--- title: "Sophist · Σοφιστής" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 2 of 5 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Sophist · Σοφιστής, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/" --- # Sophist · Σοφιστής *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* The Eleatic Stranger hunts the sophist, and finds he must say what not-being is. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg007, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg007.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 2. Pages 227–237 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-sophist/2/#p-N [¶0] 227. Theaet. Very. > Greek: 227. καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ σύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν. ΘΕΑΙ. μάλα γε. [¶1] Str. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It endeavors to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honors them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire. > Greek: ΞΕ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα συμπάσας δυνάμεις ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει· μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα συνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχείρηκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἴ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν. [¶2] Theaet. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἴδη καθάρσεως, ἓν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὄν. [¶3] Str. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term. > Greek: ΞΕ. πάντων κάλλιστα. καί μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος αὖ τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν. [¶4] Theaet. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καθʼ ὁποῖʼ ἂν ὑφηγῇ πειράσομαί σοι συντέμνειν. [¶5] Str. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul? > Greek: ΞΕ. πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι; [¶6] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶7] Str. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere? > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν καθαρμός γʼ ἦν τὸ λείπειν μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ᾖ πού τι φλαῦρον. [¶8] Theaet. Yes, it was. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν. [¶9] Str. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification. > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα, καθʼ ὅσον ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα. [¶10] Theaet. Very properly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε. [¶11] Str. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul. > Greek: ΞΕ. δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον. [¶12] Theaet. What kinds? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα; [¶13] 228. Str. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity. > Greek: 228. ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δʼ οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. [¶14] Theaet. I do not understand. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔμαθον. [¶15] Str. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing? > Greek: ΞΕ. νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας; [¶16] Theaet. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδʼ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι. [¶17] Str. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption? > Greek: ΞΕ. πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν; [¶18] Theaet. No; I think it is nothing else. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν. [¶19] Str. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly? > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν γένος; [¶20] Theaet. Nothing else at all. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο. [¶21] Str. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; [¶22] Theaet. Yes, they are, decidedly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ σφόδρα γε. [¶23] Str. Yet they must all be naturally related. > Greek: ΞΕ. συγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύμπαντα γέγονεν. [¶24] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶25] Str. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul. > Greek: ΞΕ. στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν. [¶26] Theaet. Yes, quite right. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. [¶27] Str. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; ὅσʼ ⟨ἂν⟩ κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθʼ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνῃ, πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν; [¶28] Theaet. Evidently through disproportion. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. [¶29] Str. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν. [¶30] Theaet. Very much so. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σφόδρα γε. [¶31] Str. Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark. > Greek: ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπʼ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. [¶32] Theaet. Very true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶33] Str. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned. > Greek: ΞΕ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον. [¶34] Theaet. So it seems. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν. [¶35] Str. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν. [¶36] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶37] Str. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν. [¶38] Theaet. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νυνδὴ λέξαντος ἠμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν σύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον. [¶39] Str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not? > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἔν γε σώματι περὶ δύο παθήματε τούτω δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην; [¶40] Theaet. What are they? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνε τούτω; [¶41] 229. Str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine. > Greek: 229. ΞΕ. περὶ μὲν αἶσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον ἰατρική. [¶42] Theaet. That is clear. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεσθον. [¶43] Str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice? > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκῃ. [¶44] Theaet. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν. [¶45] Str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; περὶ σύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἄν; [¶46] Theaet. No, none. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεμίαν. [¶47] Str. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important? > Greek: ΞΕ. φέρε δή· διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἆρα ἓν μόνον γένος φατέον [εἶναι] ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω; σκόπει. [¶48] Theaet. I am thinking. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σκοπῶ. [¶49] Str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way. > Greek: ΞΕ. καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἄν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν. [¶50] Theaet. In what way? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ; [¶51] Str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὑτῆς τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἓν ἐφʼ ἑνὶ [γένει] τῶν αὑτῆς ἑκατέρῳ. [¶52] Theaet. Well, can you see what you are now looking for? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί οὖν; καταφανές πῄ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον; [¶53] Str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν. [¶54] Theaet. What is it? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖον δή; [¶55] Str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· διʼ οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν. [¶56] Theaet. True. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ. [¶57] Str. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given. > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι. [¶58] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶59] Str. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον; [¶60] Theaet. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οἶμαι μὲν [οὖν], ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν διʼ ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι. [¶61] Str. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name. > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἆρʼ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας. [¶62] Theaet. Yes, we must see about that. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν. [¶63] Str. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided. > Greek: ΞΕ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι. [¶64] Theaet. On what principle? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κατὰ τί; [¶65] Str. Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother. > Greek: ΞΕ. τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον. [¶66] Theaet. What shall we call each of these? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγομεν; [¶67] Str. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς μάλιστʼ ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι· [¶68] 230. Theaet. That is true. > Greek: 230. τὸ δʼ οὖν σύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικήν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν οὕτως. [¶69] Str. On the other hand, some appear to have convinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε, εἴξασί τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτʼ ἂν ἐθέλειν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὧν οἴοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν. [¶70] Theaet. They are quite right. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς γε νομίζοντες. [¶71] Str. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way. > Greek: ΞΕ. τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται. [¶72] Theaet. In what way? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνι δή; [¶73] Str. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more. > Greek: ΞΕ. διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἶθʼ ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταὐτὸν τιθέασι παρʼ ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. οἱ δʼ ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν [τε] ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησιν, πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον ἅπερ οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή. [¶74] Theaet. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἕξεων αὕτη. [¶75] Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful. > Greek: ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. [¶76] Theaet. Perfectly true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶77] Str. Well then, who are those who practise this art? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτῃ χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τίνας φήσομεν; [¶78] 231. I am afraid to say the sophists. Theaet. Why so? > Greek: 231. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι. ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή; [¶79] Str. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honor. > Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ μεῖζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας. [¶80] Theaet. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικέ γε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. [¶81] Str. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard. > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὅμως δὲ ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι τότε ὁπόταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν. [¶82] Theaet. No, probably not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν τό γε εἰκός. [¶83] Str. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλʼ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική. [¶84] Theaet. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λεγέσθω μέν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διισχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν. [¶85] Str. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler’s grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigor. > Greek: ΞΕ. εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλά τοι κἀκεῖνον ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς ἁπάσας μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ. [¶86] Theaet. You are right. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς λέγεις. [¶87] Str. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy. > Greek: ΞΕ. πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυόμενοι, φέρε, ὁπόσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ηὑρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής. [¶88] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶89] Str. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα. [¶90] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶91] Str. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge? > Greek: ΞΕ. τρίτον δὲ ἆρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη; [¶92] Theaet. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ⟨ἦν⟩. [¶93] Str. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation. > Greek: ΞΕ. ὀρθῶς ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος. [¶94] Theaet. Yes, he was. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν γὰρ οὖν. [¶95] Str. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning. > Greek: ΞΕ. τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μέν, ὅμως δʼ ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι. [¶96] Theaet. Very true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶97] 232. Str. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labors under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one? > Greek: 232. ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρός τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει; [¶98] Theaet. Something like that is very likely to be the case. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι. [¶99] Str. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly. > Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει διʼ ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλʼ ἀναλάβωμεν ⟨ἓν⟩ πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἓν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον. [¶100] Theaet. Which was it? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶101] Str. I think we said he was a disputer. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που. [¶102] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶103] Str. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι; [¶104] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶105] Str. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute? > Greek: ΞΕ. σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καί φασιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ πῃ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅσʼ ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἆρʼ ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δρᾶν; [¶106] Theaet. That is their reputation, at any rate. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γοῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα. [¶107] Str. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; [¶108] Theaet. Those are included, of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ; [¶109] Str. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὁπόταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων λέγηταί τι, σύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατούς; [¶110] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε. [¶111] Str. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δʼ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς; [¶112] Theaet. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις. [¶113] Str. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn. > Greek: ΞΕ. τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. [¶114] Theaet. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνῃ περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι. [¶115] Str. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things? > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἑτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή τις δύναμις ἔοικʼ εἶναι; [¶116] Theaet. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται γοῦν δὴ σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν. [¶117] Str. For heaven’s sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight. > Greek: ΞΕ. σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατὸν ἡγῇ τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον. [¶118] 233. Theaet. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question. > Greek: 233. ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. [¶119] Str. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things. > Greek: ΞΕ. εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν. [¶120] Theaet. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μακάριον μεντἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος. [¶121] Str. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows? > Greek: ΞΕ. πῶς οὖν ἄν ποτέ τις πρός γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν δύναιτʼ ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν; [¶122] Theaet. He cannot at all. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς. [¶123] Str. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί ποτʼ οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα; [¶124] Theaet. Magical power in what respect? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ δὴ πέρι; [¶125] Str. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you, would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects. > Greek: ΞΕ. καθʼ ὅντινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μηδὲν αὖ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτʼ ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι. [¶126] Theaet. Certainly not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σχολῇ μεντἄν. [¶127] Str. But now people do care to do so? > Greek: ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γʼ ἐθέλουσιν; [¶128] Theaet. Very much. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα. [¶129] Str. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute. > Greek: ΞΕ. δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἶμαι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν. [¶130] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶131] Str. And they do that about all things, do they not? > Greek: ΞΕ. δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν; [¶132] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶133] Str. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things. > Greek: ΞΕ. πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται. [¶134] Theaet. To be sure. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶135] Str. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible. > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη. [¶136] Theaet. Of course it is impossible. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον; [¶137] Str. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge. > Greek: ΞΕ. δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται. [¶138] Theaet. Certainly; and I shouldn’t be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι. [¶139] Str. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this. > Greek: ΞΕ. λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων. [¶140] Theaet. What sort of an example? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή; [¶141] Str. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question. > Greek: ΞΕ. τόδε. καί μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι. [¶142] Theaet. What is the question? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶143] Str. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things— Theaet. What do you mean by all things? > Greek: ΞΕ. εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδʼ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ συνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα— ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς πάντα εἶπες; [¶144] Str. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word “all.” > Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γʼ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ σύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις. [¶145] Theaet. No, I do not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. [¶146] Str. I mean you and me among the “all,” and the other animals besides, and the trees. > Greek: ΞΕ. λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ δένδρα. [¶147] Theaet. What do you mean? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις; [¶148] Str. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings. Theaet. What would he mean by “making”? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also. > Greek: ΞΕ. εἴ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν φαίη— ΘΕΑΙ. [¶149] 234. Str. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little. > Greek: 234. τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τινα· καὶ γὰρ ζῴων αὐτὸν εἶπες ποιητήν. ΞΕ. φημί, καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμπάντων· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἕκαστα πάνυ σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται. [¶150] Theaet. This is some joke of yours. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά. [¶151] Str. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερον ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον; [¶152] Theaet. Surely we must. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάντως που. [¶153] Str. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind? > Greek: ΞΕ. παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἤ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν; [¶154] Theaet. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς· πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἓν πάντα συλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον. [¶155] Str. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter’s art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do. > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τόν γʼ ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτιπερ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ. [¶156] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶157] Str. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἆρʼ οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναί τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ᾗ αὖ δυνατὸν ⟨ὂν⟩ [αὖ] τυγχάνει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὤτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντʼ εἶναι; [¶158] Theaet. Why should there not be such another art? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνη; [¶159] Str. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true? > Greek: ΞΕ. τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥᾴδια, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων; [¶160] Theaet. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι. [¶161] Str. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: > Greek: ΞΕ. τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δʼ οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστί τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει; [¶162] 235. Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue? Theaet. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment. > Greek: 235. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη σαφὲς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων ἐστί τις μερῶν εἷς. [¶163] Str. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator. > Greek: ΞΕ. γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα. [¶164] Theaet. Of course he must. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον; [¶165] Str. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἄγε δή, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτʼ ἀνεῖναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περιειλήφαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτʼ ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γε. [¶166] Theaet. What next thing? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶167] Str. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς. [¶168] Theaet. I agree to that opinion of him, too. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κἀμοὶ τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ συνδοκεῖ. [¶169] Str. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way. > Greek: ΞΕ. δέδοκται τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου, κἀκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν· ἐὰν δʼ ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηταί πῃ, συνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας ἀεὶ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύξηται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθʼ ἕκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον. [¶170] Theaet. You are right. That is what we must do. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον. [¶171] Str. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found. > Greek: ΞΕ. κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαιρέσεως ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητουμένην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθʼ ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι. [¶172] Theaet. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. σὺ δʼ ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν τίνε τὼ δύο λέγεις. [¶173] Str. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colors to each part. > Greek: ΞΕ. μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἔστι δʼ αὕτη μάλιστα ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται. [¶174] Theaet. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτʼ ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν; [¶175] Str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand. > Greek: ΞΕ. οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθʼ ὅτι σμικρότερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοιτʼ ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δʼ ἐγγύθεν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι. [¶176] 236. Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: 236. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶177] Str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not? > Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται; [¶178] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασί γε. [¶179] Str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not? > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκός γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν; [¶180] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶181] Str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making? > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικήν; [¶182] Theaet. It is to be so called. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κλητέον. [¶183] Str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavorable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance? > Greek: ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μηδʼ εἰκὸς ᾧ φησιν ἐοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἆρʼ οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, ἔοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα; [¶184] Theaet. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶185] Str. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation? > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ σύμπασαν μιμητικήν; [¶186] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; [¶187] Str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be “fantastic art,” would it not? > Greek: ΞΕ. τὴν δὴ φάντασμα ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργαζομένην τέχνην ἆρʼ οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν προσαγορεύοιμεν; [¶188] Theaet. By all means. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πολύ γε. [¶189] Str. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic. > Greek: ΞΕ. τούτω τοίνυν τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν. [¶190] Theaet. You are right. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς. [¶191] Str. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him. > Greek: ΞΕ. ὃ δέ γε καὶ τότʼ ἠμφεγνόουν, ⟨ἐν⟩ ποτέρᾳ τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσασθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλʼ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἁνὴρ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν. [¶192] Theaet. So it seems. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν. [¶193] Str. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent? > Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων σύμφης, ἤ σε οἷον ῥύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειθισμένον συνεπεσπάσατο πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ συμφῆσαι; [¶194] Theaet. What do you mean, and why did you say that? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο εἴρηκας; [¶195] Str. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction. > Greek: ΞΕ. ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντάπασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντάπασιν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν. [¶196] 237. Theaet. Why? > Greek: 237. ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή; [¶197] Str. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse: Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; But keep your mind from this way of investigation. So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it’s all the same to you. > Greek: ΞΕ. τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων— οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδʼ ἀφʼ ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα. παρʼ ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστά γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανισθείς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει. [¶198] Theaet. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι κἀμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε. [¶199] Str. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being? > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ δρᾶν ταῦτα. καί μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι; [¶200] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶201] Str. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question “To what is the designation ‘not-being’ to be applied?” how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object? > Greek: ΞΕ. μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλʼ εἰ σπουδῇ δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρὴ τοὔνομʼ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὄν, τί δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι; [¶202] Theaet. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. χαλεπὸν ἤρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἵῳ γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον. [¶203] Str. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term “not-being” cannot be applied to any being. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπί ⟨τι⟩ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ οἰστέον. [¶204] Theaet. Of course not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; [¶205] Str. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either. > Greek: ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι. [¶206] Theaet. How could it? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή; [¶207] Str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word “something” of some being, for to speak of “something” in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not? > Greek: ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ τὶ τοῦτο [ῥῆμα] ἐπʼ ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε· μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἦ γάρ; [¶208] Theaet. Yes, it is. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον. [¶209] Str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing? > Greek: ΞΕ. ἆρα τῇδε σκοπῶν σύμφης, ὡς ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν; [¶210] Theaet. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. [¶211] Str. And you will agree that “something” or “some” in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many. > Greek: ΞΕ. ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε τὶ φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τινὲ δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ τινὲς πολλῶν. [¶212] Theaet. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; [¶213] Str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing. > Greek: ΞΕ. τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν. [¶214] Theaet. Quite necessarily. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.