146e. Yes, it would. But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing. True. Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one. No, it cannot. Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one. No.
146e. εἰ γὰρ ὁντινοῦν εἴη ἔν τῳ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. ἀληθῆ. οὔτʼ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἓν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἕτερον. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἓν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα. οὐ γάρ.
147. Ceph. And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.
147. οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερʼ ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.
147a. Of course not. But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all? Quite impossible. But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one. True. Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all. No, they would not. Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one? Yes, they would partake of it.
147a. πῶς γάρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὑτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλά πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδʼ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἆρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἕν; μετεῖχεν. εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, οὔτʼ ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἓν τὸ ἓν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων·
147b. If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part. No. But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another. Yes, we did. Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another? Yes, let us say that. The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.
147b. οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἔφαμεν γάρ. φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν. τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.
147c. That appears to be the result of our argument. Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others? Perhaps. At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it. Of course. Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less? Certainly. And if neither more nor less, then in like degree? Yes. In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.
147c. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἴσως. ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. τί μήν; οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον; τί γὰρ ἄν; εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως. ναί. οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί.
147d. What do you mean? I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing? Yes. Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once? Yes. And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly? The same thing, of course. The word other is the name of something, is it not? Certainly.
147d. πῶς λέγεις; ὧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; τί μήν; οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι; πάνυ γε.
147e. Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name. Assuredly. Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name. Certainly.
147e. ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπʼ ἄλλῃ, ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν ἧσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἧι ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, κατʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις·
148a. Ceph. In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?Yes. Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things. So it appears. But the like is opposed to the unlike.
148a. τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον· οὐχί;ναί. ἧι δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.
Yes. And the other to the same. That is also true. But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.
ναί. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γʼ ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταὐτόν.
148b. Yes, it was. And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.Certainly. In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.Yes. Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.
148b. ἐφάνη γάρ. τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. πάνυ γε. ἧι γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.ναί. ἧι ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;
Yes. Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.
ναί. ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
148c. So it appears. Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same. Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable. But there is another besides. What is it? In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike. True. Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.
148c. ἔοικεν. ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ᾗ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ᾗ δὲ ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει. τίνα; ἧι ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ᾗ δʼ ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὂν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατʼ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.
148d. Certainly. And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself. That is inevitable. Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things. I am considering. The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.Right. And the one is also in other things?
148d. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατʼ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ἀνάγκη.τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει. σκοπῶ. αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἓν ἐφάνη ὄν.ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἕν;
Yes. Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.
ναί. ἧι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτοιτο ἄν·
148e. That is clear. Thus the one would touch itself and the other things. It would. But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it? It must. Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is. Yes, it must.
148e. ᾗ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἅπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ ἅπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν. φαίνεται. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἅπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἅπτοιτο. τί δὲ τῇδε; ἆρʼ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὗ μέλλει ἅπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἣ ἂν μετʼ ἐκείνην ᾖ [ἕδρα] ᾗ ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται; ἀνάγκη. καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἅψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὂν τὸ ἓν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο·
149a. Ceph. The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not? No, it will not. The one can no more touch itself than it can be two. No. Nor, again, will it touch the others. Why not? Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them. True. Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact. There must. And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts.
149a. ἕως δʼ ἂν ᾖ ἕν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει; οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἑνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὑτοῦ. ἡ αὐτή. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἅψεται. τί δή; ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαι χωρὶς ὂν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὗ μέλλει ἅψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι. ἀληθῆ. δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἅψις εἶναι. δεῖ. ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἑξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἅψεις δύο.
149b. Yes. And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts.
149b. ναί. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ ἑνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἅψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἅψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἅψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἅψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἅψεων πλεονεκτεῖ· ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἕν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἅψις ταῖς ἅψεσιν.
149c. For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts. Right. Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less. True. But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact. Of course not. We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other. They do not. Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them. Of course not. Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number.
149c. ὀρθῶς. ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἅψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἅψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη. πῶς γάρ; οὔκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γάρ; οὔτʼ ἄρα ἕν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.
149d. No. The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two. That is clear. There is no contact if there are no two terms. No, there is none. Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact. No, certainly not. Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others. So it appears. And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others? How is that? If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?
149d. οὔ. τὸ ἓν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἕν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἅψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοιν. οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτʼ ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ ἅψις οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἅπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἅπτεται. ἔοικεν.ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; πῶς; εἰ μεῖζον εἴη τὸ ἓν ἢ τἆλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις;
149e. Certainly. Ceph. These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things. That is obvious. Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it. Necessarily. What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it? Clearly. And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one? Of course. But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?
149e. ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἑκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἕν, σμικρότητα δὲ τἆλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἔλαττον; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἤτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη. ἀνάγκη. τί δʼ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ διʼ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δῆλον δή. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; πῶς δʼ οὔ; δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῳ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς;
150b. No, it cannot. Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it. Yes. And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist. Inevitably. Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness. So it appears. Nor will greatness exist in the one.
150b. ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἑνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει. ναί. οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὰ ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ. ἀνάγκη. οὐδενί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτʼ ἐν μέρει μήτʼ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδʼ ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ· μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ᾖ μέγα·
150c. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere. True. But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness. No. Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.
150c. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι. ἀληθῆ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους. οὐ γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτὼ τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλω, οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἓν τούτοιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἂν οὐδʼ ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.
150d. Evidently not. Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them? Certainly not. Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal. Of course.
150d. οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε. ἆρʼ οὖν, εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὂν ἴσον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
150e. And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself. Certainly. The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others. Evidently.
150e. καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτʼ ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτʼ ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἴσου ὂν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται.
151. Ceph. But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself;
151. καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν.
151a. thus the one would be both greater and less than itself. Yes, it would. And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others? Of course. But that which exists must always exist somewhere. Yes. And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it? No, it cannot. But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?
151a. εἴη γὰρ ἄν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὂν ἀεί. ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὂν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γάρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἔν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι;
151b. Clearly. And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one. So it appears. Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others. Evidently. And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.
151b. φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττω. ἔοικεν. τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν.
151c. Of course. And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others. How is that? If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal. True. Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?
151c. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὂν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταὐτά. πῶς; ὧνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταὐτά. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὂν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν;
151d. Of course. And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself. Clearly. And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others? Yes, it must.
151d. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὂν αὑτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὑτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὑτοῦ. φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ ἕν; ὅτι μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
151e. And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number. Yes, it will. And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others? What do you mean? If one is, it is thereby shown to be. Yes.
151e. ἔσται.ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς; εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν. ναί.
152. Ceph. But is “to be” anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as “was” denotes participation in existence together with past time, and “will be” similar participation together with future time?
152. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία;
152a. True. Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.Certainly. And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?Yes. Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.
152a. ἔστι γάρ. μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου;ναί. ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.
Certainly. Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it? Yes, we do. Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?
ἀνάγκη. ἆρʼ οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; μεμνήμεθα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἕν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο;
152b. There is no doubt of it. Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself. Yes. And it is older (is it not) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present. No, it cannot. Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older?
152b. ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὑτοῦ οὕτω. ναί. ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἆρʼ οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ᾖ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν. οὐ γάρ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τότʼ ἤδη πρεσβύτερον;
152c. For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future. True. But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.
152c. προϊὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δʼ ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον.
152d. Clearly. The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.
152d. φαίνεται. καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὑτοῦ;ναί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; ἔστιν. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὑτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν.
Certainly. It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.Yes. And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not? It is. Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.
ἀνάγκη. τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι·
152e. Undoubtedly. But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is. Of course. Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself. So it appears. And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time? For an equal time. But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age. Of course. But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger. No. Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself. I agree. Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?
152e. ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾖ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἕν. ἔοικεν. πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; τὸν ἴσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει. πῶς δʼ οὔ; τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν. οὐ γάρ. τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὂν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
153a. Ceph. I cannot tell. But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude. Yes, they have. And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one. Of course. Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers? The smaller. Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?
153a. τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν. πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνός. πῶς δʼ οὔ; τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι τὸ ἕν.
153b. Yes. The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other. They have. And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things. Yes, they would. Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible? It is impossible.
153b. ἦ γάρ; ναί. πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἓν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν. ἔχει γάρ. πρῶτον δέ γε οἶμαι γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον, τὰ δʼ ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τἆλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ δὲ ἓν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων. εἴη γὰρ ἄν.τί δὲ τόδε; ἆρʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον;
153c. But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end. Yes. And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not? Certainly. And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives. Yes, we shall say that. The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being;
153c. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μήν; καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτʼ εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτὴ δέ γε οἶμαι ὕστατον γίγνεται, τούτῳ δʼ ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι·
153d. so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others. That is clear. Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one. I think that is clear, too. Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part? It must.
153d. ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα. οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.
153e. Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being. True. Ceph. Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them. And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one. Certainly. In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?
153e. ἀληθῆ. πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἕν· ὥστʼ εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλʼ ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἆρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.
154b. I cannot say. But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first. Yes, of course. Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.
154b. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε· εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδʼ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὂν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὂν τοῦ [ἑνὸς] ὄντος γίγνοιτʼ ἄν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν·
154c. True. And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things. No, it does not. But see whether they become older and younger in this way. In what way? Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one. What then? When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.
154c. ἀλλʼ ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δʼ οὔ. ἀληθῆ. καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται. πῇ δή; ἧι τό τε ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός. τί οὖν; ὅταν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ᾖ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα.
154d. Yes. Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction? By a smaller fraction. Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?
154d. ναί. πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἆρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ; σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τἆλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὔ; ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;
154e. Yes. And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older? Yes, it becomes younger. But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one? Certainly. Ceph. Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older; for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older.
154e. νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; πάνυ γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.
155a. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier, and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later.
155a. τὸ δʼ αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἵω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλʼ εἶεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἓν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε.
155b. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier. Yes, that is clear. Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and vice versa—from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?
155b. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· ᾗ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων;
155c. Certainly. For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others. Perfectly true. But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?
155c. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;
155d. It must. Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. Certainly. And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it? Certainly. And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it. You are right. And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.
155d. ἀνάγκη. ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται. τί μήν; καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται. πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται·
155e. That is perfectly true. Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being? Yes, it must. And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it? No, it cannot. Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.
155e. καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δʼ οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οἷόν τε. ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.
156a. Ceph. True. And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it? There is no other way at all. But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming? Yes. And losing existence is destruction? Certainly. The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed.
156a. ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ; οὐδαμῶς. τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἆρά γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἆρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. τὸ ἓν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιὲν οὐσίαν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται.
156b. Inevitably. And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?Certainly. And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined? Inevitably. And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?
156b. ἀνάγκη. ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἆρʼ οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἕν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἓν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαί τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι;
Yes. And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?
ναί. καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; οὕτως.
156c. Yes. And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all. How is that? It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without changing. Of course. And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest. No, there is none. And certainly it cannot change without changing. I should say not. Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.
156c. ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δήπου αὐτό γε μηδʼ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δή; ἑστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γάρ; χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πότʼ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν.