--- title: "Philebus · Φίληβος" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 3 of 5 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Philebus · Φίληβος, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/" --- # Philebus · Φίληβος *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* Is the good life one of pleasure, of knowledge, or a mixture of the two? > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 3. 33e–44d Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/3/#p-N [¶0] Pro. Let us assume that. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. κείσθω. [¶1] Soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρʼ ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν; [¶2] 33e. Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: 33e. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶3] Soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος, ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε. τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. ἦ γάρ; [¶4] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶5] Soc. Then just change the terms. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον. [¶6] Pro. How? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶7] 34. Soc. Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply the term want of perception to that which you are now calling forgetfulness. > Greek: 34. ΣΩ. ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον. [¶8] 34a. Pro. I understand. > Greek: 34a. ΠΡΩ. ἔμαθον. [¶9] Soc. And the union of soul and body in one common affection and one common motion you may properly call perception. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δʼ αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοιʼ ἄν. [¶10] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶11] Soc. Then do we now understand what we mean by perception? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν; [¶12] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶13] Soc. I think, then, that memory may rightly be defined as the preservation of perception. > Greek: ΣΩ. σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν. [¶14] 34b. Pro. Quite rightly. > Greek: 34b. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οὖν. [¶15] Soc. But do we not say that memory differs from recollection? > Greek: ΣΩ. μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἆρʼ οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν; [¶16] Pro. Perhaps. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως. [¶17] Soc. And is this the difference? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τόδε; [¶18] Pro. What? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶19] Soc. When the soul alone by itself, apart from the body, recalls completely any experience it has had in company with the body, we say that it recollects do we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέν ποθʼ ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτʼ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ; [¶20] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶21] Soc. And again when the soul has lost the memory of a perception or of something it has learned and then alone by itself regains this, we call everything of that kind recollection. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτʼ αἰσθήσεως εἴτʼ αὖ μαθήματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα σύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις [καὶ μνήμας] που λέγομεν. [¶22] 34c. Pro. You are right. Soc. Now my reason for saying all this is— Pro. What? Soc. That henceforth we may comprehend as completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the body; for both of these appear to be made plain by what has been said about memory and recollection. Pro. Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point. Soc. We must, it seems, consider many things in relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure; > Greek: 34c. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. ΣΩ. οὗ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντʼ εἴρηται ταῦτʼ, ἔστι τόδε. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. ἵνα πῃ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικεν δηλοῦσθαι. ΠΡΩ. λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. [¶23] 34d. but now I think our first task is to take up the nature and origin of desire. > Greek: 34d. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι τί ποτʼ ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται. [¶24] Pro. Then let us examine that; for we shall not lose anything. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν. [¶25] Soc. Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal! When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our perplexity about these very questions. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν [καὶ] ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε· εὑρόντες ὃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν. [¶26] Pro. That is a fair counter; but let us try to take up the next point. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς ἠμύνω· τὸ δʼ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα λέγειν. [¶27] Soc. Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and the like were desires? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί τινας ἐπιθυμίας; [¶28] 34e. Pro. They are, decidedly. > Greek: 34e. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. [¶29] Soc. What sort of identity have we in view when we call these, which are so different, by one name? > Greek: ΣΩ. πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθʼ ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι; [¶30] Pro. By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be easy to answer, yet it must be answered. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὅμως λεκτέον. [¶31] Soc. Let us, then, begin again at that point with the same examples. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν. [¶32] Pro. At what point? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πόθεν δή; [¶33] Soc. We say of a thing on any particular occasion, “it’s thirsty,” do we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. διψῇ γέ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι; [¶34] Pro. Of course. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶35] Soc. And that means being empty? > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο δέ γʼ ἐστὶ κενοῦται; [¶36] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶37] Soc. And is thirst, then, a desire? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία; [¶38] Pro. Yes, of drink. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί, πώματός γε. [¶39] 35a. Soc. Of drink, or of being filled with drink? > Greek: 35a. ΣΩ. πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος; [¶40] Pro. Of being filled, I suppose. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως. [¶41] Soc. The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι. [¶42] Pro. That is very plain. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σαφέστατά γε. [¶43] Soc. Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτʼ αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτʼ ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ, τούτου ὃ μήτʼ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτʼ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πώποτε ἔπαθεν; [¶44] Pro. It cannot be done. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς; [¶45] 35b. Soc. And yet he who desires, desires something, we say. > Greek: 35b. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν. [¶46] Pro. Of course. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶47] Soc. And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως. [¶48] Pro. Yes. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶49] Soc. Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness. > Greek: ΣΩ. πληρώσεώς γʼ ἄρα πῄ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο. [¶50] Pro. Yes, obviously. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον. [¶51] Soc. But it cannot be the body, for that is empty. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που. [¶52] Pro. True. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶53] Soc. The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it employ? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· [¶54] 35c. Pro. No other, I should say. Soc. And do we understand the consequences of this argument? Pro. What are the consequences? Soc. This argument declares that we have no bodily desire. Pro. How so? Soc. Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body. Pro. Yes, certainly. Soc. And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions. Pro. Certainly. > Greek: 35c. τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτʼ ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο; ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν οὐδενί. ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων; ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίγνεσθαι. ΠΡΩ. πῶς; ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. [¶55] 35d. Soc. And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul. > Greek: 35d. ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς σύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν. [¶56] Pro. Quite right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα. [¶57] Soc. So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection. > Greek: ΣΩ. διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ. [¶58] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶59] Soc. Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections. For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς. [¶60] 35e. Pro. Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist? > Greek: 35e. ΠΡΩ. ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου πέρι βίου φράζεις; [¶61] Soc. In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς. [¶62] Pro. That is true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [¶63] Soc. And what if a man is between the two? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται; [¶64] Pro. How between them? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς ἐν μέσῳ; [¶65] 36. Soc. Because of his condition, he is suffering, but he remembers the pleasures the coming of which would bring him an end of his pain; as yet, however, he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say that he is between the affections, or not? > Greek: 36. ΣΩ. διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ⟨ὧν⟩ γενομένων παύοιτʼ ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε; [¶66] 36a. Pro. Let us say so. Soc. Shall we say that he is wholly pained or wholly pleased? Pro. No, by Zeus, but he is afflicted with a twofold pain; he suffers in body from his sensation, and in soul from expectation and longing. Soc. How could you, Protarchus, speak of twofold pain? Is not an empty man sometimes possessed of a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes, on the contrary, quite hopeless? > Greek: 36a. φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι; ΠΡΩ. φῶμεν μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. πότερον ἀλγοῦνθʼ ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα; ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ, ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ. ΣΩ. πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει; [¶67] 36b. Pro. Certainly. > Greek: 36b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα γε. [¶68] Soc. And do you not think that when he has a hope of being filled he takes pleasure in his memory, and yet at the same time, since he is at the moment empty, suffers pain? > Greek: ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις [τοῖς χρόνοις] ἀλγεῖν; [¶69] Pro. It cannot be otherwise. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη. [¶70] Soc. At such a time, then, a man, or any other animal, has both pain and pleasure at once. > Greek: ΣΩ. τότε ἄρʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει. [¶71] Pro. Yes, I suppose so. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει. [¶72] Soc. And when an empty man is without hope of being filled, what then? Is not that the time when the twofold feeling of pain would arise, which you just now observed and thought the pain simply was twofold? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἆρʼ οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτʼ ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νυνδὴ κατιδὼν ᾠήθης ἁπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν; [¶73] 36c. Pro. Very true, Socrates. > Greek: 36c. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶74] Soc. Let us make use of our examination of those affections for a particular purpose. > Greek: ΣΩ. ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε χρησώμεθα. [¶75] Pro. For what purpose? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶76] Soc. Shall we say that those pleasures and pains are true or false, or that some are true and others not so? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δʼ οὔ; [¶77] Pro. But, Socrates, how can there be false pleasures or pains? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λῦπαι; [¶78] Soc. But, Protarchus, how can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς; [¶79] 36d. Pro. Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest. > Greek: 36d. ΠΡΩ. δόξας μὲν ἔγωγʼ ἄν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἄν. [¶80] Soc. What? I am afraid we are starting a very considerable discussion. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν. [¶81] Pro. You are right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. [¶82] Soc. And yet we must consider, thou son of that man, whether the discussion is relevant to what has gone before. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ ʼκείνου τἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον. [¶83] Pro. Yes, no doubt. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως τοῦτό γε. [¶84] Soc. We must dismiss everything else, tedious or otherwise, that is irrelevant. > Greek: ΣΩ. χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων. [¶85] Pro. Right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς. [¶86] 36e. Soc. Now tell me; for I am always utterly amazed by the same questions we were just proposing. Pro. What do you mean? Soc. Are not some pleasures false and others true? Pro. How could that be? Soc. Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleeping or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never, on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he does not suffer it? Pro. We have, Socrates, always believed that all this is as you suggest. Soc. But is the belief correct? Shall we consider whether it is so or not? > Greek: 36e. ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι· θαῦμα γάρ μέ γε ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῄς; ψευδεῖς, αἱ δʼ ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ΣΩ. οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθʼ ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, [ἐστιν] οὔτʼ ἐν μανίαις οὔτʼ ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθʼ ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδʼ αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δʼ οὔ. ΠΡΩ. πάνθʼ οὕτω ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὀρθῶς; ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτʼ ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται; ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον, ὥς γʼ ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν. [¶87] 37a. Pro. I should say we ought to consider that. Soc. Then let us analyze still more clearly what we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion. There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not? Pro. Yes. Soc. And of feeling pleasure? Pro. Yes. Soc. And there is an object of opinion? Pro. Of course. Soc. And something by which that which feels pleasure is pleased? Pro. Certainly. Soc. And that which has opinion, whether right or wrong, never loses its function of really having opinion? > Greek: 37a. ΣΩ. διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νυνδὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστιν γάρ πού τι δοξάζειν ἡμῖν; ΠΡΩ. ναί. ΣΩ. καὶ ἥδεσθαι; ΠΡΩ. ναί. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενόν ἐστί τι; ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. καὶ τό γε ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται; ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάζῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν. [¶88] 37b. Pro. Of course not. > Greek: 37b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶89] Soc. And that which feels pleasure, whether rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function of really feeling pleasure? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἄντε ὀρθῶς ἄντε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτʼ ἀπολεῖ. [¶90] Pro. Yes, that is true, too. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί, καὶ τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει. [¶91] Soc. Then we must consider how it is that opinion is both true and false and pleasure only true, though the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are equally real. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτῳ ποτὲ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδής τε καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δʼ ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἴληχεν ⟨σκεπτέον⟩. [¶92] Pro. Yes, so we must. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον. [¶93] Soc. You mean that we must consider this question because falsehood and truth are added as attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in each instance? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδός τε καὶ ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῂς τοῦτʼ εἶναι; [¶94] 37c. Pro. Yes. > Greek: 37c. ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶95] Soc. And furthermore, we must reach an agreement on the question whether, even if some things have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely what they are, without qualities or attributes. > Greek: ΣΩ. πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μέν ἐστι ποίʼ ἄττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ ἐστί, ποιώ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν διομολογητέον. [¶96] Pro. Evidently we must. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον. [¶97] Soc. But it is easy enough to see that they have qualities. For we said a long time ago that both pains and pleasures are great and small and intense. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι καὶ ποιώ τινε· πάλαι γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἡδοναί. [¶98] 37d. Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: 37d. ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶99] Soc. And if badness becomes an attribute of any of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion or the pleasure thereby becomes bad? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηταί τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν; [¶100] Pro. Why certainly, Socrates. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶101] Soc. And what if rightness or its opposite becomes an attribute of one of them? Shall we not say that the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the pleasure likewise? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τοὐναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ τούτων προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχῃ, ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν; [¶102] Pro. Obviously. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον. [¶103] 37e. Soc. And if that which is opined is mistaken, must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at the moment making a mistake, is not right or rightly opining? > Greek: 37e. ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ᾖ, τὴν δόξαν τότε ἁμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδʼ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσαν; [¶104] Pro. Of course. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶105] Soc. And what if we see a pain or a pleasure making a mistake in respect of that by which the pain or pleasure is caused? Shall we give it the attribute of right or good or any of the words which denote excellence? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ, ἂν αὖ λύπην ἤ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἤ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν; [¶106] Pro. That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτήσεταί γε ἡδονή. [¶107] Soc. And certainly pleasure often seems to come to us in connection with false, not true, opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέν γε ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι. [¶108] 38. Pro. Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false. > Greek: 38. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δʼ ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ. [¶109] 38a. Soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus. > Greek: 38a. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν. [¶110] Pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐδέν γε, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω. [¶111] Soc. Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance? > Greek: ΣΩ. διαφέρει δʼ ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἡ μετὰ δόξης τε ὀρθῆς καὶ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης; [¶112] 38b. Pro. There is likely to be a great difference. > Greek: 38b. ΠΡΩ. εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν. [¶113] Soc. Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν. [¶114] Pro. Lead on as you think best. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἄγʼ ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται. [¶115] Soc. Then this is the way I lead. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ ἄγω. [¶116] Pro. What way? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ; [¶117] Soc. Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion? > Greek: ΣΩ. δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής; [¶118] Pro. There is. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστιν. [¶119] Soc. And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἕπεται μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω. [¶120] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. [¶121] Soc. And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεθʼ ἑκάστοτε; [¶122] 38c. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows? Pro. How? Soc. Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees? Pro. Yes, I should say so. Soc. Next, then, would he not ask himself— Pro. What? Soc. “What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree?” > Greek: 38c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθʼ ἴσχειν; ΠΡΩ. πῶς; ΣΩ. πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα συμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθʼ ἅπερ ὁρᾷ; ΠΡΩ. φαίην ἄν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτʼ ἂν ὧδε; ΠΡΩ. πῶς; ΣΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρʼ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθʼ ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; [¶123] 38d. Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view? > Greek: 38d. ταῦτʼ εἰπεῖν ἄν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα αὑτῷ ποτε; [¶124] Pro. To be sure. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶125] Soc. And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly “It is a man”? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὑτὸν εἴποι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτυχῶς εἰπών; [¶126] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε. [¶127] Soc. Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ παρενεχθείς γʼ αὖ τάχʼ ἂν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι. [¶128] Pro. Yes, indeed. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε. [¶129] 38e. Soc. And if some one is with him, he might repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to himself, and thus that which we called an opinion now becomes a statement? > Greek: 38e. ΣΩ. κἂν μέν τίς γʼ αὐτῷ παρῇ, τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτʼ ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν; [¶130] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶131] Soc. But if he is alone when he has this thought, he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long time. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἂν δʼ ἄρα μόνος ᾖ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν πρὸς αὑτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ πορεύεται. [¶132] Pro. Undoubtedly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶133] Soc. Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the same as mine? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἆρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων ὅπερ ἐμοί; [¶134] Pro. What is yours? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶135] Soc. I think the soul at such a time is like a book. > Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοικέναι. [¶136] Pro. How is that? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶137] 39a. Soc. Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings which are connected with them seem to me almost to write words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true. > Greek: 39a. ΣΩ. ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτὸν κἀκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράφῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δʼ ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρʼ ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τἀναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη. [¶138] 39b. Pro. That is my view completely, and I accept it as stated. > Greek: 39b. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥηθέντα οὕτως. [¶139] Soc. Then accept also the presence of another workman in our souls at such a time. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον. [¶140] Pro. What workman? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τίνα; [¶141] Soc. A painter, who paints in our souls pictures to illustrate the words which the writer has written. > Greek: ΣΩ. ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει. [¶142] Pro. But how do we say he does this, and when? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν; [¶143] Soc. When a man receives from sight or some other sense the opinions and utterances of the moment and afterwards beholds in his own mind the images of those opinions and utterances. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν ἀπʼ ὄψεως ἤ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγών τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ πως. [¶144] 39c. That happens to us often enough, does it not? > Greek: 39c. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενον παρʼ ἡμῖν; [¶145] Pro. It certainly does. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν. [¶146] Soc. And the images of the true opinions are true, and those of the false are false? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς; [¶147] Pro. Assuredly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασιν. [¶148] Soc. Then if we are right about that, let us consider a further question. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα. [¶149] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶150] Soc. Whether this is an inevitable experience in relation to the present and the past, but not in relation to the future. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτα ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ; [¶151] Pro. It is in the same relation to all kinds of time. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. περὶ ἁπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως. [¶152] 39d. Soc. Was it not said a while ago that the pleasures and pains which belong to the soul alone might come before the pleasures and pains of the body, so that we have the pleasure and pain of anticipation, which relate to the future? > Greek: 39d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἵ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνοιντʼ ἄν, ὥσθʼ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον; [¶153] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶154] Soc. Do the writings and pictures, then, which we imagined a little while ago to exist within us, relate to the past and present, but not to the future? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ σμικρῷ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστίν, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν; [¶155] 39e. Pro. To the future especially. > Greek: 39e. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. [¶156] Soc. Do you say “to the future especially” because they are all hopes relating to the future and we are always filled with hopes all our lives? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὖσαι, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων; [¶157] Pro. Precisely. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶158] Soc. Well, here is a further question for you to answer. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄγε δή, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι. [¶159] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶160] Soc. A just, pious, and good man is surely a friend of the gods, is he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἆρʼ οὐ θεοφιλής ἐστιν; [¶161] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶162] 40. Soc. And an unjust and thoroughly bad man is the reverse? > Greek: 40. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἆρʼ οὐ τοὐναντίον ἐκείνῳ; [¶163] 40a. Pro. Of course. > Greek: 40a. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶164] Soc. But, as we were just now saying, every man is full of many hopes? > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέμει; [¶165] Pro. Yes, to be sure. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ; [¶166] Soc. And there are in all of us written words which we call hopes? > Greek: ΣΩ. λόγοι μήν εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν; [¶167] Pro. Yes. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶168] Soc. And also the images painted there; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐζωγραφημένα· καί τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἑαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπʼ αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφʼ αὑτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ. [¶169] 40b. Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: 40b. ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ; [¶170] Soc. Shall we or shall we not say that of these pictures those are for the most part true which are presented to the good, because they are friends of the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for the most part false? > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὖ ⟨τὸ⟩ πολὺ τοὐναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν; [¶171] Pro. Surely we must say that. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα φατέον. [¶172] Soc. Then the bad also, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are false pleasures. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γε οὐδὲν ἧττον πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημέναι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὗταί που. [¶173] Pro. Yes, surely. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶174] 40c. Soc. Then the bad rejoice for the most part in the false, and the good in true pleasures. > Greek: 40c. ΣΩ. ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν. [¶175] Pro. That is inevitably true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις. [¶176] Soc. According to our present view, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures; and pains likewise. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰσὶν δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, καὶ λῦπαι δὲ ὡσαύτως. [¶177] Pro. There are. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰσίν. [¶178] Soc. We saw, you remember, that he who had an opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it was sometimes not based upon realities, whether present, past, or future. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπʼ οὖσι δὲ μηδʼ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδὲ ἐπʼ ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε. [¶179] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. [¶180] 40d. Soc. And this it was, I believe, which created false opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not? > Greek: 40d. ΣΩ. καὶ ταῦτά γε ἦν οἶμαι τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν ψευδῆ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἦ γάρ; [¶181] Pro. Yes. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶182] Soc. Very well, must we not also grant that pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to realities? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἕξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις; [¶183] Pro. What do you mean? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶184] Soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι μηδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι. [¶185] 40e. Pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case. > Greek: 40e. ΠΡΩ. καὶ ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. [¶186] Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε; [¶187] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶188] Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν; [¶189] Pro. No. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως. [¶190] Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἡδονάς γʼ οἶμαι κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶν πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι. [¶191] 41a. Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil. > Greek: 41a. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας. σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς ἄν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλῃ δὲ ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ. [¶192] Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὔσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῷν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατʼ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνομένας λεκτέον. [¶193] 41b. for this may help us to reach our decisions. > Greek: 41b. τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις. [¶194] Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν. [¶195] Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶν κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι. [¶196] Pro. Good. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καλῶς. [¶197] Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument. > Greek: ΣΩ. περιιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον. [¶198] Pro. Let us do so. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴωμεν. [¶199] Soc. We said, you may remember, a little while ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται. [¶200] 41c. Pro. I remember; that was said. > Greek: 41c. ΠΡΩ. μεμνήμεθα καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα. [¶201] Soc. And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἤ τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον; [¶202] Pro. Yes, that was the case. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν. [¶203] Soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances. > Greek: ΣΩ. συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις. [¶204] Pro. Go on. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε. [¶205] 41d. Soc. What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now. > Greek: 41d. ΣΩ. γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ᾖ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρʼ ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νυνδὴ ἐφάνη. [¶206] Pro. Yes, that is clear. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν. [¶207] Soc. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κεῖται; [¶208] Pro. What? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶209] Soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων εἴτην. [¶210] Pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἴρηται. τί μήν; [¶211] Soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly of this? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταῦτʼ ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; [¶212] 41e. Pro. How and in what way do you mean? > Greek: 41e. ΠΡΩ. πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς; [¶213] Soc. I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἑκάστοτε τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδροτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν. [¶214] Pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη. [¶215] 42. Soc. Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things from too near at hand or from too great a distance obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false opinions; and does not this same thing happen in the case of pains and pleasures? > Greek: 42. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὄψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δʼ ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; [¶216] 42a. Pro. Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the case of sight. > Greek: 42a. ΠΡΩ. πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶217] Soc. Then our present conclusion is the opposite of what we said a little while ago. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν. [¶218] Pro. To what do you refer? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; [¶219] Soc. A while ago these opinions, being false or true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own condition of truth or falsehood. > Greek: ΣΩ. τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὗται γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρʼ αὑταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν. [¶220] 42b. Pro. Very true. > Greek: 42b. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶221] Soc. But now, because they are seen at various and changing distances and are compared with one another, the pleasures themselves appear greater and more intense by comparison with the pains, and the pains in turn, through comparison with the pleasures, vary inversely as they. > Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρʼ ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δʼ αὖ διὰ τὸ παρʼ ἡδονὰς τοὐναντίον ἐκείναις. [¶222] Pro. That is inevitable for the reasons you have given. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα. [¶223] Soc. They both, then, appear greater and less than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority, you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again can you have the face to affirm that the part of pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or real. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἑκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἑκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὄν, οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ἐρεῖς, οὐδʼ αὖ ποτε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν. [¶224] 42c. Pro. No, I cannot. > Greek: 42c. ΠΡΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. [¶225] Soc. Next, then, we will see whether we may not in another direction come upon pleasures and pains still more false than these appearing and existing in living beings. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. [¶226] Pro. What pleasures and what method do you mean? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις; [¶227] Soc. It has been said many times that pains and woes and aches and everything that is called by names of that sort are caused when nature in any instance is corrupted through combinations and dissolutions, fillings and emptyings, increases and diminutions. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἴρηταί που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι καί τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ὀνόματα ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα. [¶228] 42d. Pro. Yes, that has been said many times. > Greek: 42d. ΠΡΩ. ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις. [¶229] Soc. And we agreed that when things are restored to their natural condition, that restoration is pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. [¶230] Pro. Right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς. [¶231] Soc. But when neither of these changes takes place in the body, what then? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ᾖ; [¶232] Pro. When could that be the case, Socrates? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πότε δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶233] 42e. Soc. That question of yours is not to the point, Protarchus. > Greek: 42e. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα. [¶234] Pro. Why not? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δή; [¶235] Soc. Because you do not prevent my asking my own question again. > Greek: ΣΩ. διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύεις με διερέσθαι σε πάλιν. [¶236] Pro. What question? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίαν; [¶237] Soc. Why, Protarchus, I may say, granting that such a condition does not arise, what would be the necessary result if it did? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δʼ οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν; [¶238] Pro. You mean if the body is not changed in either direction? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα φῄς; [¶239] Soc. Yes. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτως. [¶240] Pro. It is clear, Socrates, that in that case there would never be either pleasure or pain. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτʼ ἄν τις λύπη. [¶241] 43a. Soc. Excellent. But you believe, I fancy, that some such change must always be taking place in us, as the philosophers say; for all things are always flowing and shifting. > Greek: 43a. ΣΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τόδε λέγεις, ὡς ἀεί τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοί φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ. [¶242] Pro. Yes, that is what they say, and I think their theory is important. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν. [¶243] Soc. Of course it is, in view of their own importance. But I should like to avoid this argument which is rushing at us. I am going to run away; come along and escape with me. > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδʼ οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι σύμφευγε. [¶244] Pro. What is your way of escape? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε ὅπῃ. [¶245] Soc. “We grant you all this” let us say to them. > Greek: ΣΩ. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους· [¶246] 43b. But answer me this, Protarchus, are we and all other living beings always conscious of everything that happens to us of our growth and all that sort of thing—or is the truth quite the reverse of that? > Greek: 43b. σὺ δʼ ἀπόκριναι πότερον ἀεὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα πάσχει τι τῶν ἐμψύχων, ταῦτʼ αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὔτʼ αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον. [¶247] Pro. Quite the reverse, surely; for we are almost entirely unconscious of everything of that sort. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἅπαν δήπου τοὐναντίον· ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθʼ ἡμᾶς. [¶248] Soc. Then we were not right in saying just now that the fluctuations and changes cause pains and pleasures. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται. [¶249] Pro. No, certainly not. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶250] 43c. Soc. A better and more unassailable statement would be this. > Greek: 43c. ΣΩ. ὧδʼ ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον. [¶251] Pro. What? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶252] Soc. That the great changes cause pains and pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones cause no pains or pleasures at all. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δʼ αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων. [¶253] Pro. That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότερον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶254] Soc. But if that is the case, the life of which we spoke just now would come back again. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νυνδὴ ῥηθεὶς βίος ἂν ἥκοι. [¶255] Pro. What life? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖος; [¶256] Soc. The life which we said was painless and without joys. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὃν ἄλυπόν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι. [¶257] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶258] Soc. Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two; or do you disagree? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δʼ αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δʼ ἕνα μηδέτερα. [¶259] 43d. Pro. No, I agree to this, that there are the three lives. Soc. Then freedom from pain would not be identical with pleasure? Pro. Certainly not. Soc. When you hear anyone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live all one’s life without pain, what do you understand him to mean? Pro. I think he means that freedom from pain is pleasure. Soc. Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two. > Greek: 43d. ἢ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων; ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ΣΩ. ὁπόταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἥδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον; ΠΡΩ. ἡδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι. [¶260] 43e. Pro. Agreed. Soc. Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver? Pro. Certainly not. Soc. Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly. Pro. No, certainly not. Soc. But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons who call it and consider it so. > Greek: 43e. ΣΩ. τριῶν ὄντων οὖν ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλλίοσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δʼ ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ τὸ μηδέτερα τούτων. ΠΡΩ. κεῖται. ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτο ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος; ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς ἄν; ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὔτʼ εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτʼ εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶261] 44a. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Do they, then, think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain? Pro. That is what they say. Soc. Then they do think they feel pleasure at such times; for otherwise they would not say so. Pro. Most likely. Soc. Certainly, then, they have a false opinion about pleasure, if there is an essential difference between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain. Pro. And we certainly found that difference. Soc. Then shall we adopt the view that there are, as we said just now, three states, or that there are only two—pain, which is an evil to mankind, and freedom from pain, which is of itself a good and is called pleasure? > Greek: 44a. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται; ΠΡΩ. φασὶ γοῦν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που. ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει. ΣΩ. ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡ φύσις ἑκατέρου. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μὴν χωρίς γε ἦν. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν αἱρώμεθα παρʼ ἡμῖν ταῦτʼ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δʼ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσαγορεύεσθαι; [¶262] 44b. Pro. Why do we ask ourselves that question now, Socrates? I do not understand. > Greek: 44b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφʼ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω. [¶263] Soc. No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not understand about the enemies of our friend Philebus. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις; [¶264] Pro. Whom do you mean? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας; [¶265] Soc. Certain men who are said to be master thinkers about nature, and who deny the existence of pleasures altogether. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι. [¶266] Pro. Is it possible? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶267] 44c. Soc. They say that what Philebus and his school call pleasures are all merely refuges from pain. > Greek: 44c. ΣΩ. λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν. [¶268] Pro. Do you recommend that we adopt their view, Socrates? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶269] Soc. No, but that we make use of them as seers who divine the truth, not by acquired skill, but by some innate and not ignoble repugnance which makes them hate the power of pleasure and think it so utterly unsound that its very attractiveness is mere trickery, not pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονήν, εἶναι. [¶270] 44d. You may make use of them in this way, considering also their other expressions of dislike; and after that you shall learn of the pleasures which seem to me to be true, in order that we may consider the power of pleasure from both points of view and form our judgement by comparing them. > Greek: 44d. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἵ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι πεύσῃ, ἵνα ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν. [¶271] Pro. You are right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. [¶272] Soc. Let us, then, consider these men as allies and follow them in the track of their dislike. I fancy their method would be to begin somewhere further back and ask whether, if we wished to discover the nature of any class—take the hard, for instance—we should be more likely to learn it by looking at the hardest things or at the least hard. > Greek: ΣΩ. μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους, ὥσπερ συμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἷον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι;