---
title: "Sophist · Σοφιστής"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Harold North Fowler"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/
cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Sophist · Σοφιστής. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/"
---

# Sophist · Σοφιστής

*Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler*

The Eleatic Stranger hunts the sophist, and finds he must say what not-being is.

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg007, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg007.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Pages 216–226](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/1.md)
2. [Pages 227–237](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2.md)
3. [Pages 237–248](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/3.md)
4. [Pages 248–258](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/4.md)
5. [Pages 258–268](https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/5.md)

## 1. Pages 216–226

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/1/#p-N

[¶0] 216. Theo. According to our yesterday’s agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher. Soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous, of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument—a kind of god of refutation. Theo. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger’s character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers. Soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and “visit the cities,” beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

> Greek: 216. ΘΕΟ. κατὰ τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥκομεν αὐτοί τε κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένον ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἐλέας, ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα [ἑταίρων], μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλά τινα θεὸν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὁμήρου λόγον λέληθας; ὅς φησιν ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοῦς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένιον οὐχ ἥκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ὕβρεις τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τάχʼ οὖν ἂν καὶ σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενός τε καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὤν τις ἐλεγκτικός. ΘΕΟ. οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου, ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. καί μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἁνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μήν· πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω. ΣΩ. καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ φίλε. τοῦτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολύ τι ῥᾷον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἶναι διακρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ· πάνυ γὰρ ἇνδρες οὗτοι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλʼ ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς [τίμιοι], τοῖς δʼ ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ φαντάζονται, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί, τοτὲ δʼ ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιντʼ ἂν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην, εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ, τί ταῦθʼ οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

[¶1] 217. Theo. What matters do you mean? Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher. Theo. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask? Soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name? Theo. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?
Str. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each. Theo. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard. Soc. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favor we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

> Greek: 217. ΘΕΟ. τὰ ποῖα δή; ΣΩ. σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον. ΘΕΟ. τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διενοήθης; ΣΩ. τόδε· πότερον ἓν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ δύο, ἢ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ τὰ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθʼ ἓν ὄνομα [γένος] ἑκάστῳ προσῆπτον; ΘΕΟ. ἀλλʼ οὐδείς, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελθεῖν αὐτά· ἢ πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγωμεν;
ΞΕ. οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρίʼ ἡγοῦντο· καθʼ ἕκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτʼ ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔργον. ΘΕΟ. καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρʼ ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν, ὁ δὲ ταὐτὰ ἅπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν. ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ, τοσόνδε δʼ ἡμῖν φράζε. πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαί τῳ βουληθῇς, ἢ διʼ ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὤν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;

[¶2] Str. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person. Soc. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾷον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ καθʼ αὑτόν. ΣΩ. ἔξεστι τοίνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἂν βουληθῇς ἐκλέξασθαι, πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονταί σοι πρᾴως· συμβούλῳ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἱρήσῃ, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

[¶3] Str. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favor to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδώς τίς μʼ ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλʼ ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνὸν κατʼ ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναί τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου παμμήκους ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῖσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες, ἄξενόν τι καταφαίνεταί μοι καὶ ἄγριον.

[¶4] 218. Theaet. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates’s suggestion will you please the others too?

> Greek: 218. ἐπεὶ Θεαίτητόν γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε πρότερον διείλεγμαι καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύῃ.
ΘΕΑΙ. δρᾶ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσιν κεχαρισμένος ἔσῃ.

[¶5] Str. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον εἶναι, Θεαίτητε· πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἤδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνοιτο ἂν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δʼ ἄρα τι τῷ μήκει πονῶν ἄχθῃ, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἑταίρους.

[¶6] Theaet. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὕτως οὐκ ἀπερεῖν· ἂν δʼ ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ᾧ συνδιαπονεῖν μετʼ ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄηθες.

[¶7] Str. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practice them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εὖ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδίᾳ βουλεύσῃ προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετʼ ἐμοῦ σοι συσκεπτέον ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ τί ποτʼ ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ τε κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ, τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφʼ ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτερος τάχʼ ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρʼ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν· δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνωμολογῆσθαι χωρὶς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φῦλον ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον συλλαβεῖν τί ποτʼ ἔστιν, ὁ σοφιστής· ὅσα δʼ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσιν καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔγωγε καὶ νῷν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον ἡγησαμένοις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἄλλῳ ῥᾴονι τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ μὴ σύ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν.

[¶8] Theaet. I have not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχω.

[¶9] Str. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

> Greek: ΞΕ. βούλει δῆτα περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;

[¶10] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶11] Str. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθʼ ἂν εὔγνωστον μὲν καὶ σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής· ἆρʼ οὐ πᾶσί τε γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος ἐπάξιον;

[¶12] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶13] 219. Str. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

> Greek: 219. ΞΕ. μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα.

[¶14] Theaet. That would be good.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

[¶15] Str. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

> Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή, τῇδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἤ τινα ἄτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;

[¶16] Theaet. Certainly not one without an art.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστά γε ἄτεχνον.

[¶17] Str. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἴδη δύο.

[¶18] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶19] Str. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or molded (utensils we call them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἥ τε μιμητική, σύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιότατʼ ἂν ἑνὶ προσαγορεύοιτʼ ἂν ὀνόματι.

[¶20] Theaet. How so, and what is the name?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ τίνι;

[¶21] Str. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὂν ὕστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πού φαμεν.

[¶22] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶23] Str. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γε νυνδὴ ⟨ἃ⟩ διήλθομεν ἅπαντα εἶχεν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν.

[¶24] Theaet. Yes, they do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἶχε γὰρ οὖν.

[¶25] Str. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι προσείπωμεν.

[¶26] Theaet. Agreed.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

[¶27] Str. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τό τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς χειρουμένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστʼ ἄν που διὰ ταῦτα συνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν.

[¶28] Theaet. Yes, that would be proper.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί· πρέποι γὰρ ἄν.

[¶29] Str. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

> Greek: ΞΕ. κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς συμπασῶν οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικήν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;

[¶30] Theaet. In acquisitive art, clearly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐν κτητικῇ που δῆλον.

[¶31] Str. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

> Greek: ΞΕ. κτητικῆς δὲ ἆρʼ οὐ δύο εἴδη; τὸ μὲν ἑκόντων πρὸς ἑκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὂν διά τε δωρεῶν καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπόν, ἢ κατʼ ἔργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον σύμπαν, χειρωτικὸν ἂν εἴη;

[¶32] Theaet. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

[¶33] Str. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἆρʼ οὐ διχῇ τμητέον;

[¶34] Theaet. In what way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶35] Str. By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας, τὸ δὲ κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικόν.

[¶36] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶37] Str. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ.

[¶38] Theaet. Say how it can be done.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε ὅπῃ.

[¶39] Str. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δʼ ἐμψύχου.

[¶40] Theaet. Certainly, if both exist.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω.

[¶41] 220. Str. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

> Greek: 220. ΞΕ. πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀψύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὂν πλὴν κατʼ ἔνια τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἄττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτʼ ἄλλα βραχέα, χαίρειν ἐᾶσαι, τὸ δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζῴων οὖσαν θήραν, προσειπεῖν ζῳοθηρικήν.

[¶42] Theaet. Very well.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

[¶43] Str. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ζῳοθηρικῆς δὲ ἆρʼ οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν δίκῃ, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ ὀνόμασι διῃρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον νευστικοῦ ζῴου πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρικόν;

[¶44] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶45] Str. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

> Greek: ΞΕ. νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φῦλον ὁρῶμεν, τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον;

[¶46] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶47] Str. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἡ θήρα λέγεταί πού τις ὀρνιθευτική.

[¶48] Theaet. It is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

[¶49] Str. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἁλιευτική.

[¶50] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶51] Str. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διέλοιμεν;

[¶52] Theaet. What divisions?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ ποῖα;

[¶53] Str. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καθʼ ἃ τὸ μὲν ἕρκεσιν αὐτόθεν ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ.

[¶54] Theaet. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἑκάτερον;

[¶55] Str. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μέν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἕνεκα κωλύσεως εἴργῃ τι περιέχον, ἕρκος εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν.

[¶56] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶57] Str. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

> Greek: ΞΕ. κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἕρκη χρὴ προσαγορεύειν;

[¶58] Theaet. Assuredly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶59] Str. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἑρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φήσομεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.

[¶60] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶61] Str. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word— call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ γιγνόμενον ἕτερον μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δέ τινα θήραν ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν ἑνὶ λόγῳ νῦν χρεών· ἢ τί τις ἄν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;

[¶62] Theaet. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.

[¶63] Str. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινὸν οἶμαι πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν.

[¶64] Theaet. To be sure.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶65] Str. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε μεθημερινόν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἄγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν.

[¶66] Theaet. Yes, it is so called.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

[¶67] Str. Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦ τοίνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριόδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριοδοντία τις οἶμαι κέκληται.

[¶68] Theaet. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ γοῦν τινές.

[¶69] Str. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε λοιπόν ἐστιν ἓν ἔτι μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδος.

[¶70] Theaet. What is that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶71] Str. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτῃ πληγῆς, ἀγκίστρῳ τε γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐχ ᾗ τις ἂν τύχῃ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἑκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄνω ῥάβδοις καὶ καλάμοις ἀνασπώμενον·

[¶72] 221. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?
Theaet. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

> Greek: 221. οὗ τί φήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοὔνομα λέγεσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. δοκῶ μέν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προυθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.

[¶73] Str. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle has a name in the very likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

> Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ τε κἀγὼ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοὔνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὖργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς. συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζῳοθηρικόν, ζῳοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλον ἁλιευτικόν, ἁλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπωμένην, ἀπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν τοὔνομα, ἡ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθεῖσα ἐπίκλην γέγονεν.

[¶74] Theaet. That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἱκανῶς δεδήλωται.

[¶75] Str. Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν.

[¶76] Theaet. By all means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶77] Str. Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γʼ ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἤ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν.

[¶78] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶79] Str. Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν;

[¶80] Theaet. Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην· μανθάνω γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, ὡς παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος εἶναι τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων.

[¶81] Str. But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλά τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον.

[¶82] Theaet. Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα ποτʼ οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

[¶83] Str. Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ἠγνοήκαμεν τἀνδρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα ὄντα συγγενῆ;

[¶84] Theaet. Who is akin to whom?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα τοῦ;

[¶85] Str. The angler to the sophist.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

[¶86] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶87] Str. They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

> Greek: ΞΕ. θηρευτά τινε καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι.

[¶88] Theaet. What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος θήρας ἅτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον εἴπομεν.

[¶89] Str. We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δίχα που νυνδὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

[¶90] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶91] Str. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νευστικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων· τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἄσχιστον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυειδὲς εἴη.

[¶92] 222. Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: 222. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶93] Str. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μέχρι μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ [ὁ] ἀσπαλιευτὴς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύεσθον.

[¶94] Theaet. I think they do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐοίκατον γοῦν.

[¶95] Str. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἐκτρέπεσθον δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζῳοθηρικῆς, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλαττάν που καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας, τὰ ἐν τούτοις ζῷα θηρευσόμενος.

[¶96] Theaet. To be sure.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶97] Str. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁ δέ γε ἐπὶ [τὴν] γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἑτέρους αὖ τινας, πλούτου καὶ νεότητος οἷον λειμῶνας ἀφθόνους, τἀν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρωσόμενος.

[¶98] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

[¶99] Str. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω τινὲ μέρει.

[¶100] Theaet. What are they?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον ἑκάτερον;

[¶101] Str. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων.

[¶102] Theaet. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἶτʼ ἔστι τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων;

[¶103] Str. Yes, If man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἴπερ γέ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἥμερον ζῷον. θὲς δὲ ὅπῃ χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἥμερον, εἴτε ἄλλο μὲν ἥμερόν τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄγριον, εἴτε ἥμερον μὲν λέγεις αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡγῇ θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερʼ ἂν ἡγῇ φίλον εἰρῆσθαί σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον.

[¶104] Theaet. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς τε ἥμερον, ὦ ξένε, ἡγοῦμαι ζῷον, θήραν τε ἀνθρώπων εἶναι λέγω.

[¶105] Str. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν.

[¶106] Theaet. How do we justify that assertion?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί λέγοντες;

[¶107] Str. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν μὲν λῃστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πολεμικήν, ἓν πάντα, βίαιον θήραν, ὁρισάμενοι.

[¶108] Theaet. Excellent.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.

[¶109] Str. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν δέ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικήν, ἓν αὖ τὸ σύνολον, πιθανουργικήν τινα μίαν τέχνην προσειπόντες.

[¶110] Theaet. Correct.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶111] Str. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη.

[¶112] Theaet. What kinds?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

[¶113] Str. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἰδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ δημοσίᾳ γιγνόμενον.

[¶114] Theaet. Granted; each of them does form a class.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἶδος ἑκάτερον.

[¶115] Str. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνητικόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικόν;

[¶116] Theaet. I do not understand.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ μανθάνω.

[¶117] Str. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers’ method of hunting.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὔπω προσέσχες.

[¶118] Theaet. In what respect?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ πέρι;

[¶119] Str. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν.

[¶120] Theaet. You are quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶121] Str. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω εἶδος.

[¶122] Theaet. Agreed.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶123] Str. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mistaken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦ δέ γε μισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομιλοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασι διʼ ἡδονῆς τὸ δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον τροφὴν ἑαυτῷ μόνον κολακικήν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάντες φαῖμεν ἂν ⟨ἢ⟩ ἡδυντικήν τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

[¶124] 223. Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: 223. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶125] Str. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττόμενον, ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἑτέρῳ προσειπεῖν ἄξιον ὀνόματι;

[¶126] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶127] Str. And what is that name? Try to tell.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τίνι δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν.

[¶128] Theaet. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον δή· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστήν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηυρηκέναι. τοῦτʼ οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσῆκον ὄνομʼ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν.

[¶129] Str. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, ⟨χειρωτικῆς⟩, [κτητικῆς,] θηρευτικῆς, ζῳοθηρίας, [πεζοθηρίας,] χερσαίας, [ἡμεροθηρικῆς,] ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ⟨πιθανοθηρίας⟩, ἰδιοθηρίας, [μισθαρνικῆς,] νομισματοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστική.

[¶130] Theaet. Most assuredly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶131] Str. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν· οὐ γάρ τι φαύλης μέτοχόν ἐστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλʼ εὖ μάλα ποικίλης. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται μὴ τοῦτο ὃ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς φαμεν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον εἶναί τι γένος.

[¶132] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ δή;

[¶133] Str. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἶδός που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν.

[¶134] Theaet. Yes, it was.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶135] Str. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἴδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀγοραστικόν;

[¶136] Theaet. So be it.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰρήσθω.

[¶137] Str. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμνεσθαι.

[¶138] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶139] Str. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man’s own productions the selling of one’s own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικήν.

[¶140] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶141] Str. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται;

[¶142] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶143] Str. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλάττον ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική;

[¶144] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶145] Str. And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς δʼ ἐμπορικῆς ἆρʼ οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σῶμα τρέφεται καὶ χρῆται, τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχή, πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

[¶146] Theaet. What do you mean by that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

[¶147] Str. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἕτερόν που συνίεμεν.

[¶148] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶149] 224. Str. Take, therefore, the liberal arts in general that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

> Greek: 224. ΞΕ. μουσικήν τε τοίνυν συνάπασαν λέγωμεν, ἐκ πόλεως ἑκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἔνθεν μὲν ὠνηθεῖσαν, ἑτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην [καὶ πιπρασκομένην], καὶ γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποιικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἧττον τῆς τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἔμπορον ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

[¶150] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

[¶151] Str. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα συνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

[¶152] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶153] Str. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιότατα λέγοιτʼ ἄν, τὸ δὲ γελοίῳ μὲν οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὅμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὖσαν πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τινι τῆς πράξεως ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἀνάγκη;

[¶154] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶155] Str. Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλῳ προσρητέον.

[¶156] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶157] Str. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τεχνοπωλικὸν μὴν τό γε περὶ τἆλλα ἂν ἁρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

[¶158] Theaet. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοίη πλὴν τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

[¶159] Str. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ἴθι δὴ νῦν συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὡς τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς, ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστική.

[¶160] Theaet. Very well.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μάλα γε.

[¶161] Str. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τρίτον δέ γʼ οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν, ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προυτάξατο, καλεῖν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νυνδή.

[¶162] Theaet. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὐ μέλλω;

[¶163] Str. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one’s own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικόν, ἀγοραστικόν, καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὅτιπερ ἂν ᾖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικὸν γένος, ἀεὶ σὺ προσερεῖς, ὡς φαίνῃ, σοφιστικόν.

[¶164] Theaet. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολουθεῖν.

[¶165] Str. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔτι δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἴ τινι τοιῷδε προσέοικεν ἄρα τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος.

[¶166] 225. Theaet. Of what nature?

> Greek: 225. ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ δή;

[¶167] Str. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστική τι μέρος ἡμῖν ἦν.

[¶168] Theaet. Yes, we did.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶169] Str. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα.

[¶170] Theaet. Tell what the parts are.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καθʼ ὁποῖα λέγε.

[¶171] Str. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἁμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ μαχητικόν.

[¶172] Theaet. Agreed.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

[¶173] Str. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι πρὸς σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἷον βιαστικόν.

[¶174] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶175] Str. And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄλλο εἴπῃ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν;

[¶176] Theaet. No other.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶177] Str. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον διττόν.

[¶178] Theaet. How?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶179] Str. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καθʼ ὅσον μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μήκεσί τε πρὸς ἐναντία μήκη λόγων καὶ περὶ [τὰ] δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα δημοσίᾳ, δικανικόν.

[¶180] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶181] Str. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δʼ ἐν ἰδίοις αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μῶν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν;

[¶182] Theaet. We are.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶183] Str. And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὂν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὔθʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν οὔτε νῦν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

[¶184] Theaet. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ· κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ διῄρηται.

[¶185] Str. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα;

[¶186] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶187] Str. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦ μὴν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὂν τυγχάνει.

[¶188] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[¶189] Str. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοίνυν ἣν ἑκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτῶν πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.

[¶190] Theaet. Yes, we must do so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή.

[¶191] Str. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δοκῶ μὴν τό γε διʼ ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἀκουόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ.

[¶192] Theaet. Yes, that is about what it is called.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.

[¶193] Str. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τούτου τοίνυν τοὐναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.

[¶194] Theaet. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ⟨τί⟩ τις ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι πλήν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἥκειν αὖ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν σοφιστήν;

[¶195] 226. Str. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

> Greek: 226. ΞΕ. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐριστικῆς ὂν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής.

[¶196] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶197] Str. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτόν;

[¶198] Theaet. Then we must catch him with both.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρή.

[¶199] Str. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. χρὴ γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμίν γε οὕτω ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἴχνος αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῦμεν ἄττα που;

[¶200] Theaet. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πολλά· ἀτὰρ ποῖα δὴ τῶν πολλῶν πυνθάνῃ;

[¶201] Str. To such as these: we say “sift” and “strain” and “winnow” and “separate.”

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ διαττᾶν καὶ βράττειν καὶ διακρίνειν.

[¶202] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶203] Str. And besides these there are “card” and “comb” and “beat the web” and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ πρός γε τούτοις ἔτι ξαίνειν, κατάγειν, κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἦ γάρ;

[¶204] Theaet. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι παραδείγματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἤρου;

[¶205] Str. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται σύμπαντα.

[¶206] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶207] Str. Then since there is, accorling to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα μίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἅπασι τέχνην ἑνὸς ὀνόματος ἀξιώσομεν αὐτήν.

[¶208] Theaet. What shall we call it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα προσειπόντες;

[¶209] Str. The art of discrimination.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διακριτικήν.

[¶210] Theaet. Very well.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

[¶211] Str. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἄν πῃ δυνώμεθα κατιδεῖν εἴδη.

[¶212] Theaet. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις.

[¶213] Str. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσεσι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ δʼ ὅμοιον ἀφʼ ὁμοίου.

[¶214] Theaet. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται.

[¶215] Str. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς μὲν τοίνυν ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον· τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω.

[¶216] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε τί.

[¶217] Str. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἐγὼ συννοῶ, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

[¶218] Theaet. Yes, so it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

[¶219] Str. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν ὂν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι;

[¶220] Theaet. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν.

[¶221] Str. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἴδη καθάρσεων ἑνὶ περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει.

[¶222] Theaet. What are they and what is the name?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα καὶ τίνι;

[¶223] Str. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper’s art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller’s art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τά τε τῶν ζῴων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τἀκτός, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται·

## 2. Pages 227–237

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/#p-N

[¶0] 227. Theaet. Very.

> Greek: 227. καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ σύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. μάλα γε.

[¶1] Str. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It endeavors to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honors them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

> Greek: ΞΕ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα συμπάσας δυνάμεις ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει· μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα συνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχείρηκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἴ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν.

[¶2] Theaet. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἴδη καθάρσεως, ἓν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὄν.

[¶3] Str. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάντων κάλλιστα. καί μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν.

[¶4] Theaet. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καθʼ ὁποῖʼ ἂν ὑφηγῇ πειράσομαί σοι συντέμνειν.

[¶5] Str. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι;

[¶6] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶7] Str. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καθαρμός γʼ ἦν τὸ λείπειν μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ πού τι φλαῦρον.

[¶8] Theaet. Yes, it was.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶9] Str. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα.

[¶10] Theaet. Very properly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε.

[¶11] Str. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον.

[¶12] Theaet. What kinds?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

[¶13] 228. Str. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

> Greek: 228. ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δʼ οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον.

[¶14] Theaet. I do not understand.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔμαθον.

[¶15] Str. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

> Greek: ΞΕ. νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας;

[¶16] Theaet. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδʼ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

[¶17] Str. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν;

[¶18] Theaet. No; I think it is nothing else.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶19] Str. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος;

[¶20] Theaet. Nothing else at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

[¶21] Str. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα;

[¶22] Theaet. Yes, they are, decidedly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.

[¶23] Str. Yet they must all be naturally related.

> Greek: ΞΕ. συγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύμπαντα γέγονεν.

[¶24] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶25] Str. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

> Greek: ΞΕ. στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν.

[¶26] Theaet. Yes, quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

[¶27] Str. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ὅσʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθʼ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν;

[¶28] Theaet. Evidently through disproportion.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

[¶29] Str. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

[¶30] Theaet. Very much so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶31] Str. Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπʼ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.

[¶32] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶33] Str. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον.

[¶34] Theaet. So it seems.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶35] Str. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν.

[¶36] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶37] Str. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.

[¶38] Theaet. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νυνδὴ λέξαντος ἠμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν σύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον.

[¶39] Str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἔν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματε τούτω δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;

[¶40] Theaet. What are they?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνε τούτω;

[¶41] 229. Str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

> Greek: 229. ΞΕ. περὶ μὲν αἶσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική.

[¶42] Theaet. That is clear.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεσθον.

[¶43] Str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκῃ.

[¶44] Theaet. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν.

[¶45] Str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ σύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν;

[¶46] Theaet. No, none.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

[¶47] Str. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

> Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή· διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον [εἶναι] ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω; σκόπει.

[¶48] Theaet. I am thinking.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶ.

[¶49] Str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν.

[¶50] Theaet. In what way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶51] Str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὑτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφʼ ἑνὶ [γένει] τῶν αὑτῆς ἑκατέρῳ.

[¶52] Theaet. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν; καταφανές πῄ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;

[¶53] Str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.

[¶54] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον δή;

[¶55] Str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· διʼ οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

[¶56] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶57] Str. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι.

[¶58] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶59] Str. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;

[¶60] Theaet. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οἶμαι μὲν [οὖν], ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν διʼ ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι.

[¶61] Str. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἆρʼ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.

[¶62] Theaet. Yes, we must see about that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

[¶63] Str. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι.

[¶64] Theaet. On what principle?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί;

[¶65] Str. Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον.

[¶66] Theaet. What shall we call each of these?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγομεν;

[¶67] Str. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς μάλιστʼ ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι·

[¶68] 230. Theaet. That is true.

> Greek: 230. τὸ δʼ οὖν σύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικήν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν οὕτως.

[¶69] Str. On the other hand, some appear to have convinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε, εἴξασί τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτʼ ἂν ἐθέλειν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὧν οἴοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν.

[¶70] Theaet. They are quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε νομίζοντες.

[¶71] Str. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

[¶72] Theaet. In what way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνι δή;

[¶73] Str. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἶθʼ ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταὐτὸν τιθέασι παρʼ ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. οἱ δʼ ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν [τε] ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον ἅπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή.

[¶74] Theaet. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἕξεων αὕτη.

[¶75] Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

[¶76] Theaet. Perfectly true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶77] Str. Well then, who are those who practise this art?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτῃ χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τίνας φήσομεν;

[¶78] 231. I am afraid to say the sophists.
Theaet. Why so?

> Greek: 231. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶79] Str. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honor.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ μεῖζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

[¶80] Theaet. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

[¶81] Str. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὅμως δὲ ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι τότε ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

[¶82] Theaet. No, probably not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν τό γε εἰκός.

[¶83] Str. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.

[¶84] Theaet. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λεγέσθω μέν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διισχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν.

[¶85] Str. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler’s grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigor.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς ἁπάσας μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

[¶86] Theaet. You are right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.

[¶87] Str. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυόμενοι, φέρε, ὁπόσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ηὑρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής.

[¶88] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶89] Str. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

[¶90] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶91] Str. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τρίτον δὲ ἆρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη;

[¶92] Theaet. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ⟨ἦν⟩.

[¶93] Str. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.

[¶94] Theaet. Yes, he was.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶95] Str. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μέν, ὅμως δʼ ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

[¶96] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶97] 232. Str. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labors under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

> Greek: 232. ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρός τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;

[¶98] Theaet. Something like that is very likely to be the case.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι.

[¶99] Str. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει διʼ ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλʼ ἀναλάβωμεν ⟨ἓν⟩ πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἓν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον.

[¶100] Theaet. Which was it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶101] Str. I think we said he was a disputer.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που.

[¶102] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶103] Str. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι;

[¶104] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶105] Str. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

> Greek: ΞΕ. σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καί φασιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ πῃ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅσʼ ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἆρʼ ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δρᾶν;

[¶106] Theaet. That is their reputation, at any rate.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γοῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

[¶107] Str. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

[¶108] Theaet. Those are included, of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ;

[¶109] Str. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγηταί τι, σύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατούς;

[¶110] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[¶111] Str. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς;

[¶112] Theaet. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις.

[¶113] Str. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

[¶114] Theaet. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνῃ περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.

[¶115] Str. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἑτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή τις δύναμις ἔοικʼ εἶναι;

[¶116] Theaet. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.

[¶117] Str. For heaven’s sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατὸν ἡγῇ τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον.

[¶118] 233. Theaet. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

> Greek: 233. ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

[¶119] Str. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν.

[¶120] Theaet. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μακάριον μεντἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος.

[¶121] Str. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἄν ποτέ τις πρός γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν δύναιτʼ ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

[¶122] Theaet. He cannot at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶123] Str. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα;

[¶124] Theaet. Magical power in what respect?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

[¶125] Str. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you, would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καθʼ ὅντινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μηδὲν αὖ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι.

[¶126] Theaet. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχολῇ μεντἄν.

[¶127] Str. But now people do care to do so?

> Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐθέλουσιν;

[¶128] Theaet. Very much.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶129] Str. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

[¶130] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶131] Str. And they do that about all things, do they not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν;

[¶132] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶133] Str. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

[¶134] Theaet. To be sure.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶135] Str. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη.

[¶136] Theaet. Of course it is impossible.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

[¶137] Str. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

[¶138] Theaet. Certainly; and I shouldn’t be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι.

[¶139] Str. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

[¶140] Theaet. What sort of an example?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;

[¶141] Str. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε. καί μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

[¶142] Theaet. What is the question?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶143] Str. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things— Theaet. What do you mean by all things?

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδʼ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα— ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς πάντα εἶπες;

[¶144] Str. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word “all.”

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γʼ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ σύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις.

[¶145] Theaet. No, I do not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶146] Str. I mean you and me among the “all,” and the other animals besides, and the trees.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ δένδρα.

[¶147] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

[¶148] Str. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.
Theaet. What would he mean by “making”? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἴ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν φαίη— ΘΕΑΙ.

[¶149] 234. Str. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

> Greek: 234. τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τινα· καὶ γὰρ ζῴων αὐτὸν εἶπες ποιητήν.
ΞΕ. φημί, καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμπάντων· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἕκαστα πάνυ σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται.

[¶150] Theaet. This is some joke of yours.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά.

[¶151] Str. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερον ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

[¶152] Theaet. Surely we must.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάντως που.

[¶153] Str. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

> Greek: ΞΕ. παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἤ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν;

[¶154] Theaet. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς· πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἓν πάντα συλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον.

[¶155] Str. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter’s art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τόν γʼ ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ.

[¶156] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶157] Str. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἆρʼ οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναί τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ᾗ αὖ δυνατὸν ⟨ὂν⟩ [αὖ] τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὤτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντʼ εἶναι;

[¶158] Theaet. Why should there not be such another art?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνη;

[¶159] Str. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥᾴδια, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων;

[¶160] Theaet. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

[¶161] Str. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist:

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δʼ οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστί τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει;

[¶162] 235. Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?
Theaet. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

> Greek: 235. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη σαφὲς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων ἐστί τις μερῶν εἷς.

[¶163] Str. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

> Greek: ΞΕ. γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα.

[¶164] Theaet. Of course he must.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον;

[¶165] Str. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἄγε δή, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτʼ ἀνεῖναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περιειλήφαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτʼ ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γε.

[¶166] Theaet. What next thing?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶167] Str. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς.

[¶168] Theaet. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κἀμοὶ τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ συνδοκεῖ.

[¶169] Str. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δέδοκται τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου, κἀκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν· ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηταί πῃ, συνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας ἀεὶ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύξηται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθʼ ἕκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον.

[¶170] Theaet. You are right. That is what we must do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον.

[¶171] Str. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαιρέσεως ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητουμένην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθʼ ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι.

[¶172] Theaet. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σὺ δʼ ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν τίνε τὼ δύο λέγεις.

[¶173] Str. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colors to each part.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἔστι δʼ αὕτη μάλιστα ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται.

[¶174] Theaet. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτʼ ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν;

[¶175] Str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτʼ ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δʼ ἐγγύθεν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

[¶176] 236. Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: 236. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶177] Str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

[¶178] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[¶179] Str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκός γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν;

[¶180] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶181] Str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικήν;

[¶182] Theaet. It is to be so called.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κλητέον.

[¶183] Str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μηδʼ εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἆρʼ οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, ἔοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα;

[¶184] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶185] Str. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ σύμπασαν μιμητικήν;

[¶186] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶187] Str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be “fantastic art,” would it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν δὴ φάντασμα ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἆρʼ οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν προσαγορεύοιμεν;

[¶188] Theaet. By all means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πολύ γε.

[¶189] Str. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τούτω τοίνυν τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν.

[¶190] Theaet. You are right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶191] Str. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότʼ ἠμφεγνόουν, ⟨ἐν⟩ ποτέρᾳ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλʼ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἁνὴρ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν.

[¶192] Theaet. So it seems.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶193] Str. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων σύμφης, ἤ σε οἷον ῥύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειθισμένον συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ συμφῆσαι;

[¶194] Theaet. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο εἴρηκας;

[¶195] Str. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντάπασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντάπασιν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν.

[¶196] 237. Theaet. Why?

> Greek: 237. ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶197] Str. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse:
Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is;
But keep your mind from this way of investigation.
So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it’s all the same to you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων—
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδʼ ἀφʼ ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα.
παρʼ ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστά γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει.

[¶198] Theaet. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κἀμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε.

[¶199] Str. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι;

[¶200] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶201] Str. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question “To what is the designation ‘not-being’ to be applied?” how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλʼ εἰ σπουδῇ δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρὴ τοὔνομʼ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὄν, τί δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι;

[¶202] Theaet. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὸν ἤρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἵῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

[¶203] Str. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term “not-being” cannot be applied to any being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπί ⟨τι⟩ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον.

[¶204] Theaet. Of course not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

[¶205] Str. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι.

[¶206] Theaet. How could it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;

[¶207] Str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word “something” of some being, for to speak of “something” in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ τὶ τοῦτο [ῥῆμα] ἐπʼ ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἦ γάρ;

[¶208] Theaet. Yes, it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον.

[¶209] Str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρα τῇδε σκοπῶν σύμφης, ὡς ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν;

[¶210] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶211] Str. And you will agree that “something” or “some” in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε τὶ φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τινὲ δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ τινὲς πολλῶν.

[¶212] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶213] Str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.

[¶214] Theaet. Quite necessarily.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.

## 3. Pages 237–248

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/3/#p-N

[¶0] Str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say “not-being” does not speak at all?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγειν μέν [τι], λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γʼ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὂν φθέγγεσθαι;

[¶1] Theaet. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

[¶2] 238. Str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

> Greek: 238. ΞΕ. μήπω μέγʼ εἴπῃς· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὖσα τυγχάνει.

[¶3] Theaet. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσῃς.

[¶4] Str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένοιτʼ ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον.

[¶5] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶6] Str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων ἆρά ποτε προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;

[¶7] Theaet. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶8] Str. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν σύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.

[¶9] Theaet. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.

[¶10] Str. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε πλῆθος μήτε ἓν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν προσφέρειν.

[¶11] Theaet. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχειροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.

[¶12] Str. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἢ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτο ἄν τις ἢ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;

[¶13] Theaet. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε πῇ;

[¶14] Str. When we say “things which are not,” do we not attribute plurality to them?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἆρα οὐ πλῆθος ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;

[¶15] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶16] Str. And in saying “a thing which is not,” do we not equally attribute the singular number?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ ὂν δέ, ἆρα οὐ τὸ ἓν αὖ;

[¶17] Theaet. Obviously.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

[¶18] Str. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτε ὀρθόν φαμεν ὂν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.

[¶19] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.

[¶20] Str. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?

> Greek: ΞΕ. συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτʼ εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;

[¶21] Theaet. Absolutely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶22] Str. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι, τὸ δὲ ἔτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν;

[¶23] Theaet. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνα δή;

[¶24] Str. Why, my dear fellow, don’t you see, by the very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστησι τὸ μὴ ὂν οὕτως, ὥστε, ὁπόταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

[¶25] Theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

[¶26] Str. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say “that which is not.” You understand surely?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὂν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἓν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα· τὸ μὴ ὂν γὰρ φημί. συνίης τοι.

[¶27] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶28] Str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἄφθεγκτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἶναι. συνέπῃ;

[¶29] Theaet. Yes, of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. συνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶30] Str. Then when I undertook to attach the verb “to be” to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον;

[¶31] 239. Theaet. Evidently.

> Greek: 239. ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνῃ.

[¶32] Str. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ διελεγόμην;

[¶33] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶34] Str. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν γε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον ὥς γε πρὸς ἓν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

[¶35] Theaet. Of course you did.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶36] Str. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it “it” at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φαμὲν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὡς ἓν μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἑνὸς γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

[¶37] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε.

[¶38] Str. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε τί τις ἂν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὕροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ εἶα δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα.

[¶39] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς;

[¶40] Str. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἴθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὤν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεὶς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγξασθαί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

[¶41] Theaet. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πολλὴ μεντἄν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦθʼ ὁρῶν πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροίην.

[¶42] Str. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐῶμεν· ἕως δʼ ἄν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν.

[¶43] Theaet. That seems to be decidedly the case.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

[¶44] Str. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by “image,” exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man’s question.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν τέχνην, ῥᾳδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀποστρέψει τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἴδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.

[¶45] Theaet. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἴδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα που τοιαῦτʼ ἔσθʼ ἕτερα.

[¶46] Str. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φανερός, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἶ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς.

[¶47] Theaet. Why?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶48] Str. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα.

[¶49] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶50] Str. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῷς ἐὰν ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεταί σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δʼ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

[¶51] 240. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.
Theaet. What is that?

> Greek: 240. ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον;

[¶52] Str. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said “image” of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι φθεγξάμενος εἴδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἓν ὄν. λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἄνδρα.

[¶53] Theaet. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον;

[¶54] Str. Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say “such”?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες;

[¶55] Theaet. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλʼ ἐοικὸς μέν.

[¶56] Str. And by the true you mean that which really is?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὂν λέγων;

[¶57] Theaet. Exactly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶58] Str. And the not true is the opposite of the true?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἆρʼ ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;

[¶59] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶60] Str. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὂν ἄρα λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς.

[¶61] Theaet. But it does exist, in a way.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔστι γε μήν πως.

[¶62] Str. But not truly, you mean.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὔκουν ἀληθῶς γε, φῄς.

[¶63] Theaet. No, except that it is really a likeness.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γʼ εἰκὼν ὄντως.

[¶64] Str. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ὂν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

[¶65] Theaet. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.

[¶66] Str. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐχ ἑκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἶναί πως.

[¶67] Theaet. Yes, I see that very well.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ καὶ μάλα.

[¶68] Str. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα;

[¶69] Theaet. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις;

[¶70] Str. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναί τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτʼ ἐροῦμεν;

[¶71] Theaet. We shall say that. What else could we say?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν;

[¶72] Str. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ψευδὴς δʼ αὖ δόξα ἔσται τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

[¶73] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως· τἀναντία.

[¶74] Str. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

[¶75] Theaet. Necessarily.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶76] Str. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἤ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;

[¶77] Theaet. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἴπερ ψεύσεταί ποτέ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

[¶78] Str. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται;

[¶79] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶80] Str. And this too is falsehood?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;

[¶81] Theaet. Yes, it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.

[¶82] Str. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ λόγος οἶμαι ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομισθήσεται τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.

[¶83] 241. Theaet. In what other way could a statement be made false?

> Greek: 241. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;

[¶84] Str. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

> Greek: ΞΕ. σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων, ὅταν [ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα καὶ ἀδιανόητα] προσδιωμολογημένα ᾖ τὰ πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει;

[¶85] Theaet. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τἀναντία φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νυνδή, ψευδῆ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νυνδὴ τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

[¶86] Str. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἀλλʼ ὅρα δὴ [βουλεύεσθαι] τί χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι· τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες, ὁρᾷς ὡς εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί.

[¶87] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶88] Str. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων.

[¶89] Theaet. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν γʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἑλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

[¶90] Str. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί οὖν; οὕτως ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

[¶91] Theaet. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν ἔγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοί τʼ ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τἀνδρός ἐσμεν.

[¶92] Str. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἕξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;

[¶93] Theaet. Of course I will.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἕξω;

[¶94] Str. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.

[¶95] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶96] Str. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαί τινα.

[¶97] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶98] Str. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ.

[¶99] Theaet. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχετέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

[¶100] Str. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τούτων γὰρ μήτʼ ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τά ⟨γʼ⟩ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὑτῷ λέγειν.

[¶101] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶102] 242. Str. And so we must take courage and attack our father’s theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

> Greek: 242. ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἴργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.

[¶103] Theaet. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξῃ.

[¶104] Str. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τρίτον τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.

[¶105] Theaet. You have only to utter it.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε μόνον.

[¶106] Str. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἶπόν που νυνδὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγχον ἀεί τε ἀπειρηκὼς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

[¶107] Theaet. Yes, so you did.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἶπες.

[¶108] Str. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

[¶109] Theaet. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὡς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴῃς, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἕνεκα.

[¶110] Str. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή, τίνα ἀρχήν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδʼ, ὦ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

[¶111] Theaet. What way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποίαν δή;

[¶112] Str. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι πρῶτον μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δʼ ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.

[¶113] Theaet. Express your meaning more clearly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις.

[¶114] Str. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν.

[¶115] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶116] Str. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι συνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται.

[¶117] Str. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπʼ ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ διὰ νεῖκός τι.

[¶118] 243. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.
Theaet. What is that?
Str. That they paid too little attention and consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

> Greek: 243. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
ΞΕ. ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ὠλιγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτʼ ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.

[¶119] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

[¶120] Str. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven’s sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term “not-being,” which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ὡς ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πῃ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἑκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεῶν συνίης ὅτι λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτό τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὁπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς ᾤμην συνιέναι. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἵνʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.

[¶121] Theaet. Yes, I see.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὁρῶ.

[¶122] Str. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὂν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.

[¶123] Theaet. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[¶124] Str. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

[¶125] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶126] Str. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθʼ, ἂν δόξῃ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρώτου νῦν σκεπτέον.

[¶127] Theaet. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term “being,” and see what those who use it think it signifies?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὂν φῂς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθʼ οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται;

[¶128] Str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this “being” (or “are”) of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two “being” you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους ὧδε· φέρε, ὁπόσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἤ τινε δύο τοιούτω τὰ πάντʼ εἶναί φατε, τί ποτε ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἔτι καθʼ ὑμᾶς τιθῶμεν; οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὂν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἕν, ἀλλʼ οὐ δύο εἴτην.

[¶129] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[¶130] Str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρά γε τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν;

[¶131] Theaet. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[¶132] 244. Str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

> Greek: 244. ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτʼ ἂν σαφέστατα ἕν.

[¶133] Theaet. You are perfectly right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα εἴρηκας.

[¶134] Str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say “being.” For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.— If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἠπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς, τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὂν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ᾠόμεθα, νῦν δʼ ἠπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρʼ ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐναντίον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιοῦντες παρά τε τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι πλεῖον ἑνὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὦ παῖ, τὶ πλημμελήσομεν;

[¶135] Theaet. Not in the least.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστά γε.

[¶136] Str. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one what they mean when they say “being”?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἓν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἆρʼ οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;

[¶137] Theaet. Of course we must.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶138] Str. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων. ἕν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι; — φαμὲν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ;

[¶139] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶140] Str. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ὂν καλεῖτέ τι;

[¶141] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶142] Str. Is it what you call “one,” using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον ὅπερ ἕν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;

[¶143] Theaet. What is their next answer, Stranger?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτʼ, ὦ ξένε, ἀπόκρισις;

[¶144] Str. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.

[¶145] Theaet. Why not?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶146] Str. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἓν καταγέλαστόν που.

[¶147] Theaet. Of course it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶148] Str. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

[¶149] Theaet. Why?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶150] Str. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τιθείς τε τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινε.

[¶151] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶152] Str. And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἂν ταὐτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοὔνομα, ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἰ δέ τινος αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

[¶153] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶154] Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ἕν γε, ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ἓν ὄν.

[¶155] Theaet. Necessarily.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶156] Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἑνὸς ἢ ταὐτὸν φήσουσι τούτῳ;

[¶157] Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;

[¶158] Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,
On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,
then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,
πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,
τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν τὸ ὂν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς;

[¶159] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶160] 245. Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

> Greek: 245. ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὂν καὶ ὅλον ἓν εἶναι.

[¶161] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶162] Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

[¶163] Theaet. Why?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶164] Str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀμερὲς δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς ἓν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι.

[¶165] Theaet. Yes, it must.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶166] Str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὂν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ [ὅλῳ] λόγῳ.

[¶167] Theaet. I understand.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω.

[¶168] Str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς οὕτως ἕν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὄν;

[¶169] Theaet. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν.

[¶170] Str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναί πως οὐ ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἑνὶ φανεῖται, καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἑνὸς ἔσται.

[¶171] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶172] Str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐάν γε τὸ ὂν ᾖ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου πάθος, ᾖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, ἐνδεὲς τὸ ὂν ἑαυτοῦ συμβαίνει.

[¶173] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶174] Str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερόμενον οὐκ ὂν ἔσται τὸ ὄν.

[¶175] Theaet. So it will.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶176] Str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ ἑνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος.

[¶177] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶178] Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτά τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι, καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδʼ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὄν.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶179] Str. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν [τὸ ἓν ἢ] τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα.

[¶180] Theaet. That certainly seems to be true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν.

[¶181] Str. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ ὁποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι.

[¶182] Theaet. Precisely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.

[¶183] Str. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας ἕκαστον εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὂν εἴτε δύο τινὲ εἴτε ἓν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.

[¶184] Theaet. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connection with whatever has previously been said.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην.

[¶185] Str. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μή, πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵνʼ ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν.

[¶186] 246. Theaet. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

> Greek: 246. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

[¶187] Str. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[¶188] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶189] Str. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς ⟨τι⟩ φήσει μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.

[¶190] Theaet. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.

[¶191] Str. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντʼ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ συνέστηκεν.

[¶192] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶193] Str. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. παρʼ ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.

[¶194] Theaet. How shall we get it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;

[¶195] Str. It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

> Greek: ΞΕ. παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων ῥᾷον, ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων βίᾳ χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλʼ ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾶν.

[¶196] Theaet. What way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶197] Str. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν παρὰ βελτιόνων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ χειρόνων· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τἀληθὲς ζητοῦμεν.

[¶198] Theaet. Quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶199] Str. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρʼ αὐτῶν ἀφερμήνευε.

[¶200] Theaet. I will do so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται.

[¶201] Str. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῷον εἴ φασιν εἶναί τι.

[¶202] Theaet. Of course they do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶203] Str. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν;

[¶204] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶205] Str. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχήν;

[¶206] 247. Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: 247. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶207] Str. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ ἄφρονα;

[¶208] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶209] Str. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ τοιαύτην αὐτῶν ἑκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;

[¶210] Theaet. Yes, they agree to this also.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ ταῦτα σύμφασιν.

[¶211] Str. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν.

[¶212] Theaet. Yes, they say that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὲν οὖν.

[¶213] Str. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν εἶναί φασί τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;

[¶214] Theaet. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν.

[¶215] Str. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν ἴσχειν;

[¶216] Theaet. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντʼ εἶναι σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.

[¶217] Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους γεγόνασιν ἇνδρες· ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντʼ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.

[¶218] Theaet. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

[¶219] Str. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exit. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς· εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπί τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυὲς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχʼ οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δή τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἆρʼ ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδʼ εἶναι τὸ ὄν.

[¶220] Theaet. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

[¶221] Str. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [τινα] κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτʼ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον [ὁρίζειν] τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

[¶222] Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

[¶223] Str. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us asume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη.

[¶224] 248. Theaet. It is settled.

> Greek: 248. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω συνομολογηθέν.
ΘΕΑΙ. μένει.

[¶225] Str. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.

[¶226] Theaet. I will.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται.

[¶227] Str. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἦ γάρ;

[¶228] Theaet. Yes, we do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶229] Str. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει διʼ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

[¶230] Theaet. Yes, that is what we say.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶231] Str. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐπʼ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ νυνδὴ παρʼ ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;

[¶232] Theaet. What is that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶233] Str. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντων γιγνόμενον. τάχʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

## 4. Pages 248–258

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/4/#p-N

[¶0] Theaet. What is it, then, that they say?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνʼ οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;

[¶1] Str. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νυνδὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.

[¶2] Theaet. What was it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶3] Str. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἱκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῳ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

[¶4] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶5] Str. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν φασίν.

[¶6] Theaet. And is there not something in that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;

[¶7] Str. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρὸς ὅ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρʼ αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.

[¶8] Theaet. They certainly assent to that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.

[¶9] Str. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαί φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;

[¶10] Theaet. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τἀναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.

[¶11] Str. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθʼ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.

[¶12] Theaet. Right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶13] Str. But for heaven’s sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;

[¶14] 249. Theaet. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

> Greek: 249. ΘΕΑΙ. δεινὸν μεντἄν, ὦ ξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.

[¶15] Str. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

[¶16] Theaet. How can we?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶17] Str. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντʼ αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;

[¶18] Theaet. But how else can it possess them?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τίνʼ ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

[¶19] Str. Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν ⟨ἔχειν⟩, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὂν ἑστάναι;

[¶20] Theaet. All those things seem to me absurd.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτʼ εἶναι φαίνεται.

[¶21] Str. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα.

[¶22] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶23] Str. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

> Greek: ΞΕ. συμβαίνει δʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.

[¶24] Theaet. Exactly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶25] Str. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντʼ εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.

[¶26] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶27] Str. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτʼ ἄν;

[¶28] Theaet. Not at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶29] Str. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν;

[¶30] Theaet. By no means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα.

[¶31] Str. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν πρός γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὁπῃοῦν.

[¶32] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶33] Str. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children’s prayer, “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἑστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὂν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχήν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν συναμφότερα λέγειν.

[¶34] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα.

[¶35] Str. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί οὖν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν;

[¶36] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶37] Str. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. βαβαὶ μέντʼ ἂν ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως.

[¶38] Theaet. What is this again? What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτʼ εἴρηκας;

[¶39] Str. My dear fellow, don’t you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

[¶40] Theaet. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπῃ δʼ αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἔχοντες, οὐ πάνυ συνίημι.

[¶41] Str. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον εἰ τὰ νῦν συνομολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν.

[¶42] 250. Theaet. What questions? Remind me.

> Greek: 250. ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα; ὑπόμνησόν με.

[¶43] Str. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προΐωμεν.

[¶44] Theaet. That is right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶45] Str. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἶεν δή, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις;

[¶46] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶47] Str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν εἶναί γε ὁμοίως φῂς ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἑκάτερον;

[¶48] Theaet. Yes, I do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶49] Str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῇς;

[¶50] Theaet. By no means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶51] Str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἑστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι;

[¶52] Theaet. Of course not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶53] Str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὡς ὑπʼ ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφότερα;

[¶54] Theaet. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαί τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.

[¶55] Str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφότερον τὸ ὂν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον δή τι τούτων.

[¶56] Theaet. Apparently.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶57] Str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὂν οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

[¶58] Theaet. You are about right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

[¶59] Str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρʼ ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;

[¶60] Theaet. What indeed?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖ γάρ;

[¶61] Str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι ῥᾴδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἕστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἑστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὂν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο;

[¶62] Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.

[¶63] Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.

[¶64] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶65] Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοὔνομα ἐφʼ ὅτι ποτὲ δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ. μέμνησαι;

[¶66] Theaet. Of course I do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶67] Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορίᾳ περὶ τὸ ὄν;

[¶68] Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ ξένε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα.

[¶69] Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπορίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἤδη καθάπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι·

[¶70] 251. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.
Theaet. Good.

> Greek: 251. καὶ ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπῃπερ ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς.

[¶71] Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ καθʼ ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.

[¶72] Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.

[¶73] Str. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλʼ ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἓν ἕκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.

[¶74] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

[¶75] Str. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δήπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δή τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναι.

[¶76] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶77] Str. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.

[¶78] Theaet. What are the arguments?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δή;

[¶79] Str. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἄμεικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρʼ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τί ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσομεν;

[¶80] Theaet. I cannot answer these questions for them.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

[¶81] Str. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί οὖν οὐ καθʼ ἓν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφʼ ἑκάστου τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;

[¶82] Theaet. A good suggestion.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις.

[¶83] Str. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τιθῶμέν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κίνησίς τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξετον οὐσίας;

[¶84] 252. Theaet. No.

> Greek: 252. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶85] Str. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν;

[¶86] Theaet. It will not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔσται.

[¶87] Str. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe “is” in motion, another that it “is” at rest.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἓν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατʼ εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναί φασιν ἀεί· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἑστηκότʼ εἶναι.

[¶88] Theaet. Exactly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶89] Str. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interruption, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν συντιθέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἔστι σύμμειξις.

[¶90] Theaet. Quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶91] Str. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστότατα μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.

[¶92] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶93] Str. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions “to be,” “apart,” “from the rest,” “by itself,” and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.

[¶94] Theaet. That is a remarkably accurate illustration Str. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ λέγεις ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.
ΞΕ. τί δʼ, ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

[¶95] Theaet. Even I can dispose of that assumption.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.

[¶96] Str. How?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς;

[¶97] Theaet. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἵσταιτʼ ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινοῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοίσθην ἐπʼ ἀλλήλοιν.

[¶98] Str. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἵστασθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;

[¶99] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶100] Str. Then only the third possibility is left.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

[¶101] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶102] Str. And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.

[¶103] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶104] Str. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον ηὑρέθη.

[¶105] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶106] Str. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.

[¶107] Theaet. Precisely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶108] Str. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δʼ οὔ, σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότʼ ἂν εἴη.

[¶109] 253. Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: 253. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ συναρμόττει.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶110] Str. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἁρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ.

[¶111] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε.

[¶112] Str. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὁποῖα ὁποίοις δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτό;

[¶113] Theaet. He has need of art.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τέχνης.

[¶114] Str. What art?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποίας;

[¶115] Theaet. The art of grammar.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τῆς γραμματικῆς.

[¶116] Str. And is not the same true in connection with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων φθόγγους ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μουσικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ συνιεὶς ἄμουσος;

[¶117] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶118] Str. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν τοιαῦτα εὑρήσομεν ἕτερα.

[¶119] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶120] Str. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ μείξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἆρʼ οὐ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντʼ ἄττʼ αὔτʼ ἐστιν, ὥστε συμμείγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ διʼ ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἴτια;

[¶121] Theaet. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

[¶122] Str. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν αὖ [νῦν] προσεροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

[¶123] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

[¶124] Str. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὂν ταὐτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

[¶125] Theaet. Yes, we shall.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, φήσομεν.

[¶126] Str. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ διʼ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ συνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

[¶127] Theaet. Certainly it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶128] Str. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

[¶129] Theaet. How could it be granted to anyone else?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοίη τις;

[¶130] Str. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him;

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον ἥ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἥ τε τούτου.

[¶131] 254. he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.
Theaet. How do they differ?

> Greek: 254. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶132] Str. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice, and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don’t you think so?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἦ γάρ;

[¶133] Theaet. It seems likely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶134] Str. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.

[¶135] Theaet. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἧττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

[¶136] Str. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ᾖ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

[¶137] Theaet. You are right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.

[¶138] Str. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτʼ οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὡμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπʼ ὀλίγον, τὰ δʼ ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο συνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ σαφηνείᾳ δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθʼ ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ παρεικάθῃ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὂν ἀθῴοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

[¶139] Theaet. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρή.

[¶140] Str. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν ἃ νυνδὴ διῇμεν τό τε ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

[¶141] Theaet. Yes, by far.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πολύ γε.

[¶142] Str. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν τώ γε δύο φαμὲν αὐτοῖν ἀμείκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλω.

[¶143] Theaet. Decidedly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε.

[¶144] Str. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ὂν μεικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἐστὸν γὰρ ἄμφω που.

[¶145] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶146] Str. Then these prove to be three.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.

[¶147] Theaet. To be sure.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶148] Str. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δʼ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν.

[¶149] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶150] Str. But what do we mean by these words, “the same” and “other,” which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say “the same” or “other”?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτώ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, συμμειγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεί, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό τε ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον ὡς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

[¶151] 255. Theaet. Perhaps.

> Greek: 255. ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[¶152] Str. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὔθʼ ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι.

[¶153] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶154] Str. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτιπερ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.

[¶155] Theaet. Why not?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶156] Str. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became “other” would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

> Greek: ΞΕ. κίνησίς τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθήσεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

[¶157] Theaet. Exactly so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ γε.

[¶158] Str. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.

[¶159] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶160] Str. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γʼ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδʼ αὖ στάσιν.

[¶161] Theaet. No.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ.

[¶162] Str. But should we conceive of “being” and “the same” as one?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τι διανοητέον ἡμῖν;

[¶163] Theaet. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[¶164] Str. But if “being” and “the same” have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ εἰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα προσεροῦμεν.

[¶165] Theaet. But surely that is impossible.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.

[¶166] Str. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι.

[¶167] Theaet. Pretty nearly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

[¶168] Str. So we shall consider “the same” a fourth class in addition to the other three?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἴδεσιν τὸ ταὐτὸν τιθῶμεν;

[¶169] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶170] Str. Then shall we call “the other” a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and “being” as two names for one class?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἆρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον; ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὂν ὡς δύʼ ἄττα ὀνόματα ἐφʼ ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

[¶171] Theaet. May be.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τάχʼ ἄν.

[¶172] Str. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.

[¶173] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;

[¶174] Str. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἦ γάρ;

[¶175] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶176] Str. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

[¶177] Theaet. The facts are as you say.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

[¶178] Str. Then we must place the nature of “the other” as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.

[¶179] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶180] Str. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.

[¶181] Theaet. Exactly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶182] Str. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθʼ ἓν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

[¶183] Theaet. How?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶184] Str. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;

[¶185] Theaet. We do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶186] Str. Then it is not rest.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐ στάσις ἄρʼ ἐστίν.

[¶187] Theaet. Not at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶188] 256. Str. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

> Greek: 256. ΞΕ. ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.

[¶189] Theaet. Yes, it exists.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

[¶190] Str. Now motion again is other than the same.

> Greek: ΞΕ. αὖθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταὐτοῦ ἐστιν.

[¶191] Theaet. You’re about right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

[¶192] Str. Therefore it is not the same.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν.

[¶193] Theaet. No, it is not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

[¶194] Str. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γʼ ἦν ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντʼ αὐτοῦ.

[¶195] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶196] Str. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ ταὐτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλʼ ὁπόταν μὲν ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταὐτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, διʼ ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ὥστε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταὐτόν.

[¶197] Theaet. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶198] Str. Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ κίνησις στάσεως, οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν στάσιμον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύειν;

[¶199] Theaet. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατά γε, εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μείγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή.

[¶200] Str. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐπί γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτῃ.

[¶201] Theaet. Yes, of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶202] Str. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν· ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, καθάπερ ταὐτοῦ τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

[¶203] Theaet. Inevitably.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαῖον.

[¶204] Str. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρʼ ἐστί πῃ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν νυνδὴ λόγον.

[¶205] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶206] Str. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἆρʼ αὖ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προυθέμεθα σκοπεῖν;

[¶207] Theaet. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νυνδὴ φανέντος.

[¶208] Str. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;

[¶209] Theaet. Yes, most fearlessly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.

[¶210] Str. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

[¶211] Theaet. That is perfectly clear.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

[¶212] Str. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα.

[¶213] Theaet. Yes, I suppose so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.

[¶214] Str. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.

> Greek: ΞΕ. περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

[¶215] Theaet. So it seems.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶216] 257. Str. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

> Greek: 257. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.

[¶217] Theaet. Yes, it must.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.

[¶218] Str. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρʼ ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἓν μὲν αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τἆλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.

[¶219] Theaet. That is not far from the truth.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδὸν οὕτως.

[¶220] Str. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.

[¶221] Theaet. That is very fair.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δικαιότατα εἴρηκας.

[¶222] Str. Then here is a point to consider.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε.

[¶223] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶224] Str. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλʼ ἕτερον μόνον.

[¶225] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶226] Str. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

[¶227] Theaet. No, of course not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶228] Str. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle “not” indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρʼ, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τὶ μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὒ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅττʼ ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

[¶229] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶230] Str. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.

[¶231] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶232] Str. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

[¶233] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶234] Str. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μία μέν ἐστί που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δʼ ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τʼ εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.

[¶235] Theaet. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶236] Str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὔσης ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

[¶237] Theaet. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τάχʼ ἄν· ἀλλʼ ὅπῃ δὴ λέγωμεν;

[¶238] Str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον;

[¶239] Theaet. There is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν.

[¶240] Str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τοῦτʼ οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἤ τινʼ ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

[¶241] Theaet. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχον· ὃ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἑκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

[¶242] Str. Now, then, tell me something more.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἴθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε.

[¶243] Theaet. What?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶244] Str. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλόν;

[¶245] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶246] Str. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὂν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικʼ, εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

[¶247] Theaet. Quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶248] Str. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἆρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ἧττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν;

[¶249] Theaet. Not at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶250] 258. Str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

> Greek: 258. ΞΕ. ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

[¶251] Theaet. No less truly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὁμοίως.

[¶252] Str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

[¶253] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶254] Str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὖσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὔσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἧττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

[¶255] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶256] Str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

[¶257] Theaet. That is perfectly clear.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σαφέστατά γε.

[¶258] Str. Then what shall we call this?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

[¶259] Theaet. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτό ἐστι τοῦτο.

[¶260] Str. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

> Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα ⟨μὴ μέγα⟩ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ⟨μὴ καλόν⟩, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν; ἤ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;

## 5. Pages 258–268

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/5/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/5/#p-N

[¶0] Theaet. None whatever.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

[¶1] Str. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οἶσθʼ οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν;

[¶2] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶3] Str. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πλεῖον ἢ ʼκεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

[¶4] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶5] Str. Because he says somewhere:
Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is;
Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation, Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅτι ὁ μέν πού φησιν—
οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα,
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδʼ ἀφʼ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα.
ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

[¶6] Str. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὖσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

[¶7] Theaet. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

[¶8] Str. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπῃ τις ὅτι τοὐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἴτʼ ἔστιν εἴτε μή, λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον·

[¶9] 259. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.
Theaet. True.

> Greek: 259. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἢ μέχριπερ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκείνῳ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμείγνυταί τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε ὂν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ διʼ ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε οὗ μετέσχεν ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὂν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν· τὸ δὲ ὂν αὖ θατέρου μετειληφὸς ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, ἕτερον δʼ ἐκείνων ἁπάντων ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ σύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὂν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὖ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ καθʼ ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ σύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶10] Str. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δʼ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν.

[¶11] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶12] Str. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὃ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὄν πῃ ταὐτὸν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὂν ἕτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατʼ ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.

[¶13] Theaet. Exactly so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶14] Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ γάρ, ὠγαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

[¶15] Theaet. Why so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶16] Str. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.

[¶17] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶18] 260. Str. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

> Greek: 260. ΞΕ. σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἐᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ μείγνυσθαι.

[¶19] Theaet. What was our object?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πρὸς δὴ τί;

[¶20] Str. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν· ἔτι δʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτʼ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφῃρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοί τʼ ἦμεν. ἀφῃρέθημεν δʼ ἄν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.

[¶21] Theaet. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε· λόγον δὲ διʼ ὅτι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.

[¶22] Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τῇδʼ ἑπόμενος ῥᾷστʼ ἂν μάθοις.

[¶23] Theaet. What line?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶24] Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὂν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὂν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.

[¶25] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶26] Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξῃ τε καὶ λόγῳ μείγνυται.

[¶27] Theaet. Why?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;

[¶28] Str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ μειγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθῆ πάντʼ εἶναι, μειγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.

[¶29] Theaet. So it is.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶30] Str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη.

[¶31] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶32] Str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.

[¶33] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶34] Str. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν δέ γε σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ τόπῳ καταπεφευγέναι μέν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μηδʼ εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαί τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχειν.

[¶35] Theaet. Yes, so it was.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.

[¶36] Str. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place.

> Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι· τάχα δʼ ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτʼ ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας.

[¶37] Str. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὂν ἀποδείξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.

[¶38] 261. Theaet. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences, and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

> Greek: 261. ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξένε, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατʼ ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθήρευτον εἴη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτʼ ἄλλο μετʼ ἐκεῖνο· καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεταί ποτε.

[¶39] Str. No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

> Greek: ΞΕ. θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὅ γʼ ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀπωσθείς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος ἄν ποτε ἕλοι πόλιν. νῦν δʼ ἐπεί, ὠγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ᾑρημένον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ἤδη ῥᾴω καὶ σμικρότερα.

[¶40] Theaet. Good.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.

[¶41] Str. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισώμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.

[¶42] Theaet. Very well.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶43] Str. Then let us now investigate names, just a we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ πῃ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

[¶44] Theaet. What do we need to understand about names?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον;

[¶45] Str. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρμόττει εἴτε μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.

[¶46] Theaet. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δʼ οὔ.

[¶47] Str. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι συναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.

[¶48] Theaet. How so, and what do you mean by that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτʼ εἶπας;

[¶49] Str. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.

[¶50] Theaet. How so?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶51] 262. Str. One called nouns, the other verbs.

> Greek: 262. ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.

[¶52] Theaet. Define each of them.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον.

[¶53] Str. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα ῥῆμά που λέγομεν.

[¶54] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶55] Str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.

[¶56] Theaet. Exactly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶57] Str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδʼ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

[¶58] Theaet. I do not understand that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἔμαθον.

[¶59] Str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι συνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

[¶60] Theaet. In what way?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶61] Str. For instance, “walks,” “runs,” “sleeps” and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οἷον βαδίζει τρέχει καθεύδει, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὔτʼ εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.

[¶62] Theaet. No, of course not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;

[¶63] Str. And again, when “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται λέων ἔλαφος ἵππος, ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὖ πραττόντων ὠνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδείς πω συνέστη λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτʼ ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδʼ ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δʼ ἥρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτός τε καὶ σμικρότατος.

[¶64] Theaet. What do you mean by that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς ἄρʼ ὧδε λέγεις;

[¶65] Str. When one says “a man learns,” you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῂς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;

[¶66] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[¶67] Str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

> Greek: ΞΕ. δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον ἀλλά τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλʼ οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

[¶68] Theaet. That was right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶69] Str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἥρμοττεν, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἁρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπηργάσατο.

[¶70] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶71] Str. Now there is another little point.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε.

[¶72] Theaet. What is it?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶73] Str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ᾖ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἀδύνατον.

[¶74] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶75] Str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;

[¶76] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶77] Str. Now let us pay attention to each other.

> Greek: ΞΕ. προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

[¶78] Theaet. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γοῦν.

[¶79] Str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which a action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον συνθεὶς πρᾶγμα πράξει διʼ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δʼ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, σύ μοι φράζειν.

[¶80] 263. Theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.

> Greek: 263. ΘΕΑΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

[¶81] Str. “Theaetetus sits.” It isn’t a long sentence, is it?

> Greek: ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;

[¶82] Theaet. No, it is fairly short.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.

[¶83] Str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.

[¶84] Theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.

[¶85] Str. And how about this sentence?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ ὅδʼ αὖ;

[¶86] Theaet. What one?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖος;

[¶87] Str. “Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.”

> Greek: ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος, ᾧ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.

[¶88] Theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτον οὐδʼ ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

[¶89] Str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

[¶90] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶91] Str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τούτων δὴ ποῖόν τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;

[¶92] Theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.

[¶93] Str. The true one states facts as they are about you.

> Greek: ΞΕ. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ.

[¶94] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶95] Str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.

[¶96] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶97] Str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ μὴ ὄντʼ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

[¶98] Theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχεδόν.

[¶99] Str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

[¶100] Theaet. To be sure.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

[¶101] Str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὃν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μέν, ἐξ ὧν ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτʼ ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.

[¶102] Theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. νυνδὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ συνωμολογήσαμεν.

[¶103] Str. And secondly it has a subject.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός.

[¶104] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶105] Str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.

> Greek: ΞΕ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.

[¶106] Theaet. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;

[¶107] Str. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μηδενὸς ⟨δέ⟩ γε ὢν οὐδʼ ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παράπαν· ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.

[¶108] Theaet. Quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα.

[¶109] Str. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

> Greek: ΞΕ. περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, ⟨λεγόμενα⟩ μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν [ὡς] ἔοικεν ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

[¶110] Theaet. Yes, very truly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

[¶111] Str. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθʼ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται;

[¶112] Theaet. How is it plain?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶113] Str. You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures and the several differences between them.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὧδʼ εἴσῃ ῥᾷον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτὰ τί ποτʼ ἔστιν καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.

[¶114] Theaet. Give me an opportunity.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δίδου μόνον.

[¶115] Str. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;

[¶116] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶117] Str. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;

[¶118] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶119] Str. And in speech we know there is just— Theaet. What?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνὸν— ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶120] Str. Affirmation and negation Theaet. Yes, we know that.

> Greek: ΞΕ. φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσμεν.

[¶121] 264. Str. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

> Greek: 264. ΞΕ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό;

[¶122] Theaet. Certainly not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς;

[¶123] Str. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅταν μὴ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ διʼ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἆρʼ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;

[¶124] Theaet. No.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶125] Str. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say “it seems” is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δʼ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ [τε] αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.

[¶126] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶127] Str. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

> Greek: ΞΕ. κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὑρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό;

[¶128] Theaet. Yes, I see.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κατανοῶ.

[¶129] Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν μηδʼ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμῶμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατʼ εἴδη διαιρέσεων.

[¶130] Theaet. What divisions?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποίων δή;

[¶131] Str. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

> Greek: ΞΕ. διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικήν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικήν.

[¶132] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶133] Str. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.

[¶134] Theaet. You are right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.

[¶135] Str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἴδωλον οὔτε φάντασμʼ εἴη τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι.

[¶136] Theaet. True.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

[¶137] Str. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

> Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δʼ οὖσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν.

[¶138] Theaet. Yes, it is possible.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγχωρεῖ.

[¶139] Str. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γʼ ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.

[¶140] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶141] Str. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

[¶142] 265. Theaet. Right.

> Greek: 265. ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶143] Str. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἠρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι;

[¶144] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶145] Str. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καί τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν ἐφαντάζεθʼ ἡμῖν;

[¶146] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶147] Str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

> Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα διαιρετέον πρώτην. ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποίησίς τίς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων· ἦ γάρ;

[¶148] Theaet. By all means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

[¶149] Str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον δύʼ ἔστω μέρη.

[¶150] Theaet. What are they?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποίω;

[¶151] Str. The divine and the human.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δʼ ἀνθρώπινον.

[¶152] Theaet. I don’t yet understand.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔπω μεμάθηκα.

[¶153] Str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ποιητικήν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατʼ ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι.

[¶154] Theaet. Yes, we remember.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μεμνήμεθα.

[¶155] Str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief— Theaet. What belief?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ζῷα δὴ πάντα θνητά, καὶ δὴ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τʼ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ συνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι— ΘΕΑΙ. ποίῳ τῳ;

[¶156] Str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης;

[¶157] Theaet. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαί σε κατά γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

[¶158] Str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μέν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρʼ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφʼ ἅπερ νῦν ἕλκεσθαι φῄς, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτʼ ἄν. ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τούτων ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων συνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον.

[¶159] Theaet. Quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.

[¶160] Str. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἑκατέραν αὖθις.

[¶161] Theaet. How?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;

[¶162] 266. Str. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

> Greek: 266. ΞΕ. οἷον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος.

[¶163] Theaet. Assume that it is done.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τετμήσθω.

[¶164] Str. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο δʼ αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα.

[¶165] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶166] Str. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὰ δέ γʼ ὡς ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν ἓν ἀφʼ ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὼ δʼ ὑπολοίπω σχεδὸν μάλιστʼ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποιικώ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ διαιρεῖται.

[¶167] Theaet. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε ὅπῃ ἑκατέρα αὖθις.

[¶168] Str. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. ἡμεῖς μέν που καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πεφυκότʼ ἐστίν, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα ἕκαστα· ἢ πῶς;

[¶169] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.

[¶170] Str. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τούτων δέ γε ἑκάστων εἴδωλα ἀλλʼ οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονίᾳ καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα.

[¶171] Theaet. What are they?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα;

[¶172] Str. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθʼ ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκʼ ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθὸν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται.

[¶173] Theaet. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἴδωλον ἑκάστῳ.

[¶174] Str. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆρʼ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τινʼ ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην;

[¶175] Theaet. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶176] Str. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο διττὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὖ ποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, [αὐτουργική], τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον [εἰδωλοποιική].

[¶177] Theaet. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἴδει· θείαν μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην κατὰ θάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

[¶178] Str. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἔμελλεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄντως ὂν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι φανείη πεφυκός.

[¶179] Theaet. Yes, there were.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

[¶180] Str. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καταριθμήσομεν αὐτὼ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἴδη δύο;

[¶181] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶182] 267. Str. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

> Greek: 267. ΞΕ. τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν δίχα.

[¶183] Theaet. How?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;

[¶184] Str. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν διʼ ὀργάνων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα.

[¶185] Theaet. What do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς φῄς;

[¶186] Str. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

> Greek: ΞΕ. ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληταί που.

[¶187] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶188] Str. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μιμητικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες ἀπονειμώμεθα· τὸ δʼ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες καὶ παρέντες ἑτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοῦναί τινʼ αὐτῷ.

[¶189] Theaet. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.

[¶190] Str. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

> Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι· διʼ ἃ δέ, σκόπει.

[¶191] Theaet. Please do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγε.

[¶192] Str. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δʼ οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν;

[¶193] Theaet. None.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν.

[¶194] Str. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδότων ἦν μίμημα; τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἄν τις μιμήσαιτο.

[¶195] Theaet. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶196] Str. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης συλλήβδην ἀρετῆς; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μέν, δοξάζοντες δέ πῃ, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσιν πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσιν τοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι;

[¶197] Theaet. Yes, there are very many such people.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί.

[¶198] Str. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

> Greek: ΞΕ. μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον;

[¶199] Theaet. Quite the opposite.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πᾶν.

[¶200] Str. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

> Greek: ΞΕ. μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν γε ἕτερον ἐκείνου λεκτέον οἶμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γιγνώσκοντος.

[¶201] Theaet. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶202] Str. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

> Greek: ΞΕ. πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατʼ εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετʼ ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν.

[¶203] Theaet. Agreed.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστω.

[¶204] Str. We mat therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

> Greek: ΞΕ. θατέρῳ τοίνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς μιμουμένοις δή.

[¶205] Theaet. Very true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶206] Str. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτʼ ἔχων τινά ἐστιν ἐν αὑτῷ.

[¶207] Theaet. Let us do so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶμεν.
ΞΕ. ἔχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐήθης αὐτῶν ἐστιν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει·

[¶208] 268. Str. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.
Theaet. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

> Greek: 268. τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένος ὧν εἴρηκας.

[¶209] Str. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἁπλοῦν μιμητήν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;

[¶210] Theaet. That is reaonable, at any rate.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκὸς γοῦν.

[¶211] Str. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τούτου δʼ αὖ τὸ γένος ἓν ἢ δύο φῶμεν;

[¶212] Theaet. That is your affair.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅρα σύ.

[¶213] Str. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

> Greek: ΞΕ. σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττὼ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ.

[¶214] Theaet. You are quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

[¶215] Str. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν;

[¶216] Theaet. Popular orator.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δημολογικόν.

[¶217] Str. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

> Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;

[¶218] Theaet. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is all imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μέν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δʼ ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.

[¶219] Str. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

> Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, τοὔνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπʼ ἀρχήν;

[¶220] Theaet. By all means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶221] Str. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

> Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλʼ ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τἀληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ.

[¶222] Theaet. Yes, he certainly will.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.