---
title: "Philebus · Φίληβος"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Harold North Fowler"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 1 of 5
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/
cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Philebus · Φίληβος, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/"
---

# Philebus · Φίληβος

*Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler*

Is the good life one of pleasure, of knowledge, or a mixture of the two?

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. 11a–22c

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/1/#p-N

[¶0] 11a. Soc. Observe, then, Protarchus, what the doctrine is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and what our doctrine is, against which you are to argue, if you do not agree with it.

> Greek: 11a. ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρʼ ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ᾖ λεγόμενος.

[¶1] 11b. Shall we make a brief statement of each of them?

> Greek: 11b. βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα ἑκάτερον;

[¶2] Pro. By all means.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶3] Soc. Very well: Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and pleasure and gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a good; whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings, are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are capable of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or to come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of all things.

> Greek: ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν·

[¶4] 11c. Those are pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they not, Philebus?

> Greek: 11c. δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἁπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἑκάτεροι;

[¶5] Phi. Yes, Socrates, exactly.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶6] Soc. And do you, Protarchus, accept this doctrine which is now committed to you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δέχῃ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον;

[¶7] Pro. I must accept it; for our handsome Philebus has withdrawn.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

[¶8] Soc. And must the truth about these doctrines be attained by every possible means?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆναι;

[¶9] 11d. Pro. Yes, it must.
Soc. Then let us further agree to this:
Pro. To what?
Soc. That each of us will next try to prove clearly that it is a condition and disposition of the soul which can make life happy for all human beings. Is not that what we are going to do?
Pro. It is.
Soc. Then you will show that it is the condition of pleasure, and I that it is that of wisdom?
Pro. True.
Soc. What if some other life be found superior to these two? Then if that life is found to be more akin to pleasure, both of us are defeated, are we not, by the life which has firm possession of this superiority, but the life of pleasure is victor over the life of wisdom.

> Greek: 11d. ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΣΩ. ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως;
ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ; μῶν οὐκ, ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

[¶10] 12. Pro. Yes.

> Greek: 12. ΠΡΩ. ναί.

[¶11] Soc. But if it is more akin to wisdom, then wisdom is victorious and pleasure is vanquished? Do you agree to that? Or what do you say?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;

[¶12] Pro. Yes, I at least am satisfied with that.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

[¶13] Soc. But how about you, Philebus? What do you say?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ Φιλήβῳ; τί φῄς;

[¶14] Phi. I think and always shall think that pleasure is the victor. But you, Protarchus, will make your own decision.

> Greek: ΦΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.

[¶15] Pro. Since you entrusted the argument to me, Philebus, you can no longer dictate whether to make the agreement with Socrates or not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.

[¶16] 12b. Phi. True; and for that reason I wash my hands of it and now call upon the goddess herself to witness that I do so.

> Greek: 12b. ΦΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.

[¶17] Pro. And we also will bear witness to these words of yours. But all the same, Socrates, Philebus may agree or do as he likes, let us try to finish our argument in due order.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἂν εἶμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἑξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα περαίνειν.

[¶18] Soc. We must try, and let us begin with the very goddess who Philebus says is spoken of as Aphrodite but is most truly named Pleasure.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πειρατέον, ἀπʼ αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὅδε Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δʼ ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.

[¶19] Pro. Quite right.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶20] 12c. Soc. My awe, Protarchus, in respect to the names of the gods is always beyond the greatest human fear. And now I call Aphrodite by that name which is agreeable to her; but pleasure I know has various aspects, and since, as I said, we are to begin with her, we must consider and examine what her nature is. For, when you just simply hear her name, she is only one thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of shapes which are even, in a way, unlike each other. For instance, we say that the man who lives without restraint has pleasure, and that the self-restrained man takes pleasure in his very self-restraint; and again that the fool who is full of foolish opinions and hopes is pleased, and also that the wise man takes pleasure in his very wisdom.

> Greek: 12c. ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ἕν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ· ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν·

[¶21] 12d. And would not any person who said these two kinds of pleasure were like each other be rightly regarded as a fool?

