---
title: "Protagoras · Πρωταγόρας"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 3 of 5
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-protagoras/3/
cite: "Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, Protagoras · Πρωταγόρας, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-protagoras/3/"
---

# Protagoras · Πρωταγόρας

*Plato, tr. Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb*

Socrates and the great sophist Protagoras: can virtue be taught?

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg022, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg022.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Sections 330e–341a

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-protagoras/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-protagoras/3/#p-N

[¶0] 330e. It is hard to see how anything could be holy, if holiness itself is not to be holy! And you—would you not make the same reply? “Certainly I would,” he said. Now suppose he went on to ask us: Well, and what of your statement a little while since? Perhaps I did not hear you aright, but I understood you two to say that the parts of virtue are in such a relation to each other that one of them is not like another.

> Greek: 330e. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἴποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· πῶς οὖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε; ἆρʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατήκουσα; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι ⟨τὰ⟩ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον·

[¶1] 331. Soc. Here my answer would be: As to the substance of it, you heard aright, but you made a mistake in thinking that I had any share in that statement.

> Greek: 331. ΣΩ. εἴποιμʼ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἴει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων.

[¶2] 331a. It was Protagoras here who made that answer; I was only the questioner. Then suppose he were to ask: Is our friend telling the truth, Protagoras? Is it you who say that one part of virtue is not like another? Is this statement yours? What answer would you give him? I must needs admit it, Socrates, he said. Well now, Protagoras, after that admission, what answer shall we give him, if he goes on to ask this question: Is not holiness something of such nature as to be just, and justice such as to be holy, or can it be unholy? Can holiness be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?

> Greek: 331a. εἰ οὖν εἴποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φῂς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο;—ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν. τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλʼ οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δʼ ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλʼ ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;

[¶3] 331b. What is to be our reply? I should say myself, on my own behalf, that both justice is holy and holiness just, and with your permission I would make this same reply for you also; since justness is either the same thing as holiness or extremely like it, and above all, justice is of the same kind as holiness, and holiness as justice. Are you minded to forbid this answer, or are you in agreement with it? I do not take quite so simple a view of it, Socrates, as to grant that justice is holy and holiness just.

> Greek: 331b. τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐῴης, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἤτοι ταὐτόν γʼ ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ διακωλύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως.—οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι.

[¶4] 331c. I think we have to make a distinction here. Yet what difference does it make? he said: if you like, let us assume that justice is holy and holiness just. No, no, I said; I do not want this “if you like” or “if you agree” sort of thing to be put to the proof, but you and me together; and when I say “you and me” I mean that our statement will be most properly tested if we take away the “if.”

> Greek: 331c. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον.—μή μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δʼ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστʼ ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ εἴ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ.—ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι·

[¶5] 331d. Well, at any rate, he said, justice has some resemblance to holiness; for anything in the world has some sort of resemblance to any other thing. Thus there is a point in which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so with all the other things which are regarded as most opposed to each other; and the things which we spoke of before as having different faculties and not being of the same kind as each other—the parts of the face—these in some sense resemble one another and are of like sort. In this way therefore you could prove, if you chose, that even these things are all like one another.

> Greek: 331d. καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπῃ προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἁμῇ γέ πῃ προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις.

[¶6] 331e. But it is not fair to describe things as like which have some point alike, however small, or ash unlike that have some point unlike. This surprised me, and I said to him: What, do you regard just and holy as so related to each other that they have only some small point of likeness?

> Greek: 331e. ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον.—καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν· ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις;— ΣΩ.

[¶7] 332. Soc. Not so, he replied, at all, nor yet, on the other hand, as I believe you regard them. Well then, I said, since I find you chafe at this suggestion, we will let it pass, and consider another instance that you gave. Is there a thing you call folly? Yes, he said. Is not the direct opposite to that thing wisdom? I think so, he said. And when men behave rightly and usefully, do you consider them temperate in so behaving, or the opposite? Temperate, he said. Then is it by temperance that they are temperate? Necessarily. Now those who do not behave rightly behave foolishly, and are not temperate in so behaving? I agree, he said. And behaving foolishly is the opposite to behaving temperately? Yes, he said. Now foolish behavior is due to folly, and temperate behavior to temperance? He assented. And whatever is done by strength is done strongly, and whatever by weakness, weakly? He agreed. And whatever with swiftness, swiftly, and whatever with slowness, slowly? And so whatever is done in a certain way is done by that kind of faculty, and whatever in an opposite way, by the opposite kind? He agreed. Pray now, I proceeded, is there such a thing as the beautiful? He granted it. Has this any opposite except the ugly? None. Well, is there such a thing as the good? There is. Has it any opposite but the evil? None. Tell me, is there such a thing as “shrill” in the voice? Yes, he said. Has it any other opposite than “deep.” No, he said. Now, I went on, each single opposite has but one opposite, not many?

> Greek: 332. οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι.—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἅνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ [εἰ] τοὐναντίον [ἔπραττον];—σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνῃ σωφρονοῦσιν;—ἀνάγκη.—οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες;—συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.—τοὐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως;—ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνῃ πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνῃ;—ὡμολόγει.—οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς;—ἐδόκει.—καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτῆτος, βραδέως;—ἔφη.—καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου;—συνέφη.—φέρε δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι καλόν;—συνεχώρει.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;—ἔστιν.—τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;—οὐκ ἔστιν.—τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὀξὺ ἐν φωνῇ;—ἔφη.—τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύ;—οὐκ ἔφη.—οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἓν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;—συνωμολόγει.

[¶8] 332d. He admitted this. Come now, I said, let us reckon up our points of agreement. We have agreed that one thing has but one opposite, and no more? We have. And that what is done in an opposite way is done by opposites? Yes, he said. And we have agreed that what is done foolishly is done in an opposite way to what is done temperately? Yes, he said. And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly by folly?

> Greek: 332d. ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή;—ὡμολογήκαμεν.—τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι;—ἔφη.—ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;—ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;

[¶9] 332e. He assented. Now if it is done in an opposite way, it must be done by an opposite? Yes? And one is done by temperance, and the other by folly? Yes. In an opposite way? Certainly. And by opposite faculties? Yes. Then folly is opposite to temperance Apparently. Now do you recollect that in the previous stage we have agreed that folly is opposite to wisdom? He admitted this.

> Greek: 332e. —συνεχώρει.—οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράττοιτʼ ἄν;—ναί.—πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;—ναί.—ἐναντίως;—πάνυ γε.—οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;—ναί.—ἐναντίον ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης;—φαίνεται.—μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφίᾳ ἐναντίον εἶναι;—συνωμολόγει.— ΣΩ.

[¶10] 333. Soc. And that one thing has but one opposite? Yes.

> Greek: 333. ἓν δὲ ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι;—φημί.—πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων;

[¶11] 333a. Then which, Protagoras, of our propositions are we to reject—the statement that one thing has but one opposite; or the other, that wisdom is different from temperance, and each is a part of virtue, and moreover, a different part, and that the two are as unlike, both in themselves and in their faculties, as the parts of the face? Which are we to upset? The two of them together are not quite in tune; they do not chime in harmony. How could they, if one thing must needs have but one opposite and no more, while wisdom, and temperance likewise, appear both to be opposite to folly, which is a single thing?

> Greek: 333a. τὸ ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόριον δὲ ἑκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνᾴδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνᾴδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μὲν ἓν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσιν δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ ἑνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὖ φαίνεται·

[¶12] 333b. Such is the position, Protagoras, I said or is it otherwise? He admitted it was so, much against his will. Then temperance and wisdom must be one thing? And indeed we found before that justice and holiness were almost the same thing. Come, Protagoras, I said, let us not falter, but carry out our inquiry to the end. Tell me, does a man who acts unjustly seem to you to be temperate in so acting?

> Greek: 333b. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως;—ὡμολόγησεν καὶ μάλʼ ἀκόντως.—οὐκοῦν ἓν ἂν εἴη ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὖ ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης σχεδόν τι ταὐτὸν ὄν. ἴθι δή, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἆρά τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;—αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.—πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ;—εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν.—ἀλλʼ οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνῃ, εἴτʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα εἴτε μή·

[¶13] 333c. I should be ashamed, Socrates, he replied, to admit that, in spite of what many people say. Then shall I address my argument to them, I asked, or to you? If you please, he answered, debate first against that popular theory. It is all the same to me, I said, so long as you make answer, whether it be your own opinion or not. For although my first object is to test the argument, the result perhaps will be that both I, the questioner, and my respondent are brought to the test. At first Protagoras appeared to be coy, alleging that the argument was too disconcerting: however he consented at length to make answer. Well now, I said, begin at the beginning, and tell me, do you consider people to be temperate when they are unjust? Let us suppose so, he said. And by being temperate you mean being sensible? Yes. And being sensible is being well-advised in their injustice? Let us grant it, he said. Does this mean, I asked, if they fare well by their injustice, or if they fare ill? If they fare well. Now do you say there are things that are good? I do. Then, I asked, are those things good which are profitable to men?

> Greek: 333c. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας—τὸν γὰρ λόγον ᾐτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.—ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν;—ἔφη.—τὸ δʼ εὖ φρονεῖν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν;—ἔστω, ἔφη.—πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς;—εἰ εὖ.—λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἄττα εἶναι;—λέγω.—ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ ἅ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

[¶14] 333e. Oh yes, to be sure, he replied, and also when they are not profitable to men I call them good. Here Protagoras seemed to me to be in a thoroughly provoked and harassed state, and to have set his face against answering: so when I saw him in this mood I grew wary and went gently with my questions.

> Greek: 333e. —καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ, ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ᾖ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.—καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἑώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος ἠρέμα ἠρόμην.

[¶15] 334. Soc. Do you mean, Protagoras, I asked, things that are profitable to no human being, or things not profitable in any way at all?

> Greek: 334. ΣΩ. πότερον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἃ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἃ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα;

[¶16] 334a. Can you call such things as these good? By no means, he replied; but I know a number of things that are unprofitable to men, namely, foods, drinks, drugs, and countless others, and some that are profitable; some that are neither one nor the other to men, but are one or the other to horses; and some that are profitable only to cattle, or again to dogs; some also that are not profitable to any of those, but are to trees; and some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots—such as dung, which is a good thing when applied to the roots of all plants, whereas if you chose to cast it on the young twigs and branches, it will ruin all.

> Greek: 334a. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς;—οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδʼ ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθά, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δʼ ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν·

[¶17] 334b. And oil too is utterly bad for all plants, and most deadly for the hair of all animals save that of man, while to the hair of man it is helpful, as also to the rest of his body. The good is such an elusive and diverse thing that in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man’s body, but at the same time as bad as can be for the inward; and for this reason all doctors forbid the sick to take oil, except the smallest possible quantity, in what one is going to eat—just enough to quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one’s nostrils from food and its dressings.

> Greek: 334b. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασίν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θριξὶν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πλὴν ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δʼ ἐντὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον·

[¶18] 334c. When he had thus spoken, the company acclaimed it as an excellent answer; and then I remarked: Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person, and if someone addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and therefore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you. Well, what do you mean by short answers? he asked: do you want me to make them shorter than they should be? Not at all, I said. As long as they should be? he asked. Yes, I said.

> Greek: 334c. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅτι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις. εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχανον ὑπόκωφος ὤν, ᾤου ἂν χρῆναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἕπεσθαι. πῶς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ; μηδαμῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. ἀλλʼ ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη.

[¶19] 334e. Then are my answers to be as long as I think they should be, or as you think they should be?

> Greek: 334e. ναί, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;

[¶20] 335. Soc. Well, for instance, I have heard, I said, that you yourself are able, in treating one and the same subject, not only to instruct another person in it but to speak on it at length, if you choose, without ever being at a loss for matter; or again briefly, so as to yield to no one in brevity of expression.

> Greek: 335. ΣΩ. ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι σὺ οἷός τʼ εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, οὕτως ὥστε τὸν λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ βραχέα οὕτως ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις εἰπεῖν·

[¶21] 335a. So, if you are going to argue with me, employ with me the latter method, that of brevity. Socrates, he said, I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech, and if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks. Then, as I saw that he had not been quite satisfied with himself in making his former answers, and that he would not readily accept the part of answerer in debate, I considered it was not my business to attend his meetings further, and remarked: But you know, Protagoras, I too feel uncomfortable about our having this discussion against your inclination; but when you agree to argue in such a way that I can follow, then I will argue with you.

> Greek: 335a. εἰ οὖν μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρός με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν με διαλέγεσθαι, οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων ἐφαινόμην οὐδʼ ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. καὶ ἐγώ—ἔγνων γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἑκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι—ἡγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἀλλά τοι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλῃ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι.

[¶22] 335b. For you—as people relate of you, and you yourself assert—are able to hold a discussion in the form of either long or short speeches; you are a man of knowledge:

> Greek: 335b. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῂς δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἷός τʼ εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι —σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τʼ εἶναι.

[¶23] 335c. but I have no ability for these long speeches, though I could wish that I had it. Surely you, who are proficient in both ways, ought to have made us this concession, that so we might have had our debate. But now that you refuse, and I am somewhat pressed for time and could not stay to hear you expatiate at any length—for I have an appointment—I will be off; though I daresay I should be happy enough to hear your views. With these words I rose as if to go away; but, as I was getting up, Callias laid hold of my arm with his right hand, and grasped this cloak of mine with his left, and said: We will not let you go, Socrates; for if you leave us our discussions will not go so well.

> Greek: 335c. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα ἡ συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἷός τʼ εἴην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ—εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτʼ ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτʼ εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καί μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δʼ ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουΐ, καὶ εἶπεν·

[¶24] 335d. I beg you therefore to stay with us, for there is nothing I would rather hear than an argument between you and Protagoras. Come, you must oblige us all. Then I said (I was now standing up as though to go out): Son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of knowledge, but especially do I commend and love it now, so that I should be very glad to oblige you if you asked of me something that I could do:

> Greek: 335d. οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνὸς ἥδιον ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών—ὦ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο·

[¶25] 336. Soc. but I am afraid it is as though you asked me to keep pace with Criso the runner of Himera in his prime, or to keep up in a match with one of the long-distance or day-course racers, and I could only tell you that I wish that of myself, without your asking, I could keep pace with such runners, but of course I cannot.

> Greek: 336. ΣΩ. νῦν δʼ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἱμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι, εἴποιμι ἄν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλʼ εἴ τι δέῃ θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι·

[¶26] 336a. If you want to have the spectacle of Criso and me running together, you must ask him to adapt his pace; for whereas I cannot run fast, he can run slowly. So if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point raised. Otherwise what is to be our mode of discussion?

> Greek: 336a. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι·

[¶27] 336b. For I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a harangue were two distinct things. Ah, but you see, Socrates, he said, Protagoras thinks it only fair to claim that he be allowed to discuss in his chosen style, in return for your claim that it should be in yours. At this Alcibiades intervened, saying: You do not state it quite philosophically, Callias, for Socrates here confesses he is no hand at long discourses, and yields therein to Protagoras;

> Greek: 336b. εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγʼ ᾤμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. ἀλλʼ—ὁρᾷς; —ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὑτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται, καὶ σὺ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναί οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τʼ εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ.

[¶28] 336c. but I should be surprised if he yields to any man in ability to argue, or in understanding the interchange of reason. Now if Protagoras confesses himself inferior to Socrates in argumentation, Socrates has no more to ask: but if he challenges him, let him discuss by question and answer; not spinning out a lecture on each question—beating off the arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating until most of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue.

> Greek: 336c. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφʼ ἑκάστῃ ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων·

[¶29] 336d. For Socrates, I warrant you, will not forget, despite his jesting way of calling himself forgetful. Now I think Socrates’ proposal is the more equitable—for each of us should declare his personal opinion. After Alcibiades, the next, I believe, to speak was Critias: Prodicus and Hippias, he said, it seems to me that Callias is all for supporting Protagoras, while Alcibiades is always for a contest in anything he takes up.

> Greek: 336d. ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καί φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπών· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἱππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀεὶ φιλόνικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὁρμήσῃ·

[¶30] 336e. It is not for us to contend on either side for Socrates or for Protagoras, but jointly to request them both not to break off our conference unconcluded.

> Greek: 336e. ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμφιλονικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλῦσαι τὴν συνουσίαν.

[¶31] 337a. Soc. When he had said this, Prodicus remarked: I think you are right, Critias: those who attend this sort of discussion ought to be joint, but not equal, hearers of both disputants. For there is a difference: we should listen jointly to them both, yet not give equal heed to each, but more to the wiser and less to the less intelligent. I on my part also, Protagoras and Socrates, call upon you to accede to our request, and to dispute, but not wrangle, with each other over your arguments: for friends dispute with friends, just from good feeling; whereas wrangling is between those who are at variance and enmity with one another.

> Greek: 337a. ΣΩ. εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, ὁ Πρόδικος, καλῶς μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή—ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μέν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή—ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ διʼ εὔνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσιν δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις—καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἡ συνουσία γίγνοιτο·

[¶32] 337b. In this way our meeting will have highest success, since you the speakers will thus earn the greatest measure of good repute, not praise, from us who hear you. For good repute is present in the hearers’ souls without deception, but praise is too often in the words of liars who hide what they really think.

> Greek: 337b. ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστʼ ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε—εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων— ἡμεῖς τʼ αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστʼ ἂν οὕτως εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεσθα—εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μανθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἥδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίοντά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἡδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.

[¶33] 337c. Again, we listeners would thus be most comforted, not pleased; for he is comforted who learns something and gets a share of good sense in his mind alone, whereas he is pleased who eats something or has some other pleasant sensation only in his body. When Prodicus had thus spoken, quite a number of the company showed their approval then after Prodicus the learned Hippias spoke: Gentlemen, he said, who are here present, I regard you all as kinsmen and intimates and fellow-citizens by nature, not by law:

> Greek: 337c. ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ δὲ τὸν πρόδικον Ἱππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι— φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ·

[¶34] 337d. for like is akin to like by nature, whereas law, despot of mankind, often constrains us against nature. Hence it would be shameful if we, while knowing the nature of things, should yet—being the wisest of the Greeks, and having met together for the very purpose in the very sanctuary of the wisdom of Greece, and in this the greatest and most auspicious house of the city of cities—display no worthy sign of this dignity, but should quarrel with each other like low churls.

> Greek: 337d. τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.

[¶35] 338. Soc. Now let me beg and advise you, Protagoras and Socrates, to come to terms arranged, as it were, under our arbitration: you, Socrates, must, not require that precise form of discussion with its extreme brevity, if it is disagreeable to Protagoras, but let the speeches have their head with a loose rein, that they may give us a more splendid and elegant impression; nor must you, Protagoras, let out full sail, as you run before the breeze, and so escape into the ocean of speech leaving the land nowhere in sight; rather, both of you must take a middle course.

> Greek: 338. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν, εἰ μὴ ἡδὺ Πρωταγόρᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτʼ αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμεῖν.

[¶36] 338a. So you shall do as I say, and I strongly urge you to choose an umpire or supervisor or chairman who will keep watch for you over the due measure of either’s speeches.

> Greek: 338a. ὣς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν ἑλέσθαι ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἑκατέρου.

[¶37] 338b. His proposal was approved by the company, and they all applauded it: Callias said he would not let me go, and they requested me to choose a supervisor. To this I replied that it would be a shame to choose an arbiter for our discussion; for if he who is chosen, said I, is to be our inferior, it would not be right to have the inferior overseeing the superior; while if he is our equal, that will be just as wrong, for our equal will only do very much as we do, and it will be superfluous to choose him.

> Greek: 338b. ταῦτα ἤρεσε τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ τε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἑλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἴη βραβευτὴν ἑλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἱρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὅμοιος, οὐδʼ οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὅμοιος ἡμῖν ὅμοια καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε ἐκ περιττοῦ ᾑρήσεται.

[¶38] 338c. You may say you will choose one who is our superior. This, in very truth, I hold to be impossible—to choose someone who is wiser than our friend Protagoras; and if you choose one who is not his superior, though you may say he is, that again would cast a slur on him, as if he were some paltry fellow requiring a supervisor; for, as far as I am concerned, the matter is indifferent. But let me tell you how I would have the thing done, so that your eagerness for a conference and a discussion may be satisfied. If Protagoras does not wish to answer, let him ask questions, and I will answer: at the same time I will try to show him how the answerer, in my view, ought to answer; and when I have answered all the questions that he wishes to ask, in his turn he shall render account in like manner to me.

> Greek: 338c. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἱρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἱρήσεσθε μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἱρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλʼ οὑτωσὶ ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵνʼ ὃ προθυμεῖσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι ὡς ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι·

[¶39] 338d. So if he does not seem very ready to answer the particular question put to him, you and I will join in beseeching him, as you have besought me, not to upset our conference. And for this plan there is no need to have one man as supervisor;

> Greek: 338d. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὁπόσʼ ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν·

[¶40] 338e. you will all supervise it together. They all resolved that it should be done in this way: Protagoras, though very unwilling, was obliged after all to agree to ask questions and then, when he had asked a sufficient number, to take his turn at making due response in short answers.

> Greek: 338e. καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι· καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογῆσαι ἐρωτήσειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀποκρινόμενος.

[¶41] 339. Soc. And so he began to put questions in this sort of way: I consider, Socrates, that the greatest part of a man’s education is to be skilled in the matter of verses; that is, to be able to apprehend, in the utterances of the poets, what has been rightly and what wrongly composed, and to know how to distinguish them and account for them when questioned. Accordingly my question now will be on the same subject that you and I are now debating, namely virtue, but taken in connexion with poetry: that will be the only difference. Now, Simonides, I think, somewhere remarks to Scopas, the son of Creon of Thessaly— For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard,
In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Fashioned without reproach.

> Greek: 339. ΣΩ. ἤρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὑτωσί πως· —ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τʼ εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἃ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ οὗπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δʼ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν τὸν Κρέοντος ὑὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ ὅτι— ἄνδρʼ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
τετυγμένον.

[¶42] 339b. Do you know the ode, or shall I recite the whole? To this I replied: There is no need, for I know it it happens that I have especially studied that ode. I am glad to hear it, he said. Now do you regard it as finely and correctly composed or not? Very finely and correctly, I replied. And do you regard it as finely composed, if the poet contradicts himself? No, I replied. Then observe it more closely, he said.

> Greek: 339b. τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ᾆσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος. εὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὔ;—πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ⟨καλῶς⟩ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.—δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ ποιητής;—οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—ὅρα δή, ἔφη, βέλτιον.—ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς.—οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προιόντος τοῦ ᾄσματος λέγει που—
οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον·

[¶43] 339c. >My good sir, I have given it ample attention. Are you aware, then, he asked, that as the ode proceeds he says at one point—
Nor ringeth true to me
That word of Pittacus—
And yet ’twas a sage who spake—Hard, quoth he, to be good.
Do you note that this and the former are statements of the same person? I know that, I said. Then do you think the second agrees with the first? So far as I can see, it does, I replied (at the same time, though, I was afraid there was something in what he said). Why, I asked, does it not seem so to you?

> Greek: 339c. χαλεπὸν φάτʼ ἐσθλὸν
ἔμμεναι.
ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κἀκεῖνα τὰ ἔμπροσθεν;—οἶδα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.—δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι;—φαίνεται ἔμοιγε (καὶ ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι) ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται;—πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀλαθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεταί τε καὶ οὔ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος;

[¶44] 339d. How can anyone, he replied, be thought consistent, who says both of these things? First he laid it down himself that it is hard for a man to become good in truth, and then a little further on in his poem he forgot, and he proceeds to blame Pittacus for saying the same as he did—that it is hard to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same statement that he made himself. Yet, as often as he blames the man for saying the same as himself he obviously blames himself too, so that in either the former or the latter place his statement is wrong. This speech of his won a clamorous approval from many of his hearers; and at first I felt as though I had been struck by a skilful boxer, and was quite blind and dizzy with the effect of his words and the noise of their applause. Then—to tell you the honest truth—in order to gain time for considering the poet’s meaning, I turned to Prodicus and calling him—Prodicus, I said, surely Simonides was your townsman: it behoves you to come to the man’s rescue.

> Greek: 339d. καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταὐτὰ λέγοντα αὑτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἤτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα—ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τἀληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής—τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί.

[¶45] 340. Soc. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your assistance— just as Scamander, in Homer, when besieged by Achilles, called Simois to his aid, saying—
Dear brother, let us both together stay this warriors might.
In the same way I call upon you, lest Protagoras lay Simonides in ruins. For indeed to rehabilitate Simonides requires your artistry, by which you can discriminate between wishing and desiring as two distinct things in the fine and ample manner of your statement just now.

> Greek: 340. ΣΩ. δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα—
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν, …
ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ᾗ τό τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά.

[¶46] 340b. So please consider if you agree with my view. For it is not clear that Simonides does contradict himself. Now you, Prodicus, shall declare your verdict first: do you consider becoming and being to be the same or different? Different, to be sure, said Prodicus. Now in the first passage, I said, Simonides gave it as his own opinion that it is hard for a man to become good in truth.

> Greek: 340b. καὶ νῦν σκόπει εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταὐτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;—ἄλλο νὴ Δίʼ, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.—οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἴη;—ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος.—τὸν δέ γε Πιττακόν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας, ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο.

[¶47] 340c. Quite true, said Prodicus. And he blames Pittacus, I went on, for saying not, as Protagoras holds, the same as himself, but something different. For what Pittacus said was not, as Simonides said, that it is hard “to become” but “to be” good. Now being and becoming, Protagoras, as our friend Prodicus says, are not the same thing; and if being and becoming are not the same thing, Simonides does not contradict himself. Perhaps Prodicus and many others might say with Hesiod that to become good is hard, “for Heaven hath set hard travail on the way to virtue; and when one reacheth the summit thereof,’tis an easy thing to possess, though hard before.”

> Greek: 340c. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν δὲ οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὥς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καθʼ Ἡσίοδον γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι—τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θεῖναι—ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

[¶48] 340d. When Prodicus heard this he gave me his approval: but Protagoras observed: Your correction, Socrates, contains an error greater than that which you are correcting. To which I answered: then it is a bad piece of work I have done, it would seem, Protagoras, and I am an absurd sort of physician;

> Greek: 340d. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπῄνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὃ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός·

[¶49] 340e. my treatment increases the malady. Just so, he said. How is that? I asked. Great, he replied, would be the ignorance of the poet, if he calls it such a slight matter to possess virtue, which is the hardest thing in the world, as all men agree.

> Greek: 340e. ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. ἀλλʼ οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. πῶς δή; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὅ ἐστιν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις.

[¶50] 341. Soc. Then I remarked: Upon my word, how opportunely it has happened that Prodicus is here to join in our discussion! For it is very likely, Protagoras, that Prodicus’ wisdom is a gift of long ago from heaven, beginning either in the time of Simonides or even earlier.

> Greek: 341. ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· νὴ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρόν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα.

[¶51] 341a. But you, so skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and lack the skill that I can boast because I am a disciple of the great Prodicus; and so now I find you do not understand that perhaps Simonides did not conceive “hard” in the way that you conceive it—just as, in the case of “awful,” Prodicus here corrects me each time I use the word in praising you or someone else; when I say, for instance, that Protagoras is an awfully wise man, he asks if I am not ashamed to call good things awful.

> Greek: 341a. σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὢν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι φαίνῃ, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὑτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἑκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινός ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τἀγαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν.