--- title: "The Histories · Ἱστορίαι" author: "Polybius" translator: "Evelyn S. Shuckburgh" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Classical Greek" section: 49 of 103 url: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/49/ cite: "Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, The Histories · Ἱστορίαι, section 49. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/49/" --- # The Histories · Ἱστορίαι *Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh* How did Rome conquer the known world in under fifty-three years? A Greek hostage who became Scipio’s friend explains, with the Punic Wars, Hannibal, the Roman constitution and the fall of Carthage. > Greek: ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0543.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0543.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 49. Book IX · chapters 1–14 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/49/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/49/#p-N [¶0] 1. SUCH are the most conspicuous transactions of this Olympiad, that is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain; and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books. I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it, and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers, owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations, origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before, accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of impressing it upon them. > Greek: 1. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφανέσταται πράξεις τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς προειρημένης ὀλυμπιάδος περιληφθεισῶν καὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς διαστήματος, ὅ φαμεν δεῖν ὀλυμπιάδα νομίζειν, εἰσὶν αὗται· περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐν δυσὶ βυβλίοις πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν. οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ διότι συμβαίνει τὴν πραγματείαν ἡμῶν ἔχειν αὐστηρόν τι καὶ πρὸς ἓν γένος ἀκροατῶν οἰκειοῦσθαι καὶ κρίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μονοειδὲς τῆς συντάξεως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι συγγραφεῖς σχεδὸν ἅπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή γʼ, οἱ πλείους, πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς ἱστορίας μέρεσι χρώμενοι πολλοὺς ἐφέλκονται πρὸς ἔντευξιν τῶν ὑπομνημάτων. τὸν μὲν γὰρ φιλήκοον ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος ἐπισπᾶται, τὸν δὲ πολυπράγμονα καὶ περιττὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας, καθά που καὶ παρʼ Ἐφόρῳ λέγεται, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν. ἐφʼ ὃν ἡμεῖς ψιλῶς κατηντηκότες καὶ περὶ τοῦτον πεποιημένοι τὴν ὅλην τάξιν, πρὸς ἓν μέν τι γένος, ὡς προεῖπον, οἰκείως ἡρμόσμεθα, τῷ δὲ πλείονι μέρει τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀψυχαγώγητον παρεσκευάκαμεν τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν. τίνος δὲ χάριν τἄλλα μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας ἀποδοκιμάσαντες αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις προειλάμεθα γράφειν, ἐν ἑτέροις ἡμῖν εἴρηται διὰ πλειόνων, κεφαλαιωδῶς γε μὴν οὐδὲν ἐπέχει καὶ νῦν ἐμφάσεως χάριν ὑπομνῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. [¶1] 2. Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of the foundations of cities and the consanguinity of peoples, there was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually new and require a new narrative, —as of course one generation cannot give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say.... > Greek: 2. πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἐξηριθμημένων τά τε περὶ τὰς γενεαλογίας καὶ μύθους καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας, ἔτι δὲ συγγενείας καὶ κτίσεις, λοιπὸν ἢ τὰ ἀλλότρια δεῖ λέγειν ὡς ἴδια τὸν νῦν περὶ τούτων πραγματευόμενον, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶν αἴσχιστον, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ βουλόμενον προδήλως ματαιοπονεῖν, ὑπὲρ τοιούτων ὁμολογοῦντα συντάττεσθαι καὶ φροντίζειν, ἃ διὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων ἱκανῶς δεδήλωται καὶ παραδέδοται τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παρελείφθη τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ πλειόνων ἑτέρων· ὁ δὲ πραγματικὸς τρόπος ἐνεκρίθη πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ καινοποιεῖσθαι συνεχῶς καὶ καινῆς ἐξηγήσεως δεῖσθαι τῷ μὴ συμβατὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τὸ τὰς ἐπιγινομένας πράξεις ἡμῖν ἐξαγγεῖλαι, δεύτερον δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων ὠφελιμώτατον αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μέν, μάλιστα δὲ νῦν ὑπάρχειν, τῷ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προκοπὴν εἰληφέναι καθʼ ἡμᾶς ὥστε πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ὡς ἂν εἰ μεθοδικῶς δύνασθαι χειρίζειν τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας. διόπερ ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως τῆς τέρψεως στοχαζόμενοι τῶν ἀναγνωσομένων ὡς τῆς ὠφελείας τῶν προσεχόντων, τἄλλα παρέντες ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατηνέχθημεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων οἱ συνεφιστάνοντες ἐπιμελῶς ἡμῶν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι βεβαιότατα μαρτυρήσουσι τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις. [¶2] 3. Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, Hannibal at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies, and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp. But not even so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to consult as to what was best to be done. It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians were puzzled. I think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal’s cavalry was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat. Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the country through which they went was such that the enemy’s cavalry would be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua to either side was natural and inevitable. > Greek: 3. Ἀννίβας δὲ κύκλῳ περιλαμβάνων τὸν χάρακα τοῦ Ἀππίου τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠκροβολίζετο καὶ κατεπείραζε, βουλόμενος ἐκκαλεῖσθαι πρὸς μάχην· οὐδενὸς δὲ συνυπακούοντος τέλος ἐγίνετο πολιορκίᾳ παραπλήσιον τὸ συμβαῖνον, τῶν μὲν ἱππέων ἐπιφερομένων ταῖς ἴλαις καὶ μετὰ κραυγῆς εἰσακοντιζόντων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, τῶν δὲ πεζῶν κατὰ σπείρας προσπιπτόντων καὶ διασπᾶν τὸ χαράκωμα πειρωμένων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὣς ἐδύνατο κινῆσαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐκ τῆς ὑποκειμένης προθέσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν εὐζώνοις ἀπετρίβοντο τοὺς προσπίπτοντας πρὸς τὸν χάρακα, τοῖς δὲ βαρέσι τῶν ὅπλων ἀσφαλιζόμενοι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν βελῶν ἔμενον ἐν τάξει κατὰ τὰς σημαίας. Ἀννίβας δὲ δυσαρεστούμενος τοῖς ὅλοις διὰ τὸ μήτε παραπεσεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν δύνασθαι μήτʼ ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐβουλεύετο περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. ἐμοὶ δʼ οὐ μόνοις ἂν δοκεῖ Καρχηδονίοις τὰ τότε συμβαίνοντα παρέχειν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων τοῖς πυθομένοις. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀπιστήσαι πῶς Ῥωμαῖοι, πολλαῖς μὲν ἡττημένοι μάχαις ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων, οὐ τολμῶντες δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἔτι συγκαθίστασθαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ὅμως οὔτʼ εἴκειν οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν οὔτʼ ἐκχωρεῖν τῶν ὑπαίθρων; καὶ τὸν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀντιπαρῆγον μόνον ἀεὶ ταῖς ὑπωρείαις, τότε δὲ καθίσαντες εἰς τὰ πεδία καὶ τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον τόπον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν ἰσχυροτάτην πόλιν, κύκλῳ προσμαχομένων αὐτοῖς τῶν πολεμίων, πρὸς οὓς οὐδʼ ἐπινοήσαντες οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν· καρχηδόνιοί τʼ, ἀδιαλείπτως νικῶντες ταῖς μάχαις, οὐχ ἧττον ἐνίοις καιροῖς ἐδυσχρηστοῦντο τῶν ἡττωμένων. δοκεῖ δέ μοι παραίτιον τοῦτο γεγονέναι τῆς ἑκατέρων προαιρέσεως, τὸ παρʼ ἀμφοῖν συντεθεωρῆσθαι διότι τὸ παρʼ Ἀννίβου σύνταγμα τῶν ἱππέων αἴτιον ἦν καὶ τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοῦ λείπεσθαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. διόπερ αἵ τε τῶν ἡττωμένων στρατοπέδων ἀντιπαραγωγαὶ μετὰ τὰς μάχας εὐθέως κατὰ λόγον ἐγίνοντο· διὰ γὰρ τόπων τοιούτων ἀντιπαρῆγον ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν ἔμελλε βλάψειν αὐτοὺς τὸ τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἱππικόν. τά τε περὶ τὴν Καπύην τότε συμβαίνοντʼ εἰκότως ἑκατέροις ἀπήντα. [¶3] 4. For the Roman army did not venture to come out and give battle, from fear of the enemy’s horse, but remained resolutely within their entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse, with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by cutting off their supplies of provisions. These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was impossible to raise the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces; which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail. > Greek: 4. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον ἐξιέναι μὲν πρὸς μάχην οὐκ ἐθάρρει τῷ δεδιέναι τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἱππεῖς, ἔμενε δʼ ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τετολμηκότως, σαφῶς εἰδὸς ἀβλαβῆ τὴν ἵππον αὐτοῖς ἐσομένην, ὑφʼ ἧς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἡττᾶτο. οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι πάλιν εὐλόγως οὔτε στρατοπεδεύσαντες μετὰ τῆς ἵππου μένειν ἐδύναντο πλείω χρόνον διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ παρακειμένῃ χώρᾳ χορτάσματα πάντα κατεφθαρκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους αὐτοῦ τούτου χάριν, τοῖς δὲ νώτοις οὐκ ἐφικτὸν εἶναι τοσαύτῃ μὲν ἵππῳ, τοσούτοις δʼ ὑποζυγίοις κατανύσαι χόρτον ἢ κριθὰς κομίζοντας ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος· οὔτε μὴν ἄνευ τῶν ἱππέων παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐθάρρουν πολιορκεῖν χάρακα καὶ τάφρον προβεβλημένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἴσου κίνδυνον αὐτοῖς ἀμφίδοξον εἶναι συνέβαινε χωρὶς τῶν ἱππέων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἠγωνίων καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους ὑπάτους μὴ παραγενηθέντες ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσαιεν καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν σφίσι παραστήσαιεν, ἀφελόμενοι τὴν τῶν χορηγιῶν ἐπάρκειαν. ἐξ ὧν συλλογιζόμενος Ἀννίβας ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχον τὸ διὰ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς βίας λῦσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἐπʼ ἄλλης ἐγένετο γνώμης. ὑπέλαβε γάρ, εἰ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν αἰφνιδίως ἐπιφανείη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην τόποις, ἴσως μὲν ἂν καὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνύσασθαί τι τῶν χρησίμων, ἐκπλήξας τῷ παραδόξῳ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, τούς γε περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον ἀναγκάσειν ἢ λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, σπεύδοντας τῇ πατρίδι βοηθεῖν, ἢ διαιροῦντας τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαταγωνίστους ὑπάρξειν καὶ τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους αὐτῶν. [¶4] 5. With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier into Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He wrote therefore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege. When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there was a universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal’s letter, and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope. At the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground, Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty stades from Rome, there pitched his camp. > Greek: 5. ἃ διανοηθεὶς ἐξέπεμψε γραμματοφόρον εἰς τὴν Καπύην, πείσας τινὰ τῶν Λιβύων αὐτομολῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, προνοηθεὶς τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων ἀσφαλείας· πάνυ γὰρ ἠγωνία μὴ θεωρήσαντες αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαττόμενον οἱ Καπυανοί, κἄπειτα διατραπέντες ὡς ἀπηλπισμένοι, παραδῶσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἑαυτούς. διὸ γράψας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀναζυγὴν ἀπέστειλε τὸν Λίβυν, ἵνα συνέντες τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν χωρισμὸν εὐθαρσῶς ὑπομένοιεν τὴν πολιορκίαν. τοῖς δʼ ἐν Ῥώμῃ προσπεπτωκότων τῶν περὶ τὴν Καπύην, διότι παρεστρατοπεδευκὼς Ἀννίβας πολιορκεῖ τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὀρθοὶ ταῖς διανοίαις καὶ περίφοβοι πάντες ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα διατεινούσης τῆς ἐνεστηκυίας κρίσεως· διὸ καὶ ταῖς ἐξαποστολαῖς καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὅλοι καὶ πάντες ἐνενεύκεισαν. οἱ δὲ Καπυανοὶ κομισάμενοι τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Λίβυος γράμματα καὶ γνόντες τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, κρίνοντες ἔτι ταύτην ἐξελέγξαι τὴν ἐλπίδα. Ἀννίβας δὲ μετὰ πέμπτην ἡμέραν τῆς παρουσίας, δειπνοποιησάμενος καὶ καταλιπὼν τὰ πυρὰ καιόμενα, τοιαύτην ἐποίησε τὴν ἀναζυγὴν ὥστε μηδένα συνεῖναι τῶν πολεμίων τὸ συμβαῖνον. χρησάμενος δὲ ταῖς πορείαις διὰ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος ἐνεργοῖς καὶ συνεχέσι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τόπους αἰεὶ ταῖς προπορείαις ἐξερευνώμενος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων, ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ ταῖς διανοίαις περὶ τὴν Καπύην καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖ πράξεις ὄντων ἔλαθε διαβὰς τὸν Ἀνίωνα ποταμὸν καὶ συνεγγίσας, ὥστε μὴ πλεῖον τετταράκοντα σταδίων ἀποσχὼν τῆς Ῥώμης ποιήσασθαι τὴν παρεμβολήν. [¶5] 6. On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror prevailed among the inhabitants,— this movement of Hannibal’s being as unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near, if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly, the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of the gods and implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day, an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the preservation of Rome. For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing out the lists and testing the men for the other army: whereby it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked Hannibal’s intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the enemy drawn up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened, they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devasting the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one had ever expected an enemy to set foot. > Greek: 6. οὗ γενομένου καὶ προσπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ συνέβη ταραχὴν καὶ φόβον ἐμπεσεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἅτε τοῦ πράγματος αἰφνιδίου μὲν ὄντος καὶ τελέως ἀνελπίστου διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπηρκέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὑποτρεχούσης δέ τινος ἅμα καὶ τοιαύτης ἐννοίας ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐγγίσαι καὶ καταθαρρῆσαι μὴ οὐ τῶν περὶ Καπύην στρατοπέδων ἀπολωλότων. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες τὰ τείχη προκατελάμβανον καὶ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως εὐκαίρους τόπους, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες περιπορευόμεναι τοὺς ναοὺς ἱκέτευον τοὺς θεούς, πλύνουσαι ταῖς κόμαις τὰ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐδάφη· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐταῖς ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὅταν τις ὁλοσχερὴς τὴν πατρίδα καταλαμβάνῃ κίνδυνος. ἄρτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατεστρατοπεδευκότων καὶ διανοουμένων τῇ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἡμέρᾳ καταπειράζειν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, γίνεται παράδοξόν τι καὶ τυχικὸν σύμπτωμα πρὸς σωτηρίαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον καὶ Πόπλιον τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς στρατοπέδου πρότερον πεποιημένοι τὴν καταγραφὴν ἐνόρκους εἶχον τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἥξειν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, τοῦ δʼ ἑτέρου τότε τὰς καταγραφὰς ἐποιοῦντο καὶ δοκιμασίας. ἐξ οὗ συνέβη πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν αὐτομάτως ἁθροισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην. οὓς ἐξαγαγόντες εὐθαρσῶς οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ παρεμβαλόντες πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπέσχον τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. οἱ γὰρ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥρμησαν, οὐχ ὅλως ἀπελπίζοντες αἱρήσειν κατὰ κράτος αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην· συνθεασάμενοι δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους παρατεταγμένους καὶ ταχέως διά τινος αἰχμαλώτου πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπιβολῆς ἀπέστησαν, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐδῄουν ἐπιπορευόμενοι καὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἐνεπίμπρασαν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ἀναρίθμητον περιελασάμενοι λείας πλῆθος ἥθροισαν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, ὡς ἂν εἰς ἄγραν ἥκοντες τοιαύτην εἰς ἣν οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε πολέμιον ἥξειν ἤλπιζε· [¶6] 7. But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford; and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of Hannibal’s cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace, being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large number of the Rhegini. > Greek: 7. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ὑπάτων τολμησάντων ἐν δέκα σταδίοις ἀντιστρατοπεδεῦσαι σφίσι παραβόλως, Ἀννίβας ἅμα μὲν λείας πλῆθος ἡθροικώς, ἅμα δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐλπίδος ἀποπεπτωκώς, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, συλλογιζόμενος τὰς ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς ἤλπιζε κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπίνοιαν πυθομένους τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον τὸν περὶ τὴν πόλιν κίνδυνον ἤτοι λύσαντας τὴν πολιορκίαν ὁλοσχερῶς παραβοηθήσειν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ Ῥώμῃ πράγμασιν ἢ μέρος τι καταλιπόντας τῷ πλείονι βοηθήσειν κατὰ σπουδήν· ὧν ὁπότερον ἂν συμβῇ, δεόντως ἕξειν ὑπειληφὼς ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινήν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον διασπάσαντες τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ γεφύρας καὶ συναναγκάσαντες αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ ῥεύματος περαιοῦν τὴν δύναμιν, προσέκειντο τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις περὶ τὴν διάβασιν καὶ πολλὴν παρεῖχον δυσχρηστίαν. ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἐδύναντο πρᾶξαι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντα τόπον εὐχρηστίαν τῶν Νομάδων· τῆς δὲ λείας ἱκανόν τι μέρος ἀφελόμενοι καὶ περὶ τριακοσίους καταβαλόντες τῶν πολεμίων τότε μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολήν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσαντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διὰ φόβον σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὑποχώρησιν, εἵποντο κατόπιν ταῖς παρωρείαις. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠπείγετο, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον· μετὰ δὲ πέμπτην ἡμέραν προσαγγελθέντος αὐτῷ μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον, οὕτως ὑποστὰς καὶ προσδεξάμενος τοὺς ἑπομένους ἐπιτίθεται νυκτὸς ἔτι τῇ στρατοπεδείᾳ, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐξέβαλε. τῆς δʼ ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης συνθεωρήσας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους πρός τινα λόφον ἐρυμνὸν ἀποκεχωρηκότας, τοῦ μὲν ἔτι προσκαρτερεῖν τούτοις ἀπέγνω, ποιησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Δαυνίας καὶ τῆς Βρεττίας ἐπέστη τοῖς κατὰ τὸ Ῥήγιον τόποις ἀνυπόπτως, ὥστε παρʼ ὀλίγον μὲν καὶ τῆς πόλεως κυριεῦσαι, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκπεπορευμένους ἀποτεμέσθαι καὶ πλείστων γενέσθαι Ῥηγίνων κύριος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ παρουσίᾳ. [¶7] 8. It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison. He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea, and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the intention of offering the Thebans battle; having given orders to his men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters of the town which slope down to the river. Then however a contretemps occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope. But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night march, arrived at Mantinea about mid-day, finding it entirely destitute of defenders. But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking with some dissatisfaction of these events, when they say that the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune. > Greek: 8. δοκεῖ δέ μοι δικαίως ἄν τις ἐπισημήνασθαι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν τάς τε Καρχηδονίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων ἀρετὰς καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν. καθάπερ γὰρ Ἐπαμινώνδαν τὸν Θηβαῖον θαυμάζουσι πάντες, διότι παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων καὶ θεωρήσας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτούς τε πανδημεὶ παραγεγονότας εἰς Μαντίνειαν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους εἰς ταύτην ἡθροικότας τὴν πόλιν, ὡς παραταξομένους τοῖς Θηβαίοις, δειπνοποιήσασθαι τοῖς αὑτοῦ καθʼ ὥραν παραγγείλας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν ἄρτι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιγινομένης, ὡς τῆς παρατάξεως χάριν σπεύδων εὐκαίρους τινὰς προκαταλαβέσθαι τόπους, τοιαύτην δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν ἐνεργασάμενος προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, προσμίξας δὲ περὶ τρίτην ὥραν τῇ πόλει παραδόξως καὶ καταλαβὼν τὴν Σπάρτην ἔρημον τῶν βοηθησόντων, μέχρι μὲν ἀγορᾶς ἐβιάσατο καὶ κατέσχε τῆς πόλεως τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐστραμμένους τόπους. γενομένης δὲ περιπετείας, καί τινος αὐτομόλου τὴν νύκτα διαπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν καὶ διασαφήσαντος Ἀγησιλάῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ συμβαῖνον, καὶ τῶν βοηθούντων παραγενομένων εἰς τὸν τῆς καταλήψεως καιρόν, ταύτης μὲν τῆς ἐλπίδος ἀπεσφάλη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τὸν Εὐρώταν ἀριστοποιησάμενος καὶ προσαναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς κακοπαθείας, ὥρμα πάλιν ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν, συλλογιζόμενος ὅτι συμβήσεται τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων παραβεβοηθηκότων εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην ἔρημον πάλιν καταλείπεσθαι τὴν Μαντίνειαν· ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. διὸ παρακαλέσας τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ χρησάμενος ἐνεργῷ τῇ νυκτοπορείᾳ παρῆν καὶ προσέμισγε τῇ Μαντινείᾳ περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας, ἐρήμῳ τελέως ὑπαρχούσῃ τῶν βοηθησόντων. οἱ δʼ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σπουδάζοντες μετασχεῖν τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀγῶνος τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν παρῆσαν. ἤδη δὲ τῆς Θηβαίων πρωτοπορείας συναπτούσης πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερόν, ὃ κεῖται πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐν ἑπτὰ σταδίοις, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες συνεκύρησεν ἅμα καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπιφαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τῆς Μαντινείας ὑπερκείμενον λόφον· εἰς οὓς ἐμβλέψαντες οἱ καταλελειμμένοι τῶν Μαντινέων μόλις ἐθάρρησαν ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους καὶ κωλῦσαι τὴν τῶν Θηβαίων ἔφοδον. διόπερ εἰκότως οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἐπιμέμφονται τοῖς προειρημένοις ἔργοις, φάσκοντες τῷ μὲν ἡγεμόνι πεπρᾶχθαι πᾶν ὅσον ἀγαθῷ στρατηγῷ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπεναντίων κρείττω, τῆς δὲ τύχης ἥττω γεγονέναι τὸν Ἐπαμινώνδαν. [¶8] 9. Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in play, and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the Lacedaemonians rushed off en masse at the first message and relieved Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit. I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity; and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of deliberate thought.... When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the earnest supplication of the people to depart.... > Greek: 9. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ περὶ τῶν κατʼ Ἀννίβαν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ προσβαλόντα τοῖς πολεμίοις πειραθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐκ μέρους ἀγώνων λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ τὸ ταύτης ἀποπεσόντα τῆς προσβολῆς ἐπʼ αὐτὴν ὁρμῆσαι τὴν Ῥώμην, κἄπειτα μὴ καθικόμενον τῆς προθέσεως διὰ τὰς ἐκ ταὐτομάτου περιπετείας αὖθις ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς συντρῖψαι μὲν τοὺς ἑπομένους, ἐφεδρεῦσαι δὲ τῷ κατὰ λόγον, εἰ συνέβη γενέσθαι κίνημα περὶ τοὺς τὴν Καπύην πολιορκοῦντας, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον μὴ λήξαντα τῆς προθέσεως εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν βλάβην ἀποσκῆψαι, μόνον οὐ δʼ ἀναστάτους ποιῆσαι Ῥηγίνους, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο καὶ θαυμάσαι τὸν προειρημένον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἡγεμόνα; καὶ μὴν Ῥωμαίους Λακεδαιμονίων ἀμείνους ἄν τις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ κρίνειεν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ τῇ πρώτῃ προσαγγελίᾳ συνεκχυθέντες τὴν μὲν Σπάρτην ἔσωσαν, τὴν δὲ Μαντίνειαν τὸ καθʼ αὑτοὺς μέρος ἀπέβαλον· Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα διεφύλαξαν καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν οὐκ ἔλυσαν, ἀλλʼ ἔμειναν ἀσαλεύτως καὶ βεβαίως ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη τεθαρρηκότως προσέκειντο τοῖς Καπυανοῖς. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐχ οὕτως τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἢ Καρχηδονίων ἐγκωμίου χάριν εἴρηταί μοι — τούτους μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις ἐπεσημηνάμην — τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἡγουμένων παρʼ ἀμφοτέροις καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων χειρίζειν παρʼ ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἵνα τῶν μὲν ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι, τὰ δʼ ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται παράβολον ἔχειν τι καὶ κινδυνῶδες, τοὐναντίον ἀσφαλῆ μὲν τὴν τόλμαν, θαυμασίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀείμνηστον δὲ καὶ καλὴν ἔχει τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ κατορθωθέντα καὶ διαψευσθέντα παραπλησίως, ἐὰν μόνον σὺν νῷ γένηται τὰ πραττόμενα. Ἄτελλα, πόλις Ὀπικῶν Ἰταλίας μεταξὺ Καπύης καὶ Νεαπόλεως. τὸ ἐθνικὸν … Ἀτελλανός, ὡς Πολύβιος ἐνάτῃ ‘Ἀτελλανοὶ παρέδοσαν αὑτούσ’. τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων πολιορκούντων Τάραντα Βομίλκας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος εἰς τὸ συμμαχήσειν μετὰ δυνάμεως πλείστης καὶ μηδὲν δυνηθεὶς ἐπικουρῆσαι τοῖς ἔνδον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς θέσθαι τὰ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἔλαθεν ἀναλώσας τὴν χορηγίαν. καὶ μετὰ παρακλήσεως πρότερον ἀφικέσθαι ἐκβιασθεὶς καὶ ὑποσχέσεων μεγάλων, ὕστερον μεθʼ ἱκετηρίας τῶν ἔνδον ἀποπλεῦσαι ἀπηναγκάσθη. [¶9] 10. A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but by the virtue of its own inhabitants.... The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city and to leave nothing behind. Whether they were right in doing so, and consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others, without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers. But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled. For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and such as belonged to the state to adorn the city.... > Greek: 10. οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἔξω κοσμεῖται πόλις, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῆς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρετῆς. ἐκρίθη μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ προειρημένα μετακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολιπεῖν· πότερα δʼ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο καὶ συμφερόντως αὑτοῖς ἔπραξαν ἢ τἀναντία, πολὺς ἂν εἴη λόγος, πλείων γε μὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ δεόντως σφίσι πεπρᾶχθαι μηδʼ ἀκμὴν νῦν πράττεσθαι τοῦτο τοὔργον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοιούτων ὁρμηθέντες προεβίβασαν τὴν πατρίδα, δῆλον ὡς εἰκότως ταῦτα μετέφερον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, διʼ ὧν ηὐξήθησαν. εἰ δʼ ἁπλουστάτοις χρώμενοι βίοις καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς ἐν τούτοις περιττότητος καὶ πολυτελείας ἀφεστῶτες ὅμως ἐπεκράτουν τούτων αἰεὶ παρʼ οἷς ὑπῆρχε πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, πῶς οὐ νομιστέον εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἁμάρτημα; τὸ γὰρ ἀπολιπόντας τὰ τῶν νικώντων ἔθη τὸν τῶν ἡττωμένων ζῆλον ἀναλαμβάνειν, προσεπιδραττομένους ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ φοβερώτατον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς, ὁμολογούμενον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι τῶν πραττόντων παράπτωμα. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεώμενος οὐδέποτε μακαρίζει τοὺς τἀλλότρια κεκτημένους, ὡς ἐν τῷ φθονεῖν ἅμα καί τις ἔλεος αὐτὸν ὑποτρέχει τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποβαλόντων. ἐπὰν δὲ καὶ προβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ πάντα συνάγῃ πρὸς αὑτὸν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα συγκαλῇ τρόπον τινὰ τοὺς ἐστερημένους ἐπὶ θέαν, διπλάσιον γίνεται τὸ κακόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἀναμιμνησκομένους τῶν οἰκείων συμπτωμάτων. ἐξ ὧν οὐ μόνον φθόνος, ἀλλʼ οἷον ὀργή τις ἐκκαίεται πρὸς τοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων περιπετειῶν ἀνάμνησις ὡς ἂν εἰ προτροπή τις ἐστι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τῶν πραξάντων μῖσος. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἄργυρον ἁθροίζειν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἴσως ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων ἀντιποιήσασθαι μὴ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀδυναμίαν ἐνεργασαμένους, σφίσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἑτοιμάσαντας. τὰ δʼ ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχοντα τῆς προειρημένης δυνάμεως ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόποις ἅμα τῷ φθόνῳ καταλιπόντας ἐνδοξοτέραν ποιεῖν τὴν σφετέραν πατρίδα, μὴ γραφαῖς καὶ τύποις, ἀλλὰ σεμνότητι καὶ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ κοσμοῦντας αὐτήν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν μεταλαμβανόντων ἀεὶ τὰς δυναστείας, ἵνα μὴ σκυλεύοντες τὰς πόλεις κόσμον ὑπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πατρίσι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας συμφοράς· Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ μετακομίσαντες τὰ προειρημένα ταῖς μὲν ἰδιωτικαῖς κατασκευαῖς τοὺς αὑτῶν ἐκόσμησαν βίους, ταῖς δὲ δημοσίαις τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως. [¶10] 11. The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales, trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand, Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give up his daughters as hostages.... > Greek: 11. ὅτι οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνες, κρατήσαντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων, σφῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἠδύναντο κρατεῖν, καὶ δόξαντες τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον ἀνῃρηκέναι πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἐστασίαζον, ἀεὶ παρατριβόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον Φοίνιξι πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαρχίαν. ὧν ὑπάρχων Ἀσδρούβας ὁ Γέσκωνος εἰς τοῦτο κακοπραγμοσύνης προήχθη διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὡς τὸν πιστότατον τῶν κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν φίλων Ἀνδοβάλην, πάλαι μὲν ἀποβαλόντα τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ Καρχηδονίους, ἄρτι δὲ πάλιν ἀπειληφότα διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους εὔνοιαν, ἐπεβάλετο χρημάτων πλῆθος αἰτεῖν. τοῦ δὲ παρακούσαντος διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ προγεγενημένῃ πίστει πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ψευδῆ διαβολὴν ἐπενέγκας ἠνάγκασε τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην δοῦναι τὰς ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρας εἰς ὁμηρείαν. ὅτι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον, βουλόμενοι σίτῳ χορηγηθῆναι διὰ τὸ μεγάλην εἶναι παρʼ αὐτοῖς σπάνιν, ὡς ἂν τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὑπὸ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἅπαντος ἐφθαρμένου μέχρι τῶν τῆς Ῥώμης πυλῶν, ἔξωθεν δὲ μὴ γενομένης ἐπικουρίας, ἅτε κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης πολέμων ἐνεστώτων καὶ στρατοπέδων παρακαθημένων, πλὴν τῶν κατʼ Αἴγυπτον τόπων. εἰς γὰρ τοσοῦτον κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην προεβεβήκει τὰ τῆς ἐνδείας ὥστε τὸν Σικελικὸν μέδιμνον πεντεκαίδεκα δραχμῶν ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως οὐκ ἠμέλουν τῶν πολεμικῶν. — πολλὴν μὲν ἐπισκέψεως χρείαν ἔχει τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἐπιβολάς· [¶11] 12. The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skilful use of opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience. Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy. Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall under a scientfic rule, and have no fixed design. > Greek: 12. ἔστι δὲ δυνατὸν ἐν ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν εὐστοχεῖν, ἐὰν σὺν νῷ τις πράττῃ τὸ προτεθέν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττομένων, εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων· ὅτι γε μὴν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν καιρῷ πάλιν ἐνεργουμένων πλείω γίνεται τὰ διαμαρτανόμενα τῶν κατορθουμένων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο γνῶναι χαλεπὸν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων. καὶ μὴν διότι παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἀγνοίας ἢ ῥᾳθυμίας ἐπιτελεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, οὐδεὶς ἂν τοῦτʼ ἀπορήσειε. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως σκοπεῖν ἤδη πάρεστι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπροθέτως ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς συμβαίνοντα πράξεις μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἁρμόζει λέγειν, περιπετείας δὲ καὶ συγκυρήσεις μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντα μεθοδικὸν οὐδʼ ἑστῶτα παραλειπέσθω· τὰ δὲ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐνεργούμενα, ταῦτα δηλούσθω· περὶ ὧν ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος. πάσης δὴ πράξεως ἐχούσης καιρὸν ὡρισμένον καὶ διάστημα καὶ τόπον, καὶ προσδεομένης τοῦ λαθεῖν καὶ συνθημάτων ὡρισμένων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ διʼ ὧν καὶ μεθʼ ὧν καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ πραχθήσεται, φανερὸν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἑκάστου τούτων εὐστοχήσας οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ὁ δʼ ἑνὸς ὀλιγωρήσας σφαλήσεται τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως. οὕτως ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὰς ἀποτυχίας τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων ἱκανὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ τυχὸν ἐποίησε τῶν κατὰ μέρος· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν μόλις ἱκανὰ πάντα. [¶12] 13. Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a period and place for its execution, secrecy, definite signals, persons by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole. Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail is barely enough. Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such expeditions. Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone without whom it is impossible to complete his plan; and not even to them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover, not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind. For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression of their countenances or by their actions. The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions under which marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which they can extend; and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea. The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons, and to be able to adapt the design to them. Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible impossible. Finally there must be no neglect of the subject of signals and counter signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation is to be carried out. > Greek: 13. διὸ χρὴ μηδενὸς ἀφροντιστεῖν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐπιβολαῖς τοὺς ἡγουμένους. ἔστι δʼ ἀρχὴ μὲν τῶν προειρημένων τὸ σιγᾶν, καὶ μήτε διὰ χαρὰν παραδόξου προφαινομένης ἐλπίδος μήτε διὰ φόβον μήτε διὰ συνήθειαν μήτε διὰ φιλοστοργίαν μεταδιδόναι μηδενὶ τῶν ἐκτός, αὐτοῖς δὲ κοινοῦσθαι τούτοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ προτεθὲν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, καὶ τούτοις μὴ πρότερον, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου χρείας καιρὸς ἐπαναγκάζῃ. χρὴ δὲ σιγᾶν μὴ μόνον τῇ γλώττῃ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ ψυχῇ· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κρύψαντες τοὺς λόγους ποτὲ μὲν διʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιφάσεως, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν πραττομένων φανερὰς ἐποίησαν τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἐπινοίας. δεύτερον δʼ ἐπεγνωκέναι τὰς ἡμερησίους καὶ νυκτερινὰς πορείας καὶ τὰ διανύσματα τούτων, μὴ μόνον κατὰ γῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. τρίτον καὶ μέγιστον, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος καιρῶν ἔχειν ἔννοιαν καὶ δύνασθαι τούτων κατὰ τὸ κριθὲν εὐστοχεῖν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸν τόπον τῆς πράξεως ἐν μικρῷ θετέον, ἐπειδὴ πολλάκις παρὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα δοκοῦντʼ εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ δυνατὰ πέφηνεν ἀδύνατα. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυνθημάτων, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἐκλογῆς, διʼ ὧν καὶ μεθʼ ὧν ἐνεργηθήσεται τὸ κριθέν, οὐκ ὀλιγωρητέον. [¶13] 14. Of these points some are learnt by experience, some from history, and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural features; as well as of the persons by whom and with whom he is to act. If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those whom they are conducting. These,—and other points like them, it is perhaps possible that leaders may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the working out of which is not much to our present point, though their results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of such undertakings. The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance, since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of ruining himself altogether. > Greek: 14. τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τριβῆς, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἱστορίας, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἐμπειρίαν μεθοδικὴν θεωρεῖται. κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς καὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐφʼ ὃν δεῖ παραγενέσθαι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τόπου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, διʼ ὧν μέλλει καὶ μεθʼ ὧν πράττειν. δεύτερον δʼ ἱστορεῖν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς τυχοῦσι· τὴν δὲ τῶν καθηγουμένων πίστιν ἐπί τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἀεὶ δεῖ κεῖσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια δυνατὸν ἴσως καὶ διʼ αὐτῆς τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τριβῆς περιγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτουργίας, τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἱστορίας· τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας προσδεῖται μαθήσεως καὶ θεωρημάτων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξ ἀστρολογίας καὶ γεωμετρίας, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔργον οὐ μέγα πρός γε ταύτην τὴν χρείαν, τὸ δὲ χρῆμα μέγα καὶ μεγάλα συνεργεῖν δυνάμενον πρὸς τὰς προειρημένας ἐπιβολάς. ἀναγκαιότατον δʼ αὐτοῦ τὸ περὶ τὰς νυκτερινὰς θεωρίας καὶ τὰς ἡμερινάς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσας εἶναι συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ ταύτας, οὐδʼ ἧστινος ἂν ἀσχολίας τὸ πρᾶγμα προσεδεῖτο, κοινὴ δʼ ἂν ἦν ἁπάντων ἡ γνῶσις· ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ μόνον ἔχει τὰ προειρημένα πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὑτά, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γινώσκειν τὰς αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις ἑκατέρων. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις εὐστοχήσειε πορείας καὶ διανύσματος ἡμερησίου, πῶς δὲ νυκτερινοῦ, μὴ κατανοήσας τὰς τῶν προειρημένων διαφοράς; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν ἐξικέσθαι δυνατὸν ἄνευ τῆς τούτων ἐμπειρίας, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ὑστερεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ προτερεῖν ἀνάγκη. μεῖζον δὲ τὸ προτερεῖν ἐν μόνοις τούτοις ἁμάρτημα τοῦ καθυστερεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπεράρας τὸν ὡρισμένον καιρὸν αὐτῆς ἀποτυγχάνει τῆς ἐλπίδος — τὸ γὰρ γεγονὸς ἐξ ἀποστήματος ἐπιγνοὺς αὖθις ἀπολύεται μετʼ ἀσφαλείας — ὁ δὲ προλαβὼν τὸν καιρόν, ἐγγίσας καὶ γνωρισθεὶς οὐ μόνον ἀποτυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινδυνεύει τοῖς ὅλοις.