---
title: "Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 1 of 4
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/"
---

# Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos

*Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin*

The Stoics claim to follow common sense; Plutarch shows how far they fall from it.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg138, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg138.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Sections 1–14

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/1/#p-N

[¶0] 1. LAMPRIAS. You, O Diadumenus, seem not much to care, if any one thinks that you philosophize against the common notions; since you confess that you contemn also the senses, from whence the most part of these notions in a manner proceed, having for their seat and foundation the belief of such things as appear to us. But I beseech you, with what speed you can, either by reasons, incantations, or some other manner of discourse, to cure me, who come to you full, as I seem to myself, of great and strange perturbations; so much have I been shaken, and into such a perplexity of mind have I been brought, by certain Stoics, in other things indeed very good men and my familiar friends, but most bitterly and hostilely bent against the Academy. These, for some few words modestly spoken by me, have (for I will tell you no lie) rudely and unkindly reprehended me; angrily reputing and branding the ancient philosophers as sophisters and corrupters of students of philosophy, and subverters of regular doctrines; and saying things yet more absurd than these, they fell at last upon the conceptions, into which (they maintained) the Academics had brought a certain confusion and disturbance. At length one of them said, that he thought it was not by fortune, but by the providence of the Gods, that Chrysippus came into the world after Arcesilaus and before Carneades; of which the one was the author of the contumelies and injuries done to custom, and the other flourished most of all the Academics. Chrysippus then, coming between them, by his writings against Arcesilaus, stopped also the way against the eloquence of Carneades, leaving indeed many things to the senses, as provisions against a siege, but wholly taking away the trouble about anticipations and conceptions, directing every one of them and putting it in its proper place; so that they who will again embroil and disquiet matters should accomplish nothing, but be convinced of being malicious and deceitful sophisters. I, having been this morning set on fire by these discourses, want some cooling remedies to extinguish and take away this doubting, as an inflammation, out of my mind.

> Greek: 1. ΛΑΜΠΡΙΑΣ. σοὶ μὲν εἰκός, ὦ Διαδούμενε, μὴ πάνυ μέλειν, εἴ τινι δοκεῖτε παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐννοίας ὁμολογοῦντί γε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων περιφρονεῖν, ἀφʼ ὧν σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσται γεγόνασιν ἔννοιαι, τήν γε περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πίστιν ἕδραν ἔχουσαι καὶ ἀσφάλειαν. ἐμὲ δὲ πολλῆς, ὣς γʼ ἐμαυτῷ φαίνομαι, καὶ ἀτόπου μεστὸν ἥκοντα ταραχῆς εἴτε τισὶ λόγοις εἴτʼ ἐπῳδαῖς εἴτʼ ἄλλον ἐπίστασαι τρόπον παρηγορίας οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἰατρεύων οὕτω σοι διασέσεισμαι καὶ γέγονα μετέωρος ὑπὸ Στωικῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα βελτίστων καὶ νὴ Δία συνήθων καὶ φίλων, πικρῶς δʼ ἄγαν ἐγκειμένων τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ καὶ ἀπεχθῶς· οἵ γε πρὸς μικρὰ καὶ μετʼ αἰδοῦς τὰ παρʼ ἐμοῦ λεχθέντα σεμνῶς, οὐ γὰρ ψεύσομαι, οὐ πράως ᾐτιάσαντο· τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους μετʼ ὀργῆς σοφιστὰς καὶ λυμεῶνας τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ δογμάτων ὁδῷ βαδιζόντων καὶ δε ξομμιινιβης νοτιτιις. ἀνατροπέας καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα λέγοντες καὶ νομίζοντες τέλος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ἐρρύησαν, ὡς δή τινα σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀναδασμὸν αὐταῖς ἐπάγοντας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημείας. εἶτά τις εἶπεν αὐτῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλʼ ἐκ προνοίας θεῶν νομίζοι μετʼ Ἀρκεσίλαον καὶ πρὸ Καρνεάδου γεγονέναι Χρύσιππον, ὧν ὁ μὲν ὑπῆρξε τῆς εἰς τὴν συνήθειαν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ὁ δʼ, ἤνθησε μάλιστα τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν· Χρύσιππος οὖν ἐν μέσῳ γενόμενος, ταῖς πρὸς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀντιγραφαῖς καὶ τὴν Καρνεάδου δεινότητα ἐνέφραξε, πολλὰ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλιπὼν ὥσπερ εἰς πολιορκίαν βοηθήματα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τὰς προλήψεις καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας τάραχον ἀφελὼν παντάπασι καὶ διορθώσας ἑκάστην καὶ θέμενος εἰς οἰκεῖον· ὥστε καὶ τοὺς αὖθις ἐκκρούειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι βουλομένους μηδὲν περαίνειν ἀλλʼ ἐλέγχεσθαι κακουργοῦντας καὶ σοφιζομένους. ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἐγὼ λόγων διακεκαυμένος ἕωθεν σβεστηρίων δέομαι, καθάπερ τινὰ φλεγμονὴν ἀφαιρούντων τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ.

[¶1] 2. DIADUMENUS. You perhaps have suffered the same things with some of the vulgar. But if you believe the poets, who say that the ancient city Sipylus was overthrown by the providence of the Gods when they punished Tantalus, believe also the companions of the Stoa saying that Nature, not by chance but by divine providence, brought forth Chrysippus, when she had a mind to turn things upside down and alter the course of life; for which purpose never any man was fitter than he. But as Cato said of Caesar, that never any but he came to the management of public affairs sober and considerately resolved on the ruin of the state; so does this man seem to me with the greatest diligence and eloquence to overturn and demolish custom, as they who magnify the man testify, when they dispute against him concerning the sophism called Pseudomenos (or the Liar). For to say, my best friend, that a conclusion drawn from contrary positions is not manifestly false, and again to say that some arguments having true premises and true inductions may yet moreover have the contrary to their conclusions true, what conception of demonstration or what presumption of faith does it not overthrow? They say, that the polypus in the winter gnaws his own claws; but the logic of Chrysippus, taking away and cutting off its own chiefest parts and principles,—what other notion has it left unsuspected of falsehood? For the superstructures cannot be steady and sure, if the foundations remain not firm but are shaken with so many doubts and troubles. But as those who have dust or dirt upon their bodies, if they touch or rub the filth that is upon them, seem rather to increase than remove it; so some men blame the Academics, and think them guilty of the faults with which they show themselves to be burdened. For who do more pervert the common conceptions than the Stoics? But if you please, let us leave accusing them, and defend ourselves from the things with which they charge us.

> Greek: 2. ὅμοια πολλοῖς ἴσως πέπονθας. εἰ δʼ οἱ ποιηταί σε πείθουσι, λέγοντες ὡς ἐκ θεῶν προνοίας ἀνατροπὴν ἔσχεν ἡ παλαιὰ Σίπυλος τὸν Τάνταλον κολαζόντων, πείθου τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἑταίροις, ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππον οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλʼ ἐκ προνοίας ἡ φύσις ἤνεγκεν, ἄνω τὰ κάτω καὶ τοὔμπαλιν ἀνατρέψαι δεομένη τὸν βίον· ὡς οὐ γέγονε πρὸς τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων οὐδεὶς εὐφυέστερος, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὁ Κάτων ἔλεγε πρὸ Καίσαρος ἐκείνου μηδένα νήφοντα μηδὲ φρονοῦντα ἐπὶ συγχύσει τῆς πολιτείας τοῖς δημοσίοις προσελθεῖν πράγμασιν, οὕτως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μετὰ πλείστης ἐπιμελείας καὶ δεινότητος οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀνατρέπειν καὶ καταβάλλειν τὴν συνήθειαν, ὡς ἐνιαχοῦ καὶ αὐτοὶ μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τὸν ἄνδρα σεμνύνοντες, ὅταν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου μάχωνται. τὸ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, συμπεπλεγμένον τι διʼ ἀντικειμένων μὴ φάναι ψεῦδος εὐπόρως εἶναι, λόγους δὲ πάλιν αὖ φάναι τινὰς ἀληθῆ τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς ὑγιεῖς ἔχοντας ἔτι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἔχειν ἀληθῆ, ποίαν ἔννοιαν ἀποδείξεως ἢ τίνα πίστεως οὐκ ἀνατρέπει πρόληψιν; τὸν μέν γε πολύποδά φασι τὰς πλεκτάνας αὑτοῦ περιβιβρώσκειν ὥρᾳ χειμῶνος, ἡ δὲ Χρυσίππου διαλεκτικὴ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὑτῆς ἀναιροῦσα καὶ περικόπτουσα τίνα τῶν ἄλλων ἐννοιῶν ἀπολέλοιπεν ἀνύποπτον; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε δήπου καὶ τὰ ἐποικοδομούμενα μὴ βέβαια κεῖσθαι καὶ πάγια, τῶν πρώτων μὴ μενόντων ἀπορίας δὲ καὶ ταραχὰς ἐχόντων τηλικαύτας. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οἱ πηλὸν ἢ κονιορτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοντες τὸν ἁπτόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ προσαναχρωννύμενον οὐ κινεῖν ἀλλὰ προσβάλλειν τὸ τραχῦνον δοκοῦσιν· οὕτως ἔνιοι τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς αἰτιῶνται καὶ νομίζουσι τὰς αἰτίας παρέχειν ὧν ἀναπεπλησμένους ἀποδεικνύουσιν αὐτούς· ἐπεὶ τάς γε κοινὰς ἐννοίας τίνες μᾶλλον διαστρέφουσιν; εἰ δὲ βούλει, τὸ κατηγορεῖν ἐκείνων ἀφέντες, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἀπολογησώμεθα.

[¶2] 3. LAMPRIAS. Methinks, Diadumenus, I am this day become a various and unconstant man. For erewhile I came dejected and trembling, as one that wanted an apology; and now I am changed to an accuser, and desire to enjoy the pleasure of revenge, in seeing them all convicted of philosophizing against the common conceptions and presumptions, from which they think chiefly their doctrine is derived, whence they say that it alone agrees with Nature. DIADUMENUS. Shall we then first attack those common and celebrated doctrines of theirs which themselves, gently admitting their absurdity, style paradoxes; as that only wise men are kings, that they only are rich and fair, they only citizens and judges? Or shall we send all this to the brokers, as old decayed frippery, and make our enquiry into such things as are most practical and with the greatest earnestness delivered by them? LAMPRIAS. I indeed like this best. For who is there that is not already full of the arguments brought against those paradoxes?

> Greek: 3. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ τήμερον, ὦ Διαδούμενε, ποικίλος τις ἄνθρωπος γεγονέναι καὶ παντοδαπός· ἄρτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογίας δεόμενος προσῄειν ταπεινὸς καὶ τεθορυβημένος· νῦν δὲ μεταβάλλομαι πρὸς τὴν κατηγορίαν καὶ βούλομαι ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ἀμύνης, ἐλεγχομένους εἰς ταὐτὸν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιδών, τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφʼ ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνα … δοκοῦσι, καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιβόητα βαδιστέον, ἃ δὴ παράδοξα καὶ αὐτοὶ μετʼ εὐκολίας δεχόμενοι τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπονομάζουσι, τοὺς μόνους βασιλεῖς καὶ μόνους πλουσίους καὶ καλοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ πολίτας; καὶ δικαστὰς; μόνους; ἢ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἑώλων καὶ ψυχρῶν ἀγορὰν βούλει παρῶμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα πραγματικοῖς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένοις ποιησώμεθα τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἐξετασμόν; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἥδιον οὕτως· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα γενομένων ἐλέγχων τίς οὐκ ἤδη διάπλεώς ἐστιν;

[¶3] 4. DIADUMENUS. First then consider this, whether, according to the common conceptions, they can be said to agree with Nature, who think all natural things indifferent, and esteem neither health, vigorousness of body, beauty, nor strength as desirable, commodious, profitable, or any way contributary to the completing of natural perfection; nor believe that their contraries, as maims, pains, disgraces, and diseases, are hurtful or to be shunned? To the latter of these they themselves say that Nature gives us an abhorrence, and an inclination to the former. Which very thing is not a little repugnant to common understanding, that Nature should incline us to such things as are neither good nor available, and avert us from such as are neither ill nor hurtful, and which is more, that she should render this inclination and this aversion so violent, that they who either possess not the one or fall into the other detest their life with good reason, and withdraw themselves out of it.

> Greek: 4. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἤδη τοίνυν αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκόπει πρῶτον, εἰ κατὰ τὰς κοινάς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει τοὺς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα νομίζοντας, καὶ μήτʼ ὑγίειαν μήτʼ εὐεξίαν μήτε κάλλος μήτʼ ἰσχὺν ἡγουμένους αἱρετὰ μήδʼ ὠφέλιμα μηδὲ λυσιτελῆ μηδὲ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος· μήτε τἀναντία φευκτὰ καὶ βλαβερά, πηρώσεις ἀλγηδόνας αἴσχη νόσους· ὧν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πρὸς ἃ μὲν ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς ἃ δʼ οἰκειοῦν ἡμᾶς τὴν φύσιν· εὖ μάλα καὶ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ὄντος, οἰκειοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ συμφέροντα μηδʼ ἀγαθὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν πρὸς τὰ μὴ κακὰ μηδὲ βλάπτοντα· καὶ ὃ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, οἰκειοῦν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ ἀλλοτριοῦν, ὥστε τῶν μὲν μὴ τυγχάνοντας τοῖς δὲ περιπίπτοντας, εὐλόγως ἐξάγειν τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν βίον ἀπολέγεσθαι.

[¶4] 5. DIADUMENUS. I think also that this is said by them against common sense, that Nature herself is indifferent, and yet that it is good to agree with Nature. For it is not our duty either to follow the law or be persuaded by argument, unless the law and argument be good and honest. And this indeed is the least of their errors. But if, as Chrysippus has written in his First Book concerning Exhortation, a happy life consists only in living according to virtue, other things (as he says) being nothing to us, nor co-operating any ways towards it, Nature is not only indifferent, but foolish also and stupid, in inclining us to such things as belong nothing to us; and we also are fools in thinking felicity to be an agreeing with Nature, which draws us after such things as contribute nothing to happiness. For what can be more agreeable to common sense, than that, as desirable things are requisite to live commodiously, so natural things are necessary that we may live according to Nature? Now these men say not so; but having settled the living according to Nature for their end, do nevertheless hold those things which are according to Nature to be indifferent.

> Greek: 5. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. νομίζω δʼ ἐγὼ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν λέγεσθαι, τὸ τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὸν μέγιστον. οὐδὲ τῷ κατακολουθεῖν ἀστεῖον οὐδὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι σπουδαῖον, εἰ σπουδαῖος εἴη καὶ ἀστεῖος ὁ νόμος καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔλαττον εἰ δέ, ὡς Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Προτρέπεσθαι γέγραφεν, ἐν τῷ κατʼ ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων, φησίν, οὐδὲν ὄντων πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδʼ εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων οὐ μόνον οὔκ ἐστιν ἀδιάφορος ἡ φύσις, ἀλλʼ ἀνόητος καὶ ἀπόπληκτος, οἰκειοῦσα ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἀνόητοι δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐδαιμονίαν ἡγούμενοι τὸ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν ἀγούσῃ πρὸς τὰ μηδὲν συνεργοῦντα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. καίτοι τί μᾶλλόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ καθάπερ τὰ αἱρετὰ πρὸς τὸ ὠφελίμως, οὕτω τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ δʼ οὐχ οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν τέλος εἶναι τιθέμενοι τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

[¶5] 6. DIADUMENUS. Nor is this less repugnant to common sense, that an intelligent and prudent man should not be equally affected to equal good things, but should put no value on some, and be ready to undergo and suffer any thing for others, though the things themselves are neither greater nor less one than another. For they say, It is the same thing to abstain from the enjoyment of an old woman that has one foot in the grave, and … since in both cases we do what duty requires. And yet for this, as a great and glorious thing, they should be ready to die; when as to boast of the other would be shameful and ridiculous. And even Chrysippus himself in his commentary concerning Jupiter, and in the Third Book of the Gods, says, that it were a poor, absurd, and impertinent thing to glory in such acts, as proceeding from virtue, as bearing valiantly the stinging of a wasp, or abstaining chastely from an old woman that lies a dying. Do not they then philosophize against the common conception, who profess nothing to be more commendable than those things which yet themselves are ashamed to praise? For how can that be desirable or to be approved, which is worthy neither of praise nor admiration, but the praisers and admirers of which they esteem absurd and ridiculous?

> Greek: 6. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτου παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι τὸ ἔννουν καὶ φρόνιμον ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἐπίσης ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ τίθεσθαι, τῶν δʼ ἕνεκα πᾶν ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπομεῖναι καὶ παθεῖν, μηδὲν ἀλλήλων μικρότητι καὶ μεγέθει διαφερόντων ταὐτὸ δὲ λέγουσιν αὐτοί που τῷ … τὸ σωφρόνως δυσθανατῶσαν ἀποτρίψασθαι πρεσβῦτιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀμφότεροι κατορθοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὡς; λαμπρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κἂν ἀποθάνοιεν ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ σεμνύνειν ἑαυτὸν αἰσχύνη καὶ γέλως, λέγει δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς συγγράμματι καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Θεῶν ψυχρὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄτοπον καὶ ἀλλότριον τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀπʼ ἀρετῆς συμβαινόντων ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι δῆγμα μυίας ἀνδρείως ὑπέμεινε καὶ δυσθανατώσης γραὸς ἀπέσχετο σωφρόνως. ἆρʼ οὖν παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἔννοιαν, ἃς αἰσχύνονται πράξεις ἐπαινεῖν, μηδὲν τούτων κάλλιον ὁμολογοῦντες; ποῦ γὰρ αἱρετὸν ἢ πῶς ἀποδεκτόν, ὃ μήτʼ ἐπαινεῖν μήτε θαυμάζειν ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας ἢ θαυμάζοντας ἀτόπους καὶ ψυχροὺς νομίζουσιν;

[¶6] 7. DIADUMENUS. And yet this will (I suppose) appear to you more against common sense, that a wise man should take no care whether he enjoys or not enjoys the greatest good things, but should carry himself after the same manner in these things, as in those that are indifferent and in their management and administration. For all of us, “whoever we are that eat the fruit of the spacious earth,” judge that desirable, good, and profitable, which being present we use, and absent we want and desire. But that which no man thinks worth his concern, either for his profit or delight, is indifferent. For we by no other means distinguish a laborious man from a trifler, who is for the most part also employed in action, but that the one busies himself in useless matters and indifferently, and the other in things commodious and profitable. But these men act quite contrary; for with them, a wise and prudent man, being conversant in many comprehensions and memories of comprehension, esteems few of them to belong to him; and not caring for the rest, he thinks he has neither more or less by remembering that he lately had the comprehension of Dion sneezing or Theon playing at ball. And yet every comprehension in a wise man, and every memory having assurance and firmness, is a great, yea, a very great good. When therefore his health fails, when some organ of his senses is disordered, or when his wealth is lost, is a wise man so careless as to think that none of these things concern him? Or does he, “when sick, give fees to the physicians: for the gaining of riches sail to Leucon, governor in the Bosphorus, or travel to Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians,” as Chrysippus says? And being deprived of some of his senses, does he not grow weary even of life? How then do they not acknowledge that they philosophize against the common notions, employing so much care and diligence on things indifferent, and recking not whether they have or have not great good things?

> Greek: 7. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, οἶμαι, φανεῖταί σοι παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν, εἰ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ὁ φρόνιμος μήτʼ ἀπόντων μήτʼ εἰ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ φροντίζοι, ἀλλʼ οἷός ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ τῇ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείᾳ καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ, τοιοῦτος ἂν κἀν τούτοις εἴη. πάντες γὰρ δήπουθεν εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, οὗ μὲν καὶ παρόντος ὄνησίς ἐστι καὶ μὴ παρόντος ὥσπερ ἔνδεια καὶ ὄρεξις, αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον νοοῦμεν· ἐφʼ ᾧ δʼ οὐδὲν ἄν τις πραγματεύσαιτο μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκεν μηδὲ ῥᾳστώνης, τοῦτʼ ἀδιάφορον. ἄλλῳ γὰρ οὐδενὶ τοῦ φιλοπόνου τὸν κενόσπουδον ἀφορίζομεν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὄντα πολλάκις, ἢ τῷ τὸν μὲν εἰς ἀνωφελῆ πονεῖν καὶ ἀδιαφόρως, τὸν δʼ ἕνεκά του τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ λυσιτελῶν. ἀλλʼ οὗτοί γε τοὐναντίον· ὁ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτοῖς καὶ φρόνιμος ἐν πολλαῖς καταλήψεσι καὶ μνήμαις καταλήψεων γεγονὼς ὀλίγας πρὸς αὑτὸν ἡγεῖται τῶν τʼ ἄλλων οὐ πεφροντικὼς οὐδʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οῦδὲ πλέον οἴεται, μνημονεύων ὅτι πέρυσι κατάληψιν ἔλαβε πταρνυμένου Δίωνος ἢ σφαιρίζοντος Θέωνος. καίτοι πᾶσα κατάληψις ἐν τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μνήμη τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχουσα καὶ βέβαιον εὐθύς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα καὶ μέγιστον. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁμοίως ὑγιείας ἐπιλειπούσης, αἰσθητηρίου κάμνοντος, οὐσίας ἀπολλυμένης ἀφρόντιστός ἐστι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲν ἡγούμενος τούτων ὁ σοφός· ἢ νοσῶν μὲν ἰατροῖς τελεῖ μισθοὺς χρημάτων δʼ ἕνεκα πρὸς Λεύκωνα πλεῖ τὸν ἐν Βοσπόρῳ δυνάστην καὶ πρὸς Ἰδάνθυρσον ἀποδημεῖ τὸν Σκύθην ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, τῶν δʼ αἰσθήσεων ἔστιν ἃς ἀποβαλὼν οὐδὲ ζῆν ὑπομένει; πῶς οὖν οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις τοσαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι καὶ σπουδάζοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ μεγάλων καὶ παρόντων καὶ μὴ παρόντων ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντες;

[¶7] 8. DIADUMENUS. But this is also yet against the common conceptions, that he who is a man should not rejoice when coming from the greatest evils to the greatest goods. Now their wise men suffer this. Being changed from extreme viciousness to the highest virtue, and at the same time escaping a most miserable life and attaining to a most happy one, he shows no sign of joy, nor does this so great change lift him up or yet move him, being delivered from all infelicity and vice, and coming to a certain sure and firm perfection of virtue. This also is repugnant to common sense, to maintain that the being immutable in one’s judgments and resolutions is the greatest of goods, and yet that he who has attained to the height wants not this, nor cares for it when he has it, nay, many times will not so much as stretch forth a finger for this security and constancy, which nevertheless themselves esteem the sovereign and perfect good. Nor do the Stoics say only these things, but they add also this to them,—that the continuance of time increases not any good thing; but if a man shall be wise but a minute of an hour, he will not be any way inferior in happiness to him who has all his time practised virtue and led his life happily in it. Yet, whilst they thus boldly affirm these things, they on the contrary also say, that a short-lived virtue is nothing worth; “For what advantage would the attainment of wisdom be to him who is immediately to be swallowed up by the waves or tumbled down headlong from a precipice? What would it have benefited Lichas, if being thrown by Hercules, as from a sling into the sea, he had been on a sudden changed from vice to virtue?” These therefore are the positions of men who not only philosophize against the common conceptions but also confound their own, if the having been but a little while endued with virtue is no way short of the highest felicity, and at the same time nothing worth.

> Greek: 8. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστίν, ἄνθρωπον ὄντα μὴ χαίρειν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀγαθοῖς; γενόμενον τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθεν ὁ τούτων σοφός. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄκρας κακίας μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν ἀθλιώτατον βίον διαφυγὼν ἅμα καὶ κτησάμενος τὸν μακαριώτατον οὐδὲν ἐπίδηλον εἰς χαρὰν ἔσχεν οὐδʼ ἐπῆρεν αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ἐκίνησεν ἡ τοσαύτη μεταβολή, κακοδαιμονίας ἀπαλλαγέντα καὶ μοχθηρίας ἁπάσης, εἰς δʼ ἀσφαλῆ τινα καὶ βεβαίαν παντέλειαν ἀγαθῶν ἐξικόμενον. ἔτι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν μὲν εἶναι μέγιστον τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσι καὶ βέβαιον, δεῖσθαι δὲ τούτου τὸν ἐπʼ ἄκρον προκόπτοντα μηδὲ φροντίζειν παραγενομένου πολλάκις δὲ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι ταύτης γʼ ἕνεκα τῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ βεβαιότητος, ἣν τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα νομίζουσιν. οὐ μόνον οὖν ταῦτα λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνα πρὸς τούτοις, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὔξει προσγιγνόμενος, ἀλλά, κἂν ἀκαρές τις ὥρας γένηται φρόνιμος, οὐδενὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπολειφθήσεται τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα χρωμένου τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μακαρίως ἐν αὐτῇ καταβιοῦντος. ταῦτα δʼ οὕτω νεανικῶς ἀπισχυρισάμενοι πάλιν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασιν ἀρετῆς ὄφελος ὀλιγοχρονίου τί γάρ, ἂν μέλλοντι ναυαγεῖν εὐθὺς ἢ κατακρημνίζεσθαι φρόνησις ἐπιγένηται; τί δʼ ἂν ὁ Λίχας, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἀποσφενδονώμενος, εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐκ κακίας μεταβάλῃ ταῦτʼ οὖν οὐ μόνον παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας ἐστὶ φιλοσοφούντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας κυκώντων, εἰ τὸ βραχὺν χρόνον κτήσασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐθὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἄκρας εὐδαιμονίας ἅμα καὶ μηδενὸς ὅλως ἄξιον νομίζουσι.

[¶8] 9. DIADUMENUS. Nor is this the strangest thing you will find in their doctrine; but their being of opinion that virtue and happiness, when present, are frequently not perceived by him who enjoys them, nor does he discern that, having but a little before been most miserable and foolish, he is of a sudden become wise and happy. For it is not only childish to say that he who is possessed of wisdom is ignorant of this thing alone, that he is wise, and knows not that he is delivered from folly; but, to speak in general, they make goodness to have very little weight or strength, if it does not give so much as a feeling of it when it is present. For according even to them, it is not by nature imperceptible; nay, even Chrysippus in his books of the End expressly says that good is sensible, and demonstrates it also, as he thinks. It remains then, that by its weakness and littleness it flies the sense, when being present it is unknown and concealed from the possessors. It were moreover absurd to imagine that the sight, perceiving those things which are but a little whitish or inclining to white, should not discern such as are white in perfection; or that the touch, feeling those things which are but warm or moderately hot, should be insensible of those that are hot in the highest degree. And yet more absurd it is, that a man who perceives what is commonly according to Nature —as are health and good constitution of body—should yet be ignorant of virtue when it is present, which themselves hold to be most of all and in the highest degree according to Nature. For how can it but be against sense, to conceive the difference between health and sickness, and yet so little to comprehend that between wisdom and folly as to think the one to be present when it is gone, and possessing the other to be ignorant that one has it? Now because there is from the highest progress a change made to felicity and virtue, one of these two things must of necessity follow; either that this progress is not vice and infelicity, or that virtue is not far distant from vice, nor happiness from misery, but that the difference between good and evil is very small and not to be perceived by sense; for otherwise they who have the one for the other could not be ignorant of it.

> Greek: 9. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. τοῦτο δʼ οὐκ ἂν μάλιστα θαυμάσαις αὐτῶν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι, τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγιγνομένης, πολλάκις οὐδʼ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται, διαλεληθέναι δʼ αὑτόν, ὅτι μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος ὢν καὶ ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἔχοντά τινα τὴν φρόνησιν τοῦτο μόνον μὴ φρονεῖν ὅτι φρονεῖ μηδὲ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἀγνοεῖν διαπέφευγεν εὐτράπελόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὡς εἰπεῖν τάγαθὸν ἀρρεπὲς ποιοῦσι καὶ ἀμαυρόν, εἰ μηδʼ αἴσθησιν αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ παραγενόμενον. φύσει γὰρ ἀνεπαίσθητον οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ αὐτούς ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγει διαρρήδην Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τέλους αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τάγαθόν· ὡς δʼ οἴεται, καὶ ἀποδείκνυσι. λείπεται τοίνυν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ μικρότητι διαφεύγειν αὐτὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὁπόταν παρὸν ἀγνοῆται καὶ διαλανθάνῃ τοὺς ἔχοντας. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄτοπον μέν ἐστι τὴν τῶν ἀτρέμα λευκῶν καὶ μέσως αἰσθανομένην ὄψιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ ἐπʼ ἄκρον λευκὰ καὶ τὴν τὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως θερμὰ καταλαμβάνουσαν ἁφὴν ἀναισθητεῖν τῶν σφόδρα θερμῶν ἀτοπώτερον δέ, εἴ τις τὸ κοινῶς κατὰ φύσιν, οἷόν ἐστιν ὑγίεια καὶ εὐεξία, καταλαμβάνων, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγνοεῖ παροῦσαν, ἣν μάλιστα καὶ ἄκρως κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τίθενται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου διαφορὰν καταλαμβάνειν, φρονήσεως δὲ μὴ καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ἀφροσύνης, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀπηλλαγμένην οἴεσθαι παρεῖναι, τὴν δὲ κεκτημένον ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πάρεστιν; ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας προκοπῆς μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετήν, δυεῖν ἀνάγκη θάτερον, ἢ τὴν προκοπὴν κακίαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ κακοδαιμονίαν, ἢ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς κακίας μὴ πολλῷ παραλλάττειν μηδὲ τῆς κακοδαιμονίας τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ μικρὰν καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διαφορὰν οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς διελάνθανον ἀντʼ ἐκείνων ταῦτ̓ ἔχοντες.

[¶9] 10. DIADUMENUS. Since then they will not depart from any of these contrarieties, but confess and hold them all,—that those who are proceeding towards virtue are fools and vicious, that those who are become good and wise perceive not this change in themselves, and that there is a great difference between folly and wisdom,—they must surely seem to you wonderfully to preserve an agreement in their doctrines, and yet more so in their actions, when affirming all men who are not wise to be equally wicked, unjust, faithless, and fools, they on the other side abhor and detest some of them,—nay, sometimes to such a degree that they refuse even to speak to them when they meet them,—while others of them they trust with their money, choose to offices, and take for husbands to their daughters. Now if they say these things in jest, let them smooth their brows; but if in earnest and as philosophers, it is against the common notions to reprove and blame all men alike in words, and yet to deal with some of them as moderate persons and with others as very wicked; and exceedingly to admire Chrysippus, to deride Alexinus, and yet to think neither of them more or less mad than the other. “’Tis so,” say they; “but as he who is not above a cubit under the superficies of the sea is no less drowned than he who is five hundred fathom deep, so they that are coming towards virtue are no less in vice than those that are farther off. And as blind men are still blind, though they shall perhaps a little after recover their sight; so these that have proceeded towards virtue, till such time as they have attained to it, continue foolish and wicked.” But that they who are in the way towards virtue resemble not the blind, but such as see less clearly, nor are like to those who are drowned, but—those which swim, and that near the harbor,—they themselves testify by their actions. For they would not use counsellors and generals and lawgivers as blind guides, nor would they imitate the works and actions and words and lives of some, if they saw them all equally drowned in folly and wickedness. But leaving this, wonder at the men in this behalf, that they are not taught by their own examples to give up the doctrine that these men are wise being ignorant of it themselves, and neither knowing nor being sensible that they are recovered from being drowned and see the light, and that being gotten above vice, they fetch breath again.

> Greek: 10. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς ἐκστῆναι τῶν μαχομένων ἀλλὰ πάνθʼ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τιθέναι θέλωσι, τὸ τοὺς προκόπτοντας ἀνοήτους καὶ κακοὺς εἶναι, τὸ φρονίμους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς γενομένους διαλανθάνειν ἑαυτούς, τὸ μεγάλην διαφορὰν τῆς φρονήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀφροσύνην ὑπάρχειν· ἦ πού σοι δοκοῦσι θαυμασίως ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι τὴν ὁμολογίαν βεβαιοῦν; ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὅταν πάντας ἐπίσης κακοὺς καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀπίστους καὶ ἄφρονας τοὺς μὴ σοφοὺς ἀποφαίνοντες εἶτα πάλιν τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκτρέπωνται καὶ βδελύττωνται, τοὺς δʼ ἀπαντῶντες μηδὲ προσαγορεύωσι· τοῖς δὲ χρήματα πιστεύωσιν, ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζωσιν, ἐκδιδῶσι θυγατέρας. ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ μὲν παίζοντες λέγουσι, καθείσθωσαν τὰς ὀφρῦς· εἰ δʼ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες, παρὰ τὰς κοινάς ἐστιν ἐννοίας ψέγειν μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ κακίζειν πάντας ἀνθρώπους, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὡς μετρίοις τοῖς δʼ ὡς κακίστοις· καὶ Χρύσιππον μὲν ὑπερεκπεπλῆχθαι καταγελᾶν δʼ Ἀλεξίνου, μηδὲν δὲ μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι μηδʼ ἧττον ἀλλήλων ἀφραίνειν τοὺς ἄνδρας. ναί φασίν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἧττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυιὰς πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδʼ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἧττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοί εἰσι, κἂν ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες, ἄχρι οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τυφλοῖς· ἐοίκασιν οἱ προκόπτοντες ἀλλʼ ἧττον ὀξυδορκοῦσιν, οὔτε πνιγομένοις ἀλλὰ νηχομένοις, καὶ ταῦτα πλησίον λιμένος, αὐτοὶ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μαρτυροῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐχρῶντο συμβούλοις καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ νομοθέταις ὥσπερ τυφλοῖς χειραγωγοῖς, οὐδʼ ἂν ἐζήλουν ἔργα καὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ βίους ἐνίων, εἰ πάντας ὡσαύτως πνιγομένους ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης καὶ μοχθηρίας ἑώρων. ἀφεὶς δὲ τοῦτο θαύμασον ἐκείνῃ τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ μηδὲ ι· τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδάσκονται παραδείγμασι προέσθαι τοὺς διαλεληθότας ἐκείνους σοφοὺς καὶ μὴ συνιέντας μηδʼ αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι πνιγόμενοι πέπαυνται καὶ φῶς ὁρῶσι καὶ τῆς κακίας ἐπάνω γεγονότες ἀναπεπνεύκασι.

[¶10] 11. DIADUMENUS. This also is against common sense, that it should be convenient for a man who has all good things, and wants nothing requisite to felicity and happiness, to make away himself; and much more this, that for him who neither has nor ever shall have any good thing, but who is and ever shall be accompanied with all adversities, difficulties, and mishaps, it should not be fitting to quit this life unless some of the indifferent things befall him. These laws are enacted in the Stoa; and by these they incite many wise men to kill themselves, as if they would be thereby more happy; and they restrain many foolish men, as if it were fitting for them to live on in wretchedness. Although the wise man is fortunate, blessed, every way happy, secure, and free from danger; but the vicious and foolish man is “full, as I may say, of evils, so that there is not room to put them in;” and yet they think that continuing in life is fit for the latter, and departing out of it for the former. And not without cause, says Chrysippus, for we are not to measure life by good things or evil, but by those that are according to Nature. In this manner do they maintain custom, and philosophize according to the common conceptions. What do you say?—that he who enters upon a deliberation of life and death has no right to consider “What good or ill in his own house there is;” or to weigh, as in a balance, what things have the greatest sign of serving to felicity or infelicity; but must argue whether he should live or die from those things which are neither profitable nor prejudicial, and follow such principles and sentences as command the choosing of a life full of all things to be avoided, and the shunning of one which wants nothing of all those things that are desirable? For though it is an absurd thing, friend Lamprias, to shun a life in which there is no evil, it is yet more absurd, if any one should leave what is good because he is not possessed of what is indifferent, as these men do who leave present felicity and virtue for want of riches and health which they have not. “Saturnian Jove from Glaucus took his wits,” when he went about to change his suit of golden armor for a brazen one, and to give what was worth a hundred oxen for that which was worth but nine. And yet the brazen armor was no less useful for fight than the golden; whereas beauty and health of body, as the Stoics say, contribute not the least advantage as regards happiness. And yet they seek health in exchange for wisdom. For they say, it would well enough have become Heraclitus and Pherecydes to have parted with their virtue and wisdom, if the one of them could have thereby been freed from his lousy disease, and the other from his dropsy; and if Circe had used two sorts of magical drinks, one to make wise men fools, and the other to make fools wise, Ulysses would rather have drunk that of folly, than have changed his shape for the form of a beast, though having with it wisdom, and consequently also happiness. And, they say, wisdom itself dictates to them these things, exhorting them thus: Let me go, and value not my being lost, if I must be carried about in the shape of an ass. But this, some will say, is an ass-like wisdom which teacheth thus; if indeed to be wise and enjoy felicity is good, and to wear the shape of an ass is indifferent. They say, there is a nation of the Ethiopians where a dog reigns, is called king, and has all regal honors and services done to him; but men execute the offices of magistrates and governors of cities. Do not the Stoics act in the very same manner? They give the name and appearance of good to virtue, saying that it alone is desirable, profitable, and available; but in the mean time they act these things, they philosophize, they live and die, as at the command of things indifferent. And yet none of the Ethiopians kill that dog; but he sits in state, and is revered by all. But these men destroy and corrupt their virtue, that they may obtain health and riches.

> Greek: 11. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔτι Παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον, ᾧ πάντα τἀγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστι μηδʼ ἔσται, τὰ δεινὰ δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ παρέσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον, ἂν μή τι νὴ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων αὐτῷ προσγένηται. ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐν τῇ Στοᾷ νομοθετεῖται, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐξάγουσι τῶν σοφῶν ὡς ἄμεινον εὐδαιμονοῦντας πεπαῦσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ κατέχουσι τῶν φαύλων ὡς καθήκοντος αὐτοῖς ζῆν κακοδαιμονοῦντας. καίτοι ὁ μὲν σοφὸς ὄλβιος μακάριος πανευδαίμων ἀσφαλὴς ἀκίνδυνος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ἀνόητος οἷος εἰπεῖν γέμων κακῶν δὴ κοὐκέτʼ ἔσθʼ ὅπου τεθῇ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτοις μονὴν οἴονται καθήκουσαν εἶναι κἀκείνοις ἐξαγωγήν. εἰκότως δέ φησὶ Χρύσιππος οὐ γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς δεῖ παραμετρεῖσθαι τὸν βίον ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. οὕτως ἄνθρωποι σῴζουσι τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦσι. τί λέγεις; οὐ δεῖ σκοπεῖν ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τʼ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται τὸν περὶ βίου καὶ θανάτου σκοπούμενον, οὐδʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ τὰ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν ἐξετάζειν ἐπιζήμια μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλιμα ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν μήτʼ ὠφελούντων μήτε βλαπτόντων τοὺς εἰ βιωτέον ἢ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι λογισμούς; οὐ μέλλει πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις καὶ ἀρχὰς καθηκόντως αἱρεῖσθαὶ τε τὸν βίον, ᾧ τῶν φευκτῶν οὐδὲν ἄπεστι, καὶ φεύγειν, πάντα τὰ αἱρετὰ πάρεστι; καίτοι παράλογον μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ φεύγειν τὸν βίον ἐν μηδενὶ κακῷ γενομένους· παραλογώτερον δέ, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνων τις τοῦ ἀδιαφόρου τάγαθὸν ἀφίησιν· ὅπερ οὗτοι ποιοῦσι, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν προϊέμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν παροῦσαν ἀνθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ ὁλοκληρίας, ὧν οὐ τυγχάνουσιν. ἔνθʼ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, ὅτι χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοια ἐννεαβοίων ἔμελλε διαμείψεσθαι. καίτοι τὰ μὲν χάλκεα τῶν ὅπλων οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὰ χρυσᾶ παρεῖχε χρείαν μαχομένοις, εὐπρέπεια δὲ σώματος καὶ ὑγίεια τοῖς Στωικοῖς οὔτε χρείαν οὔτʼ ὄνησίν τινα φέρει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὗτοι τῆς φρονήσεως ἀντικαταλλάττονται τὴν ὑγίειαν. καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτῳ φασὶ καὶ Φερεκύδῃ καθήκειν ἄν, εἴπερ ἠδύναντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, ὥστε παύσασθαι φθειριῶντας καὶ ὑδρωπιῶντας· καὶ τῆς Κίρκης ἐγχεούσης δύο φάρμακα, τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν ἄφρονας ἐκ φρονίμων τὸ δʼ ὅνους φρονίμους ἑξ ἀφρόνων ἀνθρὡπων, οὐκ τὸν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πιεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀφροσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς θηρίου μορφὴν τὸ εἶδος, ἔχοντα τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρονήσεως δηλονότι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; καὶ ταῦτά φασιν αὐτὴν ὑφηγεῖσθαι καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι τὴν φρόνησιν ἄφες με καὶ καταφρόνησον ἀπολλυμένης ἐμοῦ καὶ διαφθειρομένης εἰς ὄνου πρόσωπον. ἀλλʼ ὄνου γε, φήσει τις, ἡ τοιαῦτα παραγγέλλουσα φρόνησίς ἐστιν, εἰ τὸ μὲν φρονεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ δʼ ὄνου περιφέρειν πρόσωπον ἀδιάφορον. ἔθνος εἶναί φασιν Αἰθιόπων, ὅπου κύων βασιλεύει καὶ βασιλεὺς προσαγορεύεται καὶ γέρα καὶ τιμὰς ἔχει βασιλέως, ἄνδρες; δὲ πράσσουσιν ἅπερ ἡγεμόσι πόλεων προσήκει καὶ ἄρχουσιν. ἆῤ οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ὁμοίως τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τἀγαθοῦ πάρεστι τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μόνην ταύτην αἱρετὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ συμφέρον καλοῦσι, πράττουσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ ζῶσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ προστάγματος τῶν ἀδιαφόρων; καίτοι τὸν κύνα μὲν ἐκεῖνον οὐδεὶς Αἰθιόπων ἀποκτίννυσιν, ἀλλὰ σεμνῶς κάθηται προσκυνούμενος· οὗτοι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπολλύουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαφθείρουσι, τῆς ὑγιείας περιεχόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἀπονίας.

[¶11] 12. DIADUMENUS. But the corollary which Chrysippus himself has given for a conclusion to his doctrines seems to free us from the trouble of saying any thing more about it. For there being, says he, in Nature some things good, some things bad, and some things between them both, which we call indifferent; there is no man but would rather have the good than the indifferent, and the indifferent than the bad. And of this we call the Gods to witness, begging of them by our prayers principally the possession of good things, and if that may not be, deliverance from evil; not desiring that which is neither good nor bad instead of good, but willing to have it instead of evil. But this man, changing Nature and inverting its order, removes the middle out of its own place into the last, and brings back the last into the middle,—not unlike to those tyrants who give the first place to the wicked,—and he gives us a law, first to seek the good, and secondly the evil, and lastly to judge that worst which is neither good nor evil; as if any one should place infernal things next to celestial, thrusting the earth and earthly things into Tartarus,
Where very far from hence, deep under ground,
Lies a vast gulf.
Having therefore said in his Third Book of Nature, that it is more expedient for a fool to live than not, though he should never attain to wisdom, he adds these words: “For such are the good things of men, that even evil things do in a manner precede other things that are in the middle place; not that these things themselves really precede, but reason, with which we should choose rather to live, though we were to be fools.” Therefore also, though we were to be unjust, wicked, hated of the Gods, and unhappy; for none of these things are absent from those that live foolishly. Is it then convenient rather to live miserably than not to live miserably, and better to be hurt than not hurt, to be unjust than not unjust, to break the laws than not to break them? That is, is it convenient to do things that are not convenient, and a duty to live even against duty? Yes indeed, for it is worse to want sense and reason than to be a fool. What then ails them, that they will not confess that to be evil which is worse than evil? Why do they say that folly alone is to be avoided, if it is not less but rather more convenient to shun that disposition which is not capable of folly?

> Greek: 12. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἔοικε δʼ ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν τοῦ περὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείονα λέγειν ὁ κολοφὼν αὐτὸς, ὃν ὁ Χρύσιππος τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐπιτέθεικεν. ὄντων γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δὲ κακῶν τῶν δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ καὶ καλουμένων ἀδιαφόρων, οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων, ὃς οὐ βούλεται τἀγαθὸν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ τὸ ἀδιάφορον ἢ τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δήπου ποιούμεθα μάρτυρας, αἰτούμενοι ταῖς εὐχαῖς παρʼ αὐτῶν μάλιστα μὲν κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, κακῶν ἀποφυγήν, τὸ δὲ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντὶ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ μὴ θέλοντες ἔχειν ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ θέλοντες. ὁ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐναλλάττων καὶ τὴν τάξιν ἀναστρέφων ἐκ τῆς μέσης χώρας τὸ μέσον εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην μετατίθησι, τὸ δʼ ἔσχατον εἰς τὴν μέσην ἐπανάγει καὶ μετοικίζει, καθάπερ οἱ τύραννοι τοῖς κακοῖς προεδρίαν διδοὺς καὶ νομοθετῶν πρῶτον διώκειν τάγαθὸν δεύτερον δὲ τὸ κακόν, ἔσχατον δὲ καὶ χείριστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις μετὰ τὰ οὐράνια τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου τιθείη, τὴν δὲ γῆν καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἀπώσειε τῆλε μάλʼ, ἧχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἔστι βέρεθρον. εἰπὼν οὖν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Φύσεως ὅτι λυσιτελεῖ ζῆν ἄφρονα ἢ μὴ βιοῦν, κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσειν ἐπιφέρει κατὰ λέξιν τοιαῦτα γὰρ τἀγαθά ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνὰ μέσον προτερεῖν· ἔστι δʼ οὐ ταῦτα προτεροῦντα, ἀλλʼ ὁ λόγος μεθʼ οὗ βιοῦν ἐπιβάλλει μᾶλλον, εἰ καὶ ἄφρονες; ἐσόμεθα δῆλον οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄδικοι, καὶ παράνομοι καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακοδαίμονες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεστι τούτων τοῖς ἀφρόνως βιοῦσιν. ἐπιβάλλει τοίνυν κακοδαιμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ κακοδαιμονεῖν καὶ βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ παρανομεῖν ἢ μὴ παρανομεῖν; τουτέστιν ἐπιβάλλει τὰ μὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα ποιεῖν καὶ καθήκει ζῆν καὶ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. ναί χεῖρον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι τοῦ ἀφραίνειν εἶτα τί παθόντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι κακόν, ὃ τοῦ κακοῦ χεῖρόν ἐστι; διὰ τί φευκτὸν ἀποφαίνουσι μόνον τὴν ἀφροσύνην, εἰ οὐχ ἧττον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιβάλλον ἐστὶ φεύγειν τὴν μὴ δεχομένην τὸ ἀφραίνειν διάθεσιν;

[¶12] 13. DIADUMENUS. But who can complain of this, that shall remember what he has written in his Second Book of Nature, declaring that vice was not unprofitably made for the universe? But it is meet I should set down his doctrine in his own words, that you may understand in what place those rank vice, and what discourses they hold of it, who accuse Xenocrates and Speusippus for not reckoning health indifferent and riches useless. “Vice,” saith he, “has its limit in reference to other accidents. For it is also in some sort according to the reason of Nature, and (as I may so say) is not wholly useless in respect of the universe; for otherwise there would not be any good.” Is there then no good among the Gods, because there is no evil? And when Jupiter, having resolved all matter into himself, shall be alone, other differences being taken away, will there then be no good, because there will be no evil? But is there melody in a choir though none in it sings faultily, and health in the body though no member is sick: and yet cannot virtue have its existence without vice? But as the poison of a serpent or the gall of an hyena is to be mixed with some medicines, was it also of necessity that there must have been some conjunction of the wickedness of Meletus with the justice of Socrates, and the dissolute demeanor of Cleon with the probity of Pericles? And could not Jupiter have found a means to bring into the world Hercules and Lycurgus, if he had not also made for us Sardanapalus and Phalaris? It is now time for them to say that the consumption was made for the sound constitution of men’s bodies, and the gout for the swiftness of their feet; and that Achilles would not have had a good head of hair if Thersites had not been bald. For what difference is there between such triflers and ravers, and those who say that intemperance was not brought forth unprofitably for continence, nor injustice for justice, so that we must pray to the Gods, there may be always wickedness, “Lies, fawning speeches, and deceitful manners,” if, when these are taken away, virtue will also vanish and be lost?

> Greek: 13. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἀλλὰ τί ἄν τις ἐπὶ τούτοις δυσχεραίνοι, μεμνημένος ὧν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φύσεως γέγραφεν, ἀποφαίνων οὐκ ἀχρήστως τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὰ ὅλα γεγενημένην; ἄξιον δʼ ἀναλαβεῖν τὸ δόγμα ταῖς ἐκείνου λέξεσιν, ἵνα καὶ μάθῃς πως, οἱ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπευσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελὲς ἐν τίνι τόπῳ τὴν κακίαν αὐτοὶ τίθενται καὶ τίνας λόγους περὶ αὐτῆς διεξίασιν ἡ δὲ κακία πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ συμπτώματα ἔχει ὅρον γίνεται γὰρ αὐτή πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καί, ἵνʼ οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίγνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν. οὐκοῦν ἐν θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ κακόν· οὐδέ, ὅταν ὁ Ζεὺς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλώσας τὴν ὕλην ἅπασαν εἷς γένηται καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀνέλῃ διαφοράς, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν τηνικαῦτα, μηδενός γε κακοῦ παρόντος· ἀλλὰ χοροῦ μὲν ἔστιν ἐμμέλεια μηδενὸς ἀπᾴδοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ σώματος ὑγίεια μηδενὸς μορίου νοσοῦντος ἀρετὴ δʼ ἄνευ κακίας οὐκ ἔχει γένεσιν, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐνίαις τῶν ἰατρικῶν δυνάμεων ἰὸς ὄφεως καὶ χολὴ ὑαίνης ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, οὕτως ἐπιτηδειότης ἑτέρα τῇ Μελήτου μοχθηρίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Σωκράτους δικαιοσύνην καὶ τῇ Κλέωνος ἀναγωγίᾳ πρὸς τὴν Περικλέους καλοκἀγαθίαν πῶς δʼ ἂν εὗρεν ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν Ἡρακλέα φῦσαι καὶ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, εἰ μὴ καὶ Σαρδανάπαλον ἡμῖν ἔφυσε καὶ Φάλαριν; ὥρα λέγειν αὐτοῖς ὅτι καὶ φθίσις γέγονεν ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ποδάγρα πρὸς ὠκύτητα καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν Ἀχιλλεὺς κομήτης, εἰ μὴ φαλακρὸς Θερσίτης. τί γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν ταῦτα ληρούντων καὶ φλυαρούντων οἱ λέγοντες μὴ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐγκράτειαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἀδικίαν; ὅπως εὐχώμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀεὶ μοχθηρίαν εἶναι ψεύδεά θʼ αἱμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, εἰ, τούτων ἀναιρεθέντων, οἴχεται φροῦδος ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ συναπόλωλεν.

[¶13] 14. DIADUMENUS. Or do you desire to understand the greatest sweetness of his eloquence and persuasion? “For,” says he, “as comedies have in them sometimes ridiculous epigrams, which, though bad in themselves, give nevertheless a certain grace to the whole poem; so, though you may blame vice in itself, yet is it not useless to other things.” First then to say that vice was made by the providence of God, as a wanton epigram by the will of the poet, transcends in absurdity all imagination. For this being granted, how will the Gods be rather givers of good than evil? How will wickedness be displeasing to them, and hated by them? And what shall we have to oppose against these ill-sounding sentences of the poets:
A cause to men God sends,
When to chastise some house his wrath intends;
and again, “What God those seeds of strife ’twixt them did sow?” Moreover, a lewd epigram adorns the comedy and contributes to its end, which is to delight the spectators and make them laugh. But Jupiter, who is surnamed fatherly, supreme, just, and (as Pindar has it) the most perfect artist, framing the world, not as a great interlude, full of variety and great learning, but as a common city of Gods and men, living together in concord and happiness with justice and virtue,—what need had he, for the attaining to this excellent end, of thieves, murderers, parricides, and tyrants? For vice entered not as a morris-dance, pleasing and delightful to the Divinity; nor was injustice brought in amongst the affairs of men, to cause mirth and laughter by its raillery and facetiousness, since there is not to be seen in it so much as a dream of that celebrated agreement with Nature. Besides, that foolish epigram is a very small part of the poem, and takes up but a very little place in the comedy; neither do such things abound in it, nor do they corrupt any of those things which seem to have been well done, or spoil their grace. But all human affairs are replete with vice, and the whole life, from the very prologue and beginning to the end, being disordered, depraved, and disturbed, and having no part of it pure or irreprehensible (as these men say), is the most filthy and most unpleasant of all farces.

> Greek: 14. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἢ βούλει τὸ ἣδιστον αὐτοῦ τῆς γλαφυρίας καὶ πιθανότητος ἱστορῆσαι; ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι φησὶν ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρουσιν, ἃ καθʼ αὑτὰ μέν ἐστι φαῦλα τῷ δʼ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προστίθησιν, οὕτω ψέξειας ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφʼ ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν· τοῖς δʼ ὅλοις οὐκ ἄχρηστός ἐστι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα γέγονε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν δοτῆρες ἔσονται; πῶς δʼ ἔτι θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν ἡ κακία καὶ θεομισές; ἢ τί πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυσφημήματα λέγειν ἕξομεν, ὡς
θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ
καί τίς τʼ ἂρ σφῶε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τὴν κωμῳδίαν κοσμεῖ καὶ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς, ἐφιεμένης τοῦ γελοίου ἢ κεχαρισμένου τοῖς θεαταῖς· ὁ δὲ πατρῷος καὶ ὕπατος καὶ θεμίστιος Ζεὺς καὶ ἀριστοτέχνας, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, οὐ δρᾶμα δήπου μέγα καὶ ποικίλον καὶ πολυμερὲς δημιουργῶν τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄστυ κοινόν, συννεμησομένων μετὰ δίκης καὶ ἀρετῆς ὁμολογουμένως καὶ μακαρίως, τί πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τοῦτο καὶ σεμνότατον τέλος ἐδεῖτο λῃστῶν καὶ ἀνδροφόνων καὶ πατροκτόνων καὶ τυράννων; οὐ γὰρ ἡδὺ τῷ θείῳ καὶ κομψὸν ἡ κακία γέγονεν ἐπεισόδιον, οὐδὲ διʼ εὐτραπελίαν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ γέλωτα καὶ βωμολοχίαν προστέτριπται τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὑφʼ ὧν οὐδʼ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῆς ὑμνουμένης ὁμολογίας. ἔτι τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τοῦ ποιήματος πολλοστημόριόν ἐστι καὶ μικρὸν ἐπέχει παντάπασιν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ χωρίον, καὶ οὔτε πλεονάζει τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε τῶν εὖ πεποιῆσθαι δοκούντων ἀπόλλυσι καὶ λυμαίνεται τὴν χάριν· τῆς δὲ κακίας ἀναπέπλησται πάντα πράγματα καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐθὺς ἐκ παρόδου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι κορωνίδος ἀσχημονῶν καὶ ἐκπίπτων καὶ ταραττόμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων μέρος καθαρὸν μηδʼ ἀνεπίληπτον, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, αἴσχιστόν ἐστι δραμάτων ἁπάντων καὶ ἀτερπέστατον.