1.1. At daybreak the new emperor went forth to the Capitol and sacrificed; then, having ordered Marius Celsus to be brought to him, he greeted that officer, conversed with him kindly, and urged him to forget the cause of his imprisonment rather than to remember his release. Celsus replied in a manner that was neither ignoble nor ungrateful, saying that the very charge made against him afforded proof of his character, for the charge was that he had been loyal to Galba, from whom he had received no special favours. Both speakers were admired by those who were present, and the soldiery gave their approval.
1.1. ὁ δὲ νεώτερος αὐτοκράτωρ ἅμʼ ἡμέρᾳ προελθὼν εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἔθυσε· καὶ κελεύσας Μάριον Κέλσον ἀχθῆναι πρὸς αὑτὸν ἠσπάσατο καὶ διελέχθη φιλανθρώπως, καὶ παρεκάλεσε τῆς αἰτίας ἐπιλαθέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἀφέσεως μνημονεύειν. τοῦ δὲ Κέλσου μήτε ἀγεννῶς ἀποκριναμένου μήτʼ ἀναισθήτως, ἀλλά φήσαντος αὐτὸ τοῦ τρόπου διδόναι τὸ ἔγκλημα πίστιν, ἐγκεκλῆσθαι γὰρ ὅτι Γάλβᾳ βέβαιον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχεν, ᾧ χάριν οὐδεμίαν ὤφειλεν, ἠγάσθησαν οἱ παρόντες ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸ στρατιωτικὸν ἐπῄνεσεν.
1.2. In the senate Otho spoke at length in a kindly strain and like a popular leader. For part of the time during which he himself was to have been consul, he assigned the office to Verginius Rufus, and all those who had been designated as future consuls by Nero or Galba he confirmed in their appointment. To the priesthoods he promoted those who were preeminent in age or reputation.
1.2. ἐν δὲ συγκλήτῳ πολλὰ δημοτικὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα διαλεχθείς, ὃν μὲν αὐτὸς ὑπατεύειν χρόνον ἤμελλε, τούτου μέρος ἔνειμεν Οὐεργινίῳ Ῥούφῳ, τοῖς δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένοις ὑπὸ Νέρωνος ἢ Γάλβα πᾶσιν ἐτήρησε τὰς ὑπατείας. ἱερωσύναις δὲ τοὺς καθʼ ἡλικίαν προήκοντας ἢ δόξαν ἐκόσμησε.
1.3. Moreover, to all the men of senatorial rank who had been exiled under Nero and restored under Galba, he restored whatever portions of each man’s property he found to be unsold. Wherefore the citizens of highest birth and greatest influence, who before this had felt a shuddering fear that it was not a man, but some genius of retribution or avenging spirit, that had suddenly fallen upon the state, became more cheerful in their hopes for a government which wore a face so smiling.
1.3. τοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ Νέρωνος φυγοῦσι καὶ κατελθοῦσιν ἐπὶ Γάλβα συγκλητικοῖς πᾶσιν ἀπέδωκεν ὅσα μὴ πεπραμένα τῶν κτημάτων ἑκάστου ἐξεύρισκεν. ὅθεν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ κράτιστοι πεφρικότες πρότερον ὡς οὐκ ἀνδρός, ἀλλά τινος ἢ Ποινῆς ἢ παλαμναίου δαίμονος ἄφνω τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιπεπτωκότος, ἡδίους ἐγένοντο ταῖς ἐλπίσι πρὸς τὴν ἠγεμονίαν ὥσπερ διαμειδιῶσαν.
2.1. But nothing so gladdened all Romans alike, and won their allegiance to the new emperor so much, as his treatment of Tigellinus. Men were not aware that Tigellinus was already punished by his very fear of that punishment which the city was demanding as a debt due to the public, and also by incurable bodily diseases; and besides, there were those unhallowed and unspeakable grovellings of his among the vilest harlots, for which his lustful nature still panted, clutching after them as his life painfully ebbed away; these were looked upon by reasonable men as extremest punishment and an equivalent of many deaths.
2.1. ὁμοῦ δὲ Ῥωμαίους πάντας οὐδὲν εὔφρανεν οὕτως οὐδὲ ᾠκειώσατο πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς τὰ περὶ Τιγελλῖνον. ἐλελήθει μὲν γὰρ ἤδη κολαζόμενος αὐτῷ τῷ φόβῳ τῆς κολάσεως ἣν ὡς χρέος ἀπῄτει δημόσιον ἡ πόλις, καὶ νοσήμασιν ἀνηκέστοις σώματος, αὐτάς τε τὰς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀρρήτους ἐν γυναιξὶ πόρναις καὶ ἀκαθάρτοις ἐγκυλινδήσεις, αἷς ἔτι προσέσπαιρε δυσθανατοῦντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀκόλαστον ἐπιδραττόμενον, ἐσχάτην τιμωρίαν ἐποιοῦντο καὶ πολλῶν ἀντάξια θανάτων οἱ σωφρονοῦντες.
2.2. Nevertheless it vexed the common people that he should see the light of day after so many good men had been robbed of that light by him.
2.2. ἠνία δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ὅμως τόν ἥλιον ὁρῶν μετὰ τοσούτους καὶ τοιούτους διʼ αὐτὸν οὐχ ὁρῶντας.
2.3. Accordingly, Otho sent a messenger to fetch him from his country estate at Sinuessa; for he was staying there, where vessels lay at anchor, that he might fly to more distant parts. He tried to bribe the messenger with a large sum of money to let him go, but failing in this, he made him gifts nevertheless, and begged him to wait till he had shaved; and taking the razor he cut his own throat.
2.3. ἔπεμψεν οὖν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ὁ Ὄθων εἰς τοὺς περὶ Σινόεσσαν ἀγρούς· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διῃτᾶτο, πλοίων παρορμούντων, ὡς φευξόμενος ἀπωτέρω. καὶ τόν γε πεμφθέντα χρυσίῳ πολλῷ πείθειν ἐπεχείρησε παρεῖναι· μὴ πεισθέντι δὲ δῶρα μὲν ἔδωκεν οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἐδεήθη δὲ ὑπομεῖναι ἕως ἂν ἀποξύρηται τό γένειον· καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλαιμοτόμησεν.
3.1. And now that the emperor had given the people this most righteous gratification, he did not remember his own private grievances against any man soever, and in his desire to please the multitude did not refuse at first to be hailed in the theatres by the name of Nero, and when statues of Nero were produced in public, he did not prevent it.
3.1. οὕτω δὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὴν δικαιοτάτην ἡδονὴν ἀποδοὺς ὁ Καῖσαρ, αὐτὸς ἰδίας ἔχθρας οὐδενὶ τοπαράπαν ἐμνησικάκησε, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς χαριζόμενος οὐκ ἔφευγε τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις Νέρων προσαγορεύεσθαι· καί τινων εἰκόνας Νέρωνος εἰς τοὐμφανὲς προθεμένων οὐκ ἐκώλυσε.
3.2. Moreover, Cluvius Rufus tells us that “diplomas,” such as couriers are provided with, were sent to Spain, in which the cognomen of Nero was added to the name of Otho. However, perceiving that the men of highest birth and greatest influence were displeased at this, Otho gave up the practice. But while he was placing his government on this basis, the paid soldiers began to make themselves troublesome by urging him not to trust the influential citizens, but to be on his guard against them and restrict their power. It is uncertain whether their goodwill led them to be really apprehensive for him, or whether they used this pretext for raising disturbance and war.
3.2. Κλούβιος δὲ Ῥοῦφος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν φησὶ κομισθῆναι διπλώματα, οἷς ἐκπέμπουσι τοὺς γραμματηφόρους, τὸ τοῦ Νέρωνος θετὸν ὄνομα προσγεγραμμένον ἔχοντα τῷ τοῦ Ὄθωνος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοὺς πρώτους καί κρατίστους αἰσθόμενος ἐπὶ τούτῳ δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπαύσατο. τοιαύτην δὲ τῆς ἡγεμονίας κατάστασιν αὐτῷ λαμβανούσης, οἱ μισθοφόροι χαλεποὺς παρεῖχον ἑαυτούς, ἀπιστεῖν παρακελευόμενοι καί φυλάττεσθαι καί κολούειν τοὺς ἀξιολόγους, εἴτʼ ἀληθῶς φοβούμενοι διʼ εὔνοιαν, εἴτε προφάσει χρώμενοι ταύτῃ τοῦ ταράττειν καί πολεμοποιεῖν.
3.3. And so, when the emperor sent Crispinus to bring back the seventeenth legion from Ostia, and while that officer was still getting the baggage together at night and loading the arms upon the waggons, the boldest of the soldiers all began to cry out that Crispinus was come on no good errand, and that the senate was attempting to bring about a revolution, and that the transportation of the arms was an act of hostility, not of service, to the emperor.
3.3. Κρισπῖνον δὲ πέμψαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἑπτακαιδεκάτην σπεῖραν Ὠστίας ἀπάξοντα, κἀκείνου νυκτὸς ἔτι συσκευαζομένου καί τὰ ὅπλα ταῖς ἁμάξαις ἐπιτιθέντος, οἱ θρασύτατοι πάντες ἐβόων οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τὸν Κρισπῖνον ἥκειν διανοούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὴν σύγκλητον ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι νεωτέροις, καὶ τὰ ὅπλα κατὰ Καίσαρος, οὐ Καίσαρι παρακομίζεσθαι.
3.4. The notion prevailed with great numbers and exasperated them; some attacked the waggons, others killed two centurions who opposed them, as well as Crispinus himself; and then the whole body, putting themselves in array and exhorting one another to go to the help of the emperor, marched to Rome. Here, learning that eighty senators were at supper with Otho, they rushed to the palace, declaring that now was a good time to take off all the emperor’s enemies at one stroke.
3.4. τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλῶν ἁπτομένου καί παροξύνοντος, οἱ μὲν ἐπελαμβάνοντο τῶν ἁμαξῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐνισταμένους ἑκατοντάρχας δύο καί τὸν Κρισπῖνον αὐτὸν ἀπέκτειναν, πάντες δὲ διασκευασάμενοι καί παρακαλέσαντες ἀλλήλους Καίσαρι βοηθεῖν ἤλαυνον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καί πυθόμενοι παρʼ αὐτῷ δειπνεῖν ὀγδοήκοντα συγκλητικούς, ἐφέροντο πρὸς τὰ βασίλεια, νῦν καιρὸν εἶναι λέγοντες ἐν ταὐτῷ πάντας ἀνελεῖν τοὺς Καίσαρος πολεμίους.
3.5. Accordingly, the city was in great commotion, expecting to be plundered at once; in the palace there were runnings to and fro; and a dire perplexity fell upon Otho. For while he had fears about the safety of his guests, he himself was an object of fear to them, and he saw that they kept their eyes fixed upon him in speechless terror, some of them having even brought their wives with them to the supper.
3.5. ἡ μὲν οὖν πόλις ὡς αὐτίκα διαρπαγησομένη θόρυβον εἶχε πολύν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς βασιλείοις ἦσαν διαδρομαί, καί τὸν Ὄθων α δεινὴ κατελάμβανεν ἀπορία. φοβούμενος γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτὸς ἦν φοβερὸς ἐκείνοις, καί πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀνηρτημένους ἑώρα ταῖς ὄψεσιν ἀναύδους καί περιδεεῖς, ἐνίους καί μετὰ γυναικῶν ἥκοντας ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον.
3.6. But he sent the prefects of the guard with orders to explain matters to the soldiers and appease them, while at the same time he dismissed his guests by another door; and they barely succeeded in making their escape as the soldiers, forcing their way through the guards into the great hall, asked what was become of the enemies of Caesar.
3.6. ἅμα δὲ τοὺς ἐπάρχους ἀπέστελλε τοῖς στρατιώταις διαλέγεσθαι καί πραΰνειν κελεύσας, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς κεκλημένους ἄνδρας ἀναστήσας καθʼ ἑτέρας θύρας ἀφῆκε· καί μικρὸν ἔφθησαν ὑπεκφυγόντες, διὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων ὠθουμένων εἰς τὸν ἀνδρῶνα καί πυνθανομένων τί γεγόνασιν οἱ Καίσαρος πολέμιοι.
3.7. In this crisis, then, Otho stood up on his couch, and after many exhortations, and entreaties, and not without plentiful tears, at last succeeded in sending them away; but on the following day, after making a gift of twelve hundred and fifty drachmas to every man, he went into the camp.
3.7. τότε μὲν οὖν ὀρθὸς ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης πολλὰ παρηγορήσας καί δεηθεὶς καί μηδὲ δακρύων φεισάμενος μόλις ἀπέπεμψεν αὐτούς· τῇ δʼ ὑστεραίᾳ δωρησάμενος ἅπαντας κατʼ ἄνδρα χιλίαις καί διακοσίαις καί πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καί τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἐπῄνεσεν, ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνουν καί πρόθυμον, ὀλίγους δέ τινας οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ φήσας ὑποικουρεῖν, διαβάλλοντας αὐτοῦ τὴν μετριότητα καί τὴν ἐκείνων εὐστάθειαν, ἠξίου συναγανακτεῖν καί συγκολάζειν.
3.8. There he commended the great body of the soldiers for their goodwill and zeal in his service, but said that there were a few of them who were intriguing to no good purpose, thereby bringing his moderation and their fidelity into disrepute, and he demanded that they share his resentment against these and assist him in punishing them. All his hearers approving of this and bidding him to do as he wished, he took two men only, at whose punishment no one was likely to be distressed, and went away. Those who were already fond of Otho and put confidence in him admired this change in his behaviour, but others thought it a policy forced upon him by the situation, wherein he courted popular favour because of the war. For already there were sure tidings that Vitellius had assumed the dignity and power of emperor; and swift couriers were continually coming with accounts of ever new accessions to him, although others made it clear that the armies in Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Mysia, with their leaders, adhered to Otho.
3.8. ἐπαινούντων δὲ πάντων καί κελευόντων, δύο μόνους παραλαβών, οἷς οὐδεὶς ἔμελλεν ἄχθεσθαι κολασθεῖσιν, ἀπηλλάγη. ταῦτα οἱ μὲν ἀγαπῶντες ἤδη καὶ πιστεύοντες ἐθαύμαζον τὴν μεταβολήν, οἱ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα πολιτεύματα πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἡγοῦντο, δημαγωγοῦντος αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον. ἤδη γὰρ ἠγγέλλετο βεβαίως Οὐϊτέλλιος ἀξίωμα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοκράτορος ἀνειληφώς· καὶ πτεροφόροι συνεχῶς ἐφοίτων ἀεί τι προσχωρεῖν ἐκείνῳ φράζοντες, ἕτεροι δὲ τὰ Παννονικὰ καὶ τὰ Δαλματικὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ Μυσίαν στρατεύματα δηλοῦντες ᾑρῆσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων Ὄθωνα.
4.2. And quickly there came also friendly letters from Mucianus and Vespasian, who were at the head of large forces, the one in Syria, the other in Judaea. Otho was elated by these, and wrote to Vitellius advising him not to have more than a soldier’s ambitions, in which case he should be rewarded with a large sum of money, and a city, where he could live in the utmost ease and pleasure and be undisturbed.
4.2. ταχὺ δὲ ἀφίκετο καὶ παρὰ Μουκιανοῦ γράμματα καὶ παρὰ Οὐεσπεσιανοῦ φίλια, τοῦ μὲν ἐν Συρίᾳ, τοῦ δὲ ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳμεγάλας δυνάμεις ἐχόντων, ὑφʼ ὧν ἐπαιρόμενος ἔγραψεν Οὐϊτελλίῳ παραινῶν στρατιωτικὰ φρονεῖν, ὡς χρήματα πολλὰ δώσοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ βιώσεται ῥᾷστον καὶ ἥδιστον βίον μεθʼ ἡσυχίας.
4.3. Vitellius also wrote to Otho in reply, at first in a somewhat dissembling manner; but afterwards both got excited and wrote one another abusive letters filled with shameful insults; not that either brought false charges, but it was foolish and ridiculous for one to storm the other with reproaches applicable to both. For as regards prodigality, effeminacy, inexperience in war, and multiplicity of debts incurred in a previous state of poverty, it were hard to say which of them had the advantage.
4.3. ἀντέγραψε δὲ κἀκεῖνος αὐτῷ κατειρωνευόμενος ἡσυχῆ πρῶτον ἐκ δὲ τούτου διερεθιζόμενοι πολλὰ βλάσφημα καὶ ἀσελγῆ χλευάζοντες ἀλλήλοις ἔγραφον, οὐ ψευδῶς μέν, ἀνοήτως δὲ καὶ γελοίως θατέρου τὸν ἕτερον ἃ προσῆν ἀμφοτέροις ὀνείδη λοιδοροῦντος. ἀσωτίας γὰρ καὶ μαλακίας καὶ ἀπειρίας πολέμων καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πενίᾳ χρεῶν πλήθους ἔργον ἦν εἰπεῖν ὁποτέρῳ μεῖον αὐτῶν μέτεστι.
4.4. There were many reports of signs and apparitions, most of which were of uncertain and dubious origin; but everybody saw that a Victory standing in a chariot on the Capitol had dropped the reins from her hands, as if she had not power to hold them, and that the statue of Caius Caesar on the island in the Tiber, without the occurrence of earthquake or wind, had turned from west to east, which is said to have happened during the time when Vespasian was at last openly trying to seize the supreme power.
4.4. σημείων δὲ καὶ φαντασμάτων πολλῶν λεγομένων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φήμας ἀδεσπότους καὶ ἀμφιβόλους εἶχεν, ἐν δὲ Καπιτωλίῳ Νίκης ἐφεστώσης ἅρματι τὰς ἡνίας πάντες εἶδον ἀφειμένας ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν, ὥσπερ κρατεῖν μὴ δυναμένης, καὶ τὸν ἐν μεσοποταμίᾳ νήσῳ Γαΐου Καίσαρος ἀνδριάντα μήτε σεισμοῦ γεγονότος μήτε πνεύματος ἀφʼ ἑσπέρας μεταστραφέντα πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς·
4.5. The behaviour of the Tiber, too, was regarded by most people as a baleful sign. It was a time, to be sure, when rivers are at their fullest, but the Tiber had never before risen so high, nor caused so great ruin and destruction. It overflowed its banks and submerged a great part of the city, and especially the grain-market, so that dire scarcity of food prevailed for many days together.
4.5. ὅ φασι συμβῆναι περὶ τὰς ἡμέρας ἐκείνας ἐν αἷς οἱ περὶ Οὐεσπεσιανὸν ἐμφανῶς ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντελαμβάνοντο. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸν Θύμβριν δὲ σύμπτωμα σημεῖον ἐποιοῦντο οἱ πολλοὶ μοχθηρόν. ἦν μὲν γὰρ ὥρα περὶ ἣν μάλιστα οἱ ποταμοὶ πλήθουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὔπω τοσοῦτος ἤρθη πρότερον, οὐδὲ ἀπώλεσε τοσαῦτα καὶ διέφθειρεν, ὑπερχυθεὶς καὶ κατακλύσας πολὺ μέρος τῆς πόλεως, πλεῖστον δὲ ἐν ᾧ τὸν ἐπὶ πράσει διαπωλοῦσι σῖτον, ὡς δεινὴν ἀπορίαν ἡμερῶν συχνῶν κατασχεῖν.
5.1. And now, when word was brought to Rome that Caecina and Valens, who were in command with Vitellius, were in possession of the Alps, Dolabella, a man of noble family, was suspected by the praetorian soldiers of revolutionary designs. Otho therefore sent him away (through fear of him or of someone else) to the town of Aquinum, with words of encouragement. And in his selection of the men in authority who were to accompany him on his expedition he included also Lucius, the brother of Vitellius, without either increasing or diminishing his honours.
5.1. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς Ἄλπεις κατέχοντες ἤδη προσηγγέλλοντο Κεκίνας καὶ Οὐάλης Οὐϊτελλίῳ στρατηγοῦντες, ἐν Ῥώμῃ Δολοβέλλας, εὐπατρίδης ἀνήρ, ὑποψίαν παρεῖχε τοῖς μισθοφόροις νεώτερα φρονεῖν. ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὖν, εἴτε αὐτὸν εἴτε ἄλλον δεδοικώς, εἰς πόλιν Ἀκύνιον παρέπεμψε παραθαρρύνας. καταλέγων δὲ τῶν ἐν τέλει συνεκδήμους ἔταξεν ἐν τούτοις καὶ Λεύκιον τὸν Οὐϊτελλίου ἀδελφόν, οὔτε προσθεὶς οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀφελὼν ἧς εἶχε τιμῆς.
5.2. He also took strong measures for the safety of the wife and mother of Vitellius, that they might have no fear for themselves. Moreover, he appointed Flavius Sabinus, a brother of Vespasian, prefect of the city, either because in this way also he could honour the memory of Nero (for Nero had bestowed the office upon Sabinus, but Galba had deprived him of it), or rather because, by advancing Sabinus, he could show how he favoured and trusted Vespasian.
5.2. ἰσχυρῶς δὲ καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ἐπεμελήθη τοῦ Οὐϊτελλίου καὶ τῆς γυναικός, ὅπως μηδὲν φοβήσονται περὶ αὑτῶν, τῆς δὲ Ῥώμης φύλακα Φλαούιον Σαβῖνον, ἀδελφὸν Οὐεσπεσιανοῦ, κατέστησεν, εἴτε καὶ τοῦτο πράξας ἐπὶ τιμῇ Νέρωνος παρʼ ἐκείνου γὰρ εἰλήφει τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Σαβῖνος, ἀφείλετο δὲ Γάλβας αὐτόν, εἴτε μᾶλλον εὔνοιαν ἐνεδείκνυτο Οὐεσπεσιανῷ καὶ πίστιν αὔξων Σαβῖνον.
5.3. Well, then, Otho himself tarried behind at Brixillum, a town of Italy on the river Po, but sent his forces on under the command of Marius Celsus and Suetonius Paulinus, besides Gallus and Spurina. These were men of distinction, but were unable to conduct the campaign according to their own plans and wishes, owing to the disorderly and arrogant spirit of their soldiers.
5.3. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ἐν Βριξίλλῳ, πόλει τῆς Ἰταλίας περὶ τὸν Ἠριδανὸν ἀπελείφθη, στρατηγοὺς δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐξέπεμψε Μάριόν τε Κέλσον καὶ Σουητώνιον Παυλῖνον ἔτι τε Γάλλον καὶ Σπουρίναν, ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους, χρήσασθαι δὲ μὴ δυνηθέντας ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς προῃροῦντο τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λογισμοῖς διʼ ἀταξίαν καὶ θρασύτητα τῶν στρατιωτῶν.
5.4. For these would not deign to obey other officers, since, as they said, they had made the emperor their commander. It is true that the enemy’s troops also were not altogether in condition, nor under the control of their officers, but fierce and haughty, and for the same reason. Nevertheless, they were certainly experienced in fighting, and being accustomed to hard labour, they did not shun it;
5.4. οὐ γὰρ ἠξίουν ἑτέρων ἀκούειν, ὡς παρʼ αὑτῶν τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος τὸ ἄρχειν ἔχοντος. ἦν μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ὑγιαίνοντα παντάπασιν οὐδὲ χειροήθη τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, ἀλλʼ ἔμπληκτα καὶ σοβαρὰ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐκείνοις ἐμπειρία γε παρῆν τοῦ μάχεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνειν ἐθάδες ὄντες οὐκ ἔφευγον, οὗτοι δὲ μαλακοὶ μὲν ἦσαν ὑπὸ σχολῆς καὶ διαίτης ἀπολέμου, πλεῖστον χρόνον ἐν θεάτροις καὶ πανηγύρεσι καὶ παρὰ σκηνὴν βεβιωκότες, ὕβρει δὲ καὶ κόμπῳ ἐπαμπέχειν ἐβούλοντο, προσποιήσασθαι τὰς λειτουργίας ὡς κρείττονες ἀπαξιοῦντες, οὐχ ὡς ἀδύνατοι φέρειν.
5.5. whereas Otho’s men were soft, owing to their lack of employment and their unwarlike mode of life, having spent most of their time at spectacles and festivals and plays, and they wished to cloak their weakness with insolence and boasting, disdaining to perform the services laid upon them because they were above the work, not because they were unable to do it. When Spurina tried to force them into obedience, he came near being killed by them. They spared him no abuse nor insolence, declaring that he was betraying and ruining the opportunities and the cause of Caesar. Nay, some of them who were drunk came at night to his tent and demanded money for a journey, for they must go, they said, to Caesar, in order to denounce their commander.
5.5. ὁ δὲ Σπουρίνας προσβιαζόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐκινδύνευσε μικρὸν ἐλθόντας ἀνελεῖν αὐτόν. ὕβρεως δὲ καὶ βλασφημίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐφείσαντο, προδότην καὶ λυμεῶνα τῶν Καίσαρος καιρῶν καὶ πραγμάτων λέγοντες, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ μεθυσθέντες ἤδη νυκτὸς ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐφόδιον αἰτοῦντες· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς Καίσαρα βαδιστέον, ὅπως ἐκείνου κατηγορήσωσιν.
6.1. But Spurina and the emperor’s cause were helped for the time by the abuse which his soldiers received at Placentia. For when the troops of Vitellius assaulted the walls, they railed at the soldiers of Otho who manned the ramparts, calling them actors, dancers, spectators at Pythian and Olympian games, men who had never known or seen a campaign or fighting, and thought highly of themselves because they had cut off the head of a defenceless old man (meaning Galba), but would not openly enter a conflict and battle of men.
6.1. ὤνησε δὲ τὰ πράγματα καὶ Σπουρίναν ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα λοιδορία περὶ Πλακεντίαν γενομένη τῶν στρατιωτῶν, οἱ γὰρ Οὐϊτελλίου τοῖς τείχεσι προσβάλλοντες ἐχλεύαζον τοὺς Ὄθωνος ἑστῶτας παρὰ τὰς ἐπάλξεις, σκηνικοὺς καὶ πυρριχιστὰς καὶ Πυθίων καὶ Ὀλυμπίων θεωρούς, πολέμου δὲ καὶ στρατείας ἀπείρους καὶ ἀθεάτους ἀποκαλοῦντες, καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ γέροντος ἀνόπλου κεφαλὴν ἀποτεμεῖν, τὸν Γάλβαν λέγοντες, εἰς δὲ ἀγῶνα καὶ μάχην ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἂν ἐκφανῶς καταβάντας.
6.2. Otho’s soldiers were so disturbed by these reproaches, and so inflamed, that they threw themselves at the feet of Spurina, begging him to use them and command them, and pleading excuse from no danger or toil. And so, when a fierce assault was made upon the walls and many siege-engines were brought to bear upon them, Spurina’s men prevailed, repulsed their opponents with great slaughter, and held safe a city which was famous and more flourishing than any in Italy.
6.2. οὕτω γὰρ ἐταράχθησαν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ὀνειδῶν καὶ διεκάησαν ὥστε προσπεσεῖν τῷ Σπουρίνᾳ, δεόμενοι χρῆσθαι καὶ προστάττειν αὐτοῖς, οὐδένα κίνδυνον οὐδὲ πόνον ἀπολεγομένοις. ἰσχυρᾶς δὲ συστάσης τειχομαχίας καὶ μηχανημάτων πολλῶν προσαχθέντων ἐκράτησαν οἱ τοῦ Σπουρίνα, καὶ φόνῳ πολλῷ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀποκρουσάμενοι διετήρησαν ἔνδοξον πόλιν καὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον ἀνθοῦσαν.
6.3. In other ways, too, the generals of Vitellius were more vexatious than those of Otho in their dealings with both cities and private persons. One of them, Caecina, had neither the speech nor the outward appearance of a Roman citizen, but was offensive and strange, a man of huge stature, who wore Gaulish trousers and long sleeves, and conversed by signs even with Roman officials.
6.3. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν Οὐϊτελλίου στρατηγῶν οἱ Ὄθωνος ἐντυχεῖν ἀλυπότεροι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις ἐκείνων δὲ Κεκίνας μὲν οὔτε φωνὴν οὔτε σχῆμα δημοτικός, ἀλλʼ ἐπαχθὴς καὶ ἀλλόκοτος, σώματος μεγάλου, Γαλατικῶς ἀναξυρίσι καὶ χειρῖσιν ἐνεσκευασμένος, σημείοις καὶ ἄρχουσι Ῥωμαϊκοῖς διαλεγόμενος.
6.4. His wife, too, accompanied him, with an escort of picked horsemen; she rode a horse, and was conspicuously adorned. Fabius Valens, the other general, was so rapacious that neither what he plundered from the enemy nor what he stole or received as gifts from the allies could satisfy him. Indeed, it was thought that this rapacity of his had delayed his march, so that he was too late for the battle at Placentia.
6.4. καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα παρέπεμπον αὐτῷ λογάδην ἱππεῖς ὀχουμένην ἵππῳ κεκοσμημένην ἐπιφανῶς. Φάβιον δὲ Οὐάλεντα τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν οὔτε ἁρπαγαὶ πολεμίων οὔτε κλοπαὶ καὶ δωροδοκίαι παρὰ συμμάχων ἐνεπίμπλασαν χρηματιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐδόκει διὰ τοῦτο βραδέως ὁδεύων ὑστερῆσαι τῆς προτέρας μάχης.
6.5. But some blame Caecina, who, they say, was eager to win the victory himself before Valens came, and so not only made other minor mistakes, but also joined battle inopportunely and without much spirit, thereby almost ruining their whole enterprise.
6.5. οἱ δὲ τὸν Κεκίναν αἰτιῶνται, σπεύδοντα τὴν νίκην ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι πρὶν ἐκεῖνον ἐλθεῖν, ἄλλοις τε μικροτέροις περιπεσεῖν ἁμαρτήμασι καὶ μάχην οὐ κατὰ καιρὸν οὐδὲ γενναίως συνάψαι, μικροῦ πάντα τὰ πράγματα διαφθείρασαν αὐτοῖς.
7.1. For when Caecina, repulsed from Placentia, had set out to attack Cremona, another large and prosperous city, first Annius Gallus, who was coming to the help of Spurina at Placentia, hearing upon the march that Placentia was safe, but that Cremona was in peril, changed his course and led his army to Cremona, where he encamped near the enemy; then his colleagues came one by one to his aid.
7.1. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀποκρουσθεὶς τῆς Πλακεντίας ὁ Κεκίνας ἐπὶ Κρεμώνην ὥρμησεν, ἑτέραν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ μεγάλην, πρῶτος μὲν Ἄννιος Γάλλος πρὸς Πλακεντίαν Σπουρίνᾳ βοηθῶν, ὡς ἤκουσε καθʼ ὁδὸν τοὺς Πλακεντίνους περιγεγονέναι, κινδυνεύειν δὲ τοὺς ἐν Κρεμώνῃ, μετήγαγεν ἐκεῖ τὸ στράτευμα καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πλησίον τῶν πολεμίων ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος ἐβοήθει τῷ στρατηγῷ.
7.2. Caecina now placed a large body of men-at-arms in ambush where the ground was rough and woody, and then ordered his horsemen to ride towards the enemy, and if they were attacked, to withdraw little by little and retreat, until they had in this way drawn their pursuers into the ambush. But deserters brought word of all this to Celsus, who rode out with good horsemen to meet the enemy, followed up his pursuit with caution, surrounded the men in ambush, and threw them into confusion. Then he summoned his men-at-arms from the camp.
7.2. τοῦ δὲ Κεκίνα λοχίσαντος εἰς λάσια χωρία καὶ ὑλώδη πολλοὺς ὁπλίτας, ἱππεῖς δὲ προεξελάσαι κελεύσαντος, κἂν συνάψωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναχωρεῖν καὶ ἀναφεύγειν, ἄχρι ἂν ὑπάγοντες οὕτως ἐμβάλωσιν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν, ἐξήγγειλαν αὐτόμολοι τῷ Κέλσῳ. καὶ οὗτος μὲν ἱππεῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς ἀντεξελάσας, πεφυλαγμένως δὲ χρώμενος τῇ διώξει καὶ τὴν ἐνέδραν περισχὼν καὶ συνταράξας, ἐκάλει τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου.
7.3. And apparently, if these had come up in time to the support of the cavalry, not a man of the enemy would have been left alive, but the whole army with Caecina would have been crushed and slain. As it was, however, Paulinus came to their aid too slowly and too late, and incurred the charge of sullying his reputation as a commander through excessive caution.
7.3. καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἂν ἐπελθόντες ἐν καιρῷ μηδένα λιπεῖν τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μετὰ Κεκίνα στράτευμα συντρῖψαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν ἐπισπόμενοι τοῖς ἱππεῦσι· νυνὶ δὲ ὁ Παυλῖνος ὀψὲ καὶ σχολῇ προσβοηθήσας αἰτίαν ἔσχεν ἐνδεέστερον τῆς δόξης στρατηγῆσαι διʼ εὐλάβειαν.
7.4. But most of the soldiers actually accused him of treachery, and tried to incense Otho against him, loudly boasting that they had been victorious, but that their victory was made incomplete by the cowardice of their commanders. Otho did not believe them, and yet wished to avoid the appearance of disbelieving them. He therefore sent to the armies his brother Titianus, and Proculus, the prefect of the guards; of these two men Proculus had the entire authority in reality, and Titianus only in appearance.
7.4. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ προδοσίαν ἐνεκάλουν αὐτῷ, καὶ παρώξυνον τὸν Ὄθωνα, μεγαληγοροῦντες ὡς νενικηκότων αὐτῶν, τῆς δὲ νίκης οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶν προελθούσης κακίᾳ τῶν στρατηγῶν. ὁ δὲ Ὄθων οὐχ οὕτως ἐπίστευεν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐβούλετο μὴ δοκεῖν ἀπιστεῖν. ἔπεμψεν οὖν Τιτιανὸν ἐπὶ τὰ στρατεύματα τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ Πρόκλον τὸν ἔπαρχον, ὃς εἶχεν ἔργῳ τὴν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, πρόσχημα δὲ ἦν ὁ Τιτιανός.
7.5. Celsus and Paulinus, too, enjoyed the empty title of friends and counsellors, but had no power or influence in the conduct of affairs. There were disturbances also among the enemy, and especially among the troops of Valens; for when these were told about the battle at the ambuscade, they were enraged because they were not present and had given no aid where so many men had lost their lives. They actually began to stone Valens, but he finally succeeded in pacifying them, and then broke camp arid joined Caecina.
7.5. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κέλσον καὶ Παυλῖνον ἄλλως ἐφείλκοντο συμβούλων ὄνομα καὶ φίλων, ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι μηδεμίαν ἔχοντες, ἦν δὲ θορυβώδη καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῷ Οὐάλεντι· καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν ἐνέδραν μάχης ἀπαγγελθείσης ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι μὴ παρεγένοντο μηδὲ ἤμυναν ἀνδρῶν τοσούτων ἀποθανόντων, μόλις δὲ πείσας καὶ παραιτησάμενος ὡρμημένους αὐτοὺς βάλλειν ἀνέζευξε καὶ συνῆψε τοῖς περὶ Κεκίναν.
8.1. Otho now came to the camp at Bedricum (a little village near Cremona) and held a council of war. Proculus and Titianus were of the opinion that he ought to fight a decisive battle while his armies were flushed with their recent victory, and not sit there dulling the efficiency of his troops and waiting for Vitellius to come in person from Gaul.
8.1. ὁ δὲ Ὄθων παραγενόμενος εἰς Βητριακὸν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔστι δὲ πολίχνη πλησίον Κρεμώνης τὸ Βητριακόν ἐβουλεύετο περὶ τῆς μάχης, καὶ Πρόκλῳ μὲν ἐδόκει καὶ Τιτιανῷ, τῶν στρατευμάτων ὄντων προθύμων καὶ προσφάτου τῆς νίκης, διαγωνίσασθαι καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι τὴν ἀκμὴν ἀμβλύνοντα τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ περιμένοντα Οὐϊτέλλιον αὐτὸν ἐκ Γαλατίας ἐπελθεῖν·
8.2. Paulinus, on the contrary, said that the enemy already had all the resources with which they would give battle, and lacked nothing, whereas, in the case of Otho, a force as large as the one he already had might be expected from Mysia and Pannonia, if he would only wait for his own best opportunity and conduct the campaign to suit that of the enemy.
8.2. Παυλῖνος δὲ τοῖς μὲν πολεμίοις ἔφη πάντα μεθʼ ὧν μαχοῦνται παρεῖναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖν, Ὄθωνι δὲ τῆς ἤδη παρούσης οὐκ ἐλάττονα προσδόκιμον εἶναι δύναμιν ἐκ Μυσίας καὶ Παννονίας, ἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ περιμένῃ καιρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ στρατηγῇ πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολεμίων.
8.3. For his men were now confident of success in spite of their inferior numbers, and he would not find them less keen after they had received reinforcements, nay, their superiority would lead them to fight all the better. And besides, delay was to their advantage, since they had everything in abundance, while to the enemy time would bring a scarcity of supplies, since they were occupying a hostile country.
8.3. οὐ γὰρ ἀμβλυτέροις γε χρήσεσθαι τότε τοῖς νῦν θαρροῦσιν ἀπʼ ἐλαττόνων, ἂν πλείονας τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους προσλάβωσιν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ περιουσίας ἀγωνιεῖσθαι· καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τούτου τὴν διατριβὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐν ἀφθόνοις πᾶσιν ὄντων, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν χρόνον ἀπορίαν παρέξειν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν πολεμίᾳ καθεζομένοις.
8.4. So Paulinus argued, and Marius Celsus voted with him. Annius Gallus was not present, being under treatment for a fall from his horse, but Otho asked his advice by letter, and his counsel was not to hasten the battle, but to await the forces from Mysia, which were already on the march. Nevertheless, Otho would not listen to these counsels, and the day was carried by those who urged immediate battle.
8.4. ταῦτα λέγοντι Παυλίνῳ Μάριος Κέλσος ἐγένετο σύμψηφος. Ἄννιος δὲ Γάλλος οὐ παρῆν μέν, ἀλλʼ ἐθεραπεύετο πεπτωκὼς ἀφʼ ἵππου, γράψαντος δὲ Ὄθωνος αὐτῷ συνεβούλευσε μὴ σπεύδειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ Μυσίας περιμένειν δύναμιν ἤδη καθʼ ὁδὸν οὖσαν. οὐ μὴν ἐπείθετο τούτοις, ἀλλὰ ἐκράτησαν οἱ πρὸς τὴν μάχην παρορμῶντες.
9.1. Various other reasons for this are given by various writers; but manifestly the praetorian soldiers, as they were called, who served as the emperor’s guards, since they were now getting a more generous taste of real military service and longed for their accustomed life of diversion at Rome in which festivals abounded and war was unknown, could not be restrained, but were eager for the battle, feeling sure that at the very first onset they would overwhelm their opponents.
9.1. αἰτίαι δὲ πλείονες ἄλλαι ὑπʼ ἄλλων λέγονται προδήλως δὲ οἱ στρατηγικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι καὶ τάξιν ἔχοντες δορυφόρων, τότε μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς γευόμενοι στρατείας καὶ τὰς ἐν Ῥώμῃ διατριβὰς καὶ διαίτας ἀπολέμους καὶ πανηγυρικὰς ποθοῦντες, οὐκ ἦσαν καθεκτοὶ σπεύδοντες ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην, ὡς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς ἀναρπασόμενοι τούς ἐναντίους.
9.2. Moreover, it would seem that Otho himself could not longer bear up against the uncertainty of the issue, nor endure (so effeminate was he and so unused to command) his own thoughts of the dire peril confronting him; but worn out by his anxieties, he veiled his eyes, like one about to leap from a precipice, and hastened to commit his cause to fortune.
9.2. δοκεῖ δὲ μηδὲ αὐτὸς Ὄθων ἐξαναφέρειν ἔτι πρὸς τὴν ἀδηλότητα μηδὲ ὑπομένειν ἀηθείᾳ καὶ μαλακότητι τούς περὶ τῶν δεινῶν λογισμούς, ἐκπονούμενος δὲ ταῖς φροντίσι σπεύδειν ἐγκαλυψάμενος, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ κρημνοῦ, μεθεῖναι τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τὸ συντυχόν.
9.3. And this is the account given by Secundus the rhetorician, who was Otho’s secretary. But others would tell us that both armies were strongly inclined to confer; and above all, if they could agree, to elect as emperor the best of the commanders who were with them, but if not, to convene the senate and commit to it the choice of an emperor.
9.3. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν διηγεῖτο Σεκοῦνδος ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν γενόμενος τοῦ Ὄθωνος. ἑτέρων δὲ ἦν ἀκούειν ὅτι τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ἀμφοτέροις παρίσταντο ὁρμαὶ πολλαὶ ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸ συνελθεῖν καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτοὺς ὁμοφρονήσαντας ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἡγεμονικῶν ἑλέσθαι τὸν ἄριστον, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν σύγκλητον ὁμοῦ καθίσαντας ἐφεῖναι τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνῃ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος.
9.4. And since neither of the men who then had the title of emperor enjoyed high repute, it is not unlikely that the real soldiers, those who knew what hardship was and had sense, should be led to reflect that it would be a dreadful and most hateful thing if the evils which the citizens had once to their sorrow inflicted upon one another and suffered because of Sulla and Marius, and again because of Caesar and Pompey, should now be endured again only to make the imperial power a means for providing for the gluttony and drunkenness of Vitellius or for the luxury and licentiousness of Otho.
9.4. καὶ οὐκ ἀπεικός ἐστι, μηδετέρου τότε τῶν προσαγορευομένων αὐτοκρατόρων εὐδοκιμοῦντος, ἐπιπίπτειν τοιούτους διαλογισμοὺς τοῖς γνησίοις καὶ διαπόνοις καὶ σωφρονοῦσι τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ὡς ἔχθιστον εἴη καὶ δεινόν, ἃ πάλαι διὰ Σύλλαν καὶ Μάριον, εἶτα Καίσαρα καὶ Πομπήϊον ᾠκτείροντο δρῶντες ἀλλήλους καὶ πάσχοντες οἱ πολῖται, ταῦτα νῦν ὑπομένειν ἢ Οὐϊτελλίῳ λαιμαργίας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀκολασίας Ὄθωνι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν χορήγημα προθεμένους.