---
title: "Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 2 of 4
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/"
---

# Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions · De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos

*Plutarch, tr. Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin*

The Stoics claim to follow common sense; Plutarch shows how far they fall from it.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg138, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Samuel White, rev. William W. Goodwin, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg138.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 2. Sections 15–27

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-against-the-stoics/2/#p-N

[¶0] 15. DIADUMENUS. Wherefore I would willingly ask, in what vice is profitable to the universe. Not surely in respect of heavenly things, and such as are divine by nature. For it would be ridiculous to say, that if there had not arisen, or were not amongst men, malice and covetousness and lying, or that if we did not rob, plunder, slander, and murder one another, the sun would not run his appointed course, the world enjoy its seasons and periods of time, or the earth, which is seated in the midst of the universe, afford the principles of the wind and rain. It remains then, that the existence of vice must be profitable for us and our affairs; and that perhaps these men mean. Are we more healthy for being vicious, or do we more abound with necessaries? Or does vice contribute any thing to our beauty and strength? They say, no. But where on earth is virtue to be found? Is it then only a name, and a visionary opinion of night-walking sophisters, and not a reality lying conspicuous to all, like vice, so that we cannot partake of any thing as unprofitable, … but least, O ye Gods! of virtue, for which we were created? Is it not then absurd, that the utensils of the husbandman, mariner, and charioteer should be serviceable and aiding towards his intended end, whilst that which was by God made for virtue destroys and corrupts virtue? But perhaps it is time now to leave this point, and pass to another.

> Greek: 15. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ὅθεν ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, πρὸς τί γέγονεν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία τοῖς ὅλοις. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια καὶ θεῖα, φήσει. γελοῖον γὰρ εἰ, μὴ γενομένης ἐν ἀνθρώποις μηδʼ οὔσης κακίας καὶ ἀπληστίας καὶ ψευδολογίας μηδʼ ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν ἀγόντων καὶ φερόντων καὶ συκοφαντούντων καὶ φονευόντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐβάδιζεν ὁ ἥλιος τὴν τεταγμένην πορείαν οὐδʼ ἂν ὥραις ἐχρῆτο καὶ περιόδοις καιρῶν ὁ κόσμος οὐδʼ ἡ γῆ τὴν μέσην χώραν ἔχουσα τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς πνευμάτων ἐνεδίδου καὶ ὄμβρων. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα τὴν κακίαν εὐχρήστως γεγονέναι καὶ τοῦτʼ ἴσως οἱ ἄνδρες λέγουσιν. ἆῤ οὖν ὑγιαίνομεν μᾶλλον κακοὶ ὄντες, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν τῶν ἀναγκαίων; πρὸς δὲ κάλλος ἡμῖν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχὺν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία γέγονεν; οὔ φασιν. εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ὄνομα μόνον καὶ δόκημα νυκτερωπὸν ἐννύχων σοφιστῶν οὐδʼ ὥσπερ ἡ κακία πᾶσιν ῦπαρ ἔκκειται καὶ πᾶσιν ἐναργὴς· οὐδενὸς ἔσται χρηστοῦ μεταλαβεῖν, ἥκιστα δʼ ἀρετῆς, ὦ θεοί, διʼ ἣν γεγόναμεν. εἶτʼ οὐ δεινόν, εἰ γεωργῷ μὲν καὶ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ ἡνιόχῳ τὰ εὔχρηστα φορὰ, καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τέλος, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀρετὴν γεγονὸς ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ διέφθαρκεν; ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἤδη καιρὸς ἐπʼ ἄλλο τρέπεσθαι, τοῦτο δʼ ἀφεῖναι.

[¶1] 16. LAMPRIAS.. Not for my sake, my dear friend, I beseech you; for I desire to understand, in what manner these men bring in evil things before the good, and vice before virtue. DIADUMENUS. It is indeed, sir, a thing worth knowing. They babble indeed much; but in conclusion they say that prudence, being the knowledge of good and evil, would be wholly taken away if there were no evil. For as, if there are truths, it is impossible but there must be some lies also near to them; so it stands with reason, that if there are good things, there must also be evil things. LAMPRIAS.. One of these things is not said amiss; and I think also that the other is not unapprehended by me. For I see a difference here: that which is not true must immediately be false; but that is not of necessity evil which is not good; because that between true and false there is no medium, but between good and evil there is the indifferent. Nor is it of necessity that the one must subsist with the other. For Nature may have good without having any need of evil, but only having that which is neither good nor evil. But if there is any thing to be said by you to the former reason, let us hear it.

> Greek: 16. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ φίλος, ἐμὴν χάριν ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ πυθέσθαι, τίνα δὴ τρόπον οἱ ἄνδρες τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τῆς ἀρετῆς προεισάγουσιν. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀμέλει καὶ ἄξιον, ὦ ἑταῖρε πολὺς μὲν γὰρ ὁ ψελλισμὸς αὐτῶν, τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὖσαν, ἀναιρεθέντων τῶν κακῶν, καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγουσιν· ὡς δʼ ἀληθῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον μὴ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα εἶναι, παραπλησίως οἴονται προσήκειν, ἀγαθῶν ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ κακὰ ὑπάρχειν. ΛΑΜΠΡ.. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ φαύλως λέλεκται, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον οἶμαι μηδʼ ἐμὲ λανθάνειν. ὁρῶ γὰρ διαφοράν, τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εὐθὺς ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν εὐθὺς κακὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ἀληθῶν μὲν καὶ ψευδῶν οὐδέν ἐστι μέσον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ καὶ κακῶν τὸ ἀδιάφορον. καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα συνυπάρχειν ἐκείνοις· ἐξήρκει γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν τἀγαθόν, τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ δεομένην, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἔχουσαν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν πρότερον λόγον εἴ τι λέγεται παρʼ ὑμῶν, ἀκουστέον.

[¶2] 17. DIADUMENUS. Many things indeed are said; but at present we shall make use only of what is most necessary. In the first place, it is a folly to imagine that good and evil have their existence for the sake of prudence. For good and evil being already extant, prudence came afterwards; as the art of physic was invented, there being already things wholesome and unwholesome. For good and evil are not therefore extant that there may be prudence; but the faculty by which we judge good and evil that are already in being is named prudence. As sight is a sense distinguishing white from black; which colors were not therefore made that we might have sight, but we rather wanted sight to discern these things. Secondly, when the world shall be set on fire (as the Stoics will have it), there will then no evil be left, but all will then be prudent and wise. There is therefore prudence, though there is no evil; nor is it of necessity for evil to exist that prudence may have a being. But supposing that prudence must always be a knowledge of good and evil, what inconvenience would it be if, evil being taken away, prudence should no longer subsist; but instead of this we should have another virtue, not being the knowledge of good and evil, but of good only? So, if black should be wholly lost from among the colors, and any one should therefore contend that sight is also lost, for that there is no longer the sense of discerning black and white, what should hinder us from answering him: It is no prejudice to us, if we have not what you call sight, but in lieu of that have another sense and faculty, by which we apprehend colors that are white and not white. For I indeed think that neither our taste would be lost, if bitter things were wanting, nor our feeling, if pain were taken away, nor prudence, if evil had no being; but that these senses would remain, to apprehend things sweet and grateful and those that are not so, and prudence to be the science of things good and not good. But let those who think otherwise take the name to themselves, leaving us the thing.

> Greek: 17. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ νῦν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις χρηστέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εὔηθες οἴεσθαι φρονήσεως ἕνεκα γένεσιν κακῶν ὑποστῆναι καὶ ἀγαθῶν. ὄντων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιγίνεται φρόνησις, ὥσπερ ἰατρικὴ νοσερῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ ὑγιεινῶν. οὐ γὰρ τάγαθὸν ὑφίσταται καὶ τὸ κακόν, ἵνα γένηται φρόνησις, ἀλλʼ ᾗ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα κρίνομεν, ὠνομάσθη φρόνησις· ὥσπερ ὄψις ἡ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, αἴσθησις, οὐ γενομένων ὅπως ἔχοιμεν ὄψιν ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ,τὰ τοιαῦτα κρίνειν ὄψεως δεηθέντων. δεύτερον, ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δʼ ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν· ἔστι τοίνυν φρόνησις, οὐκ ὄντος κακοῦ· καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ φρόνησις ἔνι. εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως δεῖ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμην, τί δεινόν, εἰ τῶν κακῶν ἀναιρεθέντων οὐκ ἔσται φρόνησις ἑτέραν τʼ ἀντʼ ἐκείνης ἀρετὴν ἕξομεν, οὐκ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀλλʼ ἀγαθῶν μόνων ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν; ὥσπερ εἰ τῶν χρωμάτων τὸ μέλαν ἐξαπόλοιτο παντάπασιν, εἶτά τις βιάζοιτο καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ἀπολωλέναι, λευκῶν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι καὶ μελάνων αἴσθησιν τί κωλύει φάναι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι δεινὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην ὄψιν οὐκ ἔχομεν, ἄλλη δὲ πάρεστιν ἀντʼ ἐκείνης αἴσθησις ἡμῖν καὶ δύναμις, λευκῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ μὴ λευκῶν χρωμάτων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε γεῦσιν οἶμαι φροῦδον ἂν γενέσθαι, πικρῶν ἐπιλιπόντων, οὔθʼ ἁφήν, ἀλγηδόνος ἀναιρεθείσης, οὔτε φρόνησιν, κακοῦ μὴ παρόντος· ἀλλʼ ἐκείνας τε μένειν αἰσθήσεις γλυκέων καὶ ἡδέων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀντιλαμβανομένας, ταύτην τε τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν. οἷς δὲ μὴ δοκεῖ, τοὔνομα λαβόντες ἀπολιπέτωσαν ἡμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα.

[¶3] 18. DIADUMENUS. Besides all this, what should hinder but there may be an understanding of evil, and an existence of good? As the Gods, I believe, enjoy health, but understand the fever and pleurisy. Since even we, who, as they say, have abundance of evils but no good, are not yet destitute of the knowledge what prudence, what goodness, and what happiness is. And this also would be wonderful, that if virtue were absent, there should be those who could teach us what it is and give us a comprehension of it, while if vice were not extant, it should be impossible to have any understanding of it. For see what these men persuade us who philosophize against the conceptions,—that by folly indeed we comprehend prudence, but prudence without folly cannot so much as comprehend folly itself.

> Greek: 18. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, τί ἐκώλυε τοῦ μὲν κακοῦ νόησιν εἶναι τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὕπαρξιν; ὥσπερ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑγιείας μὲν ἔστι παρουσία, πυρετοῦ δὲ καὶ πλευρίτιδος νόησις. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς, κακῶν μὲν ἀφθόνως πᾶσι παρόντων ἀγαθοῦ δὲ μηδενός, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε νοεῖν οὐκ ἀπολελείμμεθα τὴν φρόνησιν τἀγαθὸν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. ὃ καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν εἰ, τῆς μὲν ἀρετῆς μὴ παρούσης, εἰσὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες ὁποῖόν ἐστι καὶ κατάληψιν ἐμποιοῦντες τῆς κακίας δὲ μὴ γενομένης, οὐ δυνατὸν ἦν κτήσασθαι νόησιν. ὅρα γὰρ οἷα πείθουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἀφροσύνῃ καταλαμβάνομεν τὴν φρόνησιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄνευ τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔθʼ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε τὴν ἀφροσύνην καταλαμβάνειν πέφυκεν.

[¶4] 19. DIADUMENUS. And if Nature had absolutely stood in need of the generation of evil, yet might one or two examples of vice have been sufficient; or if you will, it might have been requisite that ten, a thousand, or ten thousand vicious men should be brought forth, and not that the multitude of vices should be so great as “to exceed in number the sands of the sea, the dust of the earth, and the feathers of all the various kinds of birds in the world,” and yet that there should not be so much all this while as a dream of virtue. Those who in Sparta had the charge of the public halls or eating places called Phiditia, were wont to bring forth two or three Helots drunken and full of wine, that the young men, seeing what drunkenness was, might learn to keep sobriety. But in human life there are many such examples of vice. For there is not any one sober to virtue; but we all stagger up and down, acting shamefully and living miserably. Thus does reason inebriate us, and with so much trouble and madness does it fill us, that we fall in nothing short of those dogs of whom Aesop says, that seeing certain skins swimming on the water, they endeavored to drink the sea up, but burst before they could get at them. For reason also, by which we hope to gain reputation and attain to virtue, does, ere we can reach to it, corrupt and destroy us, being before filled with abundance of heady and bitter vice;—if indeed, as these men say, they who are got even to the uppermost step have no ease, cessation, or breathing from folly and infelicity.

> Greek: 19. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. εἰ δὲ δὴ πάντως ἐδεῖτο κακοῦ γενέσεως ἡ φύσις, ἓν ἦν δήπου παράδειγμα κακίας ἱκανὸν ἢ δεύτερον· εἰ δὲ βούλει, δέκα φαύλους ἢ χιλίους ἢ μυρίους ἔδει γενέσθαι, καὶ μὴ κακίας μὲν φορὰν τοσαύτην τὸ πλῆθος
οὐ ψάμμος, ἢ κόνις, ἢ πτερὰ ποικιλοθρόων οἰωνῶν
τόσσον ἂν χεύαιτʼ ἀριθμόν
ἀρετῆς δὲ μηδʼ ἐνύπνιον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Σπάρτῃ τῶν φιδιτίων ἐπιμελόμενοι δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἐπίτηδες εἵλωτας ἐμπεφορημένους ἀκράτου καὶ μεθύοντας εἰσάγοντες εἰς κοινὸν ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῖς νέοις, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν, ὅπως φυλάττωνται καὶ σωφρονῶσιν ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα τῆς κακίας γέγονε παραδείγματα· νήφων γὰρ οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ῥεμβόμεθα πάντες, ἀσχημονοῦντες καὶ κακοδαιμονοῦντες οὕτως ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς μεθύσκει καὶ τοσαύτης καταπίμπλησι ταραχῆς καὶ παραφροσύνης, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντας τῶν κυνῶν, ἅς φησιν Αἴσωπος δερμάτων τινῶν ἐμπλεόντων ἐφιεμένας ὁρμῆσαι μὲν ἐκπίνειν τὴν θάλασσαν, ῥαγῆναι δὲ πρότερον ἢ τῶν δερμάτων λαβέσθαι καὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος ἐλπίζοντας εὐδαιμονήσειν διʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ προσοίσεσθαι, πρὶν ἐπʼ ἐκείνην ἀφικέσθαι, διέφθαρκε καὶ ἀπολώλεκε, πολλῆς ἀκράτου καὶ πικρᾶς κακίας προεμφορηθέντας εἴ γε δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐπʼ ἄκρον προκόπτουσιν, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσιν, οὔτε κουφισμὸς οὔτʼ ἄνεσις ἔστιν οὔτʼ ἀναπνοὴ τῆς ἀβελτερίας καὶ κακοδαιμονίας ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.

[¶5] 20. DIADUMENUS. But let us see what manner of thing he shows vice to be who says that it was not brought forth unprofitably, and of what use and what a possession he makes it to be to those who have it, writing in his book of right actions, that a wicked man wants nothing, has need of nothing, nothing is useful to him, nothing proper, nothing fit for him. How then is vice useful, with which neither health nor abundance of riches nor advancement in virtue is profitable? Who then does not want these things, of which some are “preferable” and “acceptable,” and therefore highly useful, and others are “according to Nature,” as themselves term them? But (they say) no one has need of them, unless he become wise. Therefore the vicious man does not even stand in need of being made wise. Nor are men hungry and thirsty before they become wise. When thirsty, therefore, they have no need of water, nor when hungry, of bread.
Be like to courteous guests, and him
Who only fire and shelter asks:
does this man now not need entertainment? Nor had he need of a cloak, who said, “Give Hipponax a cloak, for I’m stiff with cold.” But will you speak a paradox indeed, both extravagant and singular? Say then that a wise man has need of nothing, that he wants nothing, he is fortunate, he is free from want, he is self-sufficient, blessed, perfect. Now what madness is this, that he to whom nothing is wanting has need of the goods he has, but that the vicious indeed wants many things, and stands in need of nothing. For thus indeed says Chrysippus, that the vicious wants but stands not in need; removing the common notions, like chessmen, backwards and forwards. For all men think that having need precedes wanting, esteeming him who stands in need of things that are not at hand or easy to be got, to want them. For no man wants horns or wings, because no man has need of them. But we say that those want arms and money and clothes who are destitute of them, when they have occasion for them. But these men are so desirous of seeming always to say something against the common notions, that for the love of novelty they often depart from their own opinions, as they do here.

> Greek: 20. ὁ τοίνυν λέγων οὐκ ἀχρήστως γεγονέναι τὴν κακίαν, ὅρα πάλιν οἷον αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι χρῆμα καὶ κτῆμα τοῖς ἔχουσι, γράφων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κατορθωμάτων ὡς ὁ φαῦλος οὐδενὸς· δεῖται, οὐδενὸς ἔχει χρείαν· οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ χρήσιμον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, οὐδὲν ἁρμόττον. πῶς οὖν εὔχρηστος ἡ κακία, μεθʼ ἧς οὐδʼ ὑγίεια χρήσιμον οὐδὲ πλῆθος χρημάτων οὐδὲ προκοπή; οὐ δεῖται δέ τις ὧν· τὰ μὲν προηγμένα· καὶ ληπτὰ καὶ νὴ Δίʼ εὔχρηστα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσιν; εἶτα τούτων οὐδεὶς ἔχει χρείαν, ἂν μὴ γένηται σοφός. οὐδὲ τοῦ σοφὸς οὖν γενέσθαι χρείαν ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος. οὐδὲ διψῶσιν οὐδὲ πεινῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, πρὶν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι· διψῶντες οὖν ὕδατος οὐκ ἔχουσι χρείαν οὐδʼ ἄρτου πεινῶντες.
ἔστε ξένοισι μειλίχοις ἐοικότες
στέγης τε μοῦνον καὶ πυρὸς κεχρημένοις·
οὗτος οὐκ εἶχε χρείαν ὑποδοχῆς; οὐδὲ χλαίνης ἐκεῖνος ὁ λέγων δὸς χλαῖναν Ἱππώνακτι κάρτα γὰρ ῥιγῶ; ἀλλὰ βούλει παράδοξον εἰπεῖν τι καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ἴδιον; λέγε τὸν σοφὸν μηδενὸς ἔχειν χρείαν μηδὲ δεῖσθαί τινος, ἐκεῖνος ὄλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεής, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης μακάριος τέλειος. νυνὶ δὲ τίς ὁ ἴλιγγος οὗτος τὸν μὲν ἀνενδεᾶ δεῖσθαι ὧν ἔχει ἀγαθῶν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἐνδεᾶ μὲν εἶναι πολλῶν δεῖσθαι δὲ μηδενός; τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς οὐ δέονται μὲν ἐνδέονται δʼ οἱ φαῦλοι, πεττῶν δίκην δεῦρο κἀκεῖ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας μετατιθείς. πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὸ δεῖσθαι πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐνδεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν οὐχ ἑτοίμων οὐδʼ εὐπορίστων δεόμενον ἐνδεῖσθαι. κεράτων γοῦν καὶ πτερῶν οὐδεὶς ἐνδεὴς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅτι μηδὲ δεῖται τούτων· ἀλλʼ ὅπλων ἐνδεεῖς, λέγομεν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ ἱματίων, ὅταν ἐν χρείᾳ γενόμενοι μὴ τυγχάνωσι μηδʼ ἔχωσιν. οἱ δʼ οὕτως ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀεί τι παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας φαίνεσθαι λέγοντες, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐξίστασθαι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ καινολογίας, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα.

[¶6] 21. DIADUMENUS. But recall yourself to the consideration of what has been said a little above. This is one of their assertions against the common conception, that no vicious man receives any utility. And yet many being instructed profit; many being slaves are made free; many being besieged are delivered, being lame are led by the hand, and being sick are cured. “But possessing all these things, they are never the better, neither do receive benefits, nor have they any benefactors, nor do they slight their benefactors.” Vicious men then are not ungrateful, no more than are wise men. Ingratitude therefore has no being; because the good receiving a benefit fail not to acknowledge it, and the bad are not capable of receiving any. Behold now. what they say to this,—that benefit is ranked among mean or middle things, and that to give and receive utility belongs only to the wise, but the bad also receive a benefit. Then they who partake of the benefit partake not also of its use; and whither a benefit extends, there is nothing useful or commodious. Now what else is there that makes a kind office a benefit, but that the bestower of it is, in some respect, useful to the needy receiver?

> Greek: 21. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. σκόπει δὲ μικρὸν ἀνωτέρω ἀναγαγὼν ἑαυτόν. ἕν τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας λεγομένων ἐστὶ τὸ μηδένα φαῦλον ὠφελεῖσθαι καίτοι παιδευόμενοὶ γε πολλοὶ προκόπτουσι καὶ δουλεύοντες ἐλευθεροῦνται καὶ πολιορκούμενοι σῴζονται καὶ πληρούμενοι χειραγωγοῦνται καὶ θεραπεύονται νοσοῦντες ἀλλʼ οὐκ ὠφελοῦνται τούτων τυγχάνοντες οὐδʼ πάσχουσιν οὐδʼ εὐεργέτας ἔχουσιν οὐδʼ εὐεργετῶν ἀμελοῦσιν οὐδʼ τοίνυν οὐδʼ ἀχαριστοῦσιν οἱ φαῦλοι καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. ἀνύπαρκτον οὖν ἐστι. τὸ ἀχάριστον οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀποστεροῦσι χάριν λαμβάνοντες, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνειν χάριν οὐ πεφύκασιν. ὅρα δὴ τί πρὸς ταῦτα λέγουσιν· ὅτι ἡ χάρις εἰς τὰ μέσα διατείνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι σοφῶν ἐστι, χάριτος δὲ καὶ φαῦλοι τυγχάνουσιν εἶθʼ οἷς χάριτος μέτεστι, τούτοις οὐ μέτεστι χρείας; ὅπου δὲ διατείνει χάρις, ἐκεῖ χρήσιμον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδʼ οἰκεῖον; ἄλλο δὲ τί ποιεῖ τὴν ὑπουργίαν χάριν ἢ τὸ πρός τι χρήσιμον ὑπάρξαι τῷ δεομένῳ τὸν παρασχόντα;

[¶7] 22. LAMPRIAS.. But let these things pass. What, I beseech you, is this so highly venerated utility, which preserving as some great and excellent thing for the wise, they permit not so much as the name of it to the vicious? DIADUMENUS. If (say they) one wise man does but any way prudently stretch out his finger, all the wise men all the world over receive utility by it. This is the work of their amity; in this do the virtues of the wise man terminate by their common utilities. Aristotle then and Xenocrates doted, saying that men receive utility from the Gods, from their parents, from their masters, being ignorant of that wonderful utility which wise men receive from one another, being moved according to virtue, though they neither are together nor yet know it. Yet all men esteem, that laying up, keeping, and bestowing are then useful and profitable, when some benefit or profit is recovered by it. The thriving man buys keys, and diligently keeps his stores, “With’s hand unlocking wealth’s sweet treasury.” But to store up and to keep with diligence and labor such things as are for no use is not seemly or honorable, but ridiculous. If Ulysses indeed had tied up with the knot which Circe taught him, not the gifts he had received from Alcinous,—tripods, caldrons, cloths, and gold,—but heaping up trash, stones, and such like trumpery, should have thought his employment about such things, and the possession and keeping of them, a happy and blessed work, would any one have imitated this foolish providence and empty care? Yet this is the beauty, gravity, and happiness of the Stoical consent, being nothing else but a gathering together and keeping of useless and indifferent things. For such are things according to Nature, and still more exterior things; if indeed they compare the greatest riches to fringes and golden chamber-pots, and sometimes also, as it happens, to oil-cruets. Then, as those who seem proudly to have affronted and railed at some Gods or demi-gods presently changing their note, fall prostrate and sit humbly on the ground, praising and magnifying the Divinity; so these men, having met with punishment of this arrogancy and vanity, again exercise themselves in these indifferent things and such as pertain nothing to them, crying out with a loud voice that there is but one thing good, specious, and honorable, the storing up of these things and the communication of them, and that it is not meet for those to live who have them not, but to dispatch out of the way and famish themselves, bidding a long farewell to virtue. DIADUMENUS. They esteem indeed Theognis to have been a man altogether of a base and abject spirit, for saying, as one over-fearful in regard to poverty, which is an indifferent thing:
From poverty to fly, into the deep
Throw thyself, Cyrnus, or from rocks so steep.
Yet they themselves exhort the same thing in prose, and affirm that a man, to free himself from some great disease or exceedingly acute pain, if he have not at hand sword or hemlock, ought to leap into the sea or throw himself headlong from a precipice; neither of which is hurtful, or evil, or incommodious, or makes them who fall into it miserable.

> Greek: 22. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἄφες. ἡ δὲ πολυτίμητος ὠφέλεια τίς ἐστιν, ἣν ὡς μέγα τι τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐξαίρετον φυλάσσοντες, οὐδʼ ὄνομα λείπουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς μὴ σοφοῖς. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. ἂν εἷς σοφὸς ὁπουδήποτε προτείνῃ τὸν δάκτυλον φρονίμως, οἱ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην σοφοὶ πάντες ὠφελοῦνται. τοῦτο τῆς ὠφελείας ἔργον αὐτῶν, εἰς τοῦτο τοῖς κοινοῖς ὠφελήμασι τῶν σοφῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τελευτῶσιν. ἐλήρει δʼ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐλήρει δὲ,Ξενοκράτης, ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ θεῶν ὠφελεῖσθαι δʼ ὑπὸ γονέων ὠφελεῖσθαι δʼ ὑπὸ καθηγητῶν ἀποφαινόμενοι, τὴν δὲ θαυμαστὴν ἀγνοοῦντες ὠφέλειαν, ἣν οἱ σοφοὶ κινουμένων κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀλλήλων ὠφελοῦνται, κἂν μὴ συνῶσι μηδὲ γιγνώσκοντες τυγχάνωσι. καὶ μὴν πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἐκλογὰς καὶ τὰς τηρήσεις καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας, ὅταν χρήσιμοι ὦσι καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, τότε χρησίμους καὶ ὠφελίμους ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ κλεῖδας ὠνεῖται καὶ ἀποθήκας φυλάττει χρηματικὸς ἀνήρ πλούτου διοίγων θάλαμον ἥδιστον χερί· τὸ δʼ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ πρὸς μηδὲν ὠφέλιμα καὶ τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ πολυπόνως οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν. ὁ οὖν Ὀδυσσεύς, εἰ τὸν δεσμὸν ἐκεῖνον ἐκμαθὼν παρὰ τῆς Κίρκης, κατεσημαίνετο διʼ αὐτοῦ μὴ τὰ παρʼ Ἀλκινόου δῶρα, τρίποδας καὶ λέβητας καὶ εἵματα καὶ χρυσὸν ἀλλὰ συρφετόν τινα καὶ λίθους καὶ … συναγαγὼν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα πραγματείαν καὶ κτῆσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τήρησιν εὐδαιμονικὸν ἔργον ἡγεῖτο καὶ μακάριον, τίς ἂν ἐζήλωσε τὴν ἀνόητον ταύτην πρόνοιαν καὶ κενόσπουδον ἐπιμέλειαν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο τῆς Στωικῆς ὁμολογίας τὸ καλόν ἐστι καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ μακάριον, ἕτερον δʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἐκλογὴ καὶ τήρησις ἀνωφελῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἀδιαφόρων τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔτι μᾶλλον· εἴ γε κρασπέδοις καὶ ἀμίσι χρυσαῖς καὶ νὴ Δία ληκύθοις, ὅταν τύχωσι, παραβάλλουσι τὸν μέγιστον πλοῦτον· εἶθʼ ὥσπερ οἱ θεῶν τινων ἢ δαιμόνων ἱερὰ δόξαντες ὑπερηφάνως καθυβρίσαι καὶ λοιδορῆσαι μετανοήσαντες εὐθὺς ὑποπίπτουσι καὶ κάθηνται ταπεινοὶ κατευλογοῦντες καὶ μεγαλύνοντες τὸ θεῖον· οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι νεμέσει τινὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ταύτης καὶ κενολογίας περιπεσόντες αὖθις ἐν τούτοις ἐξετάζονται τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις καὶ μηδὲν πρὸς αὐτούς, μέγα βοῶντες ὡς ἕν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ σεμνόν, ἡ τούτων ἐκλογὴ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα οἰκονομία, καὶ τούτων μὴ τυγχάνοντας οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι βιοῦν ἀλλʼ ἀποσφάττειν ἑαυτοὺς ἢ ἀποκαρτερεῖν, πολλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ χαίρειν φράσαντας. τὸν τοίνυν Θέογνιν αὐτοὶ παντελῶς ἀγεννῆ καὶ μικρὸν ἡγοῦνται, λέγοντα
χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ ἐς μεγακήτεα πόντον
ῥιπτεῖν, καὶ πετρῶν, Κύρνε, κατʼ ἠλιβάτων
οὕτως ἀποδειλιῶντα πρὸς τὴν πενίαν ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν· ἀλλʼ αὐτοί γε ταὐτὰ πεζῷ λόγῳ παρακελεύονται καὶ λέγουσιν, ὅτι χρὴ νόσον φεύγοντα μεγάλην καὶ ἀλγηδόνα σύντονον, ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ ξίφος ἢ κώνειον, εἰς θάλατταν ἀφεῖναι καὶ κατὰ πετρῶν ῥιπτεῖν ἑαυτόν· ὧν οὐδέτερον βλαβερὸν οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδʼ ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ κακοδαίμονας ποιεῖ τοὺς περιπίπτοντας.

[¶8] 23. DIADUMENUS. With what then, says he, shall I begin? And what shall I take for the principle of duty and matter of virtue, leaving Nature and that which is according to Nature? With what, O good sir, do Aristotle and Theophrastus begin? What beginnings do Xenocrates and Polemo take? Does not also Zeno follow these, who suppose Nature and that which is according to Nature to be the elements of happiness? But they indeed persisted in these things, as desirable, good, and profitable; and joining to them virtue, which employs them and uses every one of them according to its property, thought to complete and consummate a perfect life and one every way absolute, producing that concord which is truly suitable and consonant to Nature. For these men did not fall into confusion, like those who leap up from the ground and presently fall down again upon it, terming the same things acceptable and not desirable, proper and not good, unprofitable and yet useful, nothing to us and yet the principles of duties. But their life was such as their speech, and they exhibited actions suitable and consonant to their sayings. But they who are of the Stoic sect—not unlike to that woman in Archilochus, who deceitfully carried in one hand water, in the other fire—by some doctrines draw nature to them, and by others drive her from them. Or rather, by their deeds and actions they embrace those things which are according to Nature, as good and desirable, but in words and speeches they reject and contemn them, as indifferent and of no use to virtue for the acquiring felicity.

> Greek: 23. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. πόθεν οὖν φησὶν ἄρξωμαι; καὶ τίνα λάβω τοῦ καθήκοντος ἀρχὴν καὶ ὕλην τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀφεὶς τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; πόθεν δʼ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ Θεόφραστος; ἄρχονται; τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις ἠκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἐπὶ τούτων ἔμειναν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν προσλαβόντες αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοῦσαν, οἰκείως χρωμένην ἑκάστῳ, τέλειον ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὁλόκληρον ᾤοντο συμπληροῦν βίον καὶ συμπεραίνειν, τὴν ἀληθῶς τῇ φύσει πρόσφορον καὶ συνῳδὸν ὁμολογίαν ἀποδιδόντες. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ τῆς γῆς ἀφαλλόμενοι καὶ καταφερόμενοι πάλιν ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἐταράττοντο, ταὐτὰ πράγματα ληπτὰ καὶ οὐχ αἱρετὰ καὶ οἰκεῖα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθά, καὶ., ἀνωφελῆ μὲν εὔχρηστα δέ, καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀρχὰς δὲ τῶν καθηκόντων ὀνομάζοντες· ἀλλʼ οἷος ὁ λόγος, τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων, ἃ ἔπραττον οἷς ἔλεγον οἰκεῖα καὶ σύμφωνα παρεχόντων. ἡ δὲ τούτων αἵρεσις, ὥσπερ ἡ παρʼ Ἀρχιλόχῳ γυνή
τῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ἐφόρει
δολοφρονέουσα χειρὶ τἡτέρῃ δὲ πῦρ,
τοῖς μὲν προσάγεται τὴν φύσιν τοῖς δʼ ἀπωθεῖται δόγμασι μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἔργοις καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς αἱρετῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔχονται τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, τοῖς δʼ ὀνόμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἄχρηστα καὶ ἀρρεπῆ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀναίνονται καὶ προπηλακίζουσιν.

[¶9] 24. DIADUMENUS. Now, forasmuch as all men esteem the sovereign good to be joyous, desirable, happy, of the greatest dignity, self-sufficient, and wanting nothing; compare their good, and see how it agrees with this common conception. Does the stretching out a finger prudently produce this joy? Is a prudent torture a thing desirable? Is he happy, who with reason breaks his neck? Is that of the greatest dignity, which reason often chooses to let go for that which is not good? Is that perfect and self-sufficient, by enjoying which, if they have not also indifferent things, they neither can nor will endure to live? There is also another principle of the Stoics, by which custom is still more injured, taking and plucking from her genuine notions, which are as her legitimate children, and supposing other bastardly, wild, and illegitimate ones in their room, and necessitating her to nourish and cherish the one instead of the other; and that too in those doctrines which concern things good and bad, desirable and avoidable, proper and strange, the energy of which ought to be more clearly distinguished than that of hot and cold, black and white. For the imaginations of these things are brought in by the senses from without; but those have their original bred from the good things which we have within us. But these men entering with their logic upon the topic of felicity, as on the sophism called Pseudomenos, or that named Kyrieuon, have removed no ambiguities, but brought in very many.

> Greek: 24. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθόλου τἀγαθὸν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι χαρτὸν νοοῦσιν εὐκταῖν εὐτυχὲς ἀξίαν ἔχον τὴν μεγίστην αὔταρκες ἀπροσδεές, ὅρα τὸ τούτων παρατιθεὶς ἀγαθόν, ἆρά γε χαρτὸν ποιεῖ τὸ φρονίμως τὸν δάκτυλον προτεῖναι; τί δʼ; εὐκταῖόν ἐστι φρονίμη στρέβλωσις; εὐτυχεῖ δʼ ὁ κατακρημνίζων ἑαυτὸν εὐλόγως; ἀξίαν δʼ ἔχει τὴν μεγίστην, ὃ πολλάκις αἱρεῖ λόγος ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ προέσθαι; τέλειον δὲ καὶ αὔταρκές ἐστιν, οὗ παρόντος, ἂν μὴ τυγχάνωσι τῶν ἀδιαφόρων, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν οὐδὲ βούλονται ζῆν; γέγονε δʼ ἕτερος λόγος, ὑφʼ οὗ μᾶλλον ἡ συνήθεια παρανενόμηται, τὰς μὲν γνησίας ὑφαιροῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀποσπῶντος ἐννοίας ὥσπερ τέκνα, νόθας δὲ προσβάλλοντος ἑτέρας θηριώδεις καὶ ἀλλοκότους καὶ ταύτας ἀντʼ ἐκείνων ἐκτιθηνεῖσθαι καὶ στέργειν ἀναγκάζοντος· καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, αἱρετῶν τε καὶ φευκτῶν, οἰκείων τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίων, ἃ μᾶλλον ἔδει θερμῶν τε καὶ ψυχρῶν λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων σαφεστέραν ἔχειν τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐκείνων μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθὲν εἰσιν αἱ φαντασίαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεισόδιοι, ταῦτα δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν; οἱ δʼ ὥσπερ εἰς τὸν ψευδόμενον ἢ τὸν κυριεύοντα μετὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμβάλλοντες εἰς τὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τόπον ἔλυσαν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐν αὐτῷ μυρίας δʼ ἐποίησαν.

[¶10] 25. DIADUMENUS. Indeed, of two good things, of which the one is the end and the other belongs to the end, none is ignorant that the end is the greater and perfecter good. Chrysippus also acknowledges this difference, as is manifest from his Third Book of Good Things. For he dissents from those who make science the end, and sets it down … In his Treatise of Justice, however, he does not think that justice can be safe, if any one supposes pleasure to be the end; but grants it may, if pleasure is not said to be the end, but simply a good. Nor do I think that you need now to hear me repeat his words, since his Third Book of Justice is everywhere to be had. When therefore, O my friend, they elsewhere say that no one good is greater or less than another, and that what is not the end is equal to the end, they contradict not only the common conceptions, but even their own words. Again, if of two evils, the one when it is present renders us worse, and the other hurts us but renders us not worse, it is against common sense not to say that the evil which by its presence renders us worse is greater than that which hurts us but renders us not worse. Now Chrysippus indeed confesses, that there are some fears and sorrows and errors which hurt us, but render us not worse. Read his First Book of Justice against Plato; for in respect of other things, it is worth the while to note the babbling of the man in that place, delivering indifferently all matters and doctrines, as well proper to his own sect as foreign.

> Greek: 25. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι δυεῖν ἀγαθῶν, τοῦ μὲν τέλους τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ τέλος καὶ τελειότερον, ὑπʼ οὐδενὸς ἀγνοεῖται. γιγνώσκει δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος τὴν διαφοράν, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐν. τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ Ἀγαθῶν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἡγουμένοις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνομολογεῖ, καὶ τίθησιν … ἔν γε τοῖς περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, εἰ μέν τις ὑπόθοιτο τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος, οὐκ οἴεται σῴζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τέλος ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, οἴεται· τὰς δὲ λέξεις οὐκ οἴομαί σε δεῖσθαι νῦν ἀκούειν ἐμοῦ καταλέγοντος τὸ γὰρ τρίτον περὶ Δικαιοσύνης βιβλίον ἔστι πανταχόθεν λαβεῖν. ὅταν οὖν αὖθις, ὦ φίλε, μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν λέγωσι μηδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ μεῖζον εἶναι μηδʼ ἔλαττον ἀλλʼ ἴσον τῷ τέλει τὸ μὴ τέλος, οὐ ταῖς κοιναῖς μόνον ἐννοίαις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν λόγοις φαίνονται μαχόμενοι. καὶ πάλιν εἰ δυεῖν κακοῖν ὑφʼ οὗ μὲν γιγνόμεθα χείρονες, ὅταν παραγένηται, τὸ δὲ βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας, παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι μὴ λέγειν ἐκεῖνο μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν, ὑφʼ οὗ γιγνόμεθα χείρονες, ὅταν παραγένηται, τοῦ ὃ βλάπτει μὲν οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ χείρονας· μηδὲ κακίονα βλάβην τὴν κακίονας ἡμᾶς ἀποτελοῦσαν. ἀλλʼ ὁμολογεῖ γε Χρύσιππος εἶναί τινας φόβους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀπάτας, αἳ βλάπτουσι μὲν ἡμᾶς χείρονας δʼ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἔντυχε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα γεγραμμένων περὶ Δικαιοσύνης· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλων ἕνεκα τὴν ἐκεῖ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εὑρησιλογίαν ἄξιον ἱστορῆσαι, πάντων ἁπλῶς πραγμάτων καὶ δογμάτων οἰκείων ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀλλοτρίων ἀφειδοῦσαν.

[¶11] 26. DIADUMENUS. It is likewise against common sense when he says that there may be two ends or scopes proposed of life, and that all the things we do are not to be referred to one; and yet this is more against common sense, to say that there is an end, and yet that every action is to be referred to another. Nevertheless they must of necessity endure one of these. For if those things which are first according to Nature are not eligible for themselves, but the choice and taking of them agreeably to reason is so, and if every one therefore does all his actions for the acquiring the first things according to Nature, it follows that all things which are done must have their reference to this, that the principal things according to Nature may be obtained. But they think that they who aim and aspire to get these things do not have the things themselves for the end, but that to which they must refer, namely, the choice and not the things. For the end indeed is to choose and receive these things prudently. But the things themselves and the enjoying of them are not the end, but the material object, having its worth only from the choice. For it is my opinion that they both use and write this very expression, to show the difference. LAMPRIAS. You have exactly related both what they say and in what manner they deliver it. DIADUMENUS. But observe how it fares with them, as with those that endeavor to leap over their own shadow; for they do not leave behind, but always carry along with them in their speech some absurdity most remote from common sense. For as, if any one should say that he who shoots does all he can, not that he may hit the mark, but that he may do all he can, such a one would rightly be esteemed to speak enigmatically and prodigiously; so these doting dreamers, who contend that the obtaining of natural things is not the end of aiming after natural things, but the taking and choosing them is, and that the desire and endeavor after health is not in every one terminated in the enjoyment of health, but on the contrary, the enjoyment of health is referred to the desire and endeavor after it, and that certain walkings and contentions of speech and suffering incisions and taking of medicines, so they are done by reason, are the end of health, and not health of them,—they, I say, trifle like to those who say, Let us sup, that we may sacrifice, that we may bathe. But this rather changes order and custom, and all things which these men say carry with them the total subversion and confusion of affairs. Thus, we do not desire to take a walk in fit time that we may digest our meat; but we digest our meat that we may take a walk in fit time. Has Nature also made health for the sake of hellebore, instead of producing hellebore for the sake of health? For what is wanting to bring them to the highest degree of speaking paradoxes, but the saying of such things? What difference is there between him who says that health was made for the sake of medicines and not medicines for the sake of health, and him who makes the choice of medicines and their composition and use more desirable than health itself?—or rather who esteems health not at all desirable, but placing the end in the negotiation about these things, prefers desire to enjoyment, and not enjoyment to desire? For to desire, forsooth (they say), is joined the proceeding wisely and discreetly. It is true indeed, we will say, if respect be had to the end, that is, the enjoyment and possession of the things it pursues; but otherwise, it is wholly void of reason, if it does all things for the obtaining of that the enjoyment of which is neither honorable nor happy.

> Greek: 26. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστι· δύο τέλη καὶ σκοποὺς προκεῖσθαι τοῦ βίου, καὶ μὴ πάντων, ὅσα πράττομεν, ἐφʼ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τέλος, ἐπʼ ἄλλο δὲ τῶν πραττομένων ἕκαστον ἀναφέρεσθαι τούτων δʼ αὐτοὺς ὑπομένειν ἀνάγκη θάτερον. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μή ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογὴ καὶ λῆψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρʼ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἕκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνο δεῖ πάντα ἔχειν τὰ πραττόμενα τὴν ἀναφοράν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται μὴ στοχαζομένους μηδʼ ἐφιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ οὗ δεῖ ἐκεῖνα ἀναφέρεσθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν καὶ μὴ ταῦτα· τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκεῖνα φρονίμως· ἐκεῖνα δʼ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὕλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τοὔνομα λέγειν καὶ γράφειν αὐτούς, ἐνδεικνυμένους τὴν διαφοράν. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἀνδρικῶς; μὲν ἀπομεμνημόνευκας καὶ ὃ λέγουσι καὶ ὡς λέγουσι. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. σκόπει δʼ ὅτι ταὐτὸ πάσχουσι τοῖς τὴν σκιὰν ὑπεράλλεσθαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐφιεμένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολείπουσιν ἀλλὰ συμμεταφέρουσι τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ, πορρωτάτω τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἀφισταμένην. ὡς γὰρ εἰ τοξεύοντα φαίη τις οὐχὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ παρʼ αὑτὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλʼ ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρʼ αὑτόν, αἰνίγμασιν ὅμοια καὶ τεράστια δόξειεν ἂν περαίνειν οὕτως οἱ τριπέμπελοι βιαζόμενοι μὴ τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ στοχάζεσθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι, μηδὲ τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ δίωξιν εἰς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἑκάστῳ τελευτᾶν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔφεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ δίωξιν ἀναφέρεσθαι, περιπάτους τινὰς καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις καὶ τομὰς νὴ Δία καὶ φαρμακείας εὐλογίστους τέλη ποιούμενοι τῆς ὑγιείας, οὐχὶ τούτων ἐκείνην, ὅμοια ληροῦσι τῷ λέγοντι δειπνῶμεν, ἵνα θύωμεν, ἵνα λουώμεθα μᾶλλον δʼ ἐκεῖνος εἰωθός τι καὶ νενομισμένον ἀλλάττει καὶ ταράττει τὴν τάξιν· ἃ δʼ οὗτοι λέγουσι τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνατροπὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν οὐ σπουδάζομεν εὐκαίρως περιπατεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν ἀλλὰ πέττειν τὴν τροφὴν ἕνεκα τοῦ περιπατεῖν εὐκαίρως ἦπου καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἐλλεβόρου χάριν πεποίηκεν, οὐ τῆς· ὑγιείας τὸν ἐλλέβορον. τί γὰρ ἄλλο καταλείπεται αὐτοῖς εἰς ὑπερβολὴν παραδοξολογίας ἢ τοιαῦτα ληρεῖν; τί γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ λέγοντος γεγονέναι τὴν ὑγίειαν τῶν φαρμάκων ἕνεκα, μὴ τὰ φάρμακα τῆς ὑγιείας, ὁ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τὴν περὶ τὰ φάρμακα καὶ σύνθεσιν καὶ· χρῆσιν αὐτῶν αἱρετωτέραν ποιῶν τῆς ὑγιείας μᾶλλον τὴν μὲν οὐδʼ ὅλως αἱρετὸν ἡγούμενος, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματείᾳ τὸ τέλος τιθέμενος καὶ ἔφεσιν ἀποφαίνων τέλος τῆς τεύξεως, οὐ τῆς ἐφέσεως τὴν τεῦξιν; τῇ γὰρ ἐφέσει νὴ Δία τὸ εὐλογίστως καὶ τὸ φρονίμως πρόσεστι πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φήσομεν, ἂν ὡς πρὸς τέλος ὁρᾷ τὴν τεῦξιν ὧν διώκει καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν εἰ μή, τὸ εὐλόγιστον αὐτῆς; ἀφαιρεῖται, πάντα ποιούσης ἕνεκα τσῦ τυχεῖν, οὗ τυχεῖν οὐ σεμνὸν οὐδὲ μακάριόν ἐστι.

[¶12] 27. DIADUMENUS. Now, since we are fallen upon this discourse, any thing may rather be said to agree with common sense, than that those who have neither received nor have any conception of good do nevertheless desire and pursue it. For you see how Chrysippus drives Ariston into this difficulty, that he should understand an indifference in things inclining neither to good nor to bad, before either good or bad is itself understood; for so indifference will appear to have subsisted even before itself, if the understanding of it cannot be perceived unless good be first understood, while the good is nothing else than this very indifference. Understand now and consider this indifference which the Stoa denies and calls consent, whence and in what manner it gives us the knowledge of good. For if without good the indifference to that which is not good cannot be understood, much less does the knowledge of good things give any intelligence of itself to those who had not before some notion of the good. But as there can be no knowledge of the art of things wholesome and unwholesome in those who have not first some knowledge of the things themselves; so they cannot conceive any notion of the science of good and evil who have not some fore-knowledge of good and evil. LAMPRIAS. What then is good? DIADUMENUS. Nothing but prudence. LAMPRIAS. And what is prudence? DIADUMENUS. Nothing but the science of good. LAMPRIAS. There is much then of Jupiter’s Corinth (that is, much reasoning in a circle) admitted into their arguments. For I would have you let alone the saying about the turning of the pestle, lest you should seem to mock them; although an accident like to that has insinuated itself into their discourse. For it seems that, to the understanding of good, one has need to understand prudence, and to seek for prudence in the understanding of good, being forced always to pursue the one by the other, and thus failing of both; since to the understanding of each we have need of that which cannot be known without the other be first understood. DIADUMENUS. But there is yet another way, by which you may perceive not only the perversion but the eversion of their discourse, and the reduction of it entirely to nothing. They hold the essence of good to be the reasonable election of things according to Nature. Now the election is not reasonable which is not directed to some end, as has been said before. What then is this end? Nothing else, say they, but to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature. First then, the conception of good is lost and gone. For to reason rightly in election is an operation proceeding from an habit of right reasoning; and therefore being constrained to learn this from the end, and the end not without this, we fail of understanding either of them. Besides, which is more, this reasonable election ought in strict justice to be a choice of things good and useful, and co-operating to the end; for how can it be reasonable to choose things which are neither convenient nor honorable nor at all eligible? For be it, as they say, a reasonable election of things having a fitness for the causing felicity; see then to what a beautiful and grave conclusion their discourse brings them. For the end is (it seems), according to them, to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly. LAMPRIAS. When I hear these words, my friend, what is said seems to me strangely extravagant; and I farther want to know how this happens. DIADUMENUS. You must then be more attentive; for it is not for every one to understand this riddle. Hear therefore and answer. Is not the end, according to them, to reason rightly in the election of things according to Nature. LAMPRIAS. So they say. DIADUMENUS. And are these things according to Nature chosen as good, or as having some fitness or preferences … either for this end or for something else? LAMPRIAS. I think not for any thing else but for this end. DIADUMENUS. Now then, having discovered the matter, see what befalls them. They hold that the end is to reason rightly in the choice of things which are of worth in causing us to reason rightly, for they say that we neither have nor understand any other essence either of good or of felicity but this precious rectitude of reasoning in the election of things that are of worth. But there are some who think that this is spoken against Antipater, and not against the whole sect; for that he, being pressed by Carneades, fell into these fooleries.

> Greek: 27. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, τί ἂν φαίης μᾶλλον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἢ τὸ μὴ λαβόντας ἔννοιαν ἀγαθοῦ μηδὲ σχόντας, ἐφίεσθαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ διώκειν; ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Χρύσιππος εἰς ταύτην μᾶλλον συνελαύνει τὸν Ἀρίστωνα τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὡς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ διδόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ μήτʼ ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀδιαφορίαν ἐπινοῆσαι τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ μὴ προεπινοηθέντων· οὕτω γὰρ αὑτῆς φανεῖσθαι τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν προϋφισταμένην, εἰ νόησιν μὲν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν, μὴ πρότερον τἀγαθοῦ νοηθέντος, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ μόνον τάγαθόν ἐστιν. ἴθι δὲ καὶ σκόπει τὴν ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς ταύτην ἀρνουμένην ἀδιαφορίαν καλουμένην δʼ ὁμολογίαν, ὅπως δὴ καὶ ὁπόθεν παρέσχεν αὑτὴν ἀγαθὸν νοηθῆναι. εἰ γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἀδιαφορίαν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φρόνησις ἐπίνοιαν αὑτῆς οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἀγαθὸν μὴ προεννοήσασιν. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσερῶν τέχνης οὐ γίγνεται νόησις, οἷς μὴ πρότερον αὐτῶν ἐκείνων γέγονεν, οὕτως ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ἔστιν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν μὴ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ προεννοήσαντας. ΛΑΜΠΡ. τί οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ φρόνησις. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Τί δʼ ἡ φρόνησις; ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμη. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Πολὺς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἀφῖκται. τὴν γὰρ ὑπέρου περιτροπήν, ἵνα μὴ σκώπτειν δοκῇς, ἔασον· καίτοι τὸν γε λόγον αὐτῶν ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ πάθος κατείληφε. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν τἀγαθοῦ νόησιν αὐτὴν νοῆσαι δεόμενος φρόνησιν τὴν δʼ αὖ φρόνησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ τἀγαθὸν ζητῶν νοήσει, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀεὶ τὴν ἑτέραν διώκειν, ἀπολειπόμενος δʼ ἑκατέρας τῷ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς νοούμενον δεῖσθαι τοῦ χωρὶς νοηθῆναι μὴ δυναμένου. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. καὶ κατʼ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἔστι τὴν οὐκέτι διαστροφὴν ἀλλʼ ἐκστροφὴν αὐτῶν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τελέως εἰς τὸ μηδὲν καταμαθεῖν. οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ τίθενται τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐκλογὴ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλόγιστος ἡ μὴ πρός τι γενομένη τέλος, ὡς προείρηται. τί οὖν τοῦτʼ ἐστίν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φασίν, ἢ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογαῖς. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οἴχεται καὶ διαπέφευγεν ἡ ἔννοια τἀγαθοῦ τὸ γὰρ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς σύμπτωμα δήπουθέν ἐστι, γιγνόμενον ἀπὸ ἕξεως τῆς εὐλογιστίας· διὸ ταύτην μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους, τὸ τέλος δʼ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτης ἀναγκαζόμενοι νοεῖν, ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς ἀμφοῖν νοήσεως. ἔπειτα, ὃ μεῖζὸν ἐστι, τῷ μὲν δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ τὴν εὐλόγιστον ἐκλογὴν ἀγαθῶν ἔδει καὶ ὠφελίμων καὶ συνεργῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκλογὴν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ μήτε συμφέροντα μήτε τίμια μήθʼ ὅλως αἱρετὰ πῶς εὐλόγιστόν ἐστιν; ἔστω γάρ, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν, εὐλόγιστος; ἐκλογὴ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅρα τοίνυν, ὡς εἰς πάγκαλόν τι καὶ σεμνὸν αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγος ἐξήκει κεφάλαιον. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τέλος κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν. ΛΑΜΠΡ. Ἀλλʼ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκούοντι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται δεινῶς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ φραζόμενον· ἔτι δὲ δέομαι μαθεῖν πῶς τοῦτο συμβαίνει. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Προσεκτέον οὖν σοι μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶν αἴνιγμα συνιέναι ἄκουε δὴ καὶ ἀποκρίνου. ἆρʼ οὖν τέλος ἐστὶ κατʼ αὐτοὺς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν κατὰ φύσιν; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Λέγουσιν οὕτως. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ. Τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν πότερον ὡς ἀγαθὰ ἐκλέγονται ἢ ὡς ἀξίας τινὰς ἔχοντα ἢ προαγωγὰς … τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἢ πρὸς ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων; ΛΑΜΠΡ. Οὐ νομίζω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τέλος. ΔΙΑΔΟΥΜ.. ἤδη τοίνυν ἀποκαλύψας ὅρα τὸ συμβαῖνον αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων πρὸς τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν· ἄλλην γὰρ οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔτʼ ἔχειν φασὶν οὔτε νοεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἢ τὴν πολυτίμητον εὐλογιστίαν ταύτην περὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς τῶν ἀξίαν ἐχόντων. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον οἰόμενοι λέγεσθαι μὴ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ὑπὸ Καρνεάδου πιεζόμενον εἰς ταύτας καταδύεσθαι τὰς εὑρησιλογίας.