---
title: "Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/"
---

# Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos

*Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin*

The Stoics claim to follow common sense; Plutarch shows how far they fall from it.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg138, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg138.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Sections 1–14](https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1.md)
2. [Sections 15–27](https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2.md)
3. [Sections 28–38](https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/3.md)
4. [Sections 39–50](https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/4.md)

## 1. Sections 1–14

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/#p-N

[¶0] 1. LAMPRIAS. You, O Diadumenus, seem not much to care, if any one thinks that you philosophize against the common notions; since you confess that you contemn also the senses, from whence the most part of these notions in a manner proceed, having for their seat and foundation the belief of such things as appear to us. But I beseech you, with what speed you can, either by reasons, incantations, or some other manner of discourse, to cure me, who come to you full, as I seem to myself, of great and strange perturbations; so much have I been shaken, and into such a perplexity of mind have I been brought, by certain Stoics, in other things indeed very good men and my familiar friends, but most bitterly and hostilely bent against the Academy. These, for some few words modestly spoken by me, have (for I will tell you no lie) rudely and unkindly reprehended me; angrily reputing and branding the ancient philosophers as sophisters and corrupters of students of philosophy, and subverters of regular doctrines; and saying things yet more absurd than these, they fell at last upon the conceptions, into which (they maintained) the Academics had brought a certain confusion and disturbance. At length one of them said, that he thought it was not by fortune, but by the providence of the Gods, that Chrysippus came into the world after Arcesilaus and before Carneades; of which the one was the author of the contumelies and injuries done to custom, and the other flourished most of all the Academics. Chrysippus then, coming between them, by his writings against Arcesilaus, stopped also the way against the eloquence of Carneades, leaving indeed many things to the senses, as provisions against a siege, but wholly taking away the trouble about anticipations and conceptions, directing every one of them and putting it in its proper place; so that they who will again embroil and disquiet matters should accomplish nothing, but be convinced of being malicious and deceitful sophisters. I, having been this morning set on fire by these discourses, want some cooling remedies to extinguish and take away this doubting, as an inflammation, out of my mind.

> Greek: 1. ΛΑΜΠΡΙΑΣ. σοὶ μὲν εἰκός, ὦ Διαδούμενε, μὴ πάνυ μέλειν, εἴ τινι δοκεῖτε παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐννοίας ὁμολογοῦντί γε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων περιφρονεῖν, ἀφʼ ὧν σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται γεγόνασιν ἔννοιαι, τήν γε περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πίστιν ἕδραν ἔχουσαι καὶ ἀσφάλειαν. ἐμὲ δὲ πολλῆς, ὣς γʼ ἐμαυτῷ φαίνομαι, καὶ ἀτόπου μεστὸν ἥκοντα ταραχῆς εἴτε τισὶ λόγοις εἴτʼ ἐπῳδαῖς εἴτʼ ἄλλον ἐπίστασαι τρόπον παρηγορίας οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἰατρεύων οὕτω σοι διασέσεισμαι καὶ γέγονα μετέωρος ὑπὸ Στωικῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα βελτίστων καὶ νὴ Δία συνήθων καὶ φίλων, πικρῶς δʼ ἄγαν ἐγκειμένων τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ καὶ ἀπεχθῶς· οἵ γε πρὸς μικρὰ καὶ μετʼ αἰδοῦς τὰ παρʼ ἐμοῦ λεχθέντα σεμνῶς, οὐ γὰρ ψεύσομαι, οὐ πράως ᾐτιάσαντο· τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μετʼ ὀργῆς σοφιστὰς καὶ λυμεῶνας τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ δογμάτων ὁδῷ βαδιζόντων καὶ δε ξομμιινιβης νοτιτιις. ἀνατροπέας καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα λέγοντες καὶ νομίζοντες τέλος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ἐρρύησαν, ὡς δή τινα σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀναδασμὸν αὐταῖς ἐπάγοντας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημείας. εἶτά τις εἶπεν αὐτῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλʼ ἐκ προνοίας θεῶν νομίζοι μετʼ Ἀρκεσίλαον καὶ πρὸ Καρνεάδου γεγονέναι Χρύσιππον, ὧν ὁ μὲν ὑπῆρξε τῆς εἰς τὴν συνήθειαν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ὁ δʼ, ἤνθησε μάλιστα τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν· Χρύσιππος οὖν ἐν μέσῳ γενόμενος, ταῖς πρὸς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀντιγραφαῖς καὶ τὴν Καρνεάδου δεινότητα ἐνέφραξε, πολλὰ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλιπὼν ὥσπερ εἰς πολιορκίαν βοηθήματα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας τάραχον ἀφελὼν παντάπασι καὶ διορθώσας ἑκάστην καὶ θέμενος εἰς οἰκεῖον· ὥστε καὶ τοὺς αὖθις ἐκκρούειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι βουλομένους μηδὲν περαίνειν ἀλλʼ ἐλέγχεσθαι κακουργοῦντας καὶ σοφιζομένους. ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἐγὼ λόγων διακεκαυμένος ἕωθεν σβεστηρίων δέομαι, καθάπερ τινὰ φλεγμονὴν ἀφαιρούντων τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ.

[¶1] 2. DIADUMENUS. You perhaps have suffered the same things with some of the vulgar. But if you believe the poets, who say that the ancient city Sipylus was overthrown by the providence of the Gods when they punished Tantalus, believe also the companions of the Stoa saying that Nature, not by chance but by divine providence, brought forth Chrysippus, when she had a mind to turn things upside down and alter the course of life; for which purpose never any man was fitter than he. But as Cato said of Caesar, that never any but he came to the management of public affairs sober and considerately resolved on the ruin of the state; so does this man seem to me with the greatest diligence and eloquence to overturn and demolish custom, as they who magnify the man testify, when they dispute against him concerning the sophism called Pseudomenos (or the Liar). For to say, my best friend, that a conclusion drawn from contrary positions is not manifestly false, and again to say that some arguments having true premises and true inductions may yet moreover have the contrary to their conclusions true, what conception of demonstration or what presumption of faith does it not overthrow? They say, that the polypus in the winter gnaws his own claws; but the logic of Chrysippus, taking away and cutting off its own chiefest parts and principles,—what other notion has it left unsuspected of falsehood? For the superstructures cannot be steady and sure, if the foundations remain not firm but are shaken with so many doubts and troubles. But as those who have dust or dirt upon their bodies, if they touch or rub the filth that is upon them, seem rather to increase than remove it; so some men blame the Academics, and think them guilty of the faults with which they show themselves to be burdened. For who do more pervert the common conceptions than the Stoics? But if you please, let us leave accusing them, and defend ourselves from the things with which they charge us.

> Greek: 2. ὅμοια πολλοῖς ἴσως πέπονθας. εἰ δʼ οἱ ποιηταί σε πείθουσι, λέγοντες ὡς ἐκ θεῶν προνοίας ἀνατροπὴν ἔσχεν ἡ παλαιὰ Σίπυλος τὸν Τάνταλον κολαζόντων, πείθου τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἑταίροις, ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππον οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλʼ ἐκ προνοίας ἡ φύσις ἤνεγκεν, ἄνω τὰ κάτω καὶ τοὔμπαλιν ἀνατρέψαι δεομένη τὸν βίον· ὡς οὐ γέγονε πρὸς τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων οὐδεὶς εὐφυέστερος, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὁ Κάτων ἔλεγε πρὸ Καίσαρος ἐκείνου μηδένα νήφοντα μηδὲ φρονοῦντα ἐπὶ συγχύσει τῆς πολιτείας τοῖς δημοσίοις προσελθεῖν πράγμασιν, οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μετὰ πλείστης ἐπιμελείας καὶ δεινότητος οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀνατρέπειν καὶ καταβάλλειν τὴν συνήθειαν, ὡς ἐνιαχοῦ καὶ αὐτοὶ μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τὸν ἄνδρα σεμνύνοντες, ὅταν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου μάχωνται. τὸ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, συμπεπλεγμένον τι διʼ ἀντικειμένων μὴ φάναι ψεῦδος εὐπόρως εἶναι, λόγους δὲ πάλιν αὖ φάναι τινὰς ἀληθῆ τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς ὑγιεῖς ἔχοντας ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἔχειν ἀληθῆ, ποίαν ἔννοιαν ἀποδείξεως ἢ τίνα πίστεως οὐκ ἀνατρέπει πρόληψιν; τὸν μέν γε πολύποδά φασι τὰς πλεκτάνας αὑτοῦ περιβιβρώσκειν ὥρᾳ χειμῶνος, ἡ δὲ Χρυσίππου διαλεκτικὴ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὑτῆς ἀναιροῦσα καὶ περικόπτουσα τίνα τῶν ἄλλων ἐννοιῶν ἀπολέλοιπεν ἀνύποπτον; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε δήπου καὶ τὰ ἐποικοδομούμενα μὴ βέβαια κεῖσθαι καὶ πάγια, τῶν πρώτων μὴ μενόντων ἀπορίας δὲ καὶ ταραχὰς ἐχόντων τηλικαύτας. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οἱ πηλὸν ἢ κονιορτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοντες τὸν ἁπτόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ προσαναχρωννύμενον οὐ κινεῖν ἀλλὰ προσβάλλειν τὸ τραχῦνον δοκοῦσιν· οὕτως ἔνιοι τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς αἰτιῶνται καὶ νομίζουσι τὰς αἰτίας παρέχειν ὧν ἀναπεπλησμένους ἀποδεικνύουσιν αὐτούς· ἐπεὶ τάς γε κοινὰς ἐννοίας τίνες μᾶλλον διαστρέφουσιν; εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὸ κατηγορεῖν ἐκείνων ἀφέντες, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἀπολογησώμεθα.

[¶2] 3. LAMPRIAS. Methinks, Diadumenus, I am this day become a various and unconstant man. For erewhile I came dejected and trembling, as one that wanted an apology; and now I am changed to an accuser, and desire to enjoy the pleasure of revenge, in seeing them all convicted of philosophizing against the common conceptions and presumptions, from which they think chiefly their doctrine is derived, whence they say that it alone agrees with Nature. DIADUMENUS. Shall we then first attack those common and celebrated doctrines of theirs which themselves, gently admitting their absurdity, style paradoxes; as that only wise men are kings, that they only are rich and fair, they only citizens and judges? Or shall we send all this to the brokers, as old decayed frippery, and make our enquiry into such things as are most practical and with the greatest earnestness delivered by them? LAMPRIAS. I indeed like this best. For who is there that is not already full of the arguments brought against those paradoxes?

> Greek: 3. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ τήμερον, ὦ Διαδούμενε, ποικίλος τις ἄνθρωπος γεγονέναι καὶ παντοδαπός· ἄρτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογίας δεόμενος προσῄειν ταπεινὸς καὶ τεθορυβημένος· νῦν δὲ μεταβάλλομαι πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν καὶ βούλομαι ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ἀμύνης, ἐλεγχομένους εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιδών, τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφʼ ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνα … δοκοῦσι, καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιβόητα βαδιστέον, ἃ δὴ παράδοξα καὶ αὐτοὶ μετʼ εὐκολίας δεχόμενοι τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπονομάζουσι, τοὺς μόνους βασιλεῖς καὶ μόνους πλουσίους καὶ καλοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πολίτας; καὶ δικαστὰς; μόνους; ἢ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἑώλων καὶ ψυχρῶν ἀγορὰν βούλει παρῶμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα πραγματικοῖς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένοις ποιησώμεθα τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἐξετασμόν; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἥδιον οὕτως· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα γενομένων ἐλέγχων τίς οὐκ ἤδη διάπλεώς ἐστιν;

[¶3] 4. DIADUMENUS. First then consider this, whether, according to the common conceptions, they can be said to agree with Nature, who think all natural things indifferent, and esteem neither health, vigorousness of body, beauty, nor strength as desirable, commodious, profitable, or any way contributary to the completing of natural perfection; nor believe that their contraries, as maims, pains, disgraces, and diseases, are hurtful or to be shunned? To the latter of these they themselves say that Nature gives us an abhorrence, and an inclination to the former. Which very thing is not a little repugnant to common understanding, that Nature should incline us to such things as are neither good nor available, and avert us from such as are neither ill nor hurtful, and which is more, that she should render this inclination and this aversion so violent, that they who either possess not the one or fall into the other detest their life with good reason, and withdraw themselves out of it.

> Greek: 4. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἤδη τοίνυν αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκόπει πρῶτον, εἰ κατὰ τὰς κοινάς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει τοὺς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα νομίζοντας, καὶ μήτʼ ὑγίειαν μήτʼ εὐεξίαν μήτε κάλλος μήτʼ ἰσχὺν ἡγουμένους αἱρετὰ μήδʼ ὠφέλιμα μηδὲ λυσιτελῆ μηδὲ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος· μήτε τἀναντία φευκτὰ καὶ βλαβερά, πηρώσεις ἀλγηδόνας αἴσχη νόσους· ὧν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πρὸς ἃ μὲν ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς ἃ δʼ οἰκειοῦν ἡμᾶς τὴν φύσιν· εὖ μάλα καὶ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὄντος, οἰκειοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ συμφέροντα μηδʼ ἀγαθὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ κακὰ μηδὲ βλάπτοντα· καὶ ὃ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, οἰκειοῦν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν, ὥστε τῶν μὲν μὴ τυγχάνοντας τοῖς δὲ περιπίπτοντας, εὐλόγως ἐξάγειν τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν βίον ἀπολέγεσθαι.

[¶4] 5. DIADUMENUS. I think also that this is said by them against common sense, that Nature herself is indifferent, and yet that it is good to agree with Nature. For it is not our duty either to follow the law or be persuaded by argument, unless the law and argument be good and honest. And this indeed is the least of their errors. But if, as Chrysippus has written in his First Book concerning Exhortation, a happy life consists only in living according to virtue, other things (as he says) being nothing to us, nor co-operating any ways towards it, Nature is not only indifferent, but foolish also and stupid, in inclining us to such things as belong nothing to us; and we also are fools in thinking felicity to be an agreeing with Nature, which draws us after such things as contribute nothing to happiness. For what can be more agreeable to common sense, than that, as desirable things are requisite to live commodiously, so natural things are necessary that we may live according to Nature? Now these men say not so; but having settled the living according to Nature for their end, do nevertheless hold those things which are according to Nature to be indifferent.

> Greek: 5. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. νομίζω δʼ ἐγὼ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν λέγεσθαι, τὸ τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον. οὐδὲ τῷ κατακολουθεῖν ἀστεῖον οὐδὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι σπουδαῖον, εἰ σπουδαῖος εἴη καὶ ἀστεῖος ὁ νόμος καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔλαττον εἰ δέ, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι γέγραφεν, ἐν τῷ κατʼ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων, φησίν, οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδʼ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων οὐ μόνον οὔκ ἐστιν ἀδιάφορος ἡ φύσις, ἀλλʼ ἀνόητος καὶ ἀπόπληκτος, οἰκειοῦσα ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἀνόητοι δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐδαιμονίαν ἡγούμενοι τὸ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγούσῃ πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν συνεργοῦντα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ καθάπερ τὰ αἱρετὰ πρὸς τὸ ὠφελίμως, οὕτω τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ δʼ οὐχ οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν τέλος εἶναι τιθέμενοι τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

[¶5] 6. DIADUMENUS. Nor is this less repugnant to common sense, that an intelligent and prudent man should not be equally affected to equal good things, but should put no value on some, and be ready to undergo and suffer any thing for others, though the things themselves are neither greater nor less one than another. For they say, It is the same thing to abstain from the enjoyment of an old woman that has one foot in the grave, and … since in both cases we do what duty requires. And yet for this, as a great and glorious thing, they should be ready to die; when as to boast of the other would be shameful and ridiculous. And even Chrysippus himself in his commentary concerning Jupiter, and in the Third Book of the Gods, says, that it were a poor, absurd, and impertinent thing to glory in such acts, as proceeding from virtue, as bearing valiantly the stinging of a wasp, or abstaining chastely from an old woman that lies a dying. Do not they then philosophize against the common conception, who profess nothing to be more commendable than those things which yet themselves are ashamed to praise? For how can that be desirable or to be approved, which is worthy neither of praise nor admiration, but the praisers and admirers of which they esteem absurd and ridiculous?

> Greek: 6. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι τὸ ἔννουν καὶ φρόνιμον ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἐπίσης ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ τίθεσθαι, τῶν δʼ ἕνεκα πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπομεῖναι καὶ παθεῖν, μηδὲν ἀλλήλων μικρότητι καὶ μεγέθει διαφερόντων ταὐτὸ δὲ λέγουσιν αὐτοί που τῷ … τὸ σωφρόνως δυσθανατῶσαν ἀποτρίψασθαι πρεσβῦτιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀμφότεροι κατορθοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὡς; λαμπρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κἂν ἀποθάνοιεν ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ σεμνύνειν ἑαυτὸν αἰσχύνη καὶ γέλως, λέγει δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς συγγράμματι καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ψυχρὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀλλότριον τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς συμβαινόντων ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι δῆγμα μυίας ἀνδρείως ὑπέμεινε καὶ δυσθανατώσης γραὸς ἀπέσχετο σωφρόνως. ἆρʼ οὖν παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἔννοιαν, ἃς αἰσχύνονται πράξεις ἐπαινεῖν, μηδὲν τούτων κάλλιον ὁμολογοῦντες; ποῦ γὰρ αἱρετὸν ἢ πῶς ἀποδεκτόν, ὃ μήτʼ ἐπαινεῖν μήτε θαυμάζειν ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας ἢ θαυμάζοντας ἀτόπους καὶ ψυχροὺς νομίζουσιν;

[¶6] 7. DIADUMENUS. And yet this will (I suppose) appear to you more against common sense, that a wise man should take no care whether he enjoys or not enjoys the greatest good things, but should carry himself after the same manner in these things, as in those that are indifferent and in their management and administration. For all of us, “whoever we are that eat the fruit of the spacious earth,” judge that desirable, good, and profitable, which being present we use, and absent we want and desire. But that which no man thinks worth his concern, either for his profit or delight, is indifferent. For we by no other means distinguish a laborious man from a trifler, who is for the most part also employed in action, but that the one busies himself in useless matters and indifferently, and the other in things commodious and profitable. But these men act quite contrary; for with them, a wise and prudent man, being conversant in many comprehensions and memories of comprehension, esteems few of them to belong to him; and not caring for the rest, he thinks he has neither more or less by remembering that he lately had the comprehension of Dion sneezing or Theon playing at ball. And yet every comprehension in a wise man, and every memory having assurance and firmness, is a great, yea, a very great good. When therefore his health fails, when some organ of his senses is disordered, or when his wealth is lost, is a wise man so careless as to think that none of these things concern him? Or does he, “when sick, give fees to the physicians: for the gaining of riches sail to Leucon, governor in the Bosphorus, or travel to Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians,” as Chrysippus says? And being deprived of some of his senses, does he not grow weary even of life? How then do they not acknowledge that they philosophize against the common notions, employing so much care and diligence on things indifferent, and recking not whether they have or have not great good things?

> Greek: 7. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, οἶμαι, φανεῖταί σοι παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν, εἰ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ὁ φρόνιμος μήτʼ ἀπόντων μήτʼ εἰ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ φροντίζοι, ἀλλʼ οἷός ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ τῇ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείᾳ καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ, τοιοῦτος ἂν κἀν τούτοις εἴη. πάντες γὰρ δήπουθεν εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, οὗ μὲν καὶ παρόντος ὄνησίς ἐστι καὶ μὴ παρόντος ὥσπερ ἔνδεια καὶ ὄρεξις, αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον νοοῦμεν· ἐφʼ ᾧ δʼ οὐδὲν ἄν τις πραγματεύσαιτο μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκεν μηδὲ ῥᾳστώνης, τοῦτʼ ἀδιάφορον. ἄλλῳ γὰρ οὐδενὶ τοῦ φιλοπόνου τὸν κενόσπουδον ἀφορίζομεν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὄντα πολλάκις, ἢ τῷ τὸν μὲν εἰς ἀνωφελῆ πονεῖν καὶ ἀδιαφόρως, τὸν δʼ ἕνεκά του τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ λυσιτελῶν. ἀλλʼ οὗτοί γε τοὐναντίον· ὁ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτοῖς καὶ φρόνιμος ἐν πολλαῖς καταλήψεσι καὶ μνήμαις καταλήψεων γεγονὼς ὀλίγας πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡγεῖται τῶν τʼ ἄλλων οὐ πεφροντικὼς οὐδʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οῦδὲ πλέον οἴεται, μνημονεύων ὅτι πέρυσι κατάληψιν ἔλαβε πταρνυμένου Δίωνος ἢ σφαιρίζοντος Θέωνος. καίτοι πᾶσα κατάληψις ἐν τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μνήμη τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχουσα καὶ βέβαιον εὐθύς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα καὶ μέγιστον. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁμοίως ὑγιείας ἐπιλειπούσης, αἰσθητηρίου κάμνοντος, οὐσίας ἀπολλυμένης ἀφρόντιστός ἐστι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲν ἡγούμενος τούτων ὁ σοφός· ἢ νοσῶν μὲν ἰατροῖς τελεῖ μισθοὺς χρημάτων δʼ ἕνεκα πρὸς Λεύκωνα πλεῖ τὸν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ δυνάστην καὶ πρὸς Ἰδάνθυρσον ἀποδημεῖ τὸν Σκύθην ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, τῶν δʼ αἰσθήσεων ἔστιν ἃς ἀποβαλὼν οὐδὲ ζῆν ὑπομένει; πῶς οὖν οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις τοσαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι καὶ σπουδάζοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ μεγάλων καὶ παρόντων καὶ μὴ παρόντων ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντες;

[¶7] 8. DIADUMENUS. But this is also yet against the common conceptions, that he who is a man should not rejoice when coming from the greatest evils to the greatest goods. Now their wise men suffer this. Being changed from extreme viciousness to the highest virtue, and at the same time escaping a most miserable life and attaining to a most happy one, he shows no sign of joy, nor does this so great change lift him up or yet move him, being delivered from all infelicity and vice, and coming to a certain sure and firm perfection of virtue. This also is repugnant to common sense, to maintain that the being immutable in one’s judgments and resolutions is the greatest of goods, and yet that he who has attained to the height wants not this, nor cares for it when he has it, nay, many times will not so much as stretch forth a finger for this security and constancy, which nevertheless themselves esteem the sovereign and perfect good. Nor do the Stoics say only these things, but they add also this to them,—that the continuance of time increases not any good thing; but if a man shall be wise but a minute of an hour, he will not be any way inferior in happiness to him who has all his time practised virtue and led his life happily in it. Yet, whilst they thus boldly affirm these things, they on the contrary also say, that a short-lived virtue is nothing worth; “For what advantage would the attainment of wisdom be to him who is immediately to be swallowed up by the waves or tumbled down headlong from a precipice? What would it have benefited Lichas, if being thrown by Hercules, as from a sling into the sea, he had been on a sudden changed from vice to virtue?” These therefore are the positions of men who not only philosophize against the common conceptions but also confound their own, if the having been but a little while endued with virtue is no way short of the highest felicity, and at the same time nothing worth.

> Greek: 8. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστίν, ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ χαίρειν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀγαθοῖς; γενόμενον τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθεν ὁ τούτων σοφός. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄκρας κακίας μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν ἀθλιώτατον βίον διαφυγὼν ἅμα καὶ κτησάμενος τὸν μακαριώτατον οὐδὲν ἐπίδηλον εἰς χαρὰν ἔσχεν οὐδʼ ἐπῆρεν αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ἐκίνησεν ἡ τοσαύτη μεταβολή, κακοδαιμονίας ἀπαλλαγέντα καὶ μοχθηρίας ἁπάσης, εἰς δʼ ἀσφαλῆ τινα καὶ βεβαίαν παντέλειαν ἀγαθῶν ἐξικόμενον. ἔτι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν μὲν εἶναι μέγιστον τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ βέβαιον, δεῖσθαι δὲ τούτου τὸν ἐπʼ ἄκρον προκόπτοντα μηδὲ φροντίζειν παραγενομένου πολλάκις δὲ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι ταύτης γʼ ἕνεκα τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ βεβαιότητος, ἣν τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα νομίζουσιν. οὐ μόνον οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνα πρὸς τούτοις, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγιγνόμενος, ἀλλά, κἂν ἀκαρές τις ὥρας γένηται φρόνιμος, οὐδενὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπολειφθήσεται τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα χρωμένου τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μακαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ καταβιοῦντος. ταῦτα δʼ οὕτω νεανικῶς ἀπισχυρισάμενοι πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασιν ἀρετῆς ὄφελος ὀλιγοχρονίου τί γάρ, ἂν μέλλοντι ναυαγεῖν εὐθὺς ἢ κατακρημνίζεσθαι φρόνησις ἐπιγένηται; τί δʼ ἂν ὁ Λίχας, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἀποσφενδονώμενος, εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐκ κακίας μεταβάλῃ ταῦτʼ οὖν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστὶ φιλοσοφούντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας κυκώντων, εἰ τὸ βραχὺν χρόνον κτήσασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐθὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἄκρας εὐδαιμονίας ἅμα καὶ μηδενὸς ὅλως ἄξιον νομίζουσι.

[¶8] 9. DIADUMENUS. Nor is this the strangest thing you will find in their doctrine; but their being of opinion that virtue and happiness, when present, are frequently not perceived by him who enjoys them, nor does he discern that, having but a little before been most miserable and foolish, he is of a sudden become wise and happy. For it is not only childish to say that he who is possessed of wisdom is ignorant of this thing alone, that he is wise, and knows not that he is delivered from folly; but, to speak in general, they make goodness to have very little weight or strength, if it does not give so much as a feeling of it when it is present. For according even to them, it is not by nature imperceptible; nay, even Chrysippus in his books of the End expressly says that good is sensible, and demonstrates it also, as he thinks. It remains then, that by its weakness and littleness it flies the sense, when being present it is unknown and concealed from the possessors. It were moreover absurd to imagine that the sight, perceiving those things which are but a little whitish or inclining to white, should not discern such as are white in perfection; or that the touch, feeling those things which are but warm or moderately hot, should be insensible of those that are hot in the highest degree. And yet more absurd it is, that a man who perceives what is commonly according to Nature —as are health and good constitution of body—should yet be ignorant of virtue when it is present, which themselves hold to be most of all and in the highest degree according to Nature. For how can it but be against sense, to conceive the difference between health and sickness, and yet so little to comprehend that between wisdom and folly as to think the one to be present when it is gone, and possessing the other to be ignorant that one has it? Now because there is from the highest progress a change made to felicity and virtue, one of these two things must of necessity follow; either that this progress is not vice and infelicity, or that virtue is not far distant from vice, nor happiness from misery, but that the difference between good and evil is very small and not to be perceived by sense; for otherwise they who have the one for the other could not be ignorant of it.

> Greek: 9. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα θαυμάσαις αὐτῶν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι, τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγιγνομένης, πολλάκις οὐδʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται, διαλεληθέναι δʼ αὑτόν, ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἔχοντά τινα τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦτο μόνον μὴ φρονεῖν ὅτι φρονεῖ μηδὲ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν διαπέφευγεν εὐτράπελόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὡς εἰπεῖν τάγαθὸν ἀρρεπὲς ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀμαυρόν, εἰ μηδʼ αἴσθησιν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ παραγενόμενον. φύσει γὰρ ἀνεπαίσθητον οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ αὐτούς ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγει διαρρήδην Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τέλους αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τάγαθόν· ὡς δʼ οἴεται, καὶ ἀποδείκνυσι. λείπεται τοίνυν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ μικρότητι διαφεύγειν αὐτὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὁπόταν παρὸν ἀγνοῆται καὶ διαλανθάνῃ τοὺς ἔχοντας. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄτοπον μέν ἐστι τὴν τῶν ἀτρέμα λευκῶν καὶ μέσως αἰσθανομένην ὄψιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ ἐπʼ ἄκρον λευκὰ καὶ τὴν τὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως θερμὰ καταλαμβάνουσαν ἁφὴν ἀναισθητεῖν τῶν σφόδρα θερμῶν ἀτοπώτερον δέ, εἴ τις τὸ κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν, οἷόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια καὶ εὐεξία, καταλαμβάνων, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγνοεῖ παροῦσαν, ἣν μάλιστα καὶ ἄκρως κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τίθενται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου διαφορὰν καταλαμβάνειν, φρονήσεως δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀπηλλαγμένην οἴεσθαι παρεῖναι, τὴν δὲ κεκτημένον ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάρεστιν; ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας προκοπῆς μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετήν, δυεῖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον, ἢ τὴν προκοπὴν κακίαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ κακοδαιμονίαν, ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς κακίας μὴ πολλῷ παραλλάττειν μηδὲ τῆς κακοδαιμονίας τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ μικρὰν καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διαφορὰν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς διελάνθανον ἀντʼ ἐκείνων ταῦτ̓ ἔχοντες.

[¶9] 10. DIADUMENUS. Since then they will not depart from any of these contrarieties, but confess and hold them all,—that those who are proceeding towards virtue are fools and vicious, that those who are become good and wise perceive not this change in themselves, and that there is a great difference between folly and wisdom,—they must surely seem to you wonderfully to preserve an agreement in their doctrines, and yet more so in their actions, when affirming all men who are not wise to be equally wicked, unjust, faithless, and fools, they on the other side abhor and detest some of them,—nay, sometimes to such a degree that they refuse even to speak to them when they meet them,—while others of them they trust with their money, choose to offices, and take for husbands to their daughters. Now if they say these things in jest, let them smooth their brows; but if in earnest and as philosophers, it is against the common notions to reprove and blame all men alike in words, and yet to deal with some of them as moderate persons and with others as very wicked; and exceedingly to admire Chrysippus, to deride Alexinus, and yet to think neither of them more or less mad than the other. “’Tis so,” say they; “but as he who is not above a cubit under the superficies of the sea is no less drowned than he who is five hundred fathom deep, so they that are coming towards virtue are no less in vice than those that are farther off. And as blind men are still blind, though they shall perhaps a little after recover their sight; so these that have proceeded towards virtue, till such time as they have attained to it, continue foolish and wicked.” But that they who are in the way towards virtue resemble not the blind, but such as see less clearly, nor are like to those who are drowned, but—those which swim, and that near the harbor,—they themselves testify by their actions. For they would not use counsellors and generals and lawgivers as blind guides, nor would they imitate the works and actions and words and lives of some, if they saw them all equally drowned in folly and wickedness. But leaving this, wonder at the men in this behalf, that they are not taught by their own examples to give up the doctrine that these men are wise being ignorant of it themselves, and neither knowing nor being sensible that they are recovered from being drowned and see the light, and that being gotten above vice, they fetch breath again.

> Greek: 10. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς ἐκστῆναι τῶν μαχομένων ἀλλὰ πάνθʼ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τιθέναι θέλωσι, τὸ τοὺς προκόπτοντας ἀνοήτους καὶ κακοὺς εἶναι, τὸ φρονίμους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς γενομένους διαλανθάνειν ἑαυτούς, τὸ μεγάλην διαφορὰν τῆς φρονήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀφροσύνην ὑπάρχειν· ἦ πού σοι δοκοῦσι θαυμασίως ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι τὴν ὁμολογίαν βεβαιοῦν; ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὅταν πάντας ἐπίσης κακοὺς καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀπίστους καὶ ἄφρονας τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς ἀποφαίνοντες εἶτα πάλιν τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκτρέπωνται καὶ βδελύττωνται, τοὺς δʼ ἀπαντῶντες μηδὲ προσαγορεύωσι· τοῖς δὲ χρήματα πιστεύωσιν, ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζωσιν, ἐκδιδῶσι θυγατέρας. ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ μὲν παίζοντες λέγουσι, καθείσθωσαν τὰς ὀφρῦς· εἰ δʼ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες, παρὰ τὰς κοινάς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ψέγειν μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ κακίζειν πάντας ἀνθρώπους, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὡς μετρίοις τοῖς δʼ ὡς κακίστοις· καὶ Χρύσιππον μὲν ὑπερεκπεπλῆχθαι καταγελᾶν δʼ Ἀλεξίνου, μηδὲν δὲ μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι μηδʼ ἧττον ἀλλήλων ἀφραίνειν τοὺς ἄνδρας. ναί φασίν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυιὰς πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδʼ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι, κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες, ἄχρι οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τυφλοῖς· ἐοίκασιν οἱ προκόπτοντες ἀλλʼ ἧττον ὀξυδορκοῦσιν, οὔτε πνιγομένοις ἀλλὰ νηχομένοις, καὶ ταῦτα πλησίον λιμένος, αὐτοὶ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μαρτυροῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐχρῶντο συμβούλοις καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ νομοθέταις ὥσπερ τυφλοῖς χειραγωγοῖς, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐζήλουν ἔργα καὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ βίους ἐνίων, εἰ πάντας ὡσαύτως πνιγομένους ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης καὶ μοχθηρίας ἑώρων. ἀφεὶς δὲ τοῦτο θαύμασον ἐκείνῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ μηδὲ ι· τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδάσκονται παραδείγμασι προέσθαι τοὺς διαλεληθότας ἐκείνους σοφοὺς καὶ μὴ συνιέντας μηδʼ αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι πνιγόμενοι πέπαυνται καὶ φῶς ὁρῶσι καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐπάνω γεγονότες ἀναπεπνεύκασι.

[¶10] 11. DIADUMENUS. This also is against common sense, that it should be convenient for a man who has all good things, and wants nothing requisite to felicity and happiness, to make away himself; and much more this, that for him who neither has nor ever shall have any good thing, but who is and ever shall be accompanied with all adversities, difficulties, and mishaps, it should not be fitting to quit this life unless some of the indifferent things befall him. These laws are enacted in the Stoa; and by these they incite many wise men to kill themselves, as if they would be thereby more happy; and they restrain many foolish men, as if it were fitting for them to live on in wretchedness. Although the wise man is fortunate, blessed, every way happy, secure, and free from danger; but the vicious and foolish man is “full, as I may say, of evils, so that there is not room to put them in;” and yet they think that continuing in life is fit for the latter, and departing out of it for the former. And not without cause, says Chrysippus, for we are not to measure life by good things or evil, but by those that are according to Nature. In this manner do they maintain custom, and philosophize according to the common conceptions. What do you say?—that he who enters upon a deliberation of life and death has no right to consider “What good or ill in his own house there is;” or to weigh, as in a balance, what things have the greatest sign of serving to felicity or infelicity; but must argue whether he should live or die from those things which are neither profitable nor prejudicial, and follow such principles and sentences as command the choosing of a life full of all things to be avoided, and the shunning of one which wants nothing of all those things that are desirable? For though it is an absurd thing, friend Lamprias, to shun a life in which there is no evil, it is yet more absurd, if any one should leave what is good because he is not possessed of what is indifferent, as these men do who leave present felicity and virtue for want of riches and health which they have not. “Saturnian Jove from Glaucus took his wits,” when he went about to change his suit of golden armor for a brazen one, and to give what was worth a hundred oxen for that which was worth but nine. And yet the brazen armor was no less useful for fight than the golden; whereas beauty and health of body, as the Stoics say, contribute not the least advantage as regards happiness. And yet they seek health in exchange for wisdom. For they say, it would well enough have become Heraclitus and Pherecydes to have parted with their virtue and wisdom, if the one of them could have thereby been freed from his lousy disease, and the other from his dropsy; and if Circe had used two sorts of magical drinks, one to make wise men fools, and the other to make fools wise, Ulysses would rather have drunk that of folly, than have changed his shape for the form of a beast, though having with it wisdom, and consequently also happiness. And, they say, wisdom itself dictates to them these things, exhorting them thus: Let me go, and value not my being lost, if I must be carried about in the shape of an ass. But this, some will say, is an ass-like wisdom which teacheth thus; if indeed to be wise and enjoy felicity is good, and to wear the shape of an ass is indifferent. They say, there is a nation of the Ethiopians where a dog reigns, is called king, and has all regal honors and services done to him; but men execute the offices of magistrates and governors of cities. Do not the Stoics act in the very same manner? They give the name and appearance of good to virtue, saying that it alone is desirable, profitable, and available; but in the mean time they act these things, they philosophize, they live and die, as at the command of things indifferent. And yet none of the Ethiopians kill that dog; but he sits in state, and is revered by all. But these men destroy and corrupt their virtue, that they may obtain health and riches.

> Greek: 11. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστι μηδʼ ἔσται, τὰ δεινὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ παρέσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον, ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ νομοθετεῖται, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐξάγουσι τῶν σοφῶν ὡς ἄμεινον εὐδαιμονοῦντας πεπαῦσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ κατέχουσι τῶν φαύλων ὡς καθήκοντος αὐτοῖς ζῆν κακοδαιμονοῦντας. καίτοι ὁ μὲν σοφὸς ὄλβιος μακάριος πανευδαίμων ἀσφαλὴς ἀκίνδυνος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ἀνόητος οἷος εἰπεῖν γέμων κακῶν δὴ κοὐκέτʼ ἔσθʼ ὅπου τεθῇ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις μονὴν οἴονται καθήκουσαν εἶναι κἀκείνοις ἐξαγωγήν. εἰκότως δέ φησὶ Χρύσιππος οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς δεῖ παραμετρεῖσθαι τὸν βίον ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. οὕτως ἄνθρωποι σῴζουσι τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦσι. τί λέγεις; οὐ δεῖ σκοπεῖν ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τʼ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται τὸν περὶ βίου καὶ θανάτου σκοπούμενον, οὐδʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἐξετάζειν ἐπιζήμια μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλιμα ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν μήτʼ ὠφελούντων μήτε βλαπτόντων τοὺς εἰ βιωτέον ἢ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι λογισμούς; οὐ μέλλει πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ἀρχὰς καθηκόντως αἱρεῖσθαὶ τε τὸν βίον, ᾧ τῶν φευκτῶν οὐδὲν ἄπεστι, καὶ φεύγειν, πάντα τὰ αἱρετὰ πάρεστι; καίτοι παράλογον μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ φεύγειν τὸν βίον ἐν μηδενὶ κακῷ γενομένους· παραλογώτερον δέ, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνων τις τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου τάγαθὸν ἀφίησιν· ὅπερ οὗτοι ποιοῦσι, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν προϊέμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν παροῦσαν ἀνθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ ὁλοκληρίας, ὧν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν. ἔνθʼ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, ὅτι χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοια ἐννεαβοίων ἔμελλε διαμείψεσθαι. καίτοι τὰ μὲν χάλκεα τῶν ὅπλων οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὰ χρυσᾶ παρεῖχε χρείαν μαχομένοις, εὐπρέπεια δὲ σώματος καὶ ὑγίεια τοῖς Στωικοῖς οὔτε χρείαν οὔτʼ ὄνησίν τινα φέρει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὗτοι τῆς φρονήσεως ἀντικαταλλάττονται τὴν ὑγίειαν. καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτῳ φασὶ καὶ Φερεκύδῃ καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὥστε παύσασθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας· καὶ τῆς Κίρκης ἐγχεούσης δύο φάρμακα, τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν ἄφρονας ἐκ φρονίμων τὸ δʼ ὅνους φρονίμους ἑξ ἀφρόνων ἀνθρὡπων, οὐκ τὸν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πιεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς θηρίου μορφὴν τὸ εἶδος, ἔχοντα τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρονήσεως δηλονότι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; καὶ ταῦτά φασιν αὐτὴν ὑφηγεῖσθαι καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι τὴν φρόνησιν ἄφες με καὶ καταφρόνησον ἀπολλυμένης ἐμοῦ καὶ διαφθειρομένης εἰς ὄνου πρόσωπον. ἀλλʼ ὄνου γε, φήσει τις, ἡ τοιαῦτα παραγγέλλουσα φρόνησίς ἐστιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν φρονεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ δʼ ὄνου περιφέρειν πρόσωπον ἀδιάφορον. ἔθνος εἶναί φασιν Αἰθιόπων, ὅπου κύων βασιλεύει καὶ βασιλεὺς προσαγορεύεται καὶ γέρα καὶ τιμὰς ἔχει βασιλέως, ἄνδρες; δὲ πράσσουσιν ἅπερ ἡγεμόσι πόλεων προσήκει καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ἆῤ οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ὁμοίως τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τἀγαθοῦ πάρεστι τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μόνην ταύτην αἱρετὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ συμφέρον καλοῦσι, πράττουσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ ζῶσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ προστάγματος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων; καίτοι τὸν κύνα μὲν ἐκεῖνον οὐδεὶς Αἰθιόπων ἀποκτίννυσιν, ἀλλὰ σεμνῶς κάθηται προσκυνούμενος· οὗτοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπολλύουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαφθείρουσι, τῆς ὑγιείας περιεχόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας.

[¶11] 12. DIADUMENUS. But the corollary which Chrysippus himself has given for a conclusion to his doctrines seems to free us from the trouble of saying any thing more about it. For there being, says he, in Nature some things good, some things bad, and some things between them both, which we call indifferent; there is no man but would rather have the good than the indifferent, and the indifferent than the bad. And of this we call the Gods to witness, begging of them by our prayers principally the possession of good things, and if that may not be, deliverance from evil; not desiring that which is neither good nor bad instead of good, but willing to have it instead of evil. But this man, changing Nature and inverting its order, removes the middle out of its own place into the last, and brings back the last into the middle,—not unlike to those tyrants who give the first place to the wicked,—and he gives us a law, first to seek the good, and secondly the evil, and lastly to judge that worst which is neither good nor evil; as if any one should place infernal things next to celestial, thrusting the earth and earthly things into Tartarus,
Where very far from hence, deep under ground,
Lies a vast gulf.
Having therefore said in his Third Book of Nature, that it is more expedient for a fool to live than not, though he should never attain to wisdom, he adds these words: “For such are the good things of men, that even evil things do in a manner precede other things that are in the middle place; not that these things themselves really precede, but reason, with which we should choose rather to live, though we were to be fools.” Therefore also, though we were to be unjust, wicked, hated of the Gods, and unhappy; for none of these things are absent from those that live foolishly. Is it then convenient rather to live miserably than not to live miserably, and better to be hurt than not hurt, to be unjust than not unjust, to break the laws than not to break them? That is, is it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live even against duty? Yes indeed, for it is worse to want sense and reason than to be a fool. What then ails them, that they will not confess that to be evil which is worse than evil? Why do they say that folly alone is to be avoided, if it is not less but rather more convenient to shun that disposition which is not capable of folly?

> Greek: 12. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔοικε δʼ ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν τοῦ περὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείονα λέγειν ὁ κολοφὼν αὐτὸς, ὃν ὁ Χρύσιππος τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐπιτέθεικεν. ὄντων γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δὲ κακῶν τῶν δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ καὶ καλουμένων ἀδιαφόρων, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, ὃς οὐ βούλεται τἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον ἢ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δήπου ποιούμεθα μάρτυρας, αἰτούμενοι ταῖς εὐχαῖς παρʼ αὐτῶν μάλιστα μὲν κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, κακῶν ἀποφυγήν, τὸ δὲ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντὶ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ μὴ θέλοντες ἔχειν ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ θέλοντες. ὁ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐναλλάττων καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἀναστρέφων ἐκ τῆς μέσης χώρας τὸ μέσον εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην μετατίθησι, τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον εἰς τὴν μέσην ἐπανάγει καὶ μετοικίζει, καθάπερ οἱ τύραννοι τοῖς κακοῖς προεδρίαν διδοὺς καὶ νομοθετῶν πρῶτον διώκειν τάγαθὸν δεύτερον δὲ τὸ κακόν, ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ χείριστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις μετὰ τὰ οὐράνια τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου τιθείη, τὴν δὲ γῆν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἀπώσειε τῆλε μάλʼ, ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέρεθρον. εἰπὼν οὖν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα ἢ μὴ βιοῦν, κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν· ἔστι δʼ οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος μεθʼ οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ ἄφρονες; ἐσόμεθα δῆλον οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄδικοι, καὶ παράνομοι καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακοδαίμονες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεστι τούτων τοῖς ἀφρόνως βιοῦσιν. ἐπιβάλλει τοίνυν κακοδαιμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ παρανομεῖν ἢ μὴ παρανομεῖν; τουτέστιν ἐπιβάλλει τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα ποιεῖν καὶ καθήκει ζῆν καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. ναί χεῖρον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι τοῦ ἀφραίνειν εἶτα τί παθόντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι κακόν, ὃ τοῦ κακοῦ χεῖρόν ἐστι; διὰ τί φευκτὸν ἀποφαίνουσι μόνον τὴν ἀφροσύνην, εἰ οὐχ ἧττον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιβάλλον ἐστὶ φεύγειν τὴν μὴ δεχομένην τὸ ἀφραίνειν διάθεσιν;

[¶12] 13. DIADUMENUS. But who can complain of this, that shall remember what he has written in his Second Book of Nature, declaring that vice was not unprofitably made for the universe? But it is meet I should set down his doctrine in his own words, that you may understand in what place those rank vice, and what discourses they hold of it, who accuse Xenocrates and Speusippus for not reckoning health indifferent and riches useless. “Vice,” saith he, “has its limit in reference to other accidents. For it is also in some sort according to the reason of Nature, and (as I may so say) is not wholly useless in respect of the universe; for otherwise there would not be any good.” Is there then no good among the Gods, because there is no evil? And when Jupiter, having resolved all matter into himself, shall be alone, other differences being taken away, will there then be no good, because there will be no evil? But is there melody in a choir though none in it sings faultily, and health in the body though no member is sick: and yet cannot virtue have its existence without vice? But as the poison of a serpent or the gall of an hyena is to be mixed with some medicines, was it also of necessity that there must have been some conjunction of the wickedness of Meletus with the justice of Socrates, and the dissolute demeanor of Cleon with the probity of Pericles? And could not Jupiter have found a means to bring into the world Hercules and Lycurgus, if he had not also made for us Sardanapalus and Phalaris? It is now time for them to say that the consumption was made for the sound constitution of men’s bodies, and the gout for the swiftness of their feet; and that Achilles would not have had a good head of hair if Thersites had not been bald. For what difference is there between such triflers and ravers, and those who say that intemperance was not brought forth unprofitably for continence, nor injustice for justice, so that we must pray to the Gods, there may be always wickedness, “Lies, fawning speeches, and deceitful manners,” if, when these are taken away, virtue will also vanish and be lost?

> Greek: 13. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ τί ἄν τις ἐπὶ τούτοις δυσχεραίνοι, μεμνημένος ὧν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως γέγραφεν, ἀποφαίνων οὐκ ἀχρήστως τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα γεγενημένην; ἄξιον δʼ ἀναλαβεῖν τὸ δόγμα ταῖς ἐκείνου λέξεσιν, ἵνα καὶ μάθῃς πως, οἱ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπευσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελὲς ἐν τίνι τόπῳ τὴν κακίαν αὐτοὶ τίθενται καὶ τίνας λόγους περὶ αὐτῆς διεξίασιν ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ συμπτώματα ἔχει ὅρον γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνʼ οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. οὐκοῦν ἐν θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ κακόν· οὐδέ, ὅταν ὁ Ζεὺς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλώσας τὴν ὕλην ἅπασαν εἷς γένηται καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀνέλῃ διαφοράς, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν τηνικαῦτα, μηδενός γε κακοῦ παρόντος· ἀλλὰ χοροῦ μὲν ἔστιν ἐμμέλεια μηδενὸς ἀπᾴδοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ σώματος ὑγίεια μηδενὸς μορίου νοσοῦντος ἀρετὴ δʼ ἄνευ κακίας οὐκ ἔχει γένεσιν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐνίαις τῶν ἰατρικῶν δυνάμεων ἰὸς ὄφεως καὶ χολὴ ὑαίνης ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, οὕτως ἐπιτηδειότης ἑτέρα τῇ Μελήτου μοχθηρίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Σωκράτους δικαιοσύνην καὶ τῇ Κλέωνος ἀναγωγίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Περικλέους καλοκἀγαθίαν πῶς δʼ ἂν εὗρεν ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν Ἡρακλέα φῦσαι καὶ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, εἰ μὴ καὶ Σαρδανάπαλον ἡμῖν ἔφυσε καὶ Φάλαριν; ὥρα λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅτι καὶ φθίσις γέγονεν ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ποδάγρα πρὸς ὠκύτητα καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν Ἀχιλλεὺς κομήτης, εἰ μὴ φαλακρὸς Θερσίτης. τί γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν ταῦτα ληρούντων καὶ φλυαρούντων οἱ λέγοντες μὴ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἀδικίαν; ὅπως εὐχώμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀεὶ μοχθηρίαν εἶναι ψεύδεά θʼ αἱμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, εἰ, τούτων ἀναιρεθέντων, οἴχεται φροῦδος ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ συναπόλωλεν.

[¶13] 14. DIADUMENUS. Or do you desire to understand the greatest sweetness of his eloquence and persuasion? “For,” says he, “as comedies have in them sometimes ridiculous epigrams, which, though bad in themselves, give nevertheless a certain grace to the whole poem; so, though you may blame vice in itself, yet is it not useless to other things.” First then to say that vice was made by the providence of God, as a wanton epigram by the will of the poet, transcends in absurdity all imagination. For this being granted, how will the Gods be rather givers of good than evil? How will wickedness be displeasing to them, and hated by them? And what shall we have to oppose against these ill-sounding sentences of the poets:
A cause to men God sends,
When to chastise some house his wrath intends;
and again, “What God those seeds of strife ’twixt them did sow?” Moreover, a lewd epigram adorns the comedy and contributes to its end, which is to delight the spectators and make them laugh. But Jupiter, who is surnamed fatherly, supreme, just, and (as Pindar has it) the most perfect artist, framing the world, not as a great interlude, full of variety and great learning, but as a common city of Gods and men, living together in concord and happiness with justice and virtue,—what need had he, for the attaining to this excellent end, of thieves, murderers, parricides, and tyrants? For vice entered not as a morris-dance, pleasing and delightful to the Divinity; nor was injustice brought in amongst the affairs of men, to cause mirth and laughter by its raillery and facetiousness, since there is not to be seen in it so much as a dream of that celebrated agreement with Nature. Besides, that foolish epigram is a very small part of the poem, and takes up but a very little place in the comedy; neither do such things abound in it, nor do they corrupt any of those things which seem to have been well done, or spoil their grace. But all human affairs are replete with vice, and the whole life, from the very prologue and beginning to the end, being disordered, depraved, and disturbed, and having no part of it pure or irreprehensible (as these men say), is the most filthy and most unpleasant of all farces.

> Greek: 14. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἢ βούλει τὸ ἣδιστον αὐτοῦ τῆς γλαφυρίας καὶ πιθανότητος ἱστορῆσαι; ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι φησὶν ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, ἃ καθʼ αὑτὰ μέν ἐστι φαῦλα τῷ δʼ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προστίθησιν, οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφʼ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δʼ ὅλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα γέγονε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν δοτῆρες ἔσονται; πῶς δʼ ἔτι θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν ἡ κακία καὶ θεομισές; ἢ τί πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυσφημήματα λέγειν ἕξομεν, ὡς
θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ
καί τίς τʼ ἂρ σφῶε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τὴν κωμῳδίαν κοσμεῖ καὶ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς, ἐφιεμένης τοῦ γελοίου ἢ κεχαρισμένου τοῖς θεαταῖς· ὁ δὲ πατρῷος καὶ ὕπατος καὶ θεμίστιος Ζεὺς καὶ ἀριστοτέχνας, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, οὐ δρᾶμα δήπου μέγα καὶ ποικίλον καὶ πολυμερὲς δημιουργῶν τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄστυ κοινόν, συννεμησομένων μετὰ δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς ὁμολογουμένως καὶ μακαρίως, τί πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τοῦτο καὶ σεμνότατον τέλος ἐδεῖτο λῃστῶν καὶ ἀνδροφόνων καὶ πατροκτόνων καὶ τυράννων; οὐ γὰρ ἡδὺ τῷ θείῳ καὶ κομψὸν ἡ κακία γέγονεν ἐπεισόδιον, οὐδὲ διʼ εὐτραπελίαν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ γέλωτα καὶ βωμολοχίαν προστέτριπται τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὑφʼ ὧν οὐδʼ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῆς ὑμνουμένης ὁμολογίας. ἔτι τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ ποιήματος πολλοστημόριόν ἐστι καὶ μικρὸν ἐπέχει παντάπασιν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ χωρίον, καὶ οὔτε πλεονάζει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε τῶν εὖ πεποιῆσθαι δοκούντων ἀπόλλυσι καὶ λυμαίνεται τὴν χάριν· τῆς δὲ κακίας ἀναπέπλησται πάντα πράγματα καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐθὺς ἐκ παρόδου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι κορωνίδος ἀσχημονῶν καὶ ἐκπίπτων καὶ ταραττόμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων μέρος καθαρὸν μηδʼ ἀνεπίληπτον, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, αἴσχιστόν ἐστι δραμάτων ἁπάντων καὶ ἀτερπέστατον.