> Greek: 12d. ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως;

[¶22] Pro. No, Socrates, for though they spring from opposite sources, they are not in themselves opposed to one another; for how can pleasure help being of all things most like pleasure, that is, like itself?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονῇ γε ἡδονὴ [μὴ] οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;

[¶23] 13. Soc. Yes, my friend, and color is like color in so far as every one of them is a color they will all be the same, yet we all recognize that black is not only different from white, but is its exact opposite. And so, too, figure is like figure; they are all one in kind but the parts of the kind are in some instances absolutely opposed to each other, and in other cases there is endless variety of difference; and we can find many other examples of such relations.

> Greek: 13. ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει. καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητʼ ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει, καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθʼ εὑρήσομεν.

[¶24] 13a. Do not, therefore, rely upon this argument, which makes all the most absolute opposites identical. I am afraid we shall find some pleasures the opposites of other pleasures.

> Greek: 13a. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

[¶25] Pro. Perhaps; but why will that injure my contention?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;

[¶26] Soc. Because I shall say that, although they are unlike, you apply to them a different designation. For you say that all pleasant things are good. Now no argument contends that pleasant things are not pleasant; but whereas most of them are bad and only some are good, as we assert, nevertheless you call them all good, though you confess, if forced to it by argument, that they are unlike.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι· λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντʼ εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχὶ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ·

[¶27] 13b. Now what is the identical element which exists in the good and bad pleasures alike and makes you call them all a good?

> Greek: 13b. κακὰ δʼ ὄντα αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι, τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

[¶28] Pro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you suppose anyone who asserts that the good is pleasure will concede, or will endure to hear you say, that some pleasures are good and others bad?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;

[¶29] 13c. Soc. But you will concede that they are unlike and in some instances opposed to each other.

> Greek: 13c. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καί τινας ἐναντίας.

[¶30] Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔτι καθʼ ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.

[¶31] Soc. Here we are again at the same old argument, Protarchus, and we shall presently assert that one pleasure is not different from another, but all pleasures are alike, and the examples just cited do not affect us at all, but we shall behave and talk just like the most worthless and inexperienced reasoners.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐδʼ ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι.

[¶32] 13d. Pro. In what way do you mean?

> Greek: 13d. ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

[¶33] Soc. Why, if I have the face to imitate you and to defend myself by saying that the utterly unlike is most completely like that which is most utterly unlike it, I can say the same things you said, and we shall prove ourselves to be excessively inexperienced, and our argument will be shipwrecked and lost. Let us, then, back her out, and perhaps if we start fair again we may come to an agreement.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι σε μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον, ἕξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώμεθα, καὶ τάχʼ ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.

[¶34] 13e. Pro. How? Tell me.

> Greek: 13e. ΠΡΩ. λέγε πῶς;

[¶35] Soc. Assume, Protarchus, that I am questioned in turn by you.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

[¶36] Pro. What question do I ask?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

[¶37] Soc. Whether wisdom and knowledge and intellect and all the things which I said at first were good, when you asked me what is good, will not have the same fate as this argument of yours.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα δὴ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθά, διερωτώμενος ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

[¶38] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶39] 14. Soc. It will appear that the forms of knowledge collectively are many and some of them are unlike each other; but if some of them turn out to be actually opposites, should I be fit to engage in dialectics now if, through fear of just that, I should say that no form of knowledge is unlike any other, and then, as a consequence, our argument should vanish and be lost, like a tale that is told, and we ourselves should be saved by clinging to some irrational notion?

> Greek: 14. ΣΩ. πολλαί τε αἱ συνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθʼ ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῳζοίμεθα ἐπί τινος ἀλογίας;

[¶40] 14a. Pro. No, that must never be, except the part about our being saved. However, I like the equal treatment of your doctrine and mine. Let us grant that pleasures are many and unlike and that the forms of knowledge are many and different.

> Greek: 14a. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

[¶41] 14b. Soc. With no concealment, then, Protarchus, of the difference between my good and yours, but with fair and open acknowledgement of it, let us be bold and see if perchance on examination they will tell us whether we should say that pleasure is the good, or wisdom, or some other third principle. For surely the object of our present controversy is not to gain the victory for my assertions or yours, but both of us must fight for the most perfect truth.
Pro. Yes, we must.
Soc. Then let us establish this principle still more firmly by means of an agreement.

> Greek: 14b. ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] τοῦ τʼ ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι πότερον ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἁγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτʼ ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθʼ ἃ σύ, τῷ δʼ ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.
ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶42] 14c. Pro. What principle?
Soc. The principle which gives trouble to all men, to some of them sometimes against their will.
Pro. Speak more plainly.
Soc. I mean the principle which came in our way just now; its nature is quite marvellous. For the assertions that one is many and many are one are marvellous, and it is easy to dispute with anyone who makes either of them.
Pro. You mean when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and that there are also many of me which are opposites of each other, asserting that I, the same Protarchus, am great and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

> Greek: 14c. ΣΩ. τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον διʼ ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δή;
ΣΩ. τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἑκοῦσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε σαφέστερον.
ΣΩ. τὸν νυνδὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.
ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;

[¶43] 14d. Soc. Those wonders concerning the one and the many which you have mentioned, Protarchus, are common property, and almost everybody is agreed that they ought to be disregarded because they are childish and easy and great hindrances to speculation; and this sort of thing also should be disregarded, when a man in his discussion divides the members and likewise the parts of anything, acknowledges that they all collectively are that one thing, and then mockingly refutes himself because he has been compelled to declare miracles—that the one is many and infinite and the many only one.

> Greek: 14d. ΣΩ. σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἓν ὡς πολλά ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἓν μόνον.

[¶44] 14e. Pro. But what other wonders do you mean, Socrates, in relation to this same principle, which are not yet common property and generally acknowledged?

> Greek: 14e. ΠΡΩ. σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;

[¶45] 15a. Soc. I mean, my boy, when a person postulates unity which is not the unity of one of the things which come into being and perish, as in the examples we had just now. For in cases of a unity of that sort, as I just said, it is agreed that refutation is needless. But when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is one, the intense interest in these and similar unities becomes disagreement and controversy.

> Greek: 15a. ΣΩ. ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἓν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδή, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.

[¶46] Pro. How is that?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶47] 15b. Soc. The first question is whether we should believe that such unities really exist; the second, how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity; and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many. These are the questions, Protarchus, about this kind of one and many, not those others, which cause the utmost perplexity, if ill solved, and are, if well solved, of the greatest assistance.

> Greek: 15b. ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθʼ ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτʼ ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἁπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας [ἂν] αὖ καλῶς.

[¶48] 15c. Pro. Then is it now, Socrates, our first duty to thresh this matter out?

> Greek: 15c. ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

[¶49] Soc. Yes, that is what I should say.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

[¶50] Pro. You may assume, then, that we are all willing to agree with you about that; and perhaps it is best not to ask Philebus any questions; let sleeping dogs lie.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δʼ ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

[¶51] 15d. Soc. Very well; then where shall we begin this great and vastly complicated battle about the matters at issue? Shall we start at this point?

> Greek: 15d. ΣΩ. εἶεν· πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἆρʼ ἐνθένδε;

[¶52] Pro. At what point?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πόθεν;

[¶53] Soc. We say that one and many are identified by reason, and always, both now and in the past, circulate everywhere in every thought that is uttered. This is no new thing and will never cease; it is, in my opinion, a quality within us which will never die or grow old, and which belongs to reason itself as such. And any young man, when he first has an inkling of this, is delighted, thinking he has found a treasure of wisdom; his joy fills him with enthusiasm; he joyously sets every possible argument in motion, sometimes in one direction, rolling things up and kneading them into one, and sometimes again unrolling and dividing them; he gets himself into a muddle first and foremost, then anyone who happens to be near him, whether he be younger or older or of his own age;

> Greek: ΣΩ. φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας ηὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἅσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὑτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δʼ ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος ἄντε ἧλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς

[¶54] 16a. he spares neither father nor mother nor any other human being who can hear, and hardly even the lower animals, for he would certainly not spare a foreigner, if he could get an interpreter anywhere.

> Greek: 16a. οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

[¶55] 16. Pro. Socrates, do you not see how many we are and that we are all young men? Are you not afraid that we shall join with Philebus and attack you, if you revile us? However—for we understand your meaning—if there is any way or means of removing this confusion gently from our discussion and finding some better road than this to bring us towards the goal of our argument, kindly lead on, and we will do our best to follow for our present discussion, Socrates, is no trifling matter.

> Greek: 16. ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐ φοβῇ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου συνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς; ὅμως δὲ μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν·

[¶56] 16b. Soc. No, it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you; and there certainly is no better road, nor can there ever be, than that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and forlorn.
Pro. What is the road? Only tell us.

> Greek: 16b. οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδʼ ἂν γένοιτο ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.
ΠΡΩ. τίς αὕτη; λεγέσθω μόνον.

[¶57] 16c. Soc. One which is easy to point out, but very difficult to follow for through it all the inventions of art have been brought to light. See this is the road I mean.

> Greek: 16c. ΣΩ. ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω.

[¶58] Pro. Go on what is it?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶59] Soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was tossed down from some divine source through the agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming fire; and the ancients, who were better than we and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition that all the things which are ever said to exist are sprung from one and many and have inherent in them the finite and the infinite. This being the way in which these things are arranged, we must always assume that there is in every case one idea of everything and must look for it—for we shall find that it is there—and if we get a grasp of this, we must look next for two, if there be two, and if not, for three or some other number; and again we must treat each of those units in the same way, until we can see not only that the original unit is one and many and infinite, but just how many it is.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν— ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα·

[¶60] 16d. And we must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality until we have a view of its whole number between infinity and one; then, and not before, we may let each unit of everything pass on unhindered into infinity.

> Greek: 16d. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δʼ ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

[¶61] 17. Soc. The gods, then, as I said, handed down to us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching one another; but the wise men of the present day make the one and the many too quickly or too slowly, in haphazard fashion, and they put infinity immediately after unity; they disregard all that lies between them, and this it is which distinguishes between the dialectic and the disputatious methods of discussion.

> Greek: 17. ΣΩ. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει—οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

[¶62] 17a. Pro. I think I understand you in part, Socrates, but I need a clearer statement of some things.

> Greek: 17a. ΠΡΩ. τὰ μέν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἃ λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.

[¶63] Soc. Surely my meaning, Protarchus, is made clear in the letters of the alphabet, which you were taught as a child;

> Greek: ΣΩ. σαφὲς μήν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανʼ αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἷσπερ καὶ πεπαίδευσαι.

[¶64] 17b. so learn it from them.
Pro. How?
Soc. Sound, which passes out through the mouth of each and all of us, is one, and yet again it is infinite in number.
Pro. Yes, to be sure.
Soc. And one of us is no wiser than the other merely for knowing that it is infinite or that it is one; but that which makes each of us a grammarian is the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And it is this same knowledge which makes the musician.
Pro. How is that?

> Greek: 17b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
ΣΩ. φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστί που μία διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ ἑκάστου.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
ΣΩ. καὶ οὐδὲν ἑτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πω σοφοί, οὔτε ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὔθʼ ὅτι τὸ ἕν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι πόσα τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι ταὐτόν.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶65] 17c. Soc. Sound is one in the art of music also, so far as that art is concerned.

> Greek: 17c. ΣΩ. φωνὴ μέν που καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

[¶66] Pro. Of course.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶67] Soc. And we may say that there are two sounds, low and high, and a third, which is the intermediate, may we not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δύο δὲ θῶμεν βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότονον. ἢ πῶς;

[¶68] Pro. Yes.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.

[¶69] Soc. But knowledge of these facts would not suffice to make you a musician, although ignorance of them would make you, if I may say so, quite worthless in respect to music.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γʼ ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔσῃ.

[¶70] Pro. Certainly.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶71] Soc. But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the intervals, and all the combinations derived from them, which the men of former times discovered and handed down to us, their successors, with the traditional name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which they say are measured by numbers and must be called rhythms and measures—and they say that we must also understand that every one and many should be considered in this way—

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὁποῖα, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν—ἃ κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ διʼ ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασι ῥυθμοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν—ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά

[¶72] 17e. when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become a musician, and when by considering it in this way you have obtained a grasp of any other unity of all those which exist, you have become wise in respect to that unity. But the infinite number of individuals and the infinite number in each of them makes you in every instance indefinite in thought and of no account and not to be considered among the wise, so long as you have never fixed your eye upon any definite number in anything.
Pro. I think, Philebus, that what Socrates has said is excellent. Phi. So do I; it is excellent in itself, but why has he said it now to us, and what purpose is there in it?

> Greek: 17e. τε λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας· τὸ δʼ ἄπειρόν σε ἑκάστων καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις πλῆθος ἄπειρον ἑκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδʼ ἐνάριθμον, ἅτʼ οὐκ εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

[¶73] 18a. Soc. Protarchus, that is a very proper question which Philebus has asked us.
Pro. Certainly it is, so please answer it.
Soc. I will, when I have said a little more on just this subject. For if a person begins with some unity or other, he must, as I was saying, not turn immediately to infinity, but to some definite number; now just so, conversely, when he has to take the infinite first, he must not turn immediately to the one, but must think of some number which possesses in each case some plurality, and must end by passing from all to one.

> Greek: 18a. ΦΙ. κἀμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.
ΣΩ. δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἓν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλʼ ἐπί τινα ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθύς, ἀλλʼ [ἐπʼ] ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν.

[¶74] 18b. Let us revert to the letters of the alphabet to illustrate this.

> Greek: 18b. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

[¶75] Pro. How?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς;

[¶76] Soc. When some one, whether god or godlike man,—there is an Egyptian story that his name was Theuth—observed that sound was infinite, he was the first to notice that the vowel sounds in that infinity were not one, but many, and again that there were other elements which were not vowels but did have a sonant quality, and that these also had a definite number; and he distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call mutes.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν·

[¶77] 18c. Then he divided the mutes until he distinguished each individual one, and he treated the vowels and semivowels in the same way, until he knew the number of them and gave to each and all the name of letters. Perceiving, however, that none of us could learn any one of them alone by itself without learning them all, and considering that this was a common bond which made them in a way all one, he assigned to them all a single science and called it grammar.

> Greek: 18c. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε· καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

[¶78] 18d. Phi. I understand that more clearly than the earlier statement, Protarchus, so far as the reciprocal relations of the one and the many are concerned, but I still feel the same lack as a little while ago.

> Greek: 18d. ΦΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δʼ αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

[¶79] Soc. Do you mean, Philebus, that you do not see what this has to do with the question?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτʼ ἐστίν;

[¶80] Phi. Yes; that is what Protarchus and I have been trying to discover for a long time.

> Greek: ΦΙ. ναί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶΠρώταρχος.

[¶81] Soc. Really, have you been trying, as you say, for long time to discover it, when it was close to you all the while?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ μὴν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῄς, πάλαι.

[¶82] 18e. Phi. How is that?

> Greek: 18e. ΦΙ. πῶς;

[¶83] Soc. Was not our discussion from the beginning about wisdom and pleasure and which of them is preferable?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἱρετέον;

[¶84] Phi. Yes, of course.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶85] Soc. And surely we say that each of them is one.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.

[¶86] Phi. Certainly.

> Greek: ΦΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶87] 19. Soc. This, then, is precisely the question which the previous discussion puts to us: How is each of them one and many, and how is it that they are not immediately infinite, but each possesses a definite number, before the individual phenomena become infinite?

> Greek: 19. ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι;

[¶88] 19a. Pro. Philebus, somehow or other Socrates has led us round and plunged us into a serious question. Consider which of us shall answer it. Perhaps it is ridiculous that I, after taking your place in entire charge of the argument, should ask you to come back and answer this question because I cannot do so, but I think it would be still more ridiculous if neither of us could answer.

> Greek: 19a. ΠΡΩ. οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δʼ οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι.

[¶89] 19b. Consider, then, what we are to do. For I think Socrates is asking us whether there are or are not kinds of pleasure, how many kinds there are, and what their nature is, and the same of wisdom.

> Greek: 19b. σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν. εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα· τῆς τʼ αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.

[¶90] Soc. You are quite right, son of Callias; for, as our previous discussion showed, unless we can do this in the case of every unity, every like, every same, and their opposites, none of us can ever be of any use in anything.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.

[¶91] 19c. Pro. That, Socrates, seems pretty likely to be true. However, it is splendid for the wise man to know everything, but the next best thing, it seems, is not to be ignorant of himself. I will tell you why I say that at this moment. You, Socrates, have granted to all of us this conversation and your cooperation for the purpose of determining what is the best of human possessions. For when Philebus said it was pleasure and gaiety and enjoyment and all that sort of thing, you objected and said it was not those things, but another sort, and we very properly keep reminding ourselves voluntarily of this, in order that both claims may be present in our memory for examination.

> Greek: 19c. ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ σύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δʼ εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν. τί δή μοι τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγώ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστί, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν ἑκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵνʼ ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάτερα βασανίζηται.

[¶92] 19d. You, as it appears, assert that the good which is rightly to be called better than pleasure is mind, knowledge, intelligence, art, and all their kin; you say we ought to acquire these, not that other sort. When those two claims were made and an argument arose, we playfully threatened that we would not let you go home until the discussion was brought to some satisfactory conclusion.

> Greek: 19d. φῂς δʼ, ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ, ⟨ἃ⟩ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὴ μετʼ ἀμφισβητήσεως ἑκατέρων λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηταί τι διορισθέντων, σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν σαυτόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι·

[¶93] 19e. You agreed and put yourself at our disposal for that purpose. Now, we say that, as children put it, you cannot take back a gift once fairly given. So cease this way of meeting all that we say.

> Greek: 19e. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

[¶94] Soc. What way do you mean?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τίνα λέγεις;

[¶95] Pro. I mean puzzling us and asking questions to which we cannot at the moment give a satisfactory answer. Let us not imagine that the end of our present discussion is a mere puzzling of us all, but if we cannot answer, you must do so; for you gave us a promise. Consider, therefore, whether you yourself must distinguish the kinds of pleasure and knowledge or will let that go, in case you are able and willing to make clear in some other way the matters now at issue among us.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλʼ εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθʼ ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἡδονῆς εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθʼ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τʼ εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρʼ ἡμῖν.

[¶96] 20b. Soc. I need no longer anticipate anything terrible, since you put it in that way; for the words “in case you are willing” relieve me of all fear. And besides, I think some god has given me a vague recollection.

> Greek: 20b. ΣΩ. δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθʼ οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λύει πάντα φόβον ἑκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

[¶97] Pro. How is that, and what is the recollection about?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

[¶98] Soc. I remember now having heard long ago in a dream, or perhaps when I was awake, some talk about pleasure and wisdom to the effect that neither of the two is the good, but some third thing, different from them and better than both.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν·

[¶99] 20c. However, if this be now clearly proved to us, pleasure is deprived of victory for the good would no longer be identical with it. Is not that true?
Pro. It is.
Soc. And we shall have, in my opinion, no longer any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasure. But the progress of the discussion will make that still clearer.
Pro. Excellent! Just go on as you have begun.
Soc. First, then, let us agree on some further small points.
Pro. What are they?
Soc. Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect or imperfect?

> Greek: 20c. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταὐτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.
ΣΩ. τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατʼ ἐμὴν δόξαν. προϊὸν δʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.
ΣΩ. μίκρʼ ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα;

[¶100] 20d. Pro. The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates.
Soc. Well, and is the good sufficient?
Pro. Of course; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency.
Soc. And nothing, I should say, is more certain about it than that every intelligent being pursues it, desires it, wishes to catch and get possession of it, and has no interest in anything in which the good is not included.
Pro. There is no denying that.

> Greek: 20d. ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.
ΣΩ. τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

[¶101] 20e. Soc. Let us, then, look at the life of pleasure and the life of wisdom separately and consider and judge them.

> Greek: 20e. ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.

[¶102] Pro. How do you mean?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς εἶπες;

[¶103] 21. Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything else, and if, either be found to need anything, we can no longer regard it as our true good.

> Greek: 21. ΣΩ. μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτʼ ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἔστʼ ἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δʼ ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτʼ ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.

[¶104] 21a. Pro. No, of course not.

> Greek: 21a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶105] Soc. Shall we then undertake to test them through you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;

[¶106] Pro. By all means.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶107] Soc. Then answer.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή.

[¶108] Pro. Ask.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε.

[¶109] Soc. Would you, Protarchus, be willing to live your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

> Greek: ΣΩ. δέξαιʼ ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

[¶110] Pro. Of course I should.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶111] Soc. Would you think you needed anything further, if you were in complete possession of that enjoyment?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔχεις παντελῶς;

[¶112] Pro. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶113] Soc. But consider whether you would not have some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of calculating your wants and the like.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ δέοιʼ ἄν τι;

[¶114] 21b. Pro. Why should I? If I have enjoyment, I have everything.

> Greek: 21b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμʼ ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

[¶115] Soc. Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest pleasures all your life?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;

[¶116] Pro. Yes; why not?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶117] Soc. But if you did not possess mind or memory or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you would not know whether you were enjoying your pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are utterly devoid of intellect, must it not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό, εἰ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δήπου σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως;

[¶118] Pro. Yes, it must.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶119] 21c. Soc. And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the oyster.

> Greek: 21c. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δήπου μηδʼ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τʼ ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δʼ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μηδʼ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετʼ ὀστρεΐνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλα διανοηθῆναι;

[¶120] 21d. Is that true, or can we imagine any other result?
Pro. We certainly cannot.
Soc. And can we choose such a life?
Pro. This argument, Socrates, has made me utterly speechless for the present.
Soc. Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.
Pro. What sort of life do you mean?
Soc. I ask whether anyone would be willing to live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and perfect memory of all things, but having no share, great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter, but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.

> Greek: 21d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;
ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.
ΣΩ. μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
ΣΩ. εἴ τις δέξαιτʼ ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδʼ αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.

[¶121] 21e. Pro. Neither of the two lives can ever appear desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.

> Greek: 21e. ΠΡΩ. οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἱρετός, οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, φανῇ.

[¶122] 22a. Soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus, made up by a union of the two?

> Greek: 22a. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὁ συναμφότερος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμειχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

[¶123] Pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or wisdom?

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;

[¶124] Soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [λέγω] ἔγωγε.

[¶125] Pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of the two others—yes, every single person without exception.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ʼκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις [γε] οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δʼ οὔ.

[¶126] Soc. Then do we understand the consequences of what we are now saying?

> Greek: ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

[¶127] Pro. Certainly. Three lives have been proposed, and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable for man or any other living being.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προυτέθησαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δʼ οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζῴων οὐδενί.

[¶128] 22b. Soc. Then is it not already clear that neither of these two contained the good for if it did contain the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and such as to be chosen by all living creatures which would be able to live thus all their lives; and if any of us chose anything else, he would be choosing contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of his own free will, but from ignorance or some unfortunate necessity.

> Greek: 22b. ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτοῖν εἶχε τἀγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθʼ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

[¶129] Pro. That seems at any rate to be true.

> Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν.

[¶130] 22c. Soc. And so I think we have sufficiently proved that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered identical with the good.

> Greek: 22c. ΣΩ. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.

[¶131] Phi. But neither is your “mind” the good, Socrates; it will be open to the same objections.

> Greek: ΦΙ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.

[¶132] Soc. My mind, perhaps, Philebus; but not so, I believe, the true mind, which is also divine; that is different. I do not as yet claim for mind the victory over the combined life, but we must look and see what is to be done about the second place;

> Greek: ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γʼ ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν·