---
title: "Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος"
author: "Plato"
translator: "Harold North Fowler"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 1 of 6
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/1/
cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/1/"
---

# Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος

*Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler*

What is knowledge? Socrates, the midwife of ideas, tests three answers.

> Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg006, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg006.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Pages 142–153

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/1/#p-N

[¶0] 142. EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago? TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you. EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city. TERP. Where then? EU. As I was going down to the harbor I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth. TERP. Alive or dead? EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army. TERP. You mean the dysentery? EU. Yes. TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger! EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle. TERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara? EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived. TERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk? Could you relate it? EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand.

> Greek: 142. ΕΥ. ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; ΤΕΡ. ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατʼ ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἦ εὑρεῖν. ΕΥ. οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν. ΤΕΡ. ποῦ μήν; ΕΥ. εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε. ΤΕΡ. ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι; ΕΥ. ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι. ΤΕΡ. μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία; ΕΥ. ναί. ΤΕΡ. οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι. ΕΥ. καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεί τοι καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην. ΤΕΡ. καὶ οὐδέν γʼ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν; ΕΥ. ἠπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγʼ ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἤθελεν. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τούς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. ΤΕΡ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι; ΕΥ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος·

[¶1] 143. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down. TERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country. EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum, so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us. TERP. Very well. EU. Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as “and I said” or “and I remarked,” whenever Socrates spoke, or “he agreed or he did not agree,” in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them. TERP. That is quite fitting, Eucleides. EU. Come, boy, take the book and read.
SOC. If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

> Greek: 143. ἀλλʼ ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότʼ εὐθὺς οἴκαδʼ ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδόν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται. ΤΕΡ. ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἥκων. ΕΥ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινοῦ Θεαίτητον προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλʼ ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται. ΤΕΡ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. ΕΥ. τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὑτοῦ τε ὁπότε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷον καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἢ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ὅτι συνέφη ἢ οὐχ ὡμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα. ΤΕΡ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη. ΕΥ. ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἀνηρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δὲ ἧττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθʼ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιος γὰρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην.

[¶2] THEO. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don’t be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you.

> Greek: ΘΕΟ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι. νῦν δέ—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτʼ ἔχει.

[¶3] 144. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.
SOC. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

> Greek: 144. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὧν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον —καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ᾐσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν πρᾷον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρʼ ὁντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτʼ ἂν ᾠόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον· ἀλλʼ οἵ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ᾁττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πρᾳότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.
ΣΩ. εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν;

[¶4] THEO. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

> Greek: ΘΕΟ. ἀκήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί τέ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

[¶5] SOC. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth’s name I do not know.

> Greek: ΣΩ. γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιῶς Εὐφρονίου ἐστίν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγῇ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δʼ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

[¶6] THEO. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

> Greek: ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέναι. ἀλλʼ ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶7] SOC. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

> Greek: ΣΩ. γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

[¶8] THEO. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

> Greek: ΘΕΟ. ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

[¶9] SOC. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον· φησὶν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῷν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθʼ ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;

[¶10] THEAET. We should inquire.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐπεσκεψάμεθʼ ἄν.

[¶11] SOC. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθʼ ἄν, ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;

[¶12] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.

[¶13] SOC. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

> Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γʼ, οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν λέγει ἢ οὔ.

[¶14] 145. THEAET. I think we must.

> Greek: 145. ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι.

[¶15] SOC. Well, is Theodorus a painter?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

[¶16] THEAET. Not so far as I know.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.

[¶17] SOC. Nor a geometrician, either?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός;

[¶18] THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶19] SOC. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

[¶20] THEAET. I think so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

[¶21] SOC. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

[¶22] THEAET. Perhaps not.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως οὔ.

[¶23] SOC. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

[¶24] THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶25] SOC. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὥρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρός με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς σὲ νυνδή.

[¶26] THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ ὅρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν.

[¶27] SOC. That is not Theodorus’s way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν—πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψετʼ αὐτῷ—ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.

[¶28] THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

[¶29] SOC. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?

> Greek: ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα;

[¶30] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[¶31] SOC. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;

[¶32] THEAET. I try hard to do so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. προθυμοῦμαί γε δή.

[¶33] SOC. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά τε τούτου καὶ παρʼ ἄλλων οὓς ἂν οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε· ἆρʼ οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

[¶34] THEAET. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[¶35] SOC. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σοφίᾳ δέ γʼ οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

[¶36] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶37] SOC. And does this differ at all from knowledge?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

[¶38] THEAET. Does what differ?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;

[¶39] SOC. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

[¶40] THEAET. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;

[¶41] SOC. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

[¶42] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶43] SOC. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρʼ ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὅτι ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν.

[¶44] 146. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.
THEO. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

> Greek: 146. ἆρʼ οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δʼ ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι;
ΘΕΟ. ἥκιστα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδʼ αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδιδοῖεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ἀλλʼ ἐρώτα.

[¶45] SOC. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀκούεις δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ ἀπειθεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλʼ εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

[¶46] THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.

[¶47] SOC. Certainly, if we can.

> Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄνπερ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν.

[¶48] THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen’s arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἄν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νυνδὴ σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἑκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

[¶49] SOC. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

> Greek: ΣΩ. γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἓν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ.

[¶50] THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

[¶51] SOC. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say “cobblery” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

[¶52] THEAET. Nothing else.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν.

[¶53] SOC. And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

[¶54] THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

[¶55] SOC. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὁρίζεις;

[¶56] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶57] SOC. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γʼ ἐρωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

[¶58] THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

[¶59] 147. SOC. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters’ clay and the oven makers’ clay and the brickmakers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous?

> Greek: 147. ΣΩ. σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν;

[¶60] THEAET. Perhaps.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

[¶61] SOC. Yes in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say “clay,” no matter whether we add “the image-makers’” or any other craftsmen’s. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μέν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἴει τίς τι συνίησίν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστιν;

[¶62] THEAET. By no means.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶63] SOC. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

[¶64] THEAET. No.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γάρ.

[¶65] SOC. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.

> Greek: ΣΩ. σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

[¶66] THEAET. That is true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν οὕτως.

[¶67] SOC. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question “what is knowledge?” when we give the name of some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

> Greek: ΣΩ. γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτʼ ἐρωτηθείς.

[¶68] THEAET. So it seems.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶69] SOC. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say “clay is earth mixed with moisture” without regard to whose clay it is.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δʼ ὅτου ἐᾶν χαίρειν.

[¶70] THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

[¶71] SOC. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

[¶72] THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος [ἀποφαίνων] ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

[¶73] SOC. And did you find such a name?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ηὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

[¶74] THEAET. I think we did. But see if you agree.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

[¶75] SOC. Speak on.

> Greek: ΣΩ. λέγε.

[¶76] THEAET. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν.

[¶77] SOC. Well done!

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εὖ γε.

[¶78] THEAET. The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

[¶79] 148. SOC. Very good; and what next?

> Greek: 148. ΣΩ. κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

[¶80] THEAET. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ συμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

[¶81] SOC. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἄριστά γʼ ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι.

[¶82] THEAET. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους τε καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

[¶83] SOC. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἧττόν τι ἂν οἴει ἀληθῆ τόνδʼ ἐπαινέσαι;

[¶84] THEAET. Why, no.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.

[¶85] SOC. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων;

[¶86] THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. νὴ τὸν Δίʼ ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

[¶87] SOC. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

> Greek: ΣΩ. θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τὶ οἴου Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.

[¶88] THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. προθυμίας μὲν ἕνεκα, ὦ Σώκρατες, φανεῖται.

[¶89] SOC. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή—καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω—πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

[¶90] THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτʼ αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὔτʼ ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύῃ, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδʼ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.

[¶91] SOC. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labor, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὠδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλʼ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

[¶92] THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

[¶93] 149. SOC. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

> Greek: 149. ΣΩ. εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι ὑὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης;

[¶94] THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἤδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

[¶95] SOC. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρα καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας;

[¶96] THEAET. No, never.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς.

[¶97] SOC. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εὖ ἴσθʼ ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπῃς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

[¶98] THEAET. Yes, I have.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[¶99] SOC. Shall I tell you the reason then?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον;

[¶100] THEAET. Oh yes, do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶101] SOC. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾷον μαθήσῃ ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλʼ αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

[¶102] THEAET. Yes, certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

[¶103] SOC. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honoring them for their likeness to herself.

> Greek: ΣΩ. αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ διʼ ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

[¶104] THEAET. Very likely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός.

[¶105] SOC. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary, that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

[¶106] THEAET. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.

[¶107] SOC. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labor and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπᾴδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὂν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

[¶108] THEAET. That is true.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

[¶109] SOC. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skillful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ᾔσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;

[¶110] THEAET. I do not know that at all.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

[¶111] SOC. But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσθʼ ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης οἴει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

[¶112] THEAET. To the same art.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

[¶113] SOC. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἴει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδῆς;

[¶114] THEAET. It is not likely.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε.

[¶115] 150. SOC. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid matchmaking, through fear of falling under the charge of pandering. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

> Greek: 150. ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον συναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ᾗ δὴ προαγωγία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

[¶116] THEAET. It seems so.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

[¶117] SOC. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δʼ ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μή· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

[¶118] THEAET. Yes, I do.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.

[¶119] SOC. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labor, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant.
SOC. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more.

> Greek: ΣΩ. τῇ δέ γʼ ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δʼ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρʼ ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ παρʼ αὑτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπʼ ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον πρῳαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δʼ αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.

[¶120] 151. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men. Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife’s gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.
THEAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

> Greek: 151. ΣΩ. ὧν εἷς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί· οὕς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ʼκεῖναι· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἳ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι καί, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο· ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα· ὑποπτεύω σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τʼ εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσωμαι εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί με εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δʼ οὐχ οἷός τʼ εἶ, μηδέποτʼ εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅτι τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

[¶121] SOC. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη;

[¶122] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶123] SOC. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give.

> Greek: ΣΩ. κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλʼ ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας.

[¶124] 152. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is “the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not.” You have read that, I suppose?
THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.

> Greek: 152. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

[¶125] SOC. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you —you and I being “man”?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ;

[¶126] THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

[¶127] SOC. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

> Greek: ΣΩ. εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῷ, ὁ δʼ οὔ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

[¶128] THEAET. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶129] SOC. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold or shall we accept Protagoras’s saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

> Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ;

[¶130] THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶131] SOC. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἑκατέρῳ;

[¶132] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶133] SOC. But “seems” denotes perceiving?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

[¶134] THEAET. It does.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστιν γάρ.

[¶135] SOC. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

> Greek: ΣΩ. φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

[¶136] THEAET. Apparently.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶137] SOC. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.

> Greek: ΣΩ. αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.

[¶138] THEAET. So it seems.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.

[¶139] SOC. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in secret to his pupils.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ᾐνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

[¶140] THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

[¶141] SOC. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say “are”—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line
0ceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother,
has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don’t you think he means that?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλʼ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδʼ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτʼ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ⟨ὃς⟩ εἰπών—
Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν
πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

[¶142] THEAET. I think he does.
SOC. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.

[¶143] 153. THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

> Greek: 153. ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

[¶144] SOC. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

> Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἆλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός;

[¶145] THEAET. Yes, they are.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. αὗται μὲν οὖν.

[¶146] SOC. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

> Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζῴων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

[¶147] THEAET. Of course.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;

[¶148] SOC. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ σῴζεται;

[¶149] THEAET. Yes.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.

[¶150] SOC. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δʼ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

[¶151] THEAET. Certainly.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα.

[¶152] SOC. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?

> Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοὐναντίον;

[¶153] THEAET. Apparently.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.

[¶154] SOC. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by “the golden chain” refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα σῴζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, [ἀναγκάζω] προσβιβάζω τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ᾖ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σῴζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματʼ ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτʼ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

[¶155] THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.

[¶156] SOC. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the color that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδʼ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ τινʼ αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

[¶157] THEAET. But what do you mean?

> Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πῶς;

[¶158] SOC. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other color whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call color will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual.

> Greek: ΣΩ. ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός·