22d. for each of us might perhaps put forward a claim, one that mind is the cause of this combined life, the other that pleasure is the cause and thus neither of these two would be the good, but one or the other of them might be regarded as the cause of the good. On this point I might keep up the fight all the more against Philebus and contend that in this mixed life it is mind that is more akin and more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may be, which makes it both desirable and good; and from this point of view pleasure could advance no true claim to the first or even the second place.
22d. τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιῴμεθʼ ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δʼ ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δʼ ἂν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἂν ὡς ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ συγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτʼ ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδʼ αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο·
22e. It is farther behind than the third place, if my mind is at all to be trusted at present.
22e. πορρωτέρω δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.
23. Pro. Certainly, Socrates, it seems to me that pleasure has fought for the victory and has fallen in this bout, knocked down by your words.
23. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων·
23a. And we can only say, as it seems, that mind was wise in not laying claim to the victory; for it would have met with the same fate. Now pleasure, if she were to lose the second prize, would be deeply humiliated in the eyes of her lovers; for she would no longer appear even to them so lovely as before.
23a. τὰ γὰρ αὔτʼ ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὑτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτʼ ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.
Soc. Well, then, is it not better to leave her now and not to pain her by testing her to the utmost and proving her in the wrong?
ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;
Pro. Nonsense, Socrates!
ΠΡΩ. οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
23b. Soc. Nonsense because I spoke of paining pleasure, and that is impossible?Pro. Not only that, but because you do not understand that not one of us will let you go yet until you have finished the argument about these matters.Soc. Whew, Protarchus! Then we have a long discussion before us, and not an easy one, either, this time. For in going ahead to fight mind’s battle for the second place, I think I need a new contrivance—other weapons, as it were, than those of our previous discussion, though perhaps some of the old ones will serve. Must I then go on?Pro. Of course you must.Soc. Then let us try to be careful in making our beginning.
23b. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;ΠΡΩ. οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά. οὐκοῦν χρή;ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
23c. Pro. What kind of a beginning do you mean?Soc. Let us divide all things that now exist in the universe into two, or rather, if you please, three classes.Pro. Please tell us on what principle you would divide them.Soc. Let us take some of the subjects of our present discussion.Pro. What subjects?Soc. We said that God revealed in the universe two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we not?Pro. Certainly.Soc. Let us, then, assume these as two of our classes, and a third, made by combining these two.
23c. ΣΩ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.ΠΡΩ. ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;ΣΩ. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.ΠΡΩ. καθʼ ὅτι, φράζοις ἄν;ΣΩ. λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων.ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;ΣΩ. τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον.
23d. But I cut a ridiculous figure, it seems, when I attempt a division into classes and an enumeration.
23d. εἰμὶ δʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος κατʼ εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.
Pro. What do you mean, my friend?
ΠΡΩ. τί φῄς, ὠγαθέ;
Soc. I think we need a fourth class besides.
ΣΩ. τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.
Pro. Tell us what it is.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνος.
Soc. Note the cause of the combination of those two and assume that as the fourth in addition to the previous three.
ΣΩ. τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.
Pro. And then will you not need a fifth, which has the power of separation?
ΠΡΩ. μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου;
Soc. Perhaps; but not at present, I think. However, if we do need a fifth, you will pardon me for going after it.
ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν· ἂν δέ τι δέῃ, συγγνώσῃ πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον [βίον].
23e. Pro. Of course.
23e. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
Soc. First, then, let us take three of the four and, as we see that two of these are split up and scattered each one into many, let us try, by collecting each of them again into one, to learn how each of them was both one and many.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτε ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον.
Pro. If you could tell me more clearly about them, I might be able to follow you.
ΠΡΩ. εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχʼ ἂν ἑποίμην.
24a. Soc. I mean, then, that the two which I select are the same which I mentioned before, the infinite and the finite. I will try to show that the infinite is, in a certain sense, many; the finite can wait.
24a. ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο ἃ προτίθεμαι ταὔτʼ εἶναι ἅπερ νυνδή, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον· ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πόλλʼ ἐστί, πειράσομαι φράζειν. τὸ δὲ πέρας ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.
Soc. Consider then. What I ask you to consider is difficult and debatable; but consider it all the same. In the first place, take hotter and colder and see whether you can conceive any limit of them, or whether the more and less which dwell in their very nature do not, so long as they continue to dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end; for if there were any end of them, the more and less would themselves be ended.
ΣΩ. σκέψαι δή. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρας εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις ἄν, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦν⟨τε⟩ τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι·
24b. Pro. Very true.Soc. But always, we affirm, in the hotter and colder there is the more and less.Pro. Certainly.Soc. Always, then, the argument shows that these two have no end; and being endless, they are of course infinite.Pro. Most emphatically, Socrates.Soc. I am glad you responded, my dear Protarchus, and reminded me that the word “emphatically” which you have just used, and the word “gently” have the same force as “more” and “less.”
24b. γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὼ τετελευτήκατον.ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.ΣΩ. ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἔν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι.ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.ΣΩ. ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελῆ δʼ ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον.ΠΡΩ. καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες καὶ ἀνέμνησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθέγξω, καὶ τό γε ἠρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον τῷ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον·
24c. For wherever they are present, they do not allow any definite quantity to exist; they always introduce in every instance a comparison—more emphatic than that which is quieter, or vice versa—and thus they create the relation of more and less, thereby doing away with fixed quantity. For, as I said just now, if they did not abolish quantity, but allowed it and measure to make their appearance in the abode of the more and less, the emphatically and gently, those latter would be banished from their own proper place.
24c. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νυνδή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλʼ ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν.
24d. When once they had accepted definite quantity, they would no longer be hotter or colder; for hotter and colder are always progressing and never stationary; but quantity is at rest and does not progress. By this reasoning hotter and its opposite are shown to be infinite.
24d. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτʼ ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα.
Pro. That appears to be the case, Socrates; but, as you said, these subjects are not easy to follow. Perhaps, however, continued repetition might lead to a satisfactory agreement between the questioner and him who is questioned.
ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δʼ, ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ῥᾴδια ταῦτα συνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὖθίς τε καὶ αὖθις ἴσως λεχθέντα τόν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς ἂν συμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήναιεν.
24e. Soc. That is a good suggestion, and I must try to carry it out. However, to avoid waste of time in discussing all the individual examples, see if we can accept this as a designation of the infinite.
24e. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὖ μὲν λέγεις καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν. νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντʼ ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν.
Pro. Accept what?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
25. Soc. All things which appear to us to become more or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of the infinite as their unity, in accordance with what we said a while ago, if you remember, that we ought to collect all things that are scattered and split up and impress upon them to the best of our ability the seal of some single nature.
25. ΣΩ. ὁπόσʼ ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὃν ἔφαμεν ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.
25a. Pro. I remember.
25a. ΠΡΩ. μέμνημαι.
Soc. And the things which do not admit of more and less and the like, but do admit of all that is opposed to them—first equality and the equal, then the double, and anything which is a definite number or measure in relation to such a number or measure— all these might properly be assigned to the class of the finite.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα σύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο.
25b. What do you say to that?
25b. ἢ πῶς σὺ φῄς;
Pro. Excellent, Socrates.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Well, what shall we say is the nature of the third class, made by combining these two?
ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μεικτὸν ἐκ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;
Pro. You will tell me, I fancy, by answering your own question.
ΠΡΩ. σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.
Soc. Nay, a god will do so, if any god will give ear to my prayers.
ΣΩ. θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηταί τις θεῶν.
Pro. Pray, then, and watch.
ΠΡΩ. εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.
Soc. I am watching; and I think, Protarchus, one of the gods has this moment been gracious unto me.
ΣΩ. σκοπῶ· καί μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νυνδὴ γεγονέναι.
25c. Pro. What do you mean, and what evidence have you?
25c. ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῇ;
Soc. I will tell you, of course. Just follow what I say.
ΣΩ. φράσω δῆλον ὅτι· σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ λόγῳ.
Pro. Say on.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.
Soc. We spoke just now of hotter and colder, did we not?
ΣΩ. θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νυνδή πού τι καὶ ψυχρότερον. ἦ γάρ;
Soc. Add to them drier and wetter, more and less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and all that we assigned before to the class which unites more and less.
ΣΩ. πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.
25d. Pro. You mean the class of the infinite?
25d. ΠΡΩ. τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;
Soc. Yes. Mix with that the second class, the offspring of the limit.
ΣΩ. ναί. συμμείγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.
Pro. What class do you mean?
ΠΡΩ. ποίαν;
Soc. The class of the finite, which we ought just now to have reduced to unity, as we did that of the infinite. We have not done that, but perhaps we shall even now accomplish the same end, if these two are both unified and then the third class is revealed.
ΣΩ. ἣν καὶ νυνδή, δέον ἡμᾶς καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει, ⟨εἰ⟩ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται.
Pro. What third class, and what do you mean?
ΠΡΩ. ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;
Soc. The class of the equal and double and everything which puts an end to the differences between opposites and makes them commensurable and harmonious by the introduction of number.
ΣΩ. τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.
25e. Pro. I understand. I think you mean that by mixture of these elements certain results are produced in each instance.
25e. ΠΡΩ. μανθάνω· φαίνῃ γάρ μοι λέγειν μειγνὺς ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἐφʼ ἑκάστων αὐτῶν συμβαίνειν.
Soc. Yes, you are right.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.
Pro. Go on.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε τοίνυν.
26. Soc. In cases of illness, does not the proper combination of these elements produce health?
26. ΣΩ. ἆρα οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;
26a. Pro. Certainly.Soc. And in the acute and the grave, the quick and the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these same elements creates a limit and establishes the whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not?Pro. Excellent.Soc. And again in the case of cold and hot weather, the introduction of these elements removes the excess and indefiniteness and creates moderation and harmony.Pro. Assuredly.Soc. And thence arise the seasons and all the beauties of our world, by mixture of the infinite with the finite?
26a. ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτὰ [ἐγγιγνόμενα] ταῦτα· ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπηργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν σύμπασαν τελεώτατα συνεστήσατο;ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστά γε.ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσιν καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενομένη τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο.ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
26b. Pro. Of course.Soc. There are countless other things which I pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of the body and the many glorious beauties of the soul. For this goddess, my fair Philebus, beholding the violence and universal wickedness which prevailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of indulgence in them, established law and order, which contain a limit. You say she did harm;
26b. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμειχθέντων;ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;ΣΩ. καὶ ἄλλα γε δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθʼ ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἔχοντʼ ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω.
26c. I say, on the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you think, Protarchus?
26c. σοὶ δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;
Pro. What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.
Soc. I have spoken of these three classes, you observe.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἴρηκα, εἰ συννοεῖς.
Pro. Yes, I believe I understand; I think you mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is another class among existing things; but what you wish to designate as the third class, I do not comprehend very well.
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἓν μὲν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἓν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.
Soc. No, because the multitude which springs up in the third class overpowers you and yet the infinite also comprised many classes, nevertheless, since they were sealed with the seal of the more and less, they were seen to be of one class.
ΣΩ. τὸ γὰρ πλῆθός σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως· καίτοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο γένη, ὅμως δʼ ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἓν ἐφάνη.
26d. Pro. True.
26d. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ.
Soc. And the finite, again, did not contain many classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτʼ ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει.
Pro. Of course not.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Soc. No, not at all. And as to the third class, understand that I mean every offspring of these two which comes into being as a result of the measures created by the cooperation of the finite.
ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἓν τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων.
Pro. I understand.
ΠΡΩ. ἔμαθον.
26e. Soc. But we said there was, in addition to three classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that together. See whether you think that everything which comes into being must necessarily come into being through a cause.
26e. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον· κοινὴ δʼ ἡ σκέψις. ὅρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διά τινα αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.
Pro. Yes, I do; for how could it come into being apart from a cause?
ΠΡΩ. ἔμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γίγνοιτο;
Soc. Does not the nature of that which makes or creates differ only in name from the cause, and may not the creative agent and the cause be properly considered one?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον ἕν;
27a. Soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same principle, that which is made or created differs in name only from that which comes into being, shall we not?
27a. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νυνδή, διαφέρον εὑρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;
Pro. We shall.
ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.
Soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads, and that which is created follows after it as it comes into being?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;
Pro. Certainly.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
Soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant of the cause for the purpose of generation are not the same.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αἰτία τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ.
Pro. Of course not.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
Soc. Did not the things which come into being and the things out of which they come into being furnish us all the three classes?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;
Pro. Certainly.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
27b. Soc. And that which produces all these, the cause, we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown to be distinct from the others?
27b. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον;
Pro. Yes, it is distinct.
ΠΡΩ. ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.
Soc. It is, then, proper, now that we have distinguished the four, to make sure that we remember them separately by enumerating them in order.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθαι.
Pro. Yes, certainly.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
Soc. The first, then, I call infinite, the second limit or finite, and the third something generated by a mixture of these two. And should I be making any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and creation the fourth?
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτʼ ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μεικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μείξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι;
27c. Pro. Certainly not.
27c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
Soc. Now what is the next step in our argument, and what was our purpose in coming to the point we have reached? Was it not this? We were trying to find out whether the second place belonged to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not?
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος, καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα; ἆρʼ οὐ τόδε ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;
Pro. Yes, we were.
ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Soc. And may we not, perhaps, now that we have finished with these points, be better able to come to a decision about the first and second places, which was the original subject of our discussion?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἴσως νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν;
27d. Soc. Well then; we decided that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not?
27d. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή· νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μεικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;
Soc. And do we not see what kind of life this is, and to what class it belongs?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους;
Pro. Of course we do.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. We shall say that it belongs to the third class; for that class is not formed by mixture of any two things, but of all the things which belong to the infinite, bound by the finite; and therefore this victorious life would rightly be considered a part of this class.
ΣΩ. καὶ μέρος γʼ αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου οἶμαι γένους· οὐ γὰρ [ὁ] δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστι [μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος] ἀλλὰ συμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτʼ ἄν.
Pro. Quite rightly.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
27e. Soc. Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of unmixed pleasure? In which of the aforesaid classes may it properly be said to belong? But before you tell me, please answer this question.
27e. ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ ἄμεικτος ὤν; ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὧδε δʼ ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀποφήνασθαι.
Phi. Ask your question.
ΦΙ. λέγε μόνον.
Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they among the things which admit of more and less?
ΣΩ. ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν;
Phi. Yes, they are among those which admit of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be absolute good if it were not infinite in number and degree.
ΦΙ. ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.
28a. Soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil; so it is not the infinite which supplies any element of good in pleasure; we must look for something else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are in the class of the infinite but to which of the aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge, and mind? I think we must find the right answer to this question, for our danger is great if we fail.
28a. ΣΩ. οὐδέ γʼ ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πᾶν κακόν· ὥστʼ ἄλλο τι νῷν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν ὡς παρέχεταί τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τούτω δή σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γε γένους ἔστων· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῖμεν; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
28b. Phi. Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.
28b. ΦΙ. σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.
Soc. And you your goddess, my friend. But the question calls for an answer, all the same.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δʼ ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.
Pro. Socrates is right, Philebus; you ought to do as he asks.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὦ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ πειστέον.
Phi. Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my place?
ΦΙ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προῄρησαι λέγειν;
Pro. Yes; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself, that we may not select the wrong representative and so say something improper.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ δέομαί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.
28c. Soc. I must do as you ask, Protarchus; and it is not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said, embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when I asked to what class mind and knowledge should be assigned?
28c. ΣΩ. πειστέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλʼ ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν;
Pro. You certainly did, Socrates.
ΠΡΩ. παντάπασί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. Yet the answer is easy; for all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right. But let us, if you please, investigate the question of its class more at length.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥᾴδιον· πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.
28d. Pro. Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not consider length, so far as we are concerned you cannot bore us.
28d. ΠΡΩ. λέγʼ ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.
Soc. Good. Then let us begin by asking a question.
ΣΩ. καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε ἐπανερωτῶντες.
Pro. What is the question?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
Soc. Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and this which is called the universe are governed by an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance, or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous wisdom?
ΣΩ. πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;
28e. Pro. The two points of view have nothing in common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you are now saying seems to me actually impious. But the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and the whole revolving universe; I can never say or think anything else about it.
28e. ΠΡΩ. οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες· ὃ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, οὐδὲ ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγʼ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδʼ ἂν δοξάσαιμι.
29. Soc. Do you, then, think we should assent to this and agree in the doctrine of our predecessors, not merely intending to repeat the words of others, with no risk to ourselves, but ready to share with them in the risk and the blame, if any clever man declares that this world is not thus ordered, but is without order?
29. ΣΩ. βούλει δῆτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον συμφήσωμεν ὡς ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν τἀλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλʼ ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;
29a. Pro. Yes, of course I do.
29a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;
Soc. Then observe the argument that now comes against us.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄθρει.
Pro. Go on.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.
Soc. We see the elements which belong to the natures of all living beings, fire, water, air, and earth—or, as the storm-tossed mariners say, land in sight— in the constitution of the universe.
ΣΩ. τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα καθορῶμέν που καὶ γῆν καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοι, φασίν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει.
29b. Pro. Certainly and we are truly storm-tossed in the puzzling cross-currents of this discussion.
29b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπʼ ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.
Soc. Well, here is a point for you to consider in relation to each of these elements as it exists in us.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.
Pro. What is the point?
ΠΡΩ. ποῖον;
Soc. Each element in us is small and poor and in no way pure at all or endowed with the power which is worthy of its nature. Take one example and apply it to all. Fire, for instance, exists in us and also in the universe.
ΣΩ. ὅτι μικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρʼ ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. οἷον πῦρ ἔστι μέν που παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἔστι δʼ ἐν τῷ παντί.
Pro. Of course.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
29c. Soc. And that which is in us is small, weak, and poor, but that which is in the universe is marvellous in quantity, beauty, and every power which belongs to fire.
29c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δʼ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.
Pro. What you say is very true.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλʼ ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις.
Soc. Well, is the fire of the universe nourished, originated, and ruled by the fire within us, or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of all living beings derive nourishment and all that from the universal fire?
ΣΩ. τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ αὔξεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρʼ ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τό τʼ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἅπαντʼ ἴσχει ταῦτα;
Pro. That question does not even deserve an answer.
ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδʼ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.
29d. Soc. True; and you will, I fancy, say the same of the earth which is in us living creatures and that which is in the universe, and concerning all the other elements about which I asked a moment ago your answer will be the same.
29d. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἐρεῖς οἶμαι περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν. οὕτως ἀποκρινῇ;
Pro. Yes. Who could answer otherwise without being called a lunatic?
ΠΡΩ. τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε φανείη;
Soc. Nobody, I fancy. Now follow the next step. When we see that all the aforesaid elements are gathered together into a unit, do we not call them a body?
ΣΩ. σχεδὸν οὐδʼ ὁστισοῦν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς ἕπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα ἆρʼ οὐκ εἰς ἓν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;
Pro. Of course.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
29e. Soc. Apply the same line of thought to that which we call the universe. It would likewise be a body, being composed of the same elements.
29e. ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν· [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὂν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.
Pro. Quite right.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Soc. Does our body derive, obtain, and possess from that body, or that body from ours, nourishment and everything else that we mentioned just now?
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρʼ ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεταί τε καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴπομεν εἴληφέν τε καὶ ἔχει;
Pro. That, Socrates, is another question not worth asking.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ἕτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.
30a. Soc. Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it?
30a. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;
Pro. What is it?
ΠΡΩ. λέγε τὸ ποῖον.
Soc. Shall we not say that our body has a soul?
ΣΩ. τὸ παρʼ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρʼ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;
Pro. Clearly we shall.
ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.
Soc. Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior?
ΣΩ. πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;
Pro. Clearly it could get it from no other source.
ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Soc. No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, and the element of cause which exists in all things, this last, which gives to our bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and medical treatment when the body is ill, and which is in general a composing and healing power, is called the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same elements exist in the entire heaven and in great parts thereof, and area moreover, fair and pure, there is no means of including among them that nature which is the fairest and most precious of all.
ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν ψυχήν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δʼ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δʼ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.
30c. Pro. Certainly there would be no sense in that.Soc. Then if that is not the case, it would be better to follow the other line of thought and say, as we have often said, that there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind.Pro. Yes, most justly.Soc. Surely reason and mind could never come into being without soul.Pro. No, never.Soc. Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets.
30c. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γʼ ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετʼ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολύ, καὶ πέρας ἱκανόν, καί τις ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατʼ ἄν.ΠΡΩ. δικαιότατα δῆτα.ΣΩ. σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην.ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
30d. Pro. Certainly.Soc. Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind always rules the universe.Pro. Yes, certainly.Soc. And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all.
30d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δʼ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθʼ ὅτι φίλον ἑκάστοις λέγεσθαι.ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε.ΣΩ. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην δόξῃς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει σύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.ΣΩ. τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσει πεπορικὼς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους τῆς τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος [τῶν τεττάρων, [ὧν] ἦν ἡμῖν ἓν τοῦτο].
30e. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.Pro. Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered without my knowing it.Soc. Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from serious talk.Pro. You are right. Soc. We have now, then, my friend, pretty clearly shown to what class mind belongs and what power it possesses.
30e. ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.ΠΡΩ. ἔχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.ΣΩ. ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες.
31a. Pro. Certainly.Soc. And likewise the class of pleasure was made clear some time ago.Pro. Yes, it was.Soc. Let us, then, remember concerning both of them that mind was akin to cause and belonged more or less to that class, and that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end.
31a. ΣΩ. νῦν δήπου, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάλαι τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.ΣΩ. μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν αὑτῷ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε γένους.
31b. Pro. We will remember that, of course.
31b. ΠΡΩ. μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Soc. Our next task is to see in what and by means of what feeling each of them comes into being whenever they do come into being. We will take pleasure first and discuss these questions in relation to pleasure, as we examined its class first. But we cannot examine pleasure successfully apart from pain.
ΣΩ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον ὁπόταν γίγνησθον ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς. πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δὲ αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.
Pro. If that is our proper path, let us follow it.
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πορευώμεθα.
Soc. Do you agree with us about the origin of pleasure?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;
31c. Pro. What do you think it is?
31c. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
Soc. I think pain and pleasure naturally originate in the combined class.
ΣΩ. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.
Pro. Please, my dear Socrates, remind us which of the aforesaid classes you mean by the combined class.
ΠΡΩ. κοινὸν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμνῃσκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.
Soc. I will do so, as well as I can, my brilliant friend.
ΣΩ. ἔσται ταῦτʼ εἰς δύναμιν, ὦ θαυμάσιε.
Pro. Thank you.
ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες.
Soc. By combined class, then, let us understand that which we said was the third of the four.
ΣΩ. κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.
Pro. The one you mentioned after the infinite and the finite, and in which you put health and also, I believe, harmony?
ΠΡΩ. ὃ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;
31d. Soc. You are quite right. Now please pay very close attention.
31d. ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστʼ ἤδη πρόσεχε.
Pro. I will. Say on.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.
Soc. I say, then, that when, in us living beings, harmony is broken up, a disruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same moment.
ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἁρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.
Pro. What you say is very likely.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.
Soc. But if harmony is recomposed and returns to its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated, if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words about matters of the highest import.
ΣΩ. πάλιν δὲ ἁρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ διʼ ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅτι τάχιστα ῥηθῆναι.
31e. Pro. I think you are right, Socrates; but let us try to be more explicit.
31e. ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μέν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον δὲ ἔτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.
Soc. It is easiest to understand common and obvious examples, is it not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ῥᾷστον συννοεῖν;
Pro. What examples?
ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;
Soc. Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain?
ΣΩ. πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;
Soc. And eating, which is a filling up again, is a pleasure?
ΣΩ. ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;
32. Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling with moisture of that which was dried up is a pleasure.
32. ΣΩ. δίψος δʼ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή·
32a. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration we experience through heat are a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are a pleasure.
32a. διάκρισις δέ γʼ αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.
Pro. Certainly.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Soc. And the unnatural hardening of the moisture in an animal through cold is pain; but the natural course of the elements returning to their place and separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite, that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the passage and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure.
ΣΩ. καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δʼ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δʼ εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.
32b. Pro. Let us accept that; for it seems to me to be true in its general lines.
32b. ΠΡΩ. ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.
Soc. Then we may assume this as one kind of pain and pleasure arising severally under the conditions I have described?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;
Pro. Let that be assumed.
ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.
Soc. Now assume within the soul itself the anticipation of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful expectation of painful things to come.
ΣΩ. τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.
32c. Pro. Yes, indeed, this is another kind of pleasure and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart from the body, and arises through expectation.
32c. ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.
Soc. You are right. I think that in these two kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether the entire class is to be desired or such desirability is rather to be attributed to some other class among those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, because they are not good themselves, though some of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of the good.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσιν τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμείκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.
32d. Pro. You are quite right in saying that we must track our quarry on this trail.
32d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορηθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.
Soc. First, then, let us agree on this point: If it is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of living beings in which neither destruction nor restoration is going on, and what their state is under such conditions.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε συνίδωμεν· [ὡς] εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδών, ἀνασῳζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτε ἀνασῳζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἕξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῴοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχῃ.
32e. Fix your mind on my question: Must not every living being under those conditions necessarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure, great or small?
32e. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἆρα οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῷον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἥδεσθαι μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;
Pro. Yes, necessarily.
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.
33. Soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?
33. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου;
33a. Pro. Certainly.
33a. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
Soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.
ΣΩ. ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ἢ μή. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.
Pro. Pray do so.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε ποῖον.
Soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.
ΣΩ. [τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἑλομένῳ] βίον οἶσθʼ ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.
33b. Pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?
33b. ΠΡΩ. τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;
Soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.
ΣΩ. ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.
Pro. Yes, surely, that was said.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.
Soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.
Pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite.
ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.
Soc. No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.
33c. Pro. Quite right.
33c. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός.
Pro. How is that?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
Soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly.
ΣΩ. μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον, καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι.
33d. Pro. What do you mean?
33d. ΠΡΩ. πῶς φῄς;
Soc. Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.
ΣΩ. θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.