---
title: "How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue · Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus"
author: "Plutarch"
translator: "Frank Cole Babbitt"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Philosophy"
section: 1 of 2
url: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-progress-in-virtue/1/
cite: "Plutarch, tr. Frank Cole Babbitt, How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue · Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus, section 1. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-progress-in-virtue/1/"
---

# How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue · Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus

*Plutarch, tr. Frank Cole Babbitt*

Against the Stoics: we grow in virtue by degrees, and there are signs by which we can tell.

> Greek: ed. Grēgorios N. Vernardakēs, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0007.tlg071, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Frank Cole Babbitt, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0007.tlg071.perseus-eng3). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 1. Sections 2–9

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-progress-in-virtue/1/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/plutarch-progress-in-virtue/1/#p-N

[¶0] The essay on Progress in Virtue is one of Plutarch’s polemics against the Stoics, and is directed mainly against two of the doctrines of the Stoic philosophy. The first is that the wise man alone is virtuous, and that wisdom with attendant virtue is a sudden acquisition with no preliminary stages; the second is in a way the corollary of the first, since, if a man is not perfect (i.e. wise), it may be argued that it matters little how trivial is his imperfection and whether his faults be great or small. “He that offendeth in one point is guilty of all.” Against such doctrines as these Plutarch’s strong common sense revolts, and he endeavours to show not only that ethical advance is possible, but that there are plenty of signs by which it can be recognized. The essay is addressed (or dedicated) to Q. Sosius Senecio, one of Plutarch’s numerous Roman friends, who was twice consul in the early years of Trajan’s reign. It was at his request that Plutarch composed the Symposiacs, in which his name frequently appears, and to him are inscribed also the parallel lives of Theseus and Romulus, Demosthenes and Cicero, and Dion and Brutus. Plutarch had been with him much in Rome, and he had visited Plutarch in Greece. It is doubtless the same Sosius whom the younger Pliny addressed in two letters (i. 13 and iv. 4) which have come down to us. a So spelled in the best mss. of Pliny and in inscriptions. What possible form of argument, my dear Sosius Senetio, will keep alive in a mak the consciousness that he is growing better in regard to virtue, if it is a fact that the successive stages of his progress produce no abatement of his unwisdom, but, on the contrary, vice constantly besets all progress, and with countervailing weight drags him down, “As leaden weights submerge the fisher’s net?” For, by the same token, in music or grammar a man would not realize that he was making any improvement if in the process of learning he should in no wise lower the level of his ignorance about these subjects, and his lack of proficiency should all the time persist to the same degree. So, too, in the case of a sick man, a course of treatment that should not in some way effect an easing and alleviation of the malady, by making it to yield and let go its hold on him, would not afford him any perception of a change for the better until the opposite condition had been unmistakably engendered, his body having completely recovered its strength. On the contrary, just as in these cases persons make no progress unless their progress is marked by such an abatement of what is oppressing them, that, when the scale turns and they swing upward in the opposite direction, they can note the change, so too, in the study of philosophy, neither progress nor any sense of progress is to be assumed, if the soul does not put aside any of its gross stupidity and purge itself thereof, and if, up to the moment of its attaining the absolute and perfect good, it is wedded to evil which is also absolute. Why, if this be so, the wise man in a moment or a second of time changes from the lowest possible depravity to an unsurpassable state of virtue; and all his vice, of which he has not in long years succeeded in removing even a small portion, he suddenly leaves behind for ever. Yet you doubtless know that, on the other hand, the authors of such assertions make for themselves much trouble and great difficulties over the unwitting man, who has as yet failed to apprehend the fact that he has become wise, but does not know, and hesitates to believe, that his advancement, which has been effected by the gradual and longcontinued process of divesting himself of some qualities and adding others, has, as walking brings one where he would be, imperceptibly and quietly brought him into virtue’s company. But if there were such a swiftness in the change and a difference so vast, that the man who was the very worst in the morning should have become the very best at evening, or should the change so come about that he who was a worthless dolt when he fell asleep should awake wise, and, having dismissed from his soul his gross stupidities and false concepts of yesterday, could exclaim: “False dreams, farewell! Ye are but naught, it seems,” —who would fail to recognize that a great difference like this had been wrought in his own self, and that the light of wisdom had all at once burst upon him? Why, it seems to me that anyone who, like Caeneus, were made man from woman in answer to prayer, would sooner fail to recognize the transformation. than that anyone made temperate, wise, and brave, from being cowardly, foolish, and licentious, and transferred from a bestial to a godlike life, should for a single second not perceive what had happened to him.

> Greek: τίς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, σώσει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βελτιουμένου πρὸς ἀρετὴν συναίσθησιν, εἰ μηδεμίαν αἱ προκοπαὶ ποιοῦσι τῆς ἀφροσύνης ἄνεσιν, ἀλλʼ ἴσῳ σταθμῷ πᾶσιν ἡ κακία περιτιθεμένη
μολυβδὶς ὥστε δίκτυον κατέσπασεν;
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν μουσικοῖς τις ἢ γραμματικοῖς ἐπιδιδοὺς ἂν γνοίη μηδὲν ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν ἀπαρύτων τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἀμαθίας ἀλλʼ ἴσης ἀεὶ τῆς ἀτεχνίας αὐτῷ παρούσης, οὐδὲ κάμνοντι θεραπεία μὴ ποιοῦσα ῥᾳστώνην μηδὲ κουφισμὸν ἁμωσγέπως τοῦ νοσήματος ὑπείκοντος καὶ χαλῶντος αἴσθησιν ἂν παρέχοι διαφορᾶς, πρὶν εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἐγγενέσθαι παντάπασιν ἀναρρωσθέντος τοῦ σώματος. ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις οὐ προκόπτουσιν, ἂν προκόπτοντες ἀνέσει τοῦ βαρύνοντος οἷον ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀναφερόμενοι μὴ γιγνώσκωσι τὴν μεταβολήν, οὕτως ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὔτε προκοπὴν οὔτε τινὰ προκοπῆς αἴσθησιν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ μηδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ μεθίησι μηδʼ ἀποκαθαίρεται τῆς ἀβελτερίας, ἄχρι δὲ τοῦ λαβεῖν ἄκρατον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἀκράτῳ τῷ κακῷ χρῆται. καὶ γὰρ ἀκαρὲς χρόνου καὶ ὥρας ἐκ τῆς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσαν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διάθεσιν μεταβαλὼν ὁ σοφός, ἧς οὐδʼ ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ μέρος ἀφεῖλε κακίας ἅμα πᾶσαν ἐξαίφνης ἐκπέφευγε. καίτοι ἤδη τοὺς ταῦτά γε λέγοντας οἶσθα δήπου πάλιν πολλὰ παρέχοντας αὑτοῖς πράγματα καὶ μεγάλας ἀπορίας περὶ τοῦ διαλεληθότος, ὃς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οὐδέπω κατείληφε γεγονὼς σοφός, ἀλλʼ ἀγνοεῖ κἀμφιδοξεῖ τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ τὰ μὲν ἀφαιροῦντι τὰ δὲ προστιθέντι γιγνομένην τὴν ἐπίδοσιν καθάπερ πορείαν τῇ ἀρετῇ λαθεῖν ἀτρέμα προσμίξασαν. εἰ δὲ γʼ εἴη τάχος τοσοῦτον τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ μέγεθος, ὥστε τὸν πρωῒ κάκιστον ἑσπέρας γεγονέναι κράτιστον, ἢ ἂν οὕτω τινὶ συντύχῃ τὰ τῆς μεταβολῆς, καταδαρθόντα φαῦλον ἀνεγρέσθαι σοφὸν καὶ προσειπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς μεθεικότα τὰς χθιζὰς ἀβελτερίας καὶ ἀπάτας
ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετʼ· οὐδὲν ἦτʼ ἄρα,
τίς ἂν ἀγνοήσειεν ἑαυτοῦ διαφορὰν ἐν αὑτῷ τοσαύτην γενομένην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀθρόον ἐκλάμψασαν; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἄν τις, ὡς ὁ Καινεύς, γενόμενος κατʼ εὐχὴν ἀνὴρ ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀγνοῆσαι τὴν μετακόσμησιν, ἢ σώφρων καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἐκ δειλοῦ καὶ ἀνοήτου καὶ ἀκρατοῦς ἀποτελεσθεὶς καὶ μεταβαλὼν εἰς θεῖον ἐκ θηριώδους βίον ἀκαρὲς διαλαθεῖν αὑτόν.

[¶1] 2. Rightly has it been said: “Adjust the stone to fit The line, and not the line to fit the stone.” But those who do not adjust their tenets to fit the facts, but rather try to force the facts into an unnatural agreement with their own assumptions, have filled philosophy with a great number of difficulties, of which the greatest is that which would assign all men to a general category of badness with the single exception of the absolutely perfect man; the result of which is to make a puzzle out of what we call progress, since it falls but little short of the uttermost foolishness, and represents men who have been released by it from all kinds of passions and weaknesses as living in a state of equal wretchedness with those who have not yet been freed from a single one of the worst evils. Now these men really refute themselves when, in their lectures, they put the wrongdoing of Aristeides on an equality with that of Phalaris, and the cowardice of Brasidas on an equality with that of Dolon, and the hard-hearted attitude of Plato as actually not differing at all from that of Meletus; whereas in their life and practice they show an aversion for these latter men and avoid them as ruthless, but the former they seem to think are men of great worth, for they cite them with confidence in the most important matters.

> Greek: 2. ἀλλʼ ὀρθῶς μὲν εἴρηται τὸ
πρὸς στάθμῃ
πέτρον τίθεσθαι, μή τι πρὸς πέτρῳ στάθμην
οἱ δὲ μὴ τιθέμενοι τὰ δόγματα πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὑποθέσεις ὁμολογεῖν μὴ πεφυκότα καταβιαζόμενοι πολλῶν ἀποριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς εἰς μίαν ὁμοῦ κακίαν πάντας ἀνθρώπους πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ τελείου τιθεμένης, ὑφʼ ἧς αἴνιγμα γέγονεν ἡ λεγομένη προκοπή, μικρὸν ἀπολείπουσα ἀφροσύνης ἐσχάτης, τοὺς δὲ μὴ πάντων ἅμα παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων ἀφειμένους ὑπʼ αὐτῆς ἔτι τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν κακίστων ὁμοίως παρέχουσα κακοδαιμονοῦντας. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἑαυτοὺς ἐλέγχουσιν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς σχολαῖς ἴσην ἀδικίαν τὴν Ἀριστείδου τῇ Φαλάριδος τιθέμενοι, καὶ δειλίαν τὴν Βρασίδου τῇ Δόλωνος, καὶ νὴ Δία τῆς Μελήτου μηδʼ ὁτιοῦν τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀγνωμοσύνην διαφέρουσαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐκείνους μὲν ἐκτρεπόμενοι καὶ φεύγοντες ὡς ἀμειλίκτους, τούτοις δʼ ὡς ἀξίοις πολλοῦ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ χρώμενοι καὶ πιστεύοντες.

[¶2] 3. But as for us, we observe that there are degrees in every kind of evil, and especially in the indeterminate and undefined kind that has to do with the soul. (In the same way also there are different degrees of progress produced by the abatement of baseness like a receding shadow, as reason gradually illuminates and purifies the soul.) We do not, therefore, think that consciousness of the change is unreasonable in the case of persons who are, as it were, making their way upward out of some deep gorge, but that there are ways in which it can be computed. Of these I beg you to consider the first without further preface. Just as men sailing out into the open sea calculate their run by the time elapsed in conjunction with the strength of the wind, reckoning how much distance, after spending a certain time, while carried onward by a certain force, they are likely to have accomplished; so too in philosophy a man may take for himself as a proof that he is gaining ground the uniformity and continuity of his course, which makes on the way no frequent halts, followed by leaps and bounds, but smoothly and regularly forges ahead, and goes through the course of philosophic reasoning without mishap. For the lines: “If even small upon the small you place And do this oft,” are not merely well put in regard to the increase of money, but they apply to everything, and especially to advancement in virtue, since reason thereby gains the aid of constant and effective habit. But the variation and obtuseness often shown by students of philosophy not only cause delays and stoppages in their progress on the road to knowledge, but also bring about retrogressions, since vice always makes an onset on the man who yields ground by loitering, and carries him backward in the opposite direction. Mathematicians tell us that the planets, when their forward movement ceases, become for the moment stationary, but in the study of philosophy there is no intermission when progress halts, nor any such thing as remaining stationary, but Nature, being never free from motion of some sort, is wont to move up or down, as though suspended on a balance, and to be swayed by the better motives, or else under the influence of the contrary motives it moves rapidly towards what is worse. If therefore you follow the advice given by the god in the oracle, to “fight the Cirrhaeans all days and all nights,” and are conscious that you likewise in the daytime and the nighttime have always carried on an unrelenting warfare against vice, or at least that you have not often relaxed your vigilance nor constantly granted admission to divers pleasures, recreations, and pastimes, which are, as it were, envoys sent by vice to treat for a truce, it is then quite probable that you may go on with good courage and confidence to what still remains.

> Greek: 3. ἡμεῖς δὲ παντὶ γένει κακοῦ, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀτάκτῳ καὶ ἀορίστῳ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον προσγιγνόμενον ὁρῶντες καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ προκοπαί, καθάπερ σκιᾶς ἀνέσει τῆς μοχθηρίας τοῦ λόγου διαφωτίζοντος ἀτρέμα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ διακαθαίροντος οὐκ ἄλογον οἰόμεθα τὴν συναίσθησιν εἶναι τῆς μεταβολῆς ὥσπερ ἐκ βυθοῦ τινὸς ἀναφερομένοις, ἀλλʼ ἔχουσαν ἐπιλογισμούς. ὧν σκόπει τὸν πρῶτον εὐθύς. εἰ καθάπερ οἱ πρὸς ἀχανὲς θέοντες ἱστίοις πέλαγος ἅμα τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ῥώμην ἀναμετροῦνται τὸν δρόμον, ὅσον εἰκὸς ἐν τοσούτῳ γεγονέναι ὑπὸ τοσαύτης κομιζομένοις δυνάμεως, οὕτως ἄν τις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς πορείας καὶ μὴ πολλὰς διὰ μέσου ποιούμενον ἐπιστάσεις, εἶτʼ αὖθις ὁρμὰς καὶ ἐπιπηδήσεις, ἀλλὰ λείως καὶ ὁμαλῶς τοῦ πρόσθεν ἐπιλαμβανόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ διϊὸν ἀπταίστως διὰ τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον ἑαυτῷ ποιήσαιτο προκοπῆς. τὸ γάρ
εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο
καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτʼ ἔρδοις
οὐ πρὸς ἀργυρίου μόνον αὔξησιν εἴρηται καλῶς, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἅπαντα ποιεῖ, μάλιστα δʼ εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπίδοσιν, πολὺ καὶ τελεσιουργὸν ἔθος τοῦ λόγου προσλαμβάνοντος· αἱ δʼ ἀνωμαλίαι καὶ ἀμβλύτητες τῶν φιλοσοφούντων οὐ μόνας ποιοῦσιν ἐποχὰς ὥσπερ ἐν ὁδῷ τῆς προκοπῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναλύσεις, ἀεὶ τῷ παρείκοντι κατὰ σχολὴν τῆς κακίας ἐπιτιθεμένης καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀνθυποφερούσης. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πλάνητας οἱ μαθηματικοὶ στηρίζειν λέγουσι παυσαμένης τῆς εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορείας, ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐκ ἔστι ληγούσης διάλειμμα προκοπῆς οὐδὲ στηριγμός, ἀλλʼ ἀεί τινας ἔχουσα κινήσεις ἡ φύσις ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ῥέπειν ἐθέλει καὶ κατατείνεσθαι ταῖς βελτίοσιν, ἢ ταῖς ἐναντίαις πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον οἴχεται φερομένη. ἂν οὖν κατὰ τὸν δοθέντα χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ Κιρραίοις πάντʼ ἤματα καὶ πάσας νύκτας πολεμεῖν οὕτω συνίδῃς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας τε καὶ νύκτωρ ἀεὶ τῇ κακίᾳ διαμεμαχημένον, ἢ μὴ πολλάκις γε τὴν φρουρὰν ἀνεικότα μηδὲ συνεχῶς παρʼ αὐτῆς οἱονεὶ κήρυκας ἡδονάς τινας ἢ ῥᾳστώνας ἢ ἀσχολίας ἐπὶ σπονδαῖς προσδεδεγμένον, εἰκότως ἂν εὐθαρσὴς καὶ πρόθυμος βαδίζοις ἐπὶ τὸ λειπόμενον.

[¶3] 4. However, even though it be that intermissions occur in one’s philosophical studies, yet if the later periods of study are more constant and long-continued than they were earlier, this is no slight indication that the spirit of indifference is being expelled through industry and practice; but there is something pernicious in the opposite condition, when numerous and continued set-backs occur after no long time, as if the spirit of eagerness were withering away. We may compare a reed, the growth of which at its beginning has a very great impetus, which results in an even and continuous length, at first in long sections, since it meets with few obstacles and repulses, but later, as though for lack of breath as it gets higher up, it grows weak and weary, and is gathered up in the many frequent nodules, when the life-giving spirit meets with buffets and shocks; so with philosophy, those who at the outset engage in long excursions into its realms and later meet with a long series of obstacles and distractions without becoming aware of any change toward the better, finally get wearied out, and give up. But a man of the other type “is again given wings” by the help he gets as he is carried onward, and by the strength and eagerness born of successful accomplishment brushes aside pretences as though they were a hindering crowd in his path. In the same way that an indication of the beginning of love is to be found, not in the taking delight in the presence of the loved one (for this is usual), but in feeling a sting of pain when separated; just so are many allured by philosophy and seem to take hold of the task of learning with high aspirations, but if they are forced by other business and occupations to leave it, all that excitement of theirs subsides and they no longer care. But “He in whose heart the prick of youthful love ” is planted may appear to you moderate and mild while present at philosophical discussions; but when he is separated and apart from them, behold him ardent and troubled, and dissatisfied with all business and occupations, and, cherishing the mere recollection, he is driven about like an irrational being by his yearning towards philosophy. For we ought not to enjoy being present at discussions as we enjoy the presence of perfumes, and then when we are removed from them not seek after them or even feel uneasy; but we ought in our periods of separation to experience a sensation akin in a way to hunger and thirst, and so be led to cleave to what makes for real progress, whether it chance to be a wedding or wealth or the duties of friendship or military service that causes the temporary parting. For the greater the acquisition from philosophy is, the more annoyance there is in being cut off from it.

> Greek: 4. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν διαλείμματα γιγνόμενα τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, τὰ δʼ ὕστερα τῶν πρότερον ἑδραιότερα καὶ μακρότερα, σημεῖον οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν ἐκθλιβομένης πόνῳ καὶ ἀσκήσει τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας· τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον πονηρόν, αἱ μετʼ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον πολλαὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς ἀνακοπαί, τῆς προθυμίας οἷον ἀπομαραινομένης. ὡς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ καλάμου βλάστησις, ὁρμὴν ἔχουσα πλείστην ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς εἰς μῆκος ὁμαλὸν καὶ συνεχές, τὸ πρῶτον ἐν διαστήμασι μεγάλοις ὀλίγας λαμβάνουσα προσκρούσεις καὶ ἀντικοπάς, εἶθʼ οἷον ὑπʼ ἄσθματος ἄνω διʼ ἀσθένειαν ἀπαγορεύουσα πολλοῖς ἐνίσχεται καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς γόνασι, τοῦ πνεύματος πληγὰς καὶ τρόμους λαμβάνοντος, οὕτως ὅσοι τὸ πρῶτον μεγάλαις ἐκδρομαῖς ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, εἶτα πολλὰ καὶ συνεχῆ προσκρούματα καὶ διασπάσματα λαμβάνουσι μηδενὸς διαφόρου πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐπαισθανόμενοι, τελευτῶντες ἐξέκαμον καὶ ἀπηγόρευσαν. τῷ δʼ αὖτε πτερὰ γίγνετο διʼ ὠφέλειαν φερομένῳ καὶ διακόπτοντι τὰς προφάσεις ὥσπερ ὄχλον ἐμποδὼν ὄντα ῥώμῃ καὶ προθυμίᾳ τῆς ἀνύσεως. καθάπερ οὖν ἔρωτος ἀρχομένου σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὐ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ καλῷ παρόντι τοῦτο γὰρ κοινόν ἀλλὰ τὸ δάκνεσθαι καὶ ἀλγεῖν ἀποσπώμενον, οὕτως ἄγονται μὲν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα γε φιλοτίμως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ μανθάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἂν δʼ ἀπέλθωσιν ὑπὸ πραγμάτων ἄλλων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν, ἐξερρύη τὸ πάθος αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέρουσιν.
ὅτῳ δʼ ἔρωτος δῆγμα παιδικῶν
πρόσεστι, μέτριος μὲν ἄν σοι φανείη καὶ πρᾶος ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ συμφιλοσοφεῖν ὅταν δʼ ἀποσπασθῇ καὶ χωρὶς γένηται, θεῶ φλεγόμενον καὶ ἀδημονοῦντα καὶ δυσκολαίνοντα πᾶσι πράγμασι καὶ ἀσχολίαις, μνήμῃ δὲ φιλῶν ὥσπερ ἄλογος ἐλαύνεται πόθῳ τῷ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τοῖς λόγοις εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν παρόντας ὥσπερ τοῖς μύροις, ἀποστάντας δὲ μὴ ζητεῖν μηδʼ ἀσχάλλειν, ἀλλὰ πείνῃ τινὶ καὶ δίψῃ πάθος ὅμοιον ἐν τοῖς ἀποσπασμοῖς πάσχοντας ἔχεσθαι τοῦ προκόπτοντος ἀληθῶς, ἄν τε γάμος ἄν τε πλοῦτος ἄν τε φιλία τις ἄν τε στρατεία προσπεσοῦσα ποιήσῃ τὸν χωρισμόν. ὅσῳ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ προσειλημμένον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, τοσούτῳ πλέον ἐνοχλεῖ τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον.

[¶4] 5. Quite the same as this, or nearly the same, is the very ancient elucidation of progress found in Hesiod, which sets forth that the way is no longer uphill, nor very steep, but easy and smooth and readily accomplished, as though it were made smooth by practice, and as though it brought on a light, which is to be found in the study of philosophy, and an illumination succeeding upon perplexity, errant thought, and much vacillation, which students of philosophy encounter at the outset, like persons who have left behind the land which they know and are not yet in sight of the land to which they are sailing. For having given up the common and familiar things before gaining knowledge and possession of the better, they are carried hither and thither in the interval, and oftentimes in the wrong direction. An illustration is the story told about Sextius, the Roman, to the effect that he had renounced his honours and offices in the State for philosophy, but, because he was impatient and found the subject difficult at the outset, he came very near throwing himself down from an upper story. A similar tale, too, they record about Diogenes of Sinope at the beginning of his devotion to philosophy. The Athenians were keeping holiday with public banquets and shows in the theatre and informal gatherings among themselves, and indulging in merry-making the whole night long, while Diogenes, huddled up in a corner trying to sleep, fell into some very disturbing and disheartening reflexions how he from no compulsion had entered upon a toilsome and strange mode of life, and as a result of his own act he was now sitting without part or parcel in all these good things. A moment later, however, a mouse, it is said, crept up and busied itself with the crumbs of his bread, whereupon he once more recovered his spirits, and said to himself as though rebuking himself for cowardice, “What are you saying, Diogenes? Your leavings make a feast for this creature, but as for you, a man of birth and breeding, just because you cannot be getting drunk over there, reclining on soft and flowery couches, do you bewail and lament your lot?” Now when such fits of dejection become of infrequent occurrence and the objections and protests made by sound sense against them quickly come to our help, as though rallying after a temporary rout, and easily dissipate our depression and dismay, we may well believe that our progress rests on a firm foundation.

> Greek: 5. τούτῳ δʼ ὁμοῦ τι ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ σύνεγγυς τὸ πρεσβύτατον δήλωμα προκοπῆς τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, μηκέτι προσάντη μηδʼ ὄρθιον ἄγαν ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ λείαν καὶ διʼ εὐπετείας εἶναι τὴν ὁδόν, οἷον ἐκλεαινομένην τῇ ἀσκήσει καὶ φῶς ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ λαμπρότητα ποιοῦσαν ἐξ ἀπορίας καὶ πλάνης καὶ μεταμελειῶν, αἷς προστυγχάνουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ οἱ γῆν ἀπολιπόντες ἣν ἴσασι, μηδέπω δὲ καθορῶντες ἐφʼ ἣν πλέουσι. προέμενοι γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ συνήθη πρὶν ἢ τὰ βελτίονα γνῶναι καὶ λαβεῖν, ἐν μέσῳ περιφέρονται πολλάκις ὑποτρεπόμενοι. καθάπερ φασὶ Σέξτιον τὸν Ῥωμαῖον ἀφεικότα τὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν αὖ πάλιν δυσπαθοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπῷ τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγου δεῆσαι καταβαλεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἔκ τινος διήρους. καὶ περὶ Διογένους ὅμοια τοῦ Σινωπέως ἱστοροῦσιν ἀρχομένου φιλοσοφεῖν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις ἦν ἑορτὴ καὶ δεῖπνα δημοτελῆ καὶ θέατρα, καὶ συνουσίας μετʼ ἀλλήλων ἔχοντες ἐχρῶντο κώμοις καὶ παννυχίσιν, ὁ δʼ ἔν τινι γωνίᾳ συνεσπειραμένος ὡς καθευδήσων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς λογισμοὺς τρέποντας αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀτρέμα καὶ θραύοντας, ὡς ἀπʼ οὐδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης εἰς ἐπίπονον καὶ ἀλλόκοτον ἥκων βίον αὐτὸς ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κάθηται τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστερημένος. εἶτα μέντοι μῦν τινα προσερπύσαντα λέγεται περὶ τὰς ψίχας αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τὸν δʼ, αὖθις ἀναφέρειν τῷ φρονήματι καὶ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν οἷον ἐπιπλήττοντα καὶ κακίζοντα τί φῄς, ὦ Διόγενες; τοῦτον μὲν εὐωχεῖ τὰ σὰ λείμματα, σὺ δʼ ὁ γενναῖος ὅτι μὴ μεθύεις ἐκεῖ κατακείμενος ἐν ἁπαλοῖς καὶ ἀνθίνοις στρώμασιν καὶ θρηνεῖς σεαυτόν; ὅταν οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατασπασμοὶ γένωνται μὴ πολλάκις, αἵ τε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐξερείσεις καὶ ἀνακρούσεις τοῦ φρονήματος ὥσπερ ἐκ τροπῆς ταχεῖαι παρῶσι καὶ διαλύωσι ῥᾳδίως τὸν ἄλυν καὶ τὴν ἀδημονίαν, ἔν τινι βεβαίῳ τὴν προκοπὴν εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν.

[¶5] 6. Since, however, students of philosophy are not of themselves the only source of the dejecting and reactionary influences, which, as the result of weakness, affect them, but since also the sober advice of friends and the bitter criticisms of the unfriendly, in the form of scoffing and joking, cause a warping and weakening of purpose, and have even made some persons renounce philosophy altogether, no slight indication of progress would be shown by gentleness of demeanour in the face of such criticisms, and by not being disturbed or irritated by those who name this or that acquaintance of about the same age, and tell how he is prospering at Court, or getting a big dower at marriage, or going down to the Forum, attended by a great crowd, to stand for some office or to advocate some cause. For plainly the man who is not disconcerted or affected under such circumstances is one on whom philosophy has got a right hold. For to cease emulating what the great majority admire is impossible, except for those who have acquired the faculty of admiring virtue. For to confront the world boldly is with some people possible only under the influence of anger or mental derangement; but to contemn actions which the world admires is quite impossible without real and solid wisdom. This is the reason why they compare their own state with the other and vaunt themselves over it, as does Solon: “We will not bargain with them ever to take in exchange All of their wealth for our virtue, since virtue is ever abiding; Riches are held for a time here or there among men.” Diogenes, too, used to compare his moving from Corinth to Athens, and from Athens to Corinth again, with the sojourns of the Persian king at Susa in the spring, at Babylon in the winter, and in Media in the summer. So too Agesilaus remarked in regard to the Great King, “In what is he greater than I, unless he be more just?” And Aristotle, writing to Antipater about Alexander, said that it was not Alexander alone who had the right to be proud because he held sway over many, but any man had just as good a right, if he had the correct ideas about God. And Zeno, seeing that Theophrastus was admired for having many pupils, said, “It is true his chorus is larger, but mine is more harmonious.”

> Greek: 6. ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ μόνον ἐξ αὑτῶν τὰ κατασείοντα καὶ στρέφοντα πρὸς τοὐναντίον ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας ἐπιγίγνεται τοῖς, φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλων συμβουλαὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ διαφόρων ἀντιλήψεις ἐν γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ γιγνόμεναι κάμπτουσι καὶ μαλάσσουσιν, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τέλεον ἤδη φιλοσοφίας ἐξέσεισαν, οὐ φαῦλον ἄν τι προκοπῆς εἴη σημεῖον ἡ πρὸς ταῦτα πραότης ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ μὴ ταραττόμενον μηδὲ κνιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγόντων καὶ ὀνομαζόντων ἥλικάς τινας ἐν αὐλαῖς βασιλέων εὐημεροῦντας ἢ φερνὰς ἐπὶ γάμοις λαμβάνοντας ἢ κατιόντας ὑπὸ πλήθους εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐπʼ ἀρχήν τινα ἢ συνηγορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνέκπληκτος ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἄτεγκτος ἤδη δῆλός ἐστιν εἰλημμένος ἣν προσήκει λαβὴν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε παύσασθαι ζηλοῦντας ἅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, οἷς ἂν μὴ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἀρετὴν ἐγγένηται. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους θρασύνεσθαι καὶ διʼ ὀργὴν ἐνίοις παρέστη καὶ διὰ παραφροσύνην· ὧν δὲ θαυμάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ βεβαίου καταφρονῆσαι. διὸ καὶ ταῦτα παραβάλλοντες ἐκείνοις ἐπιγαυροῦσιν ἑαυτούς, ὥσπερ ὁ Σόλων
ἀλλʼ ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον
αἰεί,
χρήματα δʼ ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει
καὶ Διογένης τὴν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐκ Κορίνθου καὶ πάλιν εἰς Κόρινθον ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν μετάβασιν ἑαυτοῦ παρέβαλλε ταῖς βασιλέως ἔαρος μὲν ἐν Σούσοις καὶ χειμῶνος ἐν Βαβυλῶνι, θέρους δʼ ἐν Μηδίᾳ διατριβαῖς. καὶ Ἀγησίλαος περὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως τί γὰρ ἐμοῦ μείζων ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος; ὁ δʼ Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γράφων ἔφη μὴ μόνον ἐκείνῳ προσήκειν ὅτι πολλῶν κρατεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον εἴ τις ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκει περὶ θεῶν. ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ὁρῶν τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ τῷ πολλοὺς ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον, ὁ κείνου μὲν χορός ἔφη μείζων, οὑμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος ὅταν οὖν οὕτω τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀντιτιθεὶς ὑπεκχέῃς φθόνους καὶ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ τὰ κνίζοντα καὶ ταπεινοῦντα πολλοὺς τῶν ἀρχομένων φιλοσοφεῖν, μέγα·

[¶6] 7. Whenever, then, by thus setting the advantages of virtue over against merely external advantages, you have succeeded in dispelling all envy and jealousy and the things that vex and depress many beginners in philosophy, you are thus again making clear to yourself in a significant way the reality of your progress. Of no slight significance either is the change which occurs in one’s discourse. For practically all beginners in philosophy are more inclined to pursue those forms of discourse which make for repute; some of these beginners, like birds, are led by their flightiness and ambition to alight on the resplendent heights of the Natural Sciences; while others, “like puppies, delighting to pull and tear,” as Plato puts it, go in for the disputations, knotty problems, and quibbles; but the majority enter a course in Logic and Argumentation, where they straightway stock themselves up for the practice of sophistry; while a few go about making a collection of apophthegms and anecdotes, but, as Anacharsis said of the Greeks that he never saw them put their money to any use save to count it, so these persons are for ever foolishly taking account and inventory of their literary stock, but they lay up nothing else which would be to their own profit. Quite in place here is Antiphanes’ story, which somebody has recounted and applied to Plato’s close acquaintances. Antiphanes said humorously that in a certain city words congealed with the cold the moment they were spoken, and later, as they thawed out, people heard in the summer what they had said to one another in the winter; it was the same way, he asserted, with what was said by Plato to men still in their youth; not until long afterwards, if ever, did most of them come to perceive the meaning, when they had become old men. And this is the general experience with philosophy as a whole until the judgement acquires a healthy stability, and begins to find itself in accord with principles productive of character and breadth of mind, and to look for the kind of discourse whose footprints, in the words of Aesop, are turned toward us rather than away from us. For as Sophocles said, that only after handling with a light touch the turgidity of Aeschylus and next his harshness and artificiality in composition, did he, as a third step, change the character of the language, which has the most to do with moral character and goodness, so, in the same way, when students of philosophy pass from the ostentatious and artificial to the kind of discourse which deals with character and feeling they begin to make real and unaffected progress.

> Greek: 7. καὶ τοῦτο δήλωμα σεαυτῷ τοῦ προκόπτειν ποιεῖς. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικρὸν οὐδʼ ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους μεταβολή. πάντες γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν οἱ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρχόμενοι τοὺς πρὸς δόξαν διώκουσι μᾶλλον, οἱ μὲν ὥσπερ ὄρνιθες ἐπὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τὸ ὕψος ὑπὸ κουφότητος καὶ φιλοτιμίας καταίροντες, οἱ δʼ ὥσπερ τὰ σκυλάκια φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων τῷ ἕλκειν καὶ σπαράττειν χαίροντες ἐπὶ τὰς ἔριδας καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας χωροῦσι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐνδύντες εὐθὺς ἐπισιτίζονται πρὸς σοφιστείαν, ἔνιοι δὲ χρείας καὶ ἱστορίας ἀναλεγόμενοι περιίασιν, ὥσπερ Ἀνάχαρσις ἔλεγε τῷ νομίσματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν χρωμένους ὁρᾶν, οὕτω τοὺς λόγους παραριθμούμενοι καὶ παραμετροῦντες, ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν αὑτῶν τιθέμενοι. συμβαίνει δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀντιφάνους, ὅ τις εἶπεν ἐπὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος συνήθων, ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφάνης ἔλεγε παίζων ἔν τινι πόλει τὰς φωνὰς εὐθὺς λεγομένας πήγνυσθαι διὰ ψῦχος, εἶθʼ ὕστερον ἀνιεμένων ἀκούειν θέρους ἃ τοῦ χειμῶνος διελέχθησαν οὕτω δὴ τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔφη νέοις οὖσιν ἔτι λεχθέντων μόλις ὀψὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς αἰσθάνεσθαι γέροντας γενομένους. καὶ πρὸς ὅλην δὲ τοῦτο τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πεπόνθασιν, ἄχρι· οὗ κατάστασιν ἡ κρίσις λαβοῦσα τοῖς ἦθος ἐμποιοῦσι καὶ μέγεθος ἄρξηται συμφέρεσθαι καὶ ζητεῖν λόγους, ὧν κατὰ τὸν Αἴσωπον εἴσω μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξω τὰ ἴχνη τέτραπται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἔλεγε τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχὼς ὄγκον εἶτα τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατάτεχνον τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος, ὅπερ ἠθικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ βέλτιστον οὕτως οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν καὶ κατατέχνων εἰς τὸν ἁπτόμενον ἤθους καὶ πάθους λόγον μεταβῶσιν, ἄρχονται τὴν ἀληθῆ προκοπὴν προκόπτειν καὶ ἄτυφον.

[¶7] 8. Observe, then, not only when you are perusing the writings of philosophers and listening to their discourses, whether you do not give more attention to the mere language than to the subject matter, and whether you are not more on the alert for passages which involve something difficult and odd rather than for those which convey something useful, substantial, and beneficial; moreover, when you are busying yourself with poems and history, you must watch yourself to see whether anything escapes you among the ideas which are suitably expressed and tend to improvement of character or alleviation of emotion. For as Simonides says of the bee that it flits among the flowers, “Making the yellow honey its care,” while the rest of the world contents itself with their colour and fragrance, getting nothing else from them, so, while the rest of the world ranges amid poems for the sake of pleasure or diversion, if a man, through his own initiative, finds and collects something worth while, it is reasonable to expect that he at last, from force of habit and fondness for what is beautiful and appropriate, has made himself capable of appreciating it. In the case, for example, of persons who make use of Plato and Xenophon for their language, and gather therefrom nothing else but the purity of the Attic style, like dew and bloom, what can you say of them, save that they are the sort of persons that content themselves with the sweet odour and bouquet of medicines, but have no desire for their sedative and purgative virtues, nor the power to discern them? But those who are making still more and more progress are always able to derive benefit, not only from what is said, but also from what is seen and done, and to gather what is appropriate and useful therefrom. Examples are found in the stories told of Aeschylus and of others like him. Aeschylus at the Isthmian games was watching a boxing-match, and when one of the men was hit the crowd in the theatre burst into a roar. Aeschylus nudged Ion of Chios, and said, “You see what a thing training is; the man who is hit says nothing; it is the spectators who shout.” Brasidas caught a mouse among some dried figs, got bitten, and let it go; thereupon he said to himself, “Heavens, there is nothing so small or weak that it will not save its life if it has courage to defend itself.” Diogenes at the first sight of a man drinking from his hands took his cup from his wallet and threw it away. Thus attention and intense application makes persons perceptive and receptive of anything that conduces to virtue, from whatever source it come. This is more apt to be the case if they combine theory with practice, not only, as Thucydides said, “carrying on their practice amid dangers,” but also when confronted by pleasures or contentions, and when busy over lawsuits and pleadings at court and the conduct of public offices, thus, as it were, giving themselves a demonstration of their convictions, or rather arriving at their convictions by putting them to a practical test; whereas, those who are still studying, and busily looking to see what they can get from philosophy which they can straightway haul out for display in the Forum, or at a gathering of young men, or at an evening party at Court, ought not to be thought to practise philosophy any more than apothecaries are to be thought to practise medicine; or rather, a charlatan of this sort does not differ at all from the bird described by Homer, for whatever he gets he proffers through the mouth to his pupils as to an “unfledged brood,” “Badly, however, it goes with himself,” if he does not devote to his own advantage, or assimilate at all, anything of what he receives.

> Greek: 8. ὅρα δὴ μὴ μόνον φιλοσόφων συγγράμματα διεξιὼν καὶ λόγους ἀκούων εἰ μὴ πλέον τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις προσέχεις ἢ τοῖς πράγμασι μηδὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιπηδᾷς τοῖς τὸ δύσκολον ἔχουσι καὶ περιττὸν ἢ τοῖς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ σάρκινον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιήμασιν ὁμιλῶν καὶ ἱστορίᾳ παραφύλαττε σεαυτὸν εἰ μηδέν σε διαφεύγει τῶν πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους ἢ πάθους κουφισμὸν ἐμμελῶς λεγομένων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθεσιν ὁμιλεῖν ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τὴν μέλιτταν ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι χρόαν αὐτῶν καὶ ὀσμήν, ἕτερον δʼ οὐδὲν ἀγαπῶσιν οὐδὲ λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτως ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ποιήμασιν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ παιδιᾶς ἀναστρεφομένων αὐτὸς εὑρίσκων τι καὶ συνάγων σπουδῆς ἄξιον ἔοικεν ἤδη γνωριστικὸς ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ φιλίας τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ οἰκείου γεγονέναι. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ξενοφῶντι χρωμένους διὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἕτερον δὲ μηδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ Ἀττικὸν ὥσπερ δρόσον καὶ χνοῦν ἀποδρεπομένους τί ἂν ἄλλο φαίης ἢ φαρμάκων τὸ μὲν εὐῶδες καὶ ἀνθηρὸν ἀγαπᾶν, τὸ δʼ ἀνώδυνον καὶ καθαρτικὸν μὴ προσίεσθαι μηδὲ διαγιγνώσκειν; ἀλλʼ οἵ γε μᾶλλον ἔτι προκόπτοντες οὐκ ἀπὸ λόγων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ θεαμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων πάντων ὠφελεῖσθαι δύνανται καὶ συνάγειν τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ χρήσιμον, οἷα καὶ περὶ Αἰσχύλου λέγουσι καὶ περὶ ἄλλων ὁμοίων, Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ Ἰσθμοῖ θεώμενος ἀγῶνα πυκτῶν, ἐπεὶ πληγέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ θέατρον ἐξέκραγε, νύξας Ἴωνα τὸν Χῖον ὁρᾷς ἔφη οἷον ἡ ἄσκησίς ἐστιν; ὁ πεπληγὼς σιωπᾷ, οἱ δὲ θεώμενοι βοῶσιν Βρασίδας δὲ μῦν τινα συλλαβὼν ἐν ἰσχάσι καὶ δηχθεὶς ἀφῆκεν· εἶτα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὦ Ἡράκλεις ἔφη, ὡς οὐδέν ἐστι μικρὸν οὐδʼ ἀσθενές, ὃ μὴ ζήσεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι Διογένης δὲ τὸν πίνοντα ταῖς χερσὶ θεασάμενος τῆς πήρας ἐξέβαλε τὸ ποτήριον. οὕτω τὸ προσέχειν καὶ τετάσθαι τὴν ἄσκησιν αἰσθητικοὺς καὶ δεκτικοὺς ποιεῖ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν φερόντων ἁπανταχόθεν. γίγνεται δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἂν τοὺς λόγους ταῖς πράξεσι μιγνύωσι, μὴ μόνον, ὡς Θουκυδίδης ἔλεγε, μετὰ κινδύνων ποιούμενοι τὰς μελέτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ πρὸς ἔριδας καὶ περὶ κρίσεις καὶ συνηγορίας καὶ ἀρχάς, οἷον ἀπόδειξιν αὑτοῖς τῶν δογμάτων διδόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ τῷ χρῆσθαι ποιοῦντες τὰ δόγματα. ὡς τοὺς γε μανθάνοντας ἔτι καὶ πραγματευομένους καὶ σκοποῦντας ὃ λαβόντες ἐκ φιλοσοφίας εὐθὺς εἰς ἀγορὰν ἢ νέων διατριβὴν ἢ βασιλικὸν συμπόσιον ἐκκυκλήσουσιν, οὐ μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ τοὺς τὰ φάρμακα πωλοῦντας ἰατρεύειν μᾶλλον δʼ ὅλως οὐδὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος σοφιστὴς διαφέρει τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς ὄρνιθος, ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃ τοῖς μαθηταῖς ὥσπερ ἀπτῆσι νεοσσοῖς προσφέρων διὰ τοῦ στόματος.
κακῶς δὲ τὲ οἱ πέλει αὐτῷ
μηδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν οἰκείαν ἀναδιδόντι μηδὲ καταπέττοντι τῶν λαμβανομένων.

[¶8] 9. It is therefore imperative that we consider carefully whether, as for ourselves, we employ our discourse for our own improvement, and whether, as it affects others, we employ it, not for the sake of momentary repute, nor from motives of ambition, but rather with the wish to hear and to impart something; but most of all must we consider whether the spirit of contention and quarrelling over debatable questions has been put down, and whether we have ceased to equip ourselves with arguments, as with boxing-gloves or brass knuckles, with which to contend against one another, and to take more delight in scoring a hit or a knockout than in learning and imparting something. For reasonableness and mildness in such matters, and the ability to join in discussions without wrangling, and to close them without anger, and to avoid a sort of arrogance over success in argument and exasperation over defeat, are the marks of a man who is making adequate progress. Aristippus made this clear when he was once outwitted in an argument by a man who had plenty of assurance, but was otherwise foolish and flighty. For seeing that the man was rejoicing and in great conceit, Aristippus said, “For all that I have been defeated I am going home to enjoy a sweeter sleep than you who have defeated me.” It is possible also in the practice of speaking to take some measure of ourselves, if, when a large audience has unexpectedly assembled, we do not suffer from stage-fright, and if we are not dispirited when arguing in the presence of a small number; and if, when the need has arisen to speak before the people or a magistrate, we do not let the occasion slip through lack of time to put our discourse into orderly form, as is told, for instance, of Demosthenes and Alcibiades. For the latter, although most keen in thinking out his subject matter, yet because of a certain lack of confidence about his manner of speaking, used to interrupt himself in the midst of his subject, and oftentimes, through his quest and pursuit of an elusive word or phrase while actually engaged in speaking, he made a flat failure. But Homer felt no repugnance against making the very first of his lines unmetrical;, Iliad, i. 1. so abounding was his confidence regarding the rest on account of his ability. It is rather to be expected, therefore, that those whose strivings are towards virtue and honour will avail themselves of the occasion and the subject, and give least thought to the shouting and applause that may be called forth by their manner of speaking.

> Greek: 9. ὅθεν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀναγκαῖον εἰ χρώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μὲν χρηστικῶς, πρὸς ἑτέρους δὲ μὴ δόξης εἰκαίας ἕνεκα μηδʼ ἐκ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀκοῦσαί τι καὶ διδάξαι βουλόμενοι, μάλιστα δʼ εἰ τὸ φιλόνεικον καὶ δύσερι περὶ τὰς ζητήσεις ὑφεῖται καὶ πεπαύμεθα τοὺς λόγους ὥσπερ ἱμάντας ἢ σφαίρας ἐπιδούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῷ πατάξαι καὶ καταβαλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μαθεῖν τι καὶ διδάξαι χαίροντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐπιείκεια καὶ πραότης καὶ τὸ μὴ μετʼ ἀγῶνος συνίστασθαι μηδὲ διαλύεσθαι μετʼ ὀργῆς τὰς κοινολογίας μηδʼ οἷον ἐφυβρίζειν ἐλέγξαντας ἢ χαλεπαίνειν ἐλεγχθέντας ἱκανῶς προκόπτοντός ἐστιν. ἐδήλωσε δʼ Ἀρίστιππος ἔν τινι λόγῳ κατασοφισθεὶς ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπου τόλμαν μὲν ἔχοντος, ἄλλως δʼ ἀνοήτου καὶ μανικοῦ. χαίροντα γὰρ ὁρῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τετυφωμένον ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν εἶπεν ὁ ἐλεγχθεὶς ἄπειμι σοῦ τοῦ ἐλέγξαντος ἥδιον καθευδήσων ἔστι· δὲ καὶ λέγοντας ἑαυτῶν λαμβάνειν διάπειραν εἰ μήτε πολλῶν παρὰ προσδοκίαν συνελθόντων ὑπὸ δειλίας ἀναδυόμεθα, μήτʼ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἀθυμοῦμεν ἀγωνιζόμενοι, μήτε πρὸς δῆμον ἢ πρὸς ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν δεῆσαν ἐνδείᾳ τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν παρασκευῆς προϊέμεθα τὸν καιρόν, οἷα περὶ Δημοσθένους λέγουσι καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος νοῆσαι μὲν πράγματα δεινότατος ὢν περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἀθαρσέστερος ἑαυτὸν διέκρουεν. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ πολλάκις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λέγειν ζητῶν καὶ διώκων ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα διαφεῦγον ἐξέπιπτεν Ὅμηρος δὲ τὸν πρῶτον οὐ διηνέχθη τῶν στίχων ἐξενεγκὼν ἄμετρον τοσοῦτο περιῆν αὐτῷ φρονήματος εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. οὐκοῦν μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν, οἷς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἡ ἅμιλλα, τῷ καιρῷ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς λέξεσι θορύβων καὶ κρότων ἐλάχιστα φροντίζοντας, οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἕκαστον ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ τὸ χρειῶδες τοῦ πανηγυρικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν αὐταῖς πλέον ἔνεστι τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.