55. This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land. Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could. Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the town.
55. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος τὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων αὖθις ἀνέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας εἶχε τὰς ἐλπίδας, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πρότερον μὲν ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἠτυχηκότες τότε δʼ ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκ μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ἐξέβησαν, τῶν δʼ ὑπαίθρων ἐπεκράτουν· Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευον, τῆς δὲ γῆς οὐχ ὅλως ἀπήλπιζον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσχετλίαζον, οἵ τʼ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προειρημένα συμπτώματα· τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν ἐχορήγουν κατὰ γῆν ἀπροφασίστως, οἱ δὲ προσεκαρτέρουν ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ὁ δʼ Ἰούνιος ἀνακομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας καὶ περιπαθὴς ὤν, ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καινοτομῆσαί τι καὶ πρᾶξαι τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέσασθαι τὴν γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν. διὸ καὶ βραχείας αὐτῷ παραπεσούσης ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνει πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τε τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατής. ὁ δʼ Ἔρυξ ἔστι μὲν ὄρος παρὰ θάλατταν τῆς Σικελίας ἐν τῇ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κειμένῃ πλευρᾷ μεταξὺ Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δʼ ὅμορον καὶ συνάπτον πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ διαφέρον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὀρῶν πλὴν τῆς Αἴτνης. τούτου δʼ ἐπʼ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὔσης ἐπιπέδου, κεῖται τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς Ἐρυκίνης ἱερόν, ὅπερ ὁμολογουμένως ἐπιφανέστατόν ἐστι τῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ προστασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἱερῶν· ἡ δὲ πόλις ὑπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν κορυφὴν τέτακται, πάνυ μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη πανταχόθεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. ἐπί τε δὴ τὴν κορυφὴν ἐπιστήσας φυλακήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων πρόσβασιν ἐτήρει φιλοτίμως ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τόπους καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὸν τῆς ἀναβολῆς, πεπεισμένος οὕτως καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ὄρος ὑφʼ αὑτὸν ἕξειν.
56. Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications, and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the sea-board of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a detailed account in writing.
56. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες αὑτῶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρισαν· ὃς παραλαβὼν τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὥρμησεν πορθήσων τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἔτος δʼ ἦν ὀκτωκαιδέκατον τῷ πολέμῳ. κατασύρας δὲ τὴν Λοκρίδα καὶ τὴν Βρεττιανὴν χώραν, ἀποπλέων ἐντεῦθεν κατῆρε παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πρὸς τὴν Πανορμῖτιν καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εἱρκτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, ὃς κεῖται μὲν Ἔρυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξὺ πρὸς θαλάττῃ, πολὺ δέ τι τῶν ἄλλων δοκεῖ διαφέρειν τόπων ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν στρατοπέδων καὶ χρονισμόν. ἔστι γὰρ ὄρος περίτομον ἐξανεστηκὸς ἐκ τῆς περικειμένης χώρας εἰς ὕψος ἱκανόν. τούτου δʼ ἡ περίμετρος τῆς ἄνω στεφάνης οὐ λείπει τῶν ἑκατὸν σταδίων, ὑφʼ ἧς ὁ περιεχόμενος τόπος εὔβοτος ὑπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πνοιὰς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανασίμων δὲ θηρίων εἰς τέλος ἄμοιρος. περιέχεται δὲ κρημνοῖς ἀπροσίτοις ἔκ τε τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρήκοντος, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ἐστὶν ὀλίγης καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευῆς. ἔχει δʼ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ μαστόν, ὃς ἅμα μὲν ἀκροπόλεως, ἅμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυοῦς λαμβάνει τάξιν κατὰ τῆς ὑποκειμένης χώρας. κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λιλυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐν ᾧ πλῆθος ὕδατος ἄφθονον ὑπάρχει. προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει τριττὰς δυσχερεῖς, δύο μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας, μίαν δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης. ἐν ᾧ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως Ἀμίλκας, ὡς ἂν μήτε πόλεως οἰκείας μήτʼ ἄλλης ἐλπίδος μηδεμιᾶς ἀντεχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἑαυτὸν δεδωκώς, ὅμως οὐ μικροὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας Ῥωμαίοις ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκεύασεν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμώμενος κατὰ θάλατταν τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπόρθει μέχρι τῆς Κυμαίων χώρας, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ γῆν παραστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτῷ Ῥωμαίων πρὸ τῆς Πανορμιτῶν πόλεως ἐν ἴσως πέντε σταδίοις πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους ἀγῶνας συνεστήσατο κατὰ γῆν σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἐνιαυτούς. περὶ ὧν οὐχ οἷόν τε διὰ τῆς γρα φῆς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδοῦναι λόγον·
57. It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience, strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out. For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack, or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable, the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.
57. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιότησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται πληγὴν ἐπὶ πληγῇ τιθέντες ἀδιαπαύστως, λόγον μὲν ἢ πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πληγῆς οὔτε τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τοῖς θεωμένοις ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθόλου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ἑκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐψυχίας, ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰτίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, διʼ ὧν ἀνʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐποιοῦντο κατʼ ἀλλήλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπιθέσεις, προσβολάς, οὔτʼ ἂν ὁ γράφων ἐξαριθμούμενος ἐφίκοιτο, τοῖς τʼ ἀκούουσιν ἀπέραντος ἅμα δʼ ἀνωφελὴς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως γίνοιτο χρεία· ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς φιλοτιμίας μᾶλλον ἄν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθοι τῶν προειρημένων. οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας στρατηγημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὔτε τῶν εἰς παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρελείφθη. κρίσιν γε μὴν ὁλοσχερῆ γενέσθαι διὰ πλείους αἰτίας οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἦν· αἵ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἦσαν ἐφάμιλλοι, τά τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας ὁμοίως ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τό τε διάστημα τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. ὅπερ αἴτιον ἦν μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύστους γίνεσθαι καθʼ ἡμέραν, ὁλοσχερὲς δὲ συντελεῖσθαι μηδέν. τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ συνέβαινε διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ περιπεσόντας· οἱ δʼ ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀσφαλείαις καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκινδύνευον.
58. Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans, as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered. The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner. Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.
58. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἡ τύχη μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προειρημένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος ἀθλήματος εἰς παραβολώτερον ἀγώνισμα καὶ τόπον ἐλάττω συνέκλεισεν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμίλκας, τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὸν Ἔρυκα τηρούντων ἐπί τε τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τὴν ῥίζαν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατελάβετο τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρυκίνων, ἥτις ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρὸς τῇ ῥίζῃ στρατοπεδευσάντων. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε παραβόλως μὲν ὑπομένειν καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πολιορκουμένους τοὺς τὴν κορυφὴν κατέχοντας τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν, τῶν τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκειμένων καὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς παρακομιζομένων, ὡς ἂν τῆς θαλάττης καθʼ ἕνα τόπον καὶ μίαν πρόσοδον ἀντεχομένοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσαις μὲν ἀμφότεροι ταῖς πολιορκητικαῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ βίαις χρησάμενοι κατʼ ἀλλήλων, πᾶν δὲ γένος ἐνδείας ἀνασχόμενοι, πάσης δʼ ἐπιθέσεως καὶ μάχης πεῖραν λαβόντες, τέλος οὐχ, ὡς Φάβιός φησιν, ἐξαδυνατοῦντες καὶ περικακοῦντες, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀήττητοί τινες ἄνδρες ἱερὸν ἐποίησαν τὸν στέφανον. πρότερον γὰρ ἢ ʼκείνους ἀλλήλων ἐπικρατῆσαι, καίπερ δύʼ ἔτη πάλιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ διαγωνισαμένους, διʼ ἄλλου τρόπου συνέβη λαβεῖν τὸν πόλεμον τὴν κρίσιν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις τοιαύτην ἔσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύματʼ ἦν ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πολλάκις ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγάς, ἕως ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὑτοῖς καιρίως ἀλλήλων διαδράξωνται, κἄπειτα τούτου γενομένου συμβῇ τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν· οἵ τε Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ἤδη τοῖς πόνοις διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κινδύνων εἰς τέλος ἀπήλγουν τήν τε δύναμιν παρελέλυντο καὶ παρεῖντο διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφορὰς καὶ δαπάνας.
59. So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every day in the manoeuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before them.
59. ὁμοίως δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἔτη σχεδὸν ἤδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων ὁλοσχερῶς ἀφεστηκότες διά τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρινεῖν τὸν πόλεμον, τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὑτοῖς τοὔργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναν τὸ τρίτον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης, εἰ καιρίως ἅψαιντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἂν οὕτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρησαν τῆς θαλάττης εἴξαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμπτώμασιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῇ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα ναυμαχίᾳ· τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιοῦντο ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, διʼ ἧς νικήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλείσαντες τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν χορηγίας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν τοῖς ὅλοις. ἦν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλεῖον ψυχομαχία. χορηγία μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπῆρχε πρὸς τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθʼ ἕνα καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ὑφίσταντο παρέξειν πεντήρη κατηρτισμένην, ἐφʼ ᾧ τὴν δαπάνην κομιοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ταχέως ἑτοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρικῶν, ὧν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν πρὸς [παράδειγμα] τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδίου ναῦν, μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες Γάϊον Λυτάτιον ἐξέπεμψαν ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας. ὃς καὶ παραδόξως ἐπιφανεὶς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις τόν τε περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λιμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον ὅρμους, παντὸς ἀνακεχωρηκότος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῦ. συστησάμενος δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρεπάνοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τἄλλα πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευασάμενος, ἅμα μὲν ταύτῃ προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ ποιῶν, ἅμα δὲ προορώμενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου καὶ μνημονεύων τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ὅτι μόνως δύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνου κρίσεως τὰ ὅλα τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἀχρεῖον οὐδʼ ἀργὸν εἴα γίνεσθαι τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλʼ ἀνʼ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναπείρας καὶ μελέτας ποιῶν τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκείως τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῇ τε λοιπῇ τῇ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπιμελείᾳ προσκαρτερῶν ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσεν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τοὺς ναύτας.
60. That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno, and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to the foe.
60. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλῳ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παραυτίκα κατήρτιζον τὰς ναῦς, καὶ πληρώσαντες σίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων ἐξέπεμπον τὸν στόλον, βουλόμενοι μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως Ἄννωνα· ὃς ἀναχθεὶς καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἱερὰν καλουμένην νῆσον ἔσπευδε τοὺς πολεμίους λαθὼν διακομισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγορὰς ἀποθέσθαι καὶ κουφίσαι τὰς ναῦς, προσλαβὼν δʼ ἐπιβάτας ἐκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ Βάρκαν μετʼ αὐτῶν, οὕτως συμμίσγειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. ὁ δὲ Λυτάτιος συνεὶς τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν, ἀναλαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας ἔπλευσε πρὸς τὴν Αἰγοῦσσαν νῆσον τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου κειμένην. κἀνταῦθα παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ τὰς δυνάμεις διεσάφει τοῖς κυβερνήταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὔριον ναυμαχίας. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑωθινήν, ἤδη τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφαινούσης, ὁρῶν τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φορὸν ἄνεμον καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίσι δὲ δυσχερῆ γινόμενον τὸν ἀνάπλουν πρὸς ἀντίον τὸ πνεῦμα, κοίλης καὶ τραχείας οὔσης τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διηπόρει τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι. συλλογιζόμενος δʼ ὡς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμῶνος ὄντος, πρὸς Ἄννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἔτι γέμοντα τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων ἐάσῃ διᾶραι καὶ συμμῖξαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς πολεμίους, πρός τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκουφισμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρός τε τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμαν, ἧς οὐδὲν ἦν τότε φοβερώτερον· διόπερ ἔκρινε μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρόν· συνιδὼν δὲ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς ἱστιοδρομούσας ἀνήγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς. τῶν δὲ πληρωμάτων εὐχερῶς ἀναφερόντων τὸν κλύδωνα ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ταχέως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκτείνας ναῦν ἀντίπρωρ ρον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸν στόλον.
61. When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle of Drepana; and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also. The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude, for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten thousand.
61. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προκατέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατὰ ναῦν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς συνέβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. τῆς δʼ ἑκατέρων παρασκευῆς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐχούσης διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα γενομένῃ ναυμαχίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκατέροις τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη. Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν γὰρ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν καὶ τὰ βάρη πάντα χωρὶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδείων ἐξετέθειντο· τά τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα διαφέρουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τούς τʼ ἐπιβάτας κατʼ ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον. περὶ δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τἀναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχεν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ νῆες γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δʼ ἐπιβατικὰ νεοσύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ παντὸς δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτʼ ἂν ἔτι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίσαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποιήσασθαι καταφρονήσαντες ὠλιγώρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων. τοιγαροῦν ἅμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττούμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν, καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς κατέδυσαν, ἑβδομήκοντα δʼ ἑάλωσαν αὔτανδροι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ κατουρῶσαν αὖθις ἀπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἱερὰν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παραδόξως ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσας πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο, μεγάλην οὖσαν· οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρίᾳ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.
62. As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand, they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily, because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so, he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give the terms. “Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver.”
62. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτως τῆς ἥττης, ταῖς μὲν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις ἀκμὴν ἕτοιμοι πολεμεῖν ἦσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογισμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν. οὔτε γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἔτι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ δυνάμεσιν οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν, κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων· ἀπογνόντες δὲ ταύτας καὶ προδόται τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενοι, ποίαις χερσὶν ἢ ποίοις ἡγεμόσιν πολεμήσειαν οὐκ εἶχον. διόπερ ὀξέως διαπεμψάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῶν ὅλων. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν τις ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἢ δεινῶν δοκούντων εἶναι παρέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς τοῦ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν ἐλπίδας, εἰ καί τις ἄλλος ἡγεμόνων, ἐξήλεγξεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς εἴξας τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπονδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων ἐξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς. τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ νομιστέον ἡγεμόνος εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τόν τε τοῦ νικᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείπεσθαι καιρόν. τοῦ δὲ Λυτατίου προθύμως δεξαμένου τὰ παρακαλούμενα διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τετρυμένοις καὶ κάμνουσιν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ, συνέβη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ διαφορᾷ τοιούτων τινῶν συνθηκῶν διαγραφεισῶν· " 1ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Καρ‘χηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν ‘Ῥωμαίων συνδοκῇ. ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἁπάσης ‘Καρχηδονίους καὶ μὴ πολεμεῖν Ἱέρωνι μηδʼ ἐπι‘φέρειν ὅπλα Συρακοσίοις μηδὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων " 1συμμάχοις. ἀποδοῦναι Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ‘χωρὶς λύτρων ἅπαντας τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἀργυ‘ρίου κατενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ἐν ἔτεσιν ‘εἴκοσι δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα Εὐβοϊκά.’
63. When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands lying between Sicily and Italy. Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting twenty-four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history. Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea-fights, in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred. In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck, the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had to tell the story of this war. If, further, we take into consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous forces contended for mastery at sea. These considerations will establish my original observation, and show the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was not by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and danger.
63. τούτων δʼ ἐπανενεχθέντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οὐ προσεδέξατο τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος. ἀλλʼ ἐξαπέστειλεν ἄνδρας δέκα τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων. οἳ καὶ παραγενόμενοι τῶν μὲν ὅλων οὐδὲν ἔτι μετέθηκαν, βραχέα δὲ προσεπέτειναν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τόν τε γὰρ χρόνον τῶν φόρων ἐποίησαν ἥμισυν, χίλια τάλαντα προσθέντες, τῶν τε νήσων ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους προσεπέταξαν, ὅσαι μεταξὺ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεῖνται καὶ τῆς Σικελίας. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συστὰς περὶ Σικελίας πόλεμος ἐπὶ τοιούτοις καὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, ἔτη πολεμηθεὶς εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα συνεχῶς, πόλεμος ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. ἐν ᾧ χωρὶς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀνώτερον, ἅπαξ μὲν οἱ συνάμφω πλείοσιν ἢ πεντακοσίοις, πάλιν δὲ μικρῷ λείπουσιν ἑπτακοσίοις σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἀπέβαλόν γε μὴν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ πεντήρεις μετὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυαγίαις διαφθαρεισῶν εἰς ἑπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δʼ εἰς πεντακοσίας. ὥστε τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυμαχίας καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἂν περὶ τούτων ἱστορήσαντας ἐκπεπλῆχθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν πράξεων. εἰ δέ τις βουληθείη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἷς οἵ τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐναυμάχουν, οὐδʼ ἂν καθόλου δυνηθείη τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις εὑρεῖν ἐν θαλάττῃ διηγωνισμένας. ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχῃ Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδʼ αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως.
64. And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before. The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained, as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s future enemy Hannibal.
64. καὶ τί δήποτʼ ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἀπορήσαι τις ἄν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες τῶν ὅλων καὶ πολλαπλασίαν ἔχοντες ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν οὔτʼ ἂν πληρῶσαι τοσαύτας ναῦς οὔτʼ ἀναπλεῦσαι τηλικούτοις στόλοις δυνηθεῖεν; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σαφῶς ἐξέσται τὰς αἰτίας κατανοεῖν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας ἔλθωμεν· ὑπὲρ ἧς οὔθʼ ἡμῖν ἐν παρέργῳ ῥητέον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀργῶς προσεκτέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέαμα καλόν, σχεδὸν δʼ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἄγνωστον ἕως τοῦ νῦν χάριν τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς συγγεγραφότων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠγνοήκασιν, οἱ δʼ ἀσαφῆ καὶ τελέως ἀνωφελῆ πεποίηνται τὴν ἐξήγησιν. πλὴν ἔν γε τῷ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ τὰς μὲν τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων προαιρέσεις ἐφαμίλλους εὕροι τις ἂν γεγενημένας οὐ μόνον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς μεγαλοψυχίαις, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τῶν πρωτείων φιλοτιμίᾳ, τούς γε μὴν ἄνδρας οὐ μικρῷ πολλῷ δὲ γενναιοτέρους ἐν παντὶ Ῥωμαίους· ἡγεμόνα δὲ καὶ γνώμῃ καὶ τόλμῃ θετέον ἄριστον Ἀμίλκαν τῶν τότε γεγονέναι τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, πατέρα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα πολεμήσαντος Ῥωμαίοις.
65. The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature. At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days’ siege. The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former in their revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms; and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which has been generally called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as possible in accordance with the truth.
65. μετὰ δὲ τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας ἴδιόν τι καὶ παραπλήσιον ἀμφοτέροις συνέβη παθεῖν. ἐξεδέξατο γὰρ πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος Ῥωμαίους μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Φαλίσκους καλουμένους, ὃν ταχέως καὶ συμφερόντως ἐπετέλεσαν, ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν οὐ μικρὸς οὐδʼ εὐκαταφρόνητος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τούτοις ἀποστάντας Λίβυας, ἐν ᾧ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ὑπομείναντες φόβους τέλος οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας ἐκινδύνευσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον ἐπιστῆσαι μὲν ἄξιον διὰ πλείους αἰτίας, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου δὲ καὶ διὰ βραχέων αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. τόν τε γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς λεγόμενον ἄσπονδον πόλεμον, τίνα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ διάθεσιν, μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν τότε γεγονότων ἐπιγνοίη, τούς τε χρωμένους μισθοφορικαῖς δυνάμεσι τίνα δεῖ προορᾶσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μακρόθεν, ἐναργέστατʼ ἂν ἐκ τῆς τότε περιστάσεως συνθεωρήσειεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί διαφέρει καὶ κατὰ πόσον ἤθη σύμμικτα καὶ βάρβαρα τῶν ἐν παιδείαις καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐκτεθραμμένων· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καιροῖς πεπραγμένων κατανοήσειεν, διʼ ἃς ὁ κατʼ Ἀννίβαν συνέστη Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πόλεμος. ὑπὲρ οὗ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πεπολεμηκόσιν ἔτι νῦν ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὴν ἀληθινωτάτην παραστῆσαι διάληψιν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν.
66. The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was as follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore, receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all their men to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in themselves the allsufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation of discipline and want of employment. For lack of something better to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage, the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger, and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed.
66. ὡς γὰρ θᾶττον ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν προειρημένων διαλύσεων ἀποκατέστησε τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ὁ Βάρκας, εὐθέως αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δʼ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγὸς Γέσκων ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸ περαιοῦν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. προϊδόμενος δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐμφρόνως ἐνεβίβαζε κατὰ μέρη διαιρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ διαλείμματα ποιῶν τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς, βουλόμενος ἀναστροφὴν διδόναι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ τοὺς καταπλεύσαντας καὶ μισθοδοτηθέντας τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων φθάνειν ἀπαλλαττομένους ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν πρὶν ἢ τοὺς ἑξῆς περαιουμένους ἐπικαταλαβεῖν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Γέσκων ἐχόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας οὕτως ἐχείριζε τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐξαποστολήν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορούμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παραιτήσεσθαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τι τῶν προσοφειλομένων ὀψωνίων, ἐὰν καὶ συναθροίσωσι καὶ δέξωνται πάντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρακατεῖχον ἐκεῖ τοὺς καταπλέοντας διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ συνεῖχον ἐν τῇ πόλει. γινομένων δὲ πλειόνων ἀδικημάτων καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθʼ ἡμέραν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπιδόμενοι τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν ἀκρασίαν ἠξίωσαν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ἕως ἂν ἑτοιμασθῇ μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὰς σιταρχίας αὐτοῖς, προσδέξωνται δὲ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους, ἀναχωρῆσαι πάντας εἴς τινα πόλιν τὴν προσαγορευομένην Σίκκαν, λαβόντας εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα χρυσοῦν ἕκαστον. προθύμως δὲ συνυπακουσάντων πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὰς ἀποσκευάς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ὑπῆρχον, ὡς θᾶττον ἐσομένης τῆς ἐπανόδου πρὸς τοὺς ὀψωνιασμούς, ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μή ποτε διὰ χρόνου παραγεγονότες, καὶ τινὲς μὲν τέκνων ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν ἱμείροντες, οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἐκπορευθῶσι τὸ παράπαν, οἱ δʼ ἐκπορευθέντες αὖθις ἀνακάμπτωσι πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μηδὲν ἧττον ἀδίκημα γίνηται κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα προορώμενοι μετὰ πολλῆς ἀπεχθείας οὐδαμῶς βουλομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠνάγκασαν τὰς ἀποσκευὰς μεθʼ αὑτῶν ἀπαγαγεῖν. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι συναναχθέντες εἰς τὴν Σίκκαν καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου τετευχότες ἀνέσεως καὶ σχολῆς, ὅπερ ἀφυέστατον ὑπάρχει ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχηγὸν καὶ μόνον αἴτιον γίνεται στάσεως, διῆγον ἀδεῶς. ἅμα δὲ ῥᾳθυμοῦντες, τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐξελογίζοντο τὰ προσοφειλόμενα σφίσι τῶν ὀψωνίων ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον καὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι πολλαπλάσια τῶν καθηκόντων ταῦτʼ ἔφασαν δεῖν ἀπαιτεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους· πάντες δʼ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, ὧν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐπισφαλεῖς τῶν καιρῶν παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς ἐπεποίηντο, μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας καὶ μεγάλην προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐσο μένης περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπανορθώσεως.