--- title: "The Histories · Ἱστορίαι" author: "Polybius" translator: "Evelyn S. Shuckburgh" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Classical Greek" section: 14 of 103 url: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/14/ cite: "Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, The Histories · Ἱστορίαι, section 14. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/14/" --- # The Histories · Ἱστορίαι *Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh* How did Rome conquer the known world in under fifty-three years? A Greek hostage who became Scipio’s friend explains, with the Punic Wars, Hannibal, the Roman constitution and the fall of Carthage. > Greek: ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0543.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0543.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 14. Book II · chapters 60–71 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/14/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/14/#p-N [¶0] 60. But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace, without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and honour to the doers from all right-minded persons. But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery to the league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the case are these. He abdicated his sovereignty of Argos shortly before, finding himself in difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought on by the death of Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the clemency and generosity of the league; and, much to his own surprise, was left unmolested. For the Achaean government not only secured him an indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but admitted him as a member of the league, and invested him with the highest office in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and Strategus. All these favours he immediately forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little raised by the Cleomenic war; and at a crisis of the utmost importance he withdrew his native city, as well as his own personal adhesion, from the league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act of treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover of night at Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus says: he ought to have been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and to have ended his life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet the only severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae. > Greek: 60. μακρὸν γάρ. διόπερ οὐκ εἴ τινι τῶν ὁμοίων περιέπεσε δεινὸν ἡγητέον, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν. οὐδʼ Ἀντιγόνῳ προσαπτέον οὐδʼ Ἀράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, ὅν γε καὶ κατʼ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελοῦσι καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. ὅτε δὲ χωρὶς τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς παρεσπόνδησεν, τί παθεῖν ἦν ἄξιος; ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀπέθετο μὲν τὴν τυραννίδα χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον, ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν συγκλειόμενος διὰ τὸν Δημητρίου θάνατον, ἀνελπίστως δὲ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε περισταλεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρᾳότητος καὶ καλοκἀγαθίας· οἵτινες οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀσεβημάτων ἀζήμιον ἐποίησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μεγίστην τιμὴν περιέθεσαν, ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν. ὁ δʼ ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τήν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις καιροῖς προσένειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. ὃν ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὐκ ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νύκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς Φύλαρχός φησιν, περιαγόμενον δʼ εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζόμενον οὕτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τοιοῦτος ὢν οὐδενὸς ἔτυχε δεινοῦ πλὴν τοῦ καταποντισθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Κεγχρεαῖς τεταγμένων. [¶1] 61. There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with him;—and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league: and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to which an historian could better draw his reader’s attention. For what could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian. > Greek: 61. χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς μὲν Μαντινέων ἡμῖν συμφορὰς μετʼ αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἐξηγήσατο, δῆλον ὅτι καθήκειν ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι τὰς παρανόμους τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν γενναιότητος, ᾗ περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχρήσαντο καιρούς, οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐποιήσατο μνήμην, ὥσπερ τὸ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι τῶν πραξάντων οἰκειότερον ὑπάρχον τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἧττόν τι διορθουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ζηλωτῶν ἔργων ἤπερ ὑπὸ τῶν παρανόμων καὶ φευκτῶν πράξεων. ὁ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἔλαβε Κλεομένης τὴν πόλιν καὶ πῶς ἀκέραιον διαφυλάξας ἐξαπέστειλε παραχρῆμα πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην γραμματοφόρους, ἀξιῶν αὐτοὺς ἀβλαβῆ κομισαμένους τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα κοινωνῆσαι τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἐδήλωσε, βουλόμενος ὑποδεῖξαι τὴν Κλεομένους μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ μετριότητα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἀναγινωσκομένης οὐκ ἐάσαιεν εἰς τέλος ἀναγνωσθῆναι, μικροῦ δὲ καταλεύσαιεν τοὺς γραμματοφόρους, ἕως τούτου διεσάφησε. τὸ δʼ ἀκόλουθον καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἴδιον ἀφεῖλεν, τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἐπʼ ἀγαθῷ μνήμην τῶν ἀξιολόγων προαιρέσεων. καίτοι γʼ ἐμποδὼν ἦν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς λόγῳ καὶ δόγματι μόνον ὑπομείναντας πόλεμον ὑπὲρ φίλων καὶ συμμάχων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς νομίζομεν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ χώρας καταφθορὰν καὶ πολιορκίαν ἀναδεξαμένοις οὐ μόνον ἔπαινον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἀπονέμομεν, τίνα γε χρὴ περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν; ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην; οἳ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἵρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῆ ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἁπάντων συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν. οὗ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτʼ ἄν; ἐπὶ τί δʼ ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δʼ ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν; ὧν οὐδεμίαν ἐποιήσατο μνήμην Φύλαρχος, τυφλώττων, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα συγγραφεῖ καθήκοντα τῶν ἔργων. [¶2] 62. He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that, from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity of which it is capable. Still even at this period, if you could collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men, and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same period to only three hundred talents. > Greek: 62. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων ἑξακισχίλια τάλαντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πεσεῖν, ὧν τὰ δισχίλια Κλεομένει δοθῆναι κατὰ τοὺς ἐθισμούς. ἐν δὲ τούτοις πρῶτον μὲν τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων χορηγίας καὶ δυνάμεως; ἣν μάλιστα δεῖ παρὰ τοῖς ἱστοριογράφοις ὑπάρχειν. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ λέγω κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς ὑπό τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων ἄρδην κατέφθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησίων, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς καθʼ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ λέγοντες μεγίστην καρποῦσθαι δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὅμως ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπίπλων χωρὶς σωμάτων οὐχ οἷόν τε συναχθῆναι τοσοῦτο πλῆθος χρημάτων. καὶ διότι τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ εἰκῇ, λόγῳ δέ τινι μᾶλλον ἀποφαινόμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων οὐχ ἱστόρηκε διότι καθʼ οὓς καιροὺς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνέβαινον πόλεμον καὶ μυρίους μὲν ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἑκατὸν δʼ ἐπλήρουν τριήρεις, ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσφορὰς ἐτιμήσαντο τήν τε χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν οὐσίαν· ἀλλʼ ὅμως τὸ σύμπαν τίμημα τῆς ἀξίας ἐνέλιπε τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων διακοσίοις καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις. ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπεοικὸς ἂν φανείη τὸ περὶ Πελοποννησίων ἄρτι ῥηθὲν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ. κατὰ δʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ὑπερβολικῶς ἀποφαινόμενος οὐκ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν τολμήσειεν πλείω γενέσθαι τριακοσίων, ἐπειδήπερ ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι διότι καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δουλικῶν σωμάτων τὰ πλεῖστα συνέβη διαφυγεῖν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. μέγιστον δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τεκμήριον· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὄντες δεύτεροι τῶν Ἀρκάδων Μαντινεῖς οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν περιουσίαν, ὡς αὐτὸς οὗτός φησιν, ἐκ πολιορκίας δὲ καὶ παραδόσεως ἁλόντες, ὥστε μήτε διαφυγεῖν μηδένα μήτε διακλαπῆναι ῥᾳδίως μηδέν, ὅμως τὸ πᾶν λάφυρον ἐποίησαν μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς τάλαντα τριακόσια. [¶3] 63. But a more astonishing mis-statement remains to be remarked. In the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts “that about ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if he had at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for my present purpose enough has been said. > Greek: 63. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτῳ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάσειε; ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποφαινόμενος λέγει πρὸ τῆς παρατάξεως δέχʼ ἡμέραις μάλιστα τὸν παρὰ Πτολεμαίου πρεσβευτὴν ἐλθεῖν ἀγγέλλοντα πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαῖος τὸ μὲν χορηγεῖν ἀπολέγει, διαλύεσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον. τὸν δʼ ἀκούσαντά φησι κρῖναι διότι δεῖ τὴν ταχίστην ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὅλοις πρὸ τοῦ συνεῖναι τὰ προσπεπτωκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνασθαι μισθοδοτεῖν. ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἑξακισχιλίων ἐγκρατὴς ἐγεγόνει ταλάντων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, τὸν Πτολεμαῖον αὐτὸν ἠδύνατο ταῖς χορηγίαις ὑπερθέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, εἰ μόνον τριακοσίων ὑπῆρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ἱκανὸς ἦν ἀσφαλῶς ὑπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. τὸ δʼ ἅμα μὲν πάσας ἀποφαίνειν τῷ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν Πτολεμαίῳ διὰ τὰς χορηγίας, ἅμα δὲ τοσούτων χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἔτι δʼ ἀσκεψίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα τῷ συγγραφεῖ τοιαῦτα καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροὺς καὶ παρʼ ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν κατατέτακται, περὶ ὧν ἀρκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. [¶4] 64. Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at Argos. But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army, addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step, because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus: therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home, after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result. For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested. > Greek: 64. μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἅλωσιν Ἀντιγόνου παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀργείων πόλει, συναγαγὼν Κλεομένης ἅμα τῷ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς καιροῖς, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων χώραν, ὡς μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐδόκει, παραβόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τῶν κατὰ τὰς εἰσόδους τόπων, ὡς δὲ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις, ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς. ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀντίγονον διαφεικότα τὰς δυνάμεις, ᾔδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον ἔτι τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἕως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς Ἀργείους θεωροῦντας τὸ γινόμενον ἀσχάλλειν καὶ καταμέμφεσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίη μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρραπισμὸν τῶν ὄχλων ἐξελθεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, πρόδηλον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν αὐτῷ διότι νικήσει ῥᾳδίως. εἰ δʼ ἐμμείνας τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀφησυχάζοι, καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι θάρσος ἐνεργασάμενος ἀσφαλῶς ὑπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ χώρας δῃουμένης οἱ μὲν ὄχλοι συστρεφόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἐλοιδόρουν. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἡγεμονικῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον χρήσασθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καταφθείρας μὲν τὴν χώραν, καταπληξάμενος δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εὐθαρσεῖς δὲ πεποιηκὼς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανῆλθεν. [¶5] 65. Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and Achaean soldiers having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army, along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force consisted of ten thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand light armed, and three hundred cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three hundred cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner, under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of the allies there were two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry, from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from Epirus; the same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from Illyria, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted to twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees; while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading forces would take that direction: which turned out to be the case. This pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and Olympus, and the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under the command of his brother Eucleides; while he himself held Olympus with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the river he stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries, on both sides of the road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once the strength of the position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had selected the different branches of his army to occupy the points of vantage, so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in order, either for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost unassailable position. > Greek: 65. τοῦ δὲ θέρους ἐνισταμένου, καὶ συνελθόντων τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ τῆς χειμασίας, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν Ἀντίγονος προῆγε μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἔχων Μακεδόνας μὲν τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίους, πελταστὰς δὲ τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀγριᾶνας δὲ σὺν τούτοις χιλίους καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσούτους, μισθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀχαιῶν δʼ ἐπιλέκτους πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλοπολίτας χιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Κερκιδᾶς Μεγαλοπολίτης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βοιωτῶν μὲν πεζοὺς δισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους, Ἠπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλίους, ἱππεῖς πεντήκοντα, Ἀκαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσούτους, Ἰλλυριῶν χιλίους ἑξακοσίους, ἐφʼ ὧν ἦν Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος, ὥστʼ εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης προσδοκῶν τὴν ἔφοδον τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τὰς εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβολὰς ἠσφαλίσατο φυλακαῖς καὶ τάφροις καὶ δένδρων ἐκκοπαῖς, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σελλασίαν καλουμένην μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐστρατοπέδευε, τῆς πάσης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς εἰς δύο μυριάδας, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ταύτῃ ποιήσασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τὴν εἰσβολήν· ὃ καὶ συνεκύρησε. δύο δὲ λόφων ἐπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς εἰσόδου κειμένων, ὧν τὸν μὲν Εὔαν, τὸν δʼ ἕτερον Ὄλυμπον καλεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, τῆς δʼ ὁδοῦ μεταξὺ τούτων παρὰ τὸν Οἰνοῦντα ποταμὸν φερούσης εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην, ὁ μὲν Κλεομένης τῶν προειρημένων λόφων συνάμφω τάφρον καὶ χάρακα προβαλόμενος ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Εὔαν ἔταξε τοὺς περιοίκους καὶ συμμάχους, ἐφʼ ὧν ἐπέστησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν Εὐκλείδαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν Ὄλυμπον κατεῖχε μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς ἱππεῖς μετὰ μέρους τινὸς τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. Ἀντίγονος δὲ παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τήν τε τῶν τόπων ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὸν Κλεομένη πᾶσι τοῖς οἰκείοις μέρεσι τῆς δυνάμεως οὕτως εὐστόχως προκατειληφότα τὰς εὐκαιρίας ὥστε παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ σύμπαν σχῆμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὁπλομάχων προβολῆς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλειπε τῶν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν ἅμα καὶ φυλακήν, ἀλλʼ ἦν ὁμοῦ παράταξις ἐνεργὸς καὶ παρεμβολὴ δυσπρόσοδος· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπειράζειν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι προχείρως ἀπέγνω, στρατοπεδεύσας δʼ ἐν βραχεῖ διαστήματι καὶ λαβὼν πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλον καλούμενον ποταμόν, τινὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμένων συνεθεώρει τάς τε τῶν τόπων ἰδιότητας καὶ τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων διαφοράς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προδεικνύων τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐξεκαλεῖτο τὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπινοίας. [¶6] 66. The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing himself by reconnaisances of the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment’s notice to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into competition two commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill. To face the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in alternate lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were posted opposite the enemy’s cavalry, under the command of Alexander, and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries and Macedonian troops in person against the division on Olympus commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag. > Greek: 66. οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ λαβεῖν οὐδὲν ἀργὸν οὐδʼ ἔξοπλον διὰ τὸ πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως ἀντικινεῖσθαι τὸν Κλεομένη, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐπινοίας ἀπέστη, τέλος δʼ ἐξ ὁμολόγου διὰ μάχης ἀμφότεροι προέθεντο κρίνειν τὰς πράξεις· πάνυ γὰρ εὐφυεῖς καὶ παραπλησίους ἡγεμόνας ἡ τύχη συνέβαλε τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Εὔαν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακεδόνων τοὺς χαλκάσπιδας καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριούς, κατὰ σπείρας ἐναλλὰξ τεταγμένους, Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀκμήτου καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστήσας. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ Ἠπειρώτας ἐπέβαλε· τούτων δὲ κατόπιν ἦσαν δισχίλιοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν. τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς περὶ τὸν Οἰνοῦντα ποταμὸν ἀντέθηκε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων ἱππικῷ, συστήσας αὐτοῖς Ἀλέξανδρον ἡγεμόνα καὶ συμπαραθεὶς πεζοὺς τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν χιλίους καὶ Μεγαλοπολίτας τοὺς ἴσους. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἔχων καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας κατὰ τὸν Ὄλυμπον πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλεομένη διέγνω ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην. προτάξας οὖν τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπέστησε διφαλαγγίαν ἐπάλληλον τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἐποίει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὴν στενότητα τῶν τόπων. σύνθημα δʼ ἦν τοῖς μὲν Ἰλλυριοῖς τότε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόφον προσβολῆς, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀρθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ὄλυμπον τόπων σινδόνα — προσηρτημένοι γὰρ ἦσαν οὗτοι νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ Γοργύλῳ ποταμῷ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ λόφου ῥίζῃ — τοῖς δὲ Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι παραπλησίως, ἐπειδὰν φοινικὶς ἐξαρθῇ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. [¶7] 67. The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who were stationed with Cleomenes’s cavalry, observing that the Achaean lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged them on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear. It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen, vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the enemy. This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hearing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no longer had their attention diverted by an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed confidence. And this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas. > Greek: 67. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὁ μὲν καιρὸς ἧκε τῆς χρείας, τὸ δὲ σύνθημα τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς ἀπεδόθη, παρήγγειλαν δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ δέον οἷς ἦν ἐπιμελές, πάντες εὐθέως ἀναδείξαντες αὑτοὺς κατήρχοντο τῆς πρὸς τὸν βουνὸν προσβολῆς. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν Κλεομένους ἱππέων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ταχθέντες εὔζωνοι, θεωροῦντες τὰς σπείρας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐρήμους ἐκ τῶν κατόπιν οὔσας, κατʼ οὐρὰν προσπίπτοντες εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ κίνδυνον ἦγον τοὺς πρὸς τὸν λόφον βιαζομένους, ὡς ἂν τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς ἐφεστώτων, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων κατόπιν ἐπικειμένων καὶ προσφερόντων τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δὲ προορώμενος τὸ μέλλον Φιλοποίμην ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδεικνύειν ἐπεβάλλετο τοῖς προεστῶσι τὸ συμβησόμενον· οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μήτʼ ἐφʼ ἡγεμονίας τετάχθαι μηδεπώποτε κομιδῇ τε νέον ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πολίτας ἐνέβαλε τοῖς πολεμίοις τολμηρῶς. οὗ γενομένου ταχέως οἱ προσκείμενοι μισθοφόροι κατʼ οὐρὰν τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν, ἀκούσαντες τῆς κραυγῆς καὶ συνιδόντες τὴν τῶν ἱππέων συμπλοκήν, ἀφέμενοι τῶν προκειμένων ἀνέτρεχον εἰς τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τάξεις καὶ προσεβοήθουν τοῖς παρʼ αὑτῶν ἱππεῦσι. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος ἀπερίσπαστον γενόμενον τό τε τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἅμα τούτοις προσβαινόντων πλῆθος ἐκθύμως ὥρμησε καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα φανερὸν ἐγενήθη διότι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν προτερήματος αἴτιος ἐγίνετο Φιλοποίμην. [¶8] 68. It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion, for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, “Why he had engaged before the signal was given?” And upon Alexander answering that “He had not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:” Antigonus replied, “That young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you, general, were the youngster.” What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight. > Greek: 68. ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονόν φασι μετὰ ταῦτα καταπειράζοντα πυνθάνεσθαι τοῦ ταχθέντος ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππέων Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τί πρὸ τοῦ παραδοθῆναι τὸ σύνθημα τοῦ κινδύνου κατάρξαιτο. τοῦ δʼ ἀρνουμένου, φάσκοντος δὲ μειράκιόν τι Μεγαλοπολιτικὸν προεγχειρῆσαι παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην, εἰπεῖν διότι τὸ μὲν μειράκιον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ ποιήσαι, συνθεασάμενον τὸν καιρόν, ἐκεῖνος δʼ ἡγεμὼν ὑπάρχων μειρακίου τοῦ τυχόντος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οἵ γε περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ὁρῶντες προσβαινούσας τὰς σπείρας, ἀφέμενοι τοῦ χρῆσθαι ταῖς τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίαις — τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἐκ πολλοῦ συναντῶντας καὶ προσπίπτοντας τοῖς πολεμίοις τὰ μὲν ἐκείνων στίφη συνταράττειν καὶ διαλύειν, αὐτοὺς δʼ ὑποχωρεῖν ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ μεθίστασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους ἀεὶ τόπους ἀσφαλῶς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν προλυμηνάμενοι καὶ συγχέαντες τὸ τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως ἰδίωμα τῶν ὑπεναντίων ῥᾳδίως αὐτοὺς ἐτρέψαντο διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυΐαν — τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐποίησαν, καθάπερ δʼ ἐξ ἑτοίμου σφίσι τῆς νίκης ὑπαρχούσης τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς στάσιν ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς ἀνωτάτω σπεύδοντες λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους εἰς τὸ τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ καταφερῆ καὶ κρημνώδη γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. συνέβη δʼ, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, τοὐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολιπόντες αὑτοῖς ἀναχώρησιν, προσδεξάμενοι δʼ ἀκεραίους ἅμα καὶ συνεστώσας τὰς σπείρας, εἰς τοῦτο δυσχρηστίας ἦλθον ὥστε διʼ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ λόφου κορυφῆς διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπιέσθησαν τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως, εὐθέως οἱ μὲν Ἰλλυριοὶ τὴν κατάστασιν ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν τὴν ὑπὸ πόδα διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι τόπον εἰς ἀναχώρησιν καὶ μετάστασιν ἑαυτοῖς. ἐξ οὗ ταχέως συνέβη τραπέντας αὐτοὺς ὀλεθρίῳ χρήσασθαι φυγῇ, κρημνώδη καὶ δύσβατον ἐχόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τῶν τόπων. [¶9] 69. Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other hill Olympus began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and even between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother’s division was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both sides, who were on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other. Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suffering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta: but the same night he went down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to Alexandria. > Greek: 69. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συνετελεῖτο κίνδυνος, ἐκπρεπῆ ποιουμένων τὴν χρείαν τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν ἱππέων ἁπάντων, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλοποίμενος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας συνεστάναι τὸν ὅλον ἀγῶνα. καθʼ ὃν καιρὸν τῷ προειρημένῳ συνέβη τὸν μὲν ἵππον πεσεῖν πληγέντα καιρίως, αὐτὸν δὲ πεζομαχοῦντα περιπεσεῖν τραύματι βιαίῳ διʼ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μηροῖν. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὸν Ὄλυμπον τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ μισθοφόρων τὴν συμπλοκήν, παρʼ ἑκατέροις σχεδὸν ὑπαρχόντων τούτων εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. ὧν ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ μέρη, ποτὲ δʼ ὁλοσχερῶς συμπιπτόντων, διαφέρουσαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν χρείαν, ὁμοῦ τῶν τε βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐν συνόψει ποιουμένων τὴν μάχην. ἡμιλλῶντο δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κατʼ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τάγμα ταῖς εὐψυχίαις. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν πεφευγότας, τοὺς δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ἱππεῖς ὅσον οὔπω κλίνοντας, καταπλαγὴς ὢν μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξηται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἠναγκάζετο διασπᾶν τὰ προτειχίσματα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἐξάγειν μετωπηδὸν κατὰ μίαν πλευρὰν τῆς στρατοπεδείας. ἀνακληθέντων δὲ τῶν παρʼ ἑκατέροις εὐζώνων ἐκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου διὰ τῆς σάλπιγγος, συναλαλάξασαι καὶ καταβαλοῦσαι τὰς σαρίσας συνέβαλλον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀλλήλαις. ἀγῶνος δὲ γενομένου κραταιοῦ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ πόδα ποιουμένων τὴν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ πιεζομένων ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν Μακεδόνων ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακώνων εὐψυχίας, ποτὲ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξωθουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ βάρους τῆς τῶν Μακεδόνων τάξεως, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον συμφράξαντες τὰς σαρίσας καὶ χρησάμενοι τῷ τῆς ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος ἰδιώματι, βίᾳ προσπεσόντες ἐξέωσαν ἐκ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πλῆθος ἔφευγε προτροπάδην φονευόμενον· ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης ἱππεῖς τινας ἔχων περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τούτων ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς καταβὰς εἰς Γύθιον, ἡτοιμασμένων αὐτῷ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἀπῆρε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν. [¶10] 70. Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens with magnanimity and humanity; and after reestablishing their ancient constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the country. This was a instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off the battle for a few days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only held out for a brief space of time, he would have saved his crown. As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its constitution, arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time of the Nemean games. Having at this assembly received every mark of immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean community, as well as of the several states, he made all haste to reach Macedonia. He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to give him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that he ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but still more by his character and good principles. He left the kingdom of Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius. > Greek: 70. Ἀντίγονος δʼ ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου τῆς Σπάρτης τά τε λοιπὰ μεγαλοψύχως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τό τε πολίτευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, προσαγγελθέντος αὐτῷ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς εἰσβεβληκότας εἰς Μακεδονίαν πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὕτως ἀεί ποθʼ ἡ τύχη τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λόγον εἴωθε κρίνειν. καὶ γὰρ τότε Κλεομένης, εἴτε τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον παρείλκυσε τελέως ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, εἴτʼ ἀναχωρήσας ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν καιρῶν ἀντεποιήσατο, διακατέσχεν ἂν τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅ γʼ Ἀντίγονος παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν καὶ τούτοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν δευτεραῖος ἐντεῦθεν εἰς Ἄργος ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ἦλθε τὴν τῶν Νεμέων πανήγυριν. ἐν ᾗ τυχὼν πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀθάνατον δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἀνηκόντων ὑπό τε τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν ἑκάστης τῶν πόλεων ὥρμησε κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν. καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ συμβαλὼν ἐκ παρατάξεως τῇ μὲν μάχῃ κατώρθωσε, τῇ δὲ παρακλήσει καὶ κραυγῇ τῇ κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκθύμως χρησάμενος εἰς αἵματος ἀναγωγὴν καί τινα τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ἐμπεσὼν μετʼ οὐ πολὺ νόσῳ τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε, καλὰς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείξας ἐν αὑτῷ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείαν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν καὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν. τὴν δὲ Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν ἀπέλιπε Φιλίππῳ τῷ Δημητρίου. [¶11] 71. My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to treat. Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus, son of that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus and Pogon: he was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother Antiochus. The deaths of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus—fell in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the three immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus,— for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the former in the 139th. I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and laid the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when, how, and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to aim at dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians the dominion of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state of Greece, Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived at the period which I originally marked out,—that namely in which the Greeks were on the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the Hannibalic war, and the kings in Asia the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and the death of the princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to this book. > Greek: 71. τίνος δὲ χάριν ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου μνήμην; διότι τῶν καιρῶν τούτων συναπτόντων τοῖς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἱστορεῖσθαι μέλλουσι χρήσιμον ἐδόκει, μᾶλλον δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν τὸ ποιῆσαι πᾶσιν ἐναργῆ καὶ γνώριμον τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τότε κατάστασιν. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς καὶ Πτολεμαίου νόσῳ τὸν βίον μεταλλάξαντος Πτολεμαῖος ὁ κληθεὶς Φιλοπάτωρ διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν. μετήλλαξε δὲ καὶ Σέλευκος ὁ Σελεύκου τοῦ Καλλινίκου καὶ Πώγωνος ἐπικληθέντος· Ἀντίοχος δὲ διεδέξατο τὴν ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλείαν, ἀδελφὸς ὢν αὐτοῦ. παραπλήσιον γὰρ δή τι συνέβη τούτοις καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν κατασχοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς ταύτας, λέγω δὲ Σελεύκῳ, Πτολεμαίῳ, Λυσιμάχῳ. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πάντες περὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρτην πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάδα μετήλλαξαν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὗτοί τε περὶ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ τριακοστήν. ἡμεῖς δʼ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευὴν τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας διεληλύθαμεν, διʼ ἧς ὑποδέδεικται πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διʼ ἃς αἰτίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κρατήσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἤρξαντο τοῖς ἔξω πράγμασι καὶ πρῶτον ἐτόλμησαν ἀμφισβητεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῆς θαλάττης, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχουσαν τότε κατάστασιν δεδηλώκαμεν, καθῆκον ἂν εἴη παραγεγονότας ἐπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἐν οἷς ἔμελλον οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες τὸν συμμαχικόν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τὸν Ἀννιβιακόν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν βασιλεῖς τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας ἐνίστασθαι πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν βύβλον ταύτην ἀφορίζειν ἀκολούθως τῇ τε τῶν προγεγονότων πραγμάτων περιγραφῇ καὶ τῇ τῶν κεχειρικότων τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δυναστῶν καταστροφῇ.