--- title: "The Histories · Ἱστορίαι" author: "Polybius" translator: "Evelyn S. Shuckburgh" languages: [grc, en] shelf: "Classical Greek" section: 50 of 103 url: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/50/ cite: "Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, The Histories · Ἱστορίαι, section 50. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/50/" --- # The Histories · Ἱστορίαι *Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh* How did Rome conquer the known world in under fifty-three years? A Greek hostage who became Scipio’s friend explains, with the Punic Wars, Hannibal, the Roman constitution and the fall of Carthage. > Greek: ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0543.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0). > English: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0543.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included. > Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence. ## 50. Book IX · chapters 15–29 Source: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/50/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/50/#p-N [¶0] 15. In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must have at his fingers’ ends the season of the summer and winter solstice, the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that he can compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land. Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveille, or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed by the shadows or by the sun’s course, and the quarter of the heaven in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those who have studied astronomy. For since, though the nights are unequal in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise. Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun during the day, it is evident that when he has set the are subtended by the diameter of his are must rise. Therefore the length of the night is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising. And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a model to which all subsequent revolutions conform. > Greek: 15. κρατεῖ δʼ ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων ὁ καιρός, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν. διὸ προχείρως ἰστέον τῷ στρατηγῷ τροπὰς ἡλίου θερινὰς καὶ χειμερινάς, ἔτι δʼ ἰσημερίας καὶ τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν μόνως δύναιτο συμμετρεῖσθαι πρὸς λόγον τὰ διανύσματα καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. καὶ μὴν τοὺς κατὰ μέρος καιροὺς ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι, καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τοὺς τῆς νυκτός, πρὸς τὸ γινώσκειν πηνίκα ποιητέον καὶ τὰς ἐξεγέρσεις καὶ τὰς ἀναζυγάς· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνειν μὴ οὐ τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐστοχήσαντα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡμέρας καιροὺς τῇ σκιᾷ θεωρεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἔτι δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον πορείᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου γινομένοις αὐτοῦ τούτου διαστήμασι· τοὺς δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς δυσχερές, ἐὰν μή τις ἐπὶ τοῦ φαινομένου τῇ τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τάξει συμπεριφέρηται· πάνυ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον τοῖς τὰ φαινόμενα πεπολυπραγμονηκόσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀνίσων οὐσῶν τῶν νυκτῶν ὅμως ἐν πάσῃ τῇ νυκτὶ τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων ἓξ ἀναφέρεσθαι συμβαίνει, φανερὸν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μέρεσι πάσης νυκτὸς ἴσα μέρη τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων ἀναφέρεσθαι. τοῦ δʼ ἡλίου γνωριζομένου καθʼ ἡμέραν, ποίαν μοῖραν ἐπέχει, δῆλον ὡς δύναντος τούτου τὴν κατὰ διάμετρον ἐπιτέλλειν ἀνάγκη. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἂν τὸ μετὰ ταύτην μέρος ἀνατεταλκὸς φαίνηται τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ, τοσοῦτον εἰκὸς ἠνύσθαι τῆς νυκτὸς αἰεί. γνωριζομένων δὲ τῶν ζῳδίων καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τοιούτους γίνεσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος καιροὺς τῆς νυκτός. ἐν δὲ ταῖς συννεφέσι νυξὶ τῇ σελήνῃ προσεκτέον, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος ὡς ἐπίπαν αἰεὶ τὸ ταύτης ἐμφαίνεται φῶς, καθʼ ὃν ἂν ᾖ τόπον τοῦ κόσμου. καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς καιρῶν καὶ τόπων στοχαστέον, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς δύσεις, καθυπαρχούσης καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐννοίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε συμπεριφέρεσθαι ταῖς καθʼ ἡμέραν διαφοραῖς τῶν ἀνατολῶν. ἔστι δὲ τρόπος εὐθεώρητος καὶ περὶ ταύτην· ὅρος γὰρ εἷς μὴν ὡς τύπῳ, καὶ πρὸς αἴσθησιν τοιοῦτοι πάντες. [¶1] 16. And here one may mention with admiration that Homer represents Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land also. For such accidents as baffle expectation, and are incapable of being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about to mention by way of examples. > Greek: 16. ᾗ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄν τις ἐπαινέσειε, διότι παρεισάγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τὸν ἡγεμονικώτατον ἄνδρα, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἄστρων οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς πλοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ γῇ πράξεις. ἱκανὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρὰ δόξαν γινόμενα μὴ δυνάμενα τυγχάνειν προνοίας ἀκριβοῦς εἰς τὸ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρασκευάζειν καὶ πολλάκις, οἷον ὄμβρων καὶ ποταμῶν ἐπιφοραὶ καὶ πάγων ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ χιόνες, ἔτι δʼ ὁ καπνώδης καὶ συννεφὴς ἀὴρ καὶ τἄλλα τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν δυνατόν ἐστι προϊδέσθαι, καὶ τούτων ὀλιγωρήσομεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἀποτευξόμεθα διʼ αὑτούς; διόπερ οὐκ ἀφροντιστητέον οὐδενὸς τῶν προειρημένων, ἵνα μὴ τοιούτοις ἀλογήμασι περιπίπτωμεν οἵοις φασὶ περιπεσεῖν ἑτέρους τε πλείους καὶ τοὺς νῦν ὑφʼ ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι μέλλοντας ὑποδείγματος χάριν. [¶2] 17. When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league, attempted to take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly, wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single signal, and being then quite young had no experience of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in war does the success or failure of an operation turn. > Greek: 17. Ἄρατος ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἐπιβαλόμενος πραξικοπεῖν τὴν τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλιν, συνετάξατο πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῷ συνεργοῦντας ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ τὸν μὲν Ἄρατον ἔδει νυκτὸς παραγενηθέντα πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Κυναίθης ῥέοντα ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ πρεπίου μένειν ἐνσχολάσαντα μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, τοὺς δʼ ἔνδοθεν περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας, ὅτε λάβοιεν τὸν καιρόν, ἕνα μὲν αὑτῶν μεθʼ ἡσυχίας ἐν ἱματίῳ διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐκπέμψαι, καὶ κελεῦσαι προελθόντα στῆναι πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸν συνταχθέντα τάφον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς προσενεγκεῖν τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ἄρχουσι, κοιμωμένοις κατὰ μέσον ἡμέρας, τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τηρεῖν τὴν πύλην. γενομένου δὲ τούτου σπουδῇ καταταχεῖν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας ἔδει πρὸς τὴν πύλην. τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ συνάψαντος, ὁ μὲν Ἄρατος ἧκε καὶ κρυφθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἔμενε τηρῶν τὸ σύνθημα· περὶ δὲ πέμπτην ὥραν ἔχων τις πρόβατα μαλακὰ τῶν εἰθισμένων περὶ πόλιν τρέφειν, δεηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ πυθέσθαι τι τοῦ ποιμένος βιωτικόν, ἐξῆλθε διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐν ἱματίῳ καὶ στὰς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τάφον περιεβλέπετο τὸν ποιμένα. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι τὸ σύνθημα νομίσαντες σπουδῇ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐφέροντο πάντες. ταχὺ δὲ τῆς πύλης κλεισθείσης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστώτων διὰ τὸ μηδέπω μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ἡτοιμάσθαι, συνέβη μὴ μόνον τῆς πράξεως ἀποτυχεῖν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως συμπράττουσιν αἰτίους γενέσθαι τῶν μεγίστων συμπτωμάτων· καταφανεῖς γὰρ γενόμενοι παραχρῆμα προβληθέντες ἀπέθανον. τί οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν τῆς περιπετείας αἴτιον γεγονέναι; τὸ ποιήσασθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν ἁπλοῦν τὸ σύνθημα, νέον ἀκμὴν ὄντα καὶ τῆς τῶν διπλῶν συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυνθημάτων ἀκριβείας ἄπειρον. οὕτως αἱ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις ἐν μικρῷ τὸ διαφέρον ἔχουσι τῆς ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα ῥοπῆς τῶν ἐκβαινόντων. [¶3] 18. Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take Megalopolis by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall; but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his army from Sparta about sunset. The result was that he was not able to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he would not have failed in his attempt. Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already stated, when carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose, and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight, when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake. Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he did nothing but irritate the people of the town; and, after losing a considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to distrust him and be on their guard against him. > Greek: 18. καὶ μὴν Κλεομένης ὁ Σπαρτιάτης προθέμενος διὰ πράξεως ἑλεῖν τὴν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν πόλιν, συνετάξατο τοῖς τὸ τεῖχος φυλάττουσι τὸ κατὰ τὸν Φωλεὸν καλούμενον νυκτὸς ἥξειν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τρίτην φυλακήν· τοῦτον γὰρ ἐφύλαττον τὸν καιρὸν τὸ τεῖχος οἱ συμπράττοντες αὐτῷ. οὐκέτι δὲ προνοηθεὶς ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολὴν τελέως ἤδη βραχείας εἶναι συμβαίνει τὰς νύκτας, ἐκίνησε τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος περὶ δυσμὰς ἡλίου. λοιπὸν οὐ δυνάμενος καταταχεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμέρας καταλαμβανούσης εἰκῇ καὶ ἀλόγως βιαζόμενος, αἰσχρῶς ἐξέπεσε, πολλοὺς ἀποβαλὼν καὶ κινδυνεύσας τοῖς ὅλοις· ὃς εἰ κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν ηὐστόχησε τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ κρατούντων τῆς εἰσόδου τῶν συνεργούντων εἰσήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν, οὐκ ἂν διεψεύσθη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. πάλιν ὁμοίως Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεύς, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, πρᾶξιν ἔχων ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μελιταιῶν πόλεως κατὰ δύο τρόπους ἥμαρτε· καὶ γὰρ τὰς κλίμακας ἐλάττους ἔχων ἦλθε τῆς χρείας καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ διέπεσε. συνταξάμενος γὰρ ἥξειν περὶ μέσας νύκτας κατακεκοιμημένων ἤδη πάντων, πρὸ τοῦ δέοντος καιροῦ κινήσας ἐκ Λαρίσης καὶ προσπεσὼν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Μελιταιῶν χώραν, οὔτʼ ἐπιμένειν ἐδύνατο, δεδιὼς μὴ προσαγγελθείη τοῖς ἔνδον, οὔτʼ ἀνακάμψας ἔτι λαθεῖν. διόπερ ἀναγκαζόμενος εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν προάγειν, ἧκε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀκμὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγρηγορότων. ὅθεν οὔτε διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων ἠδύνατο βιάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀσυμμετρίαν οὔτε διὰ τῆς πύλης εἰσελθεῖν τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς ἔνδον αὐτῷ συνεργεῖν διὰ τὸν καιρόν. τέλος διερεθίσας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ἰδίων ἀποβαλών, μετʼ αἰσχύνης ἄπρακτος ἐπανῆλθε, πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρηγγελκὼς ἀπιστεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ φυλάττεσθαι. [¶4] 19. Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in his power to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and retiring to a place of safety. And then because the moon was eclipsed, regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed. Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders, the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be taken by those who choose to study mathematics. > Greek: 19. καὶ μὴν Νικίας ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, δυνάμενος σῴζειν τὸ περὶ τὰς Συρακούσας στράτευμα, καὶ λαβὼν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸν ἁρμόζοντα καιρὸν εἰς τὸ λαθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀποχωρήσας εἰς ἀσφαλές, κἄπειτα τῆς σελήνης ἐκλειπούσης δεισιδαιμονήσας, ὥς τι δεινὸν προσημαινούσης, ἐπέσχε τὴν ἀναζυγήν. καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο συνέβη κατὰ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν αὐτοῦ νύκτα ποιησαμένου τὴν ἀναζυγήν, προαισθομένων τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. καίτοι γε παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἱστορήσας μόνον περὶ τούτων δυνατὸς ἦν οὐχ οἷον παραλιπεῖν διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ἰδίους καιρούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεργοῖς χρήσασθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἄγνοιαν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν πέλας ἀπειρία μέγιστον ἐφόδιον γίνεται τοῖς ἐμπείροις πρὸς κατόρθωσιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν ἀστρολογίας μέχρι τῶν προειρημένων πολυπραγμονητέον. περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν κλιμάκων συμμετρίας τοιοῦτός τίς ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος τῆς θεωρίας. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ διά τινος τῶν συμπραττόντων δοθῇ τὸ τοῦ τείχους ὕψος, πρόδηλος ἡ τῶν κλιμάκων γίνεται συμμετρία· οἵων γὰρ ἂν δέκα τινῶν εἶναι συμβαίνῃ τὸ τοῦ τείχους ὕψος, τοιούτων δώδεκα δεήσει τὰς κλίμακας δαψιλῶν ὑπάρχειν. τὴν δʼ ἀπόβασιν τῆς κλίμακος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀναβαινόντων συμμετρίαν ἡμίσειαν εἶναι δεήσει τῆς κλίμακος, ἵνα μήτε πλεῖον ἀφιστάμεναι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιβαινόντων εὐσύντριπτοι γίνωνται μήτε πάλιν ὀρθότεραι προσερειδόμεναι λίαν ἀκροσφαλεῖς ὦσι τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ μετρῆσαι μηδʼ ἐγγίσαι τῷ τείχει, ληπτέον ἐξ ἀποστάσεως παντὸς ὕψους τὸ μέγεθος τῶν πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἐφεστώτων τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπιπέδοις. ὅ τε τρόπος τῆς λήψεως καὶ δυνατὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιος τοῖς βουλομένοις πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ παρὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. [¶5] 20. Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts included: at other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics. For I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject; which no man of sense would admit.... > Greek: 20. διὸ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις φανερὸν ὅτι δεήσει τοὺς βουλομένους εὐστοχεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ πράξεσι γεγεωμετρηκέναι μὴ τελείως, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφʼ ὅσον ἀναλογίας ἔννοιαν ἔχειν καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας θεωρίας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ταῦτα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν σχημάτων μεταλήψεις ἐν ταῖς στρατοπεδείαις ἀναγκαῖός ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος, χάριν τοῦ δύνασθαι ποτὲ μὲν πᾶν σχῆμα μεταλαμβάνοντας τηρεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν συμμετρίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς παρεμβολαῖς περιλαμβανομένων, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων μένοντας αὔξειν ἢ μειοῦν τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον τῇ στρατοπεδείᾳ χωρίον, κατὰ λόγον ἀεὶ τῶν προσγινομένων ἢ τῶν χωριζομένων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς· ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς τάξεις ὑπομνήμασιν ἀκριβέστερον δεδήλωται. οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι τοῦτό γε μετρίως ἡμῖν ἐποίσειν οὐδένα διότι πολλά τινα προσαρτῶμεν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, κελεύοντες ἀστρολογεῖν καὶ γεωμετρεῖν τοὺς ὀρεγομένους αὐτῆς. ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ περιττοῦ παρελκόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι χάριν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐπιφάσεως καὶ στωμυλίας πολύ τι μᾶλλον ἀποδοκιμάζων, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀνήκοντος ἐπιτάττειν, περὶ τἀναγκαῖα φιλοτιμότατός εἰμι καὶ σπουδάζων. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τοὺς μὲν ὀρχηστικῆς ἢ τοὺς αὐλητικῆς ἐφιεμένους ἐπιδέχεσθαι τήν τε περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ προκατασκευήν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν παλαίστραν, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν προσδεῖσθαι τὸ τέλος ἑκατέρου τῆς τῶν προειρημένων συνεργίας, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγίας ἀντιποιουμένους ἀσχάλλειν, εἰ δεήσει τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐπιτηδευμάτων μέχρι τινὸς ἀναλαβεῖν. ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὰς βαναύσους τέχνας ἀσκοῦντας ἐμμελεστέρους εἶναι καὶ φιλοτιμοτέρους τῶν περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ σεμνότατα προαιρουμένων διαφέρειν· ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ὁμολογήσειε νοῦν ἔχων οὐδείς. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω. [¶6] 21. Most people calculate the area merely from the length of the circumference [of towns or camps]. Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number of men by considering the mere length of a camp’s circuit. A similar mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence of a child. For if one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane underlying the hills and foundations. So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these.... Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot be expected to give real help when the time comes to act.... Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet “Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each.”... There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made, that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from writers of partial histories.... Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal. For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person, and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal, and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through Myttonus the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for any undertaking within the reach of human powers. But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs, is not easy. Some maintain that men’s real natures are brought out by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office, or as some say when in misfortunes, though they have up to that time completely maintained their secrecy. I, on the contrary, do not regard this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act contrary to their real principles. > Greek: 21. ὅτι τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὑπαρχούσης περί τε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ Καρχηδονίους, καὶ παλιντρόπων ἑκατέροις ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἀπαντωμένων ἐναλλὰξ προσπιπτόντων, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἅμα λύπην καὶ χαρὰν ὑποτρέχειν εἰκὸς ἦν τὰς ἑκάστων ψυχάς. ὅτι τῶν ἑκατέροις, Ῥωμαίοις φημὶ καὶ Καρχηδονίοις, προσπιπτόντων καὶ συμβαινόντων εἷς ἦν ἀνὴρ αἴτιος καὶ μία ψυχή, λέγω δὲ τὴν Ἀννίβου. τά τε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὁμολογουμένως οὗτος ἦν ὁ χειρίζων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν διὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἀσδρούβου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ [πρεσβύτου] Μάγωνος· οἱ γὰρ τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέρους ἀποκτείναντες [ἅμα] κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἦσαν οὗτοι. καὶ μὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἔπραττε τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς διὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἱπποκράτην, ὕστερον δὲ διὰ Μυττόνου τοῦ Λίβυος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα· καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τόπων φόβον ἀνατεινόμενος ἐξέπληττε καὶ περιέσπα Ῥωμαίους διὰ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον κοινοπραγίας. οὕτως μέγα τι φύεται χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον ἀνὴρ καὶ ψυχὴ δεόντως ἁρμοσθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν πρὸς ὅ,τι ἂν ὁρμήσῃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων διάθεσις εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἡμᾶς ἦχε περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου φύσεως, ἀπαιτεῖν ὁ καιρὸς δοκεῖ μοι τὰς μάλιστα διαπορουμένας ἰδιότητας ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι. τινὲς μὲν γὰρ ὠμὸν αὐτὸν οἴονται γεγονέναι καθʼ ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ φιλάργυρον. τὸ δʼ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένων οὐ ῥᾴδιον. ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγχεσθαί φασι τὰς φύσεις ὑπὸ τῶν περιστάσεων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις καταφανεῖς γίνεσθαι, κἂν ὅλως τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀναστέλλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις. ἐμοὶ δʼ ἔμπαλιν οὐχ ὑγιὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὀλίγα μοι φαίνονται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν φίλων παραθέσεις, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ποικιλίας, ἄνθρωποι παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν προαίρεσιν ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν. [¶7] 23. And there are many proofs of this to be found in past history if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered to have become the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions to exist in the same nature. They are compelled to change with the changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by the suggestions of friends. For instance, you will find the Athenians responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state: but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so. And when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary with the variations of their leaders. King Philip again, when Taurion and Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane. > Greek: 23. γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις ἐπὶ πολλῶν τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων ἐπιστήσας. τίς γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸν Σικελίας τύραννον οὐχ ἱστόρηκε διότι δόξας ὠμότατος εἶναι κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς δυναστείας, μετὰ ταῦτα νομίσας βεβαίως ἐνδεδέσθαι τὴν Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχὴν πάντων ἡμερώτατος δοκεῖ γεγονέναι καὶ πρᾳότατος; ἔτι δὲ Κλεομένης ὁ Σπαρτιάτης οὐ χρηστότατος μὲν βασιλεύς, πικρότατος δὲ τύραννος, εὐτραπελώτατος δὲ πάλιν ἰδιώτης καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος; καίτοι γʼ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς φύσεις τὰς ἐναντιωτάτας διαθέσεις ὑπάρχειν· ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς συμμετατίθεσθαι τὴν ἐναντίαν τῇ φύσει πολλάκις ἐμφαίνουσι διάθεσιν ἔνιοι τῶν δυναστῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, ὥστε μὴ οἷον ἐλέγχεσθαι τὰς φύσεις διὰ τούτων, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰς τῶν φίλων παραθέσεις εἴωθε συμβαίνειν οὐ μόνον ἡγεμόσι καὶ δυνάσταις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεσιν. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν εὕροι τις ἂν ὀλίγα μὲν τὰ πικρά, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ σεμνὰ τῆς πολιτείας Ἀριστείδου καὶ Περικλέους προεστώτων, Κλέωνος δὲ καὶ Χάρητος τἀναντία· Λακεδαιμονίων δʼ ἡγουμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅσα μὲν διὰ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ βασιλέως πράττοιτο, πάντα συμμαχικὴν εἶχε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὅσα δὲ διʼ Ἀγησιλάου, τοὐναντίον· ὥστε καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἔθη ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων διαφοραῖς συμμεταπίπτειν. Φίλιππος δʼ ὁ βασιλεύς, ὅτε μὲν Ταυρίων ἢ Δημήτριος αὐτῷ συμπράττοιεν, ἦν ἀσεβέστατος, ὅτε δὲ πάλιν Ἄρατος ἢ Χρυσόγονος, ἡμερώτατος. [¶8] 24. The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par with these. His circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because the journey was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and savage. It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is this man’s acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result of circumstances. > Greek: 24. παραπλήσια δέ μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις καὶ τὰ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν γεγονέναι· καὶ γὰρ περιστάσεσι παραδόξοις καὶ ποικίλαις ἐχρήσατο καὶ φίλοις τοῖς ἔγγιστα μεγάλας ἐσχηκόσι διαφοράς, ὥστε καὶ λίαν ἐκ τῶν κατʼ Ἰταλίαν πράξεων δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ προειρημένου φύσιν. τὰς μὲν οὖν τῶν περιστάσεων ὑποβολὰς εὐχερὲς καὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων καὶ διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων καταμαθεῖν, τὰς δὲ τῶν φίλων οὐκ ἄξιον παραλιπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ διὰ μιᾶς γνώμης ἱκανὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἔμφασιν ἐξὸν λαβεῖν. καθʼ ὃν γὰρ καιρὸν Ἀννίβας ἐξ Ἰβηρίας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν ἐπενόει στέλλεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, μεγίστης προφαινομένης δυσχρηστίας περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὴν ἑτοιμότητα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἅτε καὶ κατὰ τὸ μῆκος ἀνήνυτον ἔχειν τι δοκούσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα τῶν μεταξὺ κατοικούντων βαρβάρων, τότε δοκεῖ καὶ πλεονάκις ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐμπιπτούσης ἀπορίας εἷς τῶν φίλων Ἀννίβας ὁ Μονομάχος ἐπικαλούμενος ἀποφήνασθαι γνώμην διότι μία τις ὁδὸς αὑτῷ προφαίνεται. διʼ ἧς ἐστιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐφικτόν. τοῦ δʼ Ἀννίβου λέγειν κελεύσαντος, διδάξαι δεῖν ἔφη τὰς δυνάμεις ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν καὶ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι συνήθεις. … Ἀννίβας δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν ἐδυνήθη, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν οὔθʼ αὑτὸν οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἐδύνατο πεῖσαι. τούτου δὲ τἀνδρὸς εἶναί φασιν ἔργα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν εἰς Ἀννίβαν ἀναφερόμενα περὶ τῆς ὠμότητος, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων. [¶9] 25. Fond of money indeed he does seem to have been to a conspicuous degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen. But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the same operation together; but had always schemed against each other, more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on the ground of their equality of rank. > Greek: 25. φιλάργυρός γε μὴν δοκεῖ γεγονέναι διαφερόντως καὶ φίλῳ κεχρῆσθαι φιλαργύρῳ Μάγωνι τῷ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Βρεττίαν χειρίζοντι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐγὼ παρέλαβον μὲν καὶ παρʼ αὐτῶν Καρχηδονίων· ἐγχώριοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰς τῶν ἀνέμων στάσεις κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων ἀνθρώπων ἤθη κάλλιστα γινώσκουσιν· ἔτι δὲ Μασαννάσου … ἀκριβέστερον διήκουσα, φέροντος ἀπολογισμοὺς καθόλου μὲν περὶ πάντων Καρχηδονίων, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου καὶ Μάγωνος τοῦ Σαυνίτου προσαγορευομένου φιλαργυρίας. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔφη γενναιότατα κεκοινωνηκότας ἑαυτοῖς πραγμάτων τοὺς προειρημένους ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας καὶ πολλὰς μὲν πόλεις κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν, πολλὰς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν εἰληφότας ἑκατέρους, τὰς μὲν κατὰ κράτος, τὰς δʼ ἐκ παραδόσεως, οὐδέποτε μετεσχηκέναι τῆς αὐτῆς πράξεως ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἑαυτοὺς ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους στρατηγεῖν χάριν τοῦ μὴ συμπαρεῖναι θάτερον θατέρῳ πόλεως καταλαμβανομένης, ἵνα μήτε διαφέρωνται πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μήτε μερίζωνται τὸ λυσιτελές, ἐφαμίλλου τῆς ὑπεροχῆς αὐτῶν ὑπαρχούσης. [¶10] 26. The influence of friends then, and still more that of circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and will be shown by what I have to narrate. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with several armies,— nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.... > Greek: 26. πλὴν ὅτι γε καὶ τὴν Ἀννίβου φύσιν οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν φίλων παράθεσις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων περίστασις ἐβιάζετο καὶ μετετίθετο πολλάκις, ἔκ τε τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων ἐστὶ φανερόν. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ γενέσθαι τὴν Καπύην τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον εὐθέως ἦσαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, αἱ πόλεις μετέωροι, καὶ περιέβλεπον ἀφορμὰς καὶ προφάσεις τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μεταβολῆς· ὅτε δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ μάλιστα δυσχρηστηθεὶς Ἀννίβας εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. οὔτε γὰρ τηρεῖν τὰς πόλεις πάσας πολὺ διεστώσας ἀλλήλων δυνατὸς ἦν, καθίσας εἰς ἕνα τόπον, τῶν πολεμίων καὶ πλείοσι στρατοπέδοις ἀντιπαραγόντων, οὔτε διαιρεῖν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν οἷός τʼ ἦν. εὐχείρωτος γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑπάρξειν καὶ διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τῷ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι πᾶσιν αὐτὸς συμπαρεῖναι. διόπερ ἠναγκάζετο τὰς μὲν προδήλως ἐγκαταλείπειν τῶν πόλεων, ἐξ ὧν δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξάγειν, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πραγμάτων συγκαταφθείρῃ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας. ἐνίας δὲ καὶ παρασπονδῆσʼ ὑπέμεινε, μετανιστὰς εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ποιῶν ἀναρπάστους αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους. ἐξ ὧν προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν, οἱ δʼ ὠμότητα κατεγίνωσκον. καὶ γὰρ ἁρπαγαὶ χρημάτων ἅμα τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ φόνοι καὶ βίαιοι προφάσεις ἐγίνοντο διά τε τῶν ἐξιόντων καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰσιόντων στρατιωτῶν εἰς τὰς πόλεις, ἑκάστων ὑπειληφότων ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους μεταβαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ ὧν καὶ λίαν δυσχερὲς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου φύσεως, διά τε τὴν τῶν φίλων παράθεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων περίστασιν. κρατεῖ γε μὴν ἡ φήμη παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδοίοις ὡς φιλαργύρου, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ὡς ὠμοῦ γενομένου [αὐτοῦ]. οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς περιμέτρου τεκμαίρονται τὰ μεγέθη τῶν προειρημένων. λοιπὸν ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὴν μὲν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν πόλιν πεντήκοντα σταδίων ἔχειν τὸν περίβολον, τὴν δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀκτὼ καὶ τετταράκοντα, τῷ δὲ μεγέθει διπλῆν εἶναι τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως, ἄπιστον αὐτοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον. ἂν δὲ καὶ συναυξῆσαί τις βουλόμενος τὴν ἀπορίαν εἴπῃ διότι δυνατόν ἐστι τετταράκοντα σταδίων πόλιν ἢ στρατοπεδείαν ἔχουσαν τὴν περιγραφὴν διπλασίαν γίνεσθαι τῆς ἑκατὸν σταδίων ἐχούσης τὴν περίμετρον, τελέως ἐκπληκτικὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται τὸ λεγόμενον. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν αἴτιον ὅτι τῶν ἐν τοῖς παιδικοῖς μαθήμασι παραδιδομένων ἡμῖν διὰ τῆς γεωμετρίας οὐ μνημονεύομεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων προήχθην εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡγεμονίαις ἀναστρεφομένων τινὰς ἐκπλήττεσθαι, θαυμάζοντας ποτὲ μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι μείζω τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλιν εἶναι, καὶ πολλῷ μείζω, τῆς τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν, τὸν περίβολον ἔχουσαν ἐλάττω, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν τεκμαίρεσθαι, στοχαζομένους ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς περιμέτρου τῶν στρατοπεδειῶν. παραπλήσιον δέ τι καὶ ἕτερον ἀδίκημα συμβαίνει περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων ἐπιφάσεις. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς περικεκλασμένας καὶ βουνώδεις πλείους οἰκίας ὑπολαμβάνουσι κατέχεσθαι τῶν ἐπιπέδων. τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον διὰ τὸ τὰ τειχία τῶν οἰκοδομιῶν μὴ τοῖς ἐγκλίμασι τῶν ἐδάφων ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπιπέδοις οἰκοδομεῖσθαι πρὸς ὀρθάς, ἐφʼ ὧν καὶ τοὺς λόφους αὐτοὺς βεβηκέναι συμβαίνει. γνοίη δʼ ἄν τις ἐκ τοῦ φαινομένου παιδικῶς ὅμως τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ γὰρ νοήσαι τις εἰς ὕψος ἀνατεταμένας τὰς ἐν τοῖς κλίμασιν οἰκίας οὕτως ὥστε πάσας ἰσοϋψεῖς ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὡς ἑνὸς ἐπιπέδου γενομένου τοῦ κατὰ τὰ τέγη τῶν οἰκιῶν, ἴσον καὶ παράλληλον ἔσται τοῦτο τῷ τοῖς λόφοις ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τοῖς τῶν τειχῶν θεμελίοις ἐπιπέδῳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀγνοούντων δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ θαυμαζόντων, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω. [¶11] 27. The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most cities in the particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally; on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes. The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in all Greece.... Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees, on giving them a pledge for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile territory.... > Greek: 27. ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλις οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα διαφέρει τῶν πλείστων πόλεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν κατασκευήν. ἔκτισται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἐν ὀκτωκαίδεκα σταδίοις, ὥστε μηδενὸς ἀμοίρους εἶναι τῶν ἐκ ταύτης χρησίμων· ὁ δὲ περίβολος αὐτῆς καὶ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ διαφερόντως ἠσφάλισται. κεῖται γὰρ τὸ τεῖχος ἐπὶ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου καὶ περιρρῶγος, ᾗ μὲν αὐτοφυοῦς, ᾗ δὲ χειροποιήτου, περιέχεται δὲ ποταμοῖς· ῥεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς παρὰ μὲν τὴν νότιον πλευρὰν ὁ συνώνυμος τῇ πόλει, παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς δύσεις καὶ τὸν λίβα τετραμμένην ὁ προσαγορευόμενος Ὕψας. ἡ δʼ ἄκρα τῆς πόλεως ὑπέρκειται κατʼ αὐτὰς τὰς θερινὰς ἀνατολάς, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἔξωθεν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀπροσίτῳ φάραγγι περιεχομένη, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐντὸς μίαν ἔχουσα πρόσοδον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κορυφῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν ἔκτισται καὶ Διὸς Ἀταβυρίου, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ῥοδίοις· τοῦ γὰρ Ἀκράγαντος ὑπὸ Ῥοδίων ἀπῳκισμένης, εἰκότως ὁ θεὸς οὗτος τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει προσηγορίαν ἣν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις. κεκόσμηται δὲ καὶ τἄλλα μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἡ πόλις ναοῖς καὶ στοαῖς. καὶ μὴν ὁ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου νεὼς παντέλειαν μὲν οὐκ εἴληφε, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδʼ ὁποίου τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δοκεῖ λείπεσθαι. Πολύβιος δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ὠνομάσθαι Ἀκράγης διὰ τὸ εὔγεων. Ἀγάθυρνα, πόλις Σικελίας, ὡς Πολύβιος ἀνάτῃ. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος δοὺς πίστεις ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας ἔπεισεν ἐκχωρεῖν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ἐφʼ ᾧ λαμβάνοντας μέτρημα παρὰ τῶν Ῥηγίνων πορθεῖν τὴν Βρεττιανήν, κυρίους ὄντας ὧν ἂν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας ὠφεληθῶσι. [¶12] 28. Having enslaved and made an example of this town, Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up. Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece. Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and destroyed the houses with fire. And at last, after destroying towns and open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives, part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition of their injuring you. Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well.” > Greek: 28. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὴν Μακεδόνων δυναστείαν ἀρχὴν συνέβη γεγονέναι τοῖς Ἕλλησι δουλείας, οὐδʼ ἄλλως εἰπεῖν οὐδένα πέπεισμαι τολμῆσαι· σκοπεῖν δʼ οὕτως ἔξεστιν. ἦν τι σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Ἑλλήνων, οὓς ἀπῴκισαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς, ὧν μέγιστον εἶχε πρόσχημα καὶ δύναμιν ἡ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων πόλις. ταύτην ἐξανδραποδισάμενος Φίλιππος καὶ παράδειγμα ποιήσας οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεων ἐγένετο κύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλοὺς ὑφʼ αὑτὸν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τὸν φόβον. μετʼ οὐ πολὺ δὲ μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐχρήσατο μεγαλοψύχως τοῖς εὐτυχήμασιν, οὐχ ὅπως Ἀθηναίους εὖ ποιήσῃ, πολλοῦ γε δεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνους εὐεργεσίας προκαλέσηται τοὺς ἄλλους εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐθελοντὴν αὐτῷ τὸ προσταττόμενον. ἦν ἔτι τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως ἀξίωμα, δοκοῦν ἂν σὺν καιρῷ προστήσεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. τοιγαροῦν πᾶσαν ἱκανὴν ποιησάμενος πρόφασιν ἧκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, καὶ κατέφθειρε μὲν τέμνων τὴν γῆν, κατέφθειρε δʼ αἴθων τὰς οἰκίας. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἀποτεμόμενος καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑμῶν προσένειμε τὴν μὲν Ἀργείοις, τὴν δὲ Τεγεάταις καὶ Μεγαλοπολίταις, τὴν δὲ Μεσσηνίοις, ἅπαντας βουλόμενος καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον εὐεργετεῖν, ἐφʼ ᾧ μόνον ὑμᾶς κακῶς ποιεῖν. διεδέξατο παρʼ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν Ἀλέξανδρος. οὗτος πάλιν ὑπολαβὼν βραχύ τι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔναυσμα καταλείπεσθαι περὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν, τίνα τρόπον αὐτὴν διέφθειρε, πάντας ὑμᾶς οἴομαι κατανοεῖν. [¶13] 29. “And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in his victory at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians, as well as the other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples, and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone. For the Aetolians were the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining your ancestral supremacy in Greece. Who again is ignorant of the deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last Antigonus, lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously, should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians. For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy, not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece.” > Greek: 29. καὶ μὴν περὶ τῶν διαδεξαμένων τούτου τὰ πράγματα πῶς κέχρηνται τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τί με δεῖ κατὰ μέρος λέγειν; οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων οὕτως ἀπράγμων ὃς οὐχὶ πέπυσται πῶς Ἀντίπατρος μὲν ἐν τῇ περὶ Λαμίαν μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς Ἕλληνας κάκιστα μὲν ἐχρήσατο τοῖς ταλαιπώροις Ἀθηναίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἰς τοῦτο δʼ ὕβρεως ἦλθε καὶ παρανομίας ὡς φυγαδοθήρας καταστήσας ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀντειρηκότας ἢ καθόλου λελυπηκότας τι τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀγόμενοι μετὰ βίας, οἱ δʼ ἀπὸ τῶν βωμῶν ἀποσπώμενοι, μετὰ τιμωρίας ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ πάσης ἐξενηλατοῦντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος· φύξιμον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν πλὴν ἑνὸς αὐτοῖς τοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἔθνους. τά γε μὴν Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Δημητρίῳ πεπραγμένα, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Ἀντιγόνῳ τῷ Γονατᾷ, τίς οὐκ οἶδε; διὰ γὰρ τὸ προσφάτως αὐτὰ γεγονέναι τελέως ἐναργῆ συμβαίνει τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν. ὧν οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς εἰσάγοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις, οἱ δὲ τυράννους ἐμφυτεύοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τῆς δουλείας ὀνόματος. ἀφέμενος δὲ τούτων ἐπάνειμι νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν τελευταῖον Ἀντίγονον, ἵνα μὴ τὴν ἐκ τούτου πρᾶξιν ἀκάκως τινὲς ὑμῶν θεωροῦντες ὑπόχρεοι χάριτι νομίζωσιν εἶναι Μακεδόσιν. οὔτε γὰρ Ἀχαιοὺς σῴζειν προαιρούμενος Ἀντίγονος ἐπανείλετο τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον οὔτε τῇ Κλεομένους τυραννίδι δυσαρεστούμενος, ἵνα Λακεδαιμονίους ἐλευθερώσῃ· καὶ λίαν γὰρ ὅ γε τοιοῦτός ἐστι τρόπος εὐήθης, εἴ τις ἄρα ταύτην ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν διάληψιν· ἀλλʼ ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείαν ἐσομένην, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τὴν Πελοποννησίων ἀρχὴν κατακτήσησθε, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο βλέπων εὖ πεφυκότα τὸν Κλεομένην καὶ τὴν τύχην ὑμῖν λαμπρῶς συνεργοῦσαν, ἅμα φοβηθεὶς καὶ φθονήσας παρῆν, οὐ Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσων, ἀλλὰ τὰς ὑμετέρας ἐλπίδας ἀφελούμενος καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν ὑπεροχὴν ταπεινώσων. διόπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγαπᾶν ὀφείλετε Μακεδόνας, ὅτι κυριεύσαντες τῆς πόλεως οὐ διήρπασαν, ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὅτι δυναμένους ὑμᾶς ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλεονάκις ἤδη κεκωλύκασι.