1. I STATED in my first book that my work was to start from the Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now, after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained. The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under the dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of being exactly dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end. For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea of my whole plan; for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its contents. I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts, the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included between these limits is fifty-three years; and never has an equal space embraced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing them I shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in the following order:
1. ὅτι μὲν ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθέμεθα τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας τόν τε συμμαχικὸν καὶ τὸν Ἀννιβιακόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας πόλεμον, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μὲν τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως, τρίτῃ δὲ ταύτης ἀνώτερον βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ἀναδραμόντες τοῖς χρόνοις πρὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν συνεταξάμεθα τὰς πρὸ ταύτης βύβλους, ἐν αὐτῇ ʼκείνῃ διεσαφήσαμεν. νῦν δὲ πειρασόμεθα τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἐξ ὧν ἐγένοντο καὶ διʼ ἃς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ηὐξήθησαν, μετʼ ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, βραχέα προειπόντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας. ὄντος γὰρ ἑνὸς ἔργου καὶ θεάματος ἑνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὑπὲρ οὗ γράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, τοῦ πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ διὰ τί πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν ἐγένετο, τούτου δʼ ἔχοντος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν γνωριζομένην καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὡρισμένον καὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ὁμολογουμένην, χρήσιμον ἡγούμεθʼ εἶναι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῷ μερῶν, ὅσα μεταξὺ κεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους, κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπιμνησθῆναι καὶ προεκθέσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνομεν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι παρασκευάσειν ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ προλαμβανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ὅλων πρὸς τὴν κατὰ μέρος τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν, πολλὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιστήμην, ἀρίστην ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίστασιν καὶ θέαν ἀκόλουθον τοῖς εἰρημένοις ποιησόμεθα τὴν προέκθεσιν τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας. τὴν μὲν οὖν καθόλου τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔμφασιν καὶ τὴν περιγραφὴν ἤδη δεδηλώκαμεν. τῶν δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἐν αὐτῇ γεγονότων ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους, καταστροφὴν δὲ καὶ συντέλειαν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας, χρόνον δὲ τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους ἔτη πεντήκοντα τρία, περιέχεσθαι δʼ ἐν τούτῳ τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὅσας οὐδεὶς τῶν προγεγονότων καιρῶν ἐν ἴσῳ περιέλαβε διαστήματι. περὶ ὧν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος ἀρξάμενοι τοιάνδε τινὰ ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἔφοδον τῆς ἐξηγήσεως.
2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war: and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself. I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage. Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and finally went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria. Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus. At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion. Along with this I shall introduce another digression on the fall of Hiero of Syracuse. After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact for the partition of the dominions of that monarch’s infant son. I shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.
2. ὑποδείξαντες γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας, διʼ ἃς ὁ προδεδηλωμένος συνέστη Καρχηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις πόλεμος, ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς Ἀννιβιακός, ἐροῦμεν ὡς εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐμβαλόντες Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ καταλύσαντες τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν εἰς μέγαν μὲν φόβον ἐκείνους ἤγαγον περὶ σφῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, μεγάλας δʼ ἔσχον αὐτοὶ καὶ παραδόξους ἐλπίδας, ὡς καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἐξ ἐφόδου κρατήσοντες. ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις πειρασόμεθα διασαφεῖν ὡς κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Φίλιππος μὲν ὁ Μακεδὼν διαπολεμήσας Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐπεβάλετο κοινωνεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων, Ἀντίοχος δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἠμφισβήτουν, τέλος δʼ ἐπολέμησαν ὑπὲρ Κοίλης Συρίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Προυσίας ἀναλαβόντες πρὸς Βυζαντίους πόλεμον ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ἀποστῆναι τοῦ παραγωγιάζειν τοὺς πλέοντας εἰς τὸν Πόντον. στήσαντες δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων τὴν διήγησιν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας συστησόμεθα λόγον, ᾧ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὑποδείξομεν ὅτι μέγιστα συνεβάλετʼ αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότης πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν δυναστείαν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἰβήρων προσλαβεῖν καὶ Κελτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔννοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις κατὰ παρέκβασιν δηλώσομεν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς Ἱέρωνος τοῦ Συρακοσίου δυναστείας. οἷς ἐπισυνάψομεν τὰς περὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ταραχὰς καὶ τίνα τρόπον Πτολεμαίου τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον συμφρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ διαιρέσει τῆς τοῦ καταλελειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἤρξαντο κακοπραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φίλιππος μὲν τοῖς κατʼ Αἴγαιον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμον, Ἀντίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.
3. Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall, following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, and result. Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless violence of the Gauls. Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians, I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against Pharnaces. Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese, and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of the war against Perseus; and the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest of the whole world.
3. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ καὶ Λιβύῃ καὶ Σικελίᾳ πράξεις Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων μεταβιβάσομεν τὴν διήγησιν ὁλοσχερῶς εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς. ἐξηγησάμενοι δὲ τὰς Ἀττάλου καὶ Ῥοδίων ναυμαχίας πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Φιλίππου πόλεμον, ὡς ἐπράχθη καὶ διὰ τίνων καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἔσχεν, τούτῳ συνάπτοντες τὸ συνεχὲς μνησθησόμεθα τῆς Αἰτωλῶν ὀργῆς, καθʼ ἣν Ἀντίοχον ἐπισπασάμενοι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Ῥωμαίοις ἐξέκαυσαν πόλεμον. οὗ δηλώσαντες τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὴν Ἀντιόχου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διασαφήσομεν πρῶτον μὲν τίνα τρόπον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔφυγεν, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς ἡττηθεὶς τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου πάσης ἐξεχώρησε, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τίνα τρόπον Ῥωμαῖοι καταλύσαντες τὴν Γαλατῶν ὕβριν ἀδήριτον μὲν σφίσι παρεσκεύασαν τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχήν, ἀπέλυσαν δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου κατοικοῦντας βαρβαρικῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς Γαλατῶν παρανομίας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὰς Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κεφαλλήνων ἀτυχίας ἐπιβαλοῦμεν τοὺς Εὐμένει συστάντας πρός τε Προυσίαν καὶ Γαλάτας πολέμους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν μετʼ Ἀριαράθου πρὸς Φαρνάκην. οἷς ἑξῆς ἐπιμνησθέντες τῆς παρὰ Πελοποννησίων ὁμονοίας καὶ καταστάσεως, ἔτι δὲ τῆς αὐξήσεως τοῦ Ῥοδίων πολιτεύματος, συγκεφαλαιωσόμεθα τὴν ὅλην διήγησιν ἅμα καὶ τὰς πράξεις, ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐξηγησάμενοι τὴν Ἀντιόχου στρατείαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον τοῦ κληθέντος Ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας. διʼ ὧν ἅμα θεωρηθήσεται πῶς ἕκαστα χειρίσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πᾶσαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὑτοῖς.
4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of their successes or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as soon as I reached these last events in accordance with my original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power had arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time the acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands obeyed. But in truth, judgments of either side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in the field are by no means final. It has often happened that what seemed the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes and aims of the several nations, whether in their private lives or public policy. The present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results of the several employments. Accordingly the object of this work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances which broke out at a later period. These I designed to make the starting-point of what may almost be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of the actors, and in others the chief director.
4. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν κατορθωμάτων ἢ καὶ τῶν ἐλαττωμάτων ἱκανὴν ἐνεδέχετο ποιήσασθαι τὴν διάληψιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἐπαινετῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων, ἐνθάδε που λήγειν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει καὶ καταστρέφειν ἅμα τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἐπὶ τὰς τελευταίας ῥηθείσας πράξεις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ὅ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακαιτριετὴς εἰς ταῦτʼ ἔληγεν, ἥ τʼ αὔξησις καὶ προκοπὴ τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας ἐτετελείωτο· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτʼ εἶναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπόν ἐστι Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων. ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐκ αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν κρατησάντων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐλαττωθέντων αἱ ψιλῶς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων διαλήψεις, διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς μὲν τὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρήσωνται, τὰς μεγίστας ἐπενηνοχέναι συμφοράς, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας, ὅταν εὐγενῶς αὐτὰς ἀναδέξωνται, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος περιπεπτωκέναι μερίδα, προσθετέον ἂν εἴη ταῖς προειρημέναις πράξεσι τήν τε τῶν κρατούντων αἵρεσιν, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πῶς προεστάτει τῶν ὅλων, τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχὰς καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπῆρχον περὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τοὺς ζήλους ἐξηγητέον, τίνες παρʼ ἑκάστοις ἐπεκράτουν καὶ κατίσχυον περί τε τοὺς κατʼ ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσιν πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τοὐναντίον αἱρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρός τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλεῖστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτʼ εἶναι τέλος ὑποληπτέον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφαινομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νικῆσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας ὑφʼ ἑαυτούς. οὔτε γὰρ πολεμεῖ τοῖς πέλας οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταγωνίσασθαι τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους, οὔτε πλεῖ τὰ πελάγη χάριν τοῦ περαιωθῆναι μόνον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει· πάντες δὲ πράττουσι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις ἡδέων ἢ καλῶν ἢ συμφερόντων. διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τοῦτʼ ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνῶναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρʼ ἑκάστοις, ποία τις ἦν μετὰ τὸ καταγωνισθῆναι τὰ ὅλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξουσίαν ἕως τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπιγενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως. ὑπὲρ ἧς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεων καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβαινόντων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ τῶν πλείστων μὴ μόνον αὐτόπτης, ἀλλʼ ὧν μὲν συνεργὸς ὧν δὲ καὶ χειριστὴς γεγονέναι, προήχθην οἷον ἀρ χὴν ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν.
5. The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years’ possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived of it, and of his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning and end. This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events, with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several parts, I must now, remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history starts.
5. ἦν δʼ ἡ προειρημένη κίνησις, ἐν ᾗ Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν πρὸς Κελτίβηρας καὶ Οὐακκαίους ἐξήνεγκαν πόλεμον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μασαννάσαν βασιλέα τῶν Λιβύων· περὶ δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἄτταλος μὲν καὶ Προυσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπολέμησαν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Καππαδοκῶν βασιλεὺς Ἀριαράθης ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπʼ Ὀροφέρνους διὰ Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως αὖθις ἀνεκτήσατο διʼ Ἀττάλου τὴν πατρῴαν ἀρχήν. ὁ δὲ Σελεύκου Δημήτριος κύριος γενόμενος ἔτη δώδεκα τῆς ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλείας ἅμα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐστερήθη, συστραφέντων ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων. ἀποκατέστησαν δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολέμου καταιτιαθέντας, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς ἐπενεχθείσης αὐτοῖς διαβολῆς. οἱ δʼ αὐτοὶ μετʼ οὐ πολὺ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μεταναστῆσαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἄρδην αὐτοὺς ἐξαναστῆσαι προθέμενοι διὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθησομένας αἰτίας. οἷς κατάλληλα Μακεδόνων μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίων φιλίας, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμπολιτείας ἀποστάντων, ἅμα τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἔσχε τὸ κοινὸν ἀτύχημα πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα· προσδεῖ δʼ ἔτι τῆς τύχης, ἵνα συνδράμῃ τὰ τοῦ βίου πρὸς τὸ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν. πέπεισμαι μὲν γάρ, κἄν τι συμβῇ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπινον, οὐκ ἀργήσειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐδʼ ἀπορήσειν ἀνδρῶν ἀξιόχρεων, διὰ δὲ τὸ κάλλος πολλοὺς κατεγγυηθήσεσθαι καὶ σπουδάσειν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν αὐτήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας τῶν πράξεων ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου διεληλύθαμεν, βουλόμενοι καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀγαγεῖν τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, ὥρα μνημονεύοντας τῆς προθέσεως ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὑτῶν ὑποθέσεως.
6. Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly, their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions in the war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the cause of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the cause of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case, we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a war with Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a cause is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution what had already been determined as a “beginning,” but I shall look for “causes” in the motives which suggested such action and the policy which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of conduct. The Soundness of this method will be proved by the following considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them: secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of his expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it would bring him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the injuries done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great eagerness to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged in making every kind of preparation for it. Here we have the cause and the pretext of the Persian war. Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the first action in it.
6. ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν συγγεγραφότων τὰς κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πράξεις βουλόμενοι τὰς αἰτίας ἡμῖν ὑποδεικνύναι, διʼ ἃς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ὁ προειρημένος ἐνέστη πόλεμος, πρώτην μὲν ἀποφαίνουσι τὴν Ζακάνθης πολιορκίαν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν διάβασιν αὐτῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τοῦ προσαγορευομένου παρὰ τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ· ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτας ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ πολέμου φήσαιμʼ ἄν, αἰτίας γε μὴν οὐδαμῶς ἂν συγχωρήσαιμι. πολλοῦ γε δεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν αἰτίαν εἶναί τις φήσει τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου καὶ τὸν Ἀντιόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητριάδα τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους· ὧν οὔτʼ εἰκὸς οὔτʼ ἀληθές ἐστιν οὐδέτερον. τίς γὰρ ἂν νομίσειε ταύτας αἰτίας ὑπάρχειν, ὧν πολλὰ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον, οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ Φίλιππος ἔτι ζῶν ἐνήργησε καὶ παρεσκευάσατο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Περσῶν πόλεμον, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸ τῆς Ἀντιόχου παρουσίας πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων; ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διειληφότων ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μέν ἐστι πρῶτα τῶν ἁπάντων, ἡ δʼ ἀρχὴ τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναί φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων· λέγω δʼ ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ διʼ ὧν· ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναί τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα. δῆλον δʼ οἷον τὸ προειρημένον ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων. τίνες γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἦσαν αἰτίαι, καὶ πόθεν φῦναι συνέβη τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πόλεμον, εὐμαρὲς καὶ τῷ τυχόντι συνιδεῖν. ἦν δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῶν μετὰ Ξενοφῶντος Ἑλλήνων ἐκ τῶν ἄνω σατραπειῶν ἐπάνοδος, ἐν ᾗ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀσίαν διαπορευομένων αὐτῶν πολεμίαν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα μένειν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν βαρβάρων· δευτέρα δʼ ἡ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως Ἀγησιλάου διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐν ᾗ ʼκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἀξιόχρεων οὐδʼ ἀντίπαλον εὑρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἄπρακτος ἠναγκάσθη μεταξὺ διὰ τὰς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταραχὰς ἐπανελθεῖν. ἐξ ὧν Φίλιππος κατανοήσας καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν Περσῶν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεξίαν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ἐσομένων ἄθλων ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέμενος, ἅμα τῷ περιποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὔνοιαν ὁμολογουμένην, εὐθέως προφάσει χρώμενος ὅτι σπεύδει μετελθεῖν τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὁρμὴν ἔσχε καὶ προέθετο πολεμεῖν καὶ πάντα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἡτοίμαζε. διόπερ αἰτίας μὲν τὰς πρώτας ῥηθείσας ἡγητέον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου, πρόφασιν δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, ἀρχὴν δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν.
7. So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The cause was evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time had aroused in them. This was the cause. As for the pretext, it was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the first act in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias. My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception and intention.
7. καὶ μὴν τοῦ κατʼ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Ῥωμαίους δῆλον ὡς αἰτίαν μὲν τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ὀργὴν θετέον. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ δόξαντες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὠλιγωρῆσθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὐ μόνον Ἀντίοχον ἐπεσπάσαντο, πᾶν δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὀργὴν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων καιρῶν. πρόφασιν δʼ ἡγητέον τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθέρωσιν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι περιπορευόμενοι μετʼ Ἀντιόχου τὰς πόλεις ἀλόγως καὶ ψευδῶς κατήγγελλον, ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τὸν Ἀντιόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητριάδα. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαστολὴν πεποίημαι περὶ τούτων οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ἐπιτιμήσεως, χάριν δὲ τῆς τῶν φιλομαθούντων ἐπανορθώσεως. τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἰατροῦ κάμνουσιν ἀγνοοῦντος τὰς αἰτίας τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα διαθέσεων; τί δʼ ἀνδρὸς πραγματικοῦ μὴ δυναμένου συλλογίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἴληφεν; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνον εἰκὸς οὐδέποτε δεόντως συστήσασθαι τὰς τῶν σωμάτων θεραπείας, οὔτε τὸν πραγματικὸν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κατὰ τρόπον χειρίσαι τῶν προσπιπτόντων ἄνευ τῆς τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιγνώσεως. διόπερ οὐδὲν οὕτω φυλακτέον καὶ ζητητέον ὡς τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἐπειδὴ φύεται μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἰᾶσθαι δὲ ῥᾷστόν ἐστιν παντὸς τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ διαλήψεις.
8. Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured great power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate. This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain of a declaration of war.” Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could have effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put, I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and persons in imminent danger of destruction.
8. Φάβιος δέ φησιν ὁ Ῥωμαϊκὸς συγγραφεὺς ἅμα τῷ κατὰ Ζακανθαίους ἀδικήματι καὶ τὴν Ἀσδρούβου πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαρχίαν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου. ἐκεῖνον γὰρ μεγάλην ἀνειληφότα τὴν δυναστείαν ἐν τοῖς κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν τόποις, μετὰ ταῦτα παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ Λιβύην ἐπιβαλέσθαι καταλύσαντα τοὺς νόμους εἰς μοναρχίαν περιστῆσαι τὸ πολίτευμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων· τοὺς δὲ πρώτους ἄνδρας ἐπὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος προϊδομένους αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν συμφρονῆσαι καὶ διαστῆναι πρὸς αὐτόν· τὸν δʼ Ἀσδρούβαν ὑπιδόμενον, ἀναχωρήσαντʼ ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν χειρίζειν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν, οὐ προσέχοντα τῷ συνεδρίῳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Ἀννίβαν δὲ κοινωνὸν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἐκ μειρακίου γεγονότα τῆς ἐκείνου προαιρέσεως καὶ τότε διαδεξάμενον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν Ἀσδρούβᾳ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ νῦν τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον ἐξενηνοχέναι κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν Ῥωμαίοις παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων γνώμην. οὐδένα γὰρ εὐδοκεῖν τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν ἐν Καρχηδόνι τοῖς ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου περὶ τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν πραχθεῖσιν. ταῦτα δʼ εἰπών φησιν μετὰ τὴν τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως ἅλωσιν παραγενέσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, οἰομένους δεῖν ἢ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐκδιδόναι σφίσι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἢ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνειν. εἰ δέ τις ἔροιτο τὸν συγγραφέα ποῖος ἦν καιρὸς οἰκειότερος τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἢ ποῖον πρᾶγμα τούτου δικαιότερον ἢ συμφορώτερον, ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυσηρεστοῦντο, καθάπερ οὗτός φησιν, τοῖς ὑπʼ Ἀννίβου πραττομένοις, τοῦ πεισθέντας τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων παρακαλουμένοις ἐκδοῦναι μὲν τὸν αἴτιον τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἐπανελέσθαι δʼ εὐλόγως διʼ ἑτέρων τὸν κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν τῆς πόλεως, περιποιήσασθαι δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἀποτριψαμένους τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον πόλεμον, δόγματι μόνον τὴν ἐκδίκησιν ποιησαμένους, τί ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πρὸς αὐτά; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδέν. οἵ γε τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι τῶν προειρημένων ὡς ἑπτακαίδεκʼ ἔτη συνεχῶς πολεμήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἀννίβου προαίρεσιν οὐ πρότερον κατελύσαντο τὸν πόλεμον, ἕως οὗ πάσας ἐξελέγξαντες τὰς ἐλπίδας τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ σωμάτων παρεγένοντο κίνδυνον.
9. I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a reference to the facts themselves. This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war, as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.
9. τίνος δὴ χάριν ἐμνήσθην Φαβίου καὶ τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου γεγραμμένων; οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς πιθανότητος τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ πιστευθῇ παρά τισιν — ἡ μὲν γὰρ [παρὰ] τούτων ἀλογία καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξηγήσεως αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς δύναται θεωρεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν — ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀναλαμβανόντων τὰς ἐκείνου βύβλους ὑπομνήσεως, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα βλέπωσιν. ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες ἀλλʼ ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τὸν λέγοντα καὶ λαβόντες ἐν νῷ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου μετεῖχε τῶν Ῥωμαίων, πᾶν εὐθέως ἡγοῦνται τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τούτου πιστόν. ἐγὼ δὲ φημὶ μὲν δεῖν οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ δὲ κρίνειν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τὰς δοκιμασίας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα — νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐχ ἡττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρηκέναι τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἐφʼ ὧν αὐτὸς ἦν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἧτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκων πεποιῆσθαι τὰς συνθήκας, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ξένους ἐγένετο κίνημα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἂν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο καὶ παρασκευὴν πραγμάτων, ὅσον ἐπʼ ἐκείνῳ. προκαταληφθεὶς δὲ ταῖς ἐμφυλίοις ταραχαῖς ἐν τούτοις καὶ περὶ ταύτας διέτριβε τὰς πράξεις.
10. When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war, proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to establish the fact.
10. Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸ ταύτης βύβλοις περὶ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν, ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἦν συμπεριενεχθῆναι δεόντως οὔτε τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις οὔτε τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένοις ὑφʼ ἡμῶν. πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δʼ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον ἐφʼ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δὲ ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσλαβὼν τοῖς ἰδίοις θυμοῖς τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν, ὡς θᾶττον τοὺς ἀποστάντας τῶν μισθοφόρων καταπολεμήσας ἐβεβαίωσε τῇ πατρίδι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐθέως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα, σπουδάζων ταύτῃ χρήσασθαι παρασκευῇ πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον. ἣν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, λέγω δὲ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων Καρχηδονίοις. ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύσαντες εὐθαρσῶς ἐνέβησαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον πόλεμον. ὅτι δʼ Ἀμίλκας πλεῖστα μὲν συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καίπερ τετελευτηκὼς ἔτεσι δέκα πρότερον τῆς καταρχῆς αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ μὲν ἂν εὕροι τις εἰς τοῦτο· σχεδὸν δὲ πρὸς πίστιν ἀρκοῦν ἔσται τὸ λέγεσθαι μέλλον.
11. When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the following statement: “When my father was about to go on his Iberian expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having in me a most thoroughgoing supporter. But if ever you make terms or friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my power that I would not do against her.”
11. καθʼ οὓς γὰρ καιροὺς καταπολεμηθεὶς Ἀννίβας ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων τέλος ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξεχώρησε καὶ παρʼ Ἀντιόχῳ διέτριβε, τότε Ῥωμαῖοι συνθεωροῦντες ἤδη τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ἐπιβολὴν ἐξαπέστειλαν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς Ἀντίοχον, βουλόμενοι μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως προαίρεσιν. οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις ὁρῶντες τὸν Ἀντίοχον προσέχοντα τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ πρόθυμον ὄντα πολεμεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, ἐθεράπευον τὸν Ἀννίβαν, σπουδάζοντες εἰς ὑποψίαν ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον. ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. προβαίνοντος γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ὑπόπτως ἔχοντος ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἐγένετό τις καιρὸς ὡς ἐπὶ λόγον ἀχθῆναι τὴν ὑποικουρουμένην ἀτοπίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐν ᾧ καὶ πλείους ἀπολογισμοὺς ποιησάμενος Ἀννίβας τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο κατήντησε, δυσχρηστούμενος τοῖς λόγοις. ἔφη γάρ, καθʼ ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον μέλλοι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δʼ αὐτοῦ τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ποιήσαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεῦσαι μικρόν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι φιλοφρόνως εἰ βούλεται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν. ἀσμένως δὲ κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ καί τι καὶ προσαξιώσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον τῆς δεξιᾶς προσαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν ἁψάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν ὀμνύναι μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσειν. ταῦτʼ οὖν εἰδότα σαφῶς ἠξίου τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ἕως μὲν ἄν τι δυσχερὲς βουλεύηται κατὰ Ῥωμαίων, θαρρεῖν καὶ πιστεύειν, αὐτὸν συνεργὸν ἕξειν νομίζοντʼ ἀληθινώτατον. ἐπὰν δὲ διαλύσεις ἢ φιλίαν συντίθηται πρὸς αὐτούς, τότε μὴ προσδεῖσθαι διαβολῆς, ἀλλʼ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι·
12. Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his suspicions, And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy; which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he had inherited from his father. The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships; and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I will now relate the first actions in it.
12. πᾶν γάρ τι πρᾶξαι κατʼ αὐτῶν ὃ δυνατὸς εἴη. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίοχος ἀκούσας καὶ δόξας αὐτοπαθῶς ἅμα δʼ ἀληθινῶς εἰρῆσθαι, πάσης τῆς προϋπαρχούσης ὑποψίας ἀπέστη. τῆς μέντοι γε δυσμενείας τῆς Ἀμίλκου καὶ τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως ὁμολογούμενον θετέον εἶναι τοῦτο μαρτύριον, ὡς καὶ διʼ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγμάτων. τοιούτους γὰρ ἐχθροὺς παρεσκεύασε Ῥωμαίοις Ἀσδρούβαν τε τὸν τῆς θυγατρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν υἱὸν Ἀννίβαν ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν δυσμενείας. Ἀσδρούβας μὲν οὖν προαποθανὼν οὐ πᾶσιν ἔκδηλον ἐποίησε τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν· Ἀννίβᾳ δὲ παρέδωκαν οἱ καιροὶ καὶ λίαν ἐναποδείξασθαι τὴν πατρῴαν ἔχθραν εἰς Ῥωμαίους. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους χρὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον φροντίζειν ὡς τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν διαλυομένων τὰς ἔχθρας ἢ συντιθεμένων τὰς φιλίας, πότε τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκοντες καὶ πότε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡττώμενοι ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν ἐφέδρους νομίζοντες εἶναι τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ φυλάττωνται, τοῖς δὲ πιστεύοντες ὡς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φίλοις ἀληθινοῖς πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐξ ἑτοίμου παραγγέλλωσιν. αἰτίας μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου τὰς προειρημένας ἡγητέον, ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέ γεσθαι.
13. The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily, but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that presented itself of retaliating upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal, to whom they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the feelings of the army; but when news came from thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as commander in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As soon as he had taken over the command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and, having arrived before their most formidable city Althaea, he pitched his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an excellent feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the future.
13. Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἧτταν, συνεπέτεινε δʼ αὐτῶν τὴν ὀργήν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, τὰ κατὰ Σαρδόνα καὶ τὸ τῶν τελευταῖον συντεθέντων χρημάτων πλῆθος. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὰ πλεῖστα κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν ὑφʼ αὑτοὺς ποιήσασθαι πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως διέκειντο τὸ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ὑποδεικνύμενον. προσπεσούσης οὖν τῆς Ἀσδρούβου τελευτῆς, ᾧ μετὰ τὸν Ἀμίλκου θάνατον ἐνεχείρισαν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκαραδόκουν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὁρμάς· ἀφικομένης δὲ τῆς ἀγγελίας ἐκ τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅτι συμβαίνει τὰς δυνάμεις ὁμοθυμαδὸν ᾑρῆσθαι στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν, παραυτίκα συναθροίσαντες τὸν δῆμον μιᾷ γνώμῃ κυρίαν ἐποίησαν τὴν τῶν στρατοπέδων αἵρεσιν. Ἀννίβας δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθέως ὥρμησεν ὡς καταστρεψόμενος τὸ τῶν Ὀλκάδων ἔθνος· ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς Ἀλθαίαν τὴν βαρυτάτην αὐτῶν πόλιν κατεστρατοπέδευσεν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρησάμενος ἐνεργοῖς ἅμα καὶ καταπληκτικαῖς προσβολαῖς ταχέως ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως. οὗ συμβάντος οἱ λοιποὶ γενόμενοι καταπλαγεῖς ἐνέδωκαν αὑτοὺς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀργυρολογήσας δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ κυριεύσας πολλῶν χρημάτων ἧκε παραχειμάσων εἰς Καινὴν πόλιν. μεγαλοψύχως δὲ χρησάμενος τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις καὶ τὰ μὲν δοὺς τῶν ὀψωνίων τοῖς συστρατευομένοις τὰ δʼ ὑπισχνούμενος πολλὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἐνειρ γάσατο ταῖς δυνάμεσι.
14. Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei, in which he took Salmantica by assault, but only succeeded in storming Arbucala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited principally by refugees of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give these people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution, slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once, the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and, recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except the people of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country.
14. τῷ δʼ ἐπιγινομένῳ θέρει πάλιν ὁρμήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς Οὐακκαίους Ἑλμαντικὴν μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου ποιησάμενος προσβολὰς κατέσχεν, Ἀρβουκάλην δὲ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ τὴν γενναιότητα τῶν οἰκητόρων μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας πολιορκήσας κατὰ κράτος εἷλε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραδόξως εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους ἦλθε κινδύνους ἐπανάγων, συνδραμόντων ἐπʼ αὐτὸν τῶν Καρπησίων, ὃ σχεδὸν ἰσχυρότατόν ἐστιν ἔθνος τῶν κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων ἁθροισθέντων ἅμα τούτοις, οὓς ἠρέθισαν μάλιστα μὲν οἱ τῶν Ὀλκάδων φυγάδες, συνεξέκαυσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλμαντικῆς οἱ διασωθέντες. πρὸς οὓς εἰ μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἠναγκάσθησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διακινδυνεύειν, ὁμολογουμένως ἂν ἡττήθησαν. νῦν δὲ πραγματικῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀναχωρήσαντος Ἀννίβου καὶ πρόβλημα ποιησαμένου τὸν Τάγον καλούμενον ποταμὸν καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν συστησαμένου τὸν κίνδυνον, ἅμα δὲ συγχρησαμένου συναγωνιστῇ τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις οἷς εἶχε περὶ τετταράκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, συνέβη τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῷ χωρῆσαι. τῶν γὰρ βαρβάρων ἐπιβαλομένων κατὰ πλείους τόπους βιάζεσθαι καὶ περαιοῦσθαι τὸν ποταμόν, τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῶν μέρος διεφθάρη περὶ τὰς ἐκβάσεις, παραπορευομένων τῶν θηρίων παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος καὶ τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας ἀεὶ προκαταλαμβανόντων· πολλοὶ δὲ κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπώλοντο διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ ῥεύματος τοὺς ἵππους, ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἱππέας πρὸς τοὺς πεζούς. τέλος δὲ τοὔμπαλιν ἐπιδιαβάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐτρέψαντο πλείους ἢ δέκα μυριάδας ἀνθρώπων. ὧν ἡττηθέντων οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ ῥᾳδίως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἐτόλμα πλὴν Ζακανθαίων. ταύτης δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπειρᾶτο κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπέχεσθαι, βουλόμενος μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν ὁμολογουμένην δοῦναι τοῦ πολέμου Ῥωμαίοις, ἕως τἄλλα πάντα βεβαίως ὑφʼ αὑτὸν ποιήσαιτο κατὰ τὰς Ἀμίλκου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις.