69. Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans. Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn, he used the latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour, by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained, the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: and at once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of the greater part of his cavalry, and a thousand sharp-shooters of his infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and lost very few themselves.
69. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀννίβας πραξικοπήσας πόλιν Κλαστίδιον, ἐνδόντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πεπιστευμένου παρὰ Ῥωμαίων, ἀνδρὸς Βρεντεσίνου, κατέσχε. γενόμενος δὲ κύριος τῆς φρουρᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ σίτου παραθέσεως τούτῳ μὲν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς δὲ παραληφθέντας ἄνδρας ἀβλαβεῖς μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ προῆγε, δεῖγμα βουλόμενος ἐκφέρειν τῆς σφετέρας προαιρέσεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεδιότας ἀπελπίζειν τὴν παρʼ αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν καταλαμβανομένους. τὸν δὲ προδότην ἐτίμησε μεγαλείως, ἐκκαλέσασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους πρὸς τὰς Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνθεωρήσας τινὰς τῶν Κελτῶν, οἳ κατῴκουν μεταξὺ τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ, πεποιημένους μὲν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίαν, διαπεμπομένους δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους καὶ πεπεισμένους τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τὴν παρʼ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξειν, ἐξαποστέλλει πεζοὺς μὲν δισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ Κελτοὺς καὶ Νομάδας εἰς χιλίους, προστάξας ἐπιδραμεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν. τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλομένων λείαν, εὐθέως οἱ Κελτοὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὸν χάρακα τῶν Ῥωμαίων, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν. Τεβέριος δὲ καὶ πάλαι ζητῶν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ πράττειν τότε λαβὼν πρόφασιν ἐξαπέστειλε τῶν μὲν ἱππέων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος, πεζοὺς δὲ σὺν τούτοις ἀκοντιστὰς εἰς χιλίους. σπουδῇ δὲ τούτων προσμιξάντων πέραν τοῦ Τρεβία καὶ διαμαχομένων τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς λείας, ἐτράπησαν οἱ Κελτοὶ σὺν τοῖς Νομάσι καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐποιοῦντο χάρακα. ταχὺ δὲ συννοήσαντες τὸ γινόμενον οἱ προκαθήμενοι τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρεμβολῆς ἐντεῦθεν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις ἐβοήθουν τοῖς πιεζομένοις· οὗ γενομένου τραπέντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πάλιν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρεμβολήν. Τεβέριος δὲ συνορῶν τὸ γινόμενον πάντας ἐπαφῆκε τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς. τούτου δὲ συμπεσόντος αὖθις ἐγκλίναντες οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀσφάλειαν ἀπεχώρουν. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπαράσκευος ὢν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα καὶ νομίζων δεῖν μηδέποτε χωρὶς προθέσεως μηδʼ ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ὁλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους, ὅπερ εἶναι φατέον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ, τότε μὲν ἐπέσχε τοὺς παρʼ αὑτοῦ συνεγγίσαντας τῷ χάρακι καὶ στῆναι μὲν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἠνάγκασε, διώκειν δὲ καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκώλυσε, διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ σαλπιγκτῶν ἀνακαλούμενος. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι βραχὺν ἐπισχόντες χρόνον ἀνέλυσαν, ὀλίγους μὲν αὑτῶν ἀποβαλόντες, πλείους δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρκότες.
70. Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune, he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself, before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure. Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place, he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually striking some fresh blow. Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of Tiberius.
70. ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι φιλοτίμως εἶχε πρὸς τὸ τὴν ταχίστην κρῖναι τὰ ὅλα. προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν· ὅμως δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχοντος γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο λόγους περὶ τούτων πρὸς αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων· τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελτίω τὰ παρʼ αὑτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τήν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πίστει, τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσειν τι πάλιν κατʼ ἐκείνων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθινὴν παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἤλπιζε τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασιν. διὸ καὶ τοιούτοις χρώμενος λογισμοῖς μένειν ἠξίου τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ᾔδει μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδεν κρῖναι διʼ αὑτοῦ τὰ ὅλα καὶ μήτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μήτε τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχήν· οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ χρόνος. διόπερ οὐ τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδιον ἔμελλε τοῦ δέοντος σφαλήσεσθαι προφανῶς. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας παραπλησίους ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὁρμαῖς, δεύτερον ἀνασκήτοις καὶ νεοσυλλόγοις συμβαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατοπέδοις, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προΐεσθαι διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόξοις ἐγχειροῦντι πράγμασιν εἷς τρόπος ἐστὶν οὗτος σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχῶς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἐλπίδας. Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὁρμὴν τοῦ Τεβερίου πρὸς τούτοις ἦν.
71. Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them, and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river, and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle, ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and horses.
71. πάλαι δὲ συνεωρακὼς μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τόπον ἐπίπεδον μὲν καὶ ψιλόν, εὐφυῆ δὲ πρὸς ἐνέδραν διά τι ῥεῖθρον ἔχον ὀφρῦν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἀκάνθας καὶ βάτους συνεχεῖς ἐπιπεφυκότας, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ στρατηγεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἔμελλεν δʼ εὐχερῶς λήσειν· οἱ γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑλώδεις τόπους ὑπόπτως εἶχον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀεὶ τιθέναι τὰς ἐνέδρας ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, τοῖς δʼ ἐπιπέδοις καὶ ψιλοῖς ἀπεπίστευον, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας εὐφυέστεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τῶν ὑλωδῶν διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ προορᾶν πάντα τοὺς ἐνεδρεύοντας, εἶναι δʼ ἐπιπροσθήσεις ἱκανὰς ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις τόποις. τὸ γὰρ τυχὸν ῥεῖθρον μετὰ βραχείας ὀφρύος, ποτὲ δὲ κάλαμοι καὶ πτέρεις καί τι γένος ἀκανθῶν, οὐ μόνον πεζοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐνίοτε δύναται κρύπτειν, ἐὰν βραχέα τις προνοηθῇ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐπίσημα τῶν ὅπλων ὕπτια τιθέναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν, τὰς δὲ περικεφαλαίας ὑποτιθέναι τοῖς ὅπλοις. πλὴν ὅ γε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς κοινολογηθεὶς Μάγωνι τἀδελφῷ καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγῶνος, συγκατατιθεμένων αὐτῷ πάντων ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἅμα τῷ δειπνοποιήσασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀνακαλεσάμενος Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὄντα νέον μὲν ὁρμῆς δὲ πλήρη καὶ παιδομαθῆ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, συνέστησε τῶν ἱππέων ἄνδρας ἑκατὸν καὶ πεζοὺς τοὺς ἴσους. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας οὔσης ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ στρατοπέδου σημηνάμενος τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους παρηγγέλκει δειπνοποιησαμένους ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ σκηνήν. παρακαλέσας δὲ καὶ παραστήσας τούτοις τὴν πρέπουσαν ὁρμὴν τῷ καιρῷ παρήγγελλε δέκα τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἕκαστον ἐπιλεξάμενον ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τάξεων ἥκειν εἴς τινα τόπον τακτὸν ἤδη τῆς στρατοπεδείας. τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ συνταχθέν, τούτους μὲν ὄντας ἱππεῖς χιλίους καὶ πεζοὺς ἄλλους τοσούτους ἐξαπέστειλε νυκτὸς εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν, συστήσας ὁδηγοὺς καὶ τἀδελφῷ διαταξάμενος περὶ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως· αὐτὸς δʼ ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς συναγαγών, ὄντας φερεκάκους διαφερόντως, παρεκάλεσε καί τινας δωρεὰς ἐπαγγειλάμενος τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσασι προσέταξε πελάσαντας τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων χάρακι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπιδιαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ προσακροβολιζομένους κινεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, βουλόμενος ἀναρίστους καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπαρασκεύους λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας ἁθροίσας ὁμοίως παρεκάλεσε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι παρήγγειλε καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων καὶ τῶν ἵππων γίνεσθαι θεραπείαν.
72. As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair: for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp, he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand, counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged, which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are compelled by circumstances to combine forces. He then placed the cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.
72. ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἱππεῖς παραυτίκα μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν ἵππον ἐξαπέστελλε, προστάξας ἔχεσθαι καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς πεζακοντιστὰς εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους· ἐκίνει δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὅλων, ἐπαιρόμενος τῷ τε πλήθει τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῷ γεγονότι τῇ προτεραίᾳ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς εὐημερήματι. οὔσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας περὶ χειμερινὰς τροπὰς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νιφετώδους καὶ ψυχρᾶς διαφερόντως, τῶν δʼ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἵππων σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκπεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁρμῇ καὶ προθυμίᾳ περιῆν τὸ πλῆθος· ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβηκότος τῷ ῥεύματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὄμβρον, μόλις ἕως τῶν μασθῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτιζόμενοι διέβαινον· ἐξ ὧν ἐκακοπάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπό τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας, ὡς ἂν ἤδη καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσης. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατὰ σκηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ πεπωκότες καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἡτοιμακότες ἠλείφοντο καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν διαβεβηκότας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τὸν ποταμὸν προβαλόμενος ἐφεδρείαν τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, ὄντας εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ προαγαγὼν ὡς ὀκτὼ στάδια πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθεῖαν παρενέβαλε, περὶ δισμυρίους ὄντας τὸν ἀριθμόν, Ἴβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς καὶ Λίβυας, τοὺς δʼ ἱππεῖς διελὼν ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον παρέστησε τὸ κέρας, πλείους ὄντας μυρίων σὺν τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν συμμάχοις, τὰ δὲ θηρία μερίσας πρὸ τῶν κεράτων διʼ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο. Τεβέριος δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς ἀνεκαλεῖτο, θεωρῶν οὐκ ἔχοντας ὅ,τι χρήσονται τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὸ τοὺς Νομάδας ἀποχωρεῖν μὲν εὐχερῶς καὶ σποράδην, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς τολμηρῶς καὶ θρασέως· τὸ γὰρ τῆς Νομαδικῆς μάχης ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦτο· τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς παρενέβαλε κατὰ τὰς εἰθισμένας παρʼ αὐτοῖς τάξεις, ὄντας τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους εἰς μυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους εἰς δισμυρίους. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον στρατόπεδον παρʼ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς ἐπιβολὰς ἐκ τοσούτων ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν, ὅταν ὁμοῦ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἑκατέρους οἱ καιροὶ συνάγωσιν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐφʼ ἑκάτερον θεὶς τὸ κέρας, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἐπῄει τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις σοβαρῶς, ἐν τάξει καὶ βάδην ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον.
73. When the two forces came within distance, the lightarmed troops in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects. The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers, and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.
73. ἤδη δὲ σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἀλλήλοις, συνεπλέκησαν οἱ προκείμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων εὔζωνοι. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠλαττοῦντο, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερδέξιον γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε τὴν χρείαν, ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πεζακοντιστῶν κακοπαθούντων ἐξ ὄρθρου καὶ προεμένων τὰ πλεῖστα βέλη κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλοκήν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἠχρειωμένων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος. παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον. περί γε μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ὑπῆρχε τἀναντία τούτων· ἀκμαῖοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων τοὺς προκινδυνεύοντας καὶ συμπεσεῖν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἀλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἱππεῖς οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐθέως ἀπʼ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν κεράτοιν ἐπίεζον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς ἂν τῷ πλήθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἀκεραιότητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον· τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις τῶν ἱππέων ὑποχωρησάντων καὶ ψιλωθέντων τῶν τῆς φάλαγγος κεράτων, οἵ τε λογχοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων πλῆθος ὑπεραίροντες τοὺς προτεταγμένους τῶν ἰδίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ κέρατα προσπίπτοντες τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ διειργάζοντο καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐκ εἴων. οἱ δʼ ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις παρʼ ἀμφοῖν τὰς πρώτας ἔχοντες καὶ μέσας τῆς ὅλης παρεμβολῆς τάξεις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐμάχοντο συστάδην, ἐφάμιλλον ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον.
74. Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther, returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of men and horses perished from the cold.
74. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ διαναστάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Νομάδων καὶ προσπεσόντων ἄφνω κατὰ νώτου τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις περὶ τὰ μέσα, μεγάλην ταραχὴν καὶ δυσχρηστίαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις. τέλος δʼ ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα τῶν περὶ τὸν Τεβέριον πιεζούμενα κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, πέριξ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐτράπησαν καὶ συνωθοῦντο κατὰ τὸν διωγμὸν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ποταμόν. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ κατὰ μέσον τὸν κίνδυνον ταχθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν κατόπιν ἐφεστῶτες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας προσπεσόντων ἀπώλλυντο καὶ κακῶς ἔπασχον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας χώρας ἐπαναγκασθέντες ἐκράτησαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ μέρους τινὸς τῶν Λιβύων καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀποκτείναντες διέκοψαν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τάξιν. θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κεράτων ἐκπεπιεσμένους, τὸ μὲν ἐπιβοηθεῖν τούτοις ἢ πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπιέναι παρεμβολὴν ἀπέγνωσαν, ὑφορώμενοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων, κωλυόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλὴν ὄμβρου. τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἁθρόοι μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν, ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφθάρησαν ὑπό τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ προειρημένον σύστημα ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἀνεκομίσθησαν ἅμα τούτοις εἰς Πλακεντίαν. τὸ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον ἕως τοῦ ποταμοῦ καταδιῶξαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος οὐκέτι δυνάμενον πορρωτέρω προβαίνειν ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. καὶ πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ μάχῃ περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν, ὡς κατωρθωκότες· συνέβαινε γὰρ ὀλίγους μὲν τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς δὲ πλείους ἀπολωλέναι τῶν Κελτῶν· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὄμβρων καὶ τῆς ἐπιγινομένης χιόνος οὕτως διετίθεντο δεινῶς ὥστε τὰ μὲν θηρία διαφθαρῆναι πλὴν ἑνός, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὸ ψῦχος.
75. Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real reason for alarm.
75. ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος εἰδὼς μὲν τὰ συμβεβηκότα, βουλόμενος δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔπεμψε τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας ὅτι μάχης γενομένης τὴν νίκην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμὼν ἀφείλετο. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραυτίκα μὲν ἐπίστευον τοῖς προσπίπτουσιν· μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὴν αὑτῶν τηρεῖν καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς πάντας ἀπονενευκέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν, τοὺς δὲ παρʼ αὑτῶν ἀπολελοιπότας τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνακεχωρηκέναι καὶ συνηθροῖσθαι πάντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ χορηγεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνὰ τὸν Πάδον ποταμόν, καὶ λίαν σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. διὸ καὶ παραδόξου φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίνοντο καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν τῶν προκειμένων τόπων, πέμποντες εἰς Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς Τάραντα προφυλακὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαίρους· παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναῦς ἑξήκοντα πεντήρεις. Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος, οἵπερ ἔτυχον ὕπατοι τότε καθεσταμένοι, συνῆγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρʼ αὑτοῖς στρατόπεδα. παρῆγον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τὰς μὲν εἰς Ἀρίμινον τὰς δʼ εἰς Τυρρηνίαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιησόμενοι τοῖς τόποις τὴν ἔξοδον. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἱέρωνα περὶ βοηθείας, ὃς καὶ πεντακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρῆτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους· πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἡτοίμαζον. τότε γάρ εἰσι φοβερώτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατʼ ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῇ φόβος ἀληθινός.
76. While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands, and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march, some by negotation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno, lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa. Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians, prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been especially inclined to the side of Carthage. Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country, he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco, and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course of the Iberian campaign.
76. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Γνάιος Κορνήλιος ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ Ποπλίου στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἀναχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ προσέσχε τῆς Ἰβηρίας πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐμπόριον τόπους. ἀρξάμενος δʼ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποβάσεις ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπειθοῦντας ἐπολιόρκει τῶν τὴν παραλίαν κατοικούντων ἕως Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ προσδεχομένους ἐφιλανθρώπει, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ποιούμενος περὶ αὐτῶν προμήθειαν. ἀσφαλισάμενος δὲ τοὺς προσκεχωρηκότας τῶν παραθαλαττίων προῆγε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιον· πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἡθροίκει τῶν Ἰβήρων. ἅμα δὲ προϊὼν ἃς μὲν προσήγετο τὰς δὲ κατεστρέφετο τῶν πόλεων. τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων, οὓς ἔχων ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπελείφθη τῶν τόπων Ἄννων, ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτοῖς περὶ πόλιν προσαγορευομένην Κίσσαν, συμβαλὼν ὁ Γνάιος ἐκ παρατάξεως καὶ νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων ἐγένετʼ ἐγκρατής, ὡς ἂν ἁπάσης τῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὁρμησάντων παρὰ τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένης, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο καὶ φίλους, ζωγρίᾳ δὲ τόν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἰβήρων Ἀνδοβάλην ἔλαβε. τοῦτον δὲ συνέβαινε τύραννον μὲν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον τόπων, εὔνουν δὲ διαφερόντως ἀεί ποτε Καρχηδονίοις. ταχὺ δὲ συνεὶς τὸ γεγονὸς Ἀσδρούβας ἧκε παραβοηθῶν διαβὰς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν. καὶ καταμαθὼν ἀπολελειμμένους τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ῥᾳθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως ἀναστρεφομένους διὰ τὸ προτέρημα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων, παραλαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ χιλίους, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινεν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναχωρήσας καὶ διαβὰς αὖθις τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐγίνετο περὶ παρασκευὴν καὶ φυλακὴν τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπων, ποιούμενος τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Καινῇ πόλει. ὁ δὲ Γνάιος συνάψας τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τοὺς παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἐθισμοὺς κολάσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συναγαγὼν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τήν τε πεζὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατιὰν ἐν Ταρράκωνι τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐποιεῖτο. διαδοὺς δὲ τὴν λείαν ἴσως τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.
77. At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await the advance of the enemy in that direction. Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first, and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, “that he had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had severally lost to Rome.” With these words he dismissed them without ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered themselves to have sufered by the loss of harbours or cities under the Roman rule.
77. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν. ἐνισταμένης δὲ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας, Γάιος μὲν Φλαμίνιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεις προῆγε διὰ Τυρρηνίας καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἐπʼ Ἀριμίνου, ταύτῃ παρατηρήσων τὴν εἰσβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν τῇ Κελτικῇ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης αἰχμαλώτων ἐν φυλακῇ συνεῖχεν, τὰ μέτρια τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διδούς, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πάσῃ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διεξῆγεν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει, φάσκων οὐκ ἐκείνοις ἥκειν πολεμήσων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων. διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν αὐτούς, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς φρονῶσιν, ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίας. παρεῖναι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτησόμενος Ἰταλιώταις, ὁμοίως δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἣν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀπολωλεκότες ἕκαστοι τυγχάνουσι, συνανασώσων. ταῦτα δʼ εἰπὼν ἀφῆκε πάντας χωρὶς λύτρων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν προκαλεῖσθαι διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου πρὸς αὑτὸν τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἅμα δʼ ἀπαλλοτριοῦν τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίας, ἐρεθίζειν δὲ τοὺς δοκοῦντας πόλεσιν ἢ λιμέσιν ἠλαττῶσθαί τι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς.
78. While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs to be made for him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise. This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on this march.
78. ἐχρήσατο δέ τινι καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι τοιούτῳ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν. ἀγωνιῶν γὰρ τὴν ἀθεσίαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συστάσεως κατεσκευάσατο περιθετὰς τρίχας, ἁρμοζούσας ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐπιπρεπείαις, καὶ ταύταις ἐχρῆτο συνεχῶς μετατιθέμενος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας μετελάμβανε τὰς καθηκούσας ἀεὶ ταῖς περιθεταῖς. διʼ ὧν οὐ μόνον τοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἰδοῦσι δύσγνωστος ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν συνηθείᾳ γεγονόσιν. θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν πόλεμον ἐν τῇ παρʼ αὑτῶν χώρᾳ λαμβάνειν τὴν τριβήν, σπεύδοντας δὲ καὶ μετεώρους ὄντας εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας, ἔκρινε τὴν ταχίστην ἀναζευγνύειν καὶ συνεκπληροῦν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὁρμάς. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὴν ὥραν μεταβάλλειν πυνθανόμενος τῶν μάλιστα τῆς χώρας δοκούντων ἐμπειρεῖν τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἐμβολὰς τὰς εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν μακρὰς εὕρισκε καὶ προδήλους τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑλῶν εἰς Τυρρηνίαν φέρουσαν δυσχερῆ μὲν σύντομον δὲ καὶ παράδοξον φανησομένην τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον. ἀεὶ δέ πως οἰκεῖος ὢν τῇ φύσει τούτου τοῦ μέρους ταύτῃ προέθετο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν. διαδοθείσης δὲ τῆς φήμης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διότι μέλλει διά τινων ἑλῶν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγός, πᾶς τις εὐλαβῶς εἶχε πρὸς τὴν πορείαν, ὑφορώμενος βάραθρα καὶ τοὺς λιμνώδεις τῶν τόπων.
79. But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van, and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts; in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and also because when they marched through them the marshes were fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies, and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water, they managed to get a snatch of sleep for a short portion of the night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his waiting or applying any treatment to it.
79. Ἀννίβας δʼ ἐπιμελῶς ἐξητακὼς τεναγώδεις καὶ στερεοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν δίοδον τόπους, ἀναζεύξας εἰς μὲν τὴν πρωτοπορείαν ἔθηκε τοὺς Λίβυας καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ χρησιμώτερον μέρος τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως, συγκαταμίξας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀποσκευήν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν εὐπορῶσι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον εἰς τέλος ἀφροντίστως εἶχε περὶ παντὸς τοῦ σκευοφόρου, λογιζόμενος ὡς ἐὰν ἅψηται τῆς πολεμίας, ἡττηθεὶς μὲν οὐ προσδεήσεται τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὐκ ἀπορήσει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐπέβαλε τοὺς Κελτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς ἱππεῖς. ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς οὐραγίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπε Μάγωνα τῶν τε λοιπῶν χάριν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν μαλακίας καὶ φυγοπονίας, ἵνʼ ἐὰν κακοπαθοῦντες τρέπωνται πάλιν εἰς τοὐπίσω, κωλύῃ διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ προσφέρῃ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἴβηρες καὶ Λίβυες διʼ ἀκεραίων τῶν ἑλῶν ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν μετρίως κακοπαθοῦντες ἤνυον, ἅτε καὶ φερέκακοι πάντες ὄντες καὶ συνήθεις ταῖς τοιαύταις ταλαιπωρίαις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ δυσχερῶς μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν προύβαινον, τεταραγμένων καὶ διαπεπατημένων εἰς βάθος τῶν ἑλῶν, ἐπιπόνως δὲ καὶ ταλαιπώρως ὑπέμενον τὴν κακοπάθειαν, ἄπειροι πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὄντες κακουχίας. ἐκωλύοντο δὲ πάλιν ἀπονεύειν εἰς τοὐπίσω διὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας αὐτοῖς ἱππεῖς. πάντες μὲν οὖν ἐκακοπάθουν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀγρυπνίαν, ὡς ἂν ἑξῆς ἡμέρας τέτταρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας συνεχῶς διʼ ὕδατος ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν· διαφερόντως γε μὴν ἐπόνουν καὶ κατεφθείρονθʼ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ Κελτοί. τῶν δʼ ὑποζυγίων αὐτοῦ τὰ πλεῖστα πίπτοντα διὰ τοὺς πηλοὺς ἀπώλλυντο, μίαν παρεχόμενα χρείαν ἐν τῷ πεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καθεζόμενοι γὰρ ἐπʼ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν σωρηδὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπερεῖχον καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βραχὺ μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς ἀπεκοιμῶντο. οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων τὰς ὁπλὰς ἀπέβαλον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς διὰ τῶν πηλῶν πορείας. Ἀννίβας δὲ μόλις ἐπὶ τοῦ περιλειφθέντος θηρίου διεσώθη μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας, ὑπεραλγὴς ὢν διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ἐπενεχθείσης ὀφθαλμίας αὐτῷ, διʼ ἣν καὶ τέλος ἐστερήθη τῆς μιᾶς ὄψεως, οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένου τοῦ καιροῦ καταμονὴν οὐδὲ θεραπείαν διὰ τὸ τῆς περιστάσεως ἀδύνατον.
80. Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected manner, Hannibal found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium. For the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the country in his front. And being informed that the country before him abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius was a mere mob-orator and demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs, and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague, would give him many opportunities for an attack.
80. διαπεράσας δὲ παραδόξως τοὺς ἑλώδεις τόπους καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ τὸν Φλαμίνιον στρατοπεδεύοντα πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ἕλεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος τήν τε δύναμιν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ πολυπραγμονῆσαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τοὺς προκειμένους τῶν τόπων. πυνθανόμενος δὲ τὴν μὲν χώραν τὴν πρόσθεν πολλῆς γέμειν ὠφελείας, τὸν δὲ Φλαμίνιον ὀχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν εἶναι τέλειον, πρὸς ἀληθινῶν δὲ καὶ πολεμικῶν πραγμάτων χειρισμὸν οὐκ εὐφυῆ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καταπεπιστευκέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν, συνελογίζετο διότι παραλλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκείνων στρατοπεδείαν καὶ καθέντος εἰς τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν τόπους τὰ μὲν ἀγωνιῶν τὸν ἐπιτωθασμὸν τῶν ὄχλων οὐ δυνήσεται περιορᾶν δῃουμένην τὴν χώραν, τὰ δὲ κατηλγηκὼς παρέσται προχείρως εἰς πάντα τόπον ἑπόμενος, σπουδάζων διʼ αὑτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸ προτέρημα καὶ μὴ προσδέξασθαι τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ τὴν ἴσην ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος. ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανε παραδώσειν καιροὺς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. πάντα δʼ ἐμφρόνως ἐλογίζετο ταῦτα καὶ πραγματικῶς·
81. And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his consummate prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a general than the knowledge of his opponent’s character and disposition. As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,— so must a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body, but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often happened before now that, from mere idleness and lack of energy, men have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however, cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy. And are the source of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man who is the prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign. For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into your hands.
81. οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἴ τις οἴεται κυριώτερόν τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατʼ ἄνδρα καὶ ζυγὸν ἀγωνισμάτων δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νικᾶν συνθεωρεῖν πῶς δυνατὸν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τί γυμνὸν ἢ ποῖον ἔξοπλον μέρος φαίνεται τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν, οὕτως χρὴ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος, ἐπειδὴ πολλοὶ μὲν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν ἀργίαν οὐ μόνον τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους καταπροΐενται βίους ἄρδην, πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν οἶνον ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδʼ ὑπνῶσαι δύνανται χωρὶς ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ μέθης, ἔνιοι δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἔκπληξιν οὐ μόνον πόλεις καὶ βίους ἀναστάτους πεποιήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῆν αὑτῶν ἀφῄρηνται μετʼ αἰσχύνης. καὶ μὴν δειλία καὶ βλακεία κατʼ ἰδίαν μὲν αὐτοῖς ὄνειδος ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἔχουσι, περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα γενομένη κοινόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον συμπτωμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπράκτους ποιεῖ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κινδύνους ἐπιφέρει τοὺς μεγίστους τοῖς πεπιστευκόσι. προπέτειά γε μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία καὶ τῦφος εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέστατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλήν, ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἕτοιμος ὅ γε τοιοῦτος. διόπερ εἴ τις δύναιτο συννοεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς πέλας ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τῇδέ που προσιέναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ᾗ μάλιστα καὶ διʼ ὧν εὐχείρωτος ἔσθʼ ὁ προεστὼς τῶν πολεμίων, τάχιστʼ ἂν τῶν ὅλων κατακρατοίη. καθάπερ γὰρ νεὼς ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸν κυβερνήτην, τὸ ὅλον αὐτανδρὶ σκάφος ὑποχείριον γίνεται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐὰν τὸν προεστῶτα [πόλεμον] δυνάμεως χειρώσηταί τις κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ συλλογισμούς, αὐτανδρὶ γίνεται πολλάκις κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων. ἃ δὴ καὶ τότε προϊδόμενος καὶ συλλογισάμενος Ἀννίβας περὶ τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος οὐ διεσφάλη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς.