--- title: "Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος" author: "Plato" translator: "Harold North Fowler" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Philosophy" section: 6 of 6 url: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/6/ cite: "Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler, Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος, section 6. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/6/" --- # Theaetetus · Θεαίτητος *Plato, tr. Harold North Fowler* What is knowledge? Socrates, the midwife of ideas, tests three answers. > Greek: ed. John Burnet, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0059.tlg006, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Harold North Fowler, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0059.tlg006.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 6. Pages 199–210 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/6/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plato-theaetetus/6/#p-N [¶0] THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον. [¶1] SOC. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις; [¶2] THEAET. I will agree. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. [¶3] SOC. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. [¶4] THEAET. What disaster? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶5] SOC. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα. [¶6] THEAET. How so? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή; [¶7] SOC. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant. > Greek: ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει. [¶8] THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δʼ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. [¶9] SOC. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὃ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ μέν, φῄς, δοξάσει. [¶10] 200. the man who catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it? THEAET. Yes. > Greek: 200. ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶11] SOC. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. [¶12] THEAET. Certainly not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ; [¶13] SOC. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται. [¶14] THEAET. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶15] SOC. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην. [¶16] THEAET. Evidently. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον. [¶17] SOC. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, “Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?” What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν [αὐτὴν] εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δʼ οὔ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα; [¶18] THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know what to say. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν. [¶19] SOC. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν. [¶20] THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι. [¶21] SOC. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω; [¶22] THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς. [¶23] SOC. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least. > Greek: ΣΩ. λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν; [¶24] THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. [¶25] SOC. What one? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶26] THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται. [¶27] SOC. The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: “The result itself will show;” and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχʼ ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν. [¶28] 201. but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing. THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation. > Greek: 201. ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν. [¶29] SOC. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό. [¶30] THEAET. How so? What profession is it? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη; [¶31] SOC. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock, satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; [¶32] THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν. [¶33] SOC. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ πεῖσαι δʼ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι; [¶34] THEAET. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶35] SOC. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν; [¶36] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶37] SOC. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτʼ ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι. [¶38] THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δʼ ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δʼ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. [¶39] SOC. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διῄρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν. [¶40] THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μεντἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμʼ ἄν. [¶41] SOC. Listen then, while I relate it to you—“a dream for a dream.” I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; SO. for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. ΣΩ. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθʼ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθʼ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. [¶42] 202. Indeed, not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different? THEAET. That was it exactly. > Greek: 202. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον οὐδʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλʼ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον—ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν—τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δʼ οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν. [¶43] SOC. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; [¶44] THEAET. Precisely. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. [¶45] SOC. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν; [¶46] THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν. [¶47] SOC. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἓν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. [¶48] THEAET. What point? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή; [¶49] SOC. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν. [¶50] THEAET. Is that not right? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; [¶51] SOC. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα. [¶52] THEAET. What examples? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα δή; [¶53] SOC. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν; [¶54] THEAET. No; those are what he had in view. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ εἰς ταῦτα. [¶55] 203. SOC. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not? > Greek: 203. ΣΩ. βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἆρʼ αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; [¶56] THEAET. I suppose so. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως. [¶57] SOC. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; “Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?” What would you reply? > Greek: ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί· ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι ΣΩ; τί ἀποκρινῇ; [¶58] THEAET. I should say “S and O.” > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. [¶59] SOC. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς; [¶60] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. [¶61] SOC. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον. [¶62] THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δʼ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδʼ ὁντινοῦν. [¶63] SOC. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης. [¶64] THEAET. I think we have. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαινόμεθα. [¶65] SOC. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἆρʼ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; [¶66] THEAET. Probably. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γε. [¶67] SOC. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; [¶68] THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. [¶69] SOC. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; [¶70] THEAET. Of course. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; [¶71] SOC. He knows, that is, the S and the O. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γιγνώσκει. [¶72] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶73] SOC. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἑκάτερον ἄρʼ ἀγνοεῖ καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; [¶74] THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες. [¶75] SOC. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished! > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται. [¶76] THEAET. And very suddenly, too. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης. [¶77] SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων. [¶78] THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γʼ ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως ἔχοι. [¶79] SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory. > Greek: ΣΩ. σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον. [¶80] THEAET. No, we must not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. [¶81] 204. SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things. > Greek: 204. ΣΩ. ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. [¶82] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶83] SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. [¶84] THEAET. How so? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή; [¶85] SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅτι οὗ ἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; [¶86] THEAET. Yes, I do. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. [¶87] SOC. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἑκάτερον; [¶88] THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον. [¶89] SOC. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον. [¶90] THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δεῖ γε δή. [¶91] SOC. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος; [¶92] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶93] SOC. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθʼ ὅτι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δὶς τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν; [¶94] THEAET. Of the same. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ αὐτό. [¶95] SOC. That is, of six? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ; [¶96] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν. [¶97] SOC. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐφʼ ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα ἓξ εἰρήκαμεν; [¶98] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶99] SOC. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all? > Greek: ΣΩ. πᾶν δʼ οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες; [¶100] THEAET. Assuredly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη. [¶101] SOC. That is, of six? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ; [¶102] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν. [¶103] SOC. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular? > Greek: ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα; [¶104] THEAET. Apparently. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται. [¶105] SOC. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν· ἦ γάρ; [¶106] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶107] SOC. And of the furlong likewise. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως. [¶108] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶109] SOC. And the number of the army is the same as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὂν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν. [¶110] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶111] SOC. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη ἐστίν; [¶112] THEAET. No. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν. [¶113] SOC. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη; [¶114] THEAET. Evidently. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται. [¶115] SOC. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὡμολόγηται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται. [¶116] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. [¶117] SOC. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ ὅλον ἄρʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάντα ὂν μέρη. [¶118] THEAET. That seems to be true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. [¶119] SOC. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole? > Greek: ΣΩ. μέρος δʼ ἔσθʼ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου; [¶120] THEAET. Yes, of the all. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τοῦ παντός γε. [¶121] 205. SOC. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting? > Greek: 205. ΣΩ. ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχῃ. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν; [¶122] THEAET. Necessarily. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη. [¶123] SOC. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὗ δʼ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό; [¶124] THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον. [¶125] SOC. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται; [¶126] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε. [¶127] SOC. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them? > Greek: ΣΩ. πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι; [¶128] THEAET. It does. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. [¶129] SOC. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα; [¶130] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶131] SOC. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί δʼ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλʼ ἄττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γʼ ἐκείνης; [¶132] THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόριʼ ἄττʼ αὐτῆς συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπʼ ἄλλα ἰέναι. [¶133] SOC. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept. > Greek: ΣΩ. παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. [¶134] THEAET. I agree. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν. [¶135] SOC. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression “be” or “this,” because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable? > Greek: ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τἆλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ; [¶136] THEAET. I remember. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνημαι. [¶137] SOC. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην. [¶138] THEAET. There is no other to be seen. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. [¶139] SOC. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα; [¶140] THEAET. Yes, unquestionably. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶141] SOC. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή ἐστιν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δʼ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη. [¶142] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα. [¶143] SOC. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. [¶144] THEAET. I cannot dispute it. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. [¶145] SOC. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not. > Greek: ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον. [¶146] THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα. [¶147] 206. SOC. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read? > Greek: 206. ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ; τοὐναντίον λέγοντος ἆρʼ οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει; [¶148] THEAET. What experience? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; [¶149] SOC. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. [¶150] THEAET. That is very true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [¶151] SOC. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; [¶152] THEAET. Yes, that is all true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο. [¶153] SOC. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧν μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθʼ αὐτόν. [¶154] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. [¶155] SOC. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα διʼ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. [¶156] THEAET. No, we must not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν. [¶157] SOC. Now what are we intended to understand by “rational explanation”? I think it means one of three things. > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. [¶158] THEAET. What are they? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τίνων δή; [¶159] SOC. The first would be making one’s own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort? > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; [¶160] THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν. [¶161] SOC. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται. [¶162] THEAET. True. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ. [¶163] SOC. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements. > Greek: ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ. [¶164] 207. THEAET. As for example, Socrates? > Greek: 207. ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶165] SOC. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, “a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon.” Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say “wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.” > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθʼ ἁμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλʼ ἀγαπῷμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν. [¶166] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶167] SOC. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἴοιτʼ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον· τὸ δʼ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη. [¶168] THEAET. Yes, it was. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἐρρήθη γάρ. [¶169] SOC. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα. [¶170] THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; [¶171] SOC. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question. > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχῃ τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵνʼ αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν. [¶172] THEAET. Certainly I accept it. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι. [¶173] SOC. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another? > Greek: ΣΩ. πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ; [¶174] THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε. [¶175] SOC. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατʼ ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά; [¶176] THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἆρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν; [¶177] SOC. That is what I mean. > Greek: ΣΩ. ταῦτα λέγω. [¶178] THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας. [¶179] SOC. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing “Theaetetus” thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write “Theodorus” thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names? > Greek: ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἆρʼ ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν; [¶180] 208. THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge. > Greek: 208. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι. [¶181] SOC. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables? > Greek: ΣΩ. κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν; [¶182] THEAET. No, nothing. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν γε. [¶183] SOC. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write “Theaetetus” with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἑξῆς γράφῃ; [¶184] THEAET. Evidently. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον δή. [¶185] SOC. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion? > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὤν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὥς φαμεν; [¶186] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶187] SOC. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation. > Greek: ΣΩ. λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν. [¶188] THEAET. True. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ. [¶189] SOC. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὔπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. [¶190] THEAET. There is not much doubt about it. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει. [¶191] SOC. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ΣΩ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὁριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου. [¶192] THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἴδωλον, τὸ δʼ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις; [¶193] SOC. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. [¶194] THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν; [¶195] SOC. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth. > Greek: ΣΩ. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν. [¶196] THEAET. Certainly. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [¶197] SOC. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs. > Greek: ΣΩ. λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψῃ· ἕως δʼ ἂν κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ. [¶198] THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. [¶199] SOC. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὃς δʼ ἂν μετʼ ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής. [¶200] THEAET. That is what we affirm. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω. [¶201] SOC. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it. > Greek: ΣΩ. νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφειστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί μοι λέγεσθαι. [¶202] THEAET. What do you mean? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτο; [¶203] 209. SOC. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion. > Greek: 209. ΣΩ. φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον. [¶204] THEAET. Yes. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶205] SOC. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference. > Greek: ΣΩ. λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία. [¶206] THEAET. It was. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. [¶207] SOC. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἡνίκʼ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ; [¶208] THEAET. Apparently not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικε. [¶209] SOC. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men. > Greek: ΣΩ. τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει. [¶210] THEAET. You must have been. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη. [¶211] SOC. For heaven’s sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought “That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth” and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians, as the saying is? > Greek: ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν; θὲς γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ᾖ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; [¶212] THEAET. Of course not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. τί γάρ; [¶213] SOC. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι; [¶214] THEAET. Not at all. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδέν. [¶215] SOC. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρʼ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται—καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ—ἥ με, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ. [¶216] THEAET. Very true. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα. [¶217] SOC. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance? > Greek: ΣΩ. περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι. [¶218] THEAET. At any rate, it seems so. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεταί γε. [¶219] SOC. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction. > Greek: ΣΩ. τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ᾗ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις. [¶220] THEAET. How so? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς; [¶221] SOC. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this plan the twirling of a scytale or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man’s giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened. > Greek: ΣΩ. ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ. [¶222] THEAET. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago? > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. εἰπὲ δὴ τί νυνδὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου; [¶223] SOC. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not? > Greek: ΣΩ. εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμʼ ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστιν· [¶224] 210. THEAET. Yes. > Greek: 210. ἦ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. [¶225] SOC. Then, it seems, if asked, “What is knowledge?” our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη κατʼ ἐκεῖνον. [¶226] THEAET. So it seems. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν. [¶227] SOC. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge. > Greek: ΣΩ. καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετʼ ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετʼ ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη. [¶228] THEAET. Apparently not. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν. [¶229] SOC. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything? > Greek: ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; [¶230] THEAET. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me. > Greek: ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δίʼ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα. [¶231] SOC. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing? THEAET. It does, decidedly. > Greek: ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. [¶232] SOC. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are today and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair. And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again. > Greek: ΣΩ. ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάντε γίγνῃ, βελτιόνων ἔσῃ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάντε κενὸς ᾖς, ἧττον ἔσῃ βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασιν· τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν ἥν με γέγραπται· ἕωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.