---
title: "Philebus · Φίληβος"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Harold North Fowler"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/
cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Philebus · Φίληβος. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/"
---

# Philebus · Φίληβος

*Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler*

Is the good life one of pleasure, of knowledge, or a mixture of the two?

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [11a–22c](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1.md)
2. [22d–33d](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/2.md)
3. [33e–44d](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3.md)
4. [44e–56b](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4.md)
5. [56c–67b](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5.md)

## 1. 11a–22c

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/#p-N

[¶0] 11a. Soc. Observe, then, Protarchus, what the doctrine is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and what our doctrine is, against which you are to argue, if you do not agree with it.

> Greek: 11a. ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρʼ ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ᾖ λεγόμενος.

[¶1] 11b. Shall we make a brief statement of each of them?

> Greek: 11b. βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα ἑκάτερον;

[¶2] Pro. By all means.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶3] Soc. Very well: Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and pleasure and gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a good; whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings, are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are capable of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or to come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of all things.

> Greek: ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν·

[¶4] 11c. Those are pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they not, Philebus?

> Greek: 11c. δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἁπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἑκάτεροι;

[¶5] Phi. Yes, Socrates, exactly.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶6] Soc. And do you, Protarchus, accept this doctrine which is now committed to you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δέχῃ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον;

[¶7] Pro. I must accept it; for our handsome Philebus has withdrawn.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

[¶8] Soc. And must the truth about these doctrines be attained by every possible means?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆναι;

[¶9] 11d. Pro. Yes, it must.
Soc. Then let us further agree to this:
Pro. To what?
Soc. That each of us will next try to prove clearly that it is a condition and disposition of the soul which can make life happy for all human beings. Is not that what we are going to do?
Pro. It is.
Soc. Then you will show that it is the condition of pleasure, and I that it is that of wisdom?
Pro. True.
Soc. What if some other life be found superior to these two? Then if that life is found to be more akin to pleasure, both of us are defeated, are we not, by the life which has firm possession of this superiority, but the life of pleasure is victor over the life of wisdom.

> Greek: 11d. ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως;
ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μῶν οὐκ, ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

[¶10] 12. Pro. Yes.

> Greek: 12. ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶11] Soc. But if it is more akin to wisdom, then wisdom is victorious and pleasure is vanquished? Do you agree to that? Or what do you say?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;

[¶12] Pro. Yes, I at least am satisfied with that.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

[¶13] Soc. But how about you, Philebus? What do you say?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ Φιλήβῳ; τί φῄς;

[¶14] Phi. I think and always shall think that pleasure is the victor. But you, Protarchus, will make your own decision.

> Greek: ΦΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.

[¶15] Pro. Since you entrusted the argument to me, Philebus, you can no longer dictate whether to make the agreement with Socrates or not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.

[¶16] 12b. Phi. True; and for that reason I wash my hands of it and now call upon the goddess herself to witness that I do so.

> Greek: 12b. ΦΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.

[¶17] Pro. And we also will bear witness to these words of yours. But all the same, Socrates, Philebus may agree or do as he likes, let us try to finish our argument in due order.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἂν εἶμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἑξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα περαίνειν.

[¶18] Soc. We must try, and let us begin with the very goddess who Philebus says is spoken of as Aphrodite but is most truly named Pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πειρατέον, ἀπʼ αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὅδε Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δʼ ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.

[¶19] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶20] 12c. Soc. My awe, Protarchus, in respect to the names of the gods is always beyond the greatest human fear. And now I call Aphrodite by that name which is agreeable to her; but pleasure I know has various aspects, and since, as I said, we are to begin with her, we must consider and examine what her nature is. For, when you just simply hear her name, she is only one thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of shapes which are even, in a way, unlike each other. For instance, we say that the man who lives without restraint has pleasure, and that the self-restrained man takes pleasure in his very self-restraint; and again that the fool who is full of foolish opinions and hopes is pleased, and also that the wise man takes pleasure in his very wisdom.

> Greek: 12c. ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ἕν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ· ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν·

[¶21] 12d. And would not any person who said these two kinds of pleasure were like each other be rightly regarded as a fool?

> Greek: 12d. ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως;

[¶22] Pro. No, Socrates, for though they spring from opposite sources, they are not in themselves opposed to one another; for how can pleasure help being of all things most like pleasure, that is, like itself?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονῇ γε ἡδονὴ [μὴ] οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

[¶23] 13. Soc. Yes, my friend, and color is like color in so far as every one of them is a color they will all be the same, yet we all recognize that black is not only different from white, but is its exact opposite. And so, too, figure is like figure; they are all one in kind but the parts of the kind are in some instances absolutely opposed to each other, and in other cases there is endless variety of difference; and we can find many other examples of such relations.

> Greek: 13. ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει. καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητʼ ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει, καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθʼ εὑρήσομεν.

[¶24] 13a. Do not, therefore, rely upon this argument, which makes all the most absolute opposites identical. I am afraid we shall find some pleasures the opposites of other pleasures.

> Greek: 13a. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

[¶25] Pro. Perhaps; but why will that injure my contention?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

[¶26] Soc. Because I shall say that, although they are unlike, you apply to them a different designation. For you say that all pleasant things are good. Now no argument contends that pleasant things are not pleasant; but whereas most of them are bad and only some are good, as we assert, nevertheless you call them all good, though you confess, if forced to it by argument, that they are unlike.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι· λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντʼ εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχὶ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ·

[¶27] 13b. Now what is the identical element which exists in the good and bad pleasures alike and makes you call them all a good?

> Greek: 13b. κακὰ δʼ ὄντα αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι, τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

[¶28] Pro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you suppose anyone who asserts that the good is pleasure will concede, or will endure to hear you say, that some pleasures are good and others bad?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;

[¶29] 13c. Soc. But you will concede that they are unlike and in some instances opposed to each other.

> Greek: 13c. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καί τινας ἐναντίας.

[¶30] Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔτι καθʼ ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.

[¶31] Soc. Here we are again at the same old argument, Protarchus, and we shall presently assert that one pleasure is not different from another, but all pleasures are alike, and the examples just cited do not affect us at all, but we shall behave and talk just like the most worthless and inexperienced reasoners.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐδʼ ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι.

[¶32] 13d. Pro. In what way do you mean?

> Greek: 13d. ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

[¶33] Soc. Why, if I have the face to imitate you and to defend myself by saying that the utterly unlike is most completely like that which is most utterly unlike it, I can say the same things you said, and we shall prove ourselves to be excessively inexperienced, and our argument will be shipwrecked and lost. Let us, then, back her out, and perhaps if we start fair again we may come to an agreement.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι σε μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον, ἕξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώμεθα, καὶ τάχʼ ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.

[¶34] 13e. Pro. How? Tell me.

> Greek: 13e. ΠΡΩ. λέγε πῶς;

[¶35] Soc. Assume, Protarchus, that I am questioned in turn by you.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

[¶36] Pro. What question do I ask?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

[¶37] Soc. Whether wisdom and knowledge and intellect and all the things which I said at first were good, when you asked me what is good, will not have the same fate as this argument of yours.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα δὴ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθά, διερωτώμενος ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

[¶38] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶39] 14. Soc. It will appear that the forms of knowledge collectively are many and some of them are unlike each other; but if some of them turn out to be actually opposites, should I be fit to engage in dialectics now if, through fear of just that, I should say that no form of knowledge is unlike any other, and then, as a consequence, our argument should vanish and be lost, like a tale that is told, and we ourselves should be saved by clinging to some irrational notion?

> Greek: 14. ΣΩ. πολλαί τε αἱ συνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθʼ ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῳζοίμεθα ἐπί τινος ἀλογίας;

[¶40] 14a. Pro. No, that must never be, except the part about our being saved. However, I like the equal treatment of your doctrine and mine. Let us grant that pleasures are many and unlike and that the forms of knowledge are many and different.

> Greek: 14a. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

[¶41] 14b. Soc. With no concealment, then, Protarchus, of the difference between my good and yours, but with fair and open acknowledgement of it, let us be bold and see if perchance on examination they will tell us whether we should say that pleasure is the good, or wisdom, or some other third principle. For surely the object of our present controversy is not to gain the victory for my assertions or yours, but both of us must fight for the most perfect truth.
Pro. Yes, we must.
Soc. Then let us establish this principle still more firmly by means of an agreement.

> Greek: 14b. ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] τοῦ τʼ ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι πότερον ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἁγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτʼ ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθʼ ἃ σύ, τῷ δʼ ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.
ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶42] 14c. Pro. What principle?
Soc. The principle which gives trouble to all men, to some of them sometimes against their will.
Pro. Speak more plainly.
Soc. I mean the principle which came in our way just now; its nature is quite marvellous. For the assertions that one is many and many are one are marvellous, and it is easy to dispute with anyone who makes either of them.
Pro. You mean when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and that there are also many of me which are opposites of each other, asserting that I, the same Protarchus, am great and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

> Greek: 14c. ΣΩ. τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον διʼ ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δή;
ΣΩ. τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἑκοῦσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε σαφέστερον.
ΣΩ. τὸν νυνδὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.
ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

[¶43] 14d. Soc. Those wonders concerning the one and the many which you have mentioned, Protarchus, are common property, and almost everybody is agreed that they ought to be disregarded because they are childish and easy and great hindrances to speculation; and this sort of thing also should be disregarded, when a man in his discussion divides the members and likewise the parts of anything, acknowledges that they all collectively are that one thing, and then mockingly refutes himself because he has been compelled to declare miracles—that the one is many and infinite and the many only one.

> Greek: 14d. ΣΩ. σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἓν ὡς πολλά ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἓν μόνον.

[¶44] 14e. Pro. But what other wonders do you mean, Socrates, in relation to this same principle, which are not yet common property and generally acknowledged?

> Greek: 14e. ΠΡΩ. σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;

[¶45] 15a. Soc. I mean, my boy, when a person postulates unity which is not the unity of one of the things which come into being and perish, as in the examples we had just now. For in cases of a unity of that sort, as I just said, it is agreed that refutation is needless. But when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is one, the intense interest in these and similar unities becomes disagreement and controversy.

> Greek: 15a. ΣΩ. ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἓν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδή, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

[¶46] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶47] 15b. Soc. The first question is whether we should believe that such unities really exist; the second, how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity; and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many. These are the questions, Protarchus, about this kind of one and many, not those others, which cause the utmost perplexity, if ill solved, and are, if well solved, of the greatest assistance.

> Greek: 15b. ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθʼ ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτʼ ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἁπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας [ἂν] αὖ καλῶς.

[¶48] 15c. Pro. Then is it now, Socrates, our first duty to thresh this matter out?

> Greek: 15c. ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

[¶49] Soc. Yes, that is what I should say.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

[¶50] Pro. You may assume, then, that we are all willing to agree with you about that; and perhaps it is best not to ask Philebus any questions; let sleeping dogs lie.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δʼ ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

[¶51] 15d. Soc. Very well; then where shall we begin this great and vastly complicated battle about the matters at issue? Shall we start at this point?

> Greek: 15d. ΣΩ. εἶεν· πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἆρʼ ἐνθένδε;

[¶52] Pro. At what point?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πόθεν;

[¶53] Soc. We say that one and many are identified by reason, and always, both now and in the past, circulate everywhere in every thought that is uttered. This is no new thing and will never cease; it is, in my opinion, a quality within us which will never die or grow old, and which belongs to reason itself as such. And any young man, when he first has an inkling of this, is delighted, thinking he has found a treasure of wisdom; his joy fills him with enthusiasm; he joyously sets every possible argument in motion, sometimes in one direction, rolling things up and kneading them into one, and sometimes again unrolling and dividing them; he gets himself into a muddle first and foremost, then anyone who happens to be near him, whether he be younger or older or of his own age;

> Greek: ΣΩ. φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας ηὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἅσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὑτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δʼ ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος ἄντε ἧλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς

[¶54] 16a. he spares neither father nor mother nor any other human being who can hear, and hardly even the lower animals, for he would certainly not spare a foreigner, if he could get an interpreter anywhere.

> Greek: 16a. οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

[¶55] 16. Pro. Socrates, do you not see how many we are and that we are all young men? Are you not afraid that we shall join with Philebus and attack you, if you revile us? However—for we understand your meaning—if there is any way or means of removing this confusion gently from our discussion and finding some better road than this to bring us towards the goal of our argument, kindly lead on, and we will do our best to follow for our present discussion, Socrates, is no trifling matter.

> Greek: 16. ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐ φοβῇ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου συνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς; ὅμως δὲ μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν·

[¶56] 16b. Soc. No, it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you; and there certainly is no better road, nor can there ever be, than that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and forlorn.
Pro. What is the road? Only tell us.

> Greek: 16b. οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδʼ ἂν γένοιτο ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.
ΠΡΩ. τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

[¶57] 16c. Soc. One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean.

> Greek: 16c. ΣΩ. ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω.

[¶58] Pro. Go on what is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶59] Soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This being the way in which these things are arranged, we must always assume that there is in every case one idea of everything and must look for it—for we shall find that it is there—and if we get a grasp of this, we must look next for two, if there be two, and if not, for three or some other number; and again we must treat each of those units in the same way, until we can see not only that the original unit is one and many and infinite, but just how many it is.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν— ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα·

[¶60] 16d. And we must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality until we have a view of its whole number between infinity and one; then, and not before, we may let each unit of everything pass on unhindered into infinity.

> Greek: 16d. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δʼ ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

[¶61] 17. Soc. The gods, then, as I said, handed down to us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching one another; but the wise men of the present day make the one and the many too quickly or too slowly, in haphazard fashion, and they put infinity immediately after unity; they disregard all that lies between them, and this it is which distinguishes between the dialectic and the disputatious methods of discussion.

> Greek: 17. ΣΩ. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει—οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

[¶62] 17a. Pro. I think I understand you in part, Socrates, but I need a clearer statement of some things.

> Greek: 17a. ΠΡΩ. τὰ μέν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἃ λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.

[¶63] Soc. Surely my meaning, Protarchus, is made clear in the letters of the alphabet, which you were taught as a child;

> Greek: ΣΩ. σαφὲς μήν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανʼ αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ καὶ πεπαίδευσαι.

[¶64] 17b. so learn it from them.
Pro. How?
Soc. Sound, which passes out through the mouth of each and all of us, is one, and yet again it is infinite in number.
Pro. Yes, to be sure.
Soc. And one of us is no wiser than the other merely for knowing that it is infinite or that it is one; but that which makes each of us a grammarian is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And it is this same knowledge which makes the musician.
Pro. How is that?

> Greek: 17b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστί που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔτε ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι τὸ ἕν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι πόσα τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι ταὐτόν.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶65] 17c. Soc. Sound is one in the art of music also, so far as that art is concerned.

> Greek: 17c. ΣΩ. φωνὴ μέν που καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

[¶66] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶67] Soc. And we may say that there are two sounds, low and high, and a third, which is the intermediate, may we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δύο δὲ θῶμεν βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἢ πῶς;

[¶68] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶69] Soc. But knowledge of these facts would not suffice to make you a musician, although ignorance of them would make you, if I may say so, quite worthless in respect to music.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γʼ ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔσῃ.

[¶70] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶71] Soc. But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the intervals, and all the combinations derived from them, which the men of former times discovered and handed down to us, their successors, with the traditional name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which they say are measured by numbers and must be called rhythms and measures—and they say that we must also understand that every one and many should be considered in this way—

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν—ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ διʼ ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν—ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά

[¶72] 17e. when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become a musician, and when by considering it in this way you have obtained a grasp of any other unity of all those which exist, you have become wise in respect to that unity. But the infinite number of individuals and the infinite number in each of them makes you in every instance indefinite in thought and of no account and not to be considered among the wise, so long as you have never fixed your eye upon any definite number in anything.
Pro. I think, Philebus, that what Socrates has said is excellent. Phi. So do I; it is excellent in itself, but why has he said it now to us, and what purpose is there in it?

> Greek: 17e. τε λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας· τὸ δʼ ἄπειρόν σε ἑκάστων καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδʼ ἐνάριθμον, ἅτʼ οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

[¶73] 18a. Soc. Protarchus, that is a very proper question which Philebus has asked us.
Pro. Certainly it is, so please answer it.
Soc. I will, when I have said a little more on just this subject. For if a person begins with some unity or other, he must, as I was saying, not turn immediately to infinity, but to some definite number; now just so, conversely, when he has to take the infinite first, he must not turn immediately to the one, but must think of some number which possesses in each case some plurality, and must end by passing from all to one.

> Greek: 18a. ΦΙ. κἀμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.
ΣΩ. δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἓν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλʼ ἐπί τινα ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθύς, ἀλλʼ [ἐπʼ] ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν.

[¶74] 18b. Let us revert to the letters of the alphabet to illustrate this.

> Greek: 18b. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

[¶75] Pro. How?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶76] Soc. When some one, whether god or godlike man,—there is an Egyptian story that his name was Theuth—observed that sound was infinite, he was the first to notice that the vowel sounds in that infinity were not one, but many, and again that there were other elements which were not vowels but did have a sonant quality, and that these also had a definite number; and he distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call mutes.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν·

[¶77] 18c. Then he divided the mutes until he distinguished each individual one, and he treated the vowels and semivowels in the same way, until he knew the number of them and gave to each and all the name of letters. Perceiving, however, that none of us could learn any one of them alone by itself without learning them all, and considering that this was a common bond which made them in a way all one, he assigned to them all a single science and called it grammar.

> Greek: 18c. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε· καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

[¶78] 18d. Phi. I understand that more clearly than the earlier statement, Protarchus, so far as the reciprocal relations of the one and the many are concerned, but I still feel the same lack as a little while ago.

> Greek: 18d. ΦΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δʼ αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

[¶79] Soc. Do you mean, Philebus, that you do not see what this has to do with the question?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτʼ ἐστίν;

[¶80] Phi. Yes; that is what Protarchus and I have been trying to discover for a long time.

> Greek: ΦΙ. ναί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶΠρώταρχος.

[¶81] Soc. Really, have you been trying, as you say, for long time to discover it, when it was close to you all the while?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ μὴν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῄς, πάλαι.

[¶82] 18e. Phi. How is that?

> Greek: 18e. ΦΙ. πῶς;

[¶83] Soc. Was not our discussion from the beginning about wisdom and pleasure and which of them is preferable?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἱρετέον;

[¶84] Phi. Yes, of course.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶85] Soc. And surely we say that each of them is one.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.

[¶86] Phi. Certainly.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶87] 19. Soc. This, then, is precisely the question which the previous discussion puts to us: How is each of them one and many, and how is it that they are not immediately infinite, but each possesses a definite number, before the individual phenomena become infinite?

> Greek: 19. ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι;

[¶88] 19a. Pro. Philebus, somehow or other Socrates has led us round and plunged us into a serious question. Consider which of us shall answer it. Perhaps it is ridiculous that I, after taking your place in entire charge of the argument, should ask you to come back and answer this question because I cannot do so, but I think it would be still more ridiculous if neither of us could answer.

> Greek: 19a. ΠΡΩ. οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δʼ οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι.

[¶89] 19b. Consider, then, what we are to do. For I think Socrates is asking us whether there are or are not kinds of pleasure, how many kinds there are, and what their nature is, and the same of wisdom.

> Greek: 19b. σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν. εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα· τῆς τʼ αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.

[¶90] Soc. You are quite right, son of Callias; for, as our previous discussion showed, unless we can do this in the case of every unity, every like, every same, and their opposites, none of us can ever be of any use in anything.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

[¶91] 19c. Pro. That, Socrates, seems pretty likely to be true. However, it is splendid for the wise man to know everything, but the next best thing, it seems, is not to be ignorant of himself. I will tell you why I say that at this moment. You, Socrates, have granted to all of us this conversation and your cooperation for the purpose of determining what is the best of human possessions. For when Philebus said it was pleasure and gaiety and enjoyment and all that sort of thing, you objected and said it was not those things, but another sort, and we very properly keep reminding ourselves voluntarily of this, in order that both claims may be present in our memory for examination.

> Greek: 19c. ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ σύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δʼ εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν. τί δή μοι τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστί, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν ἑκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵνʼ ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάτερα βασανίζηται.

[¶92] 19d. You, as it appears, assert that the good which is rightly to be called better than pleasure is mind, knowledge, intelligence, art, and all their kin; you say we ought to acquire these, not that other sort. When those two claims were made and an argument arose, we playfully threatened that we would not let you go home until the discussion was brought to some satisfactory conclusion.

> Greek: 19d. φῂς δʼ, ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ, ⟨ἃ⟩ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὴ μετʼ ἀμφισβητήσεως ἑκατέρων λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηταί τι διορισθέντων, σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν σαυτόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι·

[¶93] 19e. You agreed and put yourself at our disposal for that purpose. Now, we say that, as children put it, you cannot take back a gift once fairly given. So cease this way of meeting all that we say.

> Greek: 19e. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

[¶94] Soc. What way do you mean?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τίνα λέγεις;

[¶95] Pro. I mean puzzling us and asking questions to which we cannot at the moment give a satisfactory answer. Let us not imagine that the end of our present discussion is a mere puzzling of us all, but if we cannot answer, you must do so; for you gave us a promise. Consider, therefore, whether you yourself must distinguish the kinds of pleasure and knowledge or will let that go, in case you are able and willing to make clear in some other way the matters now at issue among us.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλʼ εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθʼ ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἡδονῆς εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθʼ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τʼ εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρʼ ἡμῖν.

[¶96] 20b. Soc. I need no longer anticipate anything terrible, since you put it in that way; for the words “in case you are willing” relieve me of all fear. And besides, I think some god has given me a vague recollection.

> Greek: 20b. ΣΩ. δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθʼ οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λύει πάντα φόβον ἑκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

[¶97] Pro. How is that, and what is the recollection about?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

[¶98] Soc. I remember now having heard long ago in a dream, or perhaps when I was awake, some talk about pleasure and wisdom to the effect that neither of the two is the good, but some third thing, different from them and better than both.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν·

[¶99] 20c. However, if this be now clearly proved to us, pleasure is deprived of victory for the good would no longer be identical with it. Is not that true?
Pro. It is.
Soc. And we shall have, in my opinion, no longer any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasure. But the progress of the discussion will make that still clearer.
Pro. Excellent! Just go on as you have begun.
Soc. First, then, let us agree on some further small points.
Pro. What are they?
Soc. Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect or imperfect?

> Greek: 20c. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταὐτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατʼ ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.
ΣΩ. μίκρʼ ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα;

[¶100] 20d. Pro. The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates.
Soc. Well, and is the good sufficient?
Pro. Of course; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency.
Soc. And nothing, I should say, is more certain about it than that every intelligent being pursues it, desires it, wishes to catch and get possession of it, and has no interest in anything in which the good is not included.
Pro. There is no denying that.

> Greek: 20d. ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.
ΣΩ. τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

[¶101] 20e. Soc. Let us, then, look at the life of pleasure and the life of wisdom separately and consider and judge them.

> Greek: 20e. ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.

[¶102] Pro. How do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς εἶπες;

[¶103] 21. Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything else, and if, either be found to need anything, we can no longer regard it as our true good.

> Greek: 21. ΣΩ. μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτʼ ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἔστʼ ἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δʼ ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτʼ ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.

[¶104] 21a. Pro. No, of course not.

> Greek: 21a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶105] Soc. Shall we then undertake to test them through you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;

[¶106] Pro. By all means.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶107] Soc. Then answer.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή.

[¶108] Pro. Ask.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε.

[¶109] Soc. Would you, Protarchus, be willing to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δέξαιʼ ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

[¶110] Pro. Of course I should.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶111] Soc. Would you think you needed anything further, if you were in complete possession of that enjoyment?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔχεις παντελῶς;

[¶112] Pro. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶113] Soc. But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants and the like.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ δέοιʼ ἄν τι;

[¶114] 21b. Pro. Why should I? If I have enjoyment, I have everything.

> Greek: 21b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμʼ ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

[¶115] Soc. Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest pleasures all your life?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;

[¶116] Pro. Yes; why not?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶117] Soc. But if you did not possess mind or memory or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are utterly devoid of intellect, must it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό, εἰ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δήπου σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως;

[¶118] Pro. Yes, it must.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶119] 21c. Soc. And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the oyster.

> Greek: 21c. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δήπου μηδʼ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τʼ ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δʼ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μηδʼ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετʼ ὀστρεΐνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλα διανοηθῆναι;

[¶120] 21d. Is that true, or can we imagine any other result?
Pro. We certainly cannot.
Soc. And can we choose such a life?
Pro. This argument, Socrates, has made me utterly speechless for the present.
Soc. Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.
Pro. What sort of life do you mean?
Soc. I ask whether anyone would be willing to live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.

> Greek: 21d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.
ΣΩ. μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. εἴ τις δέξαιτʼ ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδʼ αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

[¶121] 21e. Pro. Neither of the two lives can ever appear desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.

> Greek: 21e. ΠΡΩ. οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἱρετός, οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, φανῇ.

[¶122] 22a. Soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?

> Greek: 22a. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὁ συναμφότερος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμειχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

[¶123] Pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;

[¶124] Soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [λέγω] ἔγωγε.

[¶125] Pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ʼκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις [γε] οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δʼ οὔ.

[¶126] Soc. Then do we understand the consequences of what we are now saying?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

[¶127] Pro. Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable for man or any other living being.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προυτέθησαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δʼ οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζῴων οὐδενί.

[¶128] 22b. Soc. Then is it not already clear that neither of these two contained the good for if it did contain the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and such as to be chosen by all living creatures which would be able to live thus all their lives; and if any of us chose anything else, he would be choosing contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of his own free will, but from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.

> Greek: 22b. ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτοῖν εἶχε τἀγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθʼ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

[¶129] Pro. That seems at any rate to be true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν.

[¶130] 22c. Soc. And so I think we have sufficiently proved that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered identical with the good.

> Greek: 22c. ΣΩ. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.

[¶131] Phi. But neither is your “mind” the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same objections.

> Greek: ΦΙ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.

[¶132] Soc. My mind, perhaps, Philebus; but not so, I believe, the true mind, which is also divine; that is different. I do not as yet claim for mind the victory over the combined life, but we must look and see what is to be done about the second place;

> Greek: ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γʼ ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν·

## 2. 22d–33d

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/2/#p-N

[¶0] 22d. for each of us might perhaps put forward a claim, one that mind is the cause of this combined life, the other that pleasure is the cause and thus neither of these two would be the good, but one or the other of them might be regarded as the cause of the good. On this point I might keep up the fight all the more against Philebus and contend that in this mixed life it is mind that is more akin and more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may be, which makes it both desirable and good; and from this point of view pleasure could advance no true claim to the first or even the second place.

> Greek: 22d. τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιῴμεθʼ ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δʼ ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δʼ ἂν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἂν ὡς ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ συγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτʼ ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδʼ αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο·

[¶1] 22e. It is farther behind than the third place, if my mind is at all to be trusted at present.

> Greek: 22e. πορρωτέρω δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

[¶2] 23. Pro. Certainly, Socrates, it seems to me that pleasure has fought for the victory and has fallen in this bout, knocked down by your words.

> Greek: 23. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων·

[¶3] 23a. And we can only say, as it seems, that mind was wise in not laying claim to the victory; for it would have met with the same fate. Now pleasure, if she were to lose the second prize, would be deeply humiliated in the eyes of her lovers; for she would no longer appear even to them so lovely as before.

> Greek: 23a. τὰ γὰρ αὔτʼ ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὑτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτʼ ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.

[¶4] Soc. Well, then, is it not better to leave her now and not to pain her by testing her to the utmost and proving her in the wrong?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

[¶5] Pro. Nonsense, Socrates!

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶6] 23b. Soc. Nonsense because I spoke of paining pleasure, and that is impossible?
Pro. Not only that, but because you do not understand that not one of us will let you go yet until you have finished the argument about these matters.
Soc. Whew, Protarchus! Then we have a long discussion before us, and not an easy one, either, this time. For in going ahead to fight mind’s battle for the second place, I think I need a new contrivance—other weapons, as it were, than those of our previous discussion, though perhaps some of the old ones will serve. Must I then go on?
Pro. Of course you must.
Soc. Then let us try to be careful in making our beginning.

> Greek: 23b. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;
ΠΡΩ. οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.
ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά. οὐκοῦν χρή;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶7] 23c. Pro. What kind of a beginning do you mean?
Soc. Let us divide all things that now exist in the universe into two, or rather, if you please, three classes.
Pro. Please tell us on what principle you would divide them.
Soc. Let us take some of the subjects of our present discussion.
Pro. What subjects?
Soc. We said that God revealed in the universe two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we not?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Let us, then, assume these as two of our classes, and a third, made by combining these two.

> Greek: 23c. ΣΩ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.
ΠΡΩ. ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.
ΠΡΩ. καθʼ ὅτι, φράζοις ἄν;
ΣΩ. λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;
ΣΩ. τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον.

[¶8] 23d. But I cut a ridiculous figure, it seems, when I attempt a division into classes and an enumeration.

> Greek: 23d. εἰμὶ δʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος κατʼ εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

[¶9] Pro. What do you mean, my friend?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί φῄς, ὠγαθέ;

[¶10] Soc. I think we need a fourth class besides.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.

[¶11] Pro. Tell us what it is.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνος.

[¶12] Soc. Note the cause of the combination of those two and assume that as the fourth in addition to the previous three.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

[¶13] Pro. And then will you not need a fifth, which has the power of separation?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου;

[¶14] Soc. Perhaps; but not at present, I think. However, if we do need a fifth, you will pardon me for going after it.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν· ἂν δέ τι δέῃ, συγγνώσῃ πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον].

[¶15] 23e. Pro. Of course.

> Greek: 23e. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶16] Soc. First, then, let us take three of the four and, as we see that two of these are split up and scattered each one into many, let us try, by collecting each of them again into one, to learn how each of them was both one and many.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτε ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον.

[¶17] Pro. If you could tell me more clearly about them, I might be able to follow you.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχʼ ἂν ἑποίμην.

[¶18] 24a. Soc. I mean, then, that the two which I select are the same which I mentioned before, the infinite and the finite. I will try to show that the infinite is, in a certain sense, many; the finite can wait.

> Greek: 24a. ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο ἃ προτίθεμαι ταὔτʼ εἶναι ἅπερ νυνδή, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον· ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πόλλʼ ἐστί, πειράσομαι φράζειν. τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

[¶19] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μένει.

[¶20] Soc. Consider then. What I ask you to consider is difficult and debatable; but consider it all the same. In the first place, take hotter and colder and see whether you can conceive any limit of them, or whether the more and less which dwell in their very nature do not, so long as they continue to dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end; for if there were any end of them, the more and less would themselves be ended.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σκέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις ἄν, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦν⟨τε⟩ τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι·

[¶21] 24b. Pro. Very true.
Soc. But always, we affirm, in the hotter and colder there is the more and less.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Always, then, the argument shows that these two have no end; and being endless, they are of course infinite.
Pro. Most emphatically, Socrates.
Soc. I am glad you responded, my dear Protarchus, and reminded me that the word “emphatically” which you have just used, and the word “gently” have the same force as “more” and “less.”

> Greek: 24b. γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὼ τετελευτήκατον.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΣΩ. ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἔν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελῆ δʼ ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες καὶ ἀνέμνησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τό γε ἠρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον·

[¶22] 24c. For wherever they are present, they do not allow any definite quantity to exist; they always introduce in every instance a comparison—more emphatic than that which is quieter, or vice versa—and thus they create the relation of more and less, thereby doing away with fixed quantity. For, as I said just now, if they did not abolish quantity, but allowed it and measure to make their appearance in the abode of the more and less, the emphatically and gently, those latter would be banished from their own proper place.

> Greek: 24c. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νυνδή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλʼ ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν.

[¶23] 24d. When once they had accepted definite quantity, they would no longer be hotter or colder; for hotter and colder are always progressing and never stationary; but quantity is at rest and does not progress. By this reasoning hotter and its opposite are shown to be infinite.

> Greek: 24d. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα.

[¶24] Pro. That appears to be the case, Socrates; but, as you said, these subjects are not easy to follow. Perhaps, however, continued repetition might lead to a satisfactory agreement between the questioner and him who is questioned.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δʼ, ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ῥᾴδια ταῦτα συνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθίς τε καὶ αὖθις ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς ἂν συμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήναιεν.

[¶25] 24e. Soc. That is a good suggestion, and I must try to carry it out. However, to avoid waste of time in discussing all the individual examples, see if we can accept this as a designation of the infinite.

> Greek: 24e. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὖ μὲν λέγεις καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν. νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντʼ ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν.

[¶26] Pro. Accept what?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

[¶27] 25. Soc. All things which appear to us to become more or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of the infinite as their unity, in accordance with what we said a while ago, if you remember, that we ought to collect all things that are scattered and split up and impress upon them to the best of our ability the seal of some single nature.

> Greek: 25. ΣΩ. ὁπόσʼ ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὃν ἔφαμεν ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

[¶28] 25a. Pro. I remember.

> Greek: 25a. ΠΡΩ. μέμνημαι.

[¶29] Soc. And the things which do not admit of more and less and the like, but do admit of all that is opposed to them—first equality and the equal, then the double, and anything which is a definite number or measure in relation to such a number or measure— all these might properly be assigned to the class of the finite.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα σύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο.

[¶30] 25b. What do you say to that?

> Greek: 25b. ἢ πῶς σὺ φῄς;

[¶31] Pro. Excellent, Socrates.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶32] Soc. Well, what shall we say is the nature of the third class, made by combining these two?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

[¶33] Pro. You will tell me, I fancy, by answering your own question.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

[¶34] Soc. Nay, a god will do so, if any god will give ear to my prayers.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηταί τις θεῶν.

[¶35] Pro. Pray, then, and watch.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

[¶36] Soc. I am watching; and I think, Protarchus, one of the gods has this moment been gracious unto me.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σκοπῶ· καί μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νυνδὴ γεγονέναι.

[¶37] 25c. Pro. What do you mean, and what evidence have you?

> Greek: 25c. ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῇ;

[¶38] Soc. I will tell you, of course. Just follow what I say.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φράσω δῆλον ὅτι· σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.

[¶39] Pro. Say on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶40] Soc. We spoke just now of hotter and colder, did we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νυνδή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἦ γάρ;

[¶41] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶42] Soc. Add to them drier and wetter, more and less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and all that we assigned before to the class which unites more and less.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.

[¶43] 25d. Pro. You mean the class of the infinite?

> Greek: 25d. ΠΡΩ. τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

[¶44] Soc. Yes. Mix with that the second class, the offspring of the limit.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ναί. συμμείγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

[¶45] Pro. What class do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίαν;

[¶46] Soc. The class of the finite, which we ought just now to have reduced to unity, as we did that of the infinite. We have not done that, but perhaps we shall even now accomplish the same end, if these two are both unified and then the third class is revealed.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἣν καὶ νυνδή, δέον ἡμᾶς καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει, ⟨εἰ⟩ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται.

[¶47] Pro. What third class, and what do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

[¶48] Soc. The class of the equal and double and everything which puts an end to the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduction of number.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.

[¶49] 25e. Pro. I understand. I think you mean that by mixture of these elements certain results are produced in each instance.

> Greek: 25e. ΠΡΩ. μανθάνω· φαίνῃ γάρ μοι λέγειν μειγνὺς ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἐφʼ ἑκάστων αὐτῶν συμβαίνειν.

[¶50] Soc. Yes, you are right.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

[¶51] Pro. Go on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε τοίνυν.

[¶52] 26. Soc. In cases of illness, does not the proper combination of these elements produce health?

> Greek: 26. ΣΩ. ἆρα οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

[¶53] 26a. Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not?
Pro. Excellent.
Soc. And again in the case of cold and hot weather, the introduction of these elements removes the excess and indefiniteness and creates moderation and harmony.
Pro. Assuredly.
Soc. And thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world, by mixture of the infinite with the finite?

> Greek: 26a. ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτὰ [ἐγγιγνόμενα] ταῦτα· ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπηργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν σύμπασαν τελεώτατα συνεστήσατο;
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστά γε.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσιν καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενομένη τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶54] 26b. Pro. Of course.
Soc. There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess, my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm;

> Greek: 26b. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμειχθέντων;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθʼ ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχοντʼ ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω.

[¶55] 26c. I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you think, Protarchus?

> Greek: 26c. σοὶ δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

[¶56] Pro. What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

[¶57] Soc. I have spoken of these three classes, you observe.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἴρηκα, εἰ συννοεῖς.

[¶58] Pro. Yes, I believe I understand; I think you mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is another class among existing things; but what you wish to designate as the third class, I do not comprehend very well.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἓν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἓν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

[¶59] Soc. No, because the multitude which springs up in the third class overpowers you and yet the infinite also comprised many classes, nevertheless, since they were sealed with the seal of the more and less, they were seen to be of one class.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ γὰρ πλῆθός σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως· καίτοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο γένη, ὅμως δʼ ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἓν ἐφάνη.

[¶60] 26d. Pro. True.

> Greek: 26d. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶61] Soc. And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτʼ ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει.

[¶62] Pro. Of course not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶63] Soc. No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἓν τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.

[¶64] Pro. I understand.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔμαθον.

[¶65] 26e. Soc. But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.

> Greek: 26e. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον· κοινὴ δʼ ἡ σκέψις. ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

[¶66] Pro. Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;

[¶67] Soc. Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν;

[¶68] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶69] 27a. Soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?

> Greek: 27a. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νυνδή, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;

[¶70] Pro. We shall.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶71] Soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;

[¶72] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.

[¶73] Soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.

[¶74] Pro. Of course not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶75] Soc. Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

[¶76] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶77] 27b. Soc. And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?

> Greek: 27b. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον;

[¶78] Pro. Yes, it is distinct.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

[¶79] Soc. It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.

[¶80] Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶81] Soc. The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτʼ ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μεικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μείξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;

[¶82] 27c. Pro. Certainly not.

> Greek: 27c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶83] Soc. Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἆρʼ οὐ τόδε ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

[¶84] Pro. Yes, we were.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

[¶85] Soc. And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἴσως νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν;

[¶86] Pro. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

[¶87] 27d. Soc. Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not?

> Greek: 27d. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή· νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μεικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

[¶88] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἦν.

[¶89] Soc. And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους;

[¶90] Pro. Of course we do.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶91] Soc. We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μέρος γʼ αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου οἶμαι γένους· οὐ γὰρ [ὁ] δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστι [μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος] ἀλλὰ συμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτʼ ἄν.

[¶92] Pro. Quite rightly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

[¶93] 27e. Soc. Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question.

> Greek: 27e. ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ ἄμεικτος ὤν; ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὧδε δʼ ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀποφήνασθαι.

[¶94] Phi. Ask your question.

> Greek: ΦΙ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶95] Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;

[¶96] Phi. Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.

> Greek: ΦΙ. ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

[¶97] 28a. Soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail.

> Greek: 28a. ΣΩ. οὐδέ γʼ ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πᾶν κακόν· ὥστʼ ἄλλο τι νῷν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν ὡς παρέχεταί τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τούτω δή σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γε γένους ἔστων· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῖμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

[¶98] 28b. Phi. Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.

> Greek: 28b. ΦΙ. σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.

[¶99] Soc. And you your goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, all the same.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δʼ ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

[¶100] Pro. Socrates is right, Philebus; you ought to do as he asks.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὦ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον.

[¶101] Phi. Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my place?

> Greek: ΦΙ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προῄρησαι λέγειν;

[¶102] Pro. Yes; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself, that we may not select the wrong representative and so say something improper.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.

[¶103] 28c. Soc. I must do as you ask, Protarchus; and it is not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said, embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when I asked to what class mind and knowledge should be assigned?

> Greek: 28c. ΣΩ. πειστέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλʼ ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν;

[¶104] Pro. You certainly did, Socrates.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶105] Soc. Yet the answer is easy; for all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right. But let us, if you please, investigate the question of its class more at length.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥᾴδιον· πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

[¶106] 28d. Pro. Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not consider length, so far as we are concerned you cannot bore us.

> Greek: 28d. ΠΡΩ. λέγʼ ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

[¶107] Soc. Good. Then let us begin by asking a question.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε ἐπανερωτῶντες.

[¶108] Pro. What is the question?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶109] Soc. Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and this which is called the universe are governed by an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance, or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous wisdom?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;

[¶110] 28e. Pro. The two points of view have nothing in common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you are now saying seems to me actually impious. But the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolving universe; I can never say or think anything else about it.

> Greek: 28e. ΠΡΩ. οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες· ὃ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, οὐδὲ ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγʼ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδʼ ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

[¶111] 29. Soc. Do you, then, think we should assent to this and agree in the doctrine of our predecessors, not merely intending to repeat the words of others, with no risk to ourselves, but ready to share with them in the risk and the blame, if any clever man declares that this world is not thus ordered, but is without order?

> Greek: 29. ΣΩ. βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον συμφήσωμεν ὡς ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν τἀλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλʼ ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;

[¶112] 29a. Pro. Yes, of course I do.

> Greek: 29a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;

[¶113] Soc. Then observe the argument that now comes against us.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄθρει.

[¶114] Pro. Go on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶115] Soc. We see the elements which belong to the natures of all living beings, fire, water, air, and earth—or, as the storm-tossed mariners say, land in sight— in the constitution of the universe.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα καθορῶμέν που καὶ γῆν καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοι, φασίν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει.

[¶116] 29b. Pro. Certainly and we are truly storm-tossed in the puzzling cross-currents of this discussion.

> Greek: 29b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπʼ ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

[¶117] Soc. Well, here is a point for you to consider in relation to each of these elements as it exists in us.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

[¶118] Pro. What is the point?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖον;

[¶119] Soc. Each element in us is small and poor and in no way pure at all or endowed with the power which is worthy of its nature. Take one example and apply it to all. Fire, for instance, exists in us and also in the universe.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι μικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρʼ ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. οἷον πῦρ ἔστι μέν που παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἔστι δʼ ἐν τῷ παντί.

[¶120] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶121] 29c. Soc. And that which is in us is small, weak, and poor, but that which is in the universe is marvellous in quantity, beauty, and every power which belongs to fire.

> Greek: 29c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δʼ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.

[¶122] Pro. What you say is very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλʼ ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις.

[¶123] Soc. Well, is the fire of the universe nourished, originated, and ruled by the fire within us, or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of all living beings derive nourishment and all that from the universal fire?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ αὔξεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρʼ ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τό τʼ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἅπαντʼ ἴσχει ταῦτα;

[¶124] Pro. That question does not even deserve an answer.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδʼ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

[¶125] 29d. Soc. True; and you will, I fancy, say the same of the earth which is in us living creatures and that which is in the universe, and concerning all the other elements about which I asked a moment ago your answer will be the same.

> Greek: 29d. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς οἶμαι περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. οὕτως ἀποκρινῇ;

[¶126] Pro. Yes. Who could answer otherwise without being called a lunatic?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε φανείη;

[¶127] Soc. Nobody, I fancy. Now follow the next step. When we see that all the aforesaid elements are gathered together into a unit, do we not call them a body?

> Greek: ΣΩ. σχεδὸν οὐδʼ ὁστισοῦν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς ἕπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἆρʼ οὐκ εἰς ἓν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

[¶128] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶129] 29e. Soc. Apply the same line of thought to that which we call the universe. It would likewise be a body, being composed of the same elements.

> Greek: 29e. ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν· [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὂν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

[¶130] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[¶131] Soc. Does our body derive, obtain, and possess from that body, or that body from ours, nourishment and everything else that we mentioned just now?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρʼ ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεταί τε καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν εἴληφέν τε καὶ ἔχει;

[¶132] Pro. That, Socrates, is another question not worth asking.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ἕτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

[¶133] 30a. Soc. Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it?

> Greek: 30a. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;

[¶134] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

[¶135] Soc. Shall we not say that our body has a soul?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρʼ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

[¶136] Pro. Clearly we shall.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.

[¶137] Soc. Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

[¶138] Pro. Clearly it could get it from no other source.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶139] Soc. No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, and the element of cause which exists in all things, this last, which gives to our bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and medical treatment when the body is ill, and which is in general a composing and healing power, is called the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same elements exist in the entire heaven and in great parts thereof, and area moreover, fair and pure, there is no means of including among them that nature which is the fairest and most precious of all.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχήν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δʼ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δʼ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.

[¶140] 30c. Pro. Certainly there would be no sense in that.
Soc. Then if that is not the case, it would be better to follow the other line of thought and say, as we have often said, that there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind.
Pro. Yes, most justly.
Soc. Surely reason and mind could never come into being without soul.
Pro. No, never.
Soc. Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets.

> Greek: 30c. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γʼ ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετʼ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολύ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν, καί τις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατʼ ἄν.
ΠΡΩ. δικαιότατα δῆτα.
ΣΩ. σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην.
ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶141] 30d. Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind always rules the universe.
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all.

> Greek: 30d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δʼ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθʼ ὅτι φίλον ἑκάστοις λέγεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε.
ΣΩ. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει σύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικὼς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους τῆς τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος [τῶν τεττάρων, [ὧν] ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο].

[¶142] 30e. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.
Pro. Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered without my knowing it.
Soc. Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from serious talk.
Pro. You are right. Soc. We have now, then, my friend, pretty clearly shown to what class mind belongs and what power it possesses.

> Greek: 30e. ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.
ΠΡΩ. ἔχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.
ΣΩ. ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.
ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες.

[¶143] 31a. Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And likewise the class of pleasure was made clear some time ago.
Pro. Yes, it was.
Soc. Let us, then, remember concerning both of them that mind was akin to cause and belonged more or less to that class, and that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end.

> Greek: 31a. ΣΩ. νῦν δήπου, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν αὑτῷ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε γένους.

[¶144] 31b. Pro. We will remember that, of course.

> Greek: 31b. ΠΡΩ. μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶145] Soc. Our next task is to see in what and by means of what feeling each of them comes into being whenever they do come into being. We will take pleasure first and discuss these questions in relation to pleasure, as we examined its class first. But we cannot examine pleasure successfully apart from pain.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον ὁπόταν γίγνησθον ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς. πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δὲ αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.

[¶146] Pro. If that is our proper path, let us follow it.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.

[¶147] Soc. Do you agree with us about the origin of pleasure?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

[¶148] 31c. Pro. What do you think it is?

> Greek: 31c. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶149] Soc. I think pain and pleasure naturally originate in the combined class.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

[¶150] Pro. Please, my dear Socrates, remind us which of the aforesaid classes you mean by the combined class.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κοινὸν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμνῃσκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

[¶151] Soc. I will do so, as well as I can, my brilliant friend.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔσται ταῦτʼ εἰς δύναμιν, ὦ θαυμάσιε.

[¶152] Pro. Thank you.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες.

[¶153] Soc. By combined class, then, let us understand that which we said was the third of the four.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

[¶154] Pro. The one you mentioned after the infinite and the finite, and in which you put health and also, I believe, harmony?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὃ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

[¶155] 31d. Soc. You are quite right. Now please pay very close attention.

> Greek: 31d. ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστʼ ἤδη πρόσεχε.

[¶156] Pro. I will. Say on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶157] Soc. I say, then, that when, in us living beings, harmony is broken up, a disruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same moment.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

[¶158] Pro. What you say is very likely.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.

[¶159] Soc. But if harmony is recomposed and returns to its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated, if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words about matters of the highest import.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ διʼ ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.

[¶160] 31e. Pro. I think you are right, Socrates; but let us try to be more explicit.

> Greek: 31e. ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μέν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον δὲ ἔτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

[¶161] Soc. It is easiest to understand common and obvious examples, is it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾷστον συννοεῖν;

[¶162] Pro. What examples?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;

[¶163] Soc. Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

[¶164] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶165] Soc. And eating, which is a filling up again, is a pleasure?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

[¶166] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶167] 32. Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling with moisture of that which was dried up is a pleasure.

> Greek: 32. ΣΩ. δίψος δʼ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή·

[¶168] 32a. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration we experience through heat are a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are a pleasure.

> Greek: 32a. διάκρισις δέ γʼ αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.

[¶169] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶170] Soc. And the unnatural hardening of the moisture in an animal through cold is pain; but the natural course of the elements returning to their place and separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite, that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the passage and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δʼ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δʼ εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

[¶171] 32b. Pro. Let us accept that; for it seems to me to be true in its general lines.

> Greek: 32b. ΠΡΩ. ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.

[¶172] Soc. Then we may assume this as one kind of pain and pleasure arising severally under the conditions I have described?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;

[¶173] Pro. Let that be assumed.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.

[¶174] Soc. Now assume within the soul itself the anticipation of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful expectation of painful things to come.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

[¶175] 32c. Pro. Yes, indeed, this is another kind of pleasure and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart from the body, and arises through expectation.

> Greek: 32c. ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

[¶176] Soc. You are right. I think that in these two kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether the entire class is to be desired or such desirability is rather to be attributed to some other class among those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, because they are not good themselves, though some of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of the good.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσιν τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμείκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.

[¶177] 32d. Pro. You are quite right in saying that we must track our quarry on this trail.

> Greek: 32d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορηθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

[¶178] Soc. First, then, let us agree on this point: If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε συνίδωμεν· [ὡς] εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδών, ἀνασῳζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτε ἀνασῳζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἕξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῴοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχῃ.

[¶179] 32e. Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure, great or small?

> Greek: 32e. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἆρα οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῷον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἥδεσθαι μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;

[¶180] Pro. Yes, necessarily.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

[¶181] 33. Soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?

> Greek: 33. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου;

[¶182] 33a. Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: 33a. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶183] Soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ἢ μή. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

[¶184] Pro. Pray do so.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε ποῖον.

[¶185] Soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.

> Greek: ΣΩ. [τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἑλομένῳ] βίον οἶσθʼ ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

[¶186] 33b. Pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?

> Greek: 33b. ΠΡΩ. τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

[¶187] Soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.

[¶188] Pro. Yes, surely, that was said.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

[¶189] Soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

[¶190] Pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.

[¶191] Soc. No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

[¶192] 33c. Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: 33c. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[¶193] Soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός.

[¶194] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶195] Soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly.

> Greek: ΣΩ. μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον, καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι.

[¶196] 33d. Pro. What do you mean?

> Greek: 33d. ΠΡΩ. πῶς φῄς;

[¶197] Soc. Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.

## 3. 33e–44d

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/#p-N

[¶0] Pro. Let us assume that.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.

[¶1] Soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρʼ ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

[¶2] 33e. Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: 33e. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶3] Soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος, ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε. τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. ἦ γάρ;

[¶4] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶5] Soc. Then just change the terms.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

[¶6] Pro. How?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶7] 34. Soc. Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply the term want of perception to that which you are now calling forgetfulness.

> Greek: 34. ΣΩ. ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

[¶8] 34a. Pro. I understand.

> Greek: 34a. ΠΡΩ. ἔμαθον.

[¶9] Soc. And the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δʼ αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοιʼ ἄν.

[¶10] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶11] Soc. Then do we now understand what we mean by perception?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν;

[¶12] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶13] Soc. I think, then, that memory may rightly be defined as the preservation of perception.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

[¶14] 34b. Pro. Quite rightly.

> Greek: 34b. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.

[¶15] Soc. But do we not say that memory differs from recollection?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἆρʼ οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;

[¶16] Pro. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

[¶17] Soc. And is this the difference?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τόδε;

[¶18] Pro. What?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶19] Soc. When the soul alone by itself, apart from the body, recalls completely any experience it has had in company with the body, we say that it recollects do we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέν ποθʼ ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτʼ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ;

[¶20] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶21] Soc. And again when the soul has lost the memory of a perception or of something it has learned and then alone by itself regains this, we call everything of that kind recollection.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτʼ αἰσθήσεως εἴτʼ αὖ μαθήματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα σύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις [καὶ μνήμας] που λέγομεν.

[¶22] 34c. Pro. You are right.
Soc. Now my reason for saying all this is—
Pro. What?
Soc. That henceforth we may comprehend as completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the body; for both of these appear to be made plain by what has been said about memory and recollection.
Pro. Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point.
Soc. We must, it seems, consider many things in relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure;

> Greek: 34c. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
ΣΩ. οὗ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντʼ εἴρηται ταῦτʼ, ἔστι τόδε.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. ἵνα πῃ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικεν δηλοῦσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν.

[¶23] 34d. but now I think our first task is to take up the nature and origin of desire.

> Greek: 34d. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι τί ποτʼ ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

[¶24] Pro. Then let us examine that; for we shall not lose anything.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

[¶25] Soc. Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal! When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our perplexity about these very questions.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν [καὶ] ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε· εὑρόντες ὃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.

[¶26] Pro. That is a fair counter; but let us try to take up the next point.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς ἠμύνω· τὸ δʼ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

[¶27] Soc. Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and the like were desires?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί τινας ἐπιθυμίας;

[¶28] 34e. Pro. They are, decidedly.

> Greek: 34e. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶29] Soc. What sort of identity have we in view when we call these, which are so different, by one name?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθʼ ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;

[¶30] Pro. By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be easy to answer, yet it must be answered.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὅμως λεκτέον.

[¶31] Soc. Let us, then, begin again at that point with the same examples.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

[¶32] Pro. At what point?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πόθεν δή;

[¶33] Soc. We say of a thing on any particular occasion, “it’s thirsty,” do we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. διψῇ γέ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι;

[¶34] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶35] Soc. And that means being empty?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο δέ γʼ ἐστὶ κενοῦται;

[¶36] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶37] Soc. And is thirst, then, a desire?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

[¶38] Pro. Yes, of drink.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί, πώματός γε.

[¶39] 35a. Soc. Of drink, or of being filled with drink?

> Greek: 35a. ΣΩ. πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;

[¶40] Pro. Of being filled, I suppose.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

[¶41] Soc. The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.

[¶42] Pro. That is very plain.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σαφέστατά γε.

[¶43] Soc. Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτʼ αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτʼ ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ, τούτου ὃ μήτʼ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτʼ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πώποτε ἔπαθεν;

[¶44] Pro. It cannot be done.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶45] 35b. Soc. And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.

> Greek: 35b. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.

[¶46] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶47] Soc. And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

[¶48] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶49] Soc. Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πληρώσεώς γʼ ἄρα πῄ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο.

[¶50] Pro. Yes, obviously.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον.

[¶51] Soc. But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που.

[¶52] Pro. True.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶53] Soc. The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it employ?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι·

[¶54] 35c. Pro. No other, I should say.
Soc. And do we understand the consequences of this argument?
Pro. What are the consequences?
Soc. This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.
Pro. How so?
Soc. Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.
Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: 35c. τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτʼ ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο;
ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν οὐδενί.
ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.

[¶55] 35d. Soc. And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.

> Greek: 35d. ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς σύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

[¶56] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶57] Soc. So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.

> Greek: ΣΩ. διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.

[¶58] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶59] Soc. Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections. For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

[¶60] 35e. Pro. Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist?

> Greek: 35e. ΠΡΩ. ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου πέρι βίου φράζεις;

[¶61] Soc. In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

[¶62] Pro. That is true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[¶63] Soc. And what if a man is between the two?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

[¶64] Pro. How between them?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

[¶65] 36. Soc. Because of his condition, he is suffering, but he remembers the pleasures the coming of which would bring him an end of his pain; as yet, however, he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say that he is between the affections, or not?

> Greek: 36. ΣΩ. διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ⟨ὧν⟩ γενομένων παύοιτʼ ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε;

[¶66] 36a. Pro. Let us say so.
Soc. Shall we say that he is wholly pained or wholly pleased?
Pro. No, by Zeus, but he is afflicted with a twofold pain; he suffers in body from his sensation, and in soul from expectation and longing.
Soc. How could you, Protarchus, speak of twofold pain? Is not an empty man sometimes possessed of a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes, on the contrary, quite hopeless?

> Greek: 36a. φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. πότερον ἀλγοῦνθʼ ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;
ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ, ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.
ΣΩ. πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει;

[¶67] 36b. Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: 36b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα γε.

[¶68] Soc. And do you not think that when he has a hope of being filled he takes pleasure in his memory, and yet at the same time, since he is at the moment empty, suffers pain?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις [τοῖς χρόνοις] ἀλγεῖν;

[¶69] Pro. It cannot be otherwise.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶70] Soc. At such a time, then, a man, or any other animal, has both pain and pleasure at once.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τότε ἄρʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.

[¶71] Pro. Yes, I suppose so.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει.

[¶72] Soc. And when an empty man is without hope of being filled, what then? Is not that the time when the twofold feeling of pain would arise, which you just now observed and thought the pain simply was twofold?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἆρʼ οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτʼ ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νυνδὴ κατιδὼν ᾠήθης ἁπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

[¶73] 36c. Pro. Very true, Socrates.

> Greek: 36c. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶74] Soc. Let us make use of our examination of those affections for a particular purpose.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε χρησώμεθα.

[¶75] Pro. For what purpose?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶76] Soc. Shall we say that those pleasures and pains are true or false, or that some are true and others not so?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δʼ οὔ;

[¶77] Pro. But, Socrates, how can there be false pleasures or pains?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λῦπαι;

[¶78] Soc. But, Protarchus, how can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;

[¶79] 36d. Pro. Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest.

> Greek: 36d. ΠΡΩ. δόξας μὲν ἔγωγʼ ἄν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἄν.

[¶80] Soc. What? I am afraid we are starting a very considerable discussion.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.

[¶81] Pro. You are right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[¶82] Soc. And yet we must consider, thou son of that man, whether the discussion is relevant to what has gone before.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ ʼκείνου τἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

[¶83] Pro. Yes, no doubt.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως τοῦτό γε.

[¶84] Soc. We must dismiss everything else, tedious or otherwise, that is irrelevant.

> Greek: ΣΩ. χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων.

[¶85] Pro. Right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶86] 36e. Soc. Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. Are not some pleasures false and others true?
Pro. How could that be?
Soc. Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleeping or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never, on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he does not suffer it?
Pro. We have, Socrates, always believed that all this is as you suggest. Soc. But is the belief correct? Shall we consider whether it is so or not?

> Greek: 36e. ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι· θαῦμα γάρ μέ γε ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῄς; ψευδεῖς, αἱ δʼ ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΣΩ. οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθʼ ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, [ἐστιν] οὔτʼ ἐν μανίαις οὔτʼ ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθʼ ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδʼ αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δʼ οὔ.
ΠΡΩ. πάνθʼ οὕτω ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὀρθῶς; ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτʼ ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;
ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον, ὥς γʼ ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

[¶87] 37a. Pro. I should say we ought to consider that.
Soc. Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And of feeling pleasure?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And there is an object of opinion?
Pro. Of course.
Soc. And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion?

> Greek: 37a. ΣΩ. διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστιν γάρ πού τι δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἥδεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενόν ἐστί τι;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται;
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάζῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν.

[¶88] 37b. Pro. Of course not.

> Greek: 37b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶89] Soc. And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἀπολεῖ.

[¶90] Pro. Yes, that is true, too.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί, καὶ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει.

[¶91] Soc. Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτῳ ποτὲ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δʼ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληχεν ⟨σκεπτέον⟩.

[¶92] Pro. Yes, so we must.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον.

[¶93] Soc. You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδός τε καὶ ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῂς τοῦτʼ εἶναι;

[¶94] 37c. Pro. Yes.

> Greek: 37c. ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶95] Soc. And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μέν ἐστι ποίʼ ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί, ποιώ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

[¶96] Pro. Evidently we must.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον.

[¶97] Soc. But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures are great and small and intense.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε· πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἡδοναί.

[¶98] 37d. Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: 37d. ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶99] Soc. And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηταί τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν;

[¶100] Pro. Why certainly, Socrates.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶101] Soc. And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχῃ, ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν;

[¶102] Pro. Obviously.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον.

[¶103] 37e. Soc. And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining?

> Greek: 37e. ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ᾖ, τὴν δόξαν τότε ἁμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;

[¶104] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶105] Soc. And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν αὖ λύπην ἤ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἤ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

[¶106] Pro. That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή.

[¶107] Soc. And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέν γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι.

[¶108] 38. Pro. Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.

> Greek: 38. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δʼ ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.

[¶109] 38a. Soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.

> Greek: 38a. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

[¶110] Pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐδέν γε, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

[¶111] Soc. Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance?

> Greek: ΣΩ. διαφέρει δʼ ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὀρθῆς καὶ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

[¶112] 38b. Pro. There is likely to be a great difference.

> Greek: 38b. ΠΡΩ. εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν.

[¶113] Soc. Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

[¶114] Pro. Lead on as you think best.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἄγʼ ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.

[¶115] Soc. Then this is the way I lead.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ ἄγω.

[¶116] Pro. What way?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ;

[¶117] Soc. Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής;

[¶118] Pro. There is.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστιν.

[¶119] Soc. And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἕπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

[¶120] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.

[¶121] Soc. And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθʼ ἑκάστοτε;

[¶122] 38c. Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows?
Pro. How?
Soc. Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees?
Pro. Yes, I should say so.
Soc. Next, then, would he not ask himself—
Pro. What?
Soc. “What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree?”

> Greek: 38c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθʼ ἴσχειν;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα συμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθʼ ἅπερ ὁρᾷ;
ΠΡΩ. φαίην ἄν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτʼ ἂν ὧδε;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρʼ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθʼ ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ;

[¶123] 38d. Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view?

> Greek: 38d. ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα αὑτῷ ποτε;

[¶124] Pro. To be sure.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶125] Soc. And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly “It is a man”?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὑτὸν εἴποι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών;

[¶126] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.

[¶127] Soc. Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ παρενεχθείς γʼ αὖ τάχʼ ἂν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

[¶128] Pro. Yes, indeed.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε.

[¶129] 38e. Soc. And if some one is with him, he might repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to himself, and thus that which we called an opinion now becomes a statement?

> Greek: 38e. ΣΩ. κἂν μέν τίς γʼ αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτʼ ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

[¶130] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶131] Soc. But if he is alone when he has this thought, he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long time.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δʼ ἄρα μόνος ᾖ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πορεύεται.

[¶132] Pro. Undoubtedly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶133] Soc. Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the same as mine?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἆρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων ὅπερ ἐμοί;

[¶134] Pro. What is yours?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶135] Soc. I think the soul at such a time is like a book.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι.

[¶136] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶137] 39a. Soc. Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings which are connected with them seem to me almost to write words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true.

> Greek: 39a. ΣΩ. ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράφῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δʼ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρʼ ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

[¶138] 39b. Pro. That is my view completely, and I accept it as stated.

> Greek: 39b. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα οὕτως.

[¶139] Soc. Then accept also the presence of another workman in our souls at such a time.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

[¶140] Pro. What workman?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τίνα;

[¶141] Soc. A painter, who paints in our souls pictures to illustrate the words which the writer has written.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

[¶142] Pro. But how do we say he does this, and when?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

[¶143] Soc. When a man receives from sight or some other sense the opinions and utterances of the moment and afterwards beholds in his own mind the images of those opinions and utterances.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν ἀπʼ ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως.

[¶144] 39c. That happens to us often enough, does it not?

> Greek: 39c. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενον παρʼ ἡμῖν;

[¶145] Pro. It certainly does.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

[¶146] Soc. And the images of the true opinions are true, and those of the false are false?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

[¶147] Pro. Assuredly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασιν.

[¶148] Soc. Then if we are right about that, let us consider a further question.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα.

[¶149] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶150] Soc. Whether this is an inevitable experience in relation to the present and the past, but not in relation to the future.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτα ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ;

[¶151] Pro. It is in the same relation to all kinds of time.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. περὶ ἁπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.

[¶152] 39d. Soc. Was it not said a while ago that the pleasures and pains which belong to the soul alone might come before the pleasures and pains of the body, so that we have the pleasure and pain of anticipation, which relate to the future?

> Greek: 39d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοιντʼ ἄν, ὥσθʼ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;

[¶153] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶154] Soc. Do the writings and pictures, then, which we imagined a little while ago to exist within us, relate to the past and present, but not to the future?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστίν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν;

[¶155] 39e. Pro. To the future especially.

> Greek: 39e. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶156] Soc. Do you say “to the future especially” because they are all hopes relating to the future and we are always filled with hopes all our lives?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

[¶157] Pro. Precisely.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶158] Soc. Well, here is a further question for you to answer.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι.

[¶159] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶160] Soc. A just, pious, and good man is surely a friend of the gods, is he not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρʼ οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν;

[¶161] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶162] 40. Soc. And an unjust and thoroughly bad man is the reverse?

> Greek: 40. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἆρʼ οὐ τοὐναντίον ἐκείνῳ;

[¶163] 40a. Pro. Of course.

> Greek: 40a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶164] Soc. But, as we were just now saying, every man is full of many hopes?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέμει;

[¶165] Pro. Yes, to be sure.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶166] Soc. And there are in all of us written words which we call hopes?

> Greek: ΣΩ. λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν;

[¶167] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶168] Soc. And also the images painted there; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα· καί τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.

[¶169] 40b. Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: 40b. ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶170] Soc. Shall we or shall we not say that of these pictures those are for the most part true which are presented to the good, because they are friends of the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for the most part false?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ ⟨τὸ⟩ πολὺ τοὐναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

[¶171] Pro. Surely we must say that.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα φατέον.

[¶172] Soc. Then the bad also, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are false pleasures.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἧττον πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗταί που.

[¶173] Pro. Yes, surely.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶174] 40c. Soc. Then the bad rejoice for the most part in the false, and the good in true pleasures.

> Greek: 40c. ΣΩ. ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

[¶175] Pro. That is inevitably true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

[¶176] Soc. According to our present view, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures; and pains likewise.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰσὶν δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, καὶ λῦπαι δὲ ὡσαύτως.

[¶177] Pro. There are.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰσίν.

[¶178] Soc. We saw, you remember, that he who had an opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it was sometimes not based upon realities, whether present, past, or future.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπʼ οὖσι δὲ μηδʼ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδὲ ἐπʼ ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

[¶179] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.

[¶180] 40d. Soc. And this it was, I believe, which created false opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not?

> Greek: 40d. ΣΩ. καὶ ταῦτά γε ἦν οἶμαι τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἦ γάρ;

[¶181] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶182] Soc. Very well, must we not also grant that pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to realities?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;

[¶183] Pro. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶184] Soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.

[¶185] 40e. Pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case.

> Greek: 40e. ΠΡΩ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

[¶186] Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε;

[¶187] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶188] Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

[¶189] Pro. No.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως.

[¶190] Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἡδονάς γʼ οἶμαι κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶν πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.

[¶191] 41a. Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil.

> Greek: 41a. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας. σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

[¶192] Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers;

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὔσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον.

[¶193] 41b. for this may help us to reach our decisions.

> Greek: 41b. τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

[¶194] Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.

[¶195] Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶν κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι.

[¶196] Pro. Good.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καλῶς.

[¶197] Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument.

> Greek: ΣΩ. περιιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

[¶198] Pro. Let us do so.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴωμεν.

[¶199] Soc. We said, you may remember, a little while ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται.

[¶200] 41c. Pro. I remember; that was said.

> Greek: 41c. ΠΡΩ. μεμνήμεθα καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.

[¶201] Soc. And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἤ τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον;

[¶202] Pro. Yes, that was the case.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶203] Soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances.

> Greek: ΣΩ. συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

[¶204] Pro. Go on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε.

[¶205] 41d. Soc. What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now.

> Greek: 41d. ΣΩ. γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ᾖ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρʼ ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐφάνη.

[¶206] Pro. Yes, that is clear.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν.

[¶207] Soc. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται;

[¶208] Pro. What?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶209] Soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην.

[¶210] Pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἴρηται. τί μήν;

[¶211] Soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly of this?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;

[¶212] 41e. Pro. How and in what way do you mean?

> Greek: 41e. ΠΡΩ. πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς;

[¶213] Soc. I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἑκάστοτε τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.

[¶214] Pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη.

[¶215] 42. Soc. Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures?

> Greek: 42. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δʼ ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

[¶216] 42a. Pro. Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the case of sight.

> Greek: 42a. ΠΡΩ. πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶217] Soc. Then our present conclusion is the opposite of what we said a little while ago.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.

[¶218] Pro. To what do you refer?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

[¶219] Soc. A while ago these opinions, being false or true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own condition of truth or falsehood.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὗται γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρʼ αὑταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.

[¶220] 42b. Pro. Very true.

> Greek: 42b. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶221] Soc. But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they.

> Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρʼ ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δʼ αὖ διὰ τὸ παρʼ ἡδονὰς τοὐναντίον ἐκείναις.

[¶222] Pro. That is inevitable for the reasons you have given.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

[¶223] Soc. They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδʼ αὖ ποτε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

[¶224] 42c. Pro. No, I cannot.

> Greek: 42c. ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶225] Soc. Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false than these appearing and existing in living beings.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.

[¶226] Pro. What pleasures and what method do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

[¶227] Soc. It has been said many times that pains and woes and aches and everything that is called by names of that sort are caused when nature in any instance is corrupted through combinations and dissolutions, fillings and emptyings, increases and diminutions.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἴρηταί που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι καί τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ὀνόματα ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

[¶228] 42d. Pro. Yes, that has been said many times.

> Greek: 42d. ΠΡΩ. ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.

[¶229] Soc. And we agreed that when things are restored to their natural condition, that restoration is pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

[¶230] Pro. Right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶231] Soc. But when neither of these changes takes place in the body, what then?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ;

[¶232] Pro. When could that be the case, Socrates?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πότε δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶233] 42e. Soc. That question of yours is not to the point, Protarchus.

> Greek: 42e. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα.

[¶234] Pro. Why not?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δή;

[¶235] Soc. Because you do not prevent my asking my own question again.

> Greek: ΣΩ. διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύεις με διερέσθαι σε πάλιν.

[¶236] Pro. What question?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίαν;

[¶237] Soc. Why, Protarchus, I may say, granting that such a condition does not arise, what would be the necessary result if it did?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;

[¶238] Pro. You mean if the body is not changed in either direction?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα φῄς;

[¶239] Soc. Yes.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτως.

[¶240] Pro. It is clear, Socrates, that in that case there would never be either pleasure or pain.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτʼ ἄν τις λύπη.

[¶241] 43a. Soc. Excellent. But you believe, I fancy, that some such change must always be taking place in us, as the philosophers say; for all things are always flowing and shifting.

> Greek: 43a. ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τόδε λέγεις, ὡς ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.

[¶242] Pro. Yes, that is what they say, and I think their theory is important.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

[¶243] Soc. Of course it is, in view of their own importance. But I should like to avoid this argument which is rushing at us. I am going to run away; come along and escape with me.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδʼ οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι σύμφευγε.

[¶244] Pro. What is your way of escape?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε ὅπῃ.

[¶245] Soc. “We grant you all this” let us say to them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους·

[¶246] 43b. But answer me this, Protarchus, are we and all other living beings always conscious of everything that happens to us of our growth and all that sort of thing—or is the truth quite the reverse of that?

> Greek: 43b. σὺ δʼ ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν ἐμψύχων, ταῦτʼ αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτʼ αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

[¶247] Pro. Quite the reverse, surely; for we are almost entirely unconscious of everything of that sort.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἅπαν δήπου τοὐναντίον· ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθʼ ἡμᾶς.

[¶248] Soc. Then we were not right in saying just now that the fluctuations and changes cause pains and pleasures.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

[¶249] Pro. No, certainly not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶250] 43c. Soc. A better and more unassailable statement would be this.

> Greek: 43c. ΣΩ. ὧδʼ ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον.

[¶251] Pro. What?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶252] Soc. That the great changes cause pains and pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones cause no pains or pleasures at all.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δʼ αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

[¶253] Pro. That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότερον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶254] Soc. But if that is the case, the life of which we spoke just now would come back again.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἥκοι.

[¶255] Pro. What life?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖος;

[¶256] Soc. The life which we said was painless and without joys.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὃν ἄλυπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

[¶257] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶258] Soc. Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two; or do you disagree?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δʼ αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δʼ ἕνα μηδέτερα.

[¶259] 43d. Pro. No, I agree to this, that there are the three lives.
Soc. Then freedom from pain would not be identical with pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. When you hear anyone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live all one’s life without pain, what do you understand him to mean?
Pro. I think he means that freedom from pain is pleasure.
Soc. Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two.

> Greek: 43d. ἢ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
ΣΩ. ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;
ΠΡΩ. ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

[¶260] 43e. Pro. Agreed.
Soc. Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly.
Pro. No, certainly not. Soc. But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons who call it and consider it so.

> Greek: 43e. ΣΩ. τριῶν ὄντων οὖν ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίοσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δʼ ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ τὸ μηδέτερα τούτων.
ΠΡΩ. κεῖται.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτο ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς ἄν;
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτʼ εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτʼ εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶261] 44a. Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Do they, then, think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain?
Pro. That is what they say.
Soc. Then they do think they feel pleasure at such times; for otherwise they would not say so.
Pro. Most likely.
Soc. Certainly, then, they have a false opinion about pleasure, if there is an essential difference between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain.
Pro. And we certainly found that difference.
Soc. Then shall we adopt the view that there are, as we said just now, three states, or that there are only two—pain, which is an evil to mankind, and freedom from pain, which is of itself a good and is called pleasure?

> Greek: 44a. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;
ΠΡΩ. φασὶ γοῦν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.
ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει.
ΣΩ. ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μὴν χωρίς γε ἦν.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρʼ ἡμῖν ταῦτʼ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δʼ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσαγορεύεσθαι;

[¶262] 44b. Pro. Why do we ask ourselves that question now, Socrates? I do not understand.

> Greek: 44b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

[¶263] Soc. No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not understand about the enemies of our friend Philebus.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις;

[¶264] Pro. Whom do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;

[¶265] Soc. Certain men who are said to be master thinkers about nature, and who deny the existence of pleasures altogether.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.

[¶266] Pro. Is it possible?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶267] 44c. Soc. They say that what Philebus and his school call pleasures are all merely refuges from pain.

> Greek: 44c. ΣΩ. λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

[¶268] Pro. Do you recommend that we adopt their view, Socrates?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶269] Soc. No, but that we make use of them as seers who divine the truth, not by acquired skill, but by some innate and not ignoble repugnance which makes them hate the power of pleasure and think it so utterly unsound that its very attractiveness is mere trickery, not pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονήν, εἶναι.

[¶270] 44d. You may make use of them in this way, considering also their other expressions of dislike; and after that you shall learn of the pleasures which seem to me to be true, in order that we may consider the power of pleasure from both points of view and form our judgement by comparing them.

> Greek: 44d. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἵ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι πεύσῃ, ἵνα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

[¶271] Pro. You are right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

[¶272] Soc. Let us, then, consider these men as allies and follow them in the track of their dislike. I fancy their method would be to begin somewhere further back and ask whether, if we wished to discover the nature of any class—take the hard, for instance—we should be more likely to learn it by looking at the hardest things or at the least hard.

> Greek: ΣΩ. μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους, ὥσπερ συμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι;

## 4. 44e–56b

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/#p-N

[¶0] 44e. Now you, Protarchus, must reply to them as you have been replying to me.

> Greek: 44e. δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχερέσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

[¶1] Pro. By all means, and I say to them that we should look at the greatest things.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

[¶2] 45. Soc. Then if we wished to discover what the nature of pleasure is, we should look, not at the smallest pleasures, but at those which are considered most extreme and intense.

> Greek: 45. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥντινά ποτʼ ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

[¶3] 45a. Pro. Every one would agree to that now.

> Greek: 45a. ΠΡΩ. πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτῃ συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.

[¶4] Soc. And the commonest and greatest pleasures are, as we have often said, those connected with the body, are they not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, αἱ πρόχειροί γε αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὗται;

[¶5] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶6] Soc. Are they greater, then, and do they become greater in those who are ill or in those who are in health? Let us take care not to answer hastily and fall into error. Perhaps we might say they are greater in those who are in health.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

[¶7] 45b. Pro. That is reasonable.
Soc. Yes, but are not those pleasures the greatest which gratify the greatest desires?
Pro. That is true.
Soc. But do not people who are in a fever, or in similar diseases, feel more intensely thirst and cold and other bodily sufferings which they usually have; and do they not feel greater want, followed by greater pleasure when their want is satisfied? Is this true, or not?

> Greek: 45b. ΠΡΩ. εἰκός γε.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται;
ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλόν τʼ ἐνδείᾳ συγγίγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται.

[¶8] 45c. Pro. Now that you have said it, it certainly appears to be true.
Soc. Then should we appear to be right in saying that if we wished to discover the greatest pleasures we should have to look, not at health, but at disease? Now do not imagine that I mean to ask you whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but assume that I am asking about the greatness of pleasure, and where the greatest intensity of such feeling normally occurs. For we say that it is our task to discover the nature of pleasure and what those who deny its existence altogether say that it is.

> Greek: 45c. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλʼ εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δὲ μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλʼ οἴου μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτε γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ φαμεν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

[¶9] 45d. Pro. I think I understand you.

> Greek: 45d. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἕπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.

[¶10] Soc. Presently, Protarchus, you will show that more clearly, for I want you to answer a question. Do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean greater in number, but greater in intensity and degree—in riotous living or in a life of self-restraint? Be careful about your reply.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἧττον δείξεις. ἀπόκριναι γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονάς—οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας—ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

[¶11] Pro. I understand you, and I see that there is a great difference. For the self-restrained are always held in check by the advice of the proverbial expression “nothing too much,” which guides their actions; but intense pleasure holds sway over the foolish and dissolute even to the point of madness and makes them notorious.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμιαζόμενος ἐπίσχει λόγος ἑκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακελευόμενος, ᾧ πείθονται·

[¶12] 45e. Soc. Good; and if that is true, it is clear that the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains originate in some depravity of soul and body, not in virtue.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Then we must select some of these pleasures and see what there is about them which made us say that they are the greatest.

> Greek: 45e. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.
ΣΩ. καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

[¶13] 46a. Pro. Yes, we must.

> Greek: 46a. ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶14] Soc. Now see what there is about the pleasures which are related to certain diseases.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον.

[¶15] Pro. What diseases?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίων;

[¶16] Soc. Repulsive diseases which the philosophers of dislike whom we mentioned utterly abominate.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὓς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς μισοῦσι παντελῶς.

[¶17] Pro. What are the pleasures?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας;

[¶18] Soc. For instance, the relief of the itch and the like by scratching, no other treatment being required. For in Heaven’s name what shall we say the feeling is which we have in this case? Is it pleasure or pain?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

[¶19] Pro. I think, Socrates, it is a mixed evil.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σύμμεικτον τοῦτό γʼ ἄρʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε γίγνεσθαί τι κακόν.

[¶20] 46b. Soc. I did not introduce this question on Philebus’ account; but unless we consider these pleasures and those that follow in their train, Protarchus, we can probably never settle the point at issue.

> Greek: 46b. ΣΩ. οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἕνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

[¶21] Pro. Then we must attack this family of pleasures.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων συγγενεῖς.

[¶22] Soc. You mean those which are mixed?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς ἐν τῇ μείξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις;

[¶23] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶24] Soc. Some mixtures are concerned with the body and are in the body only, and some belong only to the soul and are in the soul;

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰσὶ τοίνυν μείξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ·

[¶25] 46c. and we shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to the soul and to the body, and these are sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains.

> Greek: 46c. τὰς δʼ αὖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρήσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μειχθείσας τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ συναμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλουμένας.

[¶26] Pro. How so?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶27] Soc. Whenever, in the process of restoration or destruction, anyone has two opposite feelings, as we sometimes are cold, but are growing warm, or are hot, but are growing cold, the desire of having the one and being free from the other, the mixture of bitter and sweet, as they say, joined with the difficulty in getting rid of the bitter, produces impatience and, later, wild excitement.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τἀναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται, ζητῶν οἶμαι τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμειγμένον, μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

[¶28] 46d. Pro. What you say is perfectly true.

> Greek: 46d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

[¶29] Soc. And such mixtures sometimes consist of equal pains and pleasures and sometimes contain more of one or the other, do they not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μείξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων;

[¶30] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶31] Soc. In the case of the mixtures in which the pains are more than the pleasures—say the itch, which we mentioned just now, or tickling—when the burning inflammation is within and is not reached by the rubbing and scratching, which separate only such mixtures as are on the surface, sometimes by bringing the affected parts to the fire or to something cold we change from wretchedness to inexpressible pleasures, and sometimes the opposition between the internal and the external produces a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever happens to preponderate; this is the result of the forcible separation of combined elements,

> Greek: ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνωνται—τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νυνδὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν—ὁπόταν ⟨ἐν τοῖς⟩ ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ᾖ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆταί τις, τὸ δʼ ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ, τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τοὐναντίον πυρίαις μεταβάλλοντες ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους ἡδονάς, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἔξω, λύπας ἡδοναῖς συγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερʼ ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν

[¶32] 47a. or the combination of those that were separate, and the concomitant juxtaposition of pains and pleasures.

> Greek: 47a. —[καὶ] ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι.

[¶33] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶34] Soc. And when the pleasure is the predominant element in the mixture, the slight tincture of pain tickles a man and makes him mildly impatient, or again an excessive proportion of pleasure excites him and sometimes even makes him leap for joy; it produces in him all sorts of colors, attitudes, and paintings, and even causes great amazement and foolish shouting, does it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ ⟨τὰ⟩ τοιαῦτα πάντα συμμειχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμειγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἠρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δʼ αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλέον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἀπεργαζόμενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετὰ ἀφροσύνης ἐνεργάζεται;

[¶35] 47b. Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: 47b. ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε.

[¶36] Soc. And it makes him say of himself, and others say of him, that he is pleased to death with these delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit of these pleasures; he calls them the greatest of all things and counts that man the happiest who lives most entirely in the enjoyment of them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ λέγειν τε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνῄσκει· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ, καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐταῖς ὅτι μάλιστʼ ἀεὶ ζῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

[¶37] Pro. Socrates, you have described admirably what happens in the case of most people.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

[¶38] 47c. Soc. That may be, Protarchus, so far as concerns purely bodily pleasures in which internal and external sensations unite; but concerning the pleasures in which the soul and the body contribute opposite elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other’s pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single mixture—concerning these I said before that when a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices in his expectation, but is pained by his emptiness, and now I add, what I did not say at that time, that in all these cases, which are innumerable, of opposition between soul and body, there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure.

> Greek: 47c. ΣΩ. περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δέ γʼ ὧν ψυχὴ σώματι τἀναντία συμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστʼ εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι, ταῦτα ἔμπροσθε μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς, ὁπόταν [αὖ] κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὖσι μεῖξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς συμπίπτει γενομένη.

[¶39] 47d. Pro. I believe you are quite right.

> Greek: 47d. ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.

[¶40] Soc. One further mixture of pain and pleasure is left.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μείξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

[¶41] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποία, φῄς;

[¶42] Soc. That mixture of its own feelings which we said the soul often experiences.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἣν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὑτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν.

[¶43] Pro. And what do we call this?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

[¶44] 47e. Soc. Do you not regard anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains of the soul and the soul only?

> Greek: 47e. ΣΩ. ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρʼ οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

[¶45] Pro. I do.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔγωγε.

[¶46] 48. Soc. And shall we not find them full of ineffable pleasures? Or must I remind you of the anger?
Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath,
And sweeter is than honey from the comb, and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find in mournings and longings?

> Greek: 48. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὑρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων; ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι [τὸ ⟨ἐν⟩ τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς,] τὸ
ὅς τʼ ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι
ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο, καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας ἀναμεμειγμένας;

[¶47] 48a. Pro. No, you need not remind me; those things occur just as you suggest.

> Greek: 48a. ΠΡΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν συμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

[¶48] Soc. And you remember, too, how people enjoy weeping at tragedies?

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

[¶49] Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶50] Soc. And are you aware of the condition of the soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture of pain and pleasure?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν δʼ ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἆρʼ οἶσθʼ ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μεῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

[¶51] Pro. I do not quite understand.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ.

[¶52] 48b. Soc. Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarchus, to understand such a condition under those circumstances.

> Greek: 48b. ΣΩ. παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ συννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε πάθος.

[¶53] Pro. No at least I do not find it so.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν ὥς γʼ ἔοικεν ἐμοί.

[¶54] Soc. Well, then, let us take this under consideration, all the more because of its obscurity; then we can more readily understand the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾷον καταμαθεῖν τις οἷός τʼ ᾖ μεῖξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

[¶55] Pro. Please go on.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγοις ἄν.

[¶56] Soc. Would you say that envy, which was mentioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τό τοι νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

[¶57] Pro. I say it is.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶58] Soc. But certainly we see the envious man rejoicing in the misfortunes of his neighbors.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

[¶59] 48c. Pro. Yes, very much so.

> Greek: 48c. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶60] Soc. Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what we call stupidity.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἕξιν.

[¶61] Pro. Surely.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶62] Soc. Next, then, consider the nature of the ridiculous.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει.

[¶63] Pro. Please proceed.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶64] Soc. The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξεώς τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δʼ αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

[¶65] Pro. You mean “Know thyself,” Socrates?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶66] 48d. Soc. Yes; and the opposite of that, in the language of the inscription, would evidently be not to know oneself at all.
Pro. Of course.
Soc. Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
Pro. How do you mean? I am afraid I can never do it.
Soc. Then you say that I must now make the division?
Pro. Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides.
Soc. Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their condition in one of three ways?
Pro. How is that?
Soc. First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is richer than he is.

> Greek: 48d. ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. τοὐναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῇ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος ἂν εἴη.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν.
ΠΡΩ. πῇ φῄς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.
ΣΩ. λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν;
ΠΡΩ. λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὑτοὺς κατὰ τρία ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶67] 48e. Pro. Certainly a good many are affected in that way.
Soc. And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than is the case.
Pro. Certainly. Soc. But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do not.
Pro. Yes, most decidedly.
Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one to which people in general lay claim, thereby filling themselves with strife and false conceit of wisdom?
Pro. Yes, to be sure.
Soc. And we should surely be right in calling all that an evil condition.
Pro. Very much so.
Soc. Then this must further be divided into two parts, if we are to gain insight into childish envy with its absurd mixture of pleasure and pain. “How shall we divide it,” do you say? All who have this false and foolish conceit of themselves fall, like the rest of mankind, into two classes: some necessarily have strength and power, others, as I believe, the reverse.

> Greek: 48e. ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν.
ΠΡΩ. πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶν τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.
ΣΩ. πλείους δέ γε οἳ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὑτοὺς δοξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε οἶμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετῇ δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. τῶν ἀρετῶν δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν. πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις;

[¶68] 49b. Pro. Yes, necessarily.
Soc. Make the division, then, on that principle; those of them who have this false conceit and are weak and unable to revenge themselves when they are laughed at you may truly call ridiculous, but those who are strong and able to revenge themselves you will define most correctly to yourself by calling them powerful, terrible, and hateful, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and infamous—since whether real or feigned it injures their neighbors—but ignorance in the weak appears to us as naturally ridiculous.

> Greek: 49b. πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἕπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ οἶμαι τοὐναντίον.
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετʼ ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς φοβεροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις.

[¶69] 49c. Pro. Quite right. But the mixture of pleasure and pain in all this is not yet clear to me.
Soc. First, then, take up the nature of envy.
Pro. Go on. Soc. Is envy a kind of unrighteous pain and also a pleasure?
Pro. Undoubtedly.
Soc. But it is neither wrong nor envious to rejoice in the misfortunes of our enemies, is it?
Pro. No, of course not.
Soc. But when people sometimes see the misfortunes of their friends and rejoice instead of grieving, is not that wrong?
Pro. Of course it is.
Soc. And we said that ignorance was an evil to every one, did we not?
Pro. True.
Soc. Then the false conceits of our friends concerning their wisdom, their beauty, and their other qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they are weak, but hateful when they are powerful.

> Greek: 49c. ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά— βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσιν—ἡ δʼ ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μεῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὔπω μοι καταφανής.
ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή;
ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὔτʼ ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὁρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἆρα οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.
ΣΩ. τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶν λέγοντες εἴδεσιν γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσα ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δʼ ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα, ⟨φῶμεν⟩ ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;

[¶70] 49e. Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes of others?
Pro. Certainly it is ridiculous.
Soc. And do we not agree that ignorance is in itself a misfortune?
Pro. Yes, a great one.
Soc. And do we feel pleasure or pain when we laugh at it?

> Greek: 49e. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δʼ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν γε οὖσαν εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

[¶71] 50a. Pro. Pleasure, evidently.

> Greek: 50a. ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

[¶72] Soc. Did we not say that pleasure in the misfortunes of friends was caused by envy?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτʼ ἀπεργαζόμενον;

[¶73] Pro. There can be no other cause.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶74] Soc. Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these two are present at the same time on such occasions.

> Greek: ΣΩ. γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

[¶75] Pro. True.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶76] 50b. Soc. So now our argument shows that in mournings and tragedies and comedies, not merely on the stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life, and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with pleasure.

> Greek: 50b. ΣΩ. μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις ⟨καὶ κωμῳδίαις⟩, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

[¶77] Pro. It is impossible not to agree with that, Socrates, even though one be most eager to maintain the opposite opinion.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καί τις φιλονικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.

[¶78] Soc. Again we mentioned anger, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like, as conditions in which we should find a mixture of the two elements we have now often named, did we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα καὶ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μειγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα.

[¶79] 50c. Pro. Yes.
Soc. And we understand that all the details I have been describing just now are concerned only with sorrow and envy and anger?
Pro. Of course we understand that.
Soc. Then there are still many others of those conditions left for us to discuss.
Pro. Yes, very many.
Soc. Now why do you particularly suppose I pointed out to you the mixture of pain and pleasure in comedy? Was it not for the sake of convincing you, because it is easy to show the mixture in love and fear and the rest, and because I thought that when you had made this example your own, you would relieve me from the necessity of discussing those other conditions in detail, and would simply accept the fact that in the affections of the body apart from the soul, of the soul apart from the body, and of the two in common, there are plentiful mixtures of pain and pleasure?

> Greek: 50c. ἦ γάρ;
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νυνδὴ διαπερανθέντα;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
ΣΩ. διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μεῖξιν; ἆρʼ οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι·

[¶80] 50d. So tell me; will you let me off, or will you keep on till midnight? But I think I need say only a few words to induce you to let me off. I will agree to give you an account of all these matters tomorrow, but now I wish to steer my bark towards the remaining points that are needful for the judgement which Philebus demands.

> Greek: 50d. λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετʼ ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

[¶81] 50e. Pro. Good, Socrates; just finish what remains in any way you please.

> Greek: 50e. ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

[¶82] Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures we should naturally and almost of necessity proceed in turn to the unmixed.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μειχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμείκτους πορευοίμεθʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

[¶83] 51a. Pro. Very good.

> Greek: 51a. ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες.

[¶84] Soc. So I will turn to them and try to explain them; for I do not in the least agree with those who say that all pleasures are merely surcease from pain, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any way real, and that there are others which appear to be both great and numerous, but are really mixed up with pains and with cessations of the greatest pains and distresses of body and soul.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δʼ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δʼ αὐτὰς συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.

[¶85] 51b. Pro. But what pleasures, Socrates, may rightly be considered true?

> Greek: 51b. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθεῖς δʼ αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτʼ ἄν;

[¶86] Soc. Those arising from what are called beautiful colors, or from forms, most of those that arise from odors and sounds, in short all those the want of which is unfelt and painless, whereas the satisfaction furnished by them is felt by the senses, pleasant, and unmixed with pain.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν.

[¶87] Pro. Once more, Socrates, what do you mean by this?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτω;

[¶88] Soc. My meaning is certainly not clear at the first glance, and I must try to make it so.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν ἃ λέγω, πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν.

[¶89] 51c. For when I say beauty of form, I am trying to express, not what most people would understand by the words, such as the beauty of animals or of paintings, but I mean, says the argument, the straight line and the circle and the plane and solid figures formed from these by turning-lathes and rulers and patterns of angles; perhaps you understand. For I assert that the beauty of these is not relative, like that of other things, but they are always absolutely beautiful by nature and have peculiar pleasures in no way subject to comparison with the pleasures of scratching; and there are colors which possess beauty and pleasures of this character.

> Greek: 51c. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλʼ εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ καλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς·

[¶90] 51d. Do you understand?

> Greek: 51d. καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς] ἀλλʼ ἆρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς;

[¶91] Pro. I am trying to do so, Socrates; and I hope you also will try to make your meaning still clearer.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πειρῶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

[¶92] Soc. I mean that those sounds which are smooth and clear and send forth a single pure note are beautiful, not relatively, but absolutely, and that there are pleasures which pertain to these by nature and result from them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ ἠχὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλʼ αὐτὰς καθʼ αὑτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων συμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας.

[¶93] Pro. Yes, that also is true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

[¶94] 51e. Soc. The pleasures of smell are a less divine class; but they have no necessary pains mixed with them, and wherever and in whatever we find this freedom from pain, I regard it always as a mark of similarity to those other pleasures. These, then, are two classes of the pleasures of which I am speaking. Do you understand me?
Pro. I understand.

> Greek: 51e. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμεῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτʼ ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλʼ, εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἴδη δύο ⟨ὧν⟩ λέγομεν ἡδονῶν.
ΠΡΩ. κατανοῶ. ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένας.

[¶95] 52a. Soc. And further let us add to these the pleasures of knowledge, if they appear to us not to have hunger for knowledge or pangs of such hunger as their source.
Pro. I agree to that.
Soc. Well, if men are full of knowledge and then lose it through forgetfulness, do you see any pains in the losses?
Pro. Not by their inherent nature, but sometimes there is pain in reflecting on the event, when a man who has lost knowledge is pained by the lack of it.

> Greek: 52a. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὕτω συνδοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινας ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;
ΠΡΩ. οὔ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλʼ ἔν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν.

[¶96] 52b. Soc. True, my dear fellow, but just at present we are recounting natural feelings only, not reflection.

> Greek: 52b. ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.

[¶97] Pro. Then you are right in saying that we feel no pain in the loss of knowledge.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

[¶98] Soc. Then we may say that these pleasures of knowledge are unmixed with pain and are felt not by the many but only by very few.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμείκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

[¶99] Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον;

[¶100] 52c. Soc. And now that we have fairly well separated the pure pleasures and those which may be pretty correctly called impure, let us add the further statement that the intense pleasures are without measure and those of the opposite sort have measure; those which admit of greatness and intensity and are often or seldom great or intense we shall assign to the class of the infinite, which circulates more or less freely through the body and soul alike, and the others we shall assign to the class of the limited.

> Greek: 52c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ ⟨τὰς⟩ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ ⟨δεχομένας⟩, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκείνου καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου [προς]θῶμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων.

[¶101] 52d. Pro. Quite right, Socrates.

> Greek: 52d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶102] Soc. There is still another question about them to be considered.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

[¶103] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶104] Soc. What kind of thing is most closely related to truth? The pure and unadulterated, or the violent, the widespread, the great, and the sufficient?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἰταμόν;

[¶105] Pro. What is your object, Socrates, in asking that question?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος;

[¶106] Soc. My object, Protarchus, is to leave no gap in my test of pleasure and knowledge, if some part of each of them is pure and some part impure, in order that each of them may offer itself for judgement in a condition of purity, and thus make the judgement easier for you and me and all our audience.

> Greek: ΣΩ. μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, τὸ δʼ οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἑκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ συνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾴω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

[¶107] 52e. Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: 52e. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶108] Soc. Very well, let us adopt that point of view towards all the classes which we call pure. First let us select one of them and examine it.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὑτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἕν τι σκοπῶμεν.

[¶109] 53a. Pro. Which shall we select?

> Greek: 53a. ΠΡΩ. τί οὖν προελώμεθα;

[¶110] Soc. Let us first, if agreeable to you, consider whiteness.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γένος.

[¶111] Pro. By all means.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶112] Soc. How can we have purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is it the greatest and most widespread, or the most unmixed, that in which there is no trace of any other color?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδενὸς ἐνείη;

[¶113] Pro. Clearly it is the most unadulterated.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστʼ εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.

[¶114] Soc. Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus, declare that this, and not the most numerous or the greatest, is both the truest and the most beautiful of all whitenesses?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

[¶115] 53b. Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: 53b. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατά γε.

[¶116] Soc. Then we shall be perfectly right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful and truer than a great deal of mixed white.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμειγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.

[¶117] Pro. Perfectly right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

[¶118] Soc. Well then, we shall have no need of many such examples in our discussion of pleasure; we see well enough from this one that any pleasure, however small or infrequent, if uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more beautiful than a great or often repeated pleasure without purity.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐ δήπου πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ σύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, καθαρὰ λύπης, ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτʼ ἄν.

[¶119] 53c. Pro. Most certainly; and the example is sufficient.

> Greek: 53c. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα ἱκανόν.

[¶120] Soc. Here is another point. Have we not often heard it said of pleasure that it is always a process or generation and that there is no state or existence of pleasure? There are some clever people who try to prove this theory to us, and we ought to be grateful to them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

[¶121] Pro. Well, what then?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δή;

[¶122] Soc. I will explain this whole matter, Protarchus, by asking questions.

> Greek: ΣΩ. διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε.

[¶123] 53d. Pro. Go on; ask your questions.

> Greek: 53d. ΠΡΩ. λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

[¶124] Soc. There are two parts of existence, the one self-existent, the other always desiring something else.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, τὸ δʼ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.

[¶125] Pro. What do you mean? What are these two?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

[¶126] Soc. The one is by nature more imposing, the other inferior.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δʼ ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

[¶127] Pro. Speak still more plainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

[¶128] Soc. We have seen beloved boys who are fair and good, and brave lovers of them.

> Greek: ΣΩ. παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

[¶129] Pro. Yes, no doubt of it.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶130] Soc. Try to find another pair like these in all the relations we are speaking of.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δύο ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ πάνθʼ ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

[¶131] 53e. Pro. Must I say it a third time? Please tell your meaning more plainly, Socrates.

> Greek: 53e. ΠΡΩ. τὸ τρίτον ἔτʼ ἐρῶ; λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι λέγεις.

[¶132] Soc. It is no riddle, Protarchus; the talk is merely jesting with us and means that one part of existences always exists for the sake of something, and the other part is that for the sake of which the former is always coming into being.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῷν, λέγει δʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστʼ ἀεί, τὸ δʼ οὗ χάριν ἑκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται.

[¶133] Pro. I can hardly understand after all your repetition.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

[¶134] 54. Soc. Perhaps, my boy, you will understand better as the discussion proceeds.

> Greek: 54. ΣΩ. τάχα δʼ ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.

[¶135] 54a. Pro. I hope so.

> Greek: 54a. ΠΡΩ. τί γὰρ οὔ;

[¶136] Soc. Let us take another pair.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν.

[¶137] Pro. What are they?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;

[¶138] Soc. One is the generation of all things (the process of coming into being), the other is existence or being.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἓν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἕν.

[¶139] Pro. I accept your two, generation and being.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. δύο ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.

[¶140] Soc. Quite right. Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of the other, generation for the sake of being, or being for the sake of generation?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

[¶141] Pro. You are now asking whether that which is called being is what it is for the sake of generation?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνῃ;

[¶142] Soc. Yes, plainly.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φαίνομαι.

[¶143] 54b. Pro. For Heaven’s sake, is this the kind of question you keep asking me, “Tell me, Protarchus, whether you think shipbuilding is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of shipbuilding,” and all that sort of thing?
Soc. Yes; that is just what I mean, Protarchus.
Pro. Then why did you not answer it yourself, Socrates?
Soc. There is no reason why I should not; but I want you to take part in the discussion.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. I say that drugs and all sorts of instruments and materials are always employed for the sake of production or generation, but that every instance of generation is for the sake of some being or other, and generation in general is for the sake of being in general.

> Greek: 54b. ΠΡΩ. πρὸς θεῶν ἆρʼ [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με τοιόνδε τι; λέγʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, μοί, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῂς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας, καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστίν;
ΣΩ. λέγω τοῦτʼ αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε.
ΠΡΩ. τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ὅτι οὔ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶144] 54c. Pro. That is very clear.
Soc. Then pleasure, if it is a form of generation, would be generated for the sake of some form of being.
Pro. Of course.
Soc. Now surely that for the sake of which anything is generated is in the class of the good, and that which is generated for the sake of something else, my friend, must be placed in another class.

> Greek: 54c. ΣΩ. φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἑκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, σύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι συμπάσης.
ΠΡΩ. σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτʼ ἄν.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτʼ ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατον.

[¶145] 54d. Pro. Most undeniably.
Soc. Then if pleasure is a form of generation, we shall be right in placing it in a class other than that of the good, shall we not?
Pro. Quite right.
Soc. Then, as I said when we began to discuss this point, we ought to be grateful to him who pointed out that there is only a generation, but no existence, of pleasure; for he is clearly making a laughing-stock of those who assert that pleasure is a good.
Pro. Yes, most emphatically.
Soc. And he will also surely make a laughing-stock of all those who find their highest end in forms of generation.

> Greek: 54d. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶146] 54e. Pro. How is that, and to whom do you refer?
Soc. To those who, when cured of hunger or thirst or any of the troubles which are cured by generation are pleased because of the generation, as if it were pleasure, and say that they would not wish to live without thirst and hunger and the like, if they could not experience the feelings which follow after them.

> Greek: 54e. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν αὑτὸς οὗτος ἑκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;
ΣΩ. τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιᾶται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδονῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τἆλλα ἅ τις ἂν εἴποι πάντα τὰ ἑπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες.

[¶147] 55a. Pro. That seems to be their view.

> Greek: 55a. ΠΡΩ. ἐοίκασι γοῦν.

[¶148] Soc. We should all agree that the opposite of generation is destruction, should we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τοὐναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν.

[¶149] Pro. Inevitably.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον.

[¶150] Soc. And he who chooses as they do would be choosing destruction and generation, not that third life in which there was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἱροῖτʼ ἄν τις τοῦθʼ αἱρούμενος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δʼ ἦν [δυνατὸν] ὡς οἷόν τε καθαρώτατα.

[¶151] Pro. It is a great absurdity, as it appears, Socrates, to tell us that pleasure is a good.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆται.

[¶152] Soc. Yes, a great absurdity, and let us go still further.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν.

[¶153] Pro. How?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ;

[¶154] 55b. Soc. Is it not absurd to say that there is nothing good in the body or many other things, but only in the soul, and that in the soul the only good is pleasure, and that courage and self-restraint and understanding and all the other good things of the soul are nothing of the sort; and beyond all this to be obliged to say that he who is not feeling pleasure, and is feeling pain, is bad when he feels pain, though he be the best of men, and that he who feels pleasure is, when he feels pleasure, the more excellent in virtue the greater the pleasure he feels?

> Greek: 55b. ΣΩ. πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτʼ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἴληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κἂν ᾖ ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

[¶155] 55c. Pro. All that, Socrates, is the height of absurdity.

> Greek: 55c. ΠΡΩ. πάντʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλογώτατα.

[¶156] Soc. Now let us not undertake to subject pleasure to every possible test and then be found to give mind and knowledge very gentle treatment. Let us rather strike them boldly everywhere to see if their metal rings unsound at any point; so we shall find out what is by nature purest in them, and then we can make use of the truest elements of these and of pleasure to form our judgement of both.

> Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῄ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν, ὡς ὅτι καθαρώτατόν ἐστʼ αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κρίσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.

[¶157] Pro. Right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶158] 55d. Soc. Well, then, one part of knowledge is productive, the other has to do with education and support. Is that true?

> Greek: 55d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν οἶμαι δημιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς;

[¶159] Pro. It is.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶160] Soc. Let us first consider whether in the manual arts one part is more allied to knowledge, and the other less, and the one should be regarded as purest, the other as less pure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν πρῶτα εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δʼ ἧττον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δʼ ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.

[¶161] Pro. Yes, we ought to consider that.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρή.

[¶162] Soc. And should the ruling elements of each of them be separated and distinguished from the rest?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἑκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς;

[¶163] Pro. What are they, and how can they be separated?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας καὶ πῶς;

[¶164] 55e. Soc. For example, if arithmetic and the sciences of measurement and weighing were taken away from all arts, what was left of any of them would be, so to speak, pretty worthless.

> Greek: 55e. ΣΩ. οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἑκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο.

[¶165] Pro. Yes, pretty worthless.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαῦλον μὲν δή.

[¶166] 56. Soc. All that would be left for us would be to conjecture and to drill the perceptions by practice and experience, with the additional use of the powers of guessing, which are commonly called arts and acquire their efficacy by practice and toil.

> Greek: 56. ΣΩ. τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτʼ εἰκάζειν λείποιτʼ ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας.

[¶167] 56a. Pro. That is undeniable.

> Greek: 56a. ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

[¶168] Soc. Take music first; it is full of this; it attains harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by measurement; and flute music throughout tries to find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess, so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is great, and the amount of certainty small.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ σύμφωνον ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ, καὶ σύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική, τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμειγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

[¶169] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶170] 56b. Soc. And we shall find that medicine and agriculture and piloting and generalship are all in the same case.

> Greek: 56b. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἰατρικήν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὑρήσομεν ἐχούσας.

## 5. 56c–67b

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/#p-N

[¶0] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.

[¶1] Soc. But the art of building, I believe, employs the greatest number of measures and instruments which give it great accuracy and make it more scientific than most arts.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τεκτονικὴν δέ γε οἶμαι πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὀργάνοις χρωμένην τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

[¶2] Pro. In what way?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ;

[¶3] Soc. In shipbuilding and house-building, and many other branches of wood-working. For the artisan uses a rule, I imagine, a lathe, compasses, a chalk-line, and an ingenious instrument called a vice.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατʼ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τόρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτῃ καὶ στάθμῃ καί τινι προσαγωγίῳ κεκομψευμένῳ.

[¶4] 56c. Pro. Certainly, Socrates; you are right.

> Greek: 56c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

[¶5] Soc. Let us, then, divide the arts, as they are called, into two kinds, those which resemble music, and have less accuracy in their works, and those which, like building, are more exact.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ συνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

[¶6] Pro. Agreed.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.

[¶7] Soc. And of these the most exact are the arts which I just now mentioned first.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς νυνδὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν.

[¶8] Pro. I think you mean arithmetic and the other arts you mentioned with it just now.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νυνδή.

[¶9] 56d. Soc. Certainly. But, Protarchus, ought not these to be divided into two kinds? What do you say?

> Greek: 56d. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἆρʼ οὐ διττὰς αὖ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς;

[¶10] Pro. What kinds?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

[¶11] Soc. Are there not two kinds of arithmetic, that of the people and that of philosophers?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δʼ αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

[¶12] Pro. How can one kind of arithmetic be distinguished from the other?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ ποτε διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικήν;

[¶13] Soc. The distinction is no small one, Protarchus. For some arithmeticians reckon unequal units, for instance, two armies and two oxen and two very small or incomparably large units; whereas others refuse to agree with them unless each of countless units is declared to differ not at all from each and every other unit.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα·

[¶14] 56e. Pro. You are certainly quite right in saying that there is a great difference between the devotees of arithmetic, so it is reasonable to assume that it is of two kinds.

> Greek: 56e. οἱ δʼ οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύʼ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

[¶15] 57. Soc. And how about the arts of reckoning and measuring as they are used in building and in trade when compared with philosophical geometry and elaborate computations—shall we speak of each of these as one or as two?

> Greek: 57. ΣΩ. τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατʼ ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

[¶16] 57a. Pro. On the analogy of the previous example, I should say that each of them was two.

> Greek: 57a. ΠΡΩ. τῇ πρόσθεν ἑπόμενος ἔγωγʼ ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἑκατέραν τούτων.

[¶17] Soc. Right. But do you understand why I introduced this subject?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. οὗ δʼ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἆρα ἐννοεῖς;

[¶18] Pro. Perhaps; but I wish you would give the answer to your question.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

[¶19] Soc. This discussion of ours is now, I think, no less than when we began it, seeking a counterpart of pleasure, and therefore it has introduced the present subject and is considering whether there is one kind of knowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

> Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον ἐνταῦθα προβεβληκέναι σκοπῶν ἆρά ἐστί τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

[¶20] 57b. Pro. That is very clear; it was evidently introduced with that object.

> Greek: 57b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθʼ ἕνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.

[¶21] Soc. Well, had not the discussion already found in what preceded that the various arts had various purposes and various degrees of exactness?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνηυρήκειν σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

[¶22] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶23] Soc. And after having given an art a single name in what has preceded, thereby making us think that it was a single art, does not the discussion now assume that the same art is two and ask whether the art of the philosophers or that of the non-philosophers possesses the higher degree of clearness and purity?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἆρʼ οὔ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

[¶24] 57c. Pro. Yes, I think that is just the question it asks.

> Greek: 57c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

[¶25] Soc. Then what reply shall we make, Protarchus?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τίνʼ οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν;

[¶26] Pro. Socrates, we have found a marvelously great difference in the clearness of different kinds of knowledge.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

[¶27] Soc. That will make the reply easier, will it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾷον;

[¶28] Pro. Yes, to be sure; and let our reply be this, that the arithmetical and metrical arts far surpass the others and that of these the arts which are stirred by the impulse of the true philosophers are immeasurably superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δʼ αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

[¶29] 57d. Soc. We accept that as our judgement, and relying upon you we make this confident reply to those who are clever in straining arguments—
Pro. What reply?

> Greek: 57d. ΣΩ. ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν—
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶30] Soc. That there are two arts of arithmetic and two of measuring, and many other arts which, like these, are twofold in this way, but possess a single name in common.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.

[¶31] 57e. Pro. Let us give this answer, Socrates, to those who you say are clever; I hope we shall have luck with it.
Soc. These, then, we say, are the most exact arts or sciences?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. But the art of dialectic would spurn us, Protarchus, if we should judge that any other art is preferable to her.

> Greek: 57e. ΠΡΩ. διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις οὓς φῂς δεινοὺς εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστʼ εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.
ΠΡΩ. τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν;

[¶32] 58a. Pro. But what is the art to which this name belongs?
Soc. Clearly anybody can recognize the art I mean; for I am confident that all men who have any intellect whatsoever believe that the knowledge which has to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest kind of knowledge. What do you think, Protarchus?
Pro. I have often heard Gorgias constantly maintain that the art of persuasion surpasses all others for this, he said, makes all things subject to itself, not by force, but by their free will, and is by far the best of all arts; so now I hardly like to oppose either him or you.

> Greek: 58a. ΣΩ. δῆλον ὁτιὴ πᾶς ἂν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη· τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι σύμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν;
ΠΡΩ. ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν —πάντα γὰρ ὑφʼ αὑτῇ δοῦλα διʼ ἑκόντων ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν—νῦν δʼ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

[¶33] 58b. Soc. It seems to me that you wanted to speak and threw down your arms out of modesty.

> Greek: 58b. ΣΩ. τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς ἀπολιπεῖν.

[¶34] Pro. Very well; have it as you like.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ.

[¶35] Soc. Is it my fault that you have misunderstood?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

[¶36] Pro. Misunderstood what?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶37] Soc. My question, dear Protarchus, was not as yet what art or science surpasses all others by being the greatest and best and most useful to us: what I am trying to find out at present is which art, however little and of little use, has the greatest regard for clearness, exactness, and truth.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾶσα, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.

[¶38] 58c. See; you will not make Gorgias angry if you grant that his art is superior for the practical needs of men, but say that the study of which I spoke is superior in the matter of the most perfect truth, just as I said in speaking about the white that if it was small and pure it was superior to that which was great but impure. Now, therefore, with careful thought and due consideration, paying attention neither to the usefulness nor to the reputation of any arts or sciences, but to that faculty of our souls, if such there be, which by its nature loves the truth and does all things for the sake of the truth, let us examine this faculty and say whether it is most likely to possess mind and intelligence in the greatest purity, or we must look for some other faculty which has more valid claims.

> Greek: 58c. ἀλλʼ ὅρα—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσῃ Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ᾗ δʼ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δʼ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γʼ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ, καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτʼ εἴς τινας ὠφελίας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διεξερευνησάμενοι—τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

[¶39] 58e. Pro. I am considering, and I think it is difficult to concede that any other science or art cleaves more closely to truth than this.

> Greek: 58e. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶμαι συγχωρῆσαί τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.

[¶40] 59. Soc. In saying that, did you bear in mind that the arts in general, and the men who devote themselves to them, make use of opinion and persistently investigate things which have to do with opinion?

> Greek: 59. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι, καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι συντεταμένως;

[¶41] 59a. And even if they think they are studying nature, they are spending their lives in the study of the things of this world, the manner of their production, their action, and the forces to which they are subjected. Is not that true?

> Greek: 59a. εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονεν καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

[¶42] Pro. Yes, it is.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶43] Soc. Such thinkers, then, toil to discover, not eternal verities, but transient productions of the present, the future, or the past?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται τὸν πόνον;

[¶44] Pro. Perfectly true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶45] Soc. And can we say that any of these things becomes certain, if tested by the touchstone of strictest truth, since none of them ever was, will be, or is in the same state?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ μήθʼ ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;

[¶46] 59b. Pro. Of course not.

> Greek: 59b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶47] Soc. How can we gain anything fixed whatsoever about things which have no fixedness whatsoever?

> Greek: ΣΩ. περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἄν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

[¶48] Pro. In no way, as it seems to me.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

[¶49] Soc. Then no mind or science which is occupied with them possesses the most perfect truth.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστιν τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

[¶50] Pro. No, it naturally does not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε.

[¶51] Soc. Then we must dismiss the thought of you and me and Gorgias and Philebus, and make this solemn declaration on the part of our argument.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἐᾶν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ.

[¶52] 59c. Pro. What is the solemn declaration?

> Greek: 59c. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶53] Soc. That fixed and pure and true and what we call unalloyed knowledge has to do with the things which are eternally the same without change or mixture, or with that which is most akin to them; and all other things are to be regarded as secondary and inferior.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμεικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστά ἐστι συγγενές· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

[¶54] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶55] Soc. And of the names applied to such matters, it would be fairest to give the finest names to the finest things, would it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἆρʼ οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν;

[¶56] Pro. That is reasonable.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰκός γε.

[¶57] 59d. Soc. Are not mind, then, and wisdom the names which we should honor most?

> Greek: 59d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστι καὶ φρόνησις ἅ γʼ ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὀνόματα;

[¶58] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶59] Soc. Then these names are applied most accurately and correctly to cases of contemplation of true being.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ταῦτʼ ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἐστὶν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

[¶60] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶61] Soc. And these are precisely the names which I brought forward in the first place as parties to our suit.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἅ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην οὐκ ἄλλʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.

[¶62] Pro. Yes, of course they are, Socrates.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶63] Soc. Very well. As to the mixture of wisdom and pleasure, if anyone were to say that we are like artisans, with the materials before us from which to create our work, the simile would be a good one.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν. τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μεῖξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

[¶64] 59e. Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: 59e. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶65] Soc. And is it, then, our next task to try to make the mixture?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἆρʼ οὐ μειγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον;

[¶66] Pro. Surely.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶67] Soc. Would it not be better first to repeat certain things and recall them to our minds?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι;

[¶68] Pro. What things?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα;

[¶69] 60. Soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb “we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good” is an excellent one.

> Greek: 60. ΣΩ. ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δʼ ἡ παροιμία δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

[¶70] 60a. Pro. Surely.

> Greek: 60a. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;

[¶71] Soc. Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὑτωσί πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.

[¶72] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶73] Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations “good” and “pleasant” are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s.

> Greek: ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζῴοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι σύμπασι, καὶ δύο ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτω ὀρθῶς τεθέντʼ ἔχειν·

[¶74] 60b. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus?

> Greek: 60b. Σωκράτης δʼ ἓν μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτʼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε;

[¶75] Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

[¶76] Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν συνομολογοῖτο;

[¶77] Pro. What?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶78] Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων.

[¶79] 60c. Pro. In what respect?
Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that?
Pro. We did.
Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure?
Pro. Yes.

> Greek: 60c. ΠΡΩ. τίνι;
ΣΩ. ὧι παρείη τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;
ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμεικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν;
ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τῳ;

[¶80] 60d. Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one?
Pro. By no means.
Soc. And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling.

> Greek: 60d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτʼ ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονὴν εἴθʼ ὡς πλείστην εἴθʼ ὡς σφοδροτάτην, ἣν μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος μήτʼ αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδʼ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι.

[¶81] 60e. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom.

> Greek: 60e. ταὐτὰ δὲ λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτʼ ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινος.

[¶82] Pro. That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

[¶83] 61a. Soc. Then the perfect, that which is to be desired by all and is altogether good, is neither of these?

> Greek: 61a. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη;

[¶84] Pro. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶85] Soc. We must, then, gain a clear conception of the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as we said, know to what the second place is to be assigned.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνʼ, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

[¶86] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.

[¶87] Soc. And have we not found a road which leads to the good?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν;

[¶88] Pro. What road?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τίνα;

[¶89] Soc. If you were looking for a particular man and first found out correctly where he lived, you would have made great progress towards finding him whom you sought.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν πρῶτον ὀρθῶς ἵνʼ οἰκεῖ πύθοιτο αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δήπου πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

[¶90] 61b. Pro. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: 61b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶91] Soc. And just now we received an indication, as we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good, not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμείκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ.

[¶92] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.

[¶93] Soc. Surely there is greater hope that the object of our search will be clearly present in the well mixed life than in the life which is not well mixed?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μειχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή;

[¶94] Pro. Far greater.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολύ γε.

[¶95] Soc. Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be who presides over the mixing.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθʼ ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

[¶96] 61c. Pro. By all means.

> Greek: 61c. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶97] Soc. We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι—μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινος ὕδατος—ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμειγνύναι.

[¶98] Pro. Certainly we must.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶99] 61d. Soc. Before we make the mixture, tell me: should we be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure with all wisdom?

> Greek: 61d. ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἆρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει μειγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν;

[¶100] Pro. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

[¶101] Soc. But that is not safe; and I think I can offer a plan by which we can make our mixture with less risk.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ᾗ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μειγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινα ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν.

[¶102] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνα.

[¶103] Soc. We found, I believe, that one pleasure was greater than another and one art more exact than another?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

[¶104] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶105] Soc. And knowledge was of two kinds, one turning its eyes towards transitory things, the other towards things which neither come into being nor pass away, but are the same and immutable for ever.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί.

[¶106] 61e. Considering them with a view to truth, we judged that the latter was truer than the former.

> Greek: 61e. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι.

[¶107] Pro. That is quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

[¶108] Soc. Then what if we first mix the truest sections of each and see whether, when mixed together, they are capable of giving us the most adorable life, or whether we still need something more and different?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον συμμείξαντες, ἆρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα συγκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἤ τινος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων;

[¶109] 62a. Pro. I think that is what we should do.

> Greek: 62a. ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.

[¶110] Soc. Let us assume, then, a man who possesses wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same kind of knowledge of all other things.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος.

[¶111] Pro. Agreed.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.

[¶112] Soc. Now will this man have sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and human circles, even when he uses these and other kinds of rules or patterns in building houses?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

[¶113] 62b. Pro. We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine knowledge.
Soc. What? Do you mean to say that the uncertain and impure art of the false rule and circle is to be put into our mixture?
Pro. Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to find his own way home.
Soc. And must we add music, which we said a little while ago was full of guesswork and imitation and lacked purity?

> Greek: 62b. ΠΡΩ. γελοίαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν.
ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς; ἦ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον;
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν οἴκαδε.

[¶114] 62c. Pro. Yes, I think we must, if our life is to be life at all.
Soc. Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and hustled by a mob, give up, open the door, and let all the kinds of knowledge stream in, the impure mingling with the pure?

> Greek: 62c. ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ μουσικήν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος.
ΣΩ. βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπʼ ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μείγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν;

[¶115] 62d. Pro. I do not know, Socrates, what harm it can do a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge if he has the first.

> Greek: 62d. ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τις ἂν βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

[¶116] Soc. Shall I, then, let them all flow into what Homer very poetically calls
the mingling of the vales?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς συμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν;

[¶117] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶118] Soc. They are let in; and now we must turn again to the spring of pleasure. For our original plan for making the mixture, by taking first the true parts, did not succeed; because of our love of knowledge, we let all kinds of knowledge in together before pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. μεθεῖνται· καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἰτέον. ὡς γὰρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς μειγνύναι, τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἐξεγένεθʼ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταὐτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἁθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἡδονῶν.

[¶119] 62e. Pro. Very true.

> Greek: 62e. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶120] Soc. So now it is time for us to consider about pleasures also, whether these, too, shall be all let loose together, or we shall let only the true ones loose at first.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὥρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῷν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἁθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.

[¶121] Pro. It is much safer to let loose the true first.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

[¶122] Soc. We will let them loose, then. But what next? If there are any necessary pleasures, as there were kinds of knowledge, must we not mix them with the true?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μεθείσθων δή. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρʼ οὐκ εἰ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, συμμεικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

[¶123] Pro. Of course; the necessary pleasures must certainly be added.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ; τάς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν.

[¶124] 63a. Soc. And as we said it was harmless and useful to know all the arts throughout our life, if we now say the same of pleasures—that is, if it is advantageous and harmless for us to enjoy all pleasures throughout life—they must all form part of the mixture.

> Greek: 63a. ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε καί, καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὰ λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας συγκρατέον.

[¶125] Pro. What shall we say about these pleasures, and what shall we do?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

[¶126] Soc. There is no use in asking us, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences themselves about one another.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλήλων πέρι.

[¶127] 63b. Pro. What shall we ask them?

> Greek: 63b. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶128] Soc. “Dear ones—whether you should be called pleasures or by any other name—would you choose to dwell with all wisdom, or with none at all?” I think only one reply is possible.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ φίλαι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν; οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδʼ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν.

[¶129] Pro. What is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶130] Soc. What we said before: “For any class to be alone, solitary, and unalloyed is neither altogether possible nor is it profitable; but of all classes, comparing them one with another, we think the best to live with is the knowledge of all other things and, so far as is possible, the perfect knowledge of our individual selves.”

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναί τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτʼ ὠφέλιμον·

[¶131] 63c. Pro. “Your reply is excellent,” we shall tell them.
Soc. Right. And next we must turn to wisdom and mind, and question them. We shall ask them, “Do you want any further pleasures in the mixture?” And they might reply, “What pleasures?”
Pro. Quite likely.

> Greek: 63c. πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἓν ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν τἆλλά τε πάντα καὶ [αὖ τὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον· ἆρʼ ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ συγκράσει; φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. ποίων, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, ἡδονῶν;
ΠΡΩ. εἰκός.

[¶132] 63d. Soc. Then we should go on to say: “In addition to those true pleasures, do you want the greatest and most intense pleasures also to dwell with you?” “How can we want them, Socrates,” they might perhaps say, “since they contain countless hindrances for us, inasmuch as they disturb with maddening pleasures the souls of men in which we dwell, thereby preventing us from being born at all, and utterly destroying for the most part, through the carelessness and forgetfulness which they engender, those of our children which are born?”

> Greek: 63d. ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γʼ ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὅδε. πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν, ἆρʼ ἔτι προσδεῖσθʼ ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας; καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως φαῖεν ἄν, αἵ γʼ ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ μανίας [ἡδονάς], καὶ γίγνεσθαί τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐῶσι, τά τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολύ, διʼ ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν;

[¶133] 64. Soc. “But the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, you must consider almost our own by nature, and also those which are united with health and self-restraint, and furthermore all those which are handmaids of virtue in general and follow everywhere in its train as if it were a god,—add these to the mixture; but as for the pleasures which follow after folly and all baseness, it would be very senseless for anyone who desires to discover the most beautiful and most restful mixture or compound, and to try to learn which of its elements is good in man and the universe, and what we should divine its nature to be, to mix these with mind.”

> Greek: 64. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἅς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἃς] εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μείγνυ· τὰς δʼ ἀεὶ μετʼ ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν, ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι τί ποτε ἔν τʼ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον.

[¶134] 64a. Shall we not say that this reply which mind has now made for itself and memory and right opinion is wise and reasonable?

> Greek: 64a. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

[¶135] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶136] Soc. But another addition is surely necessary, without which nothing whatsoever can ever come into being.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν.

[¶137] 64b. Pro. What is it?

> Greek: 64b. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶138] Soc. That in which there is no admixture of truth can never truly come into being or exist.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὧι μὴ μείξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.

[¶139] Pro. No, of course not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶140] Soc. No. But if anything is still wanting in our mixture, you and Philebus must speak of it. For to me it seems that our argument is now completed, as it were an incorporeal order which shall rule nobly a living body.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

[¶141] Pro. And you may say, Socrates, that I am of the same opinion.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

[¶142] 64c. Soc. And if we were to say that we are now in the vestibule of the good and of the dwelling of the good, should we not be speaking the truth after a fashion?

> Greek: 64c. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἄν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;

[¶143] Pro. I certainly think so.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

[¶144] Soc. What element, then, of the mixture would appear to us to be the most precious and also the chief cause why such a state is beloved of all? When we have discovered this, we will then consider whether it is more closely attached and more akin to pleasure or to mind in the universe.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ συμμείξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστʼ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσιν γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴθʼ ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ συνέστηκεν.

[¶145] 64d. Pro. Right; for that is most serviceable to us in forming our judgement.

> Greek: 64d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι συμφορώτατον.

[¶146] Soc. And it is quite easy to see the cause which makes any mixture whatsoever either of the highest value or of none at all.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συμπάσης γε μείξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.

[¶147] Pro. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις;

[¶148] Soc. Why, everybody knows that.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδείς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

[¶149] Pro. Knows what?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶150] Soc. That any compound, however made, which lacks measure and proportion, must necessarily destroy its components and first of all itself;

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὑτήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις συμφορά.

[¶151] 64e. for it is in truth no compound, but an uncompounded jumble, and is always a misfortune to those who possess it.
Pro. Perfectly true.
Soc. So now the power of the good has taken refuge in the nature of the beautiful; for measure and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty and virtue.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. We said that truth also was mingled with them in the compound.
Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then if we cannot catch the good with the aid of one idea, let us run it down with three—beauty, proportion, and truth, and let us say that these, considered as one, may more properly than all other components of the mixture be regarded as the cause, and that through the goodness of these the mixture itself has been made good. Pro. Quite right.
Soc. So now, Protarchus, any one would be able to judge about pleasure and wisdom, and to decide which of them is more akin to the highest good and of greater value among men and gods.

> Greek: 64e. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμεῖχθαι.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθʼ ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτʼ ἂν ὁστισοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.

[¶152] 65b. Pro. That is clear; but still it is better to carry on the discussion to the end.

> Greek: 65b. ΠΡΩ. δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δʼ οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον.

[¶153] Soc. Let us, then, judge each of the three separately in its relation to pleasure and mind; for it is our duty to see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as more akin.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ ⟨ὡς⟩ μᾶλλον συγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.

[¶154] Pro. You refer to beauty, truth, and measure?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις;

[¶155] Soc. Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus; take it and look at the three—mind, truth, and pleasure; take plenty of time, and answer to yourself whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε·

[¶156] 65c. Pro. Why take time? For the difference, to my mind, is great. For pleasure is the greatest of impostors, and the story goes that in the pleasures of love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children, utterly devoid of all sense.

> Greek: 65c. καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ συγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.
ΠΡΩ. τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων·

[¶157] 65d. But mind is either identical with truth or of all things most like it and truest.

> Greek: 65d. νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

[¶158] Soc. Next, then, consider measure in the same way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται;

[¶159] Pro. That also is an easy thing to consider. For I think nothing in the world could be found more immoderate than pleasure and its transports, and nothing more in harmony with measure than mind and knowledge.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας· οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν ποτε.

[¶160] 65e. Soc. However, go on and tell about the third. Has mind or pleasure the greater share in beauty?

> Greek: 65e. ΣΩ. καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δʼ ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλεῖον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον;

[¶161] Pro. But Socrates, no one, either asleep or awake, ever saw or knew wisdom or mind to be or become unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθʼ ὕπαρ οὔτʼ ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον.

[¶162] Soc. Right.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶163] 66. Pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element which accompanies them, fill us with a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day.

> Greek: 66. ΠΡΩ. ἡδονὰς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπʼ αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.

[¶164] 66a. Soc. Then you will proclaim everywhere, Protarchus, by messengers to the absent and by speech to those present, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these.

> Greek: 66a. ΣΩ. πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδʼ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν ἀίδιον ᾑρῆσθαι.

[¶165] Pro. That appears to result from what has now been said.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

[¶166] 66b. Soc. Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class.

> Greek: 66b. ΣΩ. δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης ἐστίν.

[¶167] Pro. Yes, so it appears.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν.

[¶168] Soc. And if you count mind and wisdom as the third, you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.

[¶169] Pro. That may be.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

[¶170] Soc. And will you not put those properties fourth which we said belonged especially to the soul—sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called— and say that these come after the first three, and are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure to the good?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτʼ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον [ἢ] τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ;

[¶171] 66c. Pro. Perhaps.

> Greek: 66c. ΠΡΩ. τάχʼ ἄν.

[¶172] Soc. And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας;

[¶173] Pro. May be.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

[¶174] Soc. “But with the sixth generation,” says Orpheus, “cease the rhythmic song.” It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἕκτῃ δʼ ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

[¶175] 66d. So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head.
Pro. Yes, that should be done.
Soc. Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed.
Pro. What argument?
Soc. Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good.
Pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said “the third time” just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning.

> Greek: 66d. ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρή.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. ποῖον δή;
ΣΩ. Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

[¶176] 66e. Soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure.

> Greek: 66e. ΣΩ. ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νυνδὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

[¶177] Pro. True.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα.

[¶178] Soc. But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον ὡς εἰ φανείη τι τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.

[¶179] 67a. Pro. Yes, that is what you said.

> Greek: 67a. ΠΡΩ. εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

[¶180] Soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατα τούτοιν οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη.

[¶181] Pro. Very true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶182] Soc. In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ μηδʼ ἕτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερομένοιν αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

[¶183] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶184] Soc. And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γʼ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.

[¶185] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶186] Soc. Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

[¶187] Pro. So it seems.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικεν.

[¶188] 67b. Soc. But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse.

> Greek: 67b. ΣΩ. πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδʼ ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἆλλα σύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων.

[¶189] Pro. Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες.

[¶190] Soc. Then you will let me go?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

[¶191] Pro. There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν, ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.