---
title: "On Moral Virtue · De virtute morali"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "Matthew Morgan, rev. William W. Goodwin"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 2 of 2
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-moral-virtue/2/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. Matthew Morgan, rev. William W. Goodwin, On Moral Virtue · De virtute morali, section 2. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-moral-virtue/2/"
---

# On Moral Virtue · De virtute morali

*Plutarch, tr. Matthew Morgan, rev. William W. Goodwin*

Against the Stoics: the soul has a part that feels, and virtue is the right measure of the passions, not their removal.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg094, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Matthew Morgan, rev. William W. Goodwin, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg094.perseus-eng4). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 2. Sections 7–12

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-moral-virtue/2/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-moral-virtue/2/#p-N

[¶0] It is manifest then from what has been discoursed, that the soul does perceive within itself something that is firm and immovable, totally distinct from its passions and appetites, these being what it does always oppose and is ever contending with. But some there are, nevertheless, who affirm that reason and passion do not materially differ from one another, and that there is not in the soul any faction, sedition, or dissension of two several and contending faculties, but only a shifting, conversion, or alteration of the same reason or rational faculty from one side to the other, backward and forward, which, by reason of the suddenness and swiftness of the change, is not perceptible by us; and therefore, that we do not consider that the same faculty of the soul is by nature so adapted as to be capable of both concupiscence and repentance, of anger and of fear, of being drawn to the commission of any lewdness or evil by the allurements of pleasure, and afterwards of being again retrieved from it. And as for lust, anger, fear, and such like passions, they will have them to be nothing but perverse opinions and false judgments, not arising or formed in any inferior part of the soul, peculiarly belonging to them, but being the advances and returns, or the motions forward and backward, the good likenings and more vehement efforts, and (in a word) such operations and energies of the whole rational and directive faculty as are ready to be turned this way or that with the greatest ease imaginable; like the sudden motions and irruptions in children, the violence and impetuosity whereof, by reason of their imbecility and weakness, are very fleeting and inconstant.

> Greek: ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίγνεταί τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιαύτης ἑτερότητος αἴσθησις καὶ διαφορᾶς περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥς τινος μαχομένου καὶ τἀναντία λέγοντος αὐταῖς, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἔνιοι δέ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυεῖν διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλʼ ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς, οὐ συνορῶντας ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ φερομένης πάλιν αὑτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς, οὐ περὶ ἓν τι γιγνομένας τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλʼ ὅλου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ῥοπὰς καὶ εἴξεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὁρμάς, καὶ ὅλως ἐνεργείας τινὰς οὔσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ μεταπτωτάς, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδρομαὶ τὸ ῥαγδαῖον καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπισφαλὲς ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἔχουσι.

[¶1] But these opinions are against common sense and experience; for no man ever felt such a sudden change in himself, as that whenever he chose any thing he immediately judged it fit to be chosen, or that, on the other hand, whenever he judged any thing fit to be chosen he immediately made choice of it. Neither does the lover who is convinced by reason that his amour is fit to be broken off, and that he ought to strive against his passion, therefore immediately cease to love; nor on the other side doth he desist reasoning, and cease from being able to give a right judgment of things, even then, when, being softened and overcome by luxury, he delivers himself up a captive to his lusts. But as, while by the assistance of reason he makes opposition to the efforts of his passions, they yet continue to solicit, and at last overcome him; so likewise, when he is overcome and forced to submit to them, by the light of reason does he plainly discern and know that he has done amiss; so that neither by the passions is reason effaced and destroyed, nor yet by reason is he rescued and delivered from them; but, being tossed to and fro between the one and the other, he is a kind of neuter, and participates in common of them both. And those, methinks, who imagine that one while the directive and rational part of the soul is changed into concupiscence and lust, and that by and by reason opposes itself against them, and they are changed into that, are not much unlike them who make the sportsman and his game not to be two, but one body, which, by a nimble and dexterous mutation of itself, one while appears in the shape of the huntsman, and at another turn puts on the form of a wild beast. For as these in a plain evident matter seem to be stalk blind, so they in the other case belie even their own senses, seeing they must needs feel in themselves not merely a change or mutation of one and the same thing, but a downright struggle and quarrel between two several and distinct faculties.

> Greek: ταῦτα δὲ πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ· τὴν ἐνάργειάν ἐστι καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος αἰσθάνεται μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ κρῖνον οὐδὲ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὖ πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδὲ παύεται μὲν ἐρῶν ὅτε λογίζεται καθεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ διαμαχετέον πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐξίσταται δὲ πάλιν τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, ὅταν ἐνδιδῷ μαλασσόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ πάθος ἀντιβαίνων ἐν τῷ πάθει ἐστὶν ἔτι, καὶ πάλιν κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους διορᾷ τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον· καὶ οὔτε τῷ πάθει τὸν λόγον ἀνῄρηκεν οὔτε τῷ λογίζεσθαι τοῦ πάθους ἀπήλλακται, φερόμενος δʼ ἑκατέρωσε μέσος ἀμφοῖν καὶ κοινός ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ νῦν. μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, νῦν δὲ τὸν ἀντιταττόμενον τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ λογισμὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν ἀπέχουσι τῶν μὴ δύο τὸν κυνηγὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ θηρίον ὑπολαμβανόντων, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ σῶμα χρώμενον μεταβολῇ νῦν μὲν εἶναι θηρίον νῦν δὲ γίγνεσθαι κυνηγόν.

[¶2] But is not, say they, the deliberative power or faculty of a man often divided in itself, and distracted among several opinions contrary to one another, about that which is expedient; and yet is but one, simple, uniform thing? All this we grant to be true; but it does not reach the case we are speaking of. For that part of the soul where reason and judgment are seated is not at variance with itself, but by one and the same faculty is conversant about different reasonings; or rather, there is but one simple power of reasoning, which employs itself on several arguments, as so many different subject-matters. And therefore it is, that no disturbance or uneasiness accompanies those reasonings or deliberations, where the passions do not at all interpose. Nor are we at any time forced, as it were, to choose any thing contrary to the dictates of our own reason, but when, as in a balance, some lurking hidden passions lay something in the scale against reason to weigh it down. And this often falls out to be the case, where it is not reasoning that is opposed to reasoning, but either ambition, or emulation, or favor, or jealousy, or fear, making a show as if there were a variance or contest between two differing reasons, according to that of Homer, “Shame in denial, in acceptance fear;” and of another poet,
Hard fate to fall, but yet a glorious fate;’Tis cowardly to live, but yet ’tis sweet.
And in determining of controversies about contracts between man and man, it is by the interposition of the passions that so many disputes and delays are created. So likewise in the consultations and counsels of kings, they who design to make their court incline not to one side of the question or debate rather than the other, but only accommodate themselves to their own passions, without any regard to the interest of the public. Which is the reason that in aristocratical governments the magistrates will not suffer orators in their pleadings, by declaiming and haranguing, to raise the passions and move the affections. For reason, not being disturbed or diverted by passion, tends directly to that which is honorable and just; but if the passions are once raised, there immediately follows a mighty controversy and struggle between pleasure and grief on the one hand, and reason and judgment on the other. For otherwise how comes it to pass, that in philosophical disputes and disquisitions we so often and with so little trouble are by others drawn off from our own opinions and wrought upon to change them?—and that Aristotle himself, Democritus, and Chrysippus have without any concern or regret of mind, nay even with great satisfaction to themselves, retracted some of those points which they formerly so much approved of, and were wont so stiffly to maintain? For no passions residing in the contemplative and scientifical part of the soul make any tumult or disturbance therein, and the irrational and brutal faculties remain quiet and calm, without busying themselves to intermeddle in matters of that kind. By which means it falls out, that reason no sooner comes within view of truth, but rejecting that which is false it readily embraces it; forasmuch as there is in the former what is not to be found in the other, namely, a willingness to assent and disagree as there is occasion; whereas in all deliberations had, judgments made, and resolutions taken about such things as are to be reduced into practice, and are mixed and interwoven with the passions and affections, reason meets with much opposition, and is put under great difficulties, by being stopped and interrupted in its course by the brutal faculties of the mind, throwing in its way either pleasure or fear or grief or lust, or some such like temptation or discouragement. And then the decision of these disputes belongs to sense, which is equally affected with both the one and the other; and whichsoever of them gets the mastery, the other is not thereby destroyed, but (though struggling and resisting all the while) is forced only to comply and go along with the conqueror. As an amorous person, for example, finding himself engaged in an amour he cannot approve of, has immediately recourse to his reason, to oppose the force of that against his passion, as having them both together actually subsisting in his soul, plainly discerning them to be several and distinct, and feeling a sensible conflict between the two, while he endeavors (as it were) with his hand to repress and keep down the part which is inflamed and rages so violently within him. But, on the contrary, in those deliberations and disquisitions where the passions have nothing to do, such I mean as belong properly to the contemplative part of the soul, if the reasons are equally balanced, not inclining more to one side than another, then is there no determinate judgment formed, but there remains a doubting, as if there were a rest or suspense of the understanding between two contrary opinions. But if there happen to be any inclination or determination towards one side, that prevailing must needs get the better of the other, but without any regret or obstinate opposition from it against the opinion which is received. In short, whenever the contest seems to be of reason against reason, in that case we have no manner of sense of two distinct powers, but of one simple, uniform faculty only, under different apprehensions or imaginations; but when the dispute is between the irrational part and reason, where nature has so ordered it that neither the victory nor the defeat can be had without anxiety and regret, there immediately the two contending powers divide the soul in the quarrel, and thereby make the difference and distinction between them to be most plain and evident.

> Greek: ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ ἐμφανές τι παρορῶσιν οὗτοί τε πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσιν, οὐχ ἑνός τινος μεταβολῆς ἀλλὰ δυεῖν ἅμα μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς αἰσθανόμενοι. τί οὖν; φασίν, οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλάκις διχοφορεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας ἀνθέλκεται δόξας περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλʼ ἕν ἐστι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν φήσομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβαῖνον οὐχ ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φρονοῦν, ἀλλὰ μιᾷ χρώμενον δυνάμει διαφόρων ἐφάπτεται λογισμῶν· μᾶλλον δʼ εἷς λογισμὸς ἔστιν ἐν πράγμασι γιγνόμενος ἑτέροις ὥσπερ ὕλαις διαφερούσαις. ὅθεν οὔτε λύπη τοῖς ἄνευ πάθους λογισμοῖς ἔνεστιν, οὔθʼ ὥσπερ ἐκβιαζόμενοι παρὰ γνώμην αἱροῦνται θάτερον, ἂν μὴ νὴ Δία λανθάνῃ πάθος τι προσηρτημένον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο συμβαίνει πολλάκις, οὐ λογισμοῦ τινος πρὸς λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ φιλοτιμίας ἢ φιλονεικίας ἢ χάριτος ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ δέους ἀντιβαίνοντος, οἴεσθαι λόγων εἶναι δυεῖν διαφορὰν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις αἴδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δʼ ὑποδέχθαι· καὶ
τὸ μὲν σφαγῆναι δεινὸν εὔκλειαν δʼ ἔχει,
τὸ μὴ θανεῖν δὲ δειλὸν ἡδονὴ δʼ ἔνι,ʼ
καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις δὲ τῶν συμβολαίων ὑποτρέχοντα τὰ πάθη τὴν πλείστην ἐμποιεῖ διατριβήν καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβούλια τῶν βασιλέων οἱ πρὸς χάριν λέγοντες οὐ δυεῖν κρίσεων τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συναγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ πάθει τινὶ προστίθενται παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμόν· διὸ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις οἱ ἄρχοντες οὐκ ἐῶσι παθαίνεσθαι· ῥέπει γὰρ εὐθεῖαν ῥοπὴν ὁ ἀπαθὴς λογισμὸς ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἂν δὲ πάθος ἐγγένηται, μάχην ποιεῖ καὶ διαφορὰν τὸ ἡδόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον. ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ σκέμμασιν οὐ πρόσεστι τὸ μετὰ λύπης ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἄγεσθαι καὶ μετατίθεσθαι πολλάκις, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς τʼ Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἔνια τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορύβως καὶ ἀδήκτως καὶ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἀφεῖσαν; ὅτι τῷ θεωρητικῷ καὶ μαθηματικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος οὐδὲν ἀνθέστηκεν ἀλλʼ ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ τὸ ἄλογον ἐν τούτοις. διὸ πρὸς τἀληθὲς ὁ λογισμός, ὅταν φανῇ, προέμενος τὸ ψεῦδος ἀσμένως ἀπέκλινεν ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ μεταπειθόμενον. αἱ δὲ πραγματικαὶ βουλαὶ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ δίαιται τῶν πολλῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσαι δυσοδίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχουσι καὶ δυσκολίαν, ἐνισχομένῳ καὶ ταραττομένῳ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἀνταῖρον αὐτῷ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς τινος ἢ δέους ἢ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τούτων κριτήριον ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ γὰρ ἂν περιγένηται θάτερον, οὐκ ἀνῄρηκε θάτερον, ἀλλʼ ἐφέλκεται καταβιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον. ὁ γὰρ νουθετῶν αὑτὸν ἐρῶντα χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ πάθος, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐνόντων ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ χειρὶ φλεγμαῖνον ἕτερον μέρος πιέζων καὶ δυεῖν ὄντων καὶ διαφερόντων ἐπαισθανόμενος. ἐν μέντοι ταῖς ἀπαθέσι βουλαῖς καὶ σκέψεσιν οἵας ἔχει μάλιστα τὸ θεωρητικόν, ἂν μὲν ἴσαι μένωσιν, οὐ γέγονε κρίσις ἀλλʼ ἀπορία, στάσις οὖσα καὶ μονὴ διανοίας ὑπʼ ἐναντίων λόγων· ἂν δὲ ῥοπὴ γένηται πρὸς θάτερον ἡ κρατήσασα τὴν ἑτέραν λέλυκεν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν μηδʼ ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. ὅλως δὲ λογισμοῦ μὲν ἀντικεῖσθαι λογισμῷ δοκοῦντος, οὐ γίγνεται δυεῖν καὶ ἑτέρων αἴσθησις ἀλλʼ ἑνός τινος ἐν διαφόροις γιγνομένου φαντασίαις· ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἄλογον μάχηται τῷ λογισμῷ, μήτε κρατεῖν ἀλύπως μήτε κρατεῖσθαι πεφυκὸς εὐθὺς εἰς δύο διίστησι τῇ μάχῃ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν διαφορὰν πρόδηλον.

[¶3] 8. And not only from their contests, but no less also from the consequences that follow thereupon, may one clearly enough discern the source and original of the passions to be different from that of reason. For since a man may set his affection upon an ingenuous and virtuously disposed child, and no less also upon one that is naughty and dissolute, and since also one may have unreasonable and indecent transports of anger against his children or his parents, and on the contrary, may justly and unblamably be angry in their defence against their enemies and tyrants; as in the one case there is perceived a struggle and dispute of the passions against reason, so in the other may be seen a ready submission and agreement of them, running to its assistance, and lending as it were their helping hand. To illustrate this with a familiar example,—after a good man has in obedience to the laws married a convenient wife, he then in the first place comes to a resolution of conversing and cohabiting with her wisely and honestly, and of making at least a civil husband; but in process of time, custom and constant familiarity having bred within him a true passion for her, he sensibly finds that upon principles of reason his affection’ and love for her are every day more and more improved and grow upon him. So in like manner, young men having met with kind and gentle masters, to guide and inform their minds in the study of philosophy and sciences, make use of them at first for instruction only and information, but afterwards come to have such an affection for them, that from familiar companions and scholars they become their lovers and admirers, and are so accounted. And the same happens also to most men, with respect to good magistrates in the commonwealth, to their neighbors, and to their kindred; for, beginning an acquaintance upon necessity and interest, for the exchange of the common offices of intercourse and commerce with one another, they do afterwards by degrees, ere they are aware, grow to have a love and friendship for them; reason in such and the like cases having over-persuaded and even compelled the passions to take delight in and pursue what it before had approved of and consented to. As for the poet who said,
Of modesty two kinds there be;
The one we cannot blame,
The other troubleth many a house,
And doth decay the same;
doth he not plainly hereby intimate, that he had oftentimes found by experience that this affection of the mind, by a sheepish, shamefaced backwardness, and by foolishly bashful delays against all reason, had lost him the opportunities and seasons of making his fortune, and hindered and disappointed many brave actions and noble enterprises?

> Greek: 8. οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας κατίδοι τις ἂν τὴν παθητικὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λογικῆς οὖσαν ἑτέραν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἐρᾶν εὐφυοῦς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ γενναίου παιδὸς ἔστι δὲ φαύλου καὶ ἀκολάστου, συμβαίνει δὲ θυμῷ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀλόγως πρὸς παῖδας αὑτοῦ καὶ γονεῖς χρῆσθαι δʼ ὑπὲρ γονέων καὶ παίδων δικαίως πρὸς πολεμίους καὶ τυράννους· ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα πειθοῦς καὶ ἀκολουθίας, οἷον ἐπιρρέποντος καὶ συνεπιδιδόντος. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ γυναῖκα γήμας κατὰ νόμους ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικὴς διανοεῖται περιέπειν καὶ συνεῖναι δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως, χρόνῳ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμενον ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ νέοι διδασκάλοις ἐπιτυχόντες ἀστείοις ὑπὸ χρείας τὸ πρῶτον ἕπονται καὶ ζηλοῦσιν, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀντὶ γνωρίμων καὶ μαθητῶν ἐρασταὶ καλούμενοι καὶ ὄντες. τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἐν πόλεσι χρηστοὺς καὶ γείτονας καὶ κηδεστάς· ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ χρείας τινὸς καθηκόντως ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν, ἔπειτα λανθάνουσιν εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ὑποφερόμενοι, συνεπισπασαμένου τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ συναναπείσαντος τὸ παθητικόν. ὁ δʼ εἰπών
αἰδώς τε· δισσαὶ δʼ εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακὴ
ἡ δʼ ἄχθος οἴκων·
ἆρʼ οὐ δῆλός ἐστι συνῃσθημένος; ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πολλάκις μὲν ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ συγκατακοσμούμενον, πολλάκις δὲ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὄκνοις καὶ μελλήσεσι καιροὺς καὶ πράγματα λυμαινόμενον;

[¶4] 9. But these men, though by the force of these arguments sufficiently convinced, do yet seek for evasions, by calling shame by the name of modesty, pleasures by that of joy, and fear by that of caution. No man would go about to blame them for giving things the softest names they can invent, if they would be so just as to bestow these good words upon those passions and affections only which have put themselves under the conduct and direction of reason, and leave those which oppose reason and offer violence to it to be called by their own proper and odious names. But, when fully convinced by the tears they shed, by the trembling of their joints, and by their sudden changing of color back and forward, if instead of plainly calling the passions whereof these are the effects grief and fear, they, make use of the fantastic terms of compunctions and conturbations, and to varnish over and disguise the lusts and affections, give them the name only of so many forwardnesses of mind, and I know not what else, they seem not to act like philosophers, but, relying upon little shifts and sophistical artifices, under an amusement of strange words, they vainly hope to cover and conceal the nature of things. And yet even these men themselves sometimes make use of very proper terms to express these matters; as, for instance, when they call those joys, volitions, and cautions of theirs, not by the name of apathies, as if they were devoid of all manner of passions, but of eupathies. For then is there said to be an eupathy, or good disposition of the affections, when reason hath not utterly destroyed, but composed and adjusted them in the minds of discreet and temperate persons. But what then becomes of vicious and dissolute persons? Why, if they should judge it reasonable to love their parents, instead of a mistress or a gallant, are they unable to perform this; but should they judge it fitting to set their hearts upon a strumpet or a parasite, the judgment is no sooner made, but they are most desperately in love? Now were the passions and judgment one, it could not be but that the passions of love and hatred would immediately follow upon judgments made what to love and hate. But we see the contrary often happen; for the passions, as they submit to some resolutions and judgments, so others again they oppose themselves to, and refuse to comply with. Whence it is that, compelled thereto by truth and the evidence of things, they do not affirm every judgment and determination of reason to be passion, but that only which excites too violent and inordinate an appetite; acknowledging thereby that the faculty we have in us of judging is quite another thing than that which is susceptible of the passions, as is that also which moveth from that which is moved. Nay, even Chrysippus himself, in many places defining patience and continence to be habits of submitting to and pursuing the choice and direction of right reason, doth thereby make it apparent that by the force of truth he was driven to confess that it is one thing in us which is obedient and submissive, but another and quite a different thing which it obeys when it submits, but resists when it does not submit.

> Greek: 9. οἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ὑπείκοντες, αἰδεῖσθαι τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἣδεσθαι χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς φόβους εὐλαβείας· ταύτην μὲν οὐδενὸς; ἂν αἰτιασαμένου τὴν εὐφημίαν, εἰ ταὐτὰ πάθη προστιθέμενα μὲν τῷ λογισμῷ τούτοις καλοῦσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι, μαχόμενα δὲ καὶ βιαζόμενα τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκείνοις. ὅταν δὲ δακρύοις ἐλεγχόμενοι καὶ τρόμοις καὶ χρόας μεταβολαῖς, ἀντὶ λύπης καὶ φόβου δηγμούς τινας καὶ συνθροήσεις λέγωσι καὶ προθυμίας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὑποκορίζωνται, σοφιστικὰς δοκοῦσιν οὐ φιλοσόφους δικαιώσεις καὶ ἀποδράσεις ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων μηχανᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. καίτοι πάλιν αὐτοὶ τάς τε χαρὰς ἐκείνας καὶ τὰς βουλήσεις καὶ τὰς εὐλαβείας εὐπαθείας καλοῦσιν οὐκ ἀπαθείας, ὀρθῶς ἐνταῦθα χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασι·· γίγνεται γὰρ εὐπάθεια τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντος ἀλλὰ κοσμοῦντος καὶ τάττοντος ἐν τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς τί πάσχουσιν, ὅταν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα κρίναντες φιλεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου καὶ τῆς ἐρωμένης μὴ δύνωνται, τὴν δʼ ἑταίραν καὶ τὸν κόλακα κρίναντες, εὐθὺς καὶ φιλῶσιν; εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἦν κρίσις, ἔδει τῇ τοῦ φιλεῖν χρῆναι καὶ μισεῖν κρίσει τὸ φιλεῖν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μισεῖν νυνὶ δὲ συμβαίνει τἀναντία, ταῖς μὲν προστιθεμένου τοῦ πάθους κρίσεσι ταῖς δʼ ἀπειθοῦντος. καί φασιν αὐτοί, τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκβιαζομένων, οὐ πᾶσαν εἶναι κρίσιν πάθος ἀλλὰ τὴν κινητικὴν ὁρμῆς βιαίου καὶ πλεοναζούσης, ὁμολογοῦντες ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον. αὐτός τε Χρύσιππος ἐν πολλοῖς ὁριζόμενος τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἕξεις ἀκολουθητικὰς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ πειθόμενον ἢ πάλιν μάχεται μὴ πειθόμενον.

[¶5] 10. Now, as for those who make all sins and faults to be equal, to examine whether in other matters they have not also departed from the truth is not at this time and in this place seasonable; since they seem not herein only, but in most things else, to advance unreasonable paradoxes against common sense and experience. For according to them, all our passions and affections are so many faults and whosoever grieves, fears, or desires, commits sin. But, with their leave, nothing is more visible and apparent than the mighty difference in those and all other passions, according as we are more or less affected with them. For will any man say that the fear of Dolon was no more than that of Ajax, who, being forced to give way before the enemy,
Sometimes retreated back, then faced about,
And step by step retired at once, and fought?
Or compare the grief of Plato for the death of Socrates to the sorrow and anguish of mind which Alexander felt, when, for having murdered Clitus, he attempted to lay violent hands upon himself. For our grief is commonly increased and augmented above measure by sudden and unexpected accidents. And that which surprises us on the sudden, contrary to our hope and expectation, is much more uneasy and grievous than that which is either foreseen, or not very unlikely to happen; as must needs fall out in the case of those who, expecting nothing more than to see the happiness, advancement, and glory of a friend or a kinsman, should hear of his being put to the most exquisite tortures, as Parmenio did of his son Philotas. And who will ever say that the anger of Magas against Philemon can bear any proportion to the rage of Nicocreon against Anaxarchus? The occasion given was in both cases the same, each of them having severally been bitterly reproached and reviled by the other. For whereas Nicocreon caused Anaxarchus to be broken to pieces and brayed in a mortar with iron pestles, Magas only commanded the executioner to lay the edge of the naked sword upon the neck of Philemon, and so dismissed him. And therefore Plato called anger the nerves of the mind; because, as it may swell and be made more intense by sourness and ill-nature, so may it be slackened and remitted by gentleness and good-nature. But to elude these and such like objections, they will not allow these intense and vehement efforts of the passions to be according to judgment, or so to proceed from it as if that were therein faulty; but they call them cessations, contractions, and extensions or diffusions, which by the irrational part are capable of being increased or diminished. But that there are also differences of judgment is most plain and evident; for some there are who take poverty to be no evil at all, others who look upon it as a great evil, and others again who esteem it to be the greatest evil and worst thing in the world, insomuch that rather than endure it they would dash themselves in pieces against the rocks, or cast themselves headlong into the sea. And among those who reckon death to be an evil, some are of that opinion, in regard only that it deprives us of the enjoyment of the good things of the world, as others are with respect to the eternal torments and horrible punishments under ground in hell. As for bodily health, some love it no otherwise than as it is agreeable to Nature, and very convenient and useful; while others value it as the most sovereign good, in comparison whereof they make no reckoning of riches or children, no, nor of sceptres and crowns, “Which make men equal to the Gods above.” Nor will they, in fine, allow even virtue itself to signify any thing or be of any use, without good health. So that hence it sufficiently appears that, in the judgments men make of things, they may be mistaken and very faulty with respect to both the extremes of too much and too little; but I shall pursue this argument no farther in this place. Thus much may, however, fairly be assumed from what has already been said on this head, that even they themselves do allow a plain difference between the judgment and the irrational faculties, by means whereof, they say, the passions become greater and more violent; and so, while they cavil and contend about names and words, they give up the very cause to those who maintain the irrational part of the soul, which is the seat of the passions, to be several and distinct from that faculty by which we reason and make a judgment of things. And indeed Chrysippus, in those books which he wrote of Anomology,—after he has told us that anger is blind, not discerning oftentimes those things which are plain and conspicuous, and as frequently casting a mist upon such things as were before clear and evident,—proceeds a little farther in this manner: For, says he, the passions, being once raised, not only reject and drive away reason and those things which appear otherwise than they would have them, but violently push men forward to actions that are contrary to reason. And then he makes use of the testimony of Menander, saying,
What have I done? Where has my soul been strayed?
Would she not stay to see herself obeyed,
But let me act what I abhorred but now?
And again the same Chrysippus a little after says: Every rational creature is by Nature so disposed as to use reason in all things, and to be governed by it; but yet oftentimes it falls out that we dispose and reject it, being carried away by another more violent and over-ruling motion. In these words he plainly enough acknowledges what uses in such a case to happen on acccount of the difference and contest between the passions and reason. And upon any other ground it would be ridiculous (as Plato says) to suppose a man to be sometimes better than himself, and sometimes again worse; one while to be his own master, and another while his own slave.

> Greek: 10. ἴσα τοίνυν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα πάντα καὶ πάσας τιθέμενοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, εἰ μὲν ἄλλῃ πη παρορῶσι τἀληθές, οὐκ ἔστι καιρὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διελέγχειν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάθεσι φαίνονται κομιδῇ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐνιστάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατʼ αὐτούς ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. μεγάλαι δὲ τῶν παθῶν διαφοραὶ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ὁρῶνται· τίς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὸν Δόλωνος φόβον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ Αἴαντος ἐντροπαλιζομένου καὶ βάδην ἀπιόντος ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων ὀλίγον γόνυ γουνὸς ἀμείβοντος; ἢ τῇ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Σωκράτει τελευτήσαντι λύπῃ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ Κλεῖτον, αὑτὸν ἀνελεῖν ὁρμήσαντος; ἐπιτείνονται γὰρ οὐ μετρίως καὶ τῷ παρὰ λόγον αἱ λῦπαι, καὶ τὸ παρʼ ἐλπίδα σύμπτωμα τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ὀδυνηρότερον εἰ προσδοκῶν εὐημεροῦντα καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὄψεσθαι πύθοιτο κατεστρεβλωμένον, ὡς Φιλώταν Παρμενίων. θυμῷ δὲ τίς ἂν εἴποι πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἴσῳ κεχρῆσθαι Νικοκρέοντα καὶ πρὸς Φιλήμονα Μάγαν, ἀμφοτέρους λοιδορηθέντας ὑπʼ αὐτῶν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέροις σιδηροῖς κατέπτισσε καὶ κατέκοπτεν ἐκεῖνον ὁ δὲ τῷ Φιλήμονι τὸν δήμιον ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον ἐπιθεῖναι γυμνὴν τὴν μάχαιραν εἶτʼ ἀφεῖναι. διὸ καὶ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν θυμὸν ὁ Πλάτων προσεῖπεν ὡς ἐπιτεινόμενόν τε πικρίᾳ καὶ πραότητι χαλώμενον. ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διακρουόμενοι τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δήξεις καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὰς διαχύσεις εἶναι τὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. καίτοι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις φαίνονται γιγνόμεναι διαφοραί· τήν τε γὰρ πενίαν οἱ μὲν οὐ κακὸν οἱ δὲ καὶ μέγα κρίνουσι κακόν, οἱ δέ γε καὶ μέγιστον, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τῶν πετρῶν καὶ κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ὠθεῖν ἑαυτούς· τόν τε θάνατον οἱ μὲν ἀγαθῶν στερήσει μόνον οἱ δὲ καὶ τιμωρίαις αἰωνίοις ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ κολασμοῖς φρικώδεσι κακὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια τοῖς μὲν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ χρήσιμον ἀγαπᾶται, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ὄντων δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γάρ πλούτου χάριν ἢ τεκέων οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς, τελευτῶντες δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἀνόνητον ἡγοῦνται, τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος ὥστε φαίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δʼ - ἧττον ἁμαρτάνοντας. ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο νῦν διελεγκτέον, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἐκ τούτου ληπτέον, ὅτι συγχωροῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον, καθʼ ὅ φασι γίγνεσθαι τὸ πάθος σφοδρότερον καὶ μεῖζον, ἐρίζοντες πρὸς τοὔνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, τὰ δὲ πράγματα διδόντες τοῖς διαφέρειν τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ κρίνοντος ἀποφαινομένοις. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀνωμαλίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπών, ὅτι τυφλόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῆ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ, μικρὸν προελθών τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγιγνόμενα φησὶ πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμούς, καὶ τὰ ὡς ἑτέρως φαινόμενα βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις· εἶτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι
οἴμοι τάλας ἔγωγε, ποῦ ποτε φρένες
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν ἐν τῷ σώματι
τὸν χρόνον, ὅτʼ οὐ ταῦτʼ ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ᾑρούμεθα
καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθὼν τοῦ λογικοῦ φησι ζῴου φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς ἄλλῃ βιαιοτέρᾳ φορᾷ χρωμένους· ὁμολογῶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους διαφορᾶς. ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστιν, ᾗ φησι Πλάτων, αὐτόν τινα λέγειν αὑτοῦ κρείττονα καὶ πάλιν χείρονα, καὶ τὸν μὲν κρατοῦνθʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ κρατοῦντα.

[¶6] 11. For how could it possibly be, that a man should be better and worse than himself, and at once both his own master and slave, if every one were not in some sort naturally double or twofold, having in himself at the same time a better part and a worse? For so may he be reckoned to have a power over himself and to be better than himself, who has his worse and inferior faculties in obedience and subjection to the superior and more excellent; whereas he who suffers his nobler powers to fall under the government and direction of the intemperate and irrational part of the soul is less and worse than himself, and has wholly lost the command over himself, and is in a state which is contrary to Nature. For by the order of Nature, reason, which is divine, ought to have the sovereignty and dominion over the irrational and brutal faculties, which, deriving their original from the body, and being incorporated, as it were, and thoroughly mixed therewith, bear a very near resemblance to it, are replenished with, and do participate in common of the qualities, properties, and passions thereof; as is plain from our more vehement motions and efforts towards corporeal objects, which always increase or diminish in vigor according to the several changes and alterations which happen in the body. From whence it is that young men are in their lusts and appetites, because of the abundance and warmth of their blood, so quick, forward, hot, and furious; whereas in old men all natural fire being almost extinguished, and the first principles and source of the affections and passions, seated about the liver, being much lessened and debilitated, reason becomes more vigorous and predominant, while the appetites languish and decay together with the body. And after this manner it is that the nature of beasts is framed and disposed to divers passions. For it is not from any strength or weakness of thought, or from any opinions right or wrong which they form to themselves, that some of them are so bold and venturous, and dare encounter any thing, and others of them are fearful and cowardly, shrinking at every danger; but from the force and power of the blood, the spirits, and the body does this diversity of passions in them arise; for that part where the passions are seated, being derived from the body, as from its root, retains all the qualities and propensions of that from whence it is extracted. Now that in man there is a sympathy and an agreeable and correspondent motion of the body with the passions and appetites, is proved by the paleness and blushings of the face, by the tremblings of the joints, and by the palpitation of the heart; and, on the contrary, by the diffusion or dilatation which we feel upon the hope and expectation of pleasures. But when the mind or intellect doth move of itself alone, without any passion to disorder and ruffle it, then is the body at repose and rests quiet, having nothing at all to do with those acts and operations of the mind; as, when it takes into consideration a proposition in mathematics or some such scientifical thing, it calls not for the aid or assistance of the irrational or brutal faculties. From whence also it is very apparent that there are in us two distinct parts, differing in their powers and faculties from one another.

> Greek: 11. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ κρείττονʼ εἶναι καὶ χείρονα ἢ κρατεῖν ἅμα καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ τρόπον τινὰ διττοῦ πεφυκότος ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ βέλτιον ἔχοντος; οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπηκόῳ τῷ χείρονι χρώμενος ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κρείττων ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ καὶ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπόμενον περιορῶν καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν τὸ κρεῖττον ἥττων ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν διακείμενος. φύσει γὰρ προσήκει θεῖον ὄντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀλόγου, τοῦ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτόθεν ἔχοντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· ᾧ καὶ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ ἀναπίμπλασθαι πέφυκεν, ἐνδεδυκὸς αὐτῷ καὶ καταμεμιγμένον, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ κινούμεναι καὶ ἱστάμεναι καὶ σφοδρότητας ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολαῖς καὶ ἀνέσεις λαμβάνουσαι. διὸ νέοι μὲν καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ἰταμοὶ περί τε τὰς ὀρέξεις διάπυροι καὶ οἰστρώδεις αἵματος πλήθει καὶ θερμότητι, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτῶν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κατασβέννυται καὶ γίγνεται μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενής· ἰσχύει δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συναπομαραινομένου. τοῦτο δʼ ἀμέλει καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων ἠθοποιεῖ πρὸς τὰ πάθη φύσεις οὐ γὰρ ὀρθότητι δοξῶν οὐδὲ φαυλότητι δήπου τοῖς μὲν ἀλκαὶ καὶ ὁρμαὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα δεινὰ παρίστανται, τοῖς δʼ ἀμήχανοι πτοῖαι καὶ φόβοι τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλʼ αἱ περὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμεις τὰς τῶν παθῶν διαφορὰς ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ ῥίζης τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀναβλαστάνοντος καὶ συναναφέροντος τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν. τοῦ δʼ ἀνθρώπου ταῖς μὲν παθητικαῖς ὁρμαῖς τὸ σῶμα συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκινούμενον ἐλέγχουσιν ὠχρότητες ἐρυθήματα τρόμοι πηδήσεις καρδίας, διαχύσεις αὖ πάλιν ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἡδονῶν καὶ προσδοκίαις ὅταν δὲ μὴ μετὰ πάθους ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ κινῆται τὸ διανοητικόν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγει τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθέστηκεν οὔτε κοινωνοῦν οὔτε μετέχον αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ φρονοῦντος, εἰ τοῦ παθητικοῦ μὴ συνεφάπτοιτο μηδὲ συμπαραλαμβάνοι τὸ ἄλογον ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ δύʼ ὄντα καὶ διαφέροντα δηλοῦσθαι ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀλλήλων.

[¶7] 12. In fine, throughout the whole world, all things (as they themselves are forced to confess, and is evident in itself) are governed and directed, some by a certain habit, some by Nature, others by a brutal or irrational soul, and some again by that which has reason and understanding. Of all which things man does in some measure participate, and is concerned in all the above-mentioned differences. For he is contained by habit, and nourished by Nature; he makes use of reason and understanding; he wants not his share of the irrational soul; he has also in him a native source and inbred principle of the passions, not as adventitious, but necessary to him, which ought not therefore to be utterly rooted out, but only pruned and cultivated. For it is not the method and custom of reason—in imitation either of the manner of the Thracians or of what Lycurgus ordered to be done to the vines—to destroy and tear up all the passions and affections indifferently, good and bad, useful and hurtful together; but rather—like some kind and careful Deity who has a tender regard to the growth and improvement of fruit-trees and plants—to cut away and clip off that which grows wild and rank, and to dress and manage the rest that it may serve for use and profit. For as they who are afraid of being drunk pour not their wine upon the ground, but dilute it with water; so neither do they who fear any violent commotion of their passions go about utterly to destroy and eradicate, but rather wisely to temper and moderate them. And as they who use to break horses and oxen do not go about to take away their goings, or to render them unfit for labor and service, but only strive to cure them of their unluckiness and flinging up their heels, and to bring them to be patient of the bit and yoke, so as to become useful; after the same manner reason makes very good use of the passions, after they are well subdued and made gentle, without either tearing in pieces or over-much weakening that part of the soul which was made to be obedient to her. In Pindar we find it said:
As ’tis the horse’s pride to win the race,
And to plough up the fruitful soil
Is the laborious ox’s toil,
So the fierce dog we take the foaming boar to chase.
But much more useful than these in their several kinds are the whole brood of passions, when they become attendants to reason, and when, being assistant and obedient to virtue, they give life and vigor to it. Thus, moderate anger is of admirable use to courage or fortitude; hatred and aversion for ill men promotes the execution of justice; and a just indignation against those who are prosperous beyond what they deserve is then both convenient and even necessary, when with pride and insolence their minds are so swollen and elated, that they need to be repressed and taken down. Neither by any means can a man, though he never so much desire it, be able to separate from friendship a natural propension to affection; from humanity and good nature, tenderness and commiseration; nor from true benevolence, a mutual participation of joy and grief. And if they run into an error who would take away all love that they may destroy mad and wanton passions, neither can those be in the right who, for the sake of covetousness, condemn all other appetites and desires. Which is full as ridiculous as if one should always refuse to run, because one time or other he may chance to catch a fall; or to shoot, because he may sometimes happen to miss the mark; or should forbear all singing, because a discord or a jar is offensive to the ear. For, as in sounds the music and harmony thereof takes away neither the sharpest nor the deepest notes, and in our bodies physic procureth health, not by the destruction of heat and cold, but by a due and proportionable temperature and mixture of them both together; so in the same manner it happeneth in the soul of man, when reason becomes victorious and triumphant by reducing the faculties of the mind which belong to the passions, and all their motions, to a due moderation and mediocrity. And excessive and unmeasurable joy or grief or fear in the soul (not, however, either joy, grief, or fear, simply in itself) may very properly be resembled to a great swelling or inflammation in the body. And therefore Homer, where he says,
A valiant man doth never color change;
Excessive fear to him is very strange,
does not take away all fear (but that only which is extreme and unmanly), that bravery and courage may not be thought to be fool-hardiness, nor boldness and resolution pass for temerity and rashness. And therefore he that in pleasures and delights can prescribe bounds to his lusts and desires, and in punishing offences can moderate his rage and hatred to the offenders, shall in one case get the reputation not of an insensible, but temperate person, and in the other be accounted a man of justice without cruelty or bitterness. Whereas, if all the passions, if that were possible, were clean rooted out, reason in most men would grow sensibly more dull and inactive than the pilot of a ship in a calm. And to these things (as it should seem) prudent lawgivers having regard have wisely taken care to excite and encourage in commonwealths and cities the ambition and emulation of their people amongst one another, and with trumpets, drums, and flutes to whet their anger and courage against their enemies. For not only in poetry (as Plato very well observes), he that is inspired by the Muses, and as it were possessed by a poetical fury, will make him that is otherwise a master of his trade and an exact critic in poetry appear ridiculous; but also in fighting, those who are elevated and inspired with a noble rage, and a resolution and courage about the common pitch, become invincible, and are not to be withstood. And this is that warlike fury which the Gods, as Homer will have it, infuse into men of honor: “He spoke, and every word new strength inspired;” and again: “This more than human rage is from the Gods;” as if to reason the Gods had joined some or other of passions, as an incitement or, if I may so say, a vehicle to push and carry it forward. Nay we often see these very men against whom I now dispute exciting and encouraging young persons with praises, and as often checking and rebuking them with severe reprimands; whereupon in the one case there must follow pleasure and satisfaction as necessarily as grief and trouble are produced in the other. For reprehension and admonition certainly strike us with repentance and shame, whereof this is comprehended under fear, as the other is under grief. And these are the things they chiefly make use of for correction and amendment. Which seems to be the reason why Diogenes, to some who had magnified Plato, made this reply: What can there be in him, said he, so much to be valued, who, having been so long a philosopher, has never yet been known so much as to excite the single passion of grief in the mind of any one? And certainly the mathematics cannot so properly be called (to use the words of Xenocrates) the handles of philosophy, as these passions are of young men, namely, bashfulness, desire, repentance, pleasure, pain, ambition; whereon right reason and the law discreetly laying their salutary hands do thereby effectually and speedily reduce a young man into the right way. Agreeably hereunto the Lacedaemonian instructor of youth was in the right, when he professed that he would bring it to pass that youths under his care should take a pleasure and satisfaction in good and have an abhorrence for evil, than which there cannot be a greater or nobler end of the liberal education of youth proposed or assigned.

> Greek: 12. καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἕξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δʼ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν· ὧν ὁμοῦ τι πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μετέσχηκε καὶ γέγονεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς εἰρημέναις διαφοραῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἕξει συνέχεται καὶ φύσει τρέφεται καὶ λόγῳ χρῆται καὶ διανοίᾳ. μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχήν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν, οὐδʼ ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην. ὅθεν οὐ Θρᾴκιον οὐδὲ Λυκούργειον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον ἐστί, συνεκκόπτειν καὶ συνδιαφθείρειν τὰ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς βλαβεροῖς τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλʼ ᾗπερ ὁ φυτάλμιος θεὸς καὶ ἡμερίδης, τὸ ἄγριον κολοῦσαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀμετρίαν, εἶτα τιθασεύειν καὶ περιίστασθαι τὸ χρήσιμον. οὔτε γὰρ οἶνον οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸ μεθύειν ἐκχέουσιν οὔτε πάθος οἱ δεδιότες τὸ ταρακτικὸν ἀναιροῦσιν ἀλλὰ κεραννύουσι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ βοῶν καὶ ἵππων τὰ πηδήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀφηνιασμοὺς οὐ τὰς κινήσεις οὐδὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀφαιροῦσι· καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι δεδαμασμένοις χρῆται καὶ χειροήθεσιν ὁ λογισμός, οὐκ ἐκνευρίσας οὐδʼ ἐκτεμὼν παντάπασι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν· ὑφʼ ἅρμασι γὰρ ἵππος ὥς φησι Πίνδαρος
ἐν δʼ ἀρότρῳ βοῦς·
κάπρῳ δὲ βουλεύοντα φόνον κύνα χρὴ τλάθυμον ἐξευρεῖν.
ὧν πολὺ χρησιμώτερα τὰ τῶν παθῶν θρέμματα τῷ λογισμῷ συμπαρόντα καὶ συνεπιτείνοντα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς· ὁ θυμὸς τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ μέτριος ὤν, ἡ μισοπονηρία τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, καὶ ἡ νέμεσις ἐπὶ τοὺς παρʼ ἀξίαν εὐτυχοῦντας, ὅταν ἅμʼ ἀνοίᾳ καὶ ὕβρει φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπισχέσεως δέωνται. φιλίας δὲ φιλοστοργίαν ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἔλεον ἢ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἄν τις ἀποσπάσειεν οὐδʼ ἀποτήξειεν. εἰ δʼ οἱ τὸν ἔρωτα τῇ ἐρωτομανίᾳ συνεκβάλλοντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐδʼ οἱ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν διὰ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ψέγοντες κατορθοῦσιν ἀλλʼ ὅμοιόν τι πράττουσι τοῖς τὸ τρέχειν διὰ τὸ προσπταίειν καὶ τὸ βάλλειν διὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἀναιροῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ᾄδειν τὸ παράπαν διὰ τὸ ἀπᾴδειν ἀπεχθῶς ἔχουσιν. οἷον γὰρ ἐν φθόγγοις μουσικὴ τὸ ἐμμελὲς οὐκ ἀναιρέσει βαρύτητος καὶ ὀξύτητος, ἐν δὲ σώμασιν ἰατρικὴ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ φθορᾷ θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίαις καὶ ποσότησι κραθεισῶν ἀπεργάζεται, τοιοῦτον ἐν ψυχῇ τὸ νικῶν, ἐγγενομένης ὑπὸ λόγου ταῖς παθητικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ κινήσεσιν ἐπιεικείας καὶ μετριότητος. οἰδοῦντι γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι σώματι τὸ περιαλγοῦν καὶ περιχαρὲς καὶ περίφοβον τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ τὸ χαῖρον οὐδὲ τὸ λυπούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ φοβούμενον. καὶ καλῶς Ὅμηρος εἰπών
τοῦ δʼ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτʼ ἂρ τρέπεται χρὼς οὔτε τι λίην
ταρβεῖ
τὸν φόβον οὐκ ἀφεῖλεν ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄγαν φόβον, ὅπως ἀνδρεία μὴ ἀπόνοια καὶ θαρραλεότης μὴ θρασύτης γένηται. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας τὴν ἄγαν μισοπονηρίαν οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος ἀλλὰ σώφρων, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ὠμὸς οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἔσται. τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργότερος; ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης, πνεύματος ἐπιλιπόντος. ταῦτα δʼ ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ σάλπιγξι καὶ αὐλοῖς ἐπεγείρουσι καὶ αὔξουσι τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν ποιήμασιν, φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ διηκριβωμένον ὁ μουσόληπτος καὶ κατάσχετος ἀποδείκνυσι γελοῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς μάχας τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνθουσιῶδες ἀνυπόστατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητον· ὃ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς Ὅμηρος ἐμποιεῖν φησι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὣς εἰπὼν ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα ποιμένι λαῶν· καὶ οὐχ ὃ γʼ ἄνευθε θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται· καθάπερ ὅρμημα τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ὄχημα τὸ πάθος προστιθέντας. αὐτούς γε μὴν τούτους ὁρᾶν ἔστι πολλάκις μὲν ἐπαίνοις τοὺς νέους παρορμῶντας πολλάκις δὲ νουθεσίαις κολάζοντας· ὧν τῷ μὲν ἕπεται τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ νουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην, ὧν τὸ μὲν λύπη τῷ γένει τὸ δὲ φόβος ἐστί· καὶ τούτοις μάλιστα χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις. ᾗ καὶ Διογένης, ἐπαινουμένου Πλάτωνος, τί δʼ ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν ἔχει σεμνόν, ὃς τοσοῦτον χρόνον φιλοσοφῶν οὐδένα λελύπηκεν οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ μαθήματα φαίη τις ἄν, ὡς ἔλεγε Ξενοκράτης, λαβὰς εἶναι φιλοσοφίας, ὡς τὰ πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνην ἐπιθυμίαν μετάνοιαν ἡδονὴν λύπην φιλοτιμίαν ὧν ἐμμελῆ καὶ σωτήριον ἁφὴν ἁπτόμενος ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ νόμος εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν ὁδὸν ἀνυσίμως καθίστησι τὸν νέον. ὥστε μὴ κακῶς εἰπεῖν τὸν Λάκωνα παιδαγωγόν, ὅτι ποιήσει τὸν παῖδα τοῖς καλοῖς ἣδεσθαι καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κάλλιον ἀποφῆναι τέλος ἐλευθέρῳ προσηκούσης; παιδείας.