---
title: "On Fate · De fato"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "A. G., rev. William W. Goodwin"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-on-fate/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. A. G., rev. William W. Goodwin, On Fate · De fato. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-on-fate/"
---

# On Fate · De fato

*Plutarch, tr. A. G., rev. William W. Goodwin*

A treatise on fate, providence and what is in our power.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg108, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: A. G., rev. William W. Goodwin, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg108.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## Contents

1. [Sections 1–11](https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-on-fate/1.md)

## 1. Sections 1–11

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-on-fate/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-on-fate/1/#p-N

[¶0] 0. I will endeavor, my dearest Piso, to send you my opinion concerning Fate, written with all the clearness and compendiousness I am capable of; since you, who are not ignorant how cautious I am of writing, have thought fit to make it the subject of your request.

> Greek: 0. τὰ περὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης δοκοῦνθʼ ἡμῖν, ὡς οἷόν τε σαφῶς καὶ συντόμως πειράσομαι ἐπιστεῖλαί σοι, φίλτατε Πείσων, ἐπειδὴ σὺ τοῦτʼ ἠξίωσας οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ἣν ἔχω πρὸς τὸ γράφειν εὐλάβειαν.

[¶1] 1. You are first then to know that this word Fate is spoken and understood two manner of ways; the one as it is an energy, the other as it is a substance. First therefore, as it is an action, Plato has under a type described it, saying thus in his dialogue entitled Phaedrus: “And this is a sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable ordinance), that whatever soul being an attendant on God,” etc. And in his treatise called Timaeus: “The laws which God in the nature of the universe has established for immortal souls.” And in his book of a Commonweal he calls Fate “the speech of the virgin Lachesis, who is the daughter of Necessity.” By which sentences he not tragically but theologically shows us what his sentiments are in this matter. Now if any one, translating the fore-cited passages, would have them expressed in more familiar terms, the description in Phaedrus may be thus explained: That Fate is a divine sentence, intransgressible because its cause cannot be divested or hindered. And according to what he has said in his Timaeus, it is a law ensuing on the nature of the universe, according to which all things that are done are transacted. For this does Lachesis effect, who is indeed the daughter of Necessity, — as we have both already related, and shall yet better understand by that which will be said in the progress of our discourse. Thus you see what Fate is, when it is taken for an action.

> Greek: 1. πρῶτον τοίνυν ἴσθι, ὅτι εἱμαρμένη διχῶς καὶ λέγεται καὶ νοεῖται· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ δʼ οὐσία. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐνέργειαν τύπῳ ὑπέγραψεν ὁ Πλάτων ἔν τε τῷ Φαίδρῳ λέγων θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε, ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ ξυνοπαδὸς γενομένη· ἐν δὲ τῷ Τιμαίῳ νόμους οὓς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φύσει ὁ θεὸς εἶπε ταῖς ἀθανάτοις ψυχαῖς· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγον φησὶν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, οὐ τραγικῶς ἀλλὰ θεολογικῶς τὸ ἀρέσκον αὑτῷ ἀποφαινόμενος. εἰ δὲ κοινότερον ἐθέλοι τις ταῦτα μεταλαβὼν ὑπογράψαι, ὡς μὲν ἐν Φαίδρῳ λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἡ εἱμαρμένη λόγος θεῖος ἀπαράβατος διʼ αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον· ὡς δʼ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ νόμος ἀκόλουθος τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φύσει, καθʼ ὃν διεξάγεται τὰ γιγνόμενα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἡ Λάχεσις ἐργάζεται, ἡ τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἀληθῶς θυγάτηρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερον παρελάβομεν καὶ ὕστερον ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθʼ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ σχολὴν λόγοις. ἥδε μὲν οὖν ἡ κατʼ ἐνέργειαν εἱμαρμένη.

[¶2] 2. But as it is a substance, it seems to be the universal soul of the world, and admits of a threefold distribution; the first destiny being that which errs not; the second, that which is thought to err; and the third that which, being under the heaven, is conversant about the earth. Of these, the highest is called Clotho, the next Atropos, and the lowest, Lachesis; who, receiving the celestial influences and efficacies of her sisters, transmits and fastens them to the terrestrial things which are under her government. Thus have we declared briefly what is to be said of Fate, taken as a substance; what it is, what are its parts, after what manner it is, how it is ordained, and how it stands, both in respect to itself and to us. But as to the particularities of these things, there is another fable in his Commonweal, by which they are in some measure covertly insinuated, and we ourselves have, in the best manner we can, endeavored to explain them to you.

> Greek: 2. ἡ δὲ κατʼ οὐσίαν ἔοικεν εἶναι σύμπασʼ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ τριχῇ διανεμηθεῖσα, εἴς τε τὴν ἀπλανῆ μοῖραν καὶ εἰς τὴν πλανᾶσθαι νομιζομένην, καὶ τρίτην τὴν ὑπουράνιον τὴν περὶ γῆν ὑπάρχουσαν ὧν μὲν ἀνωτάτω Κλωθὼ προσαγορεύεται, ἡ δὲ μετʼ αὐτὴν Ἄτροπος, ἡ κατωτάτω δʼ αὖ Λάχεσις, δεχομένη μὲν τὰς οὐρανίας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐνεργείας, συμπλέκουσα δὲ καὶ διαδιδοῦσα ταύτας εἰς τὰ ἐπʼ αὐτῆς τεταγμένα τὰ ἐπίγεια. δυνάμει μὲν οὖν εἴρηται, ὁποῖα χρὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ τῆς κατʼ οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένης· καὶ γὰρ ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ πόση τις καὶ ὁποία καὶ ὅπως τέτακται καὶ ὅπως ἔχει αὐτή τε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ εἴρηται· τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα περὶ τούτων ὁ ἕτερος μῦθος ὁ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ μετρίως αἰνίττεται, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς δύναμίν σοι ταῦτʼ ἐπειράθημεν ἐξηγήσασθαι.

[¶3] 3. But we now once again turn our discourse to Fate, as it is an energy. For concerning this it is that there are so many natural, moral, and logical questions. Having therefore already in some sort sufficiently defined what it is, we are now in the next place to say something of its quality, although it may to many seem absurd. I say then that Fate, though comprehending as it were in a circle the infinity of all those things which are and have been from infinite times and shall be to infinite ages, is not in itself infinite, but determinate and finite; for neither law, reason, nor any other divine thing can be infinite. And this you will the better understand, if you consider the total revolution and the whole time in which the revolutions of the eight circles (that is, of the eight spheres of the fixed stars, sun, moon, and five planets), having (as Timaeus says) finished their course, return to one and the same point, being measured by the circle of the Same, which goes always after one manner. For in this order, which is finite and determinate, shall all things (which, as well in heaven as in earth, consist by necessity from above) be reduced to the same situation, and restored again to their first beginning. Wherefore the habitude of heaven alone, being thus ordained in all things, as well in regard of itself as of the earth and all terrestrial matters, shall again (after long revolutions) one day return; and those things that in order follow after, and being linked together in a continuity are maintained in their course, shall be present, every one of them by necessity bringing what is its own. But for the better clearing of this matter, let us understand that whatever is in us or about us is not wrought by the course of the heavens and heavenly influences, as being entirely the efficient cause both of my writing what I now write, and of your doing also what you at present do, and in the same manner as you do it. Hereafter then, when the same cause shall return, we shall do the same things we now do, and in the same manner, and shall again become the same men; and so it will be with all others. And that which follows after shall also happen by the following cause; and in brief, all things that shall happen in the whole and in every one of these universal revolutions shall again become the same. By this it appears (as we have said before) that Fate, being in some sort infinite, is nevertheless determinate and finite; and it may be also in some sort seen and comprehended, as we have farther said, that it is as it were a circle. For as a motion of a circle is a circle, and the time that measures it is also a circle; so the order of things which are done and happen in a circle may be justly esteemed and called a circle.

> Greek: 3. πάλιν γε μὴν τὴν κατʼ ἐνέργειαν εἱμαρμένην ἀναλαβόντες λέγωμεν περὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικὰ καὶ διαλεκτικὰ τυγχάνει ὄντα. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ἐπιεικῶς ἀφώρισται· ὁποία δʼ ἐστίν, ἑξῆς ῥητέον, εἰ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄτοπον φαίνεται. ἀπείρων γὰρ ἐξ ἀπείρου καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ὄντων τῶν γιγνομένων, τὰ πάντα περιβαλοῦσʼ ἐν κύκλῳ ἡ εἱμαρμένη οὐκ ἄπειρος; ἀλλὰ πεπερασμένη ἐστίν οὔτε γὰρ νόμος οὔτε λόγος οὔτε τι θεῖον ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη. ἔτι δʼ ἂν μάθοις τὸ λεγόμενον, νοήσας τήν ὅλην περίοδον καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον, ὅταν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων ὥς φησιν ὁ Τίμαιος τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπερανθέντα τάχη σχῇ κεφαλήν, τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ. ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὡρισμένῳ τʼ ὄντι καὶ θεωρουμένῳ πάνθʼ ὅσα τε κατʼ οὐρανὸν ἃ τʼ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄνωθεν συνίσταται, πάλιν μὲν εἰς ταὐτὸ καταστήσεται, πάλιν δʼ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀποδοθήσεται. μόνη γοῦν ἡ κατʼ οὐρανὸν σχέσις αὐτή τε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν κατὰ πάντα τεταγμένη πρός τε τὴν γῆν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια πάντα διὰ μακρῶν περιόδων πάλιν ἐπανήξει ποτέ· αἵ τε μετʼ αὐτὴν ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἐχόμεναι ἀλλήλαις ἐχομένως παρέσονται, ἑκάστη τὰ αὑτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης φέρουσαι. ἔστω δὲ πρὸς τὸ σαφὲς τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς νῦν ὄντων, ὅτι οὐ συμβαίνει ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων, ὡς πάντων αἰτιῶν ὄντων, καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ γράφειν νυνὶ τάδε καὶ ὡδὶ σέ τε πράττειν ἅπερ καὶ ὅπως τυγχάνεις πράττων· πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπειδὰν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀφίκηται αἰτία, ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως οἱ αὐτοὶ γενόμενοι πράξομεν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ γʼ ἑξῆς κατὰ τὴν ἑξῆς αἰτίαν γενήσεται καὶ πραχθήσεται, καὶ πάνθʼ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μίαν τὴν ὅλην περίοδον καὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην τῶν ὅλων ὡσαύτως ἀποδοθήσεται. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἤδη ὅ τι ἔφαμεν, τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἄπειρον τρόπον τινὰ οὖσαν μὴ ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ τό γε ῥηθέν, ὅτι κύκλος τίς ἐστι, μετρίως που κατῶπται· ὡς γὰρ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κύκλου κίνησις ὅ τε ταύτην παραμετρῶν χρόνος κύκλος τίς ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν κατὰ κύκλον γιγνομένων ὁ λόγος κύκλος ἂν νομισθείη.

[¶4] 4. This therefore, though there should be nothing else, almost shows us what sort of thing Fate is; but not particularly or in every respect. What kind of thing then is it in its own form? It is, as far as one can compare it, like to the civil or politic law. For first it commands the most part of things at least, if not all, conditionally; and then it comprises (as far as is possible for it) all things that belong to the public in general; and the better to make you understand both the one and the other, we must specify them by an example. The civil law speaks and ordains in general of a valiant man, and also of a deserter and a coward; and in the same manner of others. Now this is not to make the law speak of this or that man in particular, but principally to propose such things as are universal or general, and consequently such as fall under them. For we may very well say, that it is legal to reward this man for having demeaned himself valiantly, and to punish that man for flying from his colors; because the law has virtually — though not in express terms and particularly yet in such general ones as they are comprehended under, — so determined of them. As the law (if I may so speak) of physicians and masters of corporal exercises potentially comprehends particular and special things within the general; so the law of Nature, determining first and principally general matters, secondarily and consequently determines such as are particular. Thus, general things being decreed by Fate, particular and individual things may also in some sort be said to be so, because they are so by consequence with the general. But perhaps some one of those who more accurately examine and more subtly search into these things may say, on the contrary, that particular and individual things precede the composition of general things, and that the general exist only for the particular, since that for which another thing is always goes before that which is for it. Nevertheless, this is not the proper place to treat of this difficulty, but it is to be remitted to another. However, that Fate comprehends not all things clearly and expressly, but only such as are universal and general, let it pass for resolved on at present, as well for what we have already said a little before, as for what we shall say hereafter. For that which is finite and determinate, agreeing properly with divine Providence, is seen more in universal and general things than in particular; such therefore is the divine law, and also the civil; but infinity consists in particulars and individuals. After this we are to declare what this term “conditionally” means; for it is to be thought that Fate is also some such thing. That then is said to be conditionally, which is supposed to exist not of itself or absolutely, but as really dependent upon and joined to another; which signifies a suit and consequence. “And this is the sanction of Adrastea (or an inevitable ordinance), that whatever soul, being an attendant on God, shall see any thing of truth, shall till another revolution be exempt from punishment; and if it is always able to do the same, it shall never suffer any damage.” This is said both conditionally and also universally. Now that Fate is some such thing is clearly manifest, as well from its substance as from its name. For it is called εἱμαρμένη as being εἰρομένη, that is, dependent and linked; and it is a sanction or law, because things are therein ordained and disposed consequentially, as is usual in civil government.

> Greek: 4. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δηλοῖ, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ἡ εἱμαρμένη, πλὴν οὐχ ἥ γε κατὰ μέρος οὐδʼ ἡ καθʼ ἕκαστα. ποία τις οὖν καὶ ἥδε κατʼ αὖ τόδε τὸ εἶδος τοῦ λόγου; ἔστι τοίνυν, ὡς ἄν τις εἰκάσαι, οἷος ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος ὃς πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πλεῖστα, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προστάττει· ἔπειτα μὴν καθόλου τὰ πόλει προσήκοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει. πάλιν δὲ τούτων ἑκάτερον ὁποῖὸν τί ἐστι, σκεπτέον. ἀκολούθως τοίνυν ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος περὶ τʼ ἀριστέως καὶ λιποτάκτου διαλέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως· ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τοῦδʼ ἢ τοῦδʼ νόμιμόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθόλου προηγουμένως, τὰ δʼ ὑποπίπτοντα τούτων ἑπομένως. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τιμῆσαι τόνδε τινὰ ἠριστευκότα καὶ τὸ κολάσαι τόνδε τινὰ λιποτακτήσαντα νόμιμον ἂν φήσαιμεν, ὡς δυνάμει καὶ περὶ τούτων διατεταγμένου τοῦ νόμου· ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἰατρικὸς καὶ ὁ γυμναστικὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν νόμος δυνάμει τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τοῖς ὅλοις συμπεριλαμβάνει· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς φύσεως νόμος τὰ μὲν καθόλου προηγουμένως, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἑπομένως. ἔστι θʼ εἱμαρμένα τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ταῦτα, ὄντʼ ἐκείνοις συνειμαρμένα, τάχα δʼ ἄν τις τῶν ἄγαν ἀκριβολογουμένων τὰ τοιαῦτα καί τοὐναντίον φαίη προηγούμενα συντετάχθαι τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, εἶναί τε τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καθόλου, προηγεῖσθαι δὲ τῶν ἕνεκά του τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις σκεπτέον. ὅτι δʼ οὐ πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαρρήδην ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει ἀλλʼ ὅσα καθόλου, τοῦτο δὴ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ῥηθὲν πρός τε τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον καὶ τὸν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν χώραν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡρισμένον οἰκεῖον τῇ θείᾳ φρονήσει ἐν τῷ καθόλου μᾶλλον θεωρεῖται· τοιοῦτο καὶ ὁ θεῖος νόμος, ὁ μέντοι γε πολιτικός, τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστα μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, οἷον μέν ἐστιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οἰέσθω. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ ἔφαμεν τὸ μὴ καθʼ ἑαυτὸ τιθέμενον, ἀλλά πως ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὑποτεθέν, ὁπόσα ἀκολουθίαν σημαίνει. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε· ἣτις ἂν ψυχὴ συνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα· κἂν ἀεὶ δύνηται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι. τοιοῦτον μὲν δὴ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἅμα καὶ καθόλου. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὄν, ἔκ τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς προσηγορίας δῆλον. εἱμαρμένη τε γὰρ προσαγορεύεται ὡς ἂν εἰρομένη τις· θεσμὸς δὲ καὶ νόμος ὑπάρχει τῷ τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς γιγνομένοις πολιτικῶς διατετάχθαι.

[¶5] 5. We ought in the next place to consider and treat of mutual relation and affection; that is, what reference and respect Fate has to divine Providence, what to Fortune, what also to “that which is in our power,” what to contingent and other such like things; and furthermore we are to determine, how far and in what it is true or false that all things happen and are done by and according to Fate. For if the meaning is, that all things are comprehended and contained in Fate, it must be granted that this proposition is true; and if any would farther have it so understood, that all things which are done amongst men, on earth, and in heaven are placed in Fate, let this also pass as granted for the present. But if (as the expression seems rather to imply) the “being done according to Fate” signifies not all things, but only that which is an immediate consequent of Fate, then it must not be said that all things happen and are done by and according to Fate, though all things are so according to Fate as to be comprised in it. For all things that the law comprehends and of which it speaks are not legal or according to law; for it comprehends treason, it treats of the cowardly running away from one’s colors in time of battle, of adultery, and many other such like things, of which it cannot be said that any one of them is lawful. Neither indeed can I affirm of the performing a valorous act in war, the killing of a tyrant, or the doing any other virtuous deed, that it is legal; because that only is proper to be called legal, which is commanded by the law. Now if the law commands these things, how can they avoid being rebels against the law and transgressors of it, who neither perform valiant feats of arms, kill tyrants, nor do any other such remarkable acts of virtue? And if they are transgressors of the law, why is it not just they should be punished? But if this is not reasonable, it must then be also confessed that these things are not legal or according to law; but that legal and according to law is only that which is particularly prescribed and expressly commanded by the law, in any action whatsoever. In like manner, those things only are fatal and according to Fate, which are the consequences of causes preceding in the divine disposition. So that Fate indeed comprehends all things which are done; yet many of those things that are comprehended in it, and almost all that precede, should not (to speak properly) be pronounced to be fatal or according to Fate.

> Greek: 5. ἑξῆς δὲ σκεπτέον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πρός τι, πῶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πρόνοιαν ἡ εἱμαρμένη· ἔχει, πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ διωρίσθω, πῆ μὲν ἀληθὲς πῆ δὲ ψεῦδος τὸ πάντα καθʼ εἱμαρμένην. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ πάντα περιέχεσθαι δηλοῖ, συγχωρητέον εἶναι ἀληθές· εἴθʼ ὅσα περὶ ἀνθρώπους εἴτε περὶ γῆν ἅπαντα εἴτε κατʼ οὐρανὸν γιγνόμενα, βούλεταί τις ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν συγκεχωρήσθω. εἰ δʼ, ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει, τὸ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην οὐχ ἅπαντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ἑπόμενον αὐτῷ σημαίνει, οὐ πάντα ῥητέον καθʼ εἱμαρμένην. οὐδὲ γὰρ νόμιμα οὐδὲ κατὰ νόμον πάνθʼ ὁπόσα περιείληφεν ὁ νόμος· καὶ γὰρ προδοσίαν καὶ λιποταξίαν καὶ μοιχείαν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνει, ὧν οὐδὲν ἄν τις εἴποι νόμιμον· ὁπότʼ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριστεῦσαι ἢ τυραννοκτονῆσαι ἤ τι ἄλλο κατορθῶσαι φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε νόμιμον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ νόμιμον πρόσταγμα νόμου ἐστί· τὸ δʼ εἴπερ ὁ νόμος προστάττει, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπειθοῖεν καὶ παρανομοῖεν οἵ γε μὴ ἀριστεύοντες καὶ τυραννοκτονοῦντες καὶ ὅσοι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ κατορθοῦσιν; ἢ πῶς, εἰ παράνομοι οἵδε, οὐ δίκαιον κολάζειν τοὺς τοιούτους; εἴ γε μὴν ταῦτα λόγον οὐκ ἔχει, μόνα ῥητέον νόμιμὰ τε καὶ κατὰ νόμον τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὁρισθέντʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν πραττομένοις· μόνα δʼ εἱμαρμένα καὶ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς ἐν τῇ θείᾳ διατάξει προηγησαμένοις. ὥστε πάντα μὲν τὰ γιγνόμενʼ ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιλαμβάνει, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα προηγεῖται οὐκ ὀρθὸν λέγειν καθʼ εἱμαρμένην.

[¶6] 6. These things being so, we are next in order to show, how “that which is in our power” (or free will), Fortune, possible, contingent, and other like things which are placed among the antecedent causes, can consist with Fate, and Fate with them; for Fate, as it seems, comprehends all things, and yet all these things will not happen by necessity, but every one of them according to the principle of its nature. Now the nature of the possible is to presubsist, as the genus, and to go before the contingent; and the contingent, as the matter and subject, is to be presupposed to free will; and our free will ought as a master to make use of the contingent; and Fortune comes in by the side of free will, through the property of the contingent of inclining to either part. Now you will more easily apprehend what has been said, if you shall consider that every thing which is generated, and the generation itself, is not done without a generative faculty or power, and the power is not without a substance. As for example, neither the generation of man, nor that which is generated, is without a power; but this power is about man, and man himself is the substance. Now the power or faculty is between the substance, which is the powerful, and the generation and the thing generated, which are both possibles. There being then these three things, the power, the powerful, and the possible; before the power can exist, the powerful must of necessity be presupposed as its subject, and the power must also necessarily subsist before the possible. By this deduction then may in some measure be understood what is meant by possible; which may be grossly defined as “that which power is able to produce;” or yet more exactly, if to this same there be added, “provided there be nothing from without to hinder or obstruct it.” Now of possible things there are some which can never be hindered, as are those in heaven, to wit, the rising and setting of the stars, and the like to these; but others may indeed be hindered, as are the most part of human things, and many also of those which are done in the air. The first, as being done by necessity, are called necessary; the others, which may fall one way or other, are called contingent; and they may both thus be described. The necessary possible is that whose contrary is impossible; and the contingent possible is that whose contrary is also possible. For that the sun should set is a thing both necessary and possible, forasmuch as it is contrary to this that the sun should not set, which is impossible; but that, when the sun is set, there should be rain or not rain, both the one and the other is possible and contingent. And the again of things contingent, some happen oftener, others rarely and not so often, others fall out equally or indifferently, as well the one way as the other, even as it happens. Now it is manifest that those are contrary to one another, — to wit, those which fall out oftener and those which happen but seldom, — and they both for the most part depend on Nature; but that which happens equally, as much one way as another, depends on ourselves. For that under the Dog it should be either hot or cold, the one oftener, the other seldomer, are both things subject to Nature; but to walk and not to walk, and all such things of which both the one and the other are submitted to the free will of man, are said to be in us and our election; but rather more generally to be in us. For there are two sorts of this “being in our power;” the one of which proceeds from some sudden passion and motion of the mind, as from anger or pleasure; the other from the discourse and judgment of reason, which may properly be said to be in our election. And some reason there is to believe that this possible and contingent is the same thing with that which is said to be in us and according to our free will, although differently named. For in respect to the future, it is styled possible and contingent; and in respect of the present, it is named “in our power” and “in our free will.” So that these things may thus be defined: The contingent is that which is itself — as well as its contrary — possible; and “that which is in our power” is one part of the contingent, to wit, that which now takes place according to our will. Thus have we in a manner declared, that the possible in the order of Nature precedes the contingent, and that the contingent subsists before free will; as also what each of them is, whence they are so named, and what are the qualities adjoined or appertaining to them.

> Greek: 6. τούτων δʼ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἑξῆς ῥητέον, ὡς τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ τύχη τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ ταχθέντα ἐν τοῖς προηγουμένοις αὐτά τε σῴζοιτʼ ἂν καὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην σῴζοι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ εἱμαρμένη πάντα περιέχει καθάπερ καὶ δοκεῖ· τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται, ἀλλʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οἷον καὶ πέφυκεν εἶναι. πέφυκε δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν ὡς γένος προϋφεστάναι τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου· τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ὕλη τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋποκεῖσθαι· τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὡς κύριον χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ· ἡ δὲ τύχη παρεμπίπτει τῷ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα ῥοπὴν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου. μάθοις δʼ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον σαφῶς ἐννοήσας, ὡς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἅπαν καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτὴ οὐ δίχα δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ δύναμις οὐκ ἄνευ οὐσίας, οἷον ἀνθρώπου εἴτε γένεσις εἴτε γενητὸν οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως, αὕτη δὲ περὶ ἄνθρωπον, οὐσία δʼ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως μεταξὺ οὔσης, ἡ μὲν οὐσία δυνάμενον, ἡ δὲ γένεσις καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἄμφω δυνατά. τριῶν τοίνυν τούτων, δυνάμεως καὶ δυναμένου καὶ δυνατοῦ, δυνάμεως μὲν ὡς τὸ εἶναι προϋπόκειται τὸ δυνάμενον, δυνατοῦ δʼ ἡ δύναμις προϋφίσταται. σαφὲς μὲν οὖν καὶ οὕτω τὸ δυνατόν· τύπῳ δʼ ἂν ἀφορισθείη κοινότερον μὲν τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πεφυκὸς γίγνεσθαι, κυριώτερον δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὁπόταν μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ἐμποδών. τῶν δὲ δυνατῶν τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἂν κωλυθείη ποτέ, ὥσπερ τὰ κατʼ οὐρανόν, ἀνατολαὶ καὶ δύσεις καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια· τὰ δʼ οἷά τε κωλυθῆναί ἐστιν, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν μεταρσίων. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρότερʼ ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενʼ ἀναγκαῖα προσαγορεύεται, ἃ δέ πως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδέχεται ἐνδεχόμενα. ἀφορίζοιτο δʼ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα· τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον δυνατὸν τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀδυνάτῳ, τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον δυνατόν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δυνατόν. τὸ μὲν γάρ καταδῦναι τὸν ἣλιον ἀναγκαῖὸν θʼ ἅμα καὶ δυνατόν, ἀντίκειται δʼ ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ καταδῦναι· τὸ δὲ καταδύντος ἡλίου ὄμβρον γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀμφότερα δυνατὰ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα. πάλιν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπʼ ἔλαττον, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπίσης καὶ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· τοῦτο μὲν φανερὸν ὡς αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀντιτέτακται, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐπʼ ἔλαττον ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τε τὸ ἐπίσης. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ κύνα καῦμʼ ἢ ψῦχος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπʼ ἔλαττον, τῇ φύσει ἄμφω ὑποτέτακται· τὸ· δὲ περιπατεῖν καὶ μὴ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὧν ἑκάτερον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ὁρμῇ ὑποτέτακται, ὃ δὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγεται. γενικώτερον δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· δύο γὰρ εἶναι εἴδη, τὸ τʼ ἐκ πάθους καὶ θυμοῦ ἢ ἐπιθυμίας, τὸ τʼ ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ ἢ διανοίας, ὅπερ ἤδη κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἄν τις εἴποι. ἔχει δὲ λόγον μὴ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦτο, ὅπερ καθʼ ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἴρηται, μὴ ταὐτὸ κατʼ ἄλλο λέγεται. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τε καὶ καθʼ ὁρμήν. ἀφορίζοιτο δʼ ἂν ὧδε· τὸ μὲν ἐνδεχόμενον ὅπερ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν θάτερον μέρος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ὁρμὴν ἤδη γιγνόμενον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου πρότερον τῇ φύσει τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋφίσταται, καὶ οἷον αὐτῶν τυγχάνει ὂν ἕκαστον καὶ πόθεν ὀνομάζεται καὶ τά γε παρακείμενα αὐτοῖς, σχεδὸν εἴρηται.

[¶7] 7. It now remains, that we treat of Fortune and casual adventure, and whatever else is to be considered with them. It is therefore certain that Fortune is a cause. Now of causes, some are causes by themselves, and others by accident. Thus for example, the proper cause by itself of an house or a ship is the art of the mason, the carpenter, or the shipwright; but causes by accident are music, geometry, and whatever else may happen to be joined with the art of building houses or ships, in respect either of the body, the soul, or any exterior thing. Whence it appears, that the cause by itself must needs be determinate and one; but the causes by accident are never one and the same, but infinite and undetermined. For many — nay, infinite — accidents, wholly different one from the other, may be in one and the same subject. Now the cause by accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done for some end but has in it free will and election, is then called Fortune; as is the finding a treasure while one is digging a hole to plant a tree, or the doing or suffering some extraordinary thing whilst one is flying, following, or otherwise walking, or only turning about, provided it be not for the sake of that which happens, but for some other intention. Hence it is, that some of the ancients have declared Fortune to be a cause unknown, that cannot be foreseen by the human reason. But according to the Platonics, who have approached yet nearer to the true reason of it, it is thus defined: Fortune is a cause by accident, in those things which are done for some end, and which are of our election. And afterwards they add, that it is unforeseen and unknown to the human reason; although that which is rare and strange appears also by the same means to be in this kind of cause by accident. But what this is, if it is not sufficiently evidenced by the oppositions and disputations made against it, will at least most clearly be seen by what is written in Plato’s Phaedo, where you will find these words: PHAED. Have you not heard how and in what manner the judgment passed? ECH. Yes indeed; for there came one and told us of it. At which we wondered very much that, the judgment having been given long before, it seems that he died a great while after. And what, Phaedo, might be the cause of it? PHAED. It was a fortune which happened to him, Echecrates. For it chanced that, the day before the judgment, the stern of the galley which the Athenians send every year to the isle of Delos was crowned. In which discourse it is to be observed, that the expression happened to him is not simply to be understood by was done or came to pass, but it much rather regards what befell him through the concurrence of many causes together, one being done with regard to another. For the priest crowned the ship and adorned it with garlands for another end and intention, and not for the sake of Socrates; and the judges also had for some other cause condemned him. But the event was strange, and of such a nature that it might seem to have been effected by the providence of some human creature, or rather of some superior powers. And so much may suffice to show with what Fortune must of necessity subsist, and that there must be first some subject of such things as are in our free will: its effect is, moreover, like itself called Fortune. But chance or casual adventure is of a larger extent than Fortune; which it comprehends, and also several other things which may of their own nature happen sometimes one way, sometimes another. And this, as it appears by the derivation of its name, which is in Greek αὐτόματον, chance, is that which happens of itself, when that which is ordinary happens not, but another thing in its place; such as cold in the dog-days seems to be; for it is sometimes then cold.... Once for all, as “that which is in our power” is a part of the contingent, so Fortune is a part of chance or casual adventure; and both the two events are conjoined and dependent on the one and the other, to wit, chance on contingent, and Fortune on “that which is in our power,” — and yet not on all, but on what is in our election, as we have already said. Wherefore chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those which are animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man only, who has his actions voluntary. And an argument of this is, that to be fortunate and to be happy are thought to be one and the same thing. Now happiness is a certain well-doing, and well-doing is proper only to man, and to him perfect.

> Greek: 7. περὶ δὲ τῆς; τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, νῦν ἡμῖν λεκτέον. αἴτιον μὲν δή τι ἡ τύχη. τῶν δʼ αἰτίων τὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον οἰκίας ἢ νεὼς καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικὸν καὶ τὸ ναυπηγικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ γεωμετρικόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ ἢ ναυπηγικῷ εἴδει συμβεβήκῃ, εἴτε κατὰ σῶμα εἴτε κατὰ ψυχὴν εἴτε κατὰ τὰ ἐκτός. ὅθεν καὶ δῆλον, ὡς τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὡρισμένον καὶ ἕν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐχ ἕν τε καὶ ἀόριστον πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει παντάπασιν ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα. τὸ μέντοι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γίγνηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ προαίρεσις, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης προσαγορεύεται· οἷον τὸ εὑρεῖν χρυσίον σκάπτονθʼ ἵνα φυτεύσῃ, ἢ παθεῖν τι ἢ δρᾶσαι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος φεύγοντʼ ἢ διώκοντʼ ἢ ἄλλως βαδίζοντʼ ἢ αὐτὸ μόνον ἐπιστραφέντʼ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅπερ συνέπεσεν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρου τινὸς χάριν. διὸ καὶ ἀπρονόητον αἰτίαν καὶ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ τὴν τύχην ἀπέδοσαν· τῶν παλαιῶν ἔνιοι. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔγγιον ἔτι προσιόντας αὐτῇ τῷ λόγῳ, οὕτως ἀφώρισται ἡ τύχη, αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῶν ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔπειτʼ ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἀπρονόητον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ προστιθέασι· καίτοι γε κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ τὸ σπάνιον καὶ παράλογον ἐμφαίνεται τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἄρτι ῥηθέντων, ἀλλʼ ἔκ γε τῶν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένων, σαφέστατα προσπίπτει. γέγραπται δʼ ὧδε· οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἆρα ἐπύθοντο ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο; ναί· ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις· καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης; αὐτῆς ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών τί ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων; τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ συνέβη οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ γέγονεν ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτίων ἀπέβη, ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἱερεὺς ἔστεφε τὸ πλοῖον ἄλλου χάριν ἀλλʼ οὐ Σωκράτους· οἱ δὲ διʼ ἕτερον κατεψηφίσαντʼ αὐτοῦ· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀποβὰν παράλογον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη, οἷον κἂν ἐκ προνοίας ἐγεγόνει ἤτοι ἀνθρωπίνου τινὸς ἢ τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τύχης; ταῦθʼ ἱκανὰ … ὡς συνυφίστασθαι ἀνάγκη, τὸ μὲν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ παρωνύμως; καὶ τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋποκεῖσθαι ἐλέχθη. τὸ δʼ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῆς τύχης· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν περιλαβὸν ἔχει καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως συμπίπτειν πεφυκότων. ἔστι δὲ κατʼ ὄνομα, ὅπερ αὐτόματον λέγεται τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ ἐκεῖνο παρʼ … ἐπεφύκει· οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ ὑπὸ κύνα ψῦχος. ποτὲ γὰρ ψῦχος οὐ μάτην, οὐδὲ … τὸ δʼ ὅλον, ὡς τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μέρος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, οὕτως ἡ τύχη τοῦ αὐτομάτου. ἔστι δʼ ἑκατέρου ἑκατέρου σύμπτωμα, τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου· ἡ δὲ τύχη τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, καὶ τούτου οὐχ ἅπαντος, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἂν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ᾖ, ὡς προείρηται. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον κοινὸν ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ἀψύχων· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἤδη πράττειν δυναμένου. τεκμήριον δέ, ὅτι τὸ εὐτυχεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ταὐτὰ εἶναι δοξάζεται· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία τις ἡ δʼ εὐπραξία περὶ μόνον καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον.

[¶8] 8. These then are the things which are comprised in Fate, to wit, contingent, possible, election, “that which is in our power,” Fortune, chance, and their adjuncts, as are the things signified by the words perhaps and peradventure; all which indeed are contained in Fate, yet none of them is fatal. It now remains, that we discourse of divine Providence, and show how it comprehends even Fate itself.

> Greek: 8. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς εἱμαρμένης; τοιαῦτα, τὸ τʼ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ δυνατόν, ἥ τε προαίρεσις καὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, ἥ τε τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον, τά τε παρακείμενʼ αὐτοῖς ὧν καὶ τὸ τάχα καὶ τὸ ἴσως· ἃ δὴ πάντα περιέχει μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐδὲν δʼ αὐτῶν ἐστι καθʼ εἱμαρμένην. λοιπὸν δʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ προνοίας εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτή γε περιείληφε τὴν εἱμαρμένην.

[¶9] 9. The supreme therefore and first Providence is the understanding or (if you had rather) the will of the first and sovereign God, doing good to every thing that is in the world, by which all divine things have universally and throughout been most excellently and most wisely ordained and disposed. The second Providence is that of the second Gods, who go through the heaven, by which temporal and mortal things are orderly and regularly generated, and which pertains to the continuation and preservation of every kind. The third may probably be called the Providence and procuration of the Daemons, which, being placed on the earth, are the guardians and overseers of human actions. This threefold Providence therefore being seen, of which the first and supreme is chiefly and principally so named, we shall not be afraid to say, although we may in this seem to contradict the sentiments of some philosophers, that all things are done by Fate and by Providence, but not also by Nature. But some are done according to Providence, — these according to one, those according to another, — and some according to Fate; and Fate is altogether according to Providence, while Providence is in no wise according to Fate. But let this discourse be understood of the first and supreme Providence. Now that which is done according to another, whatever it is, is always posterior to that according to which it is done; as that which is according to the law is after the law, and that which is according to Nature is after Nature, so that which is according to Fate is after Fate, and must consequently be more new and modern. Wherefore supreme Providence is the most ancient of all things, except him whose will or understanding it is, to wit, the sovereign author, maker, and father of all things. “Let us therefore,” says Timaeus, “discourse for what cause the Creator made and framed this machine of the universe. He was good, and in him that is good there can never be imprinted or engendered any envy against any thing. Being therefore wholly free from this, he desired that all things should, as far as it is possible, resemble himself. He therefore, who admits this to have been chiefly the principal original of the generation and creation of the world, as it has been delivered to us by wise men, receives that which is most right. For God, who desired that all things should be good, and nothing, as far as possibly might be, evil, taking thus all that was visible, — restless as it was, and moving rashly and confusedly, — reduced it from disorder to order, esteeming the one to be altogether better than the other. For it neither was nor is convenient for him who is in all perfection good, to make any thing that should not be very excellent and beautiful.” This, therefore, and all that follows, even to his disputation concerning human souls, is to be understood of the first Providence, which in the beginning constituted all things. Afterwards he speaks thus: “Having framed the universe, he ordained souls equal in number to the stars, and distributed to each of them one; and having set them, as it were, in a chariot, showed the nature of the universe, and appointed them the laws of Fate.” Who then will not believe, that by these words he expressly and manifestly declares Fate to be, as it were, a foundation and political constitution of laws, fitted for the souls of men? Of which he afterwards renders the cause. As for the second Providence, he thus in a manner explains it, saying: “Having prescribed them all these laws, to the end that, if there should afterwards happen any fault, he might be exempt from being the cause of any of their evil, he dispersed some of them upon the earth, some into the moon, and some into the other instruments of time. And after this dispersion, he gave in charge to the young Gods the making of human bodies, and the making up and adding whatever was wanting and deficient in human souls; and after they had perfected whatever is adherent and consequent to this, they should rule and govern, in the best manner they possibly could, this mortal creature, so far as it should not be the cause of its own evils.” For by these words, “that he might be exempt from being the cause of any of their evil,” he most clearly signifies the cause of Fate; and the order and office of the young Gods manifests the second Providence; and it seems also in some sort to have touched a little upon the third, if he therefore established laws and ordinances that he might be exempt from being the cause of any of their evil. For God, who is free from all evil, has no need of laws or Fate; but every one of these petty Gods, drawn on by the providence of him who has engendered them, performs what belongs to his office. Now that this is true and agreeable to the opinion of Plato, these words of the lawgiver, spoken by him in his Book of Laws, seems to me to give sufficient testimony: “If there were any man so sufficient by Nature, being by divine Fortune happily engendered and born, that he could comprehend this, he would have no need of laws to command him. For there is not any law or ordinance more worthy and powerful than knowledge; nor is it fitting that Mind, provided it be truly and really free by Nature, should be a subject or slave to any one, but it ought to command all.”

> Greek: 9. ἔστιν οὖν πρόνοια ἡ μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτη τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ νόησις, εἴτε καὶ βούλησις οὖσα εὐεργέτις ἁπάντων, καθʼ ἣν πρώτως ἕκαστα τῶν θείων διὰ παντὸς ἄριστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κεκόσμηται. ἡ δὲ δευτέρα δευτέρων θεῶν τῶν κατʼ οὐρανὸν ἰόντων, καθʼ ἣν τά τε θνητὰ γίγνεται τεταγμένως καὶ ὅσα πρὸς διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἑκάστων τῶν γενῶν. τρίτη δʼ ἂν εἰκότι ῥηθείη πρόνοιά τε καὶ προμήθεια τῶν ὅσοι περὶ γῆν δαίμονες τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πράξεων φύλακές τε καὶ ἐπίσκοποί εἰσι. τριττῆς τοίνυν τῆς προνοίας θεωρουμένης, κυριώτατα δὲ καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πρώτης λεγομένης, οὐκ ἂν ὀκνήσαιμεν εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ φιλοσόφοις ἀνδράσι τἀναντία λέγειν δόξαιμεν, ὡς πάντα μὲν καθʼ εἱμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὐ μὴν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἀλλʼ ἔνια μὲν κατὰ πρόνοιαν καὶ ἄλλα γε κατʼ ἄλλην, ἔνια δὲ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην· καὶ ἡ μὲν εἱμαρμένη πάντως κατὰ πρόνοιαν, ἡ δὲ πρόνοια οὐδαμῶς καθʼ εἱμαρμένην. ἔστω δʼ ὁ λόγος τὰ νῦν περὶ τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀνωτάτω. τὸ μὲν κατά τι ὕστερον ἐκείνου, καθʼ ὃ τι ἂν καὶ λέγηται· οἷον τὸ κατὰ νόμον τοῦ νόμου, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς φύσεως· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην τῆς εἱμαρμένης νεώτερον ἂν εἴη. ἡ δʼ ἀνωτάτω πρόνοια πρεσβύτατον ἁπάντων, πλὴν οὗπέρ ἐστιν εἴτε βούλησις εἴτε νόησις εἴτε καὶ ἑκάτερον. ἔστι δʼ, ὡς πρότερον εἴρηται τοῦ πάντων πατρός τε καὶ δημιουργοῦ. λέγωμεν γὰρ δή φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος διʼ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν· ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δʼ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. ταύτην δὴ ιδεμγενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρʼ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατʼ ἀποδέχοιτʼ ἄν. βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φαῦλον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβών, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἦγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τοῦδε πάντως ἄμεινον. θέμις δὲ οὔτʼ ἦν οὔτʼ ἔστι τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα μέχρι ψυχῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κατὰ πρόνοιαν νομιστέον τήν γε πρώτην συνεστηκέναι· τὰ δʼ ἐντεῦθεν οὕτω λεγόμενα ξυστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις ἔταξε, … διεῖλέ τε ψυχὰς ἑκάστην πρὸς ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐμβιβάσας ὡς εἰς ὄχημα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε, νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς· ταῦτα τίς οὐκ ἂν διαρρήδην καὶ σαφέστατʼ οἰηθείη τὴν εἱμαρμένην δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ τινὰ βάσιν καὶ πολιτικὴν νομοθεσίαν ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς προσήκουσαν, ἧς δὴ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἑξῆς ἐπιφέρει; τὴν δὲ δευτέραν πρόνοιαν ὧδέ πως ἐπισημαίνεται λέγων διαθεσμοθετήσας πάντα αὐτοῖς, ἵνα τοῖς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος, ἔσπειρε τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὴν γῆν, τοὺς δʼ εἰς τὴν σελήνην, τοὺς δʼ εἰς τἄλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸν σπόρον τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, τὸ τʼ ἐπίλοιπον, ὅσον ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δέον προσγενέσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πάνθʼ ὅσα ἀκόλουθα ἐκείνοις ἀπεργασαμένους ἄρχειν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῷον, ὅ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἵνα τοῖς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἀναίτιος ἑκάστῳ σαφεστάτην αἰτίαν σημαίνει τῆς εἱμαρμένης· ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων θεῶν τάξις καὶ δημιουργία τὴν δευτέραν πρόνοιαν δηλοῖ· καί πως καὶ τρίτης παρεφάπτεσθαι ἔοικεν, εἴ γε δὴ τούτου χάριν ἡ θεσμοθεσία, ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστῳ ἀναίτιος· θεὸς δὲ κακίας ἄμοιρος οὔτε νόμων οὔθʼ εἱμαρμένης; ἐπιδέοιτʼ ἄν, ἀλλὰ τῇ προνοίᾳ τοῦ γεννήσαντος συνεπισπώμενος ἕκαστος αὐτῶν πράττει τὰ αὑτοῦ· ταῦτα δʼ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀρέσκοντα τῷ Πλάτωνι φανερά μοι δοκεῖ μαρτύρια εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις οὕτω λεγόμενα· ἐπεὶ ταῦτα εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἱκανός, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθείς, παραλαβεῖν δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο αὑτοῦ ἀρξόντων· ἐπιστήμης γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶ νοῦν οὐδενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, ἐάνπερ ἀληθινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ᾖ κατὰ φύσιν.

[¶10] 10. I therefore do for mine own part thus understand and interpret this sentence of Plato. There being a threefold Providence, the first, as having engendered Fate, does in some sort comprehend it; the second, having been engendered with Fate, is with it totally comprehended and embraced by the first; the third, as having been engendered after Fate, is comprehended by it in the same manner as are free will and Fortune, as we have already said. “For they whom the assistance of a Daemon’s power does aid in their intercourse with me” says Socrates, declaring to Theages what is the almost inevitable ordinance of Adrastea “are those whom you also mean; for they grow and come forward with speed.” In which words, what he says of a Daemon’s aiding some is to be ascribed to the third Providence, and the growing and coming forward with speed, to Fate. In brief, it is not obscure or doubtful but that this also is a kind of Fate. And perhaps it may be found much more probable that the second Providence is also comprehended under Fate, and indeed all things that are done; since Fate, as a substance, has been rightly divided by us into three parts, and the fable of the chain comprehends the revolutions of the heavens in the number and rank of those things which happen conditionally. But concerning these things I will not much contend, to wit, whether they should be called conditional, or rather conjoined with Fate, the precedent cause and commander of Fate being also fatal.

> Greek: 10. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρὸς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ταύτῃ τῇ παροιμίᾳ λαμβάνω. τριττῆς γὰρ οὔσης τῆς προνοίας, ἡ μὲν ἅτε γεννήσασα τὴν εἱμαρμένην τρόπον τινὰ αὐτὴν περιλαμβάνει· ἡ δὲ συγγεννηθεῖσα τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ πάντως αὐτῇ συμπεριλαμβάνεται ἡ δʼ ὡς ὕστερον τῆς εἱμαρμένης γενομένη κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὴ ἐμπεριέχεται ὑπʼ αὐτῆς, καθʼ ἃ καὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ τύχη εἴρηται. οἷς γὰρ ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις ὥς φησι Σωκράτης μονονουχὶ θεσμόν τινα καὶ τοιοῦτον Ἀδραστείας διεξιὼν πρὸς τὸν Θεάγην οὗτοί εἰσιν, ὧν καὶ σὺ ᾔσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν συλλαμβάνειν τισὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον κατὰ τὴν τρίτην πρόνοιαν ἀναθετέον, τὸ δὲ ταχὺ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόναι καθʼ εἱμαρμένην, τὸ δʼ ὅλον οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦθʼ εἱμαρμένη τίς ἐστιν. τάχα δʼ ἂν οὕτω πολὺ πιθανώτερον δόξειε καὶ τὴν δευτέραν πρόνοιαν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιέχεσθαι καὶ πάνθʼ ἁπλῶς τὰ γιγνόμενα· εἴ γε καὶ ἡ κατʼ οὐσίαν εἱμαρμένη ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν εἰς τὰς τρεῖς μοίρας διανενέμηται, καὶ ὁ τῆς ἁλύσεως λόγος τὰς περὶ οὐρανὸν περιόδους τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀποβαίνουσι συγκαταλέγει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγʼ ἐπὶ πλέον διενεχθείην πρότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λεγόμενα, ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον σὺν εἱμαρμένῃ προκατάρχοντος αὐτῆς τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἱμαρμένου.

[¶11] 11. Our opinion then, to speak compendiously, is such. But the contrary sentiment does not only include all things in Fate, but affirms them all to be done by and according to Fate. It accords indeed in all things to the other (the Stoic) doctrine; and that which accords to it,’tis clear, is the same thing with it. In this discourse therefore we have first spoken of the contingent; secondly, of “that which is in our power;” thirdly, of Fortune and chance, and whatever depends on them; fourthly, of praise, blame, and whatever depends on them; the fifth and last of all may be said to be prayers to the Gods, with their services and ceremonies. For the rest, as to those which are called idle and reaping arguments, and that which is named the argument against destiny, they are indeed but vain subtleties and captious sophisms, according to this discourse. But according to the contrary opinion, the first and principal conclusion seems to be, that there is nothing done without a cause, but that all things depend upon antecedent causes; the second, that the world is governed by Nature, and that it conspires, consents, and is compatible with itself; the third seems rather to be testimonies, — of which the first is divination, approved by all sorts of people, as being truly in God; the second is the equanimity and patience of wise men, who take mildly and bear patiently whatever befalls, as happening by divine ordinance and as it ought; the third is the speech so common and usual in every one’s mouth, to wit, that every proposition is true or false. Thus have we contracted this discourse into a small number of short articles, that we might in few words comprehend the whole matter of Fate; into which a scrutiny ought to be made, and the reasons of both opinions to be weighed with a most exact balance. But we shall hereafter come to discuss particulars.

> Greek: 11. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερος λόγος, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων εἰπεῖν, τοιοῦτός τις ἂν εἴη· ὁ δὲ τούτων ἐναντίος οὐ μόνον ἐν εἱμαρμένῃ ἀλλὰ καὶ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην πάντα τίθεται. πάντα δὲ θατέρῳ συνᾴδει· τὰ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ συνῳδὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ θάτερον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τόνδε τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν δεύτερον· καὶ τρίτον ἥ τε τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ὅσα κατʼ αὐτά· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος καὶ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ τέταρτα πέμπτον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εὐχαὶ θεῶν καὶ θεραπεῖαι λεγέσθω· ἀργοὶ δὲ καὶ θερίζοντες λόγοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὀνομαζόμενος σοφίσμαθʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τυγχάνει ὄντα. κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε, τὸ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον σύμπνουν καὶ συμπαθῆ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὄντα· τρίτον δέ, ἃ πρὸς τούτοις μαρτύρια μᾶλλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, μαντικὴ μὲν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδόκιμος ὡς ἀληθῶς θεῶν ὑπάρχουσα· ἡ δὲ τῶν σοφῶν πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα εὐαρέστησις, ὡς πάντα κατὰ μοῖραν γιγνόμενα δευτέρα. τρίτον δὲ τὸ πολυθρύλητον τοῦτο, ὅτι πᾶν ἀξίωμα ἢ ἀληθές ἐστιν ἢ ψευδές. τούτων γε μὴν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐμνήσθημεν, ἵνα ὡς ἐπὶ βραχὺ τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κεφάλαια δηλωθείη ἃ χρὴ διερευνήσασθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβῆ βάσανον ἑκατέρου τῶν λόγων, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐσαῦθις μέτιμεν.