28.1. Now, Caesar had long ago decided to put down Pompey, just as, of course, Pompey also had decided to put Caesar down. For now that Crassus, who was only waiting for the issue of their struggle to engage the victor, had perished among the Parthians, it remained for him who would be greatest to put down him who was, and for him who was greatest, if he would not be put down, to take off in time the man he feared.
28.1. Καίσαρι δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἐδέδοκτο καταλύειν Πομπήϊον, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει κἀκείνῳ τοῦτον Κράσσου γὰρ ἐν Πάρθοις ἀπολωλότος, ὃς ἦν ἔφεδρος ἀμφοῖν, ἀπελείπετο τῷ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γενέσθαι μεγίστῳ τὸν ὄντα καταλύειν, τῷ δέ, ἵνα μὴ πάθῃ τοῦτο, προαναιρεῖν ὃν ἐδεδοίκει.
28.2. This fear had only recently come upon Pompey, who till then despised Caesar, feeling that it was no hard task to put down again the man whom he himself had raised on high. But Caesar had from the outset formed this design, and like an athlete had removed himself to a great distance from his antagonists, and by exercising himself in the Gallic wars had practised his troops and increased his fame, lifting himself by his achievements to a height where he could vie with the successes of Pompey. He laid hold of pretexts which were furnished partly by Pompey himself, and partly by the times and the evil state of government at Rome, by reason of which candidates for office set up counting-tables in public and shamelessly bribed the multitudes, while the people went down into the forum under pay, contending in behalf of their paymaster, not with votes, but with bows and arrows, swords, and slings.
28.2. τοῦτο δὲ Πομπηΐῳ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγου φοβεῖσθαι παρέστη τέως ὑπερορῶντι Καίσαρος, ὡς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἔργον ὃν αὐτὸς ηὔξησε καταλυθῆναι πάλιν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, Καῖσαρ δὲ ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην πεποιημένος, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς ἑαυτὸν ἀποστήσας μακρὰν καὶ τοῖς Κελτικοῖς ἐγγυμνασάμενος πολέμοις ἐπήσκησε μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, ηὔξησε δὲ τὴν δόξαν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων εἰς ἀντίπαλον ἀρθεὶς τοῖς Πομπηΐου κατορθώμασι, λαμβάνων προφάσεις τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ Πομπηΐου, τὰς δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ἐνδιδόντων καὶ τῆς ἐν Ῥώμῃ κακοπολιτείας, διʼ ἣν οἱ μὲν ἀρχὰς μετιόντες ἐν μέσῳ θέμενοι τραπέζας ἐδέκαζον ἀναισχύντως τὰ πλήθη, κατῄει δὲ ὁ δῆμος ἔμμισθος, οὐ ψήφοις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεδωκότος, ἀλλὰ τόξοις καὶ ξίφεσι καὶ σφενδόναις ἁμιλλώμενος.
28.4. Often, too, they would defile the rostra with blood and corpses before they separated, leaving the city to anarchy like a ship drifting about without a steersman, so that men of understanding were content if matters issued in nothing worse for them than monarchy, after such madness and so great a tempest. And there were many who actually dared to say in public that nothing but monarchy could now cure the diseases of the state, and that this remedy might to be adopted when offered by the gentlest of physicians, hinting at Pompey.
28.4. αἵματι δὲ καὶ νεκροῖς πολλάκις αἰσχύναντες τὸ βῆμα διεκρίθησαν, ἀναρχίᾳ τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ ἀκυβέρνητον ναῦν ὑποφερομένην ἀπολιπόντες, ὥστε τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας ἀγαπᾶν εἰ πρὸς μηδὲν αὐτοῖς χεῖρον, ἀλλὰ μοναρχίαν ἐκ τοιαύτης παραφροσύνης καὶ τοσούτου κλύδωνος ἐκπεσεῖται τὰ πράγματα, πολλοὶ δὲ ἦσαν οἱ καὶ λέγειν ἐν μέσῳ τολμῶντες ἤδη πλὴν ὑπὸ μοναρχίας ἀνήκεστον εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τὸ φάρμακον τοῦτο χρῆναι τοῦ πρᾳοτάτου τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀνασχέσθαι προσφέροντος, ὑποδηλοῦντες τὸν Πομπήϊον.
28.5. And when even Pompey, although in words he affected to decline the honour, in fact did more than any one else to effect his appointment as dictator, Cato saw through his design and persuaded the senate to appoint him sole consul, solacing him with a more legal monarchy that he might not force his way to the dictatorship. They also voted him additional time in which to hold his provinces; and he had two, Spain and all Africa, which he managed by sending legates thither and maintaining armies there, for which he received from the public treasury a thousand talents annually.
28.5. ἐπεὶ δὲ κἀκεῖνος λόγῳ παραιτεῖσθαι καλλωπιζόμενος ἔργῳ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐπέραινεν ἐξ ὧν ἀναδειχθήσοιτο δικτάτωρ, συμφρονήσαντες οἱ περὶ Κάτωνα πείθουσι τὴν γερουσίαν ὕπατον αὐτὸν ἀποδεῖξαι μόνον, ὡς μὴ βιάσαιτο δικτάτωρ γενέσθαι, νομιμωτέρᾳ μοναρχίᾳ παρηγορηθείς, οἱ δὲ καὶ χρόνον ἐπεψηφίσαντο τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν· δύο δὲ εἶχεν, Ἰβηρίαν καὶ Λιβύην σύμπασαν, ἃς διῴκει πρεσβευτὰς ἀποστέλλων καὶ στρατεύματα τρέφων, οἷς ἐλάμβανεν ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου ταμιείου χίλια τάλαντα καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν.
29.1. Consequently, Caesar canvassed by proxy for a consulship, and likewise for an extension of time in which to hold his own provinces. At first, then, Pompey held his peace, while Marcellus and Lentulus opposed these plans; they hated Caesar on other grounds, and went beyond all bounds in their efforts to bring dishonour and abuse upon him.
29.1. ἐκ τούτου Καῖσαρ ὑπατείαν ἐμνᾶτο πέμπων, καὶ χρόνον ὁμοίως τῶν ἰδίων ἐπαρχιῶν, τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Πομπηΐου σιωπῶντος οἱ περὶ Μάρκελλον καὶ Λέντλον ἠναντιοῦντο, μισοῦντες ἄλλως Καίσαρα καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα προστιθέντες εἰς ἀτιμίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ προπηλακισμόν.
29.2. For instance, the inhabitants of Novum Comum, a colony recently established by Caesar in Gaul, were deprived of citizenship by them; and Marcellus, while he was consul, beat with rods a senator of Novum Comum who had come to Rome, telling him besides that he put these marks upon him to prove that he was not a Roman, and bade him go back and show them to Caesar. But after the consulship of Marcellus, Caesar having now sent his Gallic wealth for all those in public life to draw from in copious streams, and having freed Curio the tribune from many debts, and having given Paulus the consul fifteen hundred talents, out of which he adorned the forum with the Basilica, a famous monument, erected in place of the Fulvia,—under these circumstances Pompey took fright at the coalition, and openly now, by his own efforts and those of his friends, tried to have a successor appointed to Caesar in his government, and sent a demand to him for the return of the soldiers whom he had lent him for his Gallic contests. Caesar sent the soldiers back, after making a present to each man of two hundred and fifty drachmas.
29.2. Νεοκωμίτας γὰρ ἔναγχος ὑπὸ Καίσαρος ἐν Γαλατίᾳ κατῳκισμένους ἀφῃροῦντο τῆς πολιτείας καὶ Μάρκελλος ὑπατεύων ἕνα τῶν ἐκεῖ βουλευτῶν εἰς Ῥώμην ἀφικόμενον ᾔκιστο ῥάβδοις, ἐπιλέγων ὡς ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ Ῥωμαῖον εἶναι παράσημα προστίθησιν αὐτῷ, καὶ δεικνύειν ἀπιόντα Καίσαρι ἐκέλευε. μετὰ δὲ Μάρκελλον, ἤδη Καίσαρος τὸν Γαλατικὸν πλοῦτον ἀρύεσθαι ῥύδην ἀφεικότος πᾶσι τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, καὶ Κουρίωνα μὲν δημαρχοῦντα πολλῶν ἐλευθερώσαντος δανείων, Παύλῳ δὲ ὑπατεύοντι χίλια καὶ πεντακόσια τάλαντα δόντος, ἀφʼ ὧν καὶ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐκεῖνος, ὀνομαστὸν ἀνάθημα, τῇ ἀγορᾷ προσεκόσμησεν ἀντὶ τῆς Φουλβίας οἰκοδομηθεῖσαν, οὕτω δὴ φοβηθεὶς τὴν σύστασιν ὁ Πομπήϊος ἀναφανδὸν ἤδη διʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν φίλων ἔπραττεν ἀποδειχθῆναι διάδοχον Καίσαρι τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ πέμπων ἀπῄτει τοὺς στρατιώτας οὓς ἔχρησεν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς Κελτικοὺς ἀγῶνας, ὁ δὲ ἀποπέμπει, δωρησάμενος ἕκαστον ἄνδρα πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίαις δραχμαῖς.
29.4. But the officers who brought these men to Pompey spread abroad among the multitude stories regarding Caesar which were neither reasonable nor true, and ruined Pompey himself with vain hopes. They told him that Caesar’s army yearned for him, and that while he was with difficulty controlling affairs in the city owing to the disease of envy which festered in the body politic, the forces in Gaul were ready to serve him, and had but to cross into Italy when they would at once be on his side; so obnoxious to them had Caesar become by reason of the multitude of his campaigns, and so suspicious of him were they made by their fear of a monarchy.
29.4. οἱ δὲ τούτους Πομπηΐῳ κομίσαντες εἰς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς οὐδὲ χρηστοὺς κατέσπειραν λόγους ὑπὲρ τοῦ Καίσαρος, αὐτὸν δὲ Πομπήϊον ἐλπίσι κεναῖς διέφθειραν, ὡς ποθούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς Καίσαρος στρατιᾶς καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνταῦθα διὰ φθόνον πολιτείας ὑπούλου μόλις ἔχοντα, τῆς δὲ ἐκεῖ δυνάμεως ἑτοίμης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ, κἂν μόνον ὑπερβάλωσιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν εὐθὺς ἐσομένης πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὕτως γεγονέναι τὸν Καίσαρα πλήθει στρατειῶν λυπηρὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ φόβῳ μοναρχίας ὕποπτον.
29.5. All this fed Pompey’s vanity, and he neglected to provide himself with soldiers, as though he had no fears; while with speeches and resolutions of the senate he was carrying the day against Caesar, as he supposed, although he was merely getting measures rejected about which Caesar cared naught. Nay, we are told that one of the centurions sent to Rome by Caesar, as he stood in front of the senate-house and learned that the senate would not give Caesar an extension of his term of command, slapped the handle of his sword and said: “But this will give it” However, the demands which came from Caesar certainly had a striking semblance of fairness.
29.5. ἐπὶ τούτοις Πομπήϊος ἐχαυνοῦτο καὶ παρασκευῆς μὲν ἠμέλει στρατιωτῶν, ὡς μὴ δεδοικώς, λόγοις δὲ καὶ γνώμαις κατεπολιτεύετο τῷ δοκεῖν Καίσαρα, καταψηφιζόμενος ὧν ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἐφρόντιζεν· ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγεταί τινα τῶν ἀφιγμένων παρʼ αὐτὸν ταξιάρχων ἑστῶτα πρὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου καὶ πυθόμενον ὡς οὐ δίδωσιν ἡ γερουσία Καίσαρι χρόνον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλʼ αὕτη φάναι δώσει, κρούσαντα τῇ χειρὶ τὴν λαβὴν τῆς μαχαίρας.
30.1. He demanded, namely, that if he himself laid down his arms, Pompey should do the same, and that both, thus become private men, should find what favour they could with their fellow citizens; arguing that if they took away his forces from him, but confirmed Pompey in the possession of his, they would be accusing one of seeking a tyranny and making the other a tyrant.
30.1. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἥ γε παρὰ Καίσαρος ἀξίωσις τὸ πρόσχημα τῆς δικαιολογίας λαμπρὸν εἶχεν. ἠξίου γὰρ αὐτός τε καταθέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ Πομπηΐου ταὐτὸ πράξαντος ἀμφοτέρους ἰδιώτας γενομένους εὑρίσκεσθαί τι παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀγαθόν, ὡς τοὺς αὐτὸν μὲν ἀφαιρουμένους, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἣν εἶχε βεβαιοῦντας δύναμιν, ἕτερον διαβάλλοντας ἕτερον κατασκευάζειν τύραννον.
30.2. When Curio laid these proposals before the people in behalf of Caesar, he was loudly applauded, and some actually cast garlands of flowers upon him as if he were a victorious athlete. Antony, too, who was a tribune, brought before the people a letter of Caesar’s on these matters which he had received, and read it aloud, in defiance of the consuls. But in the senate, Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompey, introduced a motion that if by a fixed day Caesar did not lay down his arms he should be declared a public enemy.
30.2. ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Κουρίων ὑπὲρ Καίσαρος ἐκροτεῖτο λαμπρῶς· οἱ δὲ καὶ στεφάνους ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴν ἀνθοβολοῦντες ἠφίεσαν. Ἀντώνιος δὲ δημαρχῶν Καίσαρος ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐπιστολὴν κομισθεῖσαν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ἐξήνεγκε καὶ ἀνέγνω βίᾳ τῶν ὑπάτων, ἐν δὲ τῇ βουλῇ Σκηπίων μὲν ὁ Πομπηΐου πενθερὸς εἰσηγήσατο γνώμην, ἂν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ μὴ κατάθηται τὰ ὅπλα Καῖσαρ, ἀποδειχθῆναι πολέμιον αὐτόν.
30.3. And when the consuls put the question whether Pompey should dismiss his soldiers, and again whether Caesar should, very few senators voted for the first, and all but a few for the second; but when Antony again demanded that both should give up their commands, all with one accord assented. Scipio, however, made violent opposition, and Lentulus the consul cried out that against a robber there was need of arms, not votes; whereupon the senate broke up, and the senators put on the garb of mourning in view of the dissension.
30.3. ἐρωτώντων δὲ τῶν ὑπάτων εἰ δοκεῖ Πομπήϊον ἀφεῖναι τοὺς στρατιώτας, καὶ πάλιν, εἰ δοκεῖ Καίσαρα, τῇ μὲν ὀλίγοι παντάπασι, τῇ δὲ πάντες παρʼ ὀλίγους προσέθεντο τῶν δὲ περὶ Ἀντώνιον πάλιν ἀξιούντων ἀμφοτέρους τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖναι, πάντες ὁμαλῶς προσεχώρησαν. ἀλλὰ ἐκβιαζομένου Σκηπίωνος, καὶ Λέντλου τοῦ ὑπάτου βοῶντος ὅπλων δεῖν πρὸς ἄνδρα λῃστήν, οὐ ψήφων, τότε μὲν διελύθησαν καὶ μετεβάλοντο τὰς ἐσθῆτας ἐπὶ πένθει διὰ τὴν στάσιν.
31.1. But presently letters came from Caesar in which he appeared to take a more moderate position, for he agreed to surrender everything else, but demanded that Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum together with two legions should be given him until he stood for his second consulship. Cicero the orator, too, who had just returned from Cilicia and was busy with a reconciliation, tried to mollify Pompey, who yielded everything else, but insisted on taking away Caesar’s soldiers. Cicero also tried to persuade the friends of Caesar to compromise and come to a settlement on the basis of the provinces mentioned and only six thousand soldiers, and Pompey was ready to yield and grant so many.
31.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρὰ Καίσαρος ἧκον ἐπιστολαὶ μετριάζειν δοκοῦντος ἠξίου γὰρ ἀφεὶς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων καὶ τὸ Ἰλλυρικὸν μετὰ δυεῖν ταγμάτων αὐτῷ δοθῆναι, μέχρι οὗ τὴν δευτέραν ὑπατείαν μέτεισι, καὶ Κικέρων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἄρτι παρὼν ἐκ Κιλικίας καὶ διαλλαγὰς πράττων ἐμάλαττε τὸν Πομπήϊον, ὁ δὲ τἆλλα συγχωρῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀφῄρει. καὶ Κικέρων μὲν ἔπειθε τοὺς Καίσαρος φίλους συνενδόντας ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐπαρχίαις καὶ στρατιώταις μόνοις ἑξακισχιλίοις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις, Πομπηΐου δὲ καμπτομένου καὶ διδόντος οἱ περὶ Λέντλον οὐκ εἴων ὑπατεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς Ἀντώνιον καὶ Κουρίωνα προπηλακίσαντες ἐξήλασαν ἀτίμως, τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην Καίσαρι τῶν προφάσεων αὐτοὶ μηχανησάμενοι, καὶ διʼ ἧς μάλιστα τοὺς στρατιώτας παρώξυνεν, ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἄνδρας ἐλλογίμους καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐπὶ μισθίων ζευγῶν πεφευγότας ἐν ἐσθῆσιν οἰκετικαῖς.
31.2. Lentulus the consul, however, would not let him, but actually heaped insults upon Antony and Curio and drove them disgracefully from the senate, thus himself contriving for Caesar the most specious of his pretexts, and the one by means of which he most of all incited his soldiers, showing them men of repute and high office who had fled the city on hired carts and in the garb of slaves. For thus they had arrayed themselves in their fear and stolen out of Rome. Now, Caesar had with him not more than three hundred horsemen and five thousand legionaries; for the rest of his army had been left beyond the Alps, and was to be brought up by those whom he had sent for the purpose. He saw, however, that the beginning of his enterprise and its initial step did not require a large force at present, but must take advantage of the golden moment by showing amazing boldness and speed, since he could strike terror into his enemies by an unexpected blow more easily than he could overwhelm them by an attack in full force. He therefore ordered his centurions and other officers, taking their swords only, and without the rest of their arms, to occupy Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, avoiding commotion and bloodshed as far as possible; and he entrusted this force to Hortensius.
31.2. οὕτω γὰρ ἀπὸ Ῥώμης σκευάσαντες ἑαυτοὺς διὰ φόβον ὑπεξῄεσαν. ἦσαν μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτὸν οὐ πλείους ἱππέων τριακοσίων καὶ πεντακισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο στράτευμα πέραν Ἄλπεων ἀπολελειμμένον ἔμελλον ἄξειν οἱ πεμφθέντες. ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὧν ἐνίστατο πραγμάτων καὶ τὴν ἔφοδον οὐ πολυχειρίας δεομένην ἐν τῷ παρόντι μᾶλλον ἢ θάμβει τε τόλμης καὶ τάχει καιροῦ καταληπτέαν οὖσαν, ἐκπλήξειν γὰρ ἀπιστούμενος ῥᾷον ἢ βιάσεσθαι μετὰ παρασκευῆς ἐπελθών, τοὺς μὲν ἡγεμόνας καὶ ταξιάρχους ἐκέλευσε μαχαίρας ἔχοντας ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπλων κατασχεῖν Ἀρίμινον τῆς Κελτικῆς μεγάλην πόλιν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα φεισαμένους φόνου καὶ ταραχῆς Ὁρτησίῳ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέδωκεν.
32.3. He himself spent the day in public, attending and watching the exercises of gladiators; but a little before evening he bathed and dressed and went into the banqueting hall. Here he held brief converse with those who had been invited to supper, and just as it was getting dark rose and went away, after addressing courteously most of his guests and bidding them await his return. To a few of his friends, however, he had previously given directions to follow him, not all by the same route, but some by one way and some by another.
32.3. αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν διῆγεν ἐν φανερῷ μονομάχοις ἐφεστὼς γυμναζομένοις καὶ θεώμενος μικρὸν δὲ πρὸ ἑσπέρας θεραπεύσας τὸ σῶμα καὶ παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν ἀνδρῶνα καὶ συγγενόμενος βραχέα τοῖς παρακεκλημένοις ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον, ἤδη συσκοτάζοντος ἐξανέστη, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους φιλοφρονηθεὶς καὶ κελεύσας περιμένειν αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπανελευσόμενον, ὀλίγοις δὲ τῶν φίλων προείρητο μὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντας, ἄλλον δὲ ἄλλῃ διώκειν.
32.4. He himself mounted one of his hired carts and drove at first along another road, then turned towards Ariminum. When he came to the river which separates Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy (it is called the Rubicon), and began to reflect, now that he drew nearer to the fearful step and was agitated by the magnitude of his ventures, he checked his speed.
32.4. αὐτὸς δὲ τῶν μισθίων ζευγῶν ἐπιβὰς ἑνός ἤλαυνεν ἑτέραν τινὰ πρῶτον ὁδόν, εἶτα πρὸς τὸ Ἀρίμινον ἐπιστρέψας, ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸν διορίζοντα τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων Γαλατίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης Ἰταλίας ποταμὸν (Ῥουβίκων καλεῖται), καὶ λογισμὸς αὐτὸν εἰσῄει μᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντα τῷ δεινῷ καὶ περιφερόμενον τῷ μεγέθει τῶν τολμωμένων, ἔσχετο δρόμου·
32.5. Then, halting in his course, he communed with himself a long time in silence as his resolution wavered back and forth, and his purpose then suffered change after change. For a long time, too, he discussed his perplexities with his friends who were present, among whom was Asinius Pollio, estimating the great evils for all mankind which would follow their passage of the river, and the wide fame of it which they would leave to posterity.
32.5. καὶ τὴν πορείαν ἐπιστήσας πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διήνεγκε σιγῇ τὴν γνώμην ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα μεταλαμβάνων, καὶ τροπὰς ἔσχεν αὐτῷ τότε τὸ βούλευμα πλείστας πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων τοῖς παροῦσιν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Πολλίων Ἀσίννιος, συνδιηπόρησεν, ἀναλογιζόμενος ἡλίκων κακῶν ἄρξει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ διάβασις, ὅσον τε λόγον αὐτῆς τοῖς αὖθις ἀπολείψουσι.
32.6. But finally, with a sort of passion, as if abandoning calculation and casting himself upon the future, and uttering the phrase with which men usually prelude their plunge into desperate and daring fortunes, “Let the die be cast,” he hastened to cross the river; and going at full speed now for the rest of the time, before daybreak he dashed into Ariminum and took possession of it. It is said, moreover, that on the night before he crossed the river he had an unnatural dream; he thought, namely, that he was having incestuous intercourse with his own mother.
32.6. τέλος δὲ μετὰ θυμοῦ τινος ὥσπερ ἀφεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς εἰς τύχας ἐμβαίνουσιν ἀπόρους καὶ τόλμας προοίμιον ὑπειπὼν, Ἀνερρίφθω κύβος, ὥρμησε πρὸς τὴν διάβασιν καὶ δρόμῳ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρώμενος εἰσέπεσε πρὸ ἡμέρας εἰς τὸ Ἀρίμινον καὶ κατέσχε. λέγεται δὲ τῇ προτέρᾳ νυκτὶ τῆς διαβάσεως ὄναρ ἰδεῖν ἔκθεσμον ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μητρὶ μίγνυσθαι τὴν ἄρρητον μῖξιν.
33.1. After the seizure of Ariminum, as if the war had opened with broad gates to cover the whole earth and sea alike, and the laws of the state were confounded along with the boundaries of the province, one would not have thought that men and women, as at other times, were hurrying through Italy in consternation, but that the very cities had risen up in flight and were rushing one through another;
33.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελήφθη τὸ Ἀρίμινον, ὥσπερ ἀνεῳγμένου τοῦ πολέμου πλατείαις πύλαις ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ συγκεχυμένων ἅμα τοῖς ὅροις τῆς ἐπαρχίας τῶν νόμων τῆς πόλεως, οὐκ ἄνδρας ἄν τις ᾠήθη καὶ γυναῖκας, ὥσπερ ἄλλοτε, σὺν ἐκπλήξει διαφοιτᾶν τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις αὐτὰς ἀνισταμένας φυγῇ διαφέρεσθαι διʼ ἀλλήλων, τὴν δὲ Ῥώμην ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ῥευμάτων πιμπλαμένην φυγαῖς τῶν πέριξ δήμων καὶ μεταστάσεσιν, οὔτε ἄρχοντι πεῖσαι ῥᾳδίαν οὖσαν οὔτε λόγῳ καθεκτήν, ἐν πολλῷ κλύδωνι καὶ σάλῳ μικρὸν ἀπολιπεῖν αὐτὴν ὑφʼ αὑτῆς ἀνατετράφθαι.
33.2. while Rome herself, deluged as it were by the inhabitants of the surrounding towns who were fleeing from their homes, neither readily obeying a magistrate nor listening to the voice of reason, in the surges of a mighty sea narrowly escaped being overturned by her own internal agitations. For conflicting emotions and violent disturbances prevailed everywhere. Those who rejoiced did not keep quiet, but in many places, as was natural in a great city, encountered those who were in fear and distress, and being filled with confidence as to the future came into strife with them; while Pompey himself, who was terror-stricken, was assailed on every side, being taken to task by some for having strengthened Caesar against himself and the supreme power of the state, and denounced by others for having permitted Lentulus to insult Caesar when he was ready to yield and was offering reasonable terms of settlement.
33.2. πάθη γὰρ ἀντίπαλα καὶ βίαια κατεῖχε κινήματα πάντα τόπον. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ χαῖρον ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ δεδοικότι καὶ λυπουμένῳ κατὰ πολλὰ συμπῖπτον ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ θρασυνόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος διʼ ἐρίδων ἦν, αὐτόν τε Πομπήϊον ἐκπεπληγμένον ἄλλος ἀλλαχόθεν ἐτάραττε, τοῖς μὲν, ὡς ηὔξησε Καίσαρα καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, εὐθύνας ὑπέχοντα, τῶν δέ, ὅτι παρείκοντα καὶ προτεινόμενον εὐγνώμονας διαλύσεις ἐφῆκε τοῖς περὶ Λέντλον ὑβρίσαι, κατηγορούντων.
33.4. Favonius bade him stamp on the ground; for once, in a boastful speech to the senate, he told them to take no trouble or anxious thought about preparations for the war, since when it came he had but to stamp upon the earth to fill Italy with armies.
33.4. Φαώνιος δὲ αὐτόν ἐκέλευε τῷ ποδὶ κτυπεῖν τὴν γῆν, ἐπεὶ μεγαληγορῶν ποτε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον οὐδὲν εἴα πολυπραγμονεῖν οὐδὲ φροντίζειν ἐκείνους τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον παρασκευῆς· αὐτὸς γὰρ, ὅταν ἐπίῃ, κρούσας τὸ ἔδαφος τῷ ποδὶ στρατευμάτων ἐμπλήσειν τὴν Ἰταλίαν.
33.5. However, even then Pompey’s forces were more numerous than Caesar’s; but no one would suffer him to exercise his own judgement; and so, under the influence of many false and terrifying reports, believing that the war was already close at hand and prevailed everywhere, he gave way, was swept along with the universal tide, issued an edict declaring a state of anarchy, and forsook the city, commanding the senate to follow, and forbidding any one to remain who preferred country and freedom to tyranny.
33.5. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε πλήθει δυνάμεως ὑπερέβαλλεν ὁ Πομπήϊος τὴν Καίσαρος· εἴασε δʼ οὐδεὶς τὸν ἄνδρα χρήσασθαι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λογισμοῖς, ἀλλὰ ὑπʼ ἀγγελμάτων πολλῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ φόβων, ὡς ἐφεστῶτος ἤδη τοῦ πολέμου καὶ πάντα κατέχοντος, εἴξας καὶ συνεκκρουσθεὶς τῇ πάντων φορᾷ ψηφίζεται ταραχὴν ὁρᾶν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐξέλιπε κελεύσας ἕπεσθαι τὴν γερουσίαν, καὶ μηδένα μένειν τῶν πρὸ τῆς τυραννίδος ᾑρημένων τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.
34.1. Accordingly, the consuls fled, without even making the sacrifices usual before departure; most of the senators also fled, after seizing, in a sort of robbery, whatever came to hand of their own possessions, as though it were the property of others. Some, too, who before this had vehemently espoused the cause of Caesar, were now frightened out of their wits, and were carried along, when there was no need of it, by the sweep of the great tide.
34.1. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὕπατοι μηδὲ ἃ νόμος ἐστὶ πρὸ ἐξόδου θύσαντες ἔφυγον ἔφευγον δὲ καί τῶν βουλευτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι, τρόπον τινὰ διʼ ἁρπαγῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὅ τι τύχοιεν ὥσπερ ἀλλοτρίων λαμβάνοντες, εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ καί σφόδρα τὰ Καίσαρος ᾑρημένοι πρότερον ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ θάμβους τότε τῶν λογισμῶν καί συμπαρηνέχθησαν οὐδὲν δεόμενοι τῷ ῥεύματι τῆς φορᾶς ἐκείνης.
34.2. But most pitiful was the sight of the city, now that so great a tempest was bearing down upon her, carried along like a ship abandoned of her helmsmen to dash against whatever lay in her path. Still, although their removal was so pitiful a thing, for the sake of Pompey men considered exile to be their country, and abandoned Rome with the feeling that it was Caesar’s camp. For even Labienus, one of Caesar’s greatest friends, who had been his legate and had fought most zealously with him in all his Gallic wars, now ran away from him and came to Pompey.
34.2. οἰκτρότατον δὲ τὸ θέαμα τῆς πόλεως ἦν, ἐπιφερομένου τοσούτου χειμῶνος, ὥσπερ νεὼς ὑπὸ κυβερνητῶν ἀπαγορευόντων πρὸς τὸ συντυχὸν ἐκπεσεῖν κομιζομένης. ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὕτω τῆς μεταστάσεως οἰκτρᾶς οὔσης, τὴν μὲν φυγὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πατρίδα διὰ Πομπήϊον ἡγοῦντο, τὴν δὲ Ῥώμην ὡς Καίσαρος στρατόπεδον ἐξέλειπον· ὅπου καί Λαβιηνός, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις Καίσαρος καί πρεσβευτὴς γεγονὼς καί συνηγωνισμένος ἐν πᾶσι προθυμότατα τοῖς Κελτικοῖς πολέμοις, τότʼ ἐκεῖνον ἀποδρὰς ἀφίκετο πρὸς Πομπήϊον.
34.3. But Caesar sent to Labienus his money and his baggage; against Domitius, however, who was holding Corfinium with thirty cohorts under his command, he marched, and pitched his camp near by. Domitius, despairing of his enterprise, asked his physician, who was a slave, for a poison; and taking what was given him, drank it, intending to die.
34.3. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν καί τὰ χρήματα καί τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἀπέπεμψεν ὁ Καῖσαρ Δομετίῳ δὲ ἡγουμένῳ σπειρῶν τριάκοντα καί κατέχοντι Κορφίνιον ἐπελθὼν παρεστρατοπέδευσεν. ὁ δὲ ἀπογνοὺς τὰ καθʼ ἑαυτόν ᾔτησε τὸν ἰατρὸν οἰκέτην ὄντα φάρμακον καί λαβὼν τὸ δοθὲν ἔπιεν ὡς τεθνηξόμενος.
34.4. But after a little, hearing that Caesar showed most wonderful clemency towards his prisoners, he bewailed his fate, and blamed the rashness of his purpose. Then his physician bade him be of good cheer, since what he had drunk was a sleeping-potion and not deadly; whereupon Domitius rose up overjoyed and went to Caesar, the pledge of whose right hand he received, only to desert him and go back to Pompey. When tidings of these things came to Rome, men were made more cheerful, and some of the fugitives turned back.
34.4. μετʼ ὀλίγον δὲ ἀκούσας τὸν Καίσαρα θαυμαστῇ τινι φιλανθρωπίᾳ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἑαλωκότας, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀπεθρήνει καί τὴν ὀξύτητα τοῦ βουλεύματος ᾐτιᾶτο. τοῦ δʼ ἰατροῦ θαρρύναντος αὐτόν, ὡς ὑπνωτικόν, οὐ θανάσιμον, πεπωκότα, περιχαρὴς ἀναστὰς ἀπῄει πρὸς Καίσαρα, καί λαβὼν δεξιάν αὖθις διεξέπεσε πρὸς Πομπήϊον. ταῦτα εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπαγγελλόμενα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡδίους ἐποίει, καί τινες φυγόντες ἀνέστρεψαν.
35.1. Caesar took over the troops of Domitius, as well as all the other levies of Pompey which he surprised in the various cities. Then, since his forces were already numerous and formidable, he marched against Pompey himself. Pompey, however, did not await his approach, but fled to Brundisium, sent the consuls before him with an army to Dyrrhachium, and shortly afterwards, as Caesar drew near, sailed off himself, as shall be set forth circumstantially in his Life.
35.1. ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ τήν τε Τοῦ Δομετίου στρατιὰν παρέλαβε καί τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι Πομπηΐῳ στρατολογουμένους ἔφθασε καταλαβών. πολὺς δὲ γεγονὼς ἤδη καί φοβερός ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε Πομπήϊον. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐδέξατο τήν ἔφοδον, ἀλλʼ εἰς Βρεντέσιον φυγών τοὺς μὲν ὑπάτους πρότερον ἔστειλε μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς Δυρράχιον, αὐτὸς δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐπελθόντος Καίσαρος ἐξέπλευσεν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκείνου γραφησομένοις τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστον δηλωθήσεται.
35.2. Caesar wished to pursue him at once, but was destitute of ships; so he turned back to Rome, having in sixty days and without bloodshed become master of all Italy.. He found the city more tranquil than he was expecting, and many senators in it. With these, therefore, he conferred in a gentle and affable manner, inviting them even to send a deputation to Pompey proposing suitable terms of agreement. But no one would listen to him, either because they feared Pompey, whom they had abandoned, or because they thought that Caesar did not mean what he said, but was indulging in specious talk.
35.2. Καίσαρι δὲ βουλομένῳ μὲν εὐθὺς διώκειν ἀπορία νεῶν ἦν εἰς δὲ τήν Ῥώμην ἀνέστρεψε, γεγονὼς ἐν ἡμέραις ἑξήκοντα πάσης ἀναιμωτὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας κύριος.ἐπεὶ δὲ καί τήν πόλιν εὗρε μᾶλλον ἢ προσεδόκα καθεστῶσαν καί τῶν ἀπὸ βουλῆς ἐν αὐτῇ συχνούς, τούτοις μὲν ἐπιεικῆ καί δημοτικὰ διελέχθη, παρακαλῶν αὐτοὺς καί πρὸς Πομπήϊον ἀποστέλλειν ἄνδρας ἐπὶ συμβάσεσι πρεπούσαις· ὑπήκουσε δʼ οὐδείς, εἴτε φοβούμενοι Πομπήϊον ἐγκαταλελειμμένον, εἴτε μὴ νομίζοντες οὕτω Καίσαρα φρονεῖν, ἀλλʼ εὐπρεπείᾳ λόγων χρῆσθαι.
35.3. When the tribune Metellus tried to prevent Caesar’s taking money from the reserve funds of the state, and cited certain laws, Caesar said that arms and laws had not the same season. “But if thou art displeased at what is going on, for the present get out of the way, since war has no use for free speech; when, however, I have come to terms and laid down my arms, then thou shalt come before the people with thy harangues. And in saying this I waive my own just rights; for thou art mine, thou and all of the faction hostile to me whom I have caught.”
35.3. τοῦ δὲ δημάρχου Μετέλλου κωλύοντος αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων χρήματα λαμβάνειν καί νόμους τινὰς προφέροντος, οὐκ ἔφη τὸν αὐτὸν ὅπλων καί νόμων καιρὸν εἶναι· σὺ δὲ εἰ τοῖς πραττομένοις δυσκολαίνεις, νῦν μὲν ἐκποδὼν ἄπιθι· παρρησίας γὰρ οὐ δεῖται πόλεμος ὅταν δὲ κατάθωμαι τὰ ὅπλα συμβάσεων γενομένων, τότε παριὼν δημαγωγήσεις, καὶ ταῦτα ἔφη, λέγω τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ δικαίων ὑφιέμενος ἐμὸς γὰρ εἰ καί σὺ καί πάντες ὅσους εἴληφα τῶν πρὸς ἐμὲ στασιασάντων.
35.4. After this speech to Metellus, Caesar walked towards the door of the treasury, and when the keys were not to be found, he sent for smiths and ordered them to break in the door. Metellus once more opposed him, and was commended by some for so doing; but Caesar, raising his voice, threatened to kill him if he did not cease his troublesome interference. “And thou surely knowest, young man,” said he, “that it is more unpleasant for me to say this than to do it.” Then Metellus, in consequence of this speech, went off in a fright, and henceforth everything was speedily and easily furnished to Caesar for the war.
35.4. ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Μέτελλον εἰπών ἐβάδιζε πρὸς τὰς θύρας τοῦ ταμιείου, μὴ φαινομένων δὲ τῶν κλειδῶν χαλκεῖς μεταπεμψάμενος ἐκκόπτειν ἐκέλευεν αὖθις δὲ ἐνισταμένου τοῦ Μετέλλου καί τινων ἐπαινούντων, διατεινάμενος ἠπείλησεν ἀποκτενεῖν αὐτόν, εἰ μὴ παύσαιτο παρενοχλῶν. καί τοῦτο, ἔφη, μειράκιον, οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι μοι δυσκολώτερον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι οὗτος ὁ λόγος τότε καί Μέτελλον ἀπελθεῖν ἐποίησε καταδείσαντα καί τὰ ἄλλα ῥᾳδίως αὐτῷ καί ταχέως ὑπηρετεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.
36.1. So he made an expedition into Spain, having resolved first to drive out from there Afranius and Varro, Pompey’s legates, and bring their forces there and the provinces into his power, and then to march against Pompey, leaving not an enemy in his rear. And though his life was often in peril from ambuscades, and his army most of all from hunger, he did not cease from pursuing, challenging, and besieging the men until he had made himself by main force master of their camps and their forces. The leaders, however, made their escape to Pompey.
36.1. ἐστράτευε δʼ εἰς Ἰβηρίαν πρότερον ἐγνωκὼς τοὺς περὶ Ἀφράνιον καὶ Βάρρωνα Πομπηΐου πρεσβευτὰς ἐκβαλεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐπαρχίας ὑφʼ αὑτῷ ποιησάμενος οὕτως ἐπὶ Πομπήϊον ἐλαύνειν, μηδένα κατὰ νώτου τῶν πολεμίων ὑπολειπόμενος. κινδυνεύσας δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι πολλάκις κατʼ ἐνέδρας καὶ τῷ στρατῷ μάλιστα διὰ λιμόν, οὐκ ἀνῆκε πρότερον διώκων καὶ προκαλούμενος καὶ περιταφρεύων τοὺς ἄνδρας ἢ κύριος βίᾳ γενέσθαι τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες ᾤχοντο πρὸς Πομπήϊον φεύγοντες.
37.1. When Caesar came back to Rome, Piso, his father-in-law, urged him to send a deputation to Pompey with proposals for a settlement; but Isauricus, to please Caesar, opposed the project. So, having been made dictator by the senate, he brought home exiles, restored to civic rights the children of those who had suffered in the time of Sulla, relieved the burdens of the debtor-class by a certain adjustment of interest, took in hand a few other public measures of like character, and within eleven days abdicated the sole power, had himself declared consul with Servilius Isauricus, and entered upon his campaign.
37.1. ἐπανελθόντα δὲ εἰς Ῥώμην Καίσαρα Πείσων μὲν ὁ πενθερὸς παρεκάλει πρὸς Πομπήϊον ἀποστέλλειν ἄνδρας ὑπὲρ διαλύσεως, Ἰσαυρικὸς δὲ Καίσαρι χαριζόμενος ἀντεῖπεν. αἱρεθεὶς δὲ δικτάτωρ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς φυγάδας τε κατήγαγε, καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Σύλλα δυστυχησάντων τοὺς παῖδας ἐπιτίμους ἐποίησε, καὶ σεισαχθείᾳ τινὶ τόκων ἐκούφιζε τοὺς χρεωφειλέτας, ἄλλων τε τοιούτων ἥψατο πολιτευμάτων οὐ πολλῶν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἡμέραις ἕνδεκα τὴν μὲν μοναρχίαν ἀπειπάμενος, ὕπατον δὲ ἀναδείξας ἑαυτὸν καὶ Σερουΐλιον Ἰσαυρικόν, εἴχετο τῆς στρατείας.
37.2. The rest of his forces he passed by in a forced march, and with six hundred picked horsemen and five legions, at the time of the winter solstice, in the early part of January (this month answers nearly to the Athenian Poseideon), put to sea, and after crossing the Ionian gulf took Oricum and Apollonia, and sent his transports back again to Brundisium for the soldiers who had been belated on their march.
37.2. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας δυνάμεις καθʼ ὁδὸν ἐπειγόμενος παρῆλθεν, ἱππεῖς δὲ ἔχων λογάδας ἑξακοσίους καὶ πέντε τάγματα, χειμῶνος ἐν τροπαῖς ὄντος, ἱσταμένου Ἰαννουαρίου μηνὸς οὗτος δʼ ἂν εἴη Ποσειδεὼν Ἀθηναίοις ἀφῆκεν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ διαβαλὼν τὸν Ἰόνιον Ὤρικον καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν αἱρεῖ, τὰ δὲ πλοῖα πάλιν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Βρεντέσιον ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑστερήσαντας τῇ πορείᾳ στρατιώτας.
37.3. These, as long as they were on the road, since they were now past their physical prime and worn out with their multitudinous wars, murmured against Caesar. “Whither, pray, and to what end will this man bring us, hurrying us about and treating us like tireless and lifeless things? Even a sword gets tired out with smiting, and shield and breastplate are spared a little after so long a time of service.”
37.3. οἱ δὲ ἄχρι μὲν καθʼ ὁδὸν ἦσαν, ἅτε δὴ καὶ παρηκμακότες ἤδη τοῖς σώμασι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλήθη τῶν πολέμων ἀπειρηκότες, ἐν αἰτίαις εἶχον τὸν Καίσαρα· ποῖ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τί πέρας ἡμᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ καταθήσεται περιφέρων καὶ χρώμενος ὥσπερ ἀτρύτοις καὶ ἀψύχοις ἡμῖν; καὶ σίδηρος ἐξέκαμε πληγαῖς, καὶ θυρεοῦ τίς τίς φειδώ ἐν χρόνῳ τοσούτῳ καὶ θώρακος.
37.4. “Will not even our wounds, then, convince Caesar that he commands mortal men, and that we are mortal in the endurance of pain and suffering? Surely the wintry season and the occasion of a storm at sea not even a god can constrain; yet this man takes risks as though he were not pursuing, but flying from, enemies.” With such words as these they marched in a leisurely way to Brundisium.
37.4. οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τραυμάτων ἄρα λογίζεται Καῖσαρ ὅτι θνητῶν μὲν ἄρχει, θνητὰ δὲ πεφύκαμεν πάσχειν καὶ ἀλγεῖν; ὥραν δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ πνεύματος ἐν θαλάττῃ καιρὸν οὐδὲ θεῷ βιάζεσθαι δυνατόν ἀλλʼ οὗτος παραβάλλεται καθάπερ οὐ διώκων πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ φεύγων. τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἐπορεύοντο σχολαίως εἰς τὸ Βρεντέσιον.
37.5. But when they got there and found that Caesar had put to sea, they quickly changed their tone and reviled themselves as traitors to the Imperator; they reviled their officers, too, for not having quickened their march. Then, sitting on the cliffs, they looked off towards the open sea and Epirus, watching for the ships which were to carry them across to their commander.
37.5. ὡς δὲ ἐλθόντες εὗρον ἀνηγμένον τὸν Καίσαρα, ταχὺ πάλιν αὖ μεταβαλόντες ἐκάκιζον ἑαυτούς προδότας ἀποκαλοῦντες τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ἐκάκιζον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας οὐκ ἐπιταχύναντας τὴν πορείαν. καθήμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ τὴν Ἤπειρον ἀπεσκόπουν τὰς ναῦς ἐφʼ ὧν ἔμελλον περαιοῦσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνον.
38.1. At Apollonia, since the force which he had with him was not a match for the enemy and the delay of his troops on the other side caused him perplexity and distress, Caesar conceived the dangerous plan of embarking in a twelve-oared boat, without any one’s knowledge, and going over to Brundisium, though the sea was encompassed by such large armaments of the enemy.
38.1. ἐν δὲ Ἀπολλωνίᾳ Καῖσαρ οὐκ ἔχων ἀξιόμαχον τὴν μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, βραδυνούσης δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν, ἀπορούμενος καὶ περιπαθῶν, δεινὸν ἐβούλευσε βούλευμα, κρύφα πάντων εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβὰς τὸ μέγεθος δωδεκάσκαλμον ἀναχθῆναι πρὸς τὸ Βρεντέσιον, τηλικούτοις στόλοις περιεχομένου τοῦ πελάγους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων.
38.2. At night, accordingly, after disguising himself in the dress of a slave, he went on board, threw himself down as one of no account, and kept quiet. While the river Aoüs was carrying the boat down towards the sea, the early morning breeze, which at that time usually made the mouth of the river calm by driving back the waves, was quelled by a strong wind which blew from the sea during the night;
38.2. νυκτὸς οὖν ἐσθῆτι θεράποντος ἐπικρυψάμενος ἐνέβη, καὶ καταβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν ὥς τινα τῶν παρημελημένων ἡσύχαζε, τοῦ δὲ Ἀῴου ποταμοῦ τὴν ναῦν ὑποφέροντος εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, τὴν μὲν ἑωθινὴν αὔραν, ἣ παρεῖχε τηνικαῦτα περὶ τὰς ἐκβολὰς γαλήνην ἀπωθοῦσα πόρρω τὸ κῦμα, πολὺς πνεύσας πελάγιος διὰ νυκτὸς ἀπέσβεσε·
38.3. the river therefore chafed against the inflow of the sea and the opposition of its billows, and was rough, being beaten back with a great din and violent eddies, so that it was impossible for the master of the boat to force his way along. He therefore ordered the sailors to come about in order to retrace his course. But Caesar, perceiving this, disclosed himself, took the master of the boat by the hand, who was terrified at sight of him, and said: “Come, good man, be bold and fear naught; thou carryest Caesar and Caesar’s fortune in thy boat” The sailors forgot the storm, and laying to their oars, tried with all alacrity to force their way down the river.
38.3. πρὸς δὲ τὴν πλημμύραν τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τὴν ἀντίβασιν τοῦ κλύδωνος ἀγριαίνων ὁ ποταμός, καὶ τραχὺς ἅμα καὶ κτύπῳ μεγάλῳ καὶ σκληραῖς ἀνακοπτόμενος δίναις, ἄπορος ἦν βιασθῆναι τῷ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ναύτας ὡς ἀποστρέψων τὸν πλοῦν. αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀναδείκνυσιν ἑαυτόν, καὶ τοῦ κυβερνήτου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός ἐκπεπληγμένου πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, ἴθι, ἔφη, γενναῖε, τόλμα καὶ δέδιθι μηδέν· Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν Καίσαρος Τύχην συμπλέουσαν.
38.4. But since it was impossible, after taking much water and running great hazard at the mouth of the river, Caesar very reluctantly suffered the captain to put about. When he came back, his soldiers met him in throngs, finding much fault and sore displeased with him because he did not believe that even with them alone he was able to conquer, but was troubled, and risked his life for the sake of the absent as though distrusting those who were present.
38.4. ἐλάθοντο τοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ ναῦται, καὶ ταῖς κώπαις ἐμφύντες ἐβιάζοντο πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ τὸν ποταμόν. ὡς δὲ ἦν ἄπορα, δεξάμενος πολλὴν θάλατταν καὶ κινδυνεύσας ἐν τῷ στόματι συνεχώρησε μάλα ἄκων τῷ κυβερνήτῃ μεταβαλεῖν. ἀνιόντι δὲ αὐτῷ κατὰ πλῆθος ἀπήντων οἱ στρατιῶται, πολλὰ μεμφόμενοι καὶ δυσπαθοῦντες εἰ μὴ πέπεισται καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἱκανὸς εἶναι νικᾶν, ἀλλʼ ἄχθεται καὶ παραβάλλεται διὰ τοὺς ἀπόντας ὡς ἀπιστῶν τοῖς παροῦσιν.
39.1. After this, Antony put in from Brundisium with his forces, and Caesar was emboldened to challenge Pompey to battle. Pompey was well posted and drew ample supplies both from land and sea; while Caesar had no great abundance at first, and afterwards was actually hard pressed for want of provisions. But his soldiers dug up a certain root, mixed it with milk, and ate it.
39.1. ἐκ τούτου κατέπλευσε μὲν Ἀντώνιος ἀπὸ Βρεντεσίου τὰς δυνάμεις ἄγων θαρρήσας δὲ Καῖσαρ προὐκαλεῖτο Πομπήϊον ἱδρυμένον ἐν καλῷ καί χορηγούμενον ἔκ τε γῆς καί θαλάττης ἀποχρώντως, αὐτὸς ἐν οὐκ ἀφθόνοις διάγων κατʼ ἀρχάς, ὕστερον δὲ καί σφόδρα πιεσθεὶς ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ ῥίζαν τινὰ κόπτοντες οἱ στρατιῶται καί γάλακτι φυρῶντες προσεφέροντο.
39.2. Once, too, they made loaves of it, and running up to the enemy’s outposts, threw the loaves inside or tossed them to one another, adding by way of comment that as long as the earth produced such roots, they would not stop besieging Pompey. Pompey, however, would not allow either the loaves or these words to reach the main body of his army. For his soldiers were dejected, fearing the ferocity and hardiness of their enemies, who were like wild beasts in their eyes.
39.2. καί ποτε καί διαπλάσαντες ἐξ αὐτῆς ἄρτους καί ταῖς προφυλακαῖς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιδραμόντες ἔβαλλον εἴσω καί διερρίπτουν, ἐπιλέγοντες ὡς, ἄχρι ἂν ἡ γῆ τοιαύτας ἐκφέρῃ ῥίζας, οὐ παύσονται πολιορκοῦντες Πομπήϊον. ὁ μέντοι Πομπήϊος οὔτε τοὺς ἄρτους οὔτε τοὺς λόγους εἴα τούτους ἐκφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. ἠθύμουν γὰρ οἱ στρατιῶται, τὴν ἀγριότητα καί τὴν ἀπάθειαν τῶν πολεμίων ὥσπερ θηρίων ὀρρωδοῦντες.
39.3. There were constant skirmishings about the fortifications of Pompey, and in all of them Caesar got the better except one, where there was a great rout of his men and he was in danger of losing his camp. For when Pompey attacked not one of Caesar’s men stood his ground, but the moats were filled with the slain, and others were falling at their own ramparts and walls, whither they had been driven in headlong flight.
39.3. ἀεὶ δέ τινες περὶ τοῖς ἐρύμασι τοῖς Πομπηΐου μάχαι σποράδες ἐγίγνοντο καί περιῆν πάσαις ὁ Καῖσαρ πλὴν μιᾶς, ἐν ᾗ τροπῆς μεγάλης γενομένης ἐκινδύνευσεν ἀπολέσαι τὸ στρατόπεδον. Πομπηΐου γὰρ προσβάλλοντος οὐδεὶς ἔμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καί τάφροι κατεπίμπλαντο κτεινομένων, καί περὶ τοῖς αὑτῶν χαρακώμασι καὶ περιτειχίσμασιν ἔπιπτον ἐλαυνόμενοι προτροπάδην.
39.4. And though Caesar met the fugitives and tried to turn them back, he availed nothing, nay, when he tried to lay hold of the standards the bearers threw them away, so that the enemy captured thirty-two of them. Caesar himself too, narrowly escaped being killed. For as a tall and sturdy man was running away past him, he laid his hand upon him and bade him stay and face about upon the enemy; and the fellow, full of panic at the threatening danger, raised his sword to smite Caesar, but before he could do so Caesar’s shield-bearer lopped off his arm at the shoulder.
39.4. Καῖσαρ δὲ ὑπαντιάζων ἐπειρᾶτο μὲν ἀναστρέφειν τοὺς φεύγοντας, ἐπέραινε δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλʼ ἐπιλαμβανομένου τῶν σημείων ἀπερρίπτουν οἱ κομίζοντες, ὥστε δύο καί τριάκοντα λαβεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, αὐτὸς δὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθεν ἀποθανεῖν. ἀνδρὶ γὰρ μεγάλῳ καὶ ῥωμαλέῳ φεύγοντι παρʼ αὑτόν ἐπιβαλὼν τὴν χεῖρα μένειν ἐκέλευσε καί στρέφεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ὁ δὲ μεστὸς ὢν ταραχῆς παρὰ τὸ δεινόν ἐπήρατο τὴν μάχαιραν ὡς καθιξόμενος, φθάνει δὲ ὁ τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπασπιστὴς ἀποκόψας αὐτοῦ τὸν ὦμον.
39.5. So completely had Caesar given up his cause for lost that, when Pompey, either from excessive caution or by some chance, did not follow up his great success, but withdrew after he had shut up the fugitives within their entrenchments, Caesar said to his friends as he left them: “To-day victory had been with the enemy, if they had had a victor in command” Then going by himself to his tent and lying down, he spent that most distressful of all nights in vain reflections, convinced that he had shown bad generalship.
39.5. οὕτω δὲ ἀπέγνω τὰ καθʼ αὑτόν ὥστε, ἐπεὶ Πομπήϊος ὑπʼ εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ τύχης ἔργῳ μεγάλῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθηκεν, ἀλλὰ καθείρξας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τοὺς φεύγοντας ἀνεχώρησεν, εἶπεν ἄρα πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἀπιὼν ὁ Καῖσαρ, σήμερον ἂν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦν, εἰ τὸν νικῶντα εἶχον.
39.6. For while a fertile country lay waiting for him, and the prosperous cities of Macedonia and Thessaly, he had neglected to carry the war thither, and had posted himself here by the sea, which his enemies controlled with their fleets, being thus held in siege by lack of provisions rather than besieging with his arms.
39.6. αὐτὸς δὲ παρελθὼν εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν καὶ κατακλιθείς νύκτα πασῶν ἐκείνην ἀνιαροτάτην διήγαγεν ἐν ἀπόροις λογισμοῖς, ὡς κακῶς ἐστρατηγηκώς, ὅτι καί χώρας ἐπικειμένης βαθείας καὶ πόλεων εὐδαιμόνων τῶν Μακεδονικῶν καί Θετταλικῶν, ἐάσας ἐκεῖ περισπάσαι τὸν πόλεμον ἐνταῦθα καθέζοιτο πρὸς θαλάττῃ, ναυκρατούντων τῶν πολεμίων, πολιορκούμενος τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ὅπλοις πολιορκῶν.
39.7. Thus his despondent thoughts of the difficulty and perplexity of his situation kept him tossing upon his couch, and in the morning he broke camp, resolved to lead his army into Macedonia against Scipio; for he would then either draw Pompey after him to a place where he would give battle without drawing his supplies as he now did from the sea, or Scipio would be left alone and he would overwhelm him.
39.7. οὕτω δὴ ῥιπτασθεὶς καί ἀδημονήσας πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν καί χαλεπότητα τῶν παρόντων ἀνίστη τὸν στρατόν, ἐπὶ Σκηπίωνα προάγειν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐγνωκώς ἢ γὰρ ἐπισπάσεσθαι Πομπήϊον ὅπου μαχεῖται μὴ χορηγούμενος ὁμοίως ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, ἢ περιέσεσθαι μεμονωμένου Σκηπίωνος.
40.1. This emboldened the soldiers of Pompey and the leaders by whom he was surrounded to keep close to Caesar, whom they thought defeated and in flight. For Pompey himself was cautious about hazarding a battle for so great a stake, and since he was most excellently provided with everything necessary for a long war, he thought it best to wear out and quench the vigour of the enemy, which must be short-lived. For the best fighting men in Caesar’s army had experience, it is true, and a daring which was irresistible in combat;
40.1. τοῦτο τὴν Πομπηΐου στρατιὰν ἐπῆρε καί τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνας ὡς ἡττημένου καί φεύγοντος ἔχεσθαι Καίσαρος. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβῶς εἶχε Πομπήϊος ἀναρρῖψαι μάχην περὶ τηλικούτων, καί παρεσκευασμένος ἄριστα πᾶσι πρὸς τὸν χρόνον ἠξίου τρίβειν καί μαραίνειν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἀκμήν βραχεῖαν οὖσαν. τὸ γάρ τοι μαχιμώτατον τῆς Καίσαρος δυνάμεως ἐμπειρίαν μὲν εἶχε καί τόλμαν ἀνυπόστατον πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλάναις καί ταῖς στρατοπεδείαις καί τειχομαχοῦντες καί νυκτεγερτοῦντες ἐξέκαμνον ὑπὸ γήρως, καί βαρεῖς ἦσαν τοῖς σώμασι πρὸς τοὺς πόνους, διʼ ἀσθένειαν ἐγκαταλείποντες τὴν προθυμίαν.
40.2. but what with their long marches and frequent encampments and siege-warfare and night-watches, they were beginning to give out by reason of age, and were too unwieldy for labour, having lost their ardour from weakness. At that time, too, a kind of pestilential disease, occasioned by the strangeness of their diet, was said to be prevalent in Caesar’s army. And what was most important of all, since Caesar was neither strong in funds nor well supplied with provisions, it was thought that within a short time his army would break up of itself.
40.2. τότε δὲ καί τι νόσημα λοιμῶδες ἐλέχθη, τὴν ἀτοπίαν τῆς διαίτης ποιησάμενον ἀρχήν, ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ περιφέρεσθαι τῇ Καίσαρος, καί τὸ μέγιστον, οὔτε χρήμασιν ἐρρωμένος οὔτε τροφῆς εὐπορῶν χρόνου βραχέος ἐδόκει περὶ αὑτῷ καταλυθήσεσθαι.
41.1. For these reasons Pompey did not wish to fight, but Cato was the only one to commend his course, and this from a desire to spare the lives of his fellow citizens; for when he saw even those of the enemy who had fallen in the battle, to the number of a thousand, he burst into tears, muffled up his head, and went away. All the rest, however, reviled Pompey for trying to avoid a battle, and sought to goad him on by calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings, implying that he did not wish to lay aside his sole authority, but plumed himself on having so many commanders dependent upon him and coming constantly to his tent.
41.1. διὰ ταῦτα Πομπήϊον μάχεσθαι μὴ βουλόμενον μόνος ἐπῄνει Κάτων φειδοῖ τῶν πολιτῶν ὅς γε καὶ τοὺς πεσόντας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῶν πολεμίων εἰς χιλίους τὸ πλῆθος γενομένους ἰδών ἀπῆλθεν ἐγκαλυψάμενος καὶ καταδακρύσας. οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκάκιζον τὸν Πομπήϊον φυγομαχοῦντα, καὶ παρώξυνον Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ βασιλέα βασιλέων ἀποκαλοῦντες, ὡς δὴ μὴ βουλόμενον ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἀλλʼ ἀγαλλόμενον ἡγεμόνων τοσούτων ἐξηρτημένων αὐτοῦ καὶ φοιτώντων ἐπὶ σκηνήν.
41.2. And Favonius, affecting Cato’s boldness of speech, complained like a mad man because that year also they would be unable to enjoy the figs of Tusculum because of Pompey’s love of command. Afranius, too, who had lately come from Spain, where he had shown bad generalship, when accused of betraying his army for a bribe, asked why they did not fight with the merchant who had bought the provinces from him. Driven on by all these importunities, Pompey reluctantly sought a battle and pursued Caesar.
41.2. Φαώνιος δὲ τὴν Κάτωνος παρρησίαν ὑποποιούμενος, μανικῶς ἐσχετλίαζεν εἰ μηδὲ τῆτες ἔσται τῶν περὶ Τουσκλάνον ἀπολαῦσαι σύκων Διὰ τὴν Πομπηΐου φιλαρχίαν. Ἀφράνιος δὲ ʽ νεωστὶ γὰρ ἐξ Ἰβηρίας ἀφῖκτο κακῶς στρατηγήσασʼ διαβαλλόμενος ἐπὶ χρήμασι προδοῦναι τὸν στρατόν, ἠρώτα Διὰ τί πρὸς τὸν ἔμπορον οὐ μάχονται τὸν ἐωνημένον παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐπαρχίας, ἐκ τούτων ἁπάντων συνελαυνόμενος ἄκων εἰς μάχην ὁ Πομπήϊος ἐχώρει τὸν Καίσαρα διώκων.
41.3. Caesar accomplished most of his march with difficulty, since no one would sell him provisions, and everybody despised him on account of his recent defeat; but after he had taken Gomphi, a city of Thessaly, he not only provided food for his soldiers, but also relieved them of their disease unexpectedly. For they fell in with plenty of wine, and after drinking freely of it, and then revelling and rioting on their march, by means of their drunkenness they drove away and got rid of their trouble, since they brought their bodies into a different habit.
41.3. ὁ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην πορείαν χαλεπῶς ἤνυσεν, οὐδενὸς παρέχοντος ἀγοράν, ἀλλὰ πάντων καταφρονούντων Διὰ τὴν ἔναγχος ἧτταν ὡς δὲ εἷλε Γόμφους, Θεσσαλικὴν πόλιν, οὐ μόνον ἔθρεψε τὴν στρατιάν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ νοσήματος ἀπήλλαξε παραλόγως. ἀφθόνῳ γὰρ ἐνέτυχον οἴνῳ, καὶ πιόντες ἀνέδην, εἶτα χρώμενοι κώμοις καὶ βακχεύοντες ἀνὰ τὴν ὁδὸν, ἐκ μέθης διεκρούσαντο καὶ παρήλλαξαν τὸ πάθος, εἰς ἕξιν ἑτέραν τοῖς σώμασι μεταπεσόντες.