--- title: "Philebus · Φίληβος" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 5 of 5 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Philebus · Φίληβος, section 5. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/" --- # Philebus · Φίληβος *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* Is the good life one of pleasure, of knowledge, or a mixture of the two? > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg010, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg010.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (Stephanus sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 5. 56c–67b Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-philebus/5/#p-N [¶0] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε. [¶1] Soc. But the art of building, I believe, employs the greatest number of measures and instruments which give it great accuracy and make it more scientific than most arts. > Greek: ΣΩ. τεκτονικὴν δέ γε οἶμαι πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὀργάνοις χρωμένην τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται. [¶2] Pro. In what way? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ; [¶3] Soc. In shipbuilding and house-building, and many other branches of wood-working. For the artisan uses a rule, I imagine, a lathe, compasses, a chalk-line, and an ingenious instrument called a vice. > Greek: ΣΩ. κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατʼ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τόρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτῃ καὶ στάθμῃ καί τινι προσαγωγίῳ κεκομψευμένῳ. [¶4] 56c. Pro. Certainly, Socrates; you are right. > Greek: 56c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγεις. [¶5] Soc. Let us, then, divide the arts, as they are called, into two kinds, those which resemble music, and have less accuracy in their works, and those which, like building, are more exact. > Greek: ΣΩ. θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ συνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος. [¶6] Pro. Agreed. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. κείσθω. [¶7] Soc. And of these the most exact are the arts which I just now mentioned first. > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς νυνδὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν. [¶8] Pro. I think you mean arithmetic and the other arts you mentioned with it just now. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνῃ μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νυνδή. [¶9] 56d. Soc. Certainly. But, Protarchus, ought not these to be divided into two kinds? What do you say? > Greek: 56d. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἆρʼ οὐ διττὰς αὖ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς; [¶10] Pro. What kinds? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ποίας δὴ λέγεις; [¶11] Soc. Are there not two kinds of arithmetic, that of the people and that of philosophers? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλην μέν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δʼ αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων; [¶12] Pro. How can one kind of arithmetic be distinguished from the other? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῇ ποτε διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικήν; [¶13] Soc. The distinction is no small one, Protarchus. For some arithmeticians reckon unequal units, for instance, two armies and two oxen and two very small or incomparably large units; whereas others refuse to agree with them unless each of countless units is declared to differ not at all from each and every other unit. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· [¶14] 56e. Pro. You are certainly quite right in saying that there is a great difference between the devotees of arithmetic, so it is reasonable to assume that it is of two kinds. > Greek: 56e. οἱ δʼ οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δύʼ αὐτὰς εἶναι. [¶15] 57. Soc. And how about the arts of reckoning and measuring as they are used in building and in trade when compared with philosophical geometry and elaborate computations—shall we speak of each of these as one or as two? > Greek: 57. ΣΩ. τί δέ; λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατʼ ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν; [¶16] 57a. Pro. On the analogy of the previous example, I should say that each of them was two. > Greek: 57a. ΠΡΩ. τῇ πρόσθεν ἑπόμενος ἔγωγʼ ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἑκατέραν τούτων. [¶17] Soc. Right. But do you understand why I introduced this subject? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. οὗ δʼ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἆρα ἐννοεῖς; [¶18] Pro. Perhaps; but I wish you would give the answer to your question. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. [¶19] Soc. This discussion of ours is now, I think, no less than when we began it, seeking a counterpart of pleasure, and therefore it has introduced the present subject and is considering whether there is one kind of knowledge purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. > Greek: ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον ἐνταῦθα προβεβληκέναι σκοπῶν ἆρά ἐστί τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή. [¶20] 57b. Pro. That is very clear; it was evidently introduced with that object. > Greek: 57b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθʼ ἕνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν. [¶21] Soc. Well, had not the discussion already found in what preceded that the various arts had various purposes and various degrees of exactness? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνηυρήκειν σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης; [¶22] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶23] Soc. And after having given an art a single name in what has preceded, thereby making us think that it was a single art, does not the discussion now assume that the same art is two and ask whether the art of the philosophers or that of the non-philosophers possesses the higher degree of clearness and purity? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἆρʼ οὔ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει; [¶24] 57c. Pro. Yes, I think that is just the question it asks. > Greek: 57c. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν. [¶25] Soc. Then what reply shall we make, Protarchus? > Greek: ΣΩ. τίνʼ οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν; [¶26] Pro. Socrates, we have found a marvelously great difference in the clearness of different kinds of knowledge. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν. [¶27] Soc. That will make the reply easier, will it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾷον; [¶28] Pro. Yes, to be sure; and let our reply be this, that the arithmetical and metrical arts far surpass the others and that of these the arts which are stirred by the impulse of the true philosophers are immeasurably superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δʼ αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν. [¶29] 57d. Soc. We accept that as our judgement, and relying upon you we make this confident reply to those who are clever in straining arguments— Pro. What reply? > Greek: 57d. ΣΩ. ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν— ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶30] Soc. That there are two arts of arithmetic and two of measuring, and many other arts which, like these, are twofold in this way, but possess a single name in common. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι. [¶31] 57e. Pro. Let us give this answer, Socrates, to those who you say are clever; I hope we shall have luck with it. Soc. These, then, we say, are the most exact arts or sciences? Pro. Certainly. Soc. But the art of dialectic would spurn us, Protarchus, if we should judge that any other art is preferable to her. > Greek: 57e. ΠΡΩ. διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις οὓς φῂς δεινοὺς εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστʼ εἶναι; ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν. ΠΡΩ. τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν; [¶32] 58a. Pro. But what is the art to which this name belongs? Soc. Clearly anybody can recognize the art I mean; for I am confident that all men who have any intellect whatsoever believe that the knowledge which has to do with being, reality, and eternal immutability is the truest kind of knowledge. What do you think, Protarchus? Pro. I have often heard Gorgias constantly maintain that the art of persuasion surpasses all others for this, he said, makes all things subject to itself, not by force, but by their free will, and is by far the best of all arts; so now I hardly like to oppose either him or you. > Greek: 58a. ΣΩ. δῆλον ὁτιὴ πᾶς ἂν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη· τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι σύμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν; ΠΡΩ. ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν —πάντα γὰρ ὑφʼ αὑτῇ δοῦλα διʼ ἑκόντων ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν—νῦν δʼ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι. [¶33] 58b. Soc. It seems to me that you wanted to speak and threw down your arms out of modesty. > Greek: 58b. ΣΩ. τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς ἀπολιπεῖν. [¶34] Pro. Very well; have it as you like. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ. [¶35] Soc. Is it my fault that you have misunderstood? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε; [¶36] Pro. Misunderstood what? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶37] Soc. My question, dear Protarchus, was not as yet what art or science surpasses all others by being the greatest and best and most useful to us: what I am trying to find out at present is which art, however little and of little use, has the greatest regard for clearness, exactness, and truth. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾶσα, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν. [¶38] 58c. See; you will not make Gorgias angry if you grant that his art is superior for the practical needs of men, but say that the study of which I spoke is superior in the matter of the most perfect truth, just as I said in speaking about the white that if it was small and pure it was superior to that which was great but impure. Now, therefore, with careful thought and due consideration, paying attention neither to the usefulness nor to the reputation of any arts or sciences, but to that faculty of our souls, if such there be, which by its nature loves the truth and does all things for the sake of the truth, let us examine this faculty and say whether it is most likely to possess mind and intelligence in the greatest purity, or we must look for some other faculty which has more valid claims. > Greek: 58c. ἀλλʼ ὅρα—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσῃ Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ᾗ δʼ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δʼ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γʼ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ, καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτʼ εἴς τινας ὠφελίας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διεξερευνησάμενοι—τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον. [¶39] 58e. Pro. I am considering, and I think it is difficult to concede that any other science or art cleaves more closely to truth than this. > Greek: 58e. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶμαι συγχωρῆσαί τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην. [¶40] 59. Soc. In saying that, did you bear in mind that the arts in general, and the men who devote themselves to them, make use of opinion and persistently investigate things which have to do with opinion? > Greek: 59. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι, καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηνται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι συντεταμένως; [¶41] 59a. And even if they think they are studying nature, they are spending their lives in the study of the things of this world, the manner of their production, their action, and the forces to which they are subjected. Is not that true? > Greek: 59a. εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπῃ τε γέγονεν καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; [¶42] Pro. Yes, it is. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὕτως. [¶43] Soc. Such thinkers, then, toil to discover, not eternal verities, but transient productions of the present, the future, or the past? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνῄρηται τὸν πόνον; [¶44] Pro. Perfectly true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶45] Soc. And can we say that any of these things becomes certain, if tested by the touchstone of strictest truth, since none of them ever was, will be, or is in the same state? > Greek: ΣΩ. τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ μήθʼ ἕξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει; [¶46] 59b. Pro. Of course not. > Greek: 59b. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς; [¶47] Soc. How can we gain anything fixed whatsoever about things which have no fixedness whatsoever? > Greek: ΣΩ. περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἄν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ὁτιοῦν; [¶48] Pro. In no way, as it seems to me. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς. [¶49] Soc. Then no mind or science which is occupied with them possesses the most perfect truth. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστιν τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα. [¶50] Pro. No, it naturally does not. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε. [¶51] Soc. Then we must dismiss the thought of you and me and Gorgias and Philebus, and make this solemn declaration on the part of our argument. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἐᾶν, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ. [¶52] 59c. Pro. What is the solemn declaration? > Greek: 59c. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶53] Soc. That fixed and pure and true and what we call unalloyed knowledge has to do with the things which are eternally the same without change or mixture, or with that which is most akin to them; and all other things are to be regarded as secondary and inferior. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμεικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστά ἐστι συγγενές· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον. [¶54] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶55] Soc. And of the names applied to such matters, it would be fairest to give the finest names to the finest things, would it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἆρʼ οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιότατον ἀπονέμειν; [¶56] Pro. That is reasonable. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. εἰκός γε. [¶57] 59d. Soc. Are not mind, then, and wisdom the names which we should honor most? > Greek: 59d. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστι καὶ φρόνησις ἅ γʼ ἄν τις τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὀνόματα; [¶58] Pro. Yes. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ναί. [¶59] Soc. Then these names are applied most accurately and correctly to cases of contemplation of true being. > Greek: ΣΩ. ταῦτʼ ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἐστὶν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι. [¶60] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶61] Soc. And these are precisely the names which I brought forward in the first place as parties to our suit. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἅ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην οὐκ ἄλλʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. [¶62] Pro. Yes, of course they are, Socrates. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶63] Soc. Very well. As to the mixture of wisdom and pleasure, if anyone were to say that we are like artisans, with the materials before us from which to create our work, the simile would be a good one. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶεν. τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μεῖξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι. [¶64] 59e. Pro. Certainly. > Greek: 59e. ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα. [¶65] Soc. And is it, then, our next task to try to make the mixture? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἆρʼ οὐ μειγνύναι ἐπιχειρητέον; [¶66] Pro. Surely. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶67] Soc. Would it not be better first to repeat certain things and recall them to our minds? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι; [¶68] Pro. What things? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα; [¶69] 60. Soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think the proverb “we ought to repeat twice and even three times that which is good” is an excellent one. > Greek: 60. ΣΩ. ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δʼ ἡ παροιμία δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν. [¶70] 60a. Pro. Surely. > Greek: 60a. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν; [¶71] Soc. Well then, in God’s name; I think this is the gist of our discussion. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὑτωσί πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι. [¶72] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς; [¶73] Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good for all, and the two designations “good” and “pleasant” are properly and essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in the good is greater than pleasure’s. > Greek: ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζῴοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι σύμπασι, καὶ δύο ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτω ὀρθῶς τεθέντʼ ἔχειν· [¶74] 60b. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus? > Greek: 60b. Σωκράτης δʼ ἓν μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτʼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε; [¶75] Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν. [¶76] Soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a point of agreement among us? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν συνομολογοῖτο; [¶77] Pro. What? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶78] Soc. That the nature of the good differs from all else in this respect. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων. [¶79] 60c. Pro. In what respect? Soc. That whatever living being possesses the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We agreed to that? Pro. We did. Soc. And then we tried in thought to separate each from the other and apply them to individual lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure? Pro. Yes. > Greek: 60c. ΠΡΩ. τίνι; ΣΩ. ὧι παρείη τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως; ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμεικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν; ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα. ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τῳ; [¶80] 60d. Soc. And did we think then that either of them would be sufficient for any one? Pro. By no means. Soc. And if we made any mistake at that time, let any one now take up the question again. Assuming that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether anyone would wish to have or acquire anything whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure, be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the slightest memory of the feeling. > Greek: 60d. ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτʼ ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονὴν εἴθʼ ὡς πλείστην εἴθʼ ὡς σφοδροτάτην, ἣν μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος μήτʼ αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδʼ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. [¶81] 60e. And let him ask in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone would wish to have wisdom without any, even the slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures, or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom. > Greek: 60e. ταὐτὰ δὲ λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτʼ ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινος. [¶82] Pro. That is impossible, Socrates; it is useless to ask the same question over and over again. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν. [¶83] 61a. Soc. Then the perfect, that which is to be desired by all and is altogether good, is neither of these? > Greek: 61a. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη; [¶84] Pro. Certainly not. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶85] Soc. We must, then, gain a clear conception of the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as we said, know to what the second place is to be assigned. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνʼ, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν. [¶86] Pro. Quite right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. [¶87] Soc. And have we not found a road which leads to the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν; [¶88] Pro. What road? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τίνα; [¶89] Soc. If you were looking for a particular man and first found out correctly where he lived, you would have made great progress towards finding him whom you sought. > Greek: ΣΩ. καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν πρῶτον ὀρθῶς ἵνʼ οἰκεῖ πύθοιτο αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δήπου πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου. [¶90] 61b. Pro. Yes, certainly. > Greek: 61b. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶91] Soc. And just now we received an indication, as we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good, not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμείκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ. [¶92] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. [¶93] Soc. Surely there is greater hope that the object of our search will be clearly present in the well mixed life than in the life which is not well mixed? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μειχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή; [¶94] Pro. Far greater. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολύ γε. [¶95] Soc. Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever he be who presides over the mixing. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθʼ ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως. [¶96] 61c. Pro. By all means. > Greek: 61c. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶97] Soc. We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which we must do our best to mix as well as possible. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι—μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινος ὕδατος—ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμειγνύναι. [¶98] Pro. Certainly we must. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶99] 61d. Soc. Before we make the mixture, tell me: should we be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure with all wisdom? > Greek: 61d. ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἆρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει μειγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν; [¶100] Pro. Perhaps. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως. [¶101] Soc. But that is not safe; and I think I can offer a plan by which we can make our mixture with less risk. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ᾗ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μειγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινα ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν. [¶102] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνα. [¶103] Soc. We found, I believe, that one pleasure was greater than another and one art more exact than another? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα; [¶104] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶105] Soc. And knowledge was of two kinds, one turning its eyes towards transitory things, the other towards things which neither come into being nor pass away, but are the same and immutable for ever. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί. [¶106] 61e. Considering them with a view to truth, we judged that the latter was truer than the former. > Greek: 61e. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι. [¶107] Pro. That is quite right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς. [¶108] Soc. Then what if we first mix the truest sections of each and see whether, when mixed together, they are capable of giving us the most adorable life, or whether we still need something more and different? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον συμμείξαντες, ἆρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα συγκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἤ τινος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων; [¶109] 62a. Pro. I think that is what we should do. > Greek: 62a. ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως. [¶110] Soc. Let us assume, then, a man who possesses wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same kind of knowledge of all other things. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅτι ἔστιν, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος. [¶111] Pro. Agreed. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔστω γὰρ οὖν. [¶112] Soc. Now will this man have sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and human circles, even when he uses these and other kinds of rules or patterns in building houses? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει, κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις; [¶113] 62b. Pro. We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine knowledge. Soc. What? Do you mean to say that the uncertain and impure art of the false rule and circle is to be put into our mixture? Pro. Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to find his own way home. Soc. And must we add music, which we said a little while ago was full of guesswork and imitation and lacked purity? > Greek: 62b. ΠΡΩ. γελοίαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμαις λέγομεν. ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς; ἦ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον; ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν οἴκαδε. [¶114] 62c. Pro. Yes, I think we must, if our life is to be life at all. Soc. Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and hustled by a mob, give up, open the door, and let all the kinds of knowledge stream in, the impure mingling with the pure? > Greek: 62c. ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ μουσικήν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν; ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ποτε βίος. ΣΩ. βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπʼ ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μείγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν; [¶115] 62d. Pro. I do not know, Socrates, what harm it can do a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge if he has the first. > Greek: 62d. ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι τις ἂν βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας. [¶116] Soc. Shall I, then, let them all flow into what Homer very poetically calls the mingling of the vales? > Greek: ΣΩ. μεθιῶ δὴ τὰς συμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὁμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχήν; [¶117] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶118] Soc. They are let in; and now we must turn again to the spring of pleasure. For our original plan for making the mixture, by taking first the true parts, did not succeed; because of our love of knowledge, we let all kinds of knowledge in together before pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. μεθεῖνται· καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἰτέον. ὡς γὰρ διενοήθημεν αὐτὰς μειγνύναι, τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἐξεγένεθʼ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταὐτὸν μεθεῖμεν ἁθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἡδονῶν. [¶119] 62e. Pro. Very true. > Greek: 62e. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶120] Soc. So now it is time for us to consider about pleasures also, whether these, too, shall be all let loose together, or we shall let only the true ones loose at first. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὥρα δὴ βουλεύεσθαι νῷν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἁθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς. [¶121] Pro. It is much safer to let loose the true first. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι. [¶122] Soc. We will let them loose, then. But what next? If there are any necessary pleasures, as there were kinds of knowledge, must we not mix them with the true? > Greek: ΣΩ. μεθείσθων δή. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἆρʼ οὐκ εἰ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, συμμεικτέον καὶ ταύτας; [¶123] Pro. Of course; the necessary pleasures must certainly be added. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ; τάς γε ἀναγκαίας δήπουθεν. [¶124] 63a. Soc. And as we said it was harmless and useful to know all the arts throughout our life, if we now say the same of pleasures—that is, if it is advantageous and harmless for us to enjoy all pleasures throughout life—they must all form part of the mixture. > Greek: 63a. ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε καί, καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὰ λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας συγκρατέον. [¶125] Pro. What shall we say about these pleasures, and what shall we do? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν; καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν; [¶126] Soc. There is no use in asking us, Protarchus; we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences themselves about one another. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομένους τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλήλων πέρι. [¶127] 63b. Pro. What shall we ask them? > Greek: 63b. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶128] Soc. “Dear ones—whether you should be called pleasures or by any other name—would you choose to dwell with all wisdom, or with none at all?” I think only one reply is possible. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὦ φίλαι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν; οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδʼ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν. [¶129] Pro. What is it? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶130] Soc. What we said before: “For any class to be alone, solitary, and unalloyed is neither altogether possible nor is it profitable; but of all classes, comparing them one with another, we think the best to live with is the knowledge of all other things and, so far as is possible, the perfect knowledge of our individual selves.” > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναί τι γένος οὔτε πάνυ τι δυνατὸν οὔτʼ ὠφέλιμον· [¶131] 63c. Pro. “Your reply is excellent,” we shall tell them. Soc. Right. And next we must turn to wisdom and mind, and question them. We shall ask them, “Do you want any further pleasures in the mixture?” And they might reply, “What pleasures?” Pro. Quite likely. > Greek: 63c. πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἓν ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν τἆλλά τε πάντα καὶ [αὖ τὴν] αὐτὴν ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην. ΠΡΩ. καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον· ἆρʼ ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ συγκράσει; φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. ποίων, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, ἡδονῶν; ΠΡΩ. εἰκός. [¶132] 63d. Soc. Then we should go on to say: “In addition to those true pleasures, do you want the greatest and most intense pleasures also to dwell with you?” “How can we want them, Socrates,” they might perhaps say, “since they contain countless hindrances for us, inasmuch as they disturb with maddening pleasures the souls of men in which we dwell, thereby preventing us from being born at all, and utterly destroying for the most part, through the carelessness and forgetfulness which they engender, those of our children which are born?” > Greek: 63d. ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γʼ ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ὅδε. πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν, ἆρʼ ἔτι προσδεῖσθʼ ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς συνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας; καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως φαῖεν ἄν, αἵ γʼ ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ μανίας [ἡδονάς], καὶ γίγνεσθαί τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἐῶσι, τά τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολύ, διʼ ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν; [¶133] 64. Soc. “But the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, you must consider almost our own by nature, and also those which are united with health and self-restraint, and furthermore all those which are handmaids of virtue in general and follow everywhere in its train as if it were a god,—add these to the mixture; but as for the pleasures which follow after folly and all baseness, it would be very senseless for anyone who desires to discover the most beautiful and most restful mixture or compound, and to try to learn which of its elements is good in man and the universe, and what we should divine its nature to be, to mix these with mind.” > Greek: 64. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἅς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς [ἃς] εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μείγνυ· τὰς δʼ ἀεὶ μετʼ ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν, ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι τί ποτε ἔν τʼ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον. [¶134] 64a. Shall we not say that this reply which mind has now made for itself and memory and right opinion is wise and reasonable? > Greek: 64a. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα; [¶135] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶136] Soc. But another addition is surely necessary, without which nothing whatsoever can ever come into being. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν. [¶137] 64b. Pro. What is it? > Greek: 64b. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶138] Soc. That in which there is no admixture of truth can never truly come into being or exist. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧι μὴ μείξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν γενόμενον εἴη. [¶139] Pro. No, of course not. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶140] Soc. No. But if anything is still wanting in our mixture, you and Philebus must speak of it. For to me it seems that our argument is now completed, as it were an incorporeal order which shall rule nobly a living body. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται. [¶141] Pro. And you may say, Socrates, that I am of the same opinion. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι. [¶142] 64c. Soc. And if we were to say that we are now in the vestibule of the good and of the dwelling of the good, should we not be speaking the truth after a fashion? > Greek: 64c. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἄν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν; [¶143] Pro. I certainly think so. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ. [¶144] Soc. What element, then, of the mixture would appear to us to be the most precious and also the chief cause why such a state is beloved of all? When we have discovered this, we will then consider whether it is more closely attached and more akin to pleasure or to mind in the universe. > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ συμμείξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστʼ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσιν γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴθʼ ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ συνέστηκεν. [¶145] 64d. Pro. Right; for that is most serviceable to us in forming our judgement. > Greek: 64d. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι συμφορώτατον. [¶146] Soc. And it is quite easy to see the cause which makes any mixture whatsoever either of the highest value or of none at all. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συμπάσης γε μείξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός. [¶147] Pro. What do you mean? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶148] Soc. Why, everybody knows that. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδείς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ. [¶149] Pro. Knows what? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶150] Soc. That any compound, however made, which lacks measure and proportion, must necessarily destroy its components and first of all itself; > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὑτήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις συμφορά. [¶151] 64e. for it is in truth no compound, but an uncompounded jumble, and is always a misfortune to those who possess it. Pro. Perfectly true. Soc. So now the power of the good has taken refuge in the nature of the beautiful; for measure and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty and virtue. Pro. Certainly. Soc. We said that truth also was mingled with them in the compound. Pro. Certainly. Soc. Then if we cannot catch the good with the aid of one idea, let us run it down with three—beauty, proportion, and truth, and let us say that these, considered as one, may more properly than all other components of the mixture be regarded as the cause, and that through the goodness of these the mixture itself has been made good. Pro. Quite right. Soc. So now, Protarchus, any one would be able to judge about pleasure and wisdom, and to decide which of them is more akin to the highest good and of greater value among men and gods. > Greek: 64e. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμεῖχθαι. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθʼ ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτʼ ἂν ὁστισοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς. [¶152] 65b. Pro. That is clear; but still it is better to carry on the discussion to the end. > Greek: 65b. ΠΡΩ. δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δʼ οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον. [¶153] Soc. Let us, then, judge each of the three separately in its relation to pleasure and mind; for it is our duty to see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as more akin. > Greek: ΣΩ. καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ ⟨ὡς⟩ μᾶλλον συγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν. [¶154] Pro. You refer to beauty, truth, and measure? > Greek: ΠΡΩ. κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις; [¶155] Soc. Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus; take it and look at the three—mind, truth, and pleasure; take plenty of time, and answer to yourself whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. > Greek: ΣΩ. ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε· [¶156] 65c. Pro. Why take time? For the difference, to my mind, is great. For pleasure is the greatest of impostors, and the story goes that in the pleasures of love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children, utterly devoid of all sense. > Greek: 65c. καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ συγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ. ΠΡΩ. τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων· [¶157] 65d. But mind is either identical with truth or of all things most like it and truest. > Greek: 65d. νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον. [¶158] Soc. Next, then, consider measure in the same way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται; [¶159] Pro. That also is an easy thing to consider. For I think nothing in the world could be found more immoderate than pleasure and its transports, and nothing more in harmony with measure than mind and knowledge. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας· οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν ποτε. [¶160] 65e. Soc. However, go on and tell about the third. Has mind or pleasure the greater share in beauty? > Greek: 65e. ΣΩ. καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δʼ ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλεῖον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον; [¶161] Pro. But Socrates, no one, either asleep or awake, ever saw or knew wisdom or mind to be or become unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθʼ ὕπαρ οὔτʼ ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον. [¶162] Soc. Right. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς. [¶163] 66. Pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element which accompanies them, fill us with a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day. > Greek: 66. ΠΡΩ. ἡδονὰς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπʼ αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά. [¶164] 66a. Soc. Then you will proclaim everywhere, Protarchus, by messengers to the absent and by speech to those present, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and all which is to be considered similar to these. > Greek: 66a. ΣΩ. πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδʼ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν ἀίδιον ᾑρῆσθαι. [¶165] Pro. That appears to result from what has now been said. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. [¶166] 66b. Soc. Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class. > Greek: 66b. ΣΩ. δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης ἐστίν. [¶167] Pro. Yes, so it appears. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν. [¶168] Soc. And if you count mind and wisdom as the third, you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις. [¶169] Pro. That may be. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως. [¶170] Soc. And will you not put those properties fourth which we said belonged especially to the soul—sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called— and say that these come after the first three, and are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure to the good? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτʼ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον [ἢ] τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ; [¶171] 66c. Pro. Perhaps. > Greek: 66c. ΠΡΩ. τάχʼ ἄν. [¶172] Soc. And fifth, those pleasures which we separated and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge and, sometimes, perceptions? > Greek: ΣΩ. πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας; [¶173] Pro. May be. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἴσως. [¶174] Soc. “But with the sixth generation,” says Orpheus, “cease the rhythmic song.” It seems that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the sixth decision. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἕκτῃ δʼ ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. [¶175] 66d. So after this nothing remains for us but to give our discussion a sort of head. Pro. Yes, that should be done. Soc. Come then, let us for the third time call the same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour, and proceed. Pro. What argument? Soc. Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely and in all respects the good. Pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said “the third time” just now, you meant that we must take up our argument again from the beginning. > Greek: 66d. ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρή. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν. ΠΡΩ. ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ. ΠΡΩ. τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον. [¶176] 66e. Soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I, perceiving the truths which I have now been detailing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that mind was a far better and more excellent thing for human life than pleasure. > Greek: 66e. ΣΩ. ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νυνδὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ. [¶177] Pro. True. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα. [¶178] Soc. But suspecting that there were many other things to be considered, I said that if anything should be found better than these two, I should support mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second place, and even the second place would be lost by pleasure. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον ὡς εἰ φανείη τι τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο. [¶179] 67a. Pro. Yes, that is what you said. > Greek: 67a. ΠΡΩ. εἶπες γὰρ οὖν. [¶180] Soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that each of these two was insufficient. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατα τούτοιν οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη. [¶181] Pro. Very true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶182] Soc. In this argument, then, both mind and pleasure were set aside; neither of them is the absolute good, since they are devoid of self-sufficiency, adequacy, and perfection? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ μηδʼ ἕτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερομένοιν αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως; [¶183] Pro. Quite right. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα. [¶184] Soc. And on the appearance of a third competitor, better than either of these, mind is now found to be ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the victor. > Greek: ΣΩ. φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γʼ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ. [¶185] Pro. Certainly. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶186] Soc. Then, according to the judgement which has now been given by our discussion, the power of pleasure would be fifth. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις. [¶187] Pro. So it seems. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἔοικεν. [¶188] 67b. Soc. But not first, even if all the cattle and horses and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic muse. > Greek: 67b. ΣΩ. πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδʼ ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἆλλα σύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων. [¶189] Pro. Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες. [¶190] Soc. Then you will let me go? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με; [¶191] Pro. There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains. > Greek: ΠΡΩ. σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν, ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.