And is it for doing this that they openly claim the payment of fees? For my part I cannot bring myself to believe you; for I know of one man, Protagoras, who amassed more money by his craft than Pheidias—so famous for the noble works he produced—or any ten other sculptors. And yet how surprising that menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes should not be able to go undetected thirty days if they should return the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them, and that such doings on their part would quickly starve them to death, while for more than forty years all Greece failed to notice that Protagoras was corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them! For I believe he died about seventy years old, forty of which he spent in the practice of his art;
Soc. and he retains undiminished to this day the high reputation he has enjoyed all that time—and not only Protagoras, but a multitude of others too: some who lived before him, and others still living.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἄνυτε; οὗτοι ἄρα μόνοι τῶν ἀντιποιουμένων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὐεργετεῖν τοσοῦτον τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσον οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὠφελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅτι ἄν τις αὐτοῖς παραδῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον διαφθείρουσιν; καὶ τούτων φανερῶς χρήματα ἀξιοῦσι πράττεσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι πιστεύσω· οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἕνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, ὃς οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα ἠργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν. καίτοι τέρας λέγεις εἰ οἱ μὲν τὰ ὑποδήματα ἐργαζόμενοι τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ἐξακούμενοι οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο λαθεῖν τριάκονθʼ ἡμέρας μοχθηρότερα ἀποδιδόντες ἢ παρέλαβον τὰ ἱμάτιά τε καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλʼ εἰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῖεν, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ λιμῷ ἀποθάνοιεν, Πρωταγόρας δὲ ἄρα ὅλην τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλάνθανεν διαφθείρων τοὺς συγγιγνομένους καὶ μοχθηροτέρους ἀποπέμπων ἢ παρελάμβανεν πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη— οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα— ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἔτι εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταυτηνὶ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται, καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες.

[¶6] 92. Now are we to take it, according to you, that they wittingly deceived and corrupted the youth, or that they were themselves unconscious of it? Are we to conclude those who are frequently termed the wisest of mankind to have been so demented as that?
An. Demented! Not they, Socrates: far rather the young men who pay them money, and still more the relations who let the young men have their way; and most of all the cities that allow them to enter, and do not expel them, whether such attempt be made by stranger or citizen.
Soc. Tell me, Anytus, has any of the sophists wronged you? What makes you so hard on them?
An. No, heaven knows I have never in my life had dealings with any of them, nor would I let any of my people have to do with them either.

> Greek: 92. πότερον δὴ οὖν φῶμεν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εἰδότας αὐτοὺς ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ λωβᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους, ἢ λεληθέναι καὶ ἑαυτούς; καὶ οὕτω μαίνεσθαι ἀξιώσομεν τούτους, οὓς ἔνιοί φασι σοφωτάτους ἀνθρώπων εἶναι; ΑΝ. πολλοῦ γε δέουσι μαίνεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις διδόντες ἀργύριον τῶν νέων, τούτων δʼ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες, οἱ προσήκοντες, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα πάντων αἱ πόλεις, ἐῶσαι αὐτοὺς εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἐξελαύνουσαι, εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπιχειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός.
ΣΩ. πότερον δέ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, ἠδίκηκέ τίς σε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ἢ τί οὕτως αὐτοῖς χαλεπὸς εἶ; ΑΝ. οὐδὲ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε συγγέγονα πώποτε αὐτῶν οὐδενί, οὐδʼ ἂν ἄλλον ἐάσαιμι τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδένα.

[¶7] Soc. Then you have absolutely no experience of those persons?
An. And trust I never may.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἄπειρος ἄρʼ εἶ παντάπασι τῶν ἀνδρῶν; ΑΝ. καὶ εἴην γε.

[¶8] Soc. How then, my good sir, can you tell whether a thing has any good or evil in it, if you are quite without experience of it?
An. Easily: the fact is, I know what these people are, whether I have experience of them or not.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἄν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, εἰδείης περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ εἴτε φλαῦρον, οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειρος εἴης; ΑΝ. ῥᾳδίως· τούτους γοῦν οἶδα οἵ εἰσιν, εἴτʼ οὖν ἄπειρος αὐτῶν εἰμι εἴτε μή.

[¶9] Soc. You are a wizard, perhaps, Anytus; for I really cannot see, from what you say yourself, how else you can know anything about them. But we are not inquiring now who the teachers are whose lessons would make Meno wicked; let us grant, if you will, that they are the sophists: I only ask you to tell us, and do Meno a service as a friend of your family by letting him know, to whom in all this great city he should apply in order to become eminent in the virtue which I described just now.
An. Why not tell him yourself?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μάντις εἶ ἴσως, ὦ Ἄνυτε· ἐπεὶ ὅπως γε ἄλλως οἶσθα τούτων πέρι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς λέγεις θαυμάζοιμʼ ἄν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτους ἐπιζητοῦμεν τίνες εἰσίν, παρʼ οὓς ἂν Μένων ἀφικόμενος μοχθηρὸς γένοιτο—οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔστων οἱ σοφισταί—ἀλλὰ δὴ ἐκείνους εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν πατρικὸν τόνδε ἑταῖρον εὐεργέτησον φράσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τίνας ἀφικόμενος ἐν τοσαύτῃ πόλει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ διῆλθον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἄξιος λόγου. ΑΝ. τί δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ σὺ ἔφρασας;

[¶10] Soc. I did mention to him the men whom I supposed to be teachers of these things; but I find, from what you say, that I am quite off the track, and I daresay you are on it. Now you take your turn, and tell him to whom of the Athenians he is to go. Give us a name—anyone you please.
An. Why mention a particular one? Any Athenian gentleman he comes across, without exception, will do him more good, if he will do as he is bid, than the sophists.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὓς μὲν ἐγὼ ᾤμην διδασκάλους τούτων εἶναι, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνω οὐδὲν λέγων, ὡς σὺ φῄς· καὶ ἴσως τὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ ἐν τῷ μέρει αὐτῷ εἰπὲ παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων· εἰπὲ ὄνομα ὅτου βούλει. ΑΝ. τί δὲ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ὄνομα δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι; ὅτῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐντύχῃ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βελτίω αὐτὸν ποιήσει ἢ οἱ σοφισταί, ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ πείθεσθαι.

[¶11] Soc. And did those gentlemen grow spontaneously into what they are, and without learning from anybody are they able, nevertheless, to teach others what they did not learn themselves?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ οὗτοι οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἐγένοντο τοιοῦτοι, παρʼ οὐδενὸς μαθόντες ὅμως μέντοι ἄλλους διδάσκειν οἷοί τε ὄντες ταῦτα ἃ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον;

[¶12] 93. An. I expect they must have learnt in their turn from the older generation, who were gentlemen: or does it not seem to you that we have had many good men in this city?
Soc. Yes, I agree, Anytus; we have also many who are good at politics, and have had them in the past as well as now. But I want to know whether they have proved good teachers besides of their own virtue: that is the question with which our discussion is actually concerned; not whether there are, or formerly have been, good men here amongst us or not, but whether virtue is teachable; this has been our problem all the time. And our inquiry into this problem resolves itself into the question: Did the good men of our own and of former times know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good, or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another? That is the question I and Meno have been discussing all this time. Well, just consider it in your own way of speaking: would you not say that Themistocles was a good man?
An. I would, particularly so.

> Greek: 93. ΑΝ. καὶ τούτους ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μαθεῖν, ὄντων καλῶν κἀγαθῶν· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέναι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄνδρες;
ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ἄνυτε, καὶ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ἐνθάδε ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ γεγονέναι ἔτι οὐχ ἧττον ἢ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς; τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν τυγχάνει ὤν· οὐκ εἰ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνδρες ἐνθάδε, οὐδʼ εἰ γεγόνασιν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ πάλαι σκοποῦΜΕΝ. τοῦτο δὲ σκοποῦντες τόδε σκοποῦμεν, ἆρα οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες καὶ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν ἠπίσταντο καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδοῦναι, ἢ οὐ παραδοτὸν τοῦτο ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδὲ παραληπτὸν ἄλλῳ παρʼ ἄλλου· τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Μένων. ὧδε οὖν σκόπει ἐκ τοῦ σαυτοῦ λόγου· Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἂν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, πάντων γε μάλιστα.

[¶13] Soc. And if any man ever was a teacher of his own virtue, he especially was a good teacher of his?
An. In my opinion, yes, assuming that he wished to be so.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἦν, κἀκεῖνον εἶναι; ΑΝ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, εἴπερ ἐβούλετό γε.

[¶14] Soc. But can you suppose he would not have wished that other people should become good, honorable men—above all, I presume, his own son? Or do you think he was jealous of him, and deliberately refused to impart the virtue of his own goodness to him? Have you never heard how Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could keep his balance standing upright on horseback, and hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, so as to make him skilled in all that could be learnt from good masters. Surely you must have heard all this from your elders?
An. I have.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, οἴει, οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη ἄλλους τέ τινας καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, μάλιστα δέ που τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ; ἢ οἴει αὐτὸν φθονεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες οὐ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἦν; ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν ὑὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν; ἐπέμενεν γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθὸς ἑστηκώς, καὶ ἠκόντιζεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ὀρθός, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἠργάζετο ἃ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαιδεύσατο καὶ ἐποίησε σοφόν, ὅσα διδασκάλων ἀγαθῶν εἴχετο· ἢ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀκήκοας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων; ΑΝ. ἀκήκοα.

[¶15] Soc. Then there could be no complaints of badness in his son’s nature?
An. I daresay not.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν ἄρα τήν γε φύσιν τοῦ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ᾐτιάσατʼ ἄν τις εἶναι κακήν. ΑΝ. ἴσως οὐκ ἄν.

[¶16] Soc. But I ask you—did you ever hear anybody, old or young, say that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, had the same goodness and accomplishments as his father?
An. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τόδε; ὡς Κλεόφαντος ὁ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς ἐγένετο ἅπερ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη του ἀκήκοας ἢ νεωτέρου ἢ πρεσβυτέρου; ΑΝ. οὐ δῆτα.

[¶17] Soc. And can we believe that his father chose to train his own son in those feats, and yet made him no better than his neighbors in his own particular accomplishments—if virtue, as alleged, was to be taught?
An. On my word, I think not.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν οἰόμεθα βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ ὑὸν παιδεῦσαι, ἣν δὲ αὐτὸς σοφίαν ἦν σοφός, οὐδὲν τῶν γειτόνων βελτίω ποιῆσαι, εἴπερ ἦν γε διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ΑΝ. ἴσως μὰ Δίʼ οὔ.

[¶18] Soc. Well, there you have a fine teacher of virtue who, you admit, was one of the best men of past times.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὗτος μὲν δή σοι τοιοῦτος διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς, ὃν καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄριστον τῶν προτέρων εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψώμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου·

[¶19] 94. Let us take another, Aristeides, son of Lysimachus: do you not admit that he was a good man?
An. I do, absolutely, of course.
Soc. Well, did he not train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that masters could teach him? And in the result, do you consider he has turned out better than anyone else? You have been in his company, I know, and you see what he is like. Or take another example— the splendidly accomplished Pericles: he, as you are aware, brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.
An. Yes.

> Greek: 94. ἢ τοῦτον οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, πάντως δήπου.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν ὑὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσε, ἄνδρα δὲ βελτίω δοκεῖ σοι ὁτουοῦν πεποιηκέναι; τούτῳ γάρ που καὶ συγγέγονας καὶ ὁρᾷς οἷός ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Περικλέα, οὕτως μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα, οἶσθʼ ὅτι δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψε, Πάραλον καὶ Ξάνθιππον; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε.

[¶20] Soc. And, you know as well as I, he taught them to be the foremost horsemen of Athens, and trained them to excel in music and gymnastics and all else that comes under the head of the arts; and with all that, had he no desire to make them good men? He wished to, I imagine, but presumably it is not a thing one can be taught. And that you may not suppose it was only a few of the meanest sort of Athenians who failed in this matter, let me remind you that Thucydides’ also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, and that besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus—masters who, I should think, had the name of being the best exponents of the art. You remember them, do you not?
An. Yes, by hearsay.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτους μέντοι, ὡς οἶσθα καὶ σύ, ἱππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρους Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τἆλλα ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται οὐδενὸς χείρους· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μέν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτόν. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἴῃ καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐνθυμήθητι ὅτι Θουκυδίδης αὖ δύο ὑεῖς ἔθρεψεν, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισαν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων—τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ξανθίᾳ ἔδωκε, τὸν δὲ Εὐδώρῳ· οὗτοι δέ που ἐδόκουν τῶν τότε κάλλιστα παλαίειν—ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ΑΝ. ἔγωγε, ἀκοῇ.

[¶21] Soc. Well, is it not obvious that this father would never have spent his money on having his children taught all those things, and then have omitted to teach them at no expense the others that would have made them good men, if virtue was to be taught? Will you say that perhaps Thucydides was one of the meaner sort, and had no great number of friends among the Athenians and allies? He, who was of a great house and had much influence in our city and all over Greece, so that if virtue were to be taught he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good, whether one of our own people or a foreigner, were he himself too busy owing to the cares of state! Ah no, my dear Anytus, it looks as though virtue were not a teachable thing.
An. Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one;

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οὗ μὲν ἔδει δαπανώμενον διδάσκειν, ταῦτα μὲν ἐδίδαξε τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὑτοῦ, οὗ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδει ἀναλώσαντα ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαι, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν, εἰ διδακτὸν ἦν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θουκυδίδης φαῦλος ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἦν τοῦτο διδακτόν, ἐξευρεῖν ἂν ὅστις ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὑεῖς ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσειν, ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων τις ἢ τῶν ξένων, εἰ αὐτὸς μὴ ἐσχόλαζεν διὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμέλειαν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε Ἄνυτε, μὴ οὐκ ᾖ διδακτὸν ἀρετή. ΑΝ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι· ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνυ·

[¶22] 95. I think you know that yourself.
Soc. Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what “speaking ill” means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know. Now you must answer me: are there not good and honorable men among your people also?

> Greek: 95. οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.
ΣΩ. ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω· οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ· σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρʼ ὑμῖν εἰσιν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;

[¶23] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶24] Soc. Well then, are they willing to put themselves forward as teachers of the young, and avow that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν;

[¶25] Men. No, no, Socrates, I assure you: sometimes you may hear them refer to it as teachable, but sometimes as not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.

[¶26] Soc. Then are we to call those persons teachers of this thing, when they do not even agree on that great question?

> Greek: ΣΩ. φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται;

[¶27] Men. I should say not, Socrates.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶28] Soc. Well, and what of the sophists? Do you consider these, its only professors, to be teachers of virtue?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;

[¶29] Men. That is a point, Socrates, for which I admire Gorgias: you will never hear him promising this, and he ridicules the others when he hears them promise it. Skill in speaking is what he takes it to be their business to produce.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

[¶30] Soc. Then you do not think the sophists are teachers of virtue?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

[¶31] Men. I cannot say, Socrates. I am in the same plight as the rest of the world: sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

[¶32] Soc. And are you aware that not only you and other political folk are in two minds as to whether virtue is to be taught, but Theognis the poet also says, you remember, the very same thing?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθʼ ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει;

[¶33] Men. In which part of his poems?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;

[¶34] Soc. In those elegiac lines where he says—
Eat and drink with these men; sit with them, and be pleasing unto them, who wield great power; for from the good wilt thou win thee lessons in the good; but mingle with the bad,
“and thou wilt lose even the sense that thou hast.” Do you observe how in these words he implies that virtue is to be taught?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει—
καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπʼ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;

[¶35] Men. He does, evidently.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεταί γε.

[¶36] Soc. But in some other lines he shifts his ground a little, saying—
Could understanding be created and put into a man
(I think it runs thus) “many high rewards would they obtain” “for he would have followed the precepts of wisdom: but not by teaching wilt thou ever make the had man good” You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,—
εἰ δʼ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
λέγει πως ὅτι—
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον
οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ—
οὔ ποτʼ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός, πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν.

[¶37] 96. Men. Apparently.

> Greek: 96. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθόν.
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῳ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τἀναντία λέγει;
ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται.

[¶38] Soc. Well, can you name any other subject in which the professing teachers are not only refused recognition as teachers of others, but regarded as not even understanding it themselves, and indeed as inferior in the very quality of which they claim to be teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as men of worth and honor say at one time that it is teachable, and at another that it is not? When people are so confused about this or that matter, can you say they are teachers in any proper sense of the word?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;

[¶39] Men. No, indeed, I cannot.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

[¶40] Soc. Well, if neither the sophists nor the men who are themselves good and honorable are teachers of the subject, clearly no others can be?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;

[¶41] Men. I agree.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

[¶42] Soc. And if there are no teachers, there can be no disciples either?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

[¶43] Men. I think that statement is true.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

[¶44] Soc. And we have admitted that a thing of which there are neither teachers nor disciples cannot be taught?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

[¶45] Men. We have.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ὡμολογήκαΜΕΝ.

[¶46] Soc. So nowhere are any teachers of virtue to be found?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

[¶47] Men. That is so.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[¶48] Soc. And if no teachers, then no disciples?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

[¶49] Men. So it appears.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. φαίνεται οὕτως.

[¶50] Soc. Hence virtue cannot be taught?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;

[¶51] Men. It seems likely, if our investigation is correct. And that makes me wonder, I must say, Socrates, whether perhaps there are no good men at all, or by what possible sort of process good people can come to exist?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδʼ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

[¶52] Soc. I fear, Meno, you and I are but poor creatures, and Gorgias has been as faulty an educator of you as Prodicus of me. So our first duty is to look to ourselves, and try to find somebody who will have some means or other of making us better. I say this with special reference to our recent inquiry, in which I see that we absurdly failed to note that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good; and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive by what means good men can be produced.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους ποιήσει· λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

[¶53] Men. To what are you alluding, Socrates?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶54] Soc. I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that this must needs be so?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι·

[¶55] 97. Men. Yes.

> Greek: 97. ἦ γάρ;
ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶56] Soc. And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct?

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;

[¶57] Men. Yes.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶58] Soc. But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.

[¶59] Men. What do you mean by that?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πῶς δὴ [ὀρθῶς] λέγεις;

[¶60] Soc. I will tell you. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ⟨εἰ⟩ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;

[¶61] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶62] Soc. Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδʼ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;

[¶63] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶64] Soc. And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἕως γʼ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

[¶65] Men. Just as good.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐδὲν γάρ.

[¶66] Soc. Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue, when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν· τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.

[¶67] Men. So it seems.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικέ γε.

[¶68] Soc. Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

[¶69] Men. With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ.

[¶70] Soc. How do you mean? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right, so long as he opines rightly?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

[¶71] Men. It appears to me that he must; and therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, and why they should be two distinct and separate things.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται· ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ διʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

[¶72] Soc. Well, do you know why it is that you wonder, or shall I tell you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν διʼ ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

[¶73] Men. Please tell me.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γʼ εἰπέ.

[¶74] Soc. It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus. But perhaps there are none in your country.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν· ἴσως δὲ οὐδʼ ἔστιν παρʼ ὑμῖν.

[¶75] Men. What is the point of your remark?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

[¶76] Soc. That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away; but, if fastened, they stay where they are.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

[¶77] Men. Well, what of that?

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. τί οὖν δή;

[¶78] Soc. To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinion. For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, and effect all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον —οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον· πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντʼ ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται·

[¶79] 98. And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as in our previous talk we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends the other by its trammels.
Men. Upon my word, Socrates, it seems to be very much as you say.

> Greek: 98. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.
ΜΕΝ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.

[¶80] Soc. And indeed I too speak as one who does not know but only conjectures: yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων· ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δʼ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.

[¶81] Men. Yes, and you are right, Socrates, in so saying.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

[¶82] Soc. Well, then, am I not right also in saying that true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη;

[¶83] Men. There again, Socrates, I think you speak the truth.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

[¶84] Soc. So that right opinion will be no whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be inferior to him who has knowledge.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

[¶85] Men. That is so.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[¶86] Soc. And you know that the good man has been admitted by us to be useful.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.

[¶87] Men. Yes.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶88] Soc. Since then it is not only because of knowledge that men will be good and useful to their country, where such men are to be found, but also on account of right opinion; and since neither of these two things—knowledge and true opinion—is a natural property of mankind, being acquired—or do you think that either of them is natural?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον διʼ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διʼ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, οὔτʼ ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

[¶89] Men. Not I.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

[¶90] Soc. Then if they are not natural, good people cannot be good by nature either.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

[¶91] Men. Of course not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ δῆτα.

[¶92] Soc. And since they are not an effect of nature, we next considered whether virtue can be taught.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.

[¶93] Men. Yes.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶94] Soc. And we thought it teachable if virtue is wisdom?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή;

[¶95] Men. Yes.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶96] Soc. And if teachable, it must be wisdom?

> Greek: ΣΩ. κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι;

[¶97] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶98] Soc. And if there were teachers, it could be taught, but if there were none, it could not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;

[¶99] Men. Quite so.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὕτω.

[¶100] Soc. But surely we acknowledged that it had no teachers?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους;

[¶101] Men. That is true.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[¶102] Soc. Then we acknowledged it neither was taught nor was wisdom?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;

[¶103] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶104] Soc. But yet we admitted it was a good?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;

[¶105] Men. Yes.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ναί.

[¶106] Soc. And that which guides rightly is useful and good?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον;

[¶107] Men. Certainly.
Soc. And that there are only two things— true opinion and knowledge—that guide rightly and a man guides rightly if he have these; for things that come about by chance do not occur through human guidance; but where a man is a guide to what is right we find these two things—true opinion and knowledge.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶108] 99. Men. I agree.

> Greek: 99. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται— τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται—ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
ΜΕΝ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

[¶109] Soc. Well now, since virtue is not taught, we no longer take it to be knowledge?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;

[¶110] Men. Apparently not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὐ φαίνεται.

[¶111] Soc. So of two good and useful things one has been rejected: knowledge cannot be our guide in political conduct.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

[¶112] Men. I think not.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

[¶113] Soc. Therefore it was not by any wisdom, nor because they were wise, that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their states—Themistocles and the rest of them, to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago. For this reason it was that they were unable to make others like unto themselves—because their qualities were not an effect of knowledge.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν· διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ διʼ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

[¶114] Men. The case is probably as you say, Socrates.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

[¶115] Soc. And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion. This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states, and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners; for these people utter many a true thing when inspired, but have no knowledge of anything they say.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται· ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

[¶116] Men. I daresay that is so.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

[¶117] Soc. And may we, Meno, rightly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a great deed and word?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι;

[¶118] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶119] Soc. Then we shall be right in calling those divine of whom we spoke just now as soothsayers and prophets and all of the poetic turn; and especially we can say of the statesmen that they are divine and enraptured, as being inspired and possessed of God when they succeed in speaking many great things, while knowing nought of what they say.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ἄρʼ ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας· καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

[¶120] Men. Certainly.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. πάνυ γε.

[¶121] Soc. And the women too, I presume, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they eulogize a good man, say—“He is a divine person.”

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.

[¶122] Men. And to all appearance, Socrates, they are right; though perhaps our friend Anytus may be annoyed at your statement.

> Greek: ΜΕΝ. καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

[¶123] Soc. For my part, I care not. As for him, Meno, we will converse with him some other time. At the moment, if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it, unless there should be somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδὲν μέλει ἔμοιγε. τούτῳ μέν, ὦ Μένων, καὶ αὖθις διαλεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐν παντὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καλῶς ἐζητήσαμέν τε καὶ ἐλέγομεν, ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται, εἰ μή τις εἴη τοιοῦτος τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν.

[¶124] 100. And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—“He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades.” In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows.
Men. I think you put it excellently, Socrates.

> Greek: 100. εἰ δὲ εἴη, σχεδὸν ἄν τι οὗτος λέγοιτο τοιοῦτος ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν οἷον ἔφη Ὅμηρος ἐν τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν τὸν Τειρεσίαν εἶναι, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσι. ταὐτὸν ἂν καὶ ἐνθάδε ὁ τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν.
ΜΕΝ. κάλλιστα δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶125] Soc. Then the result of our reasoning, Meno, is found to be that virtue comes to us by a divine dispensation, when it does come. But the certainty of this we shall only know when, before asking in what way virtue comes to mankind, we set about inquiring what virtue is, in and by itself. It is time now for me to go my way, but do you persuade our friend Anytus of that whereof you are now yourself persuaded, so as to put him in a gentler mood; for if you can persuade him, you will do a good turn to the people of Athens also.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ὦ Μένων, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται· τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἔστιν ἀρετή. νῦν δʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν ὥρα ποι ἰέναι, σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρᾳότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις.