---
title: "The Histories · Ἱστορίαι"
author: "Polybius"
translator: "Evelyn S. Shuckburgh"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 3 of 103
url: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/3/
cite: "Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, The Histories · Ἱστορίαι, section 3. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/3/"
---

# The Histories · Ἱστορίαι

*Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh*

How did Rome conquer the known world in under fifty-three years? A Greek hostage who became Scipio’s friend explains, with the Punic Wars, Hannibal, the Roman constitution and the fall of Carthage.

> Greek: ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0543.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0543.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 3. Book I · chapters 23–32

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/3/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/3/#p-N

[¶0] 23. As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight. The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.

> Greek: 23. ὁ δὲ Γάιος Βίλιος ὡς θᾶττον ἔγνω τὴν περιπέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγουμένου, παραδοὺς τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα τοῖς χιλιάρχοις αὐτὸς διεκομίσθη πρὸς τὸν στόλον. πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους πορθεῖν τὴν Μυλαῗτιν χώραν ἐπιπλεῖ στόλῳ παντί. συνιδόντες δʼ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ πάντες ἔπλεον ἀντίπρωρροι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐπὶ λείαν τινὰ πρόδηλον. ἡγεῖτο δʼ Ἀννίβας αὐτῶν — οὗτος δʼ ἦν ὁ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέψας νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλεως — ἔχων ἑπτήρη τὴν γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἅμα δὲ τῷ πλησιάζειν συνθεωροῦντες ἀνανενευκότας τοὺς κόρακας ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων πρώρραις, ἐπὶ ποσὸν μὲν ἠπόρουν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ξενιζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν ὀργάνων κατασκευαῖς· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τελέως κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι πλέοντες τετολμηκότως. τῶν δὲ συμπλεκομένων σκαφῶν ἀεὶ δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐθὺς ἐπιπορευομένων διʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον· παραπλήσιον γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κίνδυνον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τὰς πρώτας συμβαλούσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἷς ἐγένετʼ αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον· Ἀννίβας δʼ ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ σκάφῃ διέφυγεν. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὡς εἰς ἐμβολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ τὰς προπλεούσας ναῦς ἐξέκλινον καὶ διένευον τὰς τῶν ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἐκπεριπλέοντες ἀσφαλῶς ἤλπιζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολάς. πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπεριισταμένων καὶ συνδιανευόντων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὥστε κατʼ ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίσαντας συνδεδέσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλίναντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες.

[¶1] 24. Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become masters of Sardinia. During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.

> Greek: 24. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραδόξως ἀντιπεποιημένοι τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλπίδος, διπλασίως ἐπερρώσθησαν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. τότε μὲν οὖν προσσχόντες τῇ Σικελίᾳ τήν τʼ Αἰγεσταίων ἔλυσαν πολιορκίαν ἐσχάτως αὐτῶν ἤδη διακειμένων κατά τε τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰγέστης ἀναχώρησιν Μάκελλαν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος εἷλον. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν Ἀμίλκας, ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων, διατρίβων περὶ Πάνορμον, γνοὺς ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις στασιάζοντας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πρωτείων, καὶ πυνθανόμενος στρατοπεδεύειν αὐτοὺς καθʼ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς συμμάχους μεταξὺ τοῦ Παρώπου καὶ τῶν Θερμῶν τῶν Ἱμεραίων, ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἀναστρατοπεδεύουσι μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως σχεδὸν εἰς τετρακισχιλίους ἀπέκτεινεν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν ὁ μὲν Ἀννίβας ἔχων τὰς διασωθείσας ναῦς ἀπέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δʼ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς Σαρδόνα διῆρε, προσλαβὼν ναῦς καί τινας τῶν ἐνδόξων τριηράρχων. χρόνοις δʼ οὐ πολλοῖς κατόπιν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνι συγκλεισθεὶς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἔν τινι λιμένι καὶ πολλὰς ἀποβαλὼν τῶν νεῶν, παραυτίκα συλληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδονίων ἀνεσταυρώθη. Ῥωμαῖοι γὰρ ἅμα τῆς θαλάττης ἥψαντο καὶ τῶν κατὰ Σαρδόνα πραγμάτων εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο. τὰ δʼ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατόπεδα τῶν Ῥωμαίων κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἑξῆς ἐνιαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἔπραξαν λόγου, τότε δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμένους ἄρχοντας Αὖλον Ἀτίλιον καὶ Γάιον Σολπίκιον ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάνορμον διὰ τὸ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων δυνάμεις ἐκεῖ παραχειμάζειν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ συνεγγίσαντες τῇ πόλει μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὐκ ἀντεξιόντων, πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ πόλιν Ἱππάναν, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος ἔλαβον, εἷλον δὲ καὶ τὸ Μυττίστρατον, πολλοὺς χρόνους ὑπομεμενηκὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τοῦ τόπου. τὴν δὲ Καμαριναίων πόλιν μικρῷ πρότερον ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀποστᾶσαν, τότε προσενέγκαντες ἔργα καὶ καταβαλόντες τὰ τείχη κατέσχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἔνναν καὶ ἕτερα πλείω πολισμάτια τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενοι Λιπαραίους ἐπεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν.

[¶2] 25. Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them. They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean Islands. The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at Heracleia Minoa.

> Greek: 25. τῷ δʼ ἑξῆς ἐνιαυτῷ Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρὸς Τυνδαρίδα καθορμισθεὶς καὶ συνθεασάμενος ἀτάκτως παραπλέοντα τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στόλον, παραγγείλας τοῖς ἰδίοις πληρώμασιν ἕπεσθαι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, αὐτὸς ὥρμησε πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔχων δέκα ναῦς ὁμοπλοούσας. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι συνιδόντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων τοὺς μὲν ἀκμὴν ἐμβαίνοντας, τοὺς δʼ ἀναγομένους, τοὺς δὲ πρώτους πολὺ προειληφότας τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπιστρέψαντες αὐτοῖς ἀπήντων. καὶ κυκλώσαντες τὰς μὲν ἄλλας διέφθειραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ναῦν παρʼ ὀλίγον αὔτανδρον ἔλαβον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ αὕτη μὲν ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ἐξηρτυμένη καὶ ταχυναυτοῦσα διέφυγε παραδόξως τὸν κίνδυνον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιπλέουσαι κατὰ βραχὺ συνηθροίζοντο. γενόμεναι δʼ ἐν μετώπῳ συνέβαλλον τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δέκα μὲν αὐτάνδρους ναῦς ἔλαβον, ὀκτὼ δὲ κατέδυσαν. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὰς Λιπαραίας καλουμένας νήσους. ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀμφότεροι νομίζοντες ἐφάμιλλον πεποιῆσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, ὥρμησαν ὁλοσχερέστερον ἐπὶ τὸ συνίστασθαι ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀντέχεσθαι πραγμάτων. αἱ δὲ πεζικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταῦτα καιροῖς οὐδὲν ἔπραξαν ἄξιον μνήμης, ἀλλὰ περὶ μικρὰς καὶ τὰς τυχούσας πράξεις κατέτριψαν τοὺς χρόνους. διὸ παρασκευασάμενοι, καθάπερ εἶπον, εἰς τὴν ἐπιφερομένην θερείαν ἀνήχθησαν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν τριάκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις μακραῖς ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις καὶ κατέσχον εἰς Μεσσήνην. ὅθεν ἀναχθέντες ἔπλεον δεξιὰν ἔχοντες τὴν Σικελίαν, κάμψαντες δὲ τὸν Πάχυνον ὑπερῆραν εἰς Ἔκνομον διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν στράτευμα περὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τόπους. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἀναπλεύσαντες Λιλυβαίῳ προσέσχον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πρὸς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν Μινῴαν καθωρμί σθησαν.

[¶3] 26. Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle. The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginans, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships. Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.

> Greek: 26. ἦν δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πρόθεσις εἰς τὴν Λιβύην πλεῖν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκεῖ περισπᾶν, ἵνα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις μὴ περὶ Σικελίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἰδίας χώρας ὁ κίνδυνος γίνηται. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις τἀναντία τούτων ἐδόκει· συνιδόντες γὰρ ὡς εὐέφοδός ἐστιν ἡ Λιβύη καὶ πᾶς ὁ κατὰ τὴν χώραν λαὸς εὐχείρωτος τοῖς ἅπαξ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβαλοῦσιν, οὐχ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ διακινδυνεύειν καὶ ναυμαχεῖν ἔσπευδον. ὄντων δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βιάζεσθαι, προφανὴς ἦν ὁ μέλλων ἀγὼν ἐκ τῆς ἑκατέρων συνίστασθαι φιλοτιμίας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὴν παρασκευὴν ἁρμόζουσαν ἐποιοῦντο πρός τε τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόβασιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν. διόπερ ἐπιλέξαντες ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων τὰς ἀρίστας χεῖρας διεῖλον τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν, ἣν ἤμελλον ἀναλαμβάνειν, εἰς τέτταρα μέρη. τὸ δὲ μέρος ἕκαστον διττὰς εἶχεν προσηγορίας· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο στρατόπεδον καὶ πρῶτος στόλος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ λόγον. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον καὶ τρίτην ἐπωνυμίαν ἔτι προσειλήφει· τριάριοι γὰρ ὠνομάζοντο κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις συνήθειαν. καὶ τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἦν στράτευμα τούτων τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως περὶ τέτταρας καὶ δέκα μυριάδας, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστης νεὼς λαμβανούσης ἐρέτας μὲν τριακοσίους, ἐπιβάτας δʼ ἑκατὸν εἴκοσιν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἡρμόζοντο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ θάλατταν κίνδυνον· τό γε μὴν πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἦν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον. ἐφʼ οἷς οὐχ οἷον ἄν τις παρὼν καὶ θεώμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀκούων καταπλαγείη τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων μεγαλομερίαν καὶ δύναμιν, στοχαζόμενος ἔκ τε τοῦ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν νεῶν πλήθους. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τὸν μὲν πλοῦν εἶναι συμβαίνει πελάγιον, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους ταχυναυτεῖν, πανταχόθεν ἐπειρῶντο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν τάξιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἑξήρεις δύʼ οὔσας, ἐφʼ ὧν ἔπλεον οἱ στρατηγοὶ Μάρκος Ἀτίλιος καὶ Λεύκιος Μάλιος, πρώτας ἐν μετώπῳ παραλλήλους ἔταξαν. τούτων δʼ ἑκατέρᾳ συνεχεῖς κατὰ μίαν ναῦν ἐπιτάττοντες τῇ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον, τῇ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον στόλον ἐπέστησαν, ἀεὶ καθʼ ἑκάστην ναῦν ἑκατέρου τοῦ στόλου μεῖζον τὸ μεταξὺ ποιοῦντες διάστημα. ταῖς δὲ πρώρραις ἔξω νεύοντα τὰ σκάφη τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἐπʼ ἀλλήλοις εἶχεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἁπλῶς εἰς ἔμβολον ἔταξαν, ἐπέβαλον τούτοις ἐπὶ μίαν ναῦν ἐν μετώπῳ τὸ τρίτον στρατόπεδον· ὧν ἐπιστάντων ἀπετελέσθη τρίγωνον τὸ πᾶν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπέστησαν τὰς ἱππηγούς, ῥύματα δόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ταῖς τοῦ τρίτου στόλου ναυσίν. ταύταις δὲ κατόπιν ἐπέβαλον τὸν τέταρτον στόλον, τοὺς τριαρίους κληθέντας, ἐπὶ μίαν παρεκτείναντες ναῦν, ὡς ὑπερτείνειν ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τοὺς πρὸ ἑαυτῶν. καὶ συναρμοσθέντων πάντων κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀπετελέσθη σχῆμα τῆς τάξεως ἔμβολον, οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν μέρος ἦν κοῖλον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ βάσει στερεόν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἐνεργὸν καὶ πρακτικόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσδιάλυτον.

[¶4] 27. Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left behind, —the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.

> Greek: 27. οἱ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλήθη διὰ βραχέων καὶ συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μὲν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ περὶ Σικελίας ποιήσονται τὸν πόλεμον, ἡττηθέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφετέρας πατρίδος κινδυνεύσουσιν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρήγγειλαν ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιούντων τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εὐθαρσῶς ἀνήγοντο καὶ καταπληκτικῶς. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἁρμοζόμενοι τὰ μὲν τρία μέρη τῆς αὑτῶν δυνάμεως ἐπὶ μίαν ἔταττον ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, ὡς κυκλώσοντες τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πάσας ἱστάντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης τάξεως ἐποίουν, ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ νεῦον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἔχων ἐπίπλους καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναυτούσας πρὸς τὴν ὑπερκέρασιν, Ἄννων ὁ περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα λειφθεὶς τῇ παρατάξει· τῶν δʼ εὐωνύμων εἶχε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀμίλκας ὁ περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμαχήσας· ὃς τότε κατὰ μέσην τὴν τάξιν ποιούμενος τὸν κίνδυνον ἐχρήσατό τινι στρατηγήματι κατὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοιῴδε. τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων συνθεασαμένων ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταμένους τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ μέσους, τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ὁ κίνδυνος ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰ μέσα Καρχηδονίων ἐκ παραγγέλματος κλινάντων πρὸς φυγὴν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξιν, οὗτοι μὲν ὑπεχώρουν μετὰ σπουδῆς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κατόπιν ἠκολούθουν ἐκθύμως. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον ἀπεσπᾶτο, τῶν μὲν ῥυμουλκούντων τὰς ἱππηγοὺς ναῦς, τῶν δὲ τριαρίων συμμενόντων καὶ συνεφεδρευόντων τούτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἱκανὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκουν ἀπεσπακέναι τόπον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνθήματος ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς Ἀμίλκου νεὼς μετεβάλοντο πάντες ἅμα καὶ συνέβαλον τοῖς ἐπικειμένοις. ἀγῶνος δὲ συστάντος καρτεροῦ, τῷ μὲν ταχυναυτεῖν ἐκπεριπλέοντες καὶ ῥᾳδίως μὲν προσιόντες ὀξέως δʼ ἀποχωροῦντες πολὺ περιῆσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, τῷ δὲ βιαιομαχεῖν κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς καὶ συνδεῖν τοῖς κόραξιν τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγγίσαντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ συναγωνιζομένων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐν ὄψει τῶν ἡγουμένων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἧττον ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶχον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰς ἐλπίδας. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τούτους μάχη τοιαύ την εἶχε διάθεσιν.

[¶5] 28. This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towingropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle. So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate: for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea. While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore. Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken.

> Greek: 28. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων Ἄννων, τὸ μεῖναν ἐν ἀποστάσει κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συμβολήν, τό τε πέλαγος ὑπεράρας ἐνέβαλε ταῖς τῶν τριαρίων ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν γῆν τεταγμένοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραγεγονότες εἰς μέτωπον ἐκ τῆς προϋπαρχούσης τάξεως καὶ ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς ἐνέβαλον τοῖς ῥυμουλκοῦσι τὰς ἱππηγούς· οἱ δʼ ἀφέμενοι τὰ ῥύματα συνεπλέκοντο καὶ διηγωνίζοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἦν δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς ὅλης συμπλοκῆς, καὶ τρεῖς ναυμαχίαι συνέστησαν πολὺ κεχωρισμέναι τοῖς τόποις ἀλλήλων· τῷ δʼ ἑκατέρων πάρισα τὰ μέρη γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν ἐφάμιλλον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐπετελεῖτο περὶ τὴν μάχην, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὅταν ᾖ παραπλήσια πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. οἱ γὰρ πρῶτοι κινδυνεύσαντες πρῶτοι καὶ διεκρίθησαν· τέλος γὰρ ἐκβιασθέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν εἰς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδεῖτο τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς· ὁ δὲ Μάρκος συνορῶν τὸν περὶ τοὺς τριαρίους καὶ τὰς ἱππηγοὺς ἀγῶνα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τούτοις, ἔχων τοῦ δευτέρου στόλου τὰς ἀκεραίους ναῦς. συνάψαντος δὲ καὶ προσμίξαντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ τριάριοι, καίπερ ἤδη κακῶς ἀπαλλάττοντες, πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς προσμαχομένων, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου προσπιπτόντων, δυσχρηστούμενοι καὶ παραδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν βοηθησάντων κυκλούμενοι, κλίναντες πελαγίαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὑποχώρησιν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὅ τε Λεύκιος ἐπαναπλέων ἤδη καὶ θεωρῶν συγκεκλεισμένον πρὸς τῇ γῇ τὸν τρίτον στόλον ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐωνύμου κέρατος, ὅ τε Μάρκος ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ καταλιπὼν τὰς ἱππηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς τριαρίους ὥρμησαν ἀμφότεροι βοηθεῖν τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι. παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ἤδη τὸ γινόμενον πολιορκίᾳ· καὶ πάντες ἂν ἀπολώλεισαν οὗτοί γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῇ γῇ συνεῖχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμβολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὐλαβῶς ἔχοντες οὐ προσῄεσαν. ταχέως δʼ ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἔλαβον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, ὀλίγαι δέ τινες παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξασαι διέφυγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τοιαύτην ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάσης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. διεφθάρη δὲ τούτων μὲν εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα. ναῦς δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων αὔτανδρος οὐδεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένεθʼ ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἑξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.

[¶6] 29. After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily. There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces. But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering any danger, and reached Rome.

> Greek: 29. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεπισιτισάμενοι καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς καταρτίσαντες, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν τοῖς προτερήμασιν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησάμενοι τῶν πληρωμάτων ἀνήγοντο ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην. προσσχόντες δὲ ταῖς πρώταις πλεούσαις ναυσὶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Ἑρμαίαν ἐπονομαζομένην, ἣ πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κόλπου κειμένη προτείνει πελάγιος ὡς πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τὰς ἐπιπλεούσας ἐνταῦθα ναῦς καὶ πάντα συναθροίσαντες τὸν στόλον ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν χώραν, ἕως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσπίδα καλουμένην πόλιν ἀφίκοντο. ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ νεωλκήσαντες, ἔτι δὲ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες τὰς ναῦς ἐγίνοντο πρὸς τὸ πολιορκεῖν αὐτήν, οὐ βουλομένων ἑκουσίως σφίσι προσχωρῆσαι τῶν κατεχόντων τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν κινδύνου τῶν Καρχηδονίων καταπλεύσαντες καὶ πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθέντας εὐθέως ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρετήρουν ταῖς πεζικαῖς καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι τοὺς προκειμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους. ἐπιγνόντες δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς ἀποβεβηκότας καὶ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Ἀσπίδα, τοῦ μὲν παραφυλάττειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἀπέγνωσαν, συνήθροιζον δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν ἐγίνοντο τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κυριεύσαντες τῆς Ἀσπίδος καὶ φυλακὴν ἀπολιπόντες τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πέμψαντες τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας μὲν περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἐρησομένους δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων τί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναζεύξαντες ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὐδενὸς δʼ ἐμποδὼν ἱσταμένου, πολλὰς μὲν οἰκήσεις περιττῶς κατεσκευασμένας διέφθειραν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος τῆς τετραπόδου λείας περιεβάλοντο· σώματα δὲ πλείω τῶν δισμυρίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνήγαγον. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ παρῆσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης οἱ διασαφοῦντες ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μένειν ἔχοντα δυνάμεις τὰς ἀρκούσας, τὸν δʼ ἕτερον ἀποκομίζειν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὸν στόλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μάρκος ἔμενεν, ὑπολειπόμενος ναῦς τετταράκοντα καὶ πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακοσίους· ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰ πληρώματα καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλῆθος καὶ κομισθεὶς παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἀσφαλῶς ἧκεν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

[¶7] 30. The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without resistance. A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the open county. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment. The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.

> Greek: 30. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὴν χρονιωτέραν οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν στρατηγοὺς ἑαυτῶν εἵλοντο δύο, τόν τʼ Ἄννωνος Ἀσδρούβαν καὶ Βώσταρον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ἀμίλκαν ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, καλοῦντες κατὰ τάχος αὐτόν. ὁ δʼ ἀναλαβὼν ἱππεῖς πεντακοσίους καὶ πεζοὺς πεντακισχιλίους παρῆν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα· καὶ κατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς τρίτος ἐβουλεύετο μετὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν πῶς δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν αὐτὴν ἀδεῶς πορθουμένην. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος μετά τινας ἡμέρας ἐπεπορεύετο, τὰ μὲν ἀτείχιστα τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἐξ ἐφόδου διαρπάζων, τὰ δὲ τετειχισμένα πολιορκῶν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς πόλιν Ἀδὺν ἀξιόχρεω, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ταύτην συνίστατο μετὰ σπουδῆς ἔργα καὶ πολιορκίαν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τῇ τε πόλει σπουδάζοντες βοηθῆσαι καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι κρίνοντες ἐξῆγον τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ καταλαβόμενοι λόφον ὑπερδέξιον μὲν τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφυῆ δὲ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεσιν, ἐν τούτῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν. λοιπὸν ἔχοντες μὲν τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀφέμενοι δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέδων χωρίων καὶ συγκλείσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς τόπους ἐρυμνοὺς καὶ δυσβάτους, ἔμελλον διδάξειν τοὺς πολεμίους ὃ δέον ἦν πράττειν κατʼ αὐτῶν. ὃ δὴ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συννοήσαντες γὰρ οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμόνες ἐμπείρως ὅτι τὸ πρακτικώτατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεως ἠχρείωται διὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἕως ἐκεῖνοι καταβάντες εἰς τὰ πεδία παρετάξαντο, χρώμενοι δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις καιροῖς ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ προσέβαινον ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸν λόφον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἱππεῖς καὶ τὰ θηρία τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἦν ἄχρηστα τελέως· οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι πάνυ γενναίως καὶ προθύμως ἐκβοηθήσαντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον στρατόπεδον ἠνάγκασαν ἐκκλῖναι καὶ φυγεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ προπεσόντες καὶ κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ θατέρου μέρους προσβαινόντων ἐτράπησαν, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐξέπεσον. τὰ μὲν οὖν θηρία μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τῶν ὁμαλῶν ἥψατο, μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν· οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς πεζοὺς βραχὺν ἐπιδιώξαντες τόπον καὶ τὸν χάρακα διαρπάσαντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενοι τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν. γενόμενοι δὲ τῆς προσαγορευομένης πόλεως Τύνητος ἐγκρατεῖς, εὐφυοῦς ὑπαρχούσης πρὸς τὰς προκειμένας ἐπιβολάς, ἔτι δὲ κειμένης εὐκαίρως κατά τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς σύνεγγυς ταύτῃ χώρας, κατεστρατοπέδευσαν εἰς αὐτήν.

[¶8] 31. The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace. The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.

> Greek: 31. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μικρῷ μὲν πρότερον κατὰ θάλατταν, τότε δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐπταικότες, οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνανδρίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων ἀβουλίαν, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐνεπεπτώκεισαν εἰς δυσχερῆ διάθεσιν. ἅμα γὰρ τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων ἔθνος συνεπιτιθέμενον αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττω, πλείω δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰργάζετο κακὰ τὴν χώραν. ἐξ ὧν διὰ τὸν φόβον συμφευγόντων εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας δυσθυμία καὶ λιμὸς ἦν ὁλοσχερής, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς πολιορκίας. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος ὁρῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐσφαλμένους καὶ νομίζων ὅσον οὔπω κρατήσειν τῆς πόλεως, ἀγωνιῶν δὲ μὴ συμβῇ τὸν ἐπιπαραγινόμενον στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης φθάσαντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν πραγμάτων λαβεῖν, προυκαλεῖτο τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰς διαλύσεις. οἱ δʼ ἀσμένως ἀκούσαντες ἐξέπεμψαν αὑτῶν τοὺς πρώτους ἄνδρας· οἳ καὶ συμμίξαντες αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ ῥέπειν ταῖς γνώμαις ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τι τῶν λεγομένων ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἀκούοντες ὑπομένειν ἐδύναντο τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μάρκος ὡς ἤδη κεκρατηκὼς τῶν ὅλων, ὅ,τι ποτὲ συνεχώρει, πᾶν ᾤετο δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι καὶ δωρεᾷ λαμβάνειν· οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς ὑποχειρίοις οὐδὲν ἂν συνεξακολουθήσαι βαρύτερον τῶν τότε προσταγμάτων, οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοῖς προτεινομένοις ἐπανῆλθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρκου. τὸ δὲ συνέδριον τῶν Καρχηδονίων διακοῦσαν τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καίπερ σχεδὸν ἀπεγνωκὸς τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας, ὅμως οὕτως ἀνδρωδῶς ἔστη καὶ γενναίως ὥστε πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἵλετο καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ καιροῦ πεῖραν λαμβάνειν ἐφʼ ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγεννὲς μηδʼ ἀνάξιον τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομεῖναι.

[¶9] 32. Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. brought a large number of men with him, and among them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’ delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.

> Greek: 32. περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καταπλεῖ τις εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα ξενολόγος τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πρότερον [εἰς τὴν Καρχηδονίων], ἄγων στρατιώτας πλείστους, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ξάνθιππόν τινα Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἄνδρα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετεσχηκότα καὶ τριβὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔχοντα σύμμετρον. ὃς διακούσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γέγονεν, καὶ συνθεωρήσας τάς τε λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων παραυτίκα συνελογίσατο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐνεφάνισε διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐχ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, αὐτοὺς δʼ ὑφʼ αὑτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν ἡγουμένων. ταχὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν περίστασιν τῶν τοῦ Ξανθίππου λόγων διαδοθέντων εἰς τὰ πλήθη καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ προεστῶτες ἀνακαλεῖσθαι καὶ πεῖραν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔφερε τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοὺς ἀπολογισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τί νῦν σφαλείησαν, καὶ διότι πεισθέντες αὐτῷ καὶ χρησάμενοι τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις τῶν τόπων ἔν τε ταῖς πορείαις καὶ στρατοπεδείαις καὶ παρατάξεσιν εὐχερῶς ἑαυτοῖς τε τὴν ἀσφάλειαν δυνήσονται παρασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους νικᾶν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ δεξάμενοι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πεισθέντες αὐτῷ παραχρῆμα τὰς δυνάμεις ἐνεχείρισαν. ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Ξανθίππου διαδιδομένην φωνὴν ὁ θροῦς καὶ λαλιά τις εὔελπις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς· ὡς δʼ ἐξαγαγὼν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὴν δύναμιν ἐν κόσμῳ παρενέβαλε καί τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν μερῶν ἐν τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ἤρξατο, τηλικαύτην ἐποίει διαφορὰν παρὰ τὴν τῶν πρότερον στρατηγῶν ἀπειρίαν ὥστε μετὰ κραυγῆς ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ σπεύδειν ὡς τάχιστα συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, πεπεισμένους μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν δεινὸν ἡγουμένου Ξανθίππου. τούτων δὲ γινομένων οἱ στρατηγοὶ συνιδόντες τοὺς ὄχλους ἀνατεθαρρηκότας παραδόξως ταῖς ψυχαῖς, παρακαλέσαντες αὐτοὺς τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ μετʼ ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὥρμησαν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν. αὕτη δʼ ἦν πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχίλιοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλεφάντων πλῆθος ἔγγιστά που τῶν ἑκατόν.