--- title: "Philebus · Φίληβος" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 4 of 5 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Philebus · Φίληβος, section 4. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/" --- # Philebus · Φίληβος *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* Is the good life one of pleasure, of knowledge, or a mixture of the two? > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 4. 44e–56b Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/4/#p-N [¶0] 44e. Now you, Protarchus, must reply to them as you have been replying to me. > Greek: 44e. δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχερέσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. [¶1] Pro. By all means, and I say to them that we should look at the greatest things. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει. [¶2] 45. Soc. Then if we wished to discover what the nature of pleasure is, we should look, not at the smallest pleasures, but at those which are considered most extreme and intense. > Greek: 45. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἥντινά ποτʼ ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον, ἀλλʼ εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας. [¶3] 45a. Pro. Every one would agree to that now. > Greek: 45a. ΠΡΩ. πᾶς ἄν σοι ταύτῃ συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν. [¶4] Soc. And the commonest and greatest pleasures are, as we have often said, those connected with the body, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, αἱ πρόχειροί γε αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὗται; [¶5] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶6] Soc. Are they greater, then, and do they become greater in those who are ill or in those who are in health? Let us take care not to answer hastily and fall into error. Perhaps we might say they are greater in those who are in health. > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν πῃ. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας. [¶7] 45b. Pro. That is reasonable. Soc. Yes, but are not those pleasures the greatest which gratify the greatest desires? Pro. That is true. Soc. But do not people who are in a fever, or in similar diseases, feel more intensely thirst and cold and other bodily sufferings which they usually have; and do they not feel greater want, followed by greater pleasure when their want is satisfied? Is this true, or not? > Greek: 45b. ΠΡΩ. εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. τί δʼ; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται; ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγοῦσι καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλόν τʼ ἐνδείᾳ συγγίγνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι; ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται. [¶8] 45c. Pro. Now that you have said it, it certainly appears to be true. Soc. Then should we appear to be right in saying that if we wished to discover the greatest pleasures we should have to look, not at health, but at disease? Now do not imagine that I mean to ask you whether those who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but assume that I am asking about the greatness of pleasure, and where the greatest intensity of such feeling normally occurs. For we say that it is our task to discover the nature of pleasure and what those who deny its existence altogether say that it is. > Greek: 45c. ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλʼ εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δὲ μή με ἡγῇ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλʼ οἴου μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτε γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ φαμεν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν. [¶9] 45d. Pro. I think I understand you. > Greek: 45d. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἕπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου. [¶10] Soc. Presently, Protarchus, you will show that more clearly, for I want you to answer a question. Do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean greater in number, but greater in intensity and degree—in riotous living or in a life of self-restraint? Be careful about your reply. > Greek: ΣΩ. τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἧττον δείξεις. ἀπόκριναι γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονάς—οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας—ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν. [¶11] Pro. I understand you, and I see that there is a great difference. For the self-restrained are always held in check by the advice of the proverbial expression “nothing too much,” which guides their actions; but intense pleasure holds sway over the foolish and dissolute even to the point of madness and makes them notorious. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροιμιαζόμενος ἐπίσχει λόγος ἑκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακελευόμενος, ᾧ πείθονται· [¶12] 45e. Soc. Good; and if that is true, it is clear that the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains originate in some depravity of soul and body, not in virtue. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then we must select some of these pleasures and see what there is about them which made us say that they are the greatest. > Greek: 45e. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται. ΣΩ. καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε τοῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι γίγνονται. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας. [¶13] 46a. Pro. Yes, we must. > Greek: 46a. ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη. [¶14] Soc. Now see what there is about the pleasures which are related to certain diseases. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον. [¶15] Pro. What diseases? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίων; [¶16] Soc. Repulsive diseases which the philosophers of dislike whom we mentioned utterly abominate. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὓς εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς μισοῦσι παντελῶς. [¶17] Pro. What are the pleasures? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας; [¶18] Soc. For instance, the relief of the itch and the like by scratching, no other treatment being required. For in Heaven’s name what shall we say the feeling is which we have in this case? Is it pleasure or pain? > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην; [¶19] Pro. I think, Socrates, it is a mixed evil. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σύμμεικτον τοῦτό γʼ ἄρʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε γίγνεσθαί τι κακόν. [¶20] 46b. Soc. I did not introduce this question on Philebus’ account; but unless we consider these pleasures and those that follow in their train, Protarchus, we can probably never settle the point at issue. > Greek: 46b. ΣΩ. οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἕνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· ἀλλʼ ἄνευ τούτων, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον. [¶21] Pro. Then we must attack this family of pleasures. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων συγγενεῖς. [¶22] Soc. You mean those which are mixed? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς ἐν τῇ μείξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις; [¶23] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶24] Soc. Some mixtures are concerned with the body and are in the body only, and some belong only to the soul and are in the soul; > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰσὶ τοίνυν μείξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· [¶25] 46c. and we shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to the soul and to the body, and these are sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains. > Greek: 46c. τὰς δʼ αὖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρήσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μειχθείσας τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ συναμφότερα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλουμένας. [¶26] Pro. How so? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶27] Soc. Whenever, in the process of restoration or destruction, anyone has two opposite feelings, as we sometimes are cold, but are growing warm, or are hot, but are growing cold, the desire of having the one and being free from the other, the mixture of bitter and sweet, as they say, joined with the difficulty in getting rid of the bitter, produces impatience and, later, wild excitement. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁπόταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τἀναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμαινόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται, ζητῶν οἶμαι τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμειγμένον, μετὰ δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον σύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ. [¶28] 46d. Pro. What you say is perfectly true. > Greek: 46d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. [¶29] Soc. And such mixtures sometimes consist of equal pains and pleasures and sometimes contain more of one or the other, do they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μείξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἑτέρων πλειόνων; [¶30] Pro. Of course. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶31] Soc. In the case of the mixtures in which the pains are more than the pleasures—say the itch, which we mentioned just now, or tickling—when the burning inflammation is within and is not reached by the rubbing and scratching, which separate only such mixtures as are on the surface, sometimes by bringing the affected parts to the fire or to something cold we change from wretchedness to inexpressible pleasures, and sometimes the opposition between the internal and the external produces a mixture of pains and pleasures, whichever happens to preponderate; this is the result of the forcible separation of combined elements, > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ τὰς μέν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνωνται—τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νυνδὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν—ὁπόταν ⟨ἐν τοῖς⟩ ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ᾖ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆταί τις, τὸ δʼ ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ, τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τοὐναντίον πυρίαις μεταβάλλοντες ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους ἡδονάς, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἔξω, λύπας ἡδοναῖς συγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερʼ ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν [¶32] 47a. or the combination of those that were separate, and the concomitant juxtaposition of pains and pleasures. > Greek: 47a. —[καὶ] ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι. [¶33] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶34] Soc. And when the pleasure is the predominant element in the mixture, the slight tincture of pain tickles a man and makes him mildly impatient, or again an excessive proportion of pleasure excites him and sometimes even makes him leap for joy; it produces in him all sorts of colors, attitudes, and paintings, and even causes great amazement and foolish shouting, does it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ ⟨τὰ⟩ τοιαῦτα πάντα συμμειχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμειγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἠρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δʼ αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλέον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἀπεργαζόμενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετὰ ἀφροσύνης ἐνεργάζεται; [¶35] 47b. Pro. Certainly. > Greek: 47b. ΠΡΩ. μάλα γε. [¶36] Soc. And it makes him say of himself, and others say of him, that he is pleased to death with these delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit of these pleasures; he calls them the greatest of all things and counts that man the happiest who lives most entirely in the enjoyment of them. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ λέγειν τε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνῄσκει· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν ἀεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ, καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐταῖς ὅτι μάλιστʼ ἀεὶ ζῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται. [¶37] Pro. Socrates, you have described admirably what happens in the case of most people. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας. [¶38] 47c. Soc. That may be, Protarchus, so far as concerns purely bodily pleasures in which internal and external sensations unite; but concerning the pleasures in which the soul and the body contribute opposite elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other’s pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single mixture—concerning these I said before that when a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices in his expectation, but is pained by his emptiness, and now I add, what I did not say at that time, that in all these cases, which are innumerable, of opposition between soul and body, there is one single mixture of pain and pleasure. > Greek: 47c. ΣΩ. περί γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δέ γʼ ὧν ψυχὴ σώματι τἀναντία συμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστʼ εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι, ταῦτα ἔμπροσθε μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς, ὁπόταν [αὖ] κενῶται, πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλήθει ἀμηχάνοις οὖσι μεῖξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς συμπίπτει γενομένη. [¶39] 47d. Pro. I believe you are quite right. > Greek: 47d. ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν. [¶40] Soc. One further mixture of pain and pleasure is left. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μείξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία. [¶41] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποία, φῄς; [¶42] Soc. That mixture of its own feelings which we said the soul often experiences. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἣν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὑτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν. [¶43] Pro. And what do we call this? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ λέγομεν; [¶44] 47e. Soc. Do you not regard anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains of the soul and the soul only? > Greek: 47e. ΣΩ. ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἆρʼ οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταύτας λύπας τινάς; [¶45] Pro. I do. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔγωγε. [¶46] 48. Soc. And shall we not find them full of ineffable pleasures? Or must I remind you of the anger? Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath, And sweeter is than honey from the comb, and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find in mournings and longings? > Greek: 48. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὑρήσομεν ἀμηχάνων; ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι [τὸ ⟨ἐν⟩ τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς,] τὸ ὅς τʼ ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο, καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας ἀναμεμειγμένας; [¶47] 48a. Pro. No, you need not remind me; those things occur just as you suggest. > Greek: 48a. ΠΡΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν συμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα. [¶48] Soc. And you remember, too, how people enjoy weeping at tragedies? > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι; [¶49] Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ; [¶50] Soc. And are you aware of the condition of the soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture of pain and pleasure? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν δʼ ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἆρʼ οἶσθʼ ὡς ἔστι κἀν τούτοις μεῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς; [¶51] Pro. I do not quite understand. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐ πάνυ κατανοῶ. [¶52] 48b. Soc. Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarchus, to understand such a condition under those circumstances. > Greek: 48b. ΣΩ. παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ συννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε πάθος. [¶53] Pro. No at least I do not find it so. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν ὥς γʼ ἔοικεν ἐμοί. [¶54] Soc. Well, then, let us take this under consideration, all the more because of its obscurity; then we can more readily understand the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases. > Greek: ΣΩ. λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾷον καταμαθεῖν τις οἷός τʼ ᾖ μεῖξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς. [¶55] Pro. Please go on. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγοις ἄν. [¶56] Soc. Would you say that envy, which was mentioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τό τοι νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς; [¶57] Pro. I say it is. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως. [¶58] Soc. But certainly we see the envious man rejoicing in the misfortunes of his neighbors. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται. [¶59] 48c. Pro. Yes, very much so. > Greek: 48c. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. [¶60] Soc. Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what we call stupidity. > Greek: ΣΩ. κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἣν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἕξιν. [¶61] Pro. Surely. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶62] Soc. Next, then, consider the nature of the ridiculous. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει. [¶63] Pro. Please proceed. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. [¶64] Soc. The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν δὴ πονηρία μέν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἕξεώς τινος ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δʼ αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τοὐναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων. [¶65] Pro. You mean “Know thyself,” Socrates? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶66] 48d. Soc. Yes; and the opposite of that, in the language of the inscription, would evidently be not to know oneself at all. Pro. Of course. Soc. Protarchus, try to divide this into three. Pro. How do you mean? I am afraid I can never do it. Soc. Then you say that I must now make the division? Pro. Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides. Soc. Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their condition in one of three ways? Pro. How is that? Soc. First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is richer than he is. > Greek: 48d. ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. τοὐναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῇ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμματος ἂν εἴη. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ τέμνειν. ΠΡΩ. πῇ φῄς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ. ΣΩ. λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν; ΠΡΩ. λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὑτοὺς κατὰ τρία ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον; ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶67] 48e. Pro. Certainly a good many are affected in that way. Soc. And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than is the case. Pro. Certainly. Soc. But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do not. Pro. Yes, most decidedly. Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one to which people in general lay claim, thereby filling themselves with strife and false conceit of wisdom? Pro. Yes, to be sure. Soc. And we should surely be right in calling all that an evil condition. Pro. Very much so. Soc. Then this must further be divided into two parts, if we are to gain insight into childish envy with its absurd mixture of pleasure and pain. “How shall we divide it,” do you say? All who have this false and foolish conceit of themselves fall, like the rest of mankind, into two classes: some necessarily have strength and power, others, as I believe, the reverse. > Greek: 48e. ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν. ΠΡΩ. πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶν τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες. ΣΩ. πλείους δέ γε οἳ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὑτοὺς δοξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. πολὺ δὲ πλεῖστοί γε οἶμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετῇ δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. τῶν ἀρετῶν δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς; ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι πάθος. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν. πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις; [¶68] 49b. Pro. Yes, necessarily. Soc. Make the division, then, on that principle; those of them who have this false conceit and are weak and unable to revenge themselves when they are laughed at you may truly call ridiculous, but those who are strong and able to revenge themselves you will define most correctly to yourself by calling them powerful, terrible, and hateful, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and infamous—since whether real or feigned it injures their neighbors—but ignorance in the weak appears to us as naturally ridiculous. > Greek: 49b. πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἕπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ οἶμαι τοὐναντίον. ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετʼ ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς φοβεροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. [¶69] 49c. Pro. Quite right. But the mixture of pleasure and pain in all this is not yet clear to me. Soc. First, then, take up the nature of envy. Pro. Go on. Soc. Is envy a kind of unrighteous pain and also a pleasure? Pro. Undoubtedly. Soc. But it is neither wrong nor envious to rejoice in the misfortunes of our enemies, is it? Pro. No, of course not. Soc. But when people sometimes see the misfortunes of their friends and rejoice instead of grieving, is not that wrong? Pro. Of course it is. Soc. And we said that ignorance was an evil to every one, did we not? Pro. True. Soc. Then the false conceits of our friends concerning their wisdom, their beauty, and their other qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they are weak, but hateful when they are powerful. > Greek: 49c. ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά— βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσιν—ἡ δʼ ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μεῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὔπω μοι καταφανής. ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον. ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον. ΣΩ. λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή; ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὔτʼ ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν; ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὁρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἆρα οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν; ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν; ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶν λέγοντες εἴδεσιν γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσα ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δʼ ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα, ⟨φῶμεν⟩ ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι; [¶70] 49e. Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes of others? Pro. Certainly it is ridiculous. Soc. And do we not agree that ignorance is in itself a misfortune? Pro. Yes, a great one. Soc. And do we feel pleasure or pain when we laugh at it? > Greek: 49e. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. κακὸν δʼ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν γε οὖσαν εἶναι; ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ γελῶμεν; [¶71] 50a. Pro. Pleasure, evidently. > Greek: 50a. ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν. [¶72] Soc. Did we not say that pleasure in the misfortunes of friends was caused by envy? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτʼ ἀπεργαζόμενον; [¶73] Pro. There can be no other cause. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη. [¶74] Soc. Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these two are present at the same time on such occasions. > Greek: ΣΩ. γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις. [¶75] Pro. True. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ. [¶76] 50b. Soc. So now our argument shows that in mournings and tragedies and comedies, not merely on the stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life, and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with pleasure. > Greek: 50b. ΣΩ. μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις ⟨καὶ κωμῳδίαις⟩, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις. [¶77] Pro. It is impossible not to agree with that, Socrates, even though one be most eager to maintain the opposite opinion. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καί τις φιλονικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία. [¶78] Soc. Again we mentioned anger, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like, as conditions in which we should find a mixture of the two elements we have now often named, did we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα καὶ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μειγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. [¶79] 50c. Pro. Yes. Soc. And we understand that all the details I have been describing just now are concerned only with sorrow and envy and anger? Pro. Of course we understand that. Soc. Then there are still many others of those conditions left for us to discuss. Pro. Yes, very many. Soc. Now why do you particularly suppose I pointed out to you the mixture of pain and pleasure in comedy? Was it not for the sake of convincing you, because it is easy to show the mixture in love and fear and the rest, and because I thought that when you had made this example your own, you would relieve me from the necessity of discussing those other conditions in detail, and would simply accept the fact that in the affections of the body apart from the soul, of the soul apart from the body, and of the two in common, there are plentiful mixtures of pain and pleasure? > Greek: 50c. ἦ γάρ; ΠΡΩ. ναί. ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νυνδὴ διαπερανθέντα; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά; ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μεῖξιν; ἆρʼ οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι· [¶80] 50d. So tell me; will you let me off, or will you keep on till midnight? But I think I need say only a few words to induce you to let me off. I will agree to give you an account of all these matters tomorrow, but now I wish to steer my bark towards the remaining points that are needful for the judgement which Philebus demands. > Greek: 50d. λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετʼ ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει. [¶81] 50e. Pro. Good, Socrates; just finish what remains in any way you please. > Greek: 50e. ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον. [¶82] Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures we should naturally and almost of necessity proceed in turn to the unmixed. > Greek: ΣΩ. κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μειχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμείκτους πορευοίμεθʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει. [¶83] 51a. Pro. Very good. > Greek: 51a. ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. [¶84] Soc. So I will turn to them and try to explain them; for I do not in the least agree with those who say that all pleasures are merely surcease from pain, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any way real, and that there are others which appear to be both great and numerous, but are really mixed up with pains and with cessations of the greatest pains and distresses of body and soul. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δʼ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δʼ αὐτὰς συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας. [¶85] 51b. Pro. But what pleasures, Socrates, may rightly be considered true? > Greek: 51b. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθεῖς δʼ αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτʼ ἄν; [¶86] Soc. Those arising from what are called beautiful colors, or from forms, most of those that arise from odors and sounds, in short all those the want of which is unfelt and painless, whereas the satisfaction furnished by them is felt by the senses, pleasant, and unmixed with pain. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας [καθαρὰς λυπῶν] παραδίδωσιν. [¶87] Pro. Once more, Socrates, what do you mean by this? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτω; [¶88] Soc. My meaning is certainly not clear at the first glance, and I must try to make it so. > Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν ἃ λέγω, πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. [¶89] 51c. For when I say beauty of form, I am trying to express, not what most people would understand by the words, such as the beauty of animals or of paintings, but I mean, says the argument, the straight line and the circle and the plane and solid figures formed from these by turning-lathes and rulers and patterns of angles; perhaps you understand. For I assert that the beauty of these is not relative, like that of other things, but they are always absolutely beautiful by nature and have peculiar pleasures in no way subject to comparison with the pleasures of scratching; and there are colors which possess beauty and pleasures of this character. > Greek: 51c. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλʼ εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ καλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς· [¶90] 51d. Do you understand? > Greek: 51d. καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς] ἀλλʼ ἆρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς; [¶91] Pro. I am trying to do so, Socrates; and I hope you also will try to make your meaning still clearer. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πειρῶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν. [¶92] Soc. I mean that those sounds which are smooth and clear and send forth a single pure note are beautiful, not relatively, but absolutely, and that there are pleasures which pertain to these by nature and result from them. > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ ἠχὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλʼ αὐτὰς καθʼ αὑτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων συμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας. [¶93] Pro. Yes, that also is true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο. [¶94] 51e. Soc. The pleasures of smell are a less divine class; but they have no necessary pains mixed with them, and wherever and in whatever we find this freedom from pain, I regard it always as a mark of similarity to those other pleasures. These, then, are two classes of the pleasures of which I am speaking. Do you understand me? Pro. I understand. > Greek: 51e. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμεῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτʼ ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλʼ, εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἴδη δύο ⟨ὧν⟩ λέγομεν ἡδονῶν. ΠΡΩ. κατανοῶ. ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένας. [¶95] 52a. Soc. And further let us add to these the pleasures of knowledge, if they appear to us not to have hunger for knowledge or pangs of such hunger as their source. Pro. I agree to that. Soc. Well, if men are full of knowledge and then lose it through forgetfulness, do you see any pains in the losses? Pro. Not by their inherent nature, but sometimes there is pain in reflecting on the event, when a man who has lost knowledge is pained by the lack of it. > Greek: 52a. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὕτω συνδοκεῖ. ΣΩ. τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινας ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας; ΠΡΩ. οὔ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλʼ ἔν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν. [¶96] 52b. Soc. True, my dear fellow, but just at present we are recounting natural feelings only, not reflection. > Greek: 52b. ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν. [¶97] Pro. Then you are right in saying that we feel no pain in the loss of knowledge. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν. [¶98] Soc. Then we may say that these pleasures of knowledge are unmixed with pain and are felt not by the many but only by very few. > Greek: ΣΩ. ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμείκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων. [¶99] Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον; [¶100] 52c. Soc. And now that we have fairly well separated the pure pleasures and those which may be pretty correctly called impure, let us add the further statement that the intense pleasures are without measure and those of the opposite sort have measure; those which admit of greatness and intensity and are often or seldom great or intense we shall assign to the class of the infinite, which circulates more or less freely through the body and soul alike, and the others we shall assign to the class of the limited. > Greek: 52c. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ ⟨τὰς⟩ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ ⟨δεχομένας⟩, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκείνου καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου [προς]θῶμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων. [¶101] 52d. Pro. Quite right, Socrates. > Greek: 52d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶102] Soc. There is still another question about them to be considered. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον. [¶103] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶104] Soc. What kind of thing is most closely related to truth? The pure and unadulterated, or the violent, the widespread, the great, and the sufficient? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι; τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἰταμόν; [¶105] Pro. What is your object, Socrates, in asking that question? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος; [¶106] Soc. My object, Protarchus, is to leave no gap in my test of pleasure and knowledge, if some part of each of them is pure and some part impure, in order that each of them may offer itself for judgement in a condition of purity, and thus make the judgement easier for you and me and all our audience. > Greek: ΣΩ. μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, τὸ δʼ οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἑκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ συνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾴω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν. [¶107] 52e. Pro. Quite right. > Greek: 52e. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα. [¶108] Soc. Very well, let us adopt that point of view towards all the classes which we call pure. First let us select one of them and examine it. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὑτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἕν τι σκοπῶμεν. [¶109] 53a. Pro. Which shall we select? > Greek: 53a. ΠΡΩ. τί οὖν προελώμεθα; [¶110] Soc. Let us first, if agreeable to you, consider whiteness. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώμεθα γένος. [¶111] Pro. By all means. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶112] Soc. How can we have purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is it the greatest and most widespread, or the most unmixed, that in which there is no trace of any other color? > Greek: ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδενὸς ἐνείη; [¶113] Pro. Clearly it is the most unadulterated. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστʼ εἰλικρινὲς ὄν. [¶114] Soc. Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus, declare that this, and not the most numerous or the greatest, is both the truest and the most beautiful of all whitenesses? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θήσομεν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον; [¶115] 53b. Pro. Quite right. > Greek: 53b. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατά γε. [¶116] Soc. Then we shall be perfectly right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful and truer than a great deal of mixed white. > Greek: ΣΩ. σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμειγμένου πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς. [¶117] Pro. Perfectly right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. [¶118] Soc. Well then, we shall have no need of many such examples in our discussion of pleasure; we see well enough from this one that any pleasure, however small or infrequent, if uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more beautiful than a great or often repeated pleasure without purity. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐ δήπου πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν ὡς ἄρα καὶ σύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς, καθαρὰ λύπης, ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων γίγνοιτʼ ἄν. [¶119] 53c. Pro. Most certainly; and the example is sufficient. > Greek: 53c. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα ἱκανόν. [¶120] Soc. Here is another point. Have we not often heard it said of pleasure that it is always a process or generation and that there is no state or existence of pleasure? There are some clever people who try to prove this theory to us, and we ought to be grateful to them. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. [¶121] Pro. Well, what then? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δή; [¶122] Soc. I will explain this whole matter, Protarchus, by asking questions. > Greek: ΣΩ. διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε φίλε. [¶123] 53d. Pro. Go on; ask your questions. > Greek: 53d. ΠΡΩ. λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον. [¶124] Soc. There are two parts of existence, the one self-existent, the other always desiring something else. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐστὸν δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, τὸ δʼ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου. [¶125] Pro. What do you mean? What are these two? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνε λέγεις; [¶126] Soc. The one is by nature more imposing, the other inferior. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δʼ ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου. [¶127] Pro. Speak still more plainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον. [¶128] Soc. We have seen beloved boys who are fair and good, and brave lovers of them. > Greek: ΣΩ. παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν. [¶129] Pro. Yes, no doubt of it. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. [¶130] Soc. Try to find another pair like these in all the relations we are speaking of. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δύο ἄλλα ζήτει κατὰ πάνθʼ ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι. [¶131] 53e. Pro. Must I say it a third time? Please tell your meaning more plainly, Socrates. > Greek: 53e. ΠΡΩ. τὸ τρίτον ἔτʼ ἐρῶ; λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι λέγεις. [¶132] Soc. It is no riddle, Protarchus; the talk is merely jesting with us and means that one part of existences always exists for the sake of something, and the other part is that for the sake of which the former is always coming into being. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῷν, λέγει δʼ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστʼ ἀεί, τὸ δʼ οὗ χάριν ἑκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνεται. [¶133] Pro. I can hardly understand after all your repetition. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. μόγις ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι. [¶134] 54. Soc. Perhaps, my boy, you will understand better as the discussion proceeds. > Greek: 54. ΣΩ. τάχα δʼ ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου. [¶135] 54a. Pro. I hope so. > Greek: 54a. ΠΡΩ. τί γὰρ οὔ; [¶136] Soc. Let us take another pair. > Greek: ΣΩ. δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν. [¶137] Pro. What are they? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποῖα; [¶138] Soc. One is the generation of all things (the process of coming into being), the other is existence or being. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἓν μέν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἕν. [¶139] Pro. I accept your two, generation and being. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. δύο ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν. [¶140] Soc. Quite right. Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of the other, generation for the sake of being, or being for the sake of generation? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα; [¶141] Pro. You are now asking whether that which is called being is what it is for the sake of generation? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνῃ; [¶142] Soc. Yes, plainly. > Greek: ΣΩ. φαίνομαι. [¶143] 54b. Pro. For Heaven’s sake, is this the kind of question you keep asking me, “Tell me, Protarchus, whether you think shipbuilding is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of shipbuilding,” and all that sort of thing? Soc. Yes; that is just what I mean, Protarchus. Pro. Then why did you not answer it yourself, Socrates? Soc. There is no reason why I should not; but I want you to take part in the discussion. Pro. Certainly. Soc. I say that drugs and all sorts of instruments and materials are always employed for the sake of production or generation, but that every instance of generation is for the sake of some being or other, and generation in general is for the sake of being in general. > Greek: 54b. ΠΡΩ. πρὸς θεῶν ἆρʼ [ἂν] ἐπανερωτᾷς με τοιόνδε τι; λέγʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, μοί, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῂς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας, καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστίν; ΣΩ. λέγω τοῦτʼ αὐτό, ὦ Πρώταρχε. ΠΡΩ. τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ὅτι οὔ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμέτεχε. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶144] 54c. Pro. That is very clear. Soc. Then pleasure, if it is a form of generation, would be generated for the sake of some form of being. Pro. Of course. Soc. Now surely that for the sake of which anything is generated is in the class of the good, and that which is generated for the sake of something else, my friend, must be placed in another class. > Greek: 54c. ΣΩ. φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, ἑκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, σύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι συμπάσης. ΠΡΩ. σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτʼ ἄν. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτʼ ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον. ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατον. [¶145] 54d. Pro. Most undeniably. Soc. Then if pleasure is a form of generation, we shall be right in placing it in a class other than that of the good, shall we not? Pro. Quite right. Soc. Then, as I said when we began to discuss this point, we ought to be grateful to him who pointed out that there is only a generation, but no existence, of pleasure; for he is clearly making a laughing-stock of those who assert that pleasure is a good. Pro. Yes, most emphatically. Soc. And he will also surely make a laughing-stock of all those who find their highest end in forms of generation. > Greek: 54d. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν; ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ. ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε. [¶146] 54e. Pro. How is that, and to whom do you refer? Soc. To those who, when cured of hunger or thirst or any of the troubles which are cured by generation are pleased because of the generation, as if it were pleasure, and say that they would not wish to live without thirst and hunger and the like, if they could not experience the feelings which follow after them. > Greek: 54e. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν αὑτὸς οὗτος ἑκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις; ΣΩ. τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιᾶται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδονῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τἆλλα ἅ τις ἂν εἴποι πάντα τὰ ἑπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες. [¶147] 55a. Pro. That seems to be their view. > Greek: 55a. ΠΡΩ. ἐοίκασι γοῦν. [¶148] Soc. We should all agree that the opposite of generation is destruction, should we not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαί γε τοὐναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν. [¶149] Pro. Inevitably. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον. [¶150] Soc. And he who chooses as they do would be choosing destruction and generation, not that third life in which there was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἱροῖτʼ ἄν τις τοῦθʼ αἱρούμενος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δʼ ἦν [δυνατὸν] ὡς οἷόν τε καθαρώτατα. [¶151] Pro. It is a great absurdity, as it appears, Socrates, to tell us that pleasure is a good. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆται. [¶152] Soc. Yes, a great absurdity, and let us go still further. > Greek: ΣΩ. πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν. [¶153] Pro. How? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ; [¶154] 55b. Soc. Is it not absurd to say that there is nothing good in the body or many other things, but only in the soul, and that in the soul the only good is pleasure, and that courage and self-restraint and understanding and all the other good things of the soul are nothing of the sort; and beyond all this to be obliged to say that he who is not feeling pleasure, and is feeling pain, is bad when he feels pain, though he be the best of men, and that he who feels pleasure is, when he feels pleasure, the more excellent in virtue the greater the pleasure he feels? > Greek: 55b. ΣΩ. πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτʼ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἴληχε ψυχή, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, κἂν ᾖ ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν. [¶155] 55c. Pro. All that, Socrates, is the height of absurdity. > Greek: 55c. ΠΡΩ. πάντʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλογώτατα. [¶156] Soc. Now let us not undertake to subject pleasure to every possible test and then be found to give mind and knowledge very gentle treatment. Let us rather strike them boldly everywhere to see if their metal rings unsound at any point; so we shall find out what is by nature purest in them, and then we can make use of the truest elements of these and of pleasure to form our judgement of both. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῄ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν, ὡς ὅτι καθαρώτατόν ἐστʼ αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κρίσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις. [¶157] Pro. Right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς. [¶158] 55d. Soc. Well, then, one part of knowledge is productive, the other has to do with education and support. Is that true? > Greek: 55d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν οἶμαι δημιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς; [¶159] Pro. It is. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως. [¶160] Soc. Let us first consider whether in the manual arts one part is more allied to knowledge, and the other less, and the one should be regarded as purest, the other as less pure. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθῶμεν πρῶτα εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δʼ ἧττον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δʼ ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα. [¶161] Pro. Yes, we ought to consider that. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρή. [¶162] Soc. And should the ruling elements of each of them be separated and distinguished from the rest? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἑκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς; [¶163] Pro. What are they, and how can they be separated? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας καὶ πῶς; [¶164] 55e. Soc. For example, if arithmetic and the sciences of measurement and weighing were taken away from all arts, what was left of any of them would be, so to speak, pretty worthless. > Greek: 55e. ΣΩ. οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἄν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικήν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἑκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο. [¶165] Pro. Yes, pretty worthless. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαῦλον μὲν δή. [¶166] 56. Soc. All that would be left for us would be to conjecture and to drill the perceptions by practice and experience, with the additional use of the powers of guessing, which are commonly called arts and acquire their efficacy by practice and toil. > Greek: 56. ΣΩ. τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτʼ εἰκάζειν λείποιτʼ ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας. [¶167] 56a. Pro. That is undeniable. > Greek: 56a. ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις. [¶168] Soc. Take music first; it is full of this; it attains harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by measurement; and flute music throughout tries to find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess, so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is great, and the amount of certainty small. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ σύμφωνον ἁρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ, καὶ σύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική, τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμειγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον. [¶169] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶170] 56b. Soc. And we shall find that medicine and agriculture and piloting and generalship are all in the same case. > Greek: 56b. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἰατρικήν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὑρήσομεν ἐχούσας.