## 2. Sections 15–27

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/#p-N

[¶0] 15. DIADUMENUS. Wherefore I would willingly ask, in what vice is profitable to the universe. Not surely in respect of heavenly things, and such as are divine by nature. For it would be ridiculous to say, that if there had not arisen, or were not amongst men, malice and covetousness and lying, or that if we did not rob, plunder, slander, and murder one another, the sun would not run his appointed course, the world enjoy its seasons and periods of time, or the earth, which is seated in the midst of the universe, afford the principles of the wind and rain. It remains then, that the existence of vice must be profitable for us and our affairs; and that perhaps these men mean. Are we more healthy for being vicious, or do we more abound with necessaries? Or does vice contribute any thing to our beauty and strength? They say, no. But where on earth is virtue to be found? Is it then only a name, and a visionary opinion of night-walking sophisters, and not a reality lying conspicuous to all, like vice, so that we cannot partake of any thing as unprofitable, … but least, O ye Gods! of virtue, for which we were created? Is it not then absurd, that the utensils of the husbandman, mariner, and charioteer should be serviceable and aiding towards his intended end, whilst that which was by God made for virtue destroys and corrupts virtue? But perhaps it is time now to leave this point, and pass to another.

> Greek: 15. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ὅθεν ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, πρὸς τί γέγονεν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία τοῖς ὅλοις. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα, φήσει. γελοῖον γὰρ εἰ, μὴ γενομένης ἐν ἀνθρώποις μηδʼ οὔσης κακίας καὶ ἀπληστίας καὶ ψευδολογίας μηδʼ ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν ἀγόντων καὶ φερόντων καὶ συκοφαντούντων καὶ φονευόντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐβάδιζεν ὁ ἥλιος τὴν τεταγμένην πορείαν οὐδʼ ἂν ὥραις ἐχρῆτο καὶ περιόδοις καιρῶν ὁ κόσμος οὐδʼ ἡ γῆ τὴν μέσην χώραν ἔχουσα τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς πνευμάτων ἐνεδίδου καὶ ὄμβρων. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα τὴν κακίαν εὐχρήστως γεγονέναι καὶ τοῦτʼ ἴσως οἱ ἄνδρες λέγουσιν. ἆῤ οὖν ὑγιαίνομεν μᾶλλον κακοὶ ὄντες, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν τῶν ἀναγκαίων; πρὸς δὲ κάλλος ἡμῖν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχὺν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία γέγονεν; οὔ φασιν. εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ὄνομα μόνον καὶ δόκημα νυκτερωπὸν ἐννύχων σοφιστῶν οὐδʼ ὥσπερ ἡ κακία πᾶσιν ῦπαρ ἔκκειται καὶ πᾶσιν ἐναργὴς· οὐδενὸς ἔσται χρηστοῦ μεταλαβεῖν, ἥκιστα δʼ ἀρετῆς, ὦ θεοί, διʼ ἣν γεγόναμεν. εἶτʼ οὐ δεινόν, εἰ γεωργῷ μὲν καὶ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὰ εὔχρηστα φορὰ, καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τέλος, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονὸς ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ διέφθαρκεν; ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἤδη καιρὸς ἐπʼ ἄλλο τρέπεσθαι, τοῦτο δʼ ἀφεῖναι.

[¶1] 16. LAMPRIAS.. Not for my sake, my dear friend, I beseech you; for I desire to understand, in what manner these men bring in evil things before the good, and vice before virtue. DIADUMENUS. It is indeed, sir, a thing worth knowing. They babble indeed much; but in conclusion they say that prudence, being the knowledge of good and evil, would be wholly taken away if there were no evil. For as, if there are truths, it is impossible but there must be some lies also near to them; so it stands with reason, that if there are good things, there must also be evil things. LAMPRIAS.. One of these things is not said amiss; and I think also that the other is not unapprehended by me. For I see a difference here: that which is not true must immediately be false; but that is not of necessity evil which is not good; because that between true and false there is no medium, but between good and evil there is the indifferent. Nor is it of necessity that the one must subsist with the other. For Nature may have good without having any need of evil, but only having that which is neither good nor evil. But if there is any thing to be said by you to the former reason, let us hear it.

> Greek: 16. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ φίλος, ἐμὴν χάριν ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ πυθέσθαι, τίνα δὴ τρόπον οἱ ἄνδρες τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς προεισάγουσιν. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀμέλει καὶ ἄξιον, ὦ ἑταῖρε πολὺς μὲν γὰρ ὁ ψελλισμὸς αὐτῶν, τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὖσαν, ἀναιρεθέντων τῶν κακῶν, καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγουσιν· ὡς δʼ ἀληθῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον μὴ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα εἶναι, παραπλησίως οἴονται προσήκειν, ἀγαθῶν ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ κακὰ ὑπάρχειν. ΛΑΜΠΡ.. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ φαύλως λέλεκται, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον οἶμαι μηδʼ ἐμὲ λανθάνειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ διαφοράν, τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εὐθὺς ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν εὐθὺς κακὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ἀληθῶν μὲν καὶ ψευδῶν οὐδέν ἐστι μέσον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ καὶ κακῶν τὸ ἀδιάφορον. καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα συνυπάρχειν ἐκείνοις· ἐξήρκει γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν τἀγαθόν, τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ δεομένην, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἔχουσαν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν πρότερον λόγον εἴ τι λέγεται παρʼ ὑμῶν, ἀκουστέον.

[¶2] 17. DIADUMENUS. Many things indeed are said; but at present we shall make use only of what is most necessary. In the first place, it is a folly to imagine that good and evil have their existence for the sake of prudence. For good and evil being already extant, prudence came afterwards; as the art of physic was invented, there being already things wholesome and unwholesome. For good and evil are not therefore extant that there may be prudence; but the faculty by which we judge good and evil that are already in being is named prudence. As sight is a sense distinguishing white from black; which colors were not therefore made that we might have sight, but we rather wanted sight to discern these things. Secondly, when the world shall be set on fire (as the Stoics will have it), there will then no evil be left, but all will then be prudent and wise. There is therefore prudence, though there is no evil; nor is it of necessity for evil to exist that prudence may have a being. But supposing that prudence must always be a knowledge of good and evil, what inconvenience would it be if, evil being taken away, prudence should no longer subsist; but instead of this we should have another virtue, not being the knowledge of good and evil, but of good only? So, if black should be wholly lost from among the colors, and any one should therefore contend that sight is also lost, for that there is no longer the sense of discerning black and white, what should hinder us from answering him: It is no prejudice to us, if we have not what you call sight, but in lieu of that have another sense and faculty, by which we apprehend colors that are white and not white. For I indeed think that neither our taste would be lost, if bitter things were wanting, nor our feeling, if pain were taken away, nor prudence, if evil had no being; but that these senses would remain, to apprehend things sweet and grateful and those that are not so, and prudence to be the science of things good and not good. But let those who think otherwise take the name to themselves, leaving us the thing.

> Greek: 17. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ νῦν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις χρηστέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εὔηθες οἴεσθαι φρονήσεως ἕνεκα γένεσιν κακῶν ὑποστῆναι καὶ ἀγαθῶν. ὄντων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιγίνεται φρόνησις, ὥσπερ ἰατρικὴ νοσερῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ ὑγιεινῶν. οὐ γὰρ τάγαθὸν ὑφίσταται καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἵνα γένηται φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα κρίνομεν, ὠνομάσθη φρόνησις· ὥσπερ ὄψις ἡ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, αἴσθησις, οὐ γενομένων ὅπως ἔχοιμεν ὄψιν ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ,τὰ τοιαῦτα κρίνειν ὄψεως δεηθέντων. δεύτερον, ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δʼ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν· ἔστι τοίνυν φρόνησις, οὐκ ὄντος κακοῦ· καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ φρόνησις ἔνι. εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως δεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμην, τί δεινόν, εἰ τῶν κακῶν ἀναιρεθέντων οὐκ ἔσται φρόνησις ἑτέραν τʼ ἀντʼ ἐκείνης ἀρετὴν ἕξομεν, οὐκ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀλλʼ ἀγαθῶν μόνων ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν; ὥσπερ εἰ τῶν χρωμάτων τὸ μέλαν ἐξαπόλοιτο παντάπασιν, εἶτά τις βιάζοιτο καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀπολωλέναι, λευκῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι καὶ μελάνων αἴσθησιν τί κωλύει φάναι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην ὄψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν, ἄλλη δὲ πάρεστιν ἀντʼ ἐκείνης αἴσθησις ἡμῖν καὶ δύναμις, λευκῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ μὴ λευκῶν χρωμάτων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε γεῦσιν οἶμαι φροῦδον ἂν γενέσθαι, πικρῶν ἐπιλιπόντων, οὔθʼ ἁφήν, ἀλγηδόνος ἀναιρεθείσης, οὔτε φρόνησιν, κακοῦ μὴ παρόντος· ἀλλʼ ἐκείνας τε μένειν αἰσθήσεις γλυκέων καὶ ἡδέων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀντιλαμβανομένας, ταύτην τε τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν. οἷς δὲ μὴ δοκεῖ, τοὔνομα λαβόντες ἀπολιπέτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα.

[¶3] 18. DIADUMENUS. Besides all this, what should hinder but there may be an understanding of evil, and an existence of good? As the Gods, I believe, enjoy health, but understand the fever and pleurisy. Since even we, who, as they say, have abundance of evils but no good, are not yet destitute of the knowledge what prudence, what goodness, and what happiness is. And this also would be wonderful, that if virtue were absent, there should be those who could teach us what it is and give us a comprehension of it, while if vice were not extant, it should be impossible to have any understanding of it. For see what these men persuade us who philosophize against the conceptions,—that by folly indeed we comprehend prudence, but prudence without folly cannot so much as comprehend folly itself.

> Greek: 18. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, τί ἐκώλυε τοῦ μὲν κακοῦ νόησιν εἶναι τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὕπαρξιν; ὥσπερ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑγιείας μὲν ἔστι παρουσία, πυρετοῦ δὲ καὶ πλευρίτιδος νόησις. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς, κακῶν μὲν ἀφθόνως πᾶσι παρόντων ἀγαθοῦ δὲ μηδενός, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε νοεῖν οὐκ ἀπολελείμμεθα τὴν φρόνησιν τἀγαθὸν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. ὃ καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν εἰ, τῆς μὲν ἀρετῆς μὴ παρούσης, εἰσὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες ὁποῖόν ἐστι καὶ κατάληψιν ἐμποιοῦντες τῆς κακίας δὲ μὴ γενομένης, οὐ δυνατὸν ἦν κτήσασθαι νόησιν. ὅρα γὰρ οἷα πείθουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἀφροσύνῃ καταλαμβάνομεν τὴν φρόνησιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄνευ τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔθʼ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε τὴν ἀφροσύνην καταλαμβάνειν πέφυκεν.

[¶4] 19. DIADUMENUS. And if Nature had absolutely stood in need of the generation of evil, yet might one or two examples of vice have been sufficient; or if you will, it might have been requisite that ten, a thousand, or ten thousand vicious men should be brought forth, and not that the multitude of vices should be so great as “to exceed in number the sands of the sea, the dust of the earth, and the feathers of all the various kinds of birds in the world,” and yet that there should not be so much all this while as a dream of virtue. Those who in Sparta had the charge of the public halls or eating places called Phiditia, were wont to bring forth two or three Helots drunken and full of wine, that the young men, seeing what drunkenness was, might learn to keep sobriety. But in human life there are many such examples of vice. For there is not any one sober to virtue; but we all stagger up and down, acting shamefully and living miserably. Thus does reason inebriate us, and with so much trouble and madness does it fill us, that we fall in nothing short of those dogs of whom Aesop says, that seeing certain skins swimming on the water, they endeavored to drink the sea up, but burst before they could get at them. For reason also, by which we hope to gain reputation and attain to virtue, does, ere we can reach to it, corrupt and destroy us, being before filled with abundance of heady and bitter vice;—if indeed, as these men say, they who are got even to the uppermost step have no ease, cessation, or breathing from folly and infelicity.

> Greek: 19. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως ἐδεῖτο κακοῦ γενέσεως ἡ φύσις, ἓν ἦν δήπου παράδειγμα κακίας ἱκανὸν ἢ δεύτερον· εἰ δὲ βούλει, δέκα φαύλους ἢ χιλίους ἢ μυρίους ἔδει γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ κακίας μὲν φορὰν τοσαύτην τὸ πλῆθος
οὐ ψάμμος, ἢ κόνις, ἢ πτερὰ ποικιλοθρόων οἰωνῶν
τόσσον ἂν χεύαιτʼ ἀριθμόν
ἀρετῆς δὲ μηδʼ ἐνύπνιον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Σπάρτῃ τῶν φιδιτίων ἐπιμελόμενοι δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἐπίτηδες εἵλωτας ἐμπεφορημένους ἀκράτου καὶ μεθύοντας εἰσάγοντες εἰς κοινὸν ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῖς νέοις, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν, ὅπως φυλάττωνται καὶ σωφρονῶσιν ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα τῆς κακίας γέγονε παραδείγματα· νήφων γὰρ οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ῥεμβόμεθα πάντες, ἀσχημονοῦντες καὶ κακοδαιμονοῦντες οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς μεθύσκει καὶ τοσαύτης καταπίμπλησι ταραχῆς καὶ παραφροσύνης, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντας τῶν κυνῶν, ἅς φησιν Αἴσωπος δερμάτων τινῶν ἐμπλεόντων ἐφιεμένας ὁρμῆσαι μὲν ἐκπίνειν τὴν θάλασσαν, ῥαγῆναι δὲ πρότερον ἢ τῶν δερμάτων λαβέσθαι καὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος ἐλπίζοντας εὐδαιμονήσειν διʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ προσοίσεσθαι, πρὶν ἐπʼ ἐκείνην ἀφικέσθαι, διέφθαρκε καὶ ἀπολώλεκε, πολλῆς ἀκράτου καὶ πικρᾶς κακίας προεμφορηθέντας εἴ γε δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐπʼ ἄκρον προκόπτουσιν, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, οὔτε κουφισμὸς οὔτʼ ἄνεσις ἔστιν οὔτʼ ἀναπνοὴ τῆς ἀβελτερίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

[¶5] 20. DIADUMENUS. But let us see what manner of thing he shows vice to be who says that it was not brought forth unprofitably, and of what use and what a possession he makes it to be to those who have it, writing in his book of right actions, that a wicked man wants nothing, has need of nothing, nothing is useful to him, nothing proper, nothing fit for him. How then is vice useful, with which neither health nor abundance of riches nor advancement in virtue is profitable? Who then does not want these things, of which some are “preferable” and “acceptable,” and therefore highly useful, and others are “according to Nature,” as themselves term them? But (they say) no one has need of them, unless he become wise. Therefore the vicious man does not even stand in need of being made wise. Nor are men hungry and thirsty before they become wise. When thirsty, therefore, they have no need of water, nor when hungry, of bread.
Be like to courteous guests, and him
Who only fire and shelter asks:
does this man now not need entertainment? Nor had he need of a cloak, who said, “Give Hipponax a cloak, for I’m stiff with cold.” But will you speak a paradox indeed, both extravagant and singular? Say then that a wise man has need of nothing, that he wants nothing, he is fortunate, he is free from want, he is self-sufficient, blessed, perfect. Now what madness is this, that he to whom nothing is wanting has need of the goods he has, but that the vicious indeed wants many things, and stands in need of nothing. For thus indeed says Chrysippus, that the vicious wants but stands not in need; removing the common notions, like chessmen, backwards and forwards. For all men think that having need precedes wanting, esteeming him who stands in need of things that are not at hand or easy to be got, to want them. For no man wants horns or wings, because no man has need of them. But we say that those want arms and money and clothes who are destitute of them, when they have occasion for them. But these men are so desirous of seeming always to say something against the common notions, that for the love of novelty they often depart from their own opinions, as they do here.

> Greek: 20. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων οὐκ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι τὴν κακίαν, ὅρα πάλιν οἷον αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι χρῆμα καὶ κτῆμα τοῖς ἔχουσι, γράφων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κατορθωμάτων ὡς ὁ φαῦλος οὐδενὸς· δεῖται, οὐδενὸς ἔχει χρείαν· οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ χρήσιμον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, οὐδὲν ἁρμόττον. πῶς οὖν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία, μεθʼ ἧς οὐδʼ ὑγίεια χρήσιμον οὐδὲ πλῆθος χρημάτων οὐδὲ προκοπή; οὐ δεῖται δέ τις ὧν· τὰ μὲν προηγμένα· καὶ ληπτὰ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ εὔχρηστα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν; εἶτα τούτων οὐδεὶς ἔχει χρείαν, ἂν μὴ γένηται σοφός. οὐδὲ τοῦ σοφὸς οὖν γενέσθαι χρείαν ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος. οὐδὲ διψῶσιν οὐδὲ πεινῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, πρὶν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· διψῶντες οὖν ὕδατος οὐκ ἔχουσι χρείαν οὐδʼ ἄρτου πεινῶντες.
ἔστε ξένοισι μειλίχοις ἐοικότες
στέγης τε μοῦνον καὶ πυρὸς κεχρημένοις·
οὗτος οὐκ εἶχε χρείαν ὑποδοχῆς; οὐδὲ χλαίνης ἐκεῖνος ὁ λέγων δὸς χλαῖναν Ἱππώνακτι κάρτα γὰρ ῥιγῶ; ἀλλὰ βούλει παράδοξον εἰπεῖν τι καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἴδιον; λέγε τὸν σοφὸν μηδενὸς ἔχειν χρείαν μηδὲ δεῖσθαί τινος, ἐκεῖνος ὄλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης μακάριος τέλειος. νυνὶ δὲ τίς ὁ ἴλιγγος οὗτος τὸν μὲν ἀνενδεᾶ δεῖσθαι ὧν ἔχει ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἐνδεᾶ μὲν εἶναι πολλῶν δεῖσθαι δὲ μηδενός; τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς οὐ δέονται μὲν ἐνδέονται δʼ οἱ φαῦλοι, πεττῶν δίκην δεῦρο κἀκεῖ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μετατιθείς. πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὸ δεῖσθαι πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐνδεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν οὐχ ἑτοίμων οὐδʼ εὐπορίστων δεόμενον ἐνδεῖσθαι. κεράτων γοῦν καὶ πτερῶν οὐδεὶς ἐνδεὴς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅτι μηδὲ δεῖται τούτων· ἀλλʼ ὅπλων ἐνδεεῖς, λέγομεν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ ἱματίων, ὅταν ἐν χρείᾳ γενόμενοι μὴ τυγχάνωσι μηδʼ ἔχωσιν. οἱ δʼ οὕτως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀεί τι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φαίνεσθαι λέγοντες, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐξίστασθαι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ καινολογίας, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα.

[¶6] 21. DIADUMENUS. But recall yourself to the consideration of what has been said a little above. This is one of their assertions against the common conception, that no vicious man receives any utility. And yet many being instructed profit; many being slaves are made free; many being besieged are delivered, being lame are led by the hand, and being sick are cured. “But possessing all these things, they are never the better, neither do receive benefits, nor have they any benefactors, nor do they slight their benefactors.” Vicious men then are not ungrateful, no more than are wise men. Ingratitude therefore has no being; because the good receiving a benefit fail not to acknowledge it, and the bad are not capable of receiving any. Behold now. what they say to this,—that benefit is ranked among mean or middle things, and that to give and receive utility belongs only to the wise, but the bad also receive a benefit. Then they who partake of the benefit partake not also of its use; and whither a benefit extends, there is nothing useful or commodious. Now what else is there that makes a kind office a benefit, but that the bestower of it is, in some respect, useful to the needy receiver?

> Greek: 21. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. σκόπει δὲ μικρὸν ἀνωτέρω ἀναγαγὼν ἑαυτόν. ἕν τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας λεγομένων ἐστὶ τὸ μηδένα φαῦλον ὠφελεῖσθαι καίτοι παιδευόμενοὶ γε πολλοὶ προκόπτουσι καὶ δουλεύοντες ἐλευθεροῦνται καὶ πολιορκούμενοι σῴζονται καὶ πληρούμενοι χειραγωγοῦνται καὶ θεραπεύονται νοσοῦντες ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὠφελοῦνται τούτων τυγχάνοντες οὐδʼ πάσχουσιν οὐδʼ εὐεργέτας ἔχουσιν οὐδʼ εὐεργετῶν ἀμελοῦσιν οὐδʼ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἀχαριστοῦσιν οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. ἀνύπαρκτον οὖν ἐστι. τὸ ἀχάριστον οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀποστεροῦσι χάριν λαμβάνοντες, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνειν χάριν οὐ πεφύκασιν. ὅρα δὴ τί πρὸς ταῦτα λέγουσιν· ὅτι ἡ χάρις εἰς τὰ μέσα διατείνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἐστι, χάριτος δὲ καὶ φαῦλοι τυγχάνουσιν εἶθʼ οἷς χάριτος μέτεστι, τούτοις οὐ μέτεστι χρείας; ὅπου δὲ διατείνει χάρις, ἐκεῖ χρήσιμον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδʼ οἰκεῖον; ἄλλο δὲ τί ποιεῖ τὴν ὑπουργίαν χάριν ἢ τὸ πρός τι χρήσιμον ὑπάρξαι τῷ δεομένῳ τὸν παρασχόντα;

[¶7] 22. LAMPRIAS.. But let these things pass. What, I beseech you, is this so highly venerated utility, which preserving as some great and excellent thing for the wise, they permit not so much as the name of it to the vicious? DIADUMENUS. If (say they) one wise man does but any way prudently stretch out his finger, all the wise men all the world over receive utility by it. This is the work of their amity; in this do the virtues of the wise man terminate by their common utilities. Aristotle then and Xenocrates doted, saying that men receive utility from the Gods, from their parents, from their masters, being ignorant of that wonderful utility which wise men receive from one another, being moved according to virtue, though they neither are together nor yet know it. Yet all men esteem, that laying up, keeping, and bestowing are then useful and profitable, when some benefit or profit is recovered by it. The thriving man buys keys, and diligently keeps his stores, “With’s hand unlocking wealth’s sweet treasury.” But to store up and to keep with diligence and labor such things as are for no use is not seemly or honorable, but ridiculous. If Ulysses indeed had tied up with the knot which Circe taught him, not the gifts he had received from Alcinous,—tripods, caldrons, cloths, and gold,—but heaping up trash, stones, and such like trumpery, should have thought his employment about such things, and the possession and keeping of them, a happy and blessed work, would any one have imitated this foolish providence and empty care? Yet this is the beauty, gravity, and happiness of the Stoical consent, being nothing else but a gathering together and keeping of useless and indifferent things. For such are things according to Nature, and still more exterior things; if indeed they compare the greatest riches to fringes and golden chamber-pots, and sometimes also, as it happens, to oil-cruets. Then, as those who seem proudly to have affronted and railed at some Gods or demi-gods presently changing their note, fall prostrate and sit humbly on the ground, praising and magnifying the Divinity; so these men, having met with punishment of this arrogancy and vanity, again exercise themselves in these indifferent things and such as pertain nothing to them, crying out with a loud voice that there is but one thing good, specious, and honorable, the storing up of these things and the communication of them, and that it is not meet for those to live who have them not, but to dispatch out of the way and famish themselves, bidding a long farewell to virtue. DIADUMENUS. They esteem indeed Theognis to have been a man altogether of a base and abject spirit, for saying, as one over-fearful in regard to poverty, which is an indifferent thing:
From poverty to fly, into the deep
Throw thyself, Cyrnus, or from rocks so steep.
Yet they themselves exhort the same thing in prose, and affirm that a man, to free himself from some great disease or exceedingly acute pain, if he have not at hand sword or hemlock, ought to leap into the sea or throw himself headlong from a precipice; neither of which is hurtful, or evil, or incommodious, or makes them who fall into it miserable.

> Greek: 22. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄφες. ἡ δὲ πολυτίμητος ὠφέλεια τίς ἐστιν, ἣν ὡς μέγα τι τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐξαίρετον φυλάσσοντες, οὐδʼ ὄνομα λείπουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς μὴ σοφοῖς. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. ἂν εἷς σοφὸς ὁπουδήποτε προτείνῃ τὸν δάκτυλον φρονίμως, οἱ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην σοφοὶ πάντες ὠφελοῦνται. τοῦτο τῆς ὠφελείας ἔργον αὐτῶν, εἰς τοῦτο τοῖς κοινοῖς ὠφελήμασι τῶν σοφῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τελευτῶσιν. ἐλήρει δʼ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐλήρει δὲ,Ξενοκράτης, ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ θεῶν ὠφελεῖσθαι δʼ ὑπὸ γονέων ὠφελεῖσθαι δʼ ὑπὸ καθηγητῶν ἀποφαινόμενοι, τὴν δὲ θαυμαστὴν ἀγνοοῦντες ὠφέλειαν, ἣν οἱ σοφοὶ κινουμένων κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀλλήλων ὠφελοῦνται, κἂν μὴ συνῶσι μηδὲ γιγνώσκοντες τυγχάνωσι. καὶ μὴν πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἐκλογὰς καὶ τὰς τηρήσεις καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὅταν χρήσιμοι ὦσι καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, τότε χρησίμους καὶ ὠφελίμους ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ κλεῖδας ὠνεῖται καὶ ἀποθήκας φυλάττει χρηματικὸς ἀνήρ πλούτου διοίγων θάλαμον ἥδιστον χερί· τὸ δʼ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ πρὸς μηδὲν ὠφέλιμα καὶ τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ πολυπόνως οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν. ὁ οὖν Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ τὸν δεσμὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐκμαθὼν παρὰ τῆς Κίρκης, κατεσημαίνετο διʼ αὐτοῦ μὴ τὰ παρʼ Ἀλκινόου δῶρα, τρίποδας καὶ λέβητας καὶ εἵματα καὶ χρυσὸν ἀλλὰ συρφετόν τινα καὶ λίθους καὶ … συναγαγὼν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείαν καὶ κτῆσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τήρησιν εὐδαιμονικὸν ἔργον ἡγεῖτο καὶ μακάριον, τίς ἂν ἐζήλωσε τὴν ἀνόητον ταύτην πρόνοιαν καὶ κενόσπουδον ἐπιμέλειαν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο τῆς Στωικῆς ὁμολογίας τὸ καλόν ἐστι καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ μακάριον, ἕτερον δʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἐκλογὴ καὶ τήρησις ἀνωφελῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιαφόρων τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔτι μᾶλλον· εἴ γε κρασπέδοις καὶ ἀμίσι χρυσαῖς καὶ νὴ Δία ληκύθοις, ὅταν τύχωσι, παραβάλλουσι τὸν μέγιστον πλοῦτον· εἶθʼ ὥσπερ οἱ θεῶν τινων ἢ δαιμόνων ἱερὰ δόξαντες ὑπερηφάνως καθυβρίσαι καὶ λοιδορῆσαι μετανοήσαντες εὐθὺς ὑποπίπτουσι καὶ κάθηνται ταπεινοὶ κατευλογοῦντες καὶ μεγαλύνοντες τὸ θεῖον· οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι νεμέσει τινὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ταύτης καὶ κενολογίας περιπεσόντες αὖθις ἐν τούτοις ἐξετάζονται τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς, μέγα βοῶντες ὡς ἕν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ σεμνόν, ἡ τούτων ἐκλογὴ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα οἰκονομία, καὶ τούτων μὴ τυγχάνοντας οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι βιοῦν ἀλλʼ ἀποσφάττειν ἑαυτοὺς ἢ ἀποκαρτερεῖν, πολλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ χαίρειν φράσαντας. τὸν τοίνυν Θέογνιν αὐτοὶ παντελῶς ἀγεννῆ καὶ μικρὸν ἡγοῦνται, λέγοντα
χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ ἐς μεγακήτεα πόντον
ῥιπτεῖν, καὶ πετρῶν, Κύρνε, κατʼ ἠλιβάτων
οὕτως ἀποδειλιῶντα πρὸς τὴν πενίαν ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν· ἀλλʼ αὐτοί γε ταὐτὰ πεζῷ λόγῳ παρακελεύονται καὶ λέγουσιν, ὅτι χρὴ νόσον φεύγοντα μεγάλην καὶ ἀλγηδόνα σύντονον, ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ ξίφος ἢ κώνειον, εἰς θάλατταν ἀφεῖναι καὶ κατὰ πετρῶν ῥιπτεῖν ἑαυτόν· ὧν οὐδέτερον βλαβερὸν οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδʼ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ κακοδαίμονας ποιεῖ τοὺς περιπίπτοντας.

[¶8] 23. DIADUMENUS. With what then, says he, shall I begin? And what shall I take for the principle of duty and matter of virtue, leaving Nature and that which is according to Nature? With what, O good sir, do Aristotle and Theophrastus begin? What beginnings do Xenocrates and Polemo take? Does not also Zeno follow these, who suppose Nature and that which is according to Nature to be the elements of happiness? But they indeed persisted in these things, as desirable, good, and profitable; and joining to them virtue, which employs them and uses every one of them according to its property, thought to complete and consummate a perfect life and one every way absolute, producing that concord which is truly suitable and consonant to Nature. For these men did not fall into confusion, like those who leap up from the ground and presently fall down again upon it, terming the same things acceptable and not desirable, proper and not good, unprofitable and yet useful, nothing to us and yet the principles of duties. But their life was such as their speech, and they exhibited actions suitable and consonant to their sayings. But they who are of the Stoic sect—not unlike to that woman in Archilochus, who deceitfully carried in one hand water, in the other fire—by some doctrines draw nature to them, and by others drive her from them. Or rather, by their deeds and actions they embrace those things which are according to Nature, as good and desirable, but in words and speeches they reject and contemn them, as indifferent and of no use to virtue for the acquiring felicity.

> Greek: 23. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. πόθεν οὖν φησὶν ἄρξωμαι; καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεὶς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; πόθεν δʼ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ Θεόφραστος; ἄρχονται; τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις ἠκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐπὶ τούτων ἔμειναν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν προσλαβόντες αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοῦσαν, οἰκείως χρωμένην ἑκάστῳ, τέλειον ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὁλόκληρον ᾤοντο συμπληροῦν βίον καὶ συμπεραίνειν, τὴν ἀληθῶς τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον καὶ συνῳδὸν ὁμολογίαν ἀποδιδόντες. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ τῆς γῆς ἀφαλλόμενοι καὶ καταφερόμενοι πάλιν ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἐταράττοντο, ταὐτὰ πράγματα ληπτὰ καὶ οὐχ αἱρετὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθά, καὶ., ἀνωφελῆ μὲν εὔχρηστα δέ, καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀρχὰς δὲ τῶν καθηκόντων ὀνομάζοντες· ἀλλʼ οἷος ὁ λόγος, τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων, ἃ ἔπραττον οἷς ἔλεγον οἰκεῖα καὶ σύμφωνα παρεχόντων. ἡ δὲ τούτων αἵρεσις, ὥσπερ ἡ παρʼ Ἀρχιλόχῳ γυνή
τῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ἐφόρει
δολοφρονέουσα χειρὶ τἡτέρῃ δὲ πῦρ,
τοῖς μὲν προσάγεται τὴν φύσιν τοῖς δʼ ἀπωθεῖται δόγμασι μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἔργοις καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔχονται τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, τοῖς δʼ ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἄχρηστα καὶ ἀρρεπῆ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀναίνονται καὶ προπηλακίζουσιν.

[¶9] 24. DIADUMENUS. Now, forasmuch as all men esteem the sovereign good to be joyous, desirable, happy, of the greatest dignity, self-sufficient, and wanting nothing; compare their good, and see how it agrees with this common conception. Does the stretching out a finger prudently produce this joy? Is a prudent torture a thing desirable? Is he happy, who with reason breaks his neck? Is that of the greatest dignity, which reason often chooses to let go for that which is not good? Is that perfect and self-sufficient, by enjoying which, if they have not also indifferent things, they neither can nor will endure to live? There is also another principle of the Stoics, by which custom is still more injured, taking and plucking from her genuine notions, which are as her legitimate children, and supposing other bastardly, wild, and illegitimate ones in their room, and necessitating her to nourish and cherish the one instead of the other; and that too in those doctrines which concern things good and bad, desirable and avoidable, proper and strange, the energy of which ought to be more clearly distinguished than that of hot and cold, black and white. For the imaginations of these things are brought in by the senses from without; but those have their original bred from the good things which we have within us. But these men entering with their logic upon the topic of felicity, as on the sophism called Pseudomenos, or that named Kyrieuon, have removed no ambiguities, but brought in very many.

> Greek: 24. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθόλου τἀγαθὸν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι χαρτὸν νοοῦσιν εὐκταῖν εὐτυχὲς ἀξίαν ἔχον τὴν μεγίστην αὔταρκες ἀπροσδεές, ὅρα τὸ τούτων παρατιθεὶς ἀγαθόν, ἆρά γε χαρτὸν ποιεῖ τὸ φρονίμως τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι; τί δʼ; εὐκταῖόν ἐστι φρονίμη στρέβλωσις; εὐτυχεῖ δʼ ὁ κατακρημνίζων ἑαυτὸν εὐλόγως; ἀξίαν δʼ ἔχει τὴν μεγίστην, ὃ πολλάκις αἱρεῖ λόγος ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ προέσθαι; τέλειον δὲ καὶ αὔταρκές ἐστιν, οὗ παρόντος, ἂν μὴ τυγχάνωσι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν οὐδὲ βούλονται ζῆν; γέγονε δʼ ἕτερος λόγος, ὑφʼ οὗ μᾶλλον ἡ συνήθεια παρανενόμηται, τὰς μὲν γνησίας ὑφαιροῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποσπῶντος ἐννοίας ὥσπερ τέκνα, νόθας δὲ προσβάλλοντος ἑτέρας θηριώδεις καὶ ἀλλοκότους καὶ ταύτας ἀντʼ ἐκείνων ἐκτιθηνεῖσθαι καὶ στέργειν ἀναγκάζοντος· καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν, οἰκείων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων, ἃ μᾶλλον ἔδει θερμῶν τε καὶ ψυχρῶν λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων σαφεστέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐκείνων μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθὲν εἰσιν αἱ φαντασίαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεισόδιοι, ταῦτα δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν; οἱ δʼ ὥσπερ εἰς τὸν ψευδόμενον ἢ τὸν κυριεύοντα μετὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμβάλλοντες εἰς τὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τόπον ἔλυσαν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐν αὐτῷ μυρίας δʼ ἐποίησαν.

[¶10] 25. DIADUMENUS. Indeed, of two good things, of which the one is the end and the other belongs to the end, none is ignorant that the end is the greater and perfecter good. Chrysippus also acknowledges this difference, as is manifest from his Third Book of Good Things. For he dissents from those who make science the end, and sets it down … In his Treatise of Justice, however, he does not think that justice can be safe, if any one supposes pleasure to be the end; but grants it may, if pleasure is not said to be the end, but simply a good. Nor do I think that you need now to hear me repeat his words, since his Third Book of Justice is everywhere to be had. When therefore, O my friend, they elsewhere say that no one good is greater or less than another, and that what is not the end is equal to the end, they contradict not only the common conceptions, but even their own words. Again, if of two evils, the one when it is present renders us worse, and the other hurts us but renders us not worse, it is against common sense not to say that the evil which by its presence renders us worse is greater than that which hurts us but renders us not worse. Now Chrysippus indeed confesses, that there are some fears and sorrows and errors which hurt us, but render us not worse. Read his First Book of Justice against Plato; for in respect of other things, it is worth the while to note the babbling of the man in that place, delivering indifferently all matters and doctrines, as well proper to his own sect as foreign.

> Greek: 25. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι δυεῖν ἀγαθῶν, τοῦ μὲν τέλους τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ τέλος καὶ τελειότερον, ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς ἀγνοεῖται. γιγνώσκει δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος τὴν διαφοράν, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐν. τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Ἀγαθῶν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἡγουμένοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνομολογεῖ, καὶ τίθησιν … ἔν γε τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, εἰ μέν τις ὑπόθοιτο τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος, οὐκ οἴεται σῴζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τέλος ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, οἴεται· τὰς δὲ λέξεις οὐκ οἴομαί σε δεῖσθαι νῦν ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ καταλέγοντος τὸ γὰρ τρίτον περὶ Δικαιοσύνης βιβλίον ἔστι πανταχόθεν λαβεῖν. ὅταν οὖν αὖθις, ὦ φίλε, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν λέγωσι μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ μεῖζον εἶναι μηδʼ ἔλαττον ἀλλʼ ἴσον τῷ τέλει τὸ μὴ τέλος, οὐ ταῖς κοιναῖς μόνον ἐννοίαις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν λόγοις φαίνονται μαχόμενοι. καὶ πάλιν εἰ δυεῖν κακοῖν ὑφʼ οὗ μὲν γιγνόμεθα χείρονες, ὅταν παραγένηται, τὸ δὲ βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας, παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι μὴ λέγειν ἐκεῖνο μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν, ὑφʼ οὗ γιγνόμεθα χείρονες, ὅταν παραγένηται, τοῦ ὃ βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας· μηδὲ κακίονα βλάβην τὴν κακίονας ἡμᾶς ἀποτελοῦσαν. ἀλλʼ ὁμολογεῖ γε Χρύσιππος εἶναί τινας φόβους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀπάτας, αἳ βλάπτουσι μὲν ἡμᾶς χείρονας δʼ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἔντυχε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα γεγραμμένων περὶ Δικαιοσύνης· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλων ἕνεκα τὴν ἐκεῖ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εὑρησιλογίαν ἄξιον ἱστορῆσαι, πάντων ἁπλῶς πραγμάτων καὶ δογμάτων οἰκείων ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἀφειδοῦσαν.

[¶11] 26. DIADUMENUS. It is likewise against common sense when he says that there may be two ends or scopes proposed of life, and that all the things we do are not to be referred to one; and yet this is more against common sense, to say that there is an end, and yet that every action is to be referred to another. Nevertheless they must of necessity endure one of these. For if those things which are first according to Nature are not eligible for themselves, but the choice and taking of them agreeably to reason is so, and if every one therefore does all his actions for the acquiring the first things according to Nature, it follows that all things which are done must have their reference to this, that the principal things according to Nature may be obtained. But they think that they who aim and aspire to get these things do not have the things themselves for the end, but that to which they must refer, namely, the choice and not the things. For the end indeed is to choose and receive these things prudently. But the things themselves and the enjoying of them are not the end, but the material object, having its worth only from the choice. For it is my opinion that they both use and write this very expression, to show the difference. LAMPRIAS. You have exactly related both what they say and in what manner they deliver it. DIADUMENUS. But observe how it fares with them, as with those that endeavor to leap over their own shadow; for they do not leave behind, but always carry along with them in their speech some absurdity most remote from common sense. For as, if any one should say that he who shoots does all he can, not that he may hit the mark, but that he may do all he can, such a one would rightly be esteemed to speak enigmatically and prodigiously; so these doting dreamers, who contend that the obtaining of natural things is not the end of aiming after natural things, but the taking and choosing them is, and that the desire and endeavor after health is not in every one terminated in the enjoyment of health, but on the contrary, the enjoyment of health is referred to the desire and endeavor after it, and that certain walkings and contentions of speech and suffering incisions and taking of medicines, so they are done by reason, are the end of health, and not health of them,—they, I say, trifle like to those who say, Let us sup, that we may sacrifice, that we may bathe. But this rather changes order and custom, and all things which these men say carry with them the total subversion and confusion of affairs. Thus, we do not desire to take a walk in fit time that we may digest our meat; but we digest our meat that we may take a walk in fit time. Has Nature also made health for the sake of hellebore, instead of producing hellebore for the sake of health? For what is wanting to bring them to the highest degree of speaking paradoxes, but the saying of such things? What difference is there between him who says that health was made for the sake of medicines and not medicines for the sake of health, and him who makes the choice of medicines and their composition and use more desirable than health itself?—or rather who esteems health not at all desirable, but placing the end in the negotiation about these things, prefers desire to enjoyment, and not enjoyment to desire? For to desire, forsooth (they say), is joined the proceeding wisely and discreetly. It is true indeed, we will say, if respect be had to the end, that is, the enjoyment and possession of the things it pursues; but otherwise, it is wholly void of reason, if it does all things for the obtaining of that the enjoyment of which is neither honorable nor happy.

> Greek: 26. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι· δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεῖσθαι τοῦ βίου, καὶ μὴ πάντων, ὅσα πράττομεν, ἐφʼ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος, ἐπʼ ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι τούτων δʼ αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη θάτερον. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρʼ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνο δεῖ πάντα ἔχειν τὰ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφοράν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται μὴ στοχαζομένους μηδʼ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν καὶ μὴ ταῦτα· τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως· ἐκεῖνα δʼ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τοὔνομα λέγειν καὶ γράφειν αὐτούς, ἐνδεικνυμένους τὴν διαφοράν. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἀνδρικῶς; μὲν ἀπομεμνημόνευκας καὶ ὃ λέγουσι καὶ ὡς λέγουσι. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. σκόπει δʼ ὅτι ταὐτὸ πάσχουσι τοῖς τὴν σκιὰν ὑπεράλλεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐφιεμένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἀλλὰ συμμεταφέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ, πορρωτάτω τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀφισταμένην. ὡς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρʼ αὑτὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλʼ ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρʼ αὑτόν, αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαίνειν οὕτως οἱ τριπέμπελοι βιαζόμενοι μὴ τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι, μηδὲ τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ δίωξιν εἰς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἑκάστῳ τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔφεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ δίωξιν ἀναφέρεσθαι, περιπάτους τινὰς καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις καὶ τομὰς νὴ Δία καὶ φαρμακείας εὐλογίστους τέλη ποιούμενοι τῆς ὑγιείας, οὐχὶ τούτων ἐκείνην, ὅμοια ληροῦσι τῷ λέγοντι δειπνῶμεν, ἵνα θύωμεν, ἵνα λουώμεθα μᾶλλον δʼ ἐκεῖνος εἰωθός τι καὶ νενομισμένον ἀλλάττει καὶ ταράττει τὴν τάξιν· ἃ δʼ οὗτοι λέγουσι τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνατροπὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν οὐ σπουδάζομεν εὐκαίρως περιπατεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν ἀλλὰ πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν ἕνεκα τοῦ περιπατεῖν εὐκαίρως ἦπου καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου χάριν πεποίηκεν, οὐ τῆς· ὑγιείας τὸν ἐλλέβορον. τί γὰρ ἄλλο καταλείπεται αὐτοῖς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν παραδοξολογίας ἢ τοιαῦτα ληρεῖν; τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος γεγονέναι τὴν ὑγίειαν τῶν φαρμάκων ἕνεκα, μὴ τὰ φάρμακα τῆς ὑγιείας, ὁ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τὴν περὶ τὰ φάρμακα καὶ σύνθεσιν καὶ· χρῆσιν αὐτῶν αἱρετωτέραν ποιῶν τῆς ὑγιείας μᾶλλον τὴν μὲν οὐδʼ ὅλως αἱρετὸν ἡγούμενος, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματείᾳ τὸ τέλος τιθέμενος καὶ ἔφεσιν ἀποφαίνων τέλος τῆς τεύξεως, οὐ τῆς ἐφέσεως τὴν τεῦξιν; τῇ γὰρ ἐφέσει νὴ Δία τὸ εὐλογίστως καὶ τὸ φρονίμως πρόσεστι πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φήσομεν, ἂν ὡς πρὸς τέλος ὁρᾷ τὴν τεῦξιν ὧν διώκει καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν εἰ μή, τὸ εὐλόγιστον αὐτῆς; ἀφαιρεῖται, πάντα ποιούσης ἕνεκα τσῦ τυχεῖν, οὗ τυχεῖν οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μακάριόν ἐστι.

[¶12] 27. DIADUMENUS. Now, since we are fallen upon this discourse, any thing may rather be said to agree with common sense, than that those who have neither received nor have any conception of good do nevertheless desire and pursue it. For you see how Chrysippus drives Ariston into this difficulty, that he should understand an indifference in things inclining neither to good nor to bad, before either good or bad is itself understood; for so indifference will appear to have subsisted even before itself, if the understanding of it cannot be perceived unless good be first understood, while the good is nothing else than this very indifference. Understand now and consider this indifference which the Stoa denies and calls consent, whence and in what manner it gives us the knowledge of good. For if without good the indifference to that which is not good cannot be understood, much less does the knowledge of good things give any intelligence of itself to those who had not before some notion of the good. But as there can be no knowledge of the art of things wholesome and unwholesome in those who have not first some knowledge of the things themselves; so they cannot conceive any notion of the science of good and evil who have not some fore-knowledge of good and evil. LAMPRIAS. What then is good? DIADUMENUS. Nothing but prudence. LAMPRIAS. And what is prudence? DIADUMENUS. Nothing but the science of good. LAMPRIAS. There is much then of Jupiter’s Corinth (that is, much reasoning in a circle) admitted into their arguments. For I would have you let alone the saying about the turning of the pestle, lest you should seem to mock them; although an accident like to that has insinuated itself into their discourse. For it seems that, to the understanding of good, one has need to understand prudence, and to seek for prudence in the understanding of good, being forced always to pursue the one by the other, and thus failing of both; since to the understanding of each we have need of that which cannot be known without the other be first understood. DIADUMENUS. But there is yet another way, by which you may perceive not only the perversion but the eversion of their discourse, and the reduction of it entirely to nothing. They hold the essence of good to be the reasonable election of things according to Nature. Now the election is not reasonable which is not directed to some end, as has been said before. What then is this end? Nothing else, say they, but to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature. First then, the conception of good is lost and gone. For to reason rightly in election is an operation proceeding from an habit of right reasoning; and therefore being constrained to learn this from the end, and the end not without this, we fail of understanding either of them. Besides, which is more, this reasonable election ought in strict justice to be a choice of things good and useful, and co-operating to the end; for how can it be reasonable to choose things which are neither convenient nor honorable nor at all eligible? For be it, as they say, a reasonable election of things having a fitness for the causing felicity; see then to what a beautiful and grave conclusion their discourse brings them. For the end is (it seems), according to them, to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly. LAMPRIAS. When I hear these words, my friend, what is said seems to me strangely extravagant; and I farther want to know how this happens. DIADUMENUS. You must then be more attentive; for it is not for every one to understand this riddle. Hear therefore and answer. Is not the end, according to them, to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature. LAMPRIAS. So they say. DIADUMENUS. And are these things according to Nature chosen as good, or as having some fitness or preferences … either for this end or for something else? LAMPRIAS. I think not for any thing else but for this end. DIADUMENUS. Now then, having discovered the matter, see what befalls them. They hold that the end is to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly, for they say that we neither have nor understand any other essence either of good or of felicity but this precious rectitude of reasoning in the election of things that are of worth. But there are some who think that this is spoken against Antipater, and not against the whole sect; for that he, being pressed by Carneades, fell into these fooleries.

> Greek: 27. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, τί ἂν φαίης μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὸ μὴ λαβόντας ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μηδὲ σχόντας, ἐφίεσθαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ διώκειν; ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππος εἰς ταύτην μᾶλλον συνελαύνει τὸν Ἀρίστωνα τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὡς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ διδόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀδιαφορίαν ἐπινοῆσαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ προεπινοηθέντων· οὕτω γὰρ αὑτῆς φανεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν προϋφισταμένην, εἰ νόησιν μὲν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν, μὴ πρότερον τἀγαθοῦ νοηθέντος, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ μόνον τάγαθόν ἐστιν. ἴθι δὲ καὶ σκόπει τὴν ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς ταύτην ἀρνουμένην ἀδιαφορίαν καλουμένην δʼ ὁμολογίαν, ὅπως δὴ καὶ ὁπόθεν παρέσχεν αὑτὴν ἀγαθὸν νοηθῆναι. εἰ γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀδιαφορίαν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φρόνησις ἐπίνοιαν αὑτῆς οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἀγαθὸν μὴ προεννοήσασιν. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν τέχνης οὐ γίγνεται νόησις, οἷς μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐκείνων γέγονεν, οὕτως ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἔστιν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν μὴ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ προεννοήσαντας. ΛΑΜΠΡ. τί οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ φρόνησις. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Τί δʼ ἡ φρόνησις; ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμη. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Πολὺς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἀφῖκται. τὴν γὰρ ὑπέρου περιτροπήν, ἵνα μὴ σκώπτειν δοκῇς, ἔασον· καίτοι τὸν γε λόγον αὐτῶν ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ πάθος κατείληφε. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν τἀγαθοῦ νόησιν αὐτὴν νοῆσαι δεόμενος φρόνησιν τὴν δʼ αὖ φρόνησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ τἀγαθὸν ζητῶν νοήσει, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀεὶ τὴν ἑτέραν διώκειν, ἀπολειπόμενος δʼ ἑκατέρας τῷ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοούμενον δεῖσθαι τοῦ χωρὶς νοηθῆναι μὴ δυναμένου. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἔστι τὴν οὐκέτι διαστροφὴν ἀλλʼ ἐκστροφὴν αὐτῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τελέως εἰς τὸ μηδὲν καταμαθεῖν. οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐκλογὴ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἡ μὴ πρός τι γενομένη τέλος, ὡς προείρηται. τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φασίν, ἢ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογαῖς. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οἴχεται καὶ διαπέφευγεν ἡ ἔννοια τἀγαθοῦ τὸ γὰρ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς σύμπτωμα δήπουθέν ἐστι, γιγνόμενον ἀπὸ ἕξεως τῆς εὐλογιστίας· διὸ ταύτην μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους, τὸ τέλος δʼ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης ἀναγκαζόμενοι νοεῖν, ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς ἀμφοῖν νοήσεως. ἔπειτα, ὃ μεῖζὸν ἐστι, τῷ μὲν δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν ἀγαθῶν ἔδει καὶ ὠφελίμων καὶ συνεργῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκλογὴν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ μήτε συμφέροντα μήτε τίμια μήθʼ ὅλως αἱρετὰ πῶς εὐλόγιστόν ἐστιν; ἔστω γάρ, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, εὐλόγιστος; ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅρα τοίνυν, ὡς εἰς πάγκαλόν τι καὶ σεμνὸν αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἐξήκει κεφάλαιον. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τέλος κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἀλλʼ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκούοντι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται δεινῶς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ φραζόμενον· ἔτι δὲ δέομαι μαθεῖν πῶς τοῦτο συμβαίνει. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Προσεκτέον οὖν σοι μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶν αἴνιγμα συνιέναι ἄκουε δὴ καὶ ἀποκρίνου. ἆρʼ οὖν τέλος ἐστὶ κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Λέγουσιν οὕτως. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν πότερον ὡς ἀγαθὰ ἐκλέγονται ἢ ὡς ἀξίας τινὰς ἔχοντα ἢ προαγωγὰς … τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἢ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Οὐ νομίζω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τέλος. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. ἤδη τοίνυν ἀποκαλύψας ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔτʼ ἔχειν φασὶν οὔτε νοεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἢ τὴν πολυτίμητον εὐλογιστίαν ταύτην περὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρησιλογίας.

## 3. Sections 28–38

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/3/#p-N

[¶0] 28. DIADUMENUS. But as for those things that are against the common conceptions taught in the Stoa concerning love, they are all of them concerned in the absurdity. They say, that those youths are deformed who are vicious and foolish, and that the wise are fair; and yet that none of these beautiful ones is either beloved or worthy of being beloved. Nor yet is this the worst; but they add, that those who love the deformed ones cease to do so when they are become fair. Now whoever knew such a love as is kindled and has its being at the sight of the body’s deformity joined with that of the soul, and is quenched and decays at the accession of beauty joined with prudence, justice, and temperance? These men are not unlike to those gnats which love to settle on the dregs of wine, or on vinegar, but shun and fly away from potable and pleasant wine. As for that which they call and term an appearance of beauty, saying that it is the inducement of love, —first, it has no probability, for in those who are very foul and highly wicked there cannot be an appearance of beauty, if indeed (as is said) the wickedness of the disposition fills the face with deformity. And secondly, it is absolutely against all common conceptions that the deformed should be worthy of love because he one day will be fair and expects to have beauty, but that when he has obtained it and is become fair and good, he should be beloved of none. LAMPRIAS. Love, they say, is a certain hunting after a young person who is as yet indeed imperfect, but naturally well-disposed towards virtue. DIADUMENUS. And what do we now else, O my best friend, but demonstrate that their sect perverts and destroys all our common conceptions with improbable things and unusual expressions? For none would hinder the solicitude of these wise men towards young persons, if it were free from all passionate affection, from being called hunting or love of instruction; but they ought to call love that which all men and women understand and call by this name, like that which Penelope’s suitors in Homer seem to acknowledge, “Who all desired to lie with her;” or as Jupiter in another place says to Juno,
For neither Goddess yet nor mortal dame
E’er kindled in my heart so great a flame.

> Greek: 28. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τῶν δὲ περὶ ἔρωτος φιλοσοφουμένων ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας τῆς ἀτοπίας πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν. αἰσχροὺς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς νέους, φαύλους γʼ ὄντας καὶ ἀνοήτους, καλοὺς δὲ τοὺς σοφούς ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν καλῶν μηδένα μήτʼ ἐρᾶσθαι μήτʼ ἀξιέραστον εἶναι. καὶ οὐ τοῦτό πω δεινόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐρασθέντας αἰσχρῶν παύεσθαι λέγουσι καλῶν γενομένων καὶ τίς ἔρωτα γιγνώσκει τοιοῦτον, ὃς ἅμα σώματος μοχθηρίᾳ ψυχῆς βλαπτομένου συνέχεται καὶ γίγνεται, κάλλους; δʼ ἅμα φρονήσει μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης ἐγγιγνομένου, κατασβέννυται καὶ ἀπομαραίνεται; οὓς μηδὲν οἴομαι τῶν κωνώπων διαφέρειν χαίρουσι γὰρ λάμπῃ καὶ ὄξει, τὸν δὲ πότιμον καὶ χρηστὸν οἶνον ἀποπετόμενοι φεύγουσιν. ἣν δὲ λέγοντες καὶ ὀνομάζοντες ἔμφασιν κάλλους ἐπαγωγὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἔρωτος λέγουσι, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· ἐν γὰρ αἰσχίστοις καὶ κακίστοις οὐκ ἂν ἔμφασις γένοιτο κάλλους· εἴπερ, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἡ μοχθηρία τοῦ ἤθους ἀναπίμπλησι τὸ εἶδος. ἔπειτα κομιδῇ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἀξιέραστον εἶναι τὸν αἰσχρόν, ὅτι μέλλει ποτὲ καὶ προσδοκᾶται κάλλος ἕξειν· κτησάμενον δὲ τοῦτο,καὶ γενόμενον καλὸν κἁγαθὸν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐρᾶσθαι. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Θήρα γάρ τις, φασίν, ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως ἀτελοῦς μὲν εὐφυοῦς δὲ μειρακίου πρὸς ἀρετήν. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Εἶθʼ ὦ βέλτιστε, πράττομεν ἄλλο νῦν ἢ τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν ἐλέγχομεν, οὔτε πιθανοῖς πράγμασιν οὔθʼ ὡμιλημένοις ὀνόμασι τὰς κοινὰς; ἐκστρέφουσαν ἡμῶν καὶ παραβιαζομένην ἐννοίας; οὐδεὶς; γὰρ ἦν ὁ κωλύων τὴν περὶ τοὺς νέους τῶν σοφῶν σπουδήν, εἰ πάθος αὐτῇ μὴ πρόσεστι, θήραν ἢ φιλοπαιδείαν προσαγορευομένην· ἔρωτα δʼ ἔδει καλεῖν ὃν πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ πᾶσαι νοοῦσι καὶ ὀνομάζουσι, οἶον τό πάντες δʼ ἠρήσαντο παραὶ λεχέεσσι κλιθῆναι καί
οὐ γὰρ πώποτὲ μʼ ὧδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν.

[¶1] 29. DIADUMENUS. Thus casting moral philosophy into these matters, in which all is “A mazy whirl, with nothing sound, and all perplexed,” they contemn and deride all about them, as if themselves were the only men who regulated nature and custom as it ought to be, and who at the same time adapted reason to each man’s peculiar state by means of aversions, desires, appetites, pursuits, and impulses. But custom has received no good from their logic, but, like the ear diseased by vain sounds, is filled with difficulty and obscurity,—of which, if you think good, we will elsewhere begin a new discourse. But now we will run through the chief and principal heads of their natural philosophy, which no less confounds the common conceptions than that other concerning ends.

> Greek: 29. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. εἰς τοιαῦτα μέντοι πράγματα τὸν ἠθικὸν λόγον ἐκβάλλοντες ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ εὐτελίζουσι καὶ διασύρουσιν, ὡς δὴ μόνοι τὴν φύσιν καὶ συνήθειαν ὀρθοῦντες ᾗ χρὴ καὶ καθιστάντες τὸν λόγον, ὃς ἅμʼ ἀποστρέφει καὶ ἐπάγει ταῖς ἐφέσεσι καὶ διώξεσι καὶ ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἕκαστον. ἡ δὲ συνήθεια τῆς διαλεκτικῆς διέραμα γενομένη χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδʼ ὑγιὲς ἀπολέλαυκεν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἀκοὴ νοσώδης ὑπὸ κενῶν ἤχων δυσηκοΐας καὶ ἀσαφείας ἐμπέπλησται περὶ ἧς αὖθις ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες, εἰ βούλει, διαλεξόμεθα. νυνὶ δὲ τὸν φυσικὸν αὐτῶν λόγον, οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ περὶ τελῶν διαταράττοντα τὰς κοινὰς προλήψεις, ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ πρώτοις ἐπιδράμωμεν.

[¶2] 30. DIADUMENUS. First, this is altogether absurd and against sense, to say that is which is not, and things which are not are. But above all, that is most absurd which they say of the universe. For, putting round about the circumference of the world an infinite vacuum, they say that the universe is neither a body nor bodiless. It follows then from this that the universe has no being, since with them body only has a being. Since therefore it is the part of that which has a being both to do and suffer, and the universe has no being, it follows that the universe will neither do nor suffer. Neither will it be in a place; for that which takes up place is a body, and the universe is not a body, therefore the universe is nowhere. And since that only rests which continues in one and the same place, the universe rests not, because it takes not up place. Neither yet is it moved, for what is moved must have a place and space to move in. Moreover, what is moved either moves itself, or suffers motion from another. Now, that which is moved by itself has some bents and inclinations proceeding from its gravity or levity; and gravity and levity are either certain habits or faculties or differences of bodies. But the universe is not a body. It follows then of necessity, that the universe is neither heavy nor light, and consequently, that it has not in itself any principle of motion. Nor yet will the universe be moved by any other; for there is nothing else besides the universe. Thus are they necessitated to say as they do, that the universe neither rests nor is moved. Lastly, since according to their opinion it must not be said that the universe is a body, and yet the heaven, the earth, animals, plants, men, and stones are bodies, it follows that that which is no body will have bodies for its parts, and things which have existence will be parts of that which has no existence, and that which is not heavy will have parts that are heavy, and what is not light will have parts that are light;—than which there cannot be any dreams imagined more repugnant to the common conceptions. DIADUMENUS. Moreover, there is nothing so evident or so agreeing to common sense as this, that what is not animate is inanimate, and what is not inanimate is animate. And yet they overthrow also this evidence, confessing the universe to be neither animate nor inanimate. Besides this, none thinks the universe, of which there is no part wanting, to be imperfect; but they deny the universe to be perfect, saying that what is perfect may be defined, but the universe because of its infiniteness cannot be defined. Therefore, according to them, there is something which is neither perfect nor imperfect. Moreover, the universe is neither a part, since there is nothing greater than it; nor the whole, for the whole (they say) is predicated only of that which is digested into order; but the universe is, through its infiniteness, undetermined and unordered. Moreover, there is no other thing which can be the cause of the universe, there being nothing besides the universe; nor is the universe the cause of other things or even of itself; for its nature suffers it not to act, and a cause is understood by its acting. Suppose now, one should ask all men what they imagine nothing to be, and what notion they have of it. Would they not answer, that it neither is a cause nor has a cause, that it is neither the whole nor a part, that it is neither perfect nor imperfect, that it is neither animate nor inanimate, that it neither is moved nor rests nor subsists, that it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; and that this and no other thing is meant by nothing? Since then they alone predicate that of the universe which all others do of nothing, it seems plain that they make the universe and nothing to be the same. Time must then be said to be nothing; the same also must be said of predicate, axiom, connection, combination, which terms they use more than any of the other philosophers, yet they say that they have no being. But farther, to say that what is true has no being or subsistence but is comprehended, and that that is comprehensible and credible which no way partakes of the essence of being,—does not this exceed all absurdity?

> Greek: 30. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καθόλου μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιὰν ἐστιν εἶναι μέν τι μὴ ὂν δʼ εἶναι, καὶ εἶναι μὲν οὐκ ὄντα δʼ εἶναι, λεγόντων ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγόμενον. κενὸν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἔξωθεν τῷ κόσμῳ περιθέντες οὔτε σῶμα τὸ πᾶν οὔτʼ ἀσώματον εἶναι λέγουσιν. ἕπεται δὲ τούτῳ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν· ὥστε οὔτε τι ποιήσει οὔτε τι πείσεται τὸ πᾶν. ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἐν τόπῳ ἔσται· σῶμα γὰρ δήπου τὸ ἐπέχον τόπον, οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ὥστʼ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ πᾶν. καὶ μὴν ᾧ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον συμβέβηκε, τοῦτο τὸ μένον· ὥστʼ οὐ μένει τὸ πᾶν οὐ γὰρ ἐπέχει τόπον. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ κινεῖται πρῶτον ὅτι καὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ τόπου δεῖ καὶ χώρας ὑποκειμένης, ἔπειθʼ ὅτι τὸ κινούμενον ἢ αὑτὸ κινεῖν ἢ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου πάσχειν πέφυκε· τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἔχει τινὰς νεύσεις ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ῥοπὰς κατὰ βάρος ἢ κουφότητα κουφότης δὲ καὶ βάρος ἤτοι σχέσεις τινὲς ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἢ διαφοραὶ πάντως σώματος τὸ δὲ πᾶν οὐ σῶμά ἐστιν· ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη μήτε βαρὺ μήτε κοῦφον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μηδʼ ἔχειν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινήσεως ἀρχήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ὑφʼ ἑτέρου κινήσεται τὸ πᾶν· ἕτερον γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ παντός· ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅπερ λέγουσι μήτε μένον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν μήτε κινούμενον. ὅλως δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ λέγειν σῶμα τὸ πᾶν μηδʼ δέον ἐστὶ κατʼ αὐτούς, σῶμα δʼ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ λίθοι τὸ μὴ ὂν σῶμα σώματα μέρη ἕξει καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος μέρη ὄντα ἔσται καὶ τὸ μὴ βαρὺ χρήσεται βαρέσι μορίοις καὶ κούφοις τὸ μὴ κοῦφον ὧν οὐδʼ ὀνείρατα λαβεῖν μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας. καὶ μὴν οὕτως οὐδὲν ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐχόμενον ἐννοιῶν ὡς τό, εἴ τι μὴ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο ἄψυχον εἶναι· καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τι μὴ ἄψυχον, ἐκεῖνο ἔμψυχον εἶναι· καὶ ταύτην οὖν ἀνατρέπουσι τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οὕτω τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογοῦντες μήτʼ ἔμψυχον εἶναι μήτʼ ἄψυχον. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων, ἀτελὲς μὲν οὐδεὶς νοεῖ τὸ πᾶν, οὗ γε δὴ μηδὲν μέρος ἄπεστιν οὗτοι δὲ τέλειον οὔ φασιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν· ὡρισμένον γάρ τι τὸ τέλειον, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὑπʼ ἀπειρίας ἀόριστον· οὐκοῦν ἔστι τι κατʼ αὐτούς, ὃ μήτʼ ἀτελὲς; μήτε τέλειόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε μέρος ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ μεῖζον· οὔτʼ ὅλον, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι· τεταγμένου γὰρ τὸ ὅλον κατηγορεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διʼ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀόριστον εἶναι καὶ ἄτακτον. αἴτιον τοίνυν οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς ἕτερόν ἐστι τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι παρὰ τὸ πᾶν ἕτερον, οὔτʼ ἄλλου τὸ πᾶν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν γὰρ οὐ πέφυκε, τῷ δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ αἴτιον νοεῖται. φέρε τοίνυν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐρωτᾶσθαι, τί νοοῦσι τὸ μηδὲν καί τίνα τοῦ ἐπίνοιαν λαμβάνουσιν ἆρʼ, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν, ὡς τὸ μήτʼ, αἴτιον ὑπάρχον μήτʼ, αἴτιον ἔχον μήθʼ ὅλον μήτε μέρος μήτε τέλειον μήτʼ ἀτελὲς μήτʼ ἔμψυχον μήτʼ ἄψυχον μήτε κινούμενον μήτε μένον που μήθʼ ὑπάρχον μήτε σῶμα μήτʼ ἀσώματον; τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν. ὅταν οὖν ὅσα πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ τοῦ μηδενός, οὗτοι μόνοι τοῦ παντὸς κατηγοροῦσι, ταὐτὸν ὡς ἔοικε φαίνονται τῷ μηδενὶ τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦντες. οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν τὸν χρόνον, τὸ κατηγόρημα, τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ συνημμένον, τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον οἷς χρῶνται μὲν μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὄντα δʼ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι. καίτοι τὸ γʼ ἀληθὲς; ὂν μὴ εἶναι μηδʼ ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ καταληπτὸν εἶναι καὶ πιστὸν ᾧ τῆς οὐσίας; τοῦ ὄντος μὴ μέτεστι, πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶσαν ἀτοπίαν ὑπερβέβληκεν;

[¶3] 31. DIADUMENUS. But lest these things should seem to have too much of logical difficulty, let us proceed to such as pertain more to natural philosophy. Since then, as themselves say, “Jove is of all beginning, midst, and end,” they ought chiefly to have applied themselves to remedy, redress, and reduce to the best order the conceptions concerning the Gods, if there were in them any thing confused or erroneous; or if not, to have left every one in those sentiments which they had from the laws and custom concerning the Divinity:
For neither now nor yesterday
These deep conceits of God began;
Time out of mind they have been aye,
But no man knows where, how, or when.
But these men, having begun (as it were) “from Vesta” to disturb the opinions settled and received in every country concerning the Gods, have not (to speak sincerely) left any thing entire and uncorrupted. For what man is there or ever was, except these, who does not believe the Divinity to be immortal and eternal? Or what in the common anticipations is more unanimously chanted forth concerning the Gods than such things as these:
There the blest Gods eternally enjoy
Their sweet delights;
and again, “Both Gods immortal, and earth-dwelling men;” and again,
Exempt from sickness and old age are they,
And free from toil, and have escaped the flood
Of roaring Acheron?
One may perhaps light upon some nations so barbarous and savage as not to think there is a God; but there was never found any man who, believing a God, did not at the same time believe him immortal and eternal. Certainly, those who were called Atheists, like Theodorus, Diagoras, and Hippo, durst not say that the Divinity is corruptible, but they did not believe that there is any thing incorruptible; not indeed admitting the subsistence of an incorruptibility, but keeping the idea of a God. But Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled (as one may say) heaven, earth, air, and sea with Gods, have not yet made any one of all these Gods immortal or eternal, except Jupiter alone, in whom they consume all the rest; so that it is no more proper for him to consume others than to be consumed himself. For it is alike an infirmity to perish by being resolved into another, and to be saved by being nourished by the resolution of others into himself. Now these are not like other of their absurdities, gathered by argument from their suppositions or drawn by consequence from their doctrines; but they themselves proclaim it aloud in their writings concerning the Gods, Providence, Fate, and Nature, expressly saying that all the other Gods were born, and shall die by the fire, melting away, in their opinion, as if they were of wax or tin. It is indeed as much against common sense that God should be mortal as that man should be immortal; nay, indeed, I do not see what the difference between God and man will be, if God also is a reasonable and corruptible animal. For if they oppose us with this subtle distinction, that man is mortal, and God not mortal but corruptible, see what they get by it. For they will say either that God is at the same time both immortal and corruptible, or else that he neither is mortal nor immortal; the absurdity of which even those cannot exceed who set themselves industriously to devise positions repugnant to common sense. I speak of others; for these men have left no one of the absurdest things unspoken or unattempted. DIADUMENUS. To these things Cleanthes, contending for the conflagration of the world, says, that the sun will make the moon and all the other stars like to himself, and will change them into himself. Indeed, if the stars, being Gods, should contribute any thing to the sun towards their own destruction by contributing to its conflagration, it would be very ridiculous for us to make prayers to them for our salvation, and to think them the saviors of men, whose nature it is to accelerate their own corruption and dissolution.

> Greek: 31. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ, μὴ δοκῇ ταῦτα λογικωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἁψώμεθα τῶν φυσικωτέρων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς μέσσα Διὸς δʼ ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, μάλιστα μὲν ἔδει τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, εἴ τι ταραχῶδες ἢ πλανητὸν ἐγγέγονεν αὐταῖς, ἰωμένους ἀπευθύνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· εἰ δὲ μή, μεθέντας γʼ ἐᾶν ὡς ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἕκαστοι καὶ τῆς συνηθείας πρὸς τὸ θεῖον.
οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς ἀλλʼ ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.
οἱ δʼ ὥσπερ ἀφʼ ἑστίας ἀρξάμενοι τὰ καθεστῶτα κινεῖν καὶ πάτρια τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης οὐδεμίαν, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἔννοιαν ὑγιᾶ καὶ ἀκέραιον ἀπολελοίπασι. τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ἢ γέγονεν, ὃς οὐκ ἄφθαρτον νοεῖ καὶ ἀίδιον τὸ θεῖον; ἢ τί ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς προλήψεσι περὶ θεῶν ὁμολογουμένως ἀναπεφώνηται μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ ἔνι τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἤματα πάντα καί ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων τʼ ἀν̔θρὡπων καὶ τὸ
κεῖνοι γάρ τʼ ἄνοσοι καὶ ἀγήραοι
πόνων τʼ ἄπειροι, βαρυβόαν
πορθμὸν πεφευγότες Ἀχέροντος;
καὶ ἴσως ἐντύχοι τις ἂν ἔθνεσι βαρβάροις καὶ ἀγρίοις θεὸν μὴ νοοῦσι, θεὸν δὲ νοῶν μὴ νοῶν δʼ ἄφθαρτον μηδʼ ἀίδιον, ἄνθρωπος; οὐδὲ εἷς γέγονεν. οἱ γοῦν ἄθεοι προσαγορευθέντες οὗτοι, Θεόδωροι καὶ Διαγόραι καὶ Ἵππωνες, οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν τὸ θεῖον ὅτι φθαρτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν ὡς ἔστι τι ἄφθαρτον τοῦ μὲν ἀφθάρτου τὴν ὕπαρξιν μὴ ἀπολείποντες τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τὴν πρόληψιν φυλάττοντες. ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν γῆν τὸν ἀέρα τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον οὐδʼ ἀίδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους· ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ τὸ φθείρειν προσεῖναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι μὴ ἐπιεικέστερον ἀσθενείᾳ γάρ τινι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἕτερον φθείρεται καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς ἑαυτὸ φθειρομένοις τρεφόμενον σῴζεται. ταῦτα δʼ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμεθα ἔχειν τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ Θεῶν καὶ Προνοίας Εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ Φύσεως γράμμασι διαρρήδην λέγουσι τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρός, τηκτοὺς κατʼ αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας. ἔστιν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν, ὡς τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀθάνατον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ θεὸν θνητὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον δʼ οὐχ ὁρῶ, τίς ἔσται θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον διαφορά, εἰ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ζῷον λογικὸν καὶ φθαρτόν ἐστιν. ἢ γὰρ αὖ τὸ σοφὸν τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν ἀντιθῶσι, θνητὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ θνητὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ φθαρτόν, ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς· ἢ γὰρ ἀθάνατον εἶναι φήσουσιν ἅμα τὸν θεὸν καὶ φθαρτόν, ἢ μήτε θνητὸν εἶναι μήτε ἀθάνατον. ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πλάττοντας ἐξεπίτηδες ἕτερα παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὑπερβάλλειν τὴν ἀτοπίαν· λέγω δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐπεὶ τούτοις γε τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων οὐδὲν ἄρρητον οὐδʼ ἀνεπιχείρητόν ἐστι παρειμένον. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει, λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιῶσαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλʼ ὅτι … οἱ ἀστέρες θεοὶ ὄντες πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν φθορὰν συνεργοῦσι τῷ ἡλίῳ, συνεργοῦντὲς τι πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, πολὺς ἂν εἴη γέλως ἡμᾶς περὶ σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς προσεύχεσθαι καὶ σωτῆρας ἀνθρώπων νομίζειν, οἷς κατὰ φύσιν ἔστι τὸ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῶν φθορὰν καὶ ἀναίρεσιν.

[¶4] 32. DIADUMENUS. And yet these men leave nothing unsaid against Epicurus, crying out, Fie, fie upon him, as confounding their presumption concerning God by taking away Providence; for God (they say) is presumed and understood to be not only immortal and happy, but also a lover of men and careful of them and beneficial to them; and herein they say true. Now if they who abolish Providence take away the pre-conception concerning God, what do they who say that the Gods indeed have care of us, but deny them to be helpful to us, and make them not bestowers of good things but of indifferent ones, giving, to wit, not virtue, but wealth, health, children, and such like things, none of which is helpful, profitable, desirable, or available? Or shall we not rather think, that the Epicureans do not take away the conceptions concerning the Gods; but that these Stoics scoff at the Gods and deride them, saying one is a God of fruits, another of marriage, another a physician, and another a diviner, while yet health, issue, and plenty of fruits are not good things, but indifferent things and unprofitable to those who have them?

> Greek: 32. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν αὐτοί γε πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσι τῶν πραγμάτων ἰοὺ, ἰού, φεῦ, φεῦ βοῶντες, ὡς συγχέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶν πρόληψιν, ἀναιρουμένης τῆς προνοίας· οὐ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ μακάριον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον προλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ νοεῖσθαι τὸν θεόν· ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν. εἰ δʼ ἀναιροῦσι τὴν περὶ θεοῦ πρόληψιν οἱ μὴ ἀπολείποντες πρόνοιαν, τί ποιοῦσιν οἱ προνοεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν τοὺς θεοὺς λέγοντες μὴ ὠφελεῖν δʼ ἡμᾶς μηδʼ ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δωτῆρας ἀλλʼ ἀδιαφόρων, ἀρετὴν μὲν μὴ διδόντας πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ τέκνων γενέσεις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντας, ὧν οὐδὲν ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ λυσιτελὲς οὐδʼ αἱρετὸν οὐδὲ συμφέρον ἐστίν; ἢ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ περιυβρίζουσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν, Ἐπικάρπιόν τινα θεὸν εἶναι λέγοντες καὶ Γενέθλιον καὶ Παιᾶνα καὶ Μαντικόν, οὐκ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς γενέσεως οὐδὲ τῆς πολυκαρπίας ἀλλʼ ἀδιαφόρων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν τοῖς λαμβάνουσι;

[¶5] 33. DIADUMENUS. The third point of the conception concerning the Gods is, that the Gods do in nothing so much differ from men as in happiness and virtue. But according to Chrysippus, they have not so much as this difference. For he says that Jupiter does not exceed Dion in virtue, but that Jupiter and Dion, being both wise, are equally aided by one another, when one falls into the motion of the other. For this and none else is the good which the Gods do to men, and likewise men to the Gods when they are wise. For they say, that a man who falls not short in virtue comes not behind them in felicity, and that he who, being tormented with diseases and being maimed in the body, makes himself away, is equally happy with Jupiter the Savior, provided he be but wise. But this man neither is nor ever was upon the earth; but there are infinite millions of men unhappy to the highest degree in the state and government of Jupiter, which is most excellently administered. Now what can be more against sense than that, when Jupiter governs exceedingly well, we should be exceedingly miserable? But if (which it is unlawful even to say) he would wish no longer to be a savior, nor a deliverer, nor a protector, but the contrary to all these glorious appellations, there can no goodness be added to the things that are, either as to their multitude or magnitude, since, as these men say, all men live to the height miserably and wickedly, neither vice receiving addition, nor unhappiness increase.

> Greek: 33. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τὸ τρίτον τοίνυν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας ἐστὶ μηδενὶ τοσοῦτον τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, ὅσον εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρουσιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ Χρύσιππον οὐδὲ τοῦτο περίεστιν αὐτοῖς ἀρετῇ τε γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερέχειν τὸν Δία τοῦ Δίωνος ὠφελεῖσθαὶ θʼ ὁμοίως ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Δίωνα, σοφοὺς ὄντας, ὅταν ἕτερος θατέρου τυγχάνῃ κινουμένου τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχει καὶ θεοῖς παρʼ ἀνθρώπων, σοφῶν κινουμένου, ἄλλο δʼ οὔκ. ἀρετῇ δὲ μὴ ἀπολειπόμενον ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲν ἀποδεῖν εὐδαιμονίας λέγουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπίσης εἶναι μακάριον τῷ Διὶ τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν ἀτυχῆ, διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις σώματος ἐξάγοντα τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτόν, εἴπερ εἴη σοφός. ἔστι δʼ οὗτος οὐδαμοῦ γῆς οὐδὲ γέγονεν· ἄπλετοι δὲ μυριάδες ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονοῦντες ἐπʼ ἄκρον ἐν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀρχῇ τὴν ἀρίστην ἐχούσῃ διοίκησιν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλον ἂν γένοιτο παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἤ, τοῦ Διὸς ὡς ἔνι ἄριστα διοικοῦντος, ἡμᾶς ὡς ἔνι χείριστα πράσσειν; εἰ γοῦν, ὃ μηδὲ θέμις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, ἐθελήσειε μὴ Σωτὴρ μηδὲ Μειλίχιος εἶναι μηδʼ Ἀλεξίκακος, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τῶν καλῶν τούτων προσηγοριῶν, οὐδὲν ἔστι προσθεῖναι τοῖς οὖσι κακὸν οὔτʼ εἰς πλῆθος οὔτʼ εἰς μέγεθος ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσι, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπʼ ἄκρον ἀθλίως καὶ μοχθηρῶς βιούντων καὶ μηδὲ τῆς κακίας ἐπίδοσιν μηδʼ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς κακοδαιμονίας δεχομένης.

[¶6] 34. DIADUMENUS. Nor is this the worst; but they are angry with Menander for saying upon the stage,
The chief beginning of men’s miseries
Are things exceeding good;
for that this is against sense. And yet they make God, who is good, the beginning of evils. “For matter,” they say, “produced not any evil of itself; for it is without quality, and whatever differences it has, it has received them all from that which moves and forms it.” But that which moves and forms it is the reason dwelling in it, since it is not made to move and form itself. So that of necessity evil, if it come by nothing, must have been produced from that which has no being; but if by some moving principle, from God. But if they think that Jupiter has not the command of his parts nor uses every one of them according to his reason, they speak against common sense, and imagine an animal, many of whose parts are not subservient to his will but use their own operations and actions, to which the whole gives no incitation nor begins their motion. For there is nothing which has life so ill compacted as that, against its will, its feet shall go, its tongue speak, its horns push, or its teeth bite. The most of which things God must of necessity suffer, if the wicked, being parts of him, do against his will lie, cheat, rob, and murder one another. But if, as Chrysippus says, the very least part cannot possibly behave itself otherwise than according to Jupiter’s pleasure, and if every living thing is so framed by Nature as to rest and move according as he inclines it and as he turns, stays, and disposes it, “This saying is more impious than the first.” For it were more tolerable to say that many parts of Jupiter are, through his weakness and want of power, hurried on to do many absurd things against his nature and will, than that there is not any intemperance or wickedness of which Jupiter is not the cause. Moreover, since they affirm the world to be a city and the stars citizens, if this be so, there must be also tribes-men and magistrates, the sun must be some consul, and the evening star a praetor or mayor of a city. Now I know not whether any one that shall go about to confute such things will not show himself more absurd than those who assert and affirm them.

> Greek: 34. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐ μὴν ἐνταῦθα τὸ δεινότατόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ Μενάνδρῳ μὲν εἰπόντι θεατρικῶς
ἀρχὴ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακῶν
τὰ λίαν ἀγαθὰ
δυσκολαίνουσι. τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἥ γʼ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχε. κινεῖ δʼ αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἐνυπάρχων καὶ σχηματίζει, μήτε κινεῖν ἑαυτὴν μήτε σχηματίζειν πεφυκυῖαν. ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τὸ κακόν, εἰ μὲν διʼ οὐδέν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν ἀρχήν, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγονὸς ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν οἴονται τὸν Δία μὴ κρατεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον ἑκάστῳ; παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν λέγουσι καὶ πλάττουσι ζῷον, οὗ πολλὰ τῶν μορίων ἐκφεύγει τὴν βούλησιν, ἰδίαις ἐνεργείαις χρώμενα καὶ πράξεσιν, αἷς τὸ ὅλον ὁρμὴν οὐ δίδωσιν οὐδὲ κατάρχει κινήσεως. οὕτω γὰρ κακῶς οὐδὲν συντέτακται τῶν ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥστʼ ἀβουλοῦντος αὐτοῦ προϊέναι πόδας ἢ φθέγγεσθαι γλῶτταν ἢ κέρα κυρίττειν ἢ δάκνειν ὀδόντας· ὧν ἀνάγκη τὰ πλεῖστα πάσχειν τὸν θεόν, εἰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν αὐτοῦ μέρη ὄντες οἱ φαῦλοι ψεύδονται καὶ ῥᾳδιουργοῦσι καὶ τοιχωρυχοῦσι καὶ ἀποκτιννύουσιν ἀλλήλους. εἰ δέ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον ἔστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς βούλησιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν μὲν ἔμψυχον οὕτως ἴσχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω κινεῖσθαι πέφυκεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἄγει κἀκεῖνος ἐπιστρέφει καὶ ἴσχει καὶ διατίθησιν ὅδʼ αὖτʼ ἐκείνου φθόγγος ἐξωλέστερος. ἑ μυριάκις γὰρ ἦν ἐπιεικέστερον ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ Διὸς ἐκβιαζόμενα τὰ μέρη πολλὰ δρᾶν ἄτοπα παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν καὶ βούλησιν, ἢ μήτʼ ἀκρασίαν εἶναι μήτε κακουργίαν, ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Ζεὺς αἴτιος. ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ φυλέτας καὶ ἄρχοντας δηλονότι καὶ βουλευτὴν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὸν ἕσπερον πρύτανιν ἢ ἀστυνόμον, οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λεγόντων καὶ ἀποφαινομένων ἀποδείκνυσιν ἀτοπωτέρους.

[¶7] 35. DIADUMENUS. Is it not therefore against sense to say that the seed is more and greater than that which is produced of it? For we see that Nature in all animals and plants, even those that are wild, has taken small, slender, and scarce visible things for principles of generation to the greatest. For it does not only from a grain of wheat produce an ear-bearing stalk, or a vine from the stone of a grape; but from a small berry or acorn which has escaped being eaten by the bird, kindling and setting generation on fire (as it were) from a little spark, it sends forth the stock of a bush, or the tall body of an oak, palm, or pine tree. Whence also they say that seed is in Greek called σπέρμα, as it were, the σπείρασις or the coiling up of a great mass in a little compass; and that Nature has the name of φύσις, as if it were the inflation (ἐμφύσησις) and diffusion of reason and numbers opened and loosened by it. But now, in opposition to this, they maintain that fire is the seed of the world, which shall after the conflagration change into seed the world, which will then have a copious nature from a smaller body and bulk, and possess an infinite space of vacuum filled by its increase; and the world being made, the size again recedes and settles, the matter being after the generation gathered and contracted into itself.

> Greek: 35. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικωτέρων λεγομένων ἆρʼ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι σπέρμα πλέον εἶναι καὶ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ γεννώμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ; τὴν γοῦν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν πᾶσι καὶ ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἡμέροις καὶ ἀγρίοις ἀρχὰς τὰ μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα καὶ μόλις ὁρατὰ τῆς τῶν μεγίστων γενέσεως λαμβάνουσαν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πυροῦ στάχυν οὐδʼ ἄμπελον ἐκ γιγάρτου μόνον, ἀλλʼ ἐκ πυρῆνος βαλάνου τινὸς ὄρνεον διαφυγούσης ὥσπερ ἐκ μικροῦ τινος σπινθῆρος ἐξάψασα καὶ ῥιπίσασα τὴν γένεσιν, ἔρνος ἢ βάτου ἢ δρυὸς ἢ φοίνικος ἢ πεύκης περιμήκιστον ἀναδίδωσιν, καί φασιν
τὸ μὲν σπέρμα τὴν ἐπὶ μικρὸν ὄγκον ἐκ πολλοῦ σπείρασιν ὠνομάσθαι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν ἐμφύσησιν οὖσαν καὶ διάχυσιν τῶν ὑπʼ αὐτῆς ἀνοιγομένων καὶ λυομένων λόγων ἢ ἀριθμῶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τε κόσμου πάλιν τὸ πῦρ ὃ σπέρμα λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἰς σπέρμα μετέβαλε τὸν κόσμον ἐκ βραχυτέρου σώματος καὶ ὄγκου, φύσιν ἔχοντα πολλὴν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ προσεπιλαμβάνοντα χώραν ἄπλετον ἐπινεμομένην τῇ αὐξήσει, γεννωμένου δʼ αὖθις ὑποχωρεῖν τὸ μέγεθος καὶ συνολισθάνειν, δυομένης καὶ συναγομένης περὶ τὴν γένεσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν τῆς ὕλης.

[¶8] 36. DIADUMENUS. You may hear them and read many of their writings, in which they jangle with the Academics, and cry out against them as confounding all things with their doctrine of indistinguishable identity, and as vehemently contending that there is but one quality in two substances. And yet there is no man who understands not this, and would not on the contrary think it wonderful and extremely strange if there should not in all time be found a dove exactly and in all respects like to another dove, a bee to a bee, a grain of wheat to a grain of wheat, or (as the proverb has it) one fig to another. But these things are plainly against common sense which the Stoics say and feign,—that there are in one substance two particular qualities, and that the same substance, which has particularly one quality, when another quality is added, receives and equally conserves them both. For if there may be two, there may be also three, four, and five, and even more than you can name, in one and the same substance; I say not in its different parts, but all alike in the whole, though ever infinite in number. For Chrysippus says, that Jupiter and the world are like to man, as is also Providence to the soul; when therefore the conflagration shall be, Jupiter, who alone of all the Gods is incorruptible, will retire into Providence, and they being together, will both perpetually remain in the one substance of the ether.

> Greek: 36. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀκοῦσαι τοίνυν ἔστιν αὐτῶν καὶ γράμμασιν ἐντυχεῖν πολλοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς διαφερομένων καὶ βοώντων, ὡς πάντα πράγματα συγχέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλαξίαις, ἐπὶ δυεῖν οὐσιῶν ἕνα ποιὸν εἶναι βιαζόμενοι καίτοι τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων οὐ διανοεῖται, καὶ τοὐναντίον οἴεται θαυμαστὸν εἶναι καὶ παράδοξον, εἰ μήτε φάττα φάττῃ μήτε μελίττῃ μέλιττα μήτε πυρῷ πυρὸς ἢ σύκῳ τὸ τοῦ λόγου σῦκον ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ γέγονεν ἀπαράλλακτον. ἐκεῖνα δʼ ὄντως; παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἃ λέγουσιν οὗτοι καὶ πλάττουσιν, ἐπὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας δύʼ ἰδίως; γενέσθαι ποιοὺς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποιὸν ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους. εἰ γὰρ δύο, καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέτταρες ἔσονται καὶ πέντε καὶ ὅσους οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι περὶ μίαν οὐσίαν· λέγω δʼ οὐκ ἐν μέρεσι διαφόροις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὁμοίως περὶ ὅλην τοὺς ἀπείρους. λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶθʼ ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

[¶9] 37. DIADUMENUS. But leaving now the Gods, and beseeching them to give these Stoics common sense and a common understanding, let us look into their doctrines concerning the elements. It is against the common conceptions that one body should be the place of another, or that a body should penetrate through a body, neither of them containing any vacuity, but the full passing into the full, and that which has no vacuity—but is full and has no place by reason of its continuity—receiving the mixture. But these men, not thrusting one thing into one, nor yet two or three or ten together, but jumbling all the parts of the world, being cut piecemeal, into any one thing which they shall first light on, and saying that the very least which is perceived by sense will contain the greatest that shall come unto it, boldly frame a new doctrine, convicting themselves here, as in many other things, of taking for their suppositions things repugnant to common sense. And presently upon this they are forced to admit into their discourse many monstrous and strange positions, mixing whole bodies with whole; of which this also is one, that three are four. For this others put as an example of those things which cannot be conceived even in thought. But to the Stoics it is a matter of truth, that when one cup of wine is mixed with two of water, if it is not to be lost but the mixture is to be equalized, it must be extended through the whole and be confounded therewith, so as to make that which was one two by the equalization of the mixture. For the one remains, but is extended as much as two, and thus is equal to the double of itself. Now if it happens in the mixture with two to take the measure of two in the diffusion, this is together the measure both of three and four,—of three because one is mixed with two, and of four because, being mixed with two, it has an equal quantity with those with which it is mixed. Now this fine subtilty is a consequence of their putting bodies into a body, and so likewise is the unintelligibleness of the manner how one is contained in the other. For it is of necessity that, of bodies passing one into another by mixture, the one should not contain and the other be contained, nor the one receive and the other be received within; for this would not be a mixture, but a contiguity and touching of the superficies, the one entering in, and the other enclosing it without, and the rest of the parts remaining unmixed and pure, and so it would be merely many different things. But there being a necessity, according to their axiom of mixture, that the things which are mixed should be mingled one within the other, and that the same things should together be contained by being within, and by receiving contain the other, and that neither of them could possibly exist again as it was before, it comes to pass that both the subjects of the mixture mutually penetrate each other, and that there is not any part of either remaining separate, but that they are necessarily all filled with each other. DIADUMENUS. Here now that famous leg of Arcesilaus comes in, with much laughter insulting over their absurdities; for if these mixtures are through the whole, what should hinder but that, a leg being cut off and putrefied and cast into the sea and diffused, not only Antigonus’s fleet (as Arcesilaus said) might sail through it, but also Xerxes’s twelve hundred ships, together with the Grecians’ three hundred galleys, might fight in it? For the progress will not henceforth fail, nor the lesser cease to be in the greater; or else the mixture will be at an end, and the extremity of it, touching where it shall end, will not pass through the whole, but will give over being mingled. But if the mixture is through the whole, the leg will not indeed of itself afford the Greeks room for the sea-fight, for to this there is need of putrefaction and change; but if one glass or but one drop of wine shall fall from hence into the Aegean or Cretan Sea, it will pass into the Ocean or main Atlantic Sea, not lightly touching its superficies, but being spread quite through it in depth, breadth, and length. And this Chrysippus admits, saying immediately in his First Book of Natural Questions, that there is nothing to hinder one drop of wine from being mixed with the whole sea. And that we may not wonder at this, he says that this one drop will by mixtion extend through the whole world; than which I know not any thing that can appear more absurd.

> Greek: 37. ἀφέντες οὖν ἤδη τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ προσευξάμενοι κοινὰς φρένας διδόναι καὶ κοινὸν νοῦν, τὰ περὶ στοιχείων πῶς ἔχει αὐτοῖς ἴδωμεν. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι. σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος, κενὸν μηδετέρου περιέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλῆρες ἐνδυομένου καὶ δεχομένου τὸ ἐπιμιγνύμενον τοῦ διάστασιν οὐκ ἔχοντος οὐδὲ χώραν ἐν αὑτῷ διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν. οἱ δʼ οὐχ ἓν εἰς ἓν οὐδὲ δύο οὐδὲ τρία καὶ δέκα συνωθοῦντες, ἀλλὰ πάντα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατακερματισθέντος ἐμβάλλοντες εἰς ἓν ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ τοὐλάχιστον αἰσθητὸν ἐπιφάσκοντες ἐπιλείψειν ἐπιόντι τῷ μεγίστῳ νεανιεύονται, δόγμα ποιούμενοι τὸν ἔλεγχον, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἅτε δὴ μαχομένας ὑποθέσεις ταῖς ἐννοίαις λαμβάνοντες. αὐτίκα γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλὰ τερατώδη καὶ ἀλλόκοτα προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς τὰ σώματα τοῖς σώμασιν ὅλοις ὅλα κεραννύντας. ὧν ἐστι καὶ τὸ τὰ τρία τέσσαρα εἶναι· τουτὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι λέγουσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ παράδειγμα τῶν ἀδιανοήτων τούτοις δὲ συμβαίνει τὸν ἕνα κύαθον τοῦ οἴνου πρὸς δύο κεραννύμενον ὕδατος, εἰ μέλλει μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἀλλʼ ἐξισοῦσθαι, παράγοντας ἐπὶ πᾶν καὶ διασυγχέοντας ἕνʼ ὄντα δύο ποιεῖν τῇ πρὸς τὰ δύο τῆς κράσεως ἐξισώσει τὸ γὰρ μένειν ἕνα καὶ δυεῖν παρεκτείνειν καὶ ποιεῖν ἴσον τῷ διπλασίῳ· ἔτι δʼ, ὅπως ἐξίκηται τῇ κράσει πρὸς τοὺς δύο, δυεῖν λαμβάνειν μέτρον ἐν τῇ διαχύσει, τοῦτο μέτρον ἅμα καὶ τριῶν ἐστι καὶ τεσσάρων· τριῶν μέν, ὅτι τοῖς δύο εἷς μέμικται· τεσσάρων δέ, ὅτι δυσὶ μεμιγμένος ἴσον ἔσχηκε πλῆθος οἷς μίγνυται. τοῦτό δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ καλὸν αὐτοῖς, ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς; σῶμα σώματα, καὶ τὸ τῆς περιοχῆς ἀδιανόητον. ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰς ἄλληλα χωρούντων τῷ κεράννυσθαι, μὴ θάτερον μὲν περιέχειν περιέχεσθαι δὲ θάτερον, καὶ τὸ μὲν δέχεσθαι τὸ δʼ ἐνυπάρχειν οὕτω γὰρ οὐ κρᾶσις ἁφὴ δὲ καὶ ψαῦσις ἔσται τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν, τῆς μὲν ἐντὸς ὑποδυομένης τῆς δʼ ἐκτὸς περιεχούσης, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων μερῶν ἀμίκτων καὶ καθαρῶν ἐνδιαφερομένων· ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη, γιγνομένης ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τῆς ἀνακράσεως, ἐν ἀλλήλοις ιὰ μιγνύμενα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ ἐνυπάρχειν περιέχεσθαι καὶ τῷ δέχεσθαι περιέχειν θάτερον καὶ μηδʼ ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὖ πάλιν δυνατὸν εἶναι, συμβαίνειν δʼ ἀμφότερα, τῆς κράσεως διʼ ἀλλήλων διιέναι καὶ μηδὲν ἐπιλείπεσθαι μηδενὸς μόριον ἀλλὰ πᾶν παντὸς ἀναπίμπλασθαι βιαζομένης. ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς Ἀρκεσιλάου σκέλος; ἥκει ταῖς ἀτοπίαις ἐπεμβαῖνον αὐτῶν μετὰ γέλωτος. εἰ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ κράσεις διʼ ὅλων, τί κωλύει, τοῦ σκέλους ἀποκοπέντος καὶ κατασαπέντος καὶ ῥιφέντος εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ διαχυθέντος, οὐ τὸν Ἀντιγόνου μόνον στόλον διεκπλεῖν, ὡς ἔλεγεν Ἀρκεσίλαος, ἀλλὰ τὰς Ξέρξου χιλίας καὶ διακοσίας καὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ὁμοῦ τριακοσίας τριήρεις ἐν τῷ σκέλει ναυμαχούσας; οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλείψει δήπουθεν προϊὸν οὐδὲ παύσεται ἐν τῷ μείζονι τοὔλαττον ἢ πέρας ἡ κρᾶσις ἕξει καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτῆς ἁφὴν ὅπου λήγει ποιησάμενον εἰς ὅλον οὐ δίεισιν ἀλλʼ ἀπαγορεύει μιγνύμενον. εἰ δὲ μεμίξεται διʼ ὅλων, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ σκέλος ἐνναυμαχῆσαι παρέξει τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δεῖται σήψεως καὶ μεταβολῆς· εἷς δέ τις κύαθος; ἢ μία σταγὼν αὐτόθεν εἰς τὸ Αἰγαῖον ἐμπεσοῦσα πέλαγος ἢ τὸ Κρητικὸν ἐφίξεται τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἐπιπολῆς ψαύουσα τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἀλλὰ πάντῃ διὰ βάθους εἰς πλάτος ὁμοῦ καὶ μῆκος ἀναχεομένη. καὶ ταῦτα προσδέχεται Χρύσιππος εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος οἴνου σταλαγμὸν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν· καὶ ἵνα δὴ μὴ τοῦτο θαυμάζωμεν, εἰς ὅλον φησὶ τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν ὧν οὐκ οἶδα τί ἂν ἀτοπώτερον φανείη.

[¶10] 38. DIADUMENUS. And this also is against sense, that there is not in the nature of bodies any thing either supreme or first or last, in which the magnitude of the body may terminate; but that there is always some phenomenon beyond the assumed body, and that this still going on carries the subject to infinity and undeterminateness. For one body cannot be imagined greater or less than another, if both of them may by their parts proceed in infinitum; but the nature of inequality is taken away. For of things that are esteemed unequal, the one falls short in its last parts, and the other goes on and exceeds. Now if there is no inequality, it follows that there is no unevenness nor roughness of bodies; for unevenness is the inequality of the same superficies with itself, and roughness is an unevenness joined with hardness; neither of which is left us by those who terminate no body in its last part, but extend them all by the multitude of their parts unto an infinity. And yet is it not evident that a man consists of more parts than a finger, and the world of more than a man? This indeed all men know and understand, unless they become Stoics; but if they are once Stoics, they on the contrary say and think that a man has no more parts than a finger, nor the world than a man. For division reduces bodies to an infinity; and of infinites neither is more or less or exceeds in multitude, or the parts of the remainder will cease to be divided and to afford a multitude of themselves. LAMPRIAS. How then do they extricate themselves out of these difficulties? DIADUMENUS. Surely with very great cunning and courage. For Chrysippus says: “If we are asked, if we have any parts, and how many, and of what and how many parts they consist, we are to use a distinction, making it a position that the whole body is compacted of the head, trunk, and legs, as if that were all which is enquired and doubted of. But if they extend their interrogation to the last parts, no such thing is to be undertaken, but we are to say that they consist not of any certain parts, nor yet of so many, nor of infinite, nor of finite.” And I seem to myself to have used his very words, that you may perceive how he maintains the common notions, forbidding us to think of what or how many parts every body is compacted, and whether of infinite or finite. For if there were any medium between finite and infinite, as the indifferent is between good and evil, he should, by telling us what that is, have solved the difficulty. But if—as that which is not equal is presently understood to be unequal, and that which is not mortal to be immortal—we also understand that which is not finite to be immediately infinite, to say that a body consists of parts neither finite nor infinite is, in my opinion, the same thing as to affirm that an argument is compacted of positions neither true nor false … DIADUMENUS.

> Greek: 38. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν μήτʼ ἄκρον ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν σωμάτων μήτε πρῶτον μήτʼ ἔσχατον μηδέν, εἰς ὃ λήγει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλʼ ἀεί τι τοῦ ληφθέντος ἐπέκεινα φαινόμενον εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀόριστον ἐμβάλλειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. οὔτε γὰρ μεῖζον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἔσται νοεῖν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μέγεθος, εἰ τὸ προϊέναι τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐπʼ ἄπειρον ἀμφοτέροις συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλʼ ἀνισότητος αἴρεται φύσις ἀνίσων γὰρ νοουμένων, τὸ μὲν προαπολείπεται τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέρεσι τὸ δὲ παραλλάττει καὶ περίεστι· μὴ οὔσης δʼ ἀνισότητος, ἕπεται μὴ ἀνωμαλίαν εἶναι μηδὲ τραχύτητα σώματος· ἀνωμαλία μὲν γάρ ἐστι μιᾶς ἐπιφανείας ἀνισότης πρὸς ἑαυτήν, τραχύτης δʼ ἀνωμαλία μετὰ σκληρότητος· ὧν οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσιν οἱ σῶμα εἰς ἔσχατον μέρος περαίνοντες ἀλλὰ πάντα πλήθει μερῶν ἐπʼ ἄπειρον ἐξάγοντες καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἐναργές ἐστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ πλειόνων συνεστηκέναι μορίων ἢ τὸν δάκτυλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ πάλιν τὸν κόσμον ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίστανται καὶ διανοοῦνται πάντες, ἂν μὴ Στωικοὶ γένωνται γενόμενοι δὲ Στωικοὶ τἀναντία λέγουσι καὶ δοξάζουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πλειόνων μορίων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ δάκτυλος οὐδʼ ὁ κόσμος ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἐπʼ ἄπειρον γὰρ ἡ τομὴ προάγει τὰ σώματα· τῶν δʼ ἀπείρων οὐδέν ἐστι πλέον οὐδʼ ἔλαττον οὐδʼ ὅλως ὑπερβάλλει πλῆθος, ἢ παύσεται τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου μεριζόμενα καὶ παρέχοντα πλῆθος ἐξ αὑτῶν ὁτισοῦν. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Πῶς οὖν ἀμύνονται ταύτας; τὰς ἀπορίας; ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. εὐμηχάνως κομιδῇ καὶ ἀνδρείως λέγει γὰρ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐρωτωμένους ἡμᾶς, εἴ τινα ἔχομεν μέρη καὶ πόσα καὶ ἐκ τίνων συγκείμενα μερῶν καὶ πόσων, διαστολῇ χρήσεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ὁλοσχερὲς τιθέντας, ὡς ἐκ κεφαλῆς καὶ θώρακος καὶ σκελῶν συγκείμεθα τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀπορούμενον ἐὰν δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσχατα μέρη τὸ ἐρωτᾶν προάγωσιν, οὐδέν φησὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν ὑποληπτέον, ἀλλὰ ῥητέον οὔτʼ ἔκ τινων συνεστάναι καὶ ὁμοίως οὔτʼ ἐξ ὁποσωνοῦν οὔτʼ ἐξ ἀπείρων οὔτʼ ἐκ πεπερασμένων. καί μοι δοκῶ ταῖς ἐκείνου κεχρῆσθαι λέξεσιν αὐταῖς, ὅπως συνίδῃς ὃν τρόπον διεφύλαττε τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, κελεύων ἡμᾶς νοεῖν τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον οὔτʼ ἔκ τινων οὔτʼ ἐξ ὁποσωνοῦν μερῶν οὔτʼ ἐξ ἀπείρων οὔτʼ ἐκ πεπερασμένων συγκείμενον. εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὸ ἀδιάφορον, οὕτω πεπερασμένου τι καὶ ἀπείρου μέσον ἐστίν, εἰπόντα τί τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἔδει λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν· εἰ δέ, ὡς τὸ μὴ ἴσον εὐθὺς ἄνισον καὶ τὸ μὴ φθαρτὸν ἄφθαρτον, οὕτω τὸ μὴ πεπερασμένον ἄπειρον νοοῦμεν, ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, οἶμαι, τῷ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι μήτʼ ἐκ πεπερασμένων μήτʼ ἐξ ἀπείρων καὶ λόγον εἶναι μήτʼ ἐξ ἀληθῶν λημμάτων μήτʼ ἐκ ψευδῶν μήτʼ ἐξ … ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

## 4. Sections 39–50

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/4/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/4/#p-N

[¶0] 39. To this he with a certain youthful rashness adds, that in a pyramid consisting of triangles, the sides inclining to the juncture are unequal, and yet do not exceed one another in that they are greater. Thus does he keep the common notions. For if there is any thing greater and not exceeding, there will be also something less and not deficient, and so also something unequal which neither exceeds nor is deficient; that is, there will be an unequal thing equal, a greater not greater, and a less not less. See it yet farther, in what manner he answered Democritus, enquiring philosophically and properly, if a cone is divided by a plane parallel with its base, what is to be thought of the superficies of its segments, whether they are equal or unequal; for if they are unequal, they will render the cone uneven, receiving many step-like incisions and roughnesses; but if they are equal, the sections will be equal, and the cone will seem to have the same qualities as the cylinder, to wit, to be composed not of unequal but of equal circles; which is most absurd. Here, that he may convince Democritus of ignorance, he says, that the superficies are neither equal or unequal, but that the bodies are unequal, because the superficies are neither equal nor unequal. Indeed to assert this for a law, that bodies are unequal while the superficies are not unequal, is the part of a man who takes to himself a wonderful liberty of writing whatever comes into his head. For reason and manifest evidence, on the contrary, give us to understand, that the superficies of unequal bodies are unequal, and that the bigger the body is, the greater also is the superficies, unless the excess, by which it is the greater, is void of a superficies. For if the superficies of the greater bodies do not exceed those of the less, but sooner fail, a part of that body which has an end will be without an end and infinite. For if he says that he is compelled to this, … For those rabbeted incisions, which he suspects in a cone, are made by the inequality of the body, and not of the superficies. It is ridiculous therefore to take the superficies out of the account, and after all to leave the inequality in the bodies themselves. But to persist still in this matter, what is more repugnant to sense than the imagining of such things? For if we admit that one superficies is neither equal nor unequal to another, we may say also of magnitude and of number, that one is neither equal nor unequal to another; and this, not having any thing that we can call or think to be a neuter or medium between equal and unequal. Besides, if there are superficies neither equal nor unequal, what hinders but there may be also circles neither equal nor unequal? For indeed these superficies of conic sections are circles. And if circles, why may not also their diameters be neither equal nor unequal? And if so, why not also angles, triangles, parallelograms, parallelepipeds, and bodies? For if the longitudes are neither equal nor unequal to one another, so will the weight, percussion, and bodies be neither equal nor unequal. How then dare these men inveigh against those who introduce vacuities, and suppose that there are some indivisible atoms, and who say that motion and rest are not inconsistent with each other, when themselves affirm such axioms as these to be false: If any things are not equal to one another, they are unequal to one another; and the same things are not equal and unequal to one another? But when he says that there is something greater and yet not exceeding, it were worth the while to ask, whether these things quadrate with one another. For if they quadrate, how is either the greater? And if they do not quadrate, how can it be but the one must exceed and the other fall short? For if neither of these be, the other both will and will not quadrate with the greater. For those who keep not the common conceptions must of necessity fall into such perplexities.

> Greek: 39. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπινεανιευόμενός φησι τῆς πυραμίδος ἐκ τριγώνων συνισταμένης τὰς πλευρὰς κατὰ τὴν συναφὴν ἐγκεκλιμένας ἀνίσους μὲν εἶναι, μὴ ὑπερέχον δʼ ᾗ μείζονές εἰσιν οὕτως ἐτήρει τὰς ἐννοίας. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι μεῖζον καὶ μὴ ὑπερέχον, ἔσται τι μικρότερον καὶ μὴ ἐλλεῖπον· ὥστε καὶ ἄνισον μήθʼ ὑπερέχον μήτʼ ἐλλεῖπον, τουτέστιν ἴσον τὸ ἄνισον καὶ οὐ μεῖζον τὸ μεῖζον οὐδὲ μικρότερον τὸ μικρότερον. ἔτι τοίνυν ὅρα τίνα τρόπον ἀπήντησε Δημοκρίτῳ, διαποροῦντι φυσικῶς καὶ ἐπιτυχῶς, εἰ κῶνος τέμνοιτο παρὰ τὴν βάσιν ἐπιπέδῳ, τί χρὴ διανοεῖσθαι τὰς τῶν τμημάτων ἐπιφανείας, ἴσας ἢ ἀνίσους γιγνομένας. ἄνισοι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι τὸν κῶνον ἀνώμαλον παρέξουσι, πολλὰς ἀποχαράξεις λαμβάνοντα βαθμοειδεῖς; καὶ τραχύτητας· ἴσων δʼ οὐσῶν, ἴσα τμήματα ἔσται καὶ φανεῖται τὸ τοῦ κυλίνδρου πεπονθὼς ὁ κῶνος, ἐξ ἴσων συγκείμενος καὶ οὐκ ἀνίσων κύκλων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀτοπώτατον. ἐνταῦθα δὴ τὸν Δημόκριτον ἀποφαίνων ἀγνοοῦντα τὰς μὲν ἐπιφανείας φησὶ μήτʼ ἴσας εἶναι μήτʼ ἀνίσους, ἄνισα δὲ τὰ σώματα τῷ μήτʼ ἴσας εἶναι μήτʼ ἀνίσους τὰς ἐπιφανείας. τὸ μὲν δὴ νομοθετεῖν τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν μήτʼ ἴσων μήτʼ ἀνίσων οὐσῶν τὰ σώματα συμβαίνειν ἄνισα εἶναι θαυμαστὴν ἐξουσίαν αὑτῷ τοῦ γράφειν ὅ τι ἂν ἐπίῃ διδόντος ἐστί. τοὐναντίον γὰρ ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ἐναργείας νοεῖν δίδωσι τῶν ἀνίσων σωμάτων ἀνίσους εἶναι τὰς ἐπιφανείας, καὶ μείζονα τὴν τοῦ μείζονα· εἴ γε μὴ μέλλει τὴν ὑπεροχήν, μεῖζόν ἐστιν, ἐστερημένην ἐπιφανείας ἕξειν. εἰ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσι τὰς τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἐπιφανείας αἱ τῶν μειζόνων ἀλλὰ προαπολείπουσιν, ἔσται σώματος; πέρας ἔχοντος μέρος ἄνευ πέρατος καὶ ἀπεράτωτον. εἰ γὰρ λέγει, ὅτι βιαζόμενος οὕτω … ἃς γὰρ ὑφορᾶται περὶ τὸν κῶνον ἀναχαράξεις, ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἀνισότης δήπουθεν οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν ἀπεργάζεται. γελοῖον οὖν τὸ τὰς ἐπιφανείας ὑπεξαιρούμενον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐλεγχομένην ἀπολιπεῖν ἀνωμαλίαν. ἀλλʼ ἂν μένωμεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, τί μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα πλάττειν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπιφάνειαν ἐπιφανείᾳ θήσομεν μήτʼ ἴσην εἶναι μήτʼ ἄνισον, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἔσται μεγέθει φάναι καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμῷμήτʼ ἴσον εἶναι μήτʼ ἄνισον καὶ ταῦτʼ ἴσου καὶ ἀνίσου καὶ ἀνίσου μέσον, ὃ μηδέτερόν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔχοντας εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ νοῆσαι δυναμένους. ἔτι δʼ οὐσῶν ἐπιφανειῶν μήτʼ ἴσων μήτʼ ἀνίσων, τί κωλύει καὶ κύκλους νοεῖσθαι μήτʼ ἴσους μήτʼ ἀνίσους; αὐταὶ γὰρ δήπουθεν αἱ τῶν κωνικῶν τμημάτων ἐπιφάνειαι κύκλοι εἰσίν· εἰ δὲ κύκλους, καὶ διαμέτρους κύκλων θετέον μήτʼ ἴσους μήτʼ ἀνίσους εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ γωνίας καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ παραλληλόγραμμα καὶ παραλληλεπίπεδα καὶ σώματα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μήκη ἐστὶ μήτʼ ἴσα μήτʼ ἄνισα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βάρος ἔσται καὶ πληγὴ καὶ σώματα. εἶτα πῶς τολμῶσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς τὰς κενότητας εἰσάγουσι καὶ ἀμερῆ τινα καὶ μαχόμενον μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε μένειν ὑποτιθεμένοις, αὐτοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀξιώματα ψευδῆ λέγοντες εἶναι; εἴ τινα μή ἐστιν ἴσα ἀλλήλοις, ἐκεῖνα ἄνισὰ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ἴσα ταῦτʼ ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ ἄνισα δʼ ἐστὶ ταῦτʼ ἀλλήλοις. ἐπεὶ δέ φησιν εἶναί τι μεῖζον οὐ μὴν ὑπερέχον ἄξιον ἀπορῆσαι πότερον ταῦτʼ ἐφαρμόσει ἀλλήλοις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει, πῶς μεῖζόν ἐστι θάτερον; εἰ δʼ οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δʼ ἐλλείπειν; τῷ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει τῷ μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ ἐφαρμόσει τῷ μὴ μεῖζον εἶναι θάτερον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν· τοιαύταις ἀπορίαις γίγνεσθαι τοὺς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μὴ φυλάττοντας.

[¶1] 40. DIADUMENUS. It is moreover against sense to say that nothing touches another; nor is this less absurd, that bodies touch one another, but touch by nothing. For they are necessitated to admit these things, who allow not the least parts of a body, but assume something which is before that which seems to touch, and never cease to proceed still farther. What, therefore, these men principally object to the patrons of those indivisible bodies called atoms is this, that there is neither a touching of the whole by the whole, nor of the parts by the parts; for that the one makes not a touching but a mixture, and that the other is not possible, these individuals having no parts. How then do not they themselves fall into the same inconvenience, leaving no first or last part, whilst they say, that whole bodies mutually touch one another by a term or extremity and not by a part? But this term is not a body; therefore one body shall touch one another by that which is incorporeal, and again shall not touch, that which is incorporeal coming between them. And if it shall touch, the body shall both do and suffer something by that which is incorporeal. For it is the nature of bodies mutually to do and suffer, and to touch. But if the body has a touching by that which is incorporeal, it will have also a contact, and a mixture, and a coalition. Again, in these contacts and mixtures the extremities of the bodies must either remain, or not remain but be corrupted. Now both of these are against sense. For neither do they themselves admit corruptions and generations of incorporeal things; nor can there be a mixture and coalition of bodies retaining their own extremities. For the extremity determines and constitutes the nature of the body; and mixtions, unless the mutual laying of parts by parts are thereby understood, wholly confound all those that are mixed. And, as these men say, we must admit the corruption of extremities in mixtures, and their generation again in the separation of them. But this none can easily understand. Now by what bodies mutually touch each other, by the same they press, thrust, and crush each other. Now that this should be done or suffered by things that are incorporeal, is impossible and not so much as to be imagined. But yet this they would constrain us to conceive. For if a sphere touch a plane by a point, it is manifest that it may be also drawn over the plane upon a point; and if the superficies of it is painted with vermilion, it will imprint a red line on the plane; and if it is fiery hot, it will burn the plane. Now for an incorporeal thing to color, or a body to be burned by that which is incorporeal, is against sense. But if we should imagine an earthen or glassy sphere to fall from on high upon a plane of stone, it were against reason to think it would not be broken, being struck against that which is hard and solid; but it would be more absurd that it should be broken, falling upon an extremity or point that is incorporeal. So that the presumptions concerning things incorporeal and corporeal are wholly disturbed, or rather taken away, by their joining to them many impossibilities.

> Greek: 40. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν τὸ μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν· οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τοῦτο, ἅπτεσθαι μὲν ἀλλήλων τὰ σώματα μηδενὶ δʼ ἅπτεσθαι τοῦτο δʼ ἀνάγκη προσδέχεσθαι τοῖς μὴ ἀπολείπουσιν ἐλάχιστα μέρη σώματος, ἀλλʼ ἀεί τι τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἅπτεσθαι πρότερον λαμβάνουσι καὶ μηδέποτε τοῦ προάγειν ἐπέκεινα παυομένοις. ὃ γοῦν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προφέρουσι τοῖς τῶν ἀμερῶν προϊσταμένοις, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μήθʼ ὅλοις ὅλων ἁφὴν εἶναι μήτε μέρεσι μερῶν τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἁφὴν ἀλλὰ κρᾶσιν ποιεῖν, τὸ δʼ οὐκ εἶναι δυνατόν, μέρη τῶν ἀμερῶν οὐκ ἐχόντων πῶς οὖν οὐκ αὐτοὶ τούτῳ περιπίπτουσι, μηδὲν μέρος ἔσχατον μηδὲ πρῶτον ἀπολείποντες; ὅτι νὴ Δία ψαύειν κατὰ πέρας τὰ σώματα οὐχ ὅλα ὅλων οὐδὲ κατὰ μέρος λέγουσι· τὸ δὲ πέρας σῶμα οὔκ ἐστιν. ἅψεται τοίνυν σῶμα σώματος ἀσωμάτῳ· καὶ οὐχ ἅψεται πάλιν, ἀσωμάτου μεταξὺ ὄντος. εἰ δʼ ἅψεται, καὶ ποιήσει τι καὶ πείσεται τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ σῶμα· ποιεῖν γάρ τι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἅπτεσθαι τὰ σώματα πέφυκεν. εἰ δʼ ἁφὴν ἴσχει τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ συναφὴν ἕξει καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφυΐαν. ἔτι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συναφαῖς; καὶ κράσεσιν ἢ μένειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μὴ μένειν, ἀλλʼ ἐφθάρθαι τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων. ἑκάτερον δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι· φθορὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀσωμάτων καὶ γενέσεις οὐδʼ αὐτοὶ καταλείπουσι κρᾶσις δὲ καὶ συναφὴ σωμάτων ἰδίοις χρωμένων πέρασιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ γὰρ πέρας ὁρίζει καὶ ἵστησι τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν· αἱ δὲ κράσεις, εἰ μὴ μερῶν παρὰ μέρη παραθέσεις εἰσὶν ἀλλʼ ὅλοις ὅλα τὰ κιρνάμενα συγχέουσιν, ὥσπερ οὗτοι λέγουσι, φθορὰς ἀπολειπτέον περάτων ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν, εἶτα γενέσεις ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῦτα δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ῥᾳδίως νοήσειεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καθʼ ὃ γʼ ἅπτεται τὰ σώματα ἀλλήλων, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ πιέζεται καὶ θλίβεται καὶ συντρίβεται ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων ἀσώματον δὲ ταῦτα πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν οὐ δυνατόν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διανοητόν ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ βιάζονται νοεῖν ἡμᾶς. εἰ γὰρ ἡ σφαῖρα τοῦ ἐπιπέδου κατὰ σημεῖον ἅπτεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ σύρεται κατὰ σημεῖον διὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου· κἂν μίλτῳ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀληλιμμένη, μιλτίνην ἐνομόρξεται τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ γραμμήν· κἂν πεπυρρωμένη, πυρρώσει τὸ ἐπίπεδον ἀσωμάτῳ δὲ χρώζεσθαι καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ πυροῦσθαι σῶμα παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν. ἂν δὲ δὴ κεραμεᾶν ἢ κρυσταλλίνην σφαῖραν εἰς ἐπίπεδον φερομένην λίθινον ἀφʼ ὕψους νοήσωμεν, ἄλογον εἰ μὴ συντριβήσεται, πληγῆς πρὸς ἀντίτυπον γενομένης ἀτοπώτερον δὲ τὸ συντριβῆναι κατὰ πέρας καὶ σημεῖον ἀσώματον προσπεσοῦσαν. ὥστε πάντῃ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ταράττεσθαι προλήψεις, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πολλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων παρατιθεμένοις ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

[¶2] 41. DIADUMENUS. It is also against common sense, that there should be a time future and past, but no time present; and that erewhile and lately subsist, but now is nothing at all. Yet this often befalls the Stoics, who admit not the least time between, nor will allow the present to be indivisible; but whatsoever any one thinks to take and understand as present, one part of that they say to be future, and the other part past; so that there is no part remaining or left of the present time: but of that which is said to be present, one part is distributed to the future, the other to the past. Therefore one of these two things follows: either that; holding there was a time and there will be a time, we must deny there is a time; or we must hold that there is a time present, part of which has already been and part will be, and say that of that which now is, one part is future and the other past; and that of now, one part is before and the other behind; and that now is that which is neither yet now nor any longer now; for that which is past is no longer now, and that which is to come is not yet now. And dividing thus the present, they must needs say of the year and of the day, that part of it was of the year or day past, and part will be of the year or day to come; and that of what is together, there is a part before and a part after. For no less are they perplexed, confounding together these terms, not yet and already and no longer and now and not now. But all other men suppose, esteem, and think erewhile and awhile hence to be different parts of time from now, which is followed by the one and preceded by the other. But Archedemus, saying that now is the beginning and juncture of that which is past and that which is near at hand, has (as it seems) without perceiving it thereby taken away all time. For if now is no time, but only a term or extremity of time, and if every part of time is such as now, all time seems to have no parts, but to be wholly dissolved into terms, joints, and beginnings. But Chrysippus, desiring to show more artifice in his division, in his book of Vacuity and some others, says, that the past and future time are not, but have subsisted (or will subsist), and that the present only is; but in his third, fourth, and fifth books concerning Parts, he asserts, that of the present time one part is past, the other to come. Thus it comes to pass, that he divides subsisting time into non-subsisting parts of a subsisting total, or rather leaves nothing at all of time subsisting, if the present has no part but what is either future or past.

> Greek: 41. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι χρόνον εἶναι μέλλοντα καὶ παρῳχημένον, ἐνεστῶτα δὲ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρτι καὶ τὸ πρῴην ὑφεστάναι, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅλως μηδὲν εἶναι. καὶ μὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐλάχιστον χρόνον μὴ ἀπολείπουσι μηδὲ τὸ νῦν ἀμερὲς εἶναι βουλομένοις, ἀλλʼ ὅ τι ἄν τις ὡς ἐνεστὼς οἴηται λαβὼν διανοεῖσθαι, τούτου τὸ μὲν μέλλον τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον εἶναι φάσκουσιν ὥστε μηδὲν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ὑπομένειν μηδὲ λείπεσθαι μόριον χρόνου παρόντος, ἄν, ὃς λέγεται παρεῖναι, τούτου τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ μέλλοντα τὰ δʼ εἰς τὰ παρῳχημένα διανέμηται. δυεῖν οὖν συμβαίνει θάτερον, ἢ τὸ ἦν χρόνος καὶ ἔσται χρόνος τιθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἔστι χρόνος· ἢ ἔστι χρόνος ἐνεστηκώς, οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐνειστήκει τὸ δʼ ἐνστήσεται καὶ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ μὲν μέλλον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον, καὶ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον ὥστε νῦν εἶναι τὸ μηδέπω νῦν καὶ τὸ μηκέτι νῦν· οὐκέτι γὰρ νῦν τὸ παρῳχημένον καὶ οὐδέπω νῦν τὸ μέλλον. ἀνάγκη δʼ οὕτω διαιροῦσι λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ σήμερον τὸ μὲν ἐχθὲς τὸ δʼ αὔριον καὶ τοῦ τῆτες τὸ μὲν πέρυσι τὸ δʼ εἰς νέωτα, καὶ τοῦ ἅμα τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικέστερα τούτων κυκῶσι, ταὐτὰ ποιοῦντες τὸ μηδέπω καὶ τὸ ἤδη καὶ τὸ μηκέτι καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ νῦν· οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὸ ἄρτι καὶ τὸ μετὰ μικρόν, ὡς ἕτερα τοῦ νῦν μόρια, καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νῦν τίθενται καὶ νοοῦσι καὶ νομίζουσι. τούτων Ἀρχέδημος μὲν ἀρχήν τινα καὶ συμβολὴν εἶναι λέγων τοῦ παρῳχημένου καὶ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου τὸ νῦν λέληθεν αὑτὸν ὡς ἔοικε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἀναιρῶν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ νῦν οὐ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ πέρας χρόνου πᾶν δὲ μόριον χρόνου τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ νῦν ἐστιν, οὐδὲν φαίνεται μέρος ἔχων ὁ σύμπας χρόνος ἀλλʼ εἰς πέρατα διόλου καὶ συμβολὰς καὶ ὁρμὰς ἀναλυόμενος. Χρύσιππος δὲ βουλόμενος φιλοτεχνεῖν περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Κενοῦ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ ʼτὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλʼ ὑφεστηκέναι φησί, μόνον δʼ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστηκός ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ πέμπτῳ περὶ τῶν Μερῶν τίθησι τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλλον εἶναι τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ τοῦ χρόνου διαιρεῖν εἰς τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως τοῦ χρόνου μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν ὑπάρχον, εἰ τὸ ἐνεστηκὸς οὐδὲν ἔχει μέρος, ὃ μὴ μέλλον ἐστὶν ἢ παρῳχημένον.

[¶3] 42. DIADUMENUS. These men’s conception therefore of time is not unlike the grasping of water, which, the harder it is held, all the more slides and runs away. As to actions and motions, all evidence is utterly confounded. For if now is divided into past and future, it is of necessity that what is now moved partly has been moved and partly shall be moved, that the end and beginning of motion have been taken away, that nothing of any work has been done first, nor shall any thing be last, the actions being distributed with time. For as they say that of present time, part is past and part to come; so of that which is doing, it will be said that part is done and part shall be done. When therefore had to dine, to write, to walk, a beginning, and when shall they have an end, if every one who is dining has dined and shall dine, and every one who is walking has walked and shall walk? But this is, as it is said, of all absurdities the most absurd, that if he who now lives has already lived and shall live, then to live neither had beginning nor shall have end; but every one of us, as it seems, was born without beginning to live, and shall die without ceasing to live. For if there is no last part, but he who lives has something of the present still remaining for the future, to say “Socrates shall live” will never be false so long as it shall be true to say “Socrates lives;” and so long also will be false to say “Socrates is dead.” So that, if “Socrates shall live” is true in infinite parts of time, it will in no part of time be true to say “Socrates is dead.” And verily what end will there be of a work, and where will you terminate an action, if, as often as it is true to say “This is doing,” it is likewise true to say “This shall be doing”? For he will lie who shall say, there will be an end of Plato’s writing and disputing; since Plato will never give over writing and disputing, if it is never false to say of him who disputes that he shall dispute, and of him who writes that he shall write. Moreover, there will be no part of that which now is, but either has been or is to be, and is either past or future; but of what has been and is to be, of past and future, there is no sense; wherefore there is absolutely no sense of any thing. For we neither see what is past and future, nor do we hear or have any other sense of what has been or is to be. Nothing then, even what is present, is to be perceived by sense, if of the present, part is always future and part past,—if part has been and part is to be.

> Greek: 42. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρόνου νόησις αὐτοῖς οἷον ὕδατος περίδραξις, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον πιέζεται, διαρρέοντος καὶ διολισθάνοντος· τὰ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ κινήσεων τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει σύγχυσιν τῆς ἐναργείας ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν εἰς τὸ παρῳχημένον τὸ δʼ εἰς τὸ μέλλον διαιρεῖται, καὶ τοῦ κινουμένου κατὰ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν κεκινῆσθαι τὸ δὲ κινήσεσθαι πέρας δὲ κινήσεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι καὶ ἀρχὴν μηδενὸς δʼ ἔργου πρῶτον γεγονέναι μηδʼ ἔσχατον ἔσεσθαι μηδέν, τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πράξεων συνδιανεμομένων. ὡς γὰρ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος χρόνου τὸ μὲν παρῳχῆσθαι τὸ δὲ μέλλειν λέγουσιν, οὕτω τοῦ πραττομένου τὸ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὸ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι. πότε τοίνυν ἔσχεν ἀρχὴν πότε δʼ ἕξει τελευτὴν τὸ ἀριστᾶν τὸ γράφειν τὸ βαδίζειν, εἰ πᾶς μὲν ὁ ἀριστῶν ἠρίστησε καὶ ἀριστήσει πᾶς δʼ ὁ βαδίζων ἐβάδιζε καὶ βαδιεῖται; τὸ δὲ δεινῶν, φασί, δεινότατον, εἰ τῷ ζῶντι τὸ ἐζηκέναι καὶ ζήσεσθαι συμβέβηκεν, οὔτʼ ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τὸ ζῆν οὔθʼ ἕξει πέρας· ἀλλʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὡς ἔοικε γέγονε μὴ ἀρξάμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τεθνήξεται μὴ παυσάμενος. εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔσχατον μέρος ἀλλʼ ἀεί τι τῷ ζῶντι τοῦ παρόντος εἰς τὸ μέλλον περίεστιν, οὐδέποτε γίγνεται ψεῦδος τὸ ζήσεσθαι Σωκράτη· ἀλλʼ ὁσάκις ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ ζῇ Σωκράτης, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ψεῦδος τὸ τέθνηκε Σωκράτης ὥστʼ, εἰ τὸ ζήσεται Σωκράτης ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν ἀπείροις χρόνου μέρεσιν, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνου μέρει τὸ τέθνηκε Σωκράτης ἀληθὲς ἔσται. καίτοι τί πέρας ἂν ἔργου γένοιτο; ποῦ δʼ ἂν λήξειε τὸ πραττόμενον, ἄν, ὁσάκις ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πράττεται, τοσαυτάκις ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ πραχθήσεται; ψεύσεται γὰρ ὁ λέγων περὶ τοῦ γράφοντος καὶ διαλεγομένου Πλάτωνος, ὅτι παύσεταί ποτε Πλάτων διαλεγόμενος, εἰ μηδέποτε ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ διαλεχθήσεται περὶ τοῦ διαλεγομένου καὶ τὸ γράψει περὶ τοῦ γράφοντος. ἔτι τοίνυν τοῦ γιγνομένου μέρος οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἤτοι γεγονός ἐστιν ἢ γενησόμενον καὶ παρεληλυθὸς ἢ μέλλον· γεγονότος δὲ καὶ γεγενημένου καὶ παρῳχημένου καὶ μέλλοντος αἴσθησις οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδενὸς οὖν ἁπλῶς αἴσθησίς ἐστιν. οὔτε γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τὸ παρῳχημένον ἢ τὸ μέλλον οὔτʼ ἀκούομεν οὔτʼ ἄλλην τινὰ λαμβάνομεν αἴσθησιν τῶν γεγονότων ἢ γενησομένων· οὐδὲν οὖν, οὐδʼ ἂν παρῇ τι, αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, εἰ τοῦ παρόντος ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν μέλλει τὸ δὲ παρῴχηκε καὶ τὸ μὲν γεγονός ἐστι τὸ δὲ γενησόμενον.

[¶4] 43. DIADUMENUS. Now they indeed say, that Epicurus does intolerable things and violates the conceptions, in moving all bodies with equal celerity, and admitting none of them to be swifter than another. And yet it is much more intolerable and farther remote from sense, that nothing can be overtaken by another:
Not though Adrastus’s swift-footed steed
Should chase the tortoise slow,
as the proverb has it. Now this must of necessity fall out, if things move according to prius and posterius, and the intervals through which they pass are (as these men’s tenet is) divisible in infinitum; for if the tortoise is but a furlong before the horse, they who divide this furlong in infinitum, and move them both according to prius and posterius, will never bring the swiftest to the slowest; the slower always adding some interval divisible into infinite spaces. Now to affirm that, water being poured from a bowl or cup, it will never be all poured out, is it not both against common sense, and a consequence of what these men say? For no man can understand the motion according to prius of things infinitely divisible to be consummated; but leaving always somewhat divisible, it will make all the effusion, all the running and flux of a liquid, motion of a solid, and fall of an heavy thing imperfect.

> Greek: 43. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν αὐτοί γε σχέτλια ποιεῖν τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λέγουσι καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰς ἐννοίας, ἰσοταχῶς τὰ σώματα κινοῦντα καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολείποντα μηδενὸς ταχύτερον. πολλῷ δὲ τούτου σχετλιώτερόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπήρτηται τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὸ μηδὲν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς περικαταλαμβάνεσθαι, μηδʼ εἰ χελώνην τὸ τοῦ λόγου φασὶ μετόπισθε διώκοι Ἀδρήστου ταχὺς ἵππος. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, τῶν μὲν κινουμένων κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, τῶν δὲ διαστημάτων, ἃ διεξίασιν, εἰς ἄπειρον ὄντων μεριστῶν, ὥσπερ ἀξιοῦσιν οὗτοι. εἰ γὰρ φθαίη πλέθρῳ μόνον ἡ χελώνη τὸν ἵππον, οἱ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνοντες ἑκάτερα δὲ κινοῦντες κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, οὐδέποτε τῷ βραδυτάτῳ προσάξουσι τὸ τάχιστον, ἀεί τι διάστημα τοῦ βραδυτέρου προλαμβάνοντος εἰς ἄπειρα διαστήματα μεριζόμενον. τὸ δʼ ἔκ τινος φιάλης ἢ κύλικος ὕδατος ἐκχεομένου μηδέποτε πᾶν ἐκχυθήσεσθαι πῶς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἢ πῶς οὐχ ἑπόμενον οἷς οὗτοι λέγουσι; τὴν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον τῶν εἰς ἄπειρον μεριστῶν κίνησιν οὐκ ἄν τις νοήσειε τὸ πᾶν διανύουσαν, ἀλλʼ ἀεί τι μεριστὸν ὑπολείπουσα ποιήσει πᾶσαν μὲν ἔκχυσιν πᾶσαν δʼ ὀλίσθησιν καὶ ῥύσιν ὑγροῦ καὶ φορὰν στερεοῦ καὶ βάρους μεθειμένου πτῶσιν ἀσυντέλεστον.

[¶5] 44. DIADUMENUS. I pass by many absurdities of theirs, touching only such as are against sense. The dispute concerning increase is indeed ancient; for the question, as Chrysippus says, was put by Epicharmus. Now, whereas those of the Academy think that the doubt is not very easy and ready all of a sudden to be cleared, these men have mightily exclaimed against them, and accused them of taking away the presumptions, and yet themselves are so far from preserving the common notions, that they pervert even sense itself. For the discourse is simple, and these men grant the suppositions,—that all particular substances flow and are carried, some of them emitting forth somewhat from themselves, and others receiving things coming from elsewhere; and that the things to which there is made an accession or from which there is a decession by numbers and multitudes, do not remain the same, but become others by the said accessions, the substance receiving a change; and that these changes are not rightly called by custom increasings or diminutions, but it is fitter they should be styled generations and corruptions, because they drive by force from one state to another, whereas to increase and be diminished are passions of a body that is subject and permanent. These things being thus in a manner said and delivered, what would these defenders of evidence and canonical regulators of common conceptions have? Every one of us (they say) is double, twin-like, and composed of a double nature; not as the poets feigned of the Molionidae, that they in some parts grow together and in some parts are separated,—but every one of us has two bodies, having the same color, the same figure, the same weight and place … These things were never before seen by any man; but these men alone have discerned this composition, doubleness, and ambiguity, how every one of us is two subjects, the one substance, the other quality; and the one is in perpetual flux and motion, neither increasing nor being diminished nor remaining altogether; the other remains and increases and is diminished, and suffers all things contrary to the former, with which it is so concorporated, conjoined, and confounded, that it exhibits not any difference to be perceived by sense. Indeed, Lynceus is said to have penetrated stones and oaks with his sight; and a certain man sitting on a watch-tower in Sicily beheld the ships of the Carthaginians setting forth from their harbor, which was a day and a night’s sail from thence. Callicrates and Myrmecides are said to have made chariots that might be covered with the wings of a fly, and to have engraved verses of Homer on a sesame seed. But none ever discerned or discovered this diversity in us; nor have we perceived ourselves to be double, in one part always flowing, and in the other remaining the same from our birth even to our death. But I make the discourse more simple, since they make four subjects in every one, or rather every one of us to be four. But two are sufficient to show their absurdity. For if, when we hear Pentheus in the tragedy affirm that he sees two suns and two cities of Thebes, we say that he does not see, but that his sight is dazzled, he being transported and troubled in his mind; why do we not bid those farewell, who assert not one city alone, but all men and animals, and all trees, vessels, instruments, and clothes, to be double and composed of two, as men who constrain us to dote rather than to understand? But this feigning other natures of subjects must perhaps be pardoned them; for there appears no other invention by which they can maintain and uphold the augmentations of which they are so fond.

> Greek: 44. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. παρίημι δὲ πολλὰς ἀτοπίας αὐτῶν τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐφαπτόμενος. ὁ τοίνυν περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος; ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρχαῖος· ἠρώτηται γάρ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, ὑπʼ Ἐπιχάρμου· τῶν δʼ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ οἰομένων μὴ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον μηδʼ αὐτόθεν ἕτοιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλὰ κατῃτιᾶσθαι κατεβόησαν, ὡς τὰς προλήψεις ἀναιρούντων καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας … φυλάττουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσδιαστρέφουσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἁπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς μὲν ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθιείσας τὰ δέ ποθεν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς ἢ πλήθεσι ταὐτὰ, μὴ διαμένειν, ἀλλʼ ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης αὐξήσεις δὲ καὶ φθίσεις οὐ κατὰ δίκην ὑπὸ συνηθείας ἐκνενικῆσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς ταύτας λέγεσθαι, γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς μᾶλλον αὐτὰς ὀνομάζεσθαι προσῆκον, ὅτι τοῦ καθεστῶτος εἰς ἕτερον ἐκβιβάζουσι τὸ δʼ αὔξεσθαι καὶ τὸ μειοῦσθαι πάθη σώματός ἐστιν ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαμένοντος. οὕτω δέ πως τούτων λεγομένων καὶ τιθεμένων, τί ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ πρόδικοι τῆς ἐναργείας οὗτοι καὶ κανόνες τῶν ἐννοιῶν; ἕκαστον ἡμῶν δίδυμον εἶναι καὶ διφυᾶ καὶ διττόν· οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς Μολιονίδας τοῖς μὲν ἡνωμένους μέρεσι τοῖς δʼ ἀποκρινομένους, ἀλλὰ δύο σώματα ταὐτὸν ἔχοντα χρῶμα, ταὐτὸν δὲ σχῆμα, ταὐτὸν δὲ βάρος καὶ τόπον … ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ὁρώμενα πρότερον· ἀλλʼ οὗτοι μόνον εἶδον τὴν σύνθεσιν ταύτην καὶ διπλόην καὶ ἀμφιβολίαν, ὡς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία τὸ δὲ ποιότης· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτʼ αὐξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον μήθʼ ὅλως οἷόν ἐστι διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὐξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται, καὶ πάντα πάσχει τἀναντία θατέρῳ, συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμοῦ παρέχον ἅψασθαι. καίτοι λέγεται μὲν ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἐκεῖνος διὰ πέτρας καὶ διὰ δρυὸς ὁρᾶν· ἑώρα δέ τις ἀπὸ σκοπῆς ἐν Σικελίᾳ καθεζόμενος τὰς Καρχηδονίων ἐκ τοῦ λιμένος ναῦς ἐκπλεούσας, ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ἀπεχούσας δρόμον· οἱ δὲ περὶ Καλλικράτη καὶ Μυρμηκίδην λέγονται δημιουργεῖν ἅρματα μυίας πτεροῖς καλυπτόμενα καὶ διατορεύειν ἐν σησάμῳ γράμμασιν ἔπη τῶν Ὁμήρου· ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἑτερότητα καὶ διαφορὰν οὐδεὶς διεῖλεν οὐδὲ διέστησεν· οὐδʼ ἡμεῖς ᾐσθόμεθα διττοὶ γεγονότες καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀεὶ ῥέοντες μέρει τῷ δʼ ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄχρι τελευτῆς οἱ αὐτοὶ διαμένοντες. ἁπλούστερον δὲ ποιοῦμαι τὸν λόγον ἐπεὶ τέσσαρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα· περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέσσαρʼ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο πρὸς τὴν ἀτοπίαν, εἴ γε τοῦ μὲν Πενθέως ἀκούοντες ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγοντος ὡς δύο μὲν ἡλίους ὁρᾷ, διττὰς δὲ Θήβας οὐχ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ παρορᾶν λέγομεν, ἐκτρεπόμενον καὶ παρακινοῦντα τοῖς λογισμοῖς· τούτους δʼ οὐ μίαν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα καὶ δένδρα πάντα καὶ σκεύη καὶ ὄργανα καὶ ἱμάτια διττὰ καὶ διφυᾶ τιθεμένους οὐ χαίρειν ἐῶμεν, ὡς παρανοεῖν ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ νοεῖν ἀναγκάζοντας; ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἴσως αὐτοῖς συγγνωστέον πλάττουσιν ἑτέρας φύσεις ὑποκειμένων· ἄλλη γὰρ οὐδεμία φαίνεται μηχανὴ φιλοτιμουμένοις σῶσαι καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰς αὐξήσεις.

[¶6] 45. DIADUMENUS. But by what cause moved, or for the adorning of what other suppositions, they frame in a manner innumerable differences and forms of bodies in the soul, there is none can say, unless it be that they remove, or rather wholly abdicate and destroy, the common and usual notions, to introduce other foreign and strange ones. For it is very absurd that, making all virtues and vices—and with them all arts, memories, fancies, passions, impulses, and assents—to be bodies, they should affirm that they neither lie nor subsist in any subject, leaving them for a place one only hole, like a prick in the heart, where they crowd the principal part of the soul, enclosed with so many bodies, that a very great number of them lie hid even from those who think they can spare and distinguish them one from another. Nay, that they should not only make them bodies, but also rational creatures, and even a swarm of such creatures, not friendly or gentle, but a multitude maliciously rebellious and revengeful, and should so make of each one of us a park or menagerie or Trojan horse, or whatever else we may call their fancies,—this is the very height of contempt and rebellion against evidence and custom. But they say, that not only the virtues and vices, not only the passions, as anger, envy, grief, and maliciousness, not only comprehensions, fancies, and ignorances, not only arts, as shoemaking and working in brass, are animals; but besides these, also they make even the operations bodies and animals, saying that walking is an animal, as also dancing, supposing, saluting, and railing. The consequence of this is that laughing and weeping are also animals; and if so, then also are coughing, sneezing, groaning, spitting, blowing the nose, and other such like things sufficiently known. Neither have they any cause to take it ill that they are by reason, proceeding leisurely, reduced to this, if they shall call to mind how Chrysippus, in his First Book of Natural Questions, argues thus: “Is not night a body? And are not then the evening, dawning, and midnight bodies? Or is not a day a body? Is not then the first day of the month a body? And the tenth, the fifteenth, and the thirtieth, are they not bodies? Is not a month a body? Summer, autumn, and the year, are they not bodies?”

> Greek: 45. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τί παθόντες ἤ τίνας πάλιν ἄλλας ὑποθέσεις κοσμοῦντες ἐνδημιουργοῦσι σωμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ ἰδέας ὀλίγου δέω εἰπεῖν ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν· ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὰς κοινὰς καὶ συνήθεις ἐξοικίζοντες ἐννοίας, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως ἀναιροῦντες καὶ διαφθείροντες, ἑτέρας ἐπεισάγουσιν ἀλλοκότους καὶ ξένας. ἄτοπον γὰρ εὖ μάλα τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πάσας, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμὰς καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένους ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κεῖσθαι μηδʼ ὑπάρχειν τόπον τούτοις, ἕνα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πόρον στιγμιαῖον ἀπολιπεῖν, ὅπου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν συστέλλουσι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑπὸ τοσούτων σωμάτων κατεχόμενον, ὅσων τοὺς πάνυ δοκοῦντας ἀφορίζειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πολὺ πλῆθος διαπέφευγε. τὸ δὲ μὴ μόνον σώματα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῷα λογικὰ καὶ ζῴων τοσούτων σμῆνος οὐ φίλιον οὐδʼ ἥμερον, ἀλλʼ ὄχλον ἀντιστάτην κακίαις καὶ πολέμιον νοῦν ἔχοντας, ἀποφαίνειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παράδεισον ἢ μάνδραν ἢ δούρειον ἵππον τί ἄν τις ἃ πλάττουσιν οὗτοι διανοηθείη καὶ προσαγορεύσειεν;ʼ ὑπερβολὴ τίς ἐστιν ὀλιγωρίας καὶ παρανομίας εἰς τὴν ἐνάργειαν καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν. οἱ δʼ οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῷα εἶναι λέγουσιν οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον ὀργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῷα, τὴν σκυτοτομικὴν τὴν χαλκοτυπικήν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῷον τὴν ὄρχησιν τὴν ὑπόδεσιν τὴν προσαγόρευσιν τὴν λοιδορίαν ἕπεται δὲ τούτοις καὶ γέλωτα ζῷον εἶναι καὶ κλαυθμόν· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ βῆχα καὶ πταρμὸν καὶ στεναγμὸν πτύσιν τε πάντως καὶ ἀπόμυξιν καὶ τὰ λοιπά· ἔνδηλα γάρ ἐστι. καὶ μὴ δυσχεραινέτωσαν ἐπὶ ταῦτʼ ἀγόμενοι τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν λόγῳ, Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν Ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος οὐχ ἡ μὲν νὺξ σῶμʼ ἐστίν, ἡ δʼ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὄρθρος καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματʼ οὔκ ἐστιν· οὐδʼ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμʼ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα καὶ ἡ δεκάτη καὶ πεντεκαιδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

[¶7] 46. DIADUMENUS. These things they hold against the common conceptions; but those which follow they hold also against their own, engendering that which is most hot by refrigeration, and that which is most subtile by condensation. For the soul, to wit, is a substance most hot and most subtile. But this they make by the refrigeration and condensation of the body, changing, as it were, by induration the spirit, which of vegetative is made animal. Moreover, they say that the sun became animated, his moisture changing into intellectual fire. Behold how the sun is imagined to be engendered by refrigeration! Xenophanes indeed, when one told him that he had seen eels living in hot water, answered, We will boil them then in cold. But if these men engender heat by refrigeration and lightness by condensation, it follows, they must also generate cold things by heat, thick things by dissolution, and heavy things by rarefaction, that so they may keep some proportion in their absurdity.

> Greek: 46. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς βιάζονται προλήψεις· ἐκεῖνα δʼ ἤδη καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἰδίας, τὸ θερμότατον περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τὸ λεπτομερέστατον γεννῶντες. ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ θερμότατόν ἐστι δήπου καὶ λεπτομερέστατον· ποιοῦσι δʼ αὐτὴν τῇ περιψύξει καὶ πυκνώσει τοῦ σώματος, οἷον στομώσει τὸ πνεῦμα μεταβάλλοντος, ἐκ φυτικοῦ ψυχικὸν γενόμενον. γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον λέγουσι, τοῦ ὑγροῦ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν. ὥρα καὶ τὸν ἥλιον διανοεῖσθαι περιψύξει γεννώμενον. ὁ μὲν οὖν,Ξενοφάνης, διηγουμένου τινὸς ἐγχέλεις ἑωρακέναι ἐν ὕδατι θερμῷ ζώσας, οὐκοῦν εἶπεν ἐν ψυχρῷ αὐτὰς ἑψήσομεν τούτοις δʼ· ἑποιτ̓ἄν, εἰ περιψύξει τὰ θερμότατα γεννῶσι καὶ πυκνώσει τὰ κουφότατα, θερμότητι πάλιν αὖ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ διαχύσει τὰ πυκνὰ καὶ διακρίσει τὰ βαρέα γεννᾶν, ἀλογίας τινὸς φυλάττουσιν ἀναλογίαν.

[¶8] 47. DIADUMENUS. And do they not also determine the substance and generation of conception itself, even against the common conceptions? For conception is a certain imagination, and imagination an impression in the soul. Now the nature of the soul is an exhalation, in which it is difficult for an impression to be made because of its tenuity, and for which it is impossible to keep an impression it may have received. For its nutriment and generation, consisting of moist things, have continual accession and consumption. And the mixture of respiration with the air always makes some new exhalation, which is altered and changed by the flux of the air coming from abroad and again going out. For one may more easily imagine that a stream of running water can retain figures, impressions, and images, than that a spirit can be carried in vapors and humors, and continually mingled with another idle and strange breath from without. But these men so far forget themselves, that, having defined the conceptions to be certain stored-up intelligences, and memoirs to be constant and habitual impressions, and having wholly fixed the sciences, as having stability and firmness, they presently place under them a basis and seat of a slippery substance, easy to be dissipated and in perpetual flux and motion.

> Greek: 47. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ … ἑννοίας δʼ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς καὶ γένεσιν οὐ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας ὑποτίθενται; φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἔννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ· ψυχῇ δὲ φύσις ἀναθυμίασις, ἣν τυπωθῆναι μὲν ἐργῶδες διὰ μανότητα, δεξαμένην δὲ τηρῆσαι τύπωσιν ἀδύνατον ἥ τε γὰρ τροφὴ καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς ἐξ ὑγρῶν οὖσα συνεχῆ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἀνάλωσιν· ἥ τε πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἐπιμιξία καινὴν ἀεὶ ποιεῖ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξισταμένην καὶ τρεπομένην ὑπὸ τοῦ θύραθεν ἐμβάλλοντος ὀχετοῦ καὶ πάλιν ἐξιόντος. ῥεῦμα γὰρ ἄν τις ὕδατος φερομένου μᾶλλον διανοηθείη σχήματα καὶ τύπους καὶ εἴδη διαφυλάττον, ἢ πνεῦμα φερόμενον ἑν τοῖς ἀτμοῖς καὶ ὑγρότησιν, ἑτέρῳ δʼ ἔξωθεν ἐνδελεχῶς οἷον ἀργῷ καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ πνεύματι κιρνάμενον. ἀλλʼ οὕτω παρακούοντες ἑαυτῶν, ὥστε τὰς ἐννοίας ἐννοίας ἀποκειμένας τινὰς ὁριζόμενοι νοήσεις, μνήμας δὲ μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς τυπώσεις, τὰς δʼ ἐπιστήμας καὶ παντάπασι πηγνύντες ὡς τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ βέβαιον ἐχούσας, εἶτα τούτοις ὑποτίθεσθαι βάσιν καὶ ἕδραν οὐσίας ὀλισθηρᾶς καὶ σκεδαστῆς καὶ φερομένης ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεούσης.

[¶9] 48. DIADUMENUS. Now the common conception of an element and principle, naturally imprinted in almost all men, is this, that it is simple, unmixed, and uncompounded. For that is not an element or principle which is mixed; but those things are so of which it is mixed. But these men, making God, who is the principle of all things, to be an intellectual body and a mind seated in matter, pronounce him to be neither simple nor uncompounded, but to be composed of and by another; matter being of itself indeed without reason and void of quality, and yet having simplicity and the property of a principle. If then God is not incorporeal and immaterial, he participates of matter as a principle. For if matter and reason are one and the same thing, they have not rightly defined matter to be reasonless; but if they are different things, then is God constituted of them both, and is not a simple, but compound thing, having to the intellectual taken the corporeal from matter.

> Greek: 48. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. στοιχείου γε μὴν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἔννοια κοινὴ πᾶσιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώποις ἐμπέφυκεν, ὡς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἄκρατον εἶναι καὶ ἀσύνθετον· οὐ γὰρ στοιχεῖον οὐδʼ ἀρχὴ τὸ μεμιγμένον ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν μέμικται. καὶ μὴν οὗτοι τὸν θεὸν ἀρχὴν ὄντα σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες οὐ καθαρὸν οὐδʼ ἁπλοῦν οὐδʼ ἀσύνθετον ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἑτέρου καὶ διʼ ἑτέρον ἀποφαίνουσιν ἡ δʼ ὕλη καθʼ αὑτὴν ἄλογος οὖσα καὶ ἄποιος τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀρχοειδὲς ὁ θεὸς δέ, εἴπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσώματος οὐδʼ ἄυλος, ὡς ἀρχῆς μετέσχηκε τῆς ὕλης. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ λόγος, οὐκ εὖ τὴν ὕλην ἄλογον ἀποδεδώκασιν εἰ δʼ ἕτερα, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ταμίας ἄν τις ὁ θεὸς εἴη καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἀλλὰ σύνθετον πρᾶγμα τῷ νοερῷ τὸ σωματικὸν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης προσειληφώς.

[¶10] 49. DIADUMENUS. Moreover, calling these four bodies, earth, water, air, and fire, the first elements, they do (I know not how) make some of them simple and pure, and others compound and mixed. For they hold that earth and water keep together neither themselves nor other things, but preserve their unity by the participation of air and force of fire; but that air and fire do both fortify themselves by their own strength, or being mixed with the other two, give them force, permanence, and subsistence. How then is either earth or water an element, if neither of them is either simple, or first, or self-sufficient, but if each wants somewhat from without to contain and keep it in its being? For they have not left so much as a thought of their substance; but this discourse concerning the earth has much confusion and uncertainty, when they say that it subsists of itself; for if the earth is of itself, how has it need of the air to fix and contain it? But neither the earth nor water can any more be said to be of itself; but the air, drawing together and thickening the matter, has made the earth, and again dissolving and mollifying it, has produced the water. Neither of these then is an element, since something else has contributed being and generation to them both.

> Greek: 49. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τά γε μὴν τέσσαρα σώματα, γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ ἀέρα τε καὶ πῦρ, πρῶτα στοιχεῖα προσαγορεύοντες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ καὶ καθαρὰ τὰ δὲ σύνθετα καὶ μεμιγμένα ποιοῦσι. γῆν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀεὶ καὶ ὕδωρ οὔθʼ ἑαυτὰ συνέχειν οὔθʼ ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὑτῶν τʼ εἶναι διʼ εὐτονίαν ἐκτατικά, καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες. πῶς οὖν ἔτι γῆ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὕδωρ, εἰ μήθʼ ἁπλοῦν μήτε πρῶτον μήθʼ αὑτῷ διαρκές, ἀλλʼ ἐνδεὲς ἔξωθεν εἰς ἀεὶ τοῦ συνέχοντος ἐν τῷ εἶναι καὶ σῴζοντος; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀπολελοίπασιν, ἀλλὰ πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν καὶ ἀσάφειαν οὕτως ὁ λόγος λεγόμενος τῆς γῆς τινὸς καθʼ ἑαυτήν. εἶτα πῶς οὖσα γῆ καθʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀέρος δεῖται συνιστάντος αὐτὴν καὶ συνέχοντος; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστι γῆ καθʼ ἑαυτὴν οὐδʼ ὕδωρ· ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην ὁ ἀὴρ ὧδε μὲν συναγαγὼν καὶ πυκνώσας γῆν ἐποίησεν, ὧδε δὲ πάλιν διαλυθεῖσαν καὶ μαλαχθεῖσαν ὕδωρ. οὐδέτερον οὖν τούτων στοιχεῖον, οἷς ἕτερον ἀμφοτέροις οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν παρέσχηκεν.

[¶11] 50. DIADUMENUS. Moreover, they say that subsistence and matter are subject to qualities, and do so in a manner define them; and again, they make the qualities to be also bodies. But these things have much perplexity. For if qualities have a peculiar substance, for which they both are and are called bodies, they need no other substance; for they have one of their own. But if they have under them in common only that which the Stoics call essence and matter, it is manifest they do but participate of the body; for they are not bodies. But the subject and recipient must of necessity differ from those things which it receives and to which it is subject. But these men see by halves; for they say indeed that matter is void of quality, but they will not call qualities immaterial. Now how can they make a body without quality, who understand no quality without a body? For the reason which joins a body to all quality suffers not the understanding to comprehend any body without some quality. Either, therefore, he who oppugns incorporeal quality seems also to oppugn unqualified matter; or separating the one from the other, he mutually parts them both. As for the reason which some pretend, that matter is called unqualified not because it is void of all quality, but because it has all qualities, it is most of all against sense. For no man calls that unqualified which is capable of every quality, nor that impassible which is by nature always apt to suffer all things, nor that immovable which is moved every way. And this doubt is not solved, that, however matter is always understood with quality, yet it is understood to be another thing and differing from quality.

> Greek: 50. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ὕλην ὑφεστάναι ταῖς ποιότησι λέγουσι, ὡς σχεδὸν οὕτω τὸν ὅρον ἀποδιδόναι τὰς δὲ ποιότητας αὖ πάλιν οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσι. ταῦτα δὲ πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίαν οὐσίαν αἱ ποιότητας ἔχουσι καθʼ ἣν σώματα λέγονται καὶ εἰσιν, οὐχ ἑτέρας οὐσίας δέονται· τὴν γὰρ αὑτῶν ἔχουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μόνον αὐταῖς ὑφέστηκε τὸ κοινόν, ὅπερ οὐσίαν οὗτοι καὶ ὕλην καλοῦσι, δῆλον ὅτι σώματος μετέχουσι σώματα γὰρ οὔκ εἰσι· τὸ δ’ ὑφεστὼς καὶ δεχόμενον διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τῶν ἃ δέχεται καὶ οἷς ὑφέστηκεν. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἣμισυ βλέπουσι· τὴν γὰρ ὕλην ἄποιον ὀνομάζουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας οὐκέτι βούλονται καλεῖν ἀύλους. καίτοι πῶς οἷόν τε σῶμα ποιότητος ἄνευ ποιῆσαι, ποιότητα σώματος ἄνευ μὴ νοοῦντας; ὁ γὰρ συμπλέκων σῶμα πάσῃ ποιότητι λόγος οὐδενὸς ἐᾷ μὴ σύν τινι ποιότητι σώματος ἅψασθαι τὴν διάνοιαν. ἢ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἀσώματον τῆς ποιότητος μαχόμενος μάχεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄποιον τῆς ὕλης; ἔοικεν, ἢ θατέρου θάτερον ἀποκρίνων καὶ ἀμφότερα χωρίζειν ἀλλήλων. ὃν δέ τινες αὐτῶν προβάλλονται λόγον, ὡς ἄποιον τὴν οὐσίαν ὀνομάζοντες, οὐχ ὅτι πάσης ἐστέρηται ποιότητος ἀλλʼ ὅτι πάσας ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας, μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιὰν ἐστιν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἄποιον νοεῖ τὸ μηδεμιᾶς ποιότητος ἄμοιρον οὐδʼ ἀπαθὲς τὸ πάντα πάσχειν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς οὐδʼ ἀκίνητον τὸ πάντῃ κινητόν. ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὐ λέλυται, κἂν ἀεὶ μετὰ ποιότητος ἡ ὕλη νοῆται, τὸ ἑτέραν αὐτὴν νοεῖσθαι καὶ διαφέρουσαν τῆς ποιότητος.