1. THE Carthaginians having seized the transports as prizes of war, and with them an extraordinary quantity of provisions, Scipio was extremely enraged, not so much at the loss of the provisions, as by the fact that the enemy had thereby obtained vast supply of necessaries; and still more at the Carthaginians having violated the sworn articles of truce, and commenced the war He therefore at once selected Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius to go to Carthage, to remonstrate on what had taken place, and at the same time to announce that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; for he had lately received a despatch from home to that effect. Upon their arrival in Carthage these envoys first had an audience of the Senate, and then were introduced to a meeting of the people. On both occasions they spoke with great freedom on the situation of affairs, reminding their hearers that “Their ambassadors who had come to the Roman camp at Tunes, on being admitted to the council of officers, had not been content with appealing to the gods and kissing the ground, as other people do, but had thrown themselves upon the earth, and in abject humiliation had kissed the feet of the assembled officers; and then, rising from the ground, had reproached themselves for breaking the existing treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, and acknowledged that they deserved every severity at the hands of the Romans; but intreated to be spared the last severities, from a regard to the vicissitudes of human fortune, for their folly would be the means of displaying the generosity of the Romans. Remembering all this, the general and the officers then present in the council were at a loss to understand what had encouraged them to forget what they then said, and to venture to break their sworn articles of agreement. Plainly it was this—they trusted in Hannibal and the forces that had arrived with him. But they were very ill advised. All the world knew that he and his army had been driven these two years past from every port of Italy, and had retreated into the neighbourhood of the Lacinian promontory, where they had been so closely shut up and almost besieged, that they had barely been able to get safe away home. Not that, even if they had come back,” he added, “as conquerors, and were minded to engage us who have already defeated you in two consecutive battles, ought you to entertain any doubt as to the result, or to speculate on the chance of victory. The certainty of defeat were a better subject for your reflections: and when that takes place, what are the gods that you will summon to your aid? And what arguments will you use to move the pity of the victors for your misfortunes? You must needs expect to be debarred from all hope of mercy from gods and men alike by your perfidy and folly.”
1. ὅτι τῶν Καρχηδονίων λαβόντων αἰχμαλώτους τὰς φορτηγοὺς νῆας τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ χορηγίας πλῆθος ἐξαίσιον ὁ Πόπλιος βαρέως μὲν ἔφερεν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ μόνον σφίσι παρῃρῆσθαι τὴν χορηγίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς παρεσκευάσθαι δαψίλειαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἔτι δὲ βαρύτερον ἐπὶ τῷ παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἐγείρεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον. διὸ καὶ παραυτίκα προχειρισάμενος πρεσβευτὰς Λεύκιον Σέργιον καὶ Λεύκιον Βαίβιον καὶ Λεύκιον Φάβιον ἐξαπέστειλε διαλεξομένους τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγονότων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δηλώσοντας ὅτι κεκύρωκε τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ῥωμαίων· ἄρτι γὰρ ἧκε τῷ Ποπλίῳ γράμματα διασαφοῦντα περὶ τῶν προειρημένων. οἱ δὲ παραγενηθέντες εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς παραχθέντες, ἔλεγον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων μετὰ παρρησίας, πρῶτον μὲν ἀναμιμνήσκοντες ὡς οἱ παρʼ ἐκείνων πρεσβευταί, παραγενηθέντες εἰς Τύνητα πρὸς σφᾶς καὶ παρελθόντες εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, οὐ μόνον τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσπάσαιντο καὶ τὴν γῆν προσκυνήσαιεν, καθάπερ ἔστιν ἔθος τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεσόντες ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἀγεννῶς τοὺς πόδας καταφιλοῖεν τῶν ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀναστάντες [ὡς] κατηγορήσαιεν σφῶν αὐτῶν, διότι καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας συνθήκας Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἀθετήσαιεν αὐτοί. διόπερ ἔφασαν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πᾶν εἰκότως ἂν πάθοιεν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τύχης ἕνεκα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐδέοντο μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον· ἔσεσθαι γὰρ τὴν σφετέραν ἀβουλίαν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς Ῥωμαίων καλοκἀγαθίας. ὧν μνημονεύοντα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἔφασαν [τὸν] αὐτὸν οἱ πρέσβεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ τότε γεγονότας ἐκπλήττεσθαι, τίνι ποτὲ πιστεύοντες ἐπελανθάνοντο μὲν τῶν τότε ῥηθέντων, ἀθετεῖν δὲ τολμῶσι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας. σχεδὸν δὲ τοῦτʼ εἶναι δῆλον ὡς Ἀννίβᾳ πεποιθότες καὶ ταῖς μετὰ τούτου παρούσαις δυνάμεσι ταῦτα τολμῶσι ποιεῖν, κακῶς φρονοῦντες· σαφῶς γὰρ εἰδέναι πάντας ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι δεύτερον ἔτος ἤδη φεύγοντες ἐκ πάσης Ἰταλίας εἰς τοὺς περὶ Λακίνιον τόπους, κἀκεῖ συγκεκλεισμένοι καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκούμενοι, μόλις ἑαυτοὺς ἐκσεσωκότες ἥκουσι νῦν. "οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ εἰ καὶ νενικηκότες τοὺς ἐκεῖ παρῆσαν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔμελλον διακινδυνεύειν τοὺς δυσὶ μάχαις ἑξῆς ὑμᾶς ἤδη νενικηκότας, ὅμως ἀμφιδόξους ἔχειν ἔδει τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοῦ νικᾶν ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σφαλῆναι πάλιν. οὗ συμβάντος ποίους ἐπικαλέσεσθε" ἔφη "θεούς; ποίοις δὲ χρώμενοι λόγοις τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρατούντων ἔλεον ἐπισπάσεσθε πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν συμφοράς; πάσης εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλπίδος ἀποκλεισθήσεσθαι καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὴν ἀθεσίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβουλίαν."
2. After delivering this’ speech the envoys retired. Some few of the citizens were against breaking the treaty; but the majority, both of the politicians and the Senate, were much annoyed by its terms, and irritated by the plain speaking of the envoys; and, moreover, could not make up their minds to surrender the captured transports and the provisions which were on board them. But their main motive was a confident hope that they might yet conquer by means of Hannibal. The people therefore voted to dismiss the envoys without an answer. Moreover, the political party, whose aim it was to bring on the war at all hazards, held a meeting and arranged the following act of treachery. They gave out that it was necessary to make provision for conducting the envoys back to their camp in safety. They therefore at once caused two triremes to be got ready to convoy them; but at the same time sent a message to the Navarch Hasdrubal to have some vessels ready at no great distance from the Roman camp, in order that, as soon as the convoys had taken leave of the Roman envoys, he might bear down upon their ships and sink them; for the Carthaginian fleet was stationed at the time close under Utica. Having made this arrangement with Hasdrubal, they despatched the envoys, with instructions to the officers of the convoys to leave them and return, as soon as they had passed the mouth of the River Macara; for it was from this point that the enemy’s camp came into sight. Therefore, according to their instructions, as soon as they had passed this point, the officers of the convoys made signs of farewell to the Roman envoys and returned. Lucius and his colleagues suspected no danger, and felt no other annoyance at this proceeding than as regarding it as a mark of disrespect. But no sooner were they left thus alone, than three Carthaginian vessels suddenly started out to attack them, and came up with the Roman quinquereme. They failed, indeed, to stave her in, because she evaded them; nor did they succeed in boarding her, because the men resisted them with great spirit. But they ran up alongside of the vessel, and kept attacking her at various points, and managed to wound the marines with their darts and kill a considerable number of them; until at last the Romans, observing that their forage parties along the shore were rushing down to the beach to their assistance, ran their ships upon land. Most of the marines were killed, but the envoys had the unexpected good fortune to escape with their lives.
2. οἱ μὲν οὖν πρέσβεις τοιαῦτα διαλεχθέντες ἀνεχώρησαν· τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὀλίγοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ συναινοῦντες μὴ παραβαίνειν τὰς ὁμολογίας, οἱ δὲ πλείους καὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν βουλευομένων βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον τὰς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιταγάς, δυσχερῶς δʼ ἀνείχοντο τὴν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν παρρησίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν προέσθαι τὰ κατηγμένα πλοῖα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων χορηγίας. τὸ δὲ συνέχον, οὐ μικρὰς ἀλλὰ μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας νικήσειν διὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἔδοξε τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους ἐξαποστέλλειν· τῶν δὲ πολιτευομένων οἷς ἦν προκείμενον ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συγχέαι πάλιν τὸν πόλεμον, οὗτοι συνεδρεύσαντες μηχανῶνταί τι τοιοῦτον. ἔφασαν δεῖν πρόνοιαν ποιήσασθαι τῶν πρεσβευτῶν, ἵνα μετʼ ἀσφαλείας ἀνακομισθῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν παρεμβολήν. καὶ παραυτίκα τούτοις μὲν ἡτοίμαζον δύο τριήρεις παραπόμπους, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ναύαρχον Ἀσδρούβαν διεπέμψαντο παρακαλοῦντες ἑτοιμάσαι πλοῖα μὴ μακρὰν τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων παρεμβολῆς, ἵνʼ ἐπειδὰν αἱ παραπέμπουσαι νῆες ἀπολίπωσι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπαναχθέντα ταῦτα καταποντίσῃ τοὺς πρεσβευτάς. ἐφώρμει γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ ναυτικὸν κατὰ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης ἐγκειμένους τόπους. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διαταξάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἐξέπεμπον τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐντειλάμενοι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν τριήρων, [ὡς] ἐὰν παραλλάξωσι τὸν Μακάραν ποταμόν, αὖθις ἀπολιπόντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐν τῷ πόρῳ τοὺς πρεσβευτάς· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων συνορᾶν ἤδη τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρεμβολήν· οἱ δὲ παραπέμποντες, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν παρήλλαξαν τὸν ποταμόν, ἀσπασάμενοι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους αὖθις ἐπανέπλεον. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὑφεωρῶντο δεινόν, νομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς παραπέμποντας διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν αὐτοὺς προαπολιπεῖν ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐδυσχέραινον. ἅμα δὲ τῷ μονωθέντας αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ἐπανάγονται τρισὶ τριήρεσιν ἐξ ὑποβολῆς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ παραβαλόντες τῇ Ῥωμαϊκῇ πεντήρει τρῶσαι μὲν οὐχ οἷοί τʼ ἦσαν, ὑποχωρούσης τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ τοῦ καταστρώματος ἐπιβῆναι διὰ τὸ γενναίως ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας· ἐκ παραβολῆς δὲ καὶ πέριξ προσμαχόμενοι κατετίτρωσκον τοὺς ἐπιβάτας καὶ διέφθειρον πολλοὺς αὐτῶν, ἕως οὗ κατιδόντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς προνομεύοντας τὴν παραλίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας παραβοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐξέβαλον τὴν ναῦν εἰς τὴν γῆν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐπιβατῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ πρεσβευταὶ παραδόξως ἐξεσώθησαν.
3. This was the signal for the recommencement of the war in a fiercer and more angry spirit than before. The Romans on their part, looking upon themselves as having been treated with perfidy, were possessed with a furious determination to conquer the Carthaginians; while the latter, conscious of the consequences of what they had done, were ready to go all lengths to avoid falling under the power of the enemy. With such feelings animating both sides, it was quite evident that the result would have to be decided on the field of battle. Consequently everybody, not only in Italy and Libya, but in Iberia, Sicily, and Sardinia, was in a state of excited expectation, watching with conflicting feelings to see what would happen. But meanwhile Hannibal, finding himself too weak in cavalry, sent to a certain Numidian named Tychaeus, who was a friend of Syphax, and was reputed to possess the most warlike cavalry in Libya, urging him “to lend his aid, and not let the present opportunity slip; as he must be well aware that, if the Carthaginians won the day, he would be able to maintain his rule; but if the Romans proved victorious, his very life would be in danger, owing to the ambition of Massanissa.” This prince was convinced by these arguments, and joined Hannibal with two thousand horsemen.
3. γενομένων δὲ τούτων αὖθις ὁ πόλεμος ἄλλην ἀρχὴν εἰλήφει βαρυτέραν τῆς πρόσθεν καὶ δυσμενικωτέραν. οἵ τε γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι δοκοῦντες παρεσπονδῆσθαι φιλοτίμως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸ περιγενέσθαι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως εἶχον πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριοι γενηθῆναι. τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν παραστάσεως ὑπαρχούσης προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι δεήσει μάχῃ κρίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβύην πάντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Σαρδόνα μετεώρους εἶναι καὶ περισπᾶσθαι ταῖς διανοίαις, καραδοκοῦντας τὸ συμβησόμενον. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, ἐλλείπων τοῖς ἱππικοῖς, διέπεμπε πρός τινα Νομάδα Τυχαῖον, ὃς ἦν μὲν οἰκεῖος Σόφακος, ἱππεῖς δὲ μαχιμωτάτους ἔχειν ἐδόκει τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, παρακαλῶν αὐτὸν βοηθεῖν καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ, σαφῶς γινώσκοντα διότι Καρχηδονίων κρατησάντων δύναται διαφυλάττειν τὴν ἀρχήν, Ῥωμαίων δʼ ἐκνικησάντων καὶ τῷ βίῳ κινδυνεύσει διὰ τὴν Μασαννάσου φιλαρχίαν. οὗτος οὖν πεισθεὶς τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις ἧκε μετὰ δισχιλίων ἱππέων πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν.
4. Having secured his fleet, Scipio left Baebius in command of it in his place, while he himself went a round of the cities. This time he did not admit to mercy those who voluntarily surrendered, but carried all the towns by force, and enslaved the inhabitants, to show his anger at the treachery of the Carthaginians. To Massanissa he sent message after message, explaining to him how the Punic government had broken the terms, and urging him to collect the largest army he was able and join him with all speed. For as soon as the treaty had been made, Massanissa, as I have said, had immediately departed with his own army and ten Roman cohorts, infantry and cavalry, accompanied by some commissioners from Scipio, that he might not only recover his own kingdom, but secure the addition of that of Syphax also, by the assistance of the Romans. And this purpose was eventually effected. It happened that just at this time the envoys from Rome arrived at the naval camp. Those of them who had been sent by the Roman government, Baebius at once caused to be escorted to Scipio, while he retained those who were Carthaginians. The latter were much cast down, and regarded their position as one of great danger; for when they were informed of the impious outrage committed by their countrymen on the persons of the Roman envoys, they thought there could be no doubt that the vengeance for it would be wreaked upon themselves. But when Scipio learnt from the recently-arrived commissioners that the senate and people accepted with enthusiasm the treaty which he had made with the Carthaginians, and were ready to grant everything he asked, he was highly delighted, and ordered Baebius to send the envoys home with all imaginable courtesy. And he was very well advised to do so, in my opinion. For as he knew that his countrymen made a great point of respecting the rights of ambassadors, he considered in his own mind, not what the Carthaginians deserved to have done to them, but what it was becoming in Romans to inflict. Therefore, though he did not relax his own indignation and anger at what they had done, he yet endeavoured, in the words of the proverb, “to maintain the good traditions of his sires.” The result was that, by this superiority in his conduct, a very decided impression was made upon the spirits of the Carthaginians and of Hannibal himself.
4. Πόπλιος δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν ἀσφαλισάμενος καὶ καταλιπὼν Βαίβιον ἀντιστράτηγον, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, οὐκέτι παραλαμβάνων εἰς τὴν πίστιν τοὺς ἐθελοντὴν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίζοντας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ βίας ἀνδραποδιζόμενος καὶ φανερὰν ποιῶν τὴν ὀργήν, ἣν εἶχε πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους διὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων παρασπόνδησιν· πρὸς δὲ Μασαννάσαν διεπέμπετο συνεχῶς, ἀποδηλῶν αὐτῷ τίνα τρόπον παραβεβηκότες εἶεν οἱ Φοίνικες τὰς σπονδάς, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἁθροίζειν δύναμιν ὡς πλείστην καὶ συνάπτειν αὐτῷ κατὰ σπουδήν. ὁ γὰρ Μασαννάσας ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι τὰς συνθήκας, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, εὐθέως ἀφώρμησε μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως, προσλαβὼν δέκα σημαίας Ῥωμαϊκὰς ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ πρεσβευτὰς παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, χάριν τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὴν πατρῴαν ἀρχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ Σόφακος προσκατακτήσασθαι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπικουρίας· ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συνέτυχε δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Ῥώμης πρεσβευτὰς περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς εἰς τὸν ναυτικὸν χάρακα τὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταπλεῦσαι. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρʼ αὑτῶν ὁ Βαίβιος παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον ἐξέπεμψε, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρακατεῖχε, τά τε λοιπὰ δυσθύμως διακειμένους καὶ νομίζοντας ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις εἶναι κινδύνοις· πυθόμενοι γὰρ τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀσέβειαν πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, πρόδηλον ἐδόκουν εἶναι σφίσι τὴν ἐκ τούτων τιμωρίαν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, διακούσας τῶν παραγεγονότων ὅτι προθύμως ἥ τε σύγκλητος ὅ τε δῆμος ἀποδέξαιντο τὰς γενομένας διʼ αὑτοῦ συνθήκας πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ διότι πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ἑτοίμως ἔχοιεν, ἐπὶ μὲν τούτοις ἔχαιρε μεγάλως, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων προσέταξε τῷ Βαιβίῳ μετὰ πάσης φιλανθρωπίας ἀποπέμπειν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, πάνυ καλῶς βουλευσάμενος, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ φρονίμως. θεωρῶν γὰρ τὴν σφετέραν πατρίδα περὶ πλείστου ποιουμένην τὴν περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς πίστιν, ἐσκοπεῖτο παρʼ αὑτῷ συλλογιζόμενος οὐχ οὕτως τί δέον παθεῖν Καρχηδονίους, ὡς τί δέον ἦν πρᾶξαι Ῥωμαίους. διὸ παρακατασχὼν τὸν ἴδιον θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι πικρίαν, ἐπειράθη διαφυλάξαι, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν "πατέρων εὖ κείμενα ἔργα." τοιγαροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι πάντας ἥττησε ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν αὐτόν, ὑπερθέμενος τῇ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ τὴν ἐκείνων ἄνοιαν.
5. When the people of Carthage saw the cities in their territory being sacked, they sent a message to Hannibal begging him to act without delay, to come to close quarters with the enemy, and bring the matter to the decision of battle. He bade the messengers in answer “to confine their attention to other matters, and to leave such things to him, for he would choose the time for fighting himself.” Some days afterwards he broke up his quarters at Adrumetum, and pitched his camp near ZAMA, a town about five days’ march to the west of Carthage. From that place he sent spies to ascertain the place, nature, and strength of the Roman general’s encampment. These spies were caught and brought to Scipio, who, so far from inflicting upon them the usual punishment of spies, appointed a tribune to show them everything in the camp thoroughly and without reserve; and when this had been done, he asked the men whether the appointed officer had been careful to point out everything to them. Upon their replying that he had, he gave them provisions and an escort, and despatched them with injunctions to be careful to tell Hannibal everything they had seen. On their return to his camp, Hannibal was so much struck with the magnanimity and high courage of Scipio, that he conceived a lively desire for a personal interview with him. With this purpose he sent a herald to say that he was desirous of a parley to discuss the matters at issue. When the herald had delivered his message, Scipio at once expressed his consent, and said that he would himself send him a message when it suited him to meet, naming the time and place. The herald returned to Hannibal with this answer. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand infantry and about four thousand cavalry. Scipio received him with cordiality, and congratulated him on having added to his sway all those who had previously been subject to Syphax. Thus reinforced, he removed his camp to Naragara: selecting it as a place which, among other advantages, enabled him to get water within a javelin’s throw.
5. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὰς πόλεις ἐκπορθουμένας, ἔπεμπον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, δεόμενοι μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ προσπελάζειν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα διὰ μάχης. ὁ δὲ διακούσας τοῖς μὲν παροῦσιν ἀπεκρίθη τἄλλα σκοπεῖν, περὶ δὲ τούτου ῥᾳθυμεῖν· διαλήψεσθαι γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτός. μετὰ δέ τινας ἡμέρας ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῶν παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρύμητα τόπων προῆλθε καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ Ζάμαν· αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ πόλις ἀπέχουσα Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν πέντε. κἀκεῖθεν ἐξέπεμψε τρεῖς κατασκόπους, βουλόμενος ἐπιγνῶναι ποῦ στρατοπεδεύουσι καὶ πῶς χειρίζει τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός. Πόπλιος δʼ, ἐπαναχθέντων ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν κατασκόπων, τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ κολάζειν τοὺς ἑαλωκότας, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς τοὐναντίον συστήσας αὐτοῖς χιλίαρχον ἐπέταξε πάντα καθαρίως ὑποδεῖξαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν παρεμβολήν. γενομένου δὲ τούτου προσεπύθετο τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ πάντα φιλοτίμως αὐτοῖς ὑποδέδειχεν ὁ συσταθείς· τῶν δὲ φησάντων, δοὺς ἐφόδια καὶ παραπομπὴν ἐξαπέστειλε προστάξας ἐπιμελῶς Ἀννίβᾳ διασαφεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀπηντημένων αὐτοῖς. ὧν παραγενηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ Ἀννίβας τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν τἀνδρὸς οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅπως εἰς ὁρμὴν ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι συνελθεῖν εἰς λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ. κρίνας δὲ τοῦτο διεπέμψατο κήρυκα, φάσκων βούλεσθαι κοινολογηθῆναι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἀκούσας ταῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος συγκατετίθετο τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις, ἔφη δὲ πέμψειν πρὸς αὐτὸν διασαφῶν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ συμπορεύεσθαι, τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν καιρόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀκούσας ὁ κῆρυξ ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν παρεμβολήν· τῇ δʼ ἐπαύριον ἧκε Μασαννάσας, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους. ὃν ἀποδεξάμενος ὁ Πόπλιος φιλανθρώπως καὶ συγχαρεὶς ἐπὶ τῷ πάντας ὑπηκόους πεποιῆσθαι τοὺς πρότερον Σόφακι πειθομένους, ἀνέζευξε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς πρὸς πόλιν Ναράγαρα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, πρός τε τἄλλα τόπον εὐφυῆ καταλαβόμενος καὶ τὴν ὑδρείαν ἐντὸς βέλους ποιησάμενος.
6. From this place he sent to the Carthaginian general, informing him that he was ready to meet him, and discuss matters with him. On hearing this, Hannibal moved his quarters to within thirty stades of Scipio, and pitched his camp on a hill, which seemed a favourable position for his present purpose, except that water had to be fetched from a considerable distance, which caused his soldiers great fatigue. Next day both commanders advanced from their camps attended by a few horsemen. Presently they left these escorts and met in the intervening space by themselves, each accompanied by an interpreter. Hannibal was the first to speak, after the usual salutation. He said that “He wished that the Romans had never coveted any possession outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside Libya; for these were both noble empires, and were, so to speak, marked out by nature. But since,” he continued, “our rival claims to Sicily first made us enemies, and then those for Iberia; and since, finally, unwarned by the lessons of misfortune, we have gone so far that the one nation has endangered the very soil of its native land, and the other is now actually doing so, all that there remains for us to do is to try our best to deprecate the wrath of the gods, and to put an end, as far as in us lies, to these feelings of obstinate hostility. I personally am ready to do this, because I have learnt by actual experience that Fortune is the most fickle thing in the world, and inclines with decisive favour now to one side and now to the other on the slightest pretext, treating mankind like young children.”
6. κἀντεῦθεν ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, φάσκων ἕτοιμος εἶναι συμπορεύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς λόγους. ὧν ἀκούσας Ἀννίβας ἀνέζευξε, καὶ συνεγγίσας, ὥστε μὴ πλεῖον ἀπέχειν τριάκοντα σταδίων, κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρός τινα λόφον, ὃς τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἐδόκει, τὴν δʼ ὑδρείαν ἀπωτέρω μικρὸν εἶχε· καὶ πολλὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ὑπέμενον οἱ στρατιῶται περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἑξῆς ἡμέραν προῆλθον ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς ἀμφότεροι μετʼ ὀλίγων ἱππέων, κἄπειτα χωρισθέντες ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτοὶ συνῆλθον εἰς τὸ μέσον ἔχοντες ἑρμηνέα μεθʼ αὑτῶν. δεξιωσάμενος δὲ πρῶτος Ἀννίβας ἤρξατο λέγειν ὡς ἐβούλετο μὲν ἂν μήτε Ῥωμαίους ἐπιθυμῆσαι μηδέποτε μηδενὸς τῶν ἐκτὸς Ἰταλίας μήτε Καρχηδονίους τῶν ἐκτὸς Λιβύης· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ εἶναι ταύτας καὶ καλλίστας δυναστείας καὶ συλλήβδην ὡς ἂν εἰ περιωρισμένας ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως. "ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀμφισβητήσαντες ἐξεπολεμώσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν κατʼ Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης οὔπω νουθετούμενοι μέχρι τούτου προβεβήκαμεν ὥστε καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους οὓς μὲν κεκινδυνευκέναι, τοὺς δʼ ἀκμὴν ἔτι καὶ νῦν κινδυνεύειν, λοιπόν ἐστιν, εἴ πως δυνάμεθα διʼ αὑτῶν παραιτησάμενοι τοὺς θεοὺς διαλύσασθαι τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλοτιμίαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἕτοιμός εἰμι τῷ πεῖραν εἰληφέναι διʼ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς εὐμετάθετός ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ παρὰ μικρὸν εἰς ἑκάτερα ποιεῖ μεγάλας ῥοπάς, καθά περ εἰ νηπίοις παισὶ χρωμένη·
7. “But it is about you that I am anxious, Scipio. For you are still a young man, and everything has succeeded to your wishes both in Iberia and Libya, and you have as yet never experienced the ebb tide of Fortune; I fear, therefore, that my words, true as they are, will not influence you. But do look at the facts in the light of one story, and that not connected with a former generation, but our own. Look at me! I am that Hannibal who, after the battle of Cannae, became master of nearly all Italy; and presently advancing to Rome itself, and pitching my camp within forty stades of it, deliberated as to what I should do with you and your country; but now I am in Libya debating with you, a Roman, as to the bare existence of myself and my countrymen. With such a reverse as that before your eyes, I beg you not to entertain high thoughts, but to deliberate with a due sense of human weakness on the situation; and the way to do that is among good things to choose the greatest, among evils the least. What man of sense, then, would deliberately choose to incur the risk which is now before you. If you conquer, you will add nothing of importance to your glory or to that of your country; while, if you are worsted, you will have been yourself the means of entirely cancelling all the honours and glories you have already won. What then is the point that I am seeking to establish by these arguments? It is that the Romans should retain all the countries for which we have hitherto contended—I mean Sicily, Sardinia, and Iberia; and that the Carthaginians should engage never to go to war with Rome for these; and also that all the islands lying between Italy and Libya should belong to Rome. For I am persuaded that such a treaty will be at once safest for the Carthaginians, and most glorious for you and the entire people of Rome.”
7. σὲ δʼ ἀγωνιῶ, Πόπλιε, λίαν" ἔφη "καὶ διὰ τὸ νέον εἶναι κομιδῇ καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντα σοι κατὰ λόγον κεχωρηκέναι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην καὶ μηδέπω μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐμπεπτωκέναι παλιρρύμην, μήποτʼ οὐ πεισθῇς διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις, καίπερ οὖσι πιστοῖς. σκόπει δʼ ἀφʼ ἑνὸς τῶν λόγων τὰ πράγματα, μὴ τὰ τῶν προγεγονότων, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθʼ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. εἰμὶ τοιγαροῦν Ἀννίβας ἐκεῖνος, ὃς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κάνναις μάχην σχεδὸν ἁπάσης Ἰταλίας ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος μετά τινα χρόνον ἧκον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας ἐν τετταράκοντα σταδίοις ἐβουλευόμην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς ὑμετέρας πατρίδος ἐδάφους πῶς ἐστί μοι χρηστέον, ὃς νῦν ἐν Λιβύῃ πάρειμι πρὸς σὲ Ῥωμαῖον ὄντα περὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων σωτηρίας κοινολογησόμενος. εἰς ἃ βλέποντα παρακαλῶ σε μὴ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἀνθρωπίνως βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀεὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τῶν κακῶν δὲ τοὐλάχιστον αἱρεῖσθαι. τίς οὖν ἂν ἕλοιτο νοῦν ἔχων πρὸς τοιοῦτον ὁρμᾶν κίνδυνον οἷος σοὶ νῦν ἐνέστηκεν; ἐν ᾧ νικήσας μὲν οὔτε τῇ σαυτοῦ δόξῃ μέγα τι προσθήσεις οὔτε τῇ τῆς πατρίδος, ἡττηθεὶς δὲ πάντα τὰ πρὸ τούτου σεμνὰ καὶ καλὰ διʼ αὑτὸν ἄρδην ἀναιρήσεις. τί οὖν ἐστιν ὃ προτίθεμαι τέλος τῶν νυνὶ λόγων; πάντα περὶ ὧν πρότερον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν, Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν — ταῦτα δʼ ἦν Σικελία, Σαδρώ, τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν — καὶ μηδέποτε Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀντᾶραι πόλεμον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους, ὅσαι μεταξὺ κεῖνται τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ Λιβύης, Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν. ταύτας γὰρ πέπεισμαι τὰς συνθήκας καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀσφαλεστάτας μὲν εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις, ἐνδοξοτάτας δὲ σοὶ καὶ πᾶσι Ῥωμαίοις."
8. In reply to this speech of Hannibal, Scipio said “That neither in the Sicilian nor Iberian war were the Romans the aggressors, but notoriously the Carthaginians, which no one knew better than Hannibal himself. That the gods themselves had confirmed this by giving the victory, not to those who struck the first and unprovoked blow, but to those who only acted in self-defence. That he was as ready as any one to keep before his eyes the uncertainty of Fortune, and tried his best to confine his efforts within the range of human infirmity. But if,” he continued, “you had yourself quitted Italy before the Romans crossed to Libya with the offer of these terms in your hands, I do not think that you would have been disappointed in your expectation. But now that your departure from Italy has been involuntary, and we have crossed into Libya and conquered the country, it is clear that matters stand on a very different footing. But above all, consider the point which affairs have reached now. Your countrymen have been beaten, and at their earnest prayer we arranged a written treaty, in which, besides the offer now made by you, it was provided that the Carthaginians should restore prisoners without ransom, should surrender all their decked vessels, pay five thousand talents, and give hostages for their performance of these articles. These were the terms which I and they mutually agreed upon; we both despatched envoys to our respective Senates and people,—we consenting to grant these terms, the Carthaginians begging to have them granted. The Senate agreed: the people ratified the treaty. But though they had got what they asked, the Carthaginians annulled the compact by an act of perfidy towards us. What course is left to me? Put yourself in my place and say. To withdraw the severest clauses of the treaty? Are we to do this, say you, not in order that by reaping the reward of treachery they may learn in future to outrage their benefactors, but in order that by getting what they ask for they may be grateful to us? Why, only the other day, after obtaining what they begged for as suppliants, because your presence gave them a slender hope of success, they at once treated us as hated foes and public enemies. In these circumstances, if a still severer clause were added to the conditions imposed, it might be possible to refer the treaty back to the people; but, if I were to withdraw any of these conditions, such a reference does not admit even of discussion. What then is the conclusion of my discourse? It is, that you must submit yourselves and your country to us unconditionally, or conquer us in the field.”
8. Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν ταῦτʼ εἶπεν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ὑπολαβὼν οὔτε τοῦ περὶ Σικελίας ἔφη πολέμου Ῥωμαίους οὔτε τοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας αἰτίους γεγονέναι, Καρχηδονίους δὲ προφανῶς· ὑπὲρ ὧν κάλλιστα γινώσκειν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν. μάρτυρας δὲ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς γεγονέναι τούτων, περιθέντας τὸ κράτος οὐ τοῖς ἄρχουσι χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀμυνομένοις. βλέπειν δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐδενὸς ἧττον καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων στοχάζεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. " ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν εἰς Λιβύην αὐτὸς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐκχωρήσας προύτεινας τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας, οὐκ ἂν οἴομαί σε διαψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος. ἐπεὶ δὲ σὺ μὲν ἄκων ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀπηλλάγης, ἡμεῖς δὲ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Λιβύην τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκρατήσαμεν, δῆλον ὡς μεγάλην εἴληφε τὰ πράγματα παραλλαγήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ τί πέρας; ἡττηθέντων καὶ δεηθέντων τῶν παρὰ σοῦ πολιτῶν ἐθέμεθα συνθήκας ἐγγράπτους, ἐν αἷς ἦν πρὸς τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν προτεινομένοις τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς λύτρων Καρχηδονίους, τῶν πλοίων παραχωρῆσαι τῶν καταφράκτων, πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα προσενεγκεῖν, ὅμηρα δοῦναι περὶ τούτων. ταῦτʼ ἦν ἃ συνεθέμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν ἀμφότεροι πρός τε τὴν σύγκλητον τὴν ἡμετέραν καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἡμεῖς μὲν ὁμολογοῦντες εὐδοκεῖν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ δεόμενοι τούτων τυχεῖν. ἐπείσθη τὸ συνέδριον τούτοις, ὁ δὲ δῆμος συγκατῄνεσε. τυχόντες ὧν ἠξίουν ἠθέτησαν ταῦτα Καρχηδόνιοι, παρασπονδήσαντες ἡμᾶς. τί λείπεται ποιεῖν; σὺ τὴν ἐμὴν χώραν μεταλαβὼν εἶπον. ἀφελεῖν τὰ βαρύτατα τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐπιταγμάτων; ἵνα δὴ λαβόντες ἆθλα τῆς παρανομίας διδαχθῶσι τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν παρασπονδεῖν· ἀλλʼ ἵνα τυχόντες ὧν ἀξιοῦσι χάριν ὀφείλωσιν ἡμῖν; ἀλλὰ νυνὶ μεθʼ ἱκετηρίας τυχόντες ὧν παρεκάλουν, ὅτι βραχείας ἐλπίδος ἐπελάβοντο τῆς κατὰ σέ, παρὰ πόδας ὡς ἐχθροῖς ἡμῖν κέχρηνται καὶ πολεμίοις. ἐν οἷς βαρυτέρου μέν τινος προσεπιταχθέντος δυνατὸν ἀνενεγκεῖν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ διαλύσεως, ὑφαίρεσιν δὲ ποιουμένοις τῶν ὑποκειμένων οὐδʼ ἀναφορὰν ἔχει τὸ διαβούλιον. τί πέρας οὖν πάλιν τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων; ἢ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὑμᾶς διδόναι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ μαχομένους νικᾶν".
9. After these speeches Hannibal and Scipio parted without coming to any terms; and next morning by daybreak both generals drew out their forces and engaged. To the Carthaginians it was a struggle for their own lives and the sovereignty of Libya; to the Romans for universal dominion and supremacy. And could any one who grasped the situation fail to be moved at the story? Armies more fitted for war than these, or generals who had been more successful or more thoroughly trained in all the operations of war, it would be impossible to find, or any other occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the world known to history,—a destiny which had not to wait long for its fulfilment. Scipio placed his men on the field in the following order: the hastati first, with an interval between their maniples; behind them the principes, their maniples not arranged to cover the intervals between those of the hastati as the Roman custom is, but immediately behind them at some distance, because the enemy was so strong in elephants. In the rear of these he stationed the triarii. On his left wing he stationed Gaius Laelius with the Italian cavalry, on the right Massanissa with all his Numidians. The intervals between the front maniples he filled up with maniples of velites, who were ordered to begin the battle; but if they found themselves unable to stand the charge of the elephants, to retire quickly either to the rear of the whole army by the intervals between the maniples, which went straight through the ranks, or, if they got entangled with the elephants, to step aside into the lateral spaces between the maniples.
9. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διαλεχθέντες αὑτοῖς Ἀννίβας καὶ Πόπλιος ἐχωρίσθησαν, ἀσύμβατον ποιησάμενοι τὴν κοινολογίαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῆγον ἀμφότεροι καὶ συνίσταντο τὸν ἀγῶνα, Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς σφετέρας σωτηρίας καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πραγμάτων, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας. ἐφʼ ἃ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιστήσας συμπαθὴς γένοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐξήγησιν; οὔτε γὰρ δυνάμεις πολεμικωτέρας οὔθʼ ἡγεμόνας ἐπιτυχεστέρους τούτων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀθλητὰς γεγονότας τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων εὕροι τις ἂν ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ μὴν ἆθλα μείζω τὴν τύχην ἐκτεθεικυῖαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις τῶν τότε προκειμένων· οὐ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεύειν οἱ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅσα νῦν πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἱστορίαν. ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι μετʼ ὀλίγον. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Πόπλιος ἔθηκε τὰς τάξεις τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἁστάτους καὶ τὰς τούτων σημαίας ἐν διαστήμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τιθεὶς τὰς σπείρας οὐ κατὰ τὸ τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν διάστημα, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ καταλλήλους ἐν ἀποστάσει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐλεφάντων· τελευταίους δʼ ἐπέστησε τοὺς τριαρίους. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κεράτων ἔταξε κατὰ μὲν τὸ λαιὸν Γάιον Λαίλιον, ἔχοντα τοὺς Ἰταλικοὺς ἱππέας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος Μασαννάσαν μετὰ πάντων τῶν ὑφʼ ἑαυτὸν ταττομένων Νομάδων. τὰ δὲ διαστήματα τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν ἀνεπλήρωσε ταῖς τῶν γροσφομάχων σπείραις, παραγγείλας τούτοις προκινδυνεύειν, ἐὰν δʼ ἐκβιάζωνται κατὰ τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἔφοδον, ἀποχωρεῖν, τοὺς μὲν καταταχοῦντας διὰ τῶν ἐπʼ εὐθείας διαστημάτων εἰς τοὐπίσω τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, τοὺς δὲ περικαταλαμβανομένους εἰς τὰ πλάγια παρίστασθαι διαστήματα κατὰ τὰς σημαίας.
10. These dispositions made, he went along the ranks delivering an exhortation to the men, which, though short, was much to the point in the circumstances in which they were placed. He called upon them, “Remembering their former victories, to show themselves to be men of mettle and worthy their reputation and their country. To put before their eyes that the effect of their victory would be not only to make them complete masters of Libya, but to give them and their country the supremacy and undisputed lordship of the world. But if the result of the battle were unfavourable, those who fell fighting gallantly would have the record of having died for their country, while those that saved themselves by flight would spend the rest of their days as objects of pitying contempt and scorn. For there was no place in Libya which could secure their safety if they fled; while, if they fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, no one who looked facts in the face could doubt what would happen to them. May none of you,” he added, “learn that by experience! Since, then, Fortune puts before us the most glorious of rewards, in whichever way the battle is decided, should we not be at once the most mean-spirited and foolish of mankind if we abandon the most glorious alternative, and from a paltry clinging to life deliberately choose the worst of misfortunes? Charge the enemy then with the steady resolve to do one of two things, to conquer or to die! For it is men thus minded who invariably conquer their opponents, since they enter the field with no other hope of life.”
10. ταῦτα δʼ ἑτοιμασάμενος ἐπεπορεύετο παρακαλῶν τὰς δυνάμεις βραχέως μέν, οἰκείως δὲ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως. ἠξίου γὰρ μνημονεύοντας τῶν προγεγονότων ἀγώνων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, σφῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίους, καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὅτι κρατήσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ πραγμάτων ἔσονται κύριοι βεβαίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι περιποιήσουσιν· ἐὰν δʼ ὡς ἄλλως ἐκβῇ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον, οἱ μὲν ἀποθανόντες εὐγενῶς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ κάλλιστον ἐντάφιον ἕξουσι τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος θάνατον, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες αἴσχιστον καὶ ἐλεεινότατον τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον. ἀσφάλειαν γὰρ τοῖς φυγοῦσιν οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς περιποιῆσαι τόπος τῶν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ· πεσοῦσι δʼ ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων χεῖρας οὐκ ἄδηλα [εἶναι] τὰ συμβησόμενα τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις· "ὧν" ἔφη "μηδενὶ γένοιτο πεῖραν ὑμῶν λαβεῖν. τῆς δʼ οὖν τύχης ἡμῖν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ἐκτεθεικυίας, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴημεν ἀγεννέστατοι καὶ συλλήβδην ἀφρονέστατοι πάντων, εἰ παρέντες τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑλοίμεθα τὰ μέγιστα τῶν κακῶν διὰ φιλοζωίαν; " διόπερ ἠξίου δύο προθεμένους, ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ἢ νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν, ὁμόσε χωρεῖν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους. τοὺς γὰρ τοιαύτας ἔχοντας διαλήψεις κατʼ ἀνάγκην ἀεὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων, ἐπειδὰν ἀπελπίσαντες τοῦ ζῆν ἴωσιν εἰς τὴν μάχην.
11. Such was Scipio’s address to his men. Meanwhile Hannibal had put his men also into position. His elephants, which numbered more than eighty, he placed in the van of the whole army. Next his mercenaries, amounting to twelve thousand, and consisting of Ligurians, Celts, Baliarians, and Mauretani; behind them the native Libyans and Carthaginians; and on the rear of the whole the men whom he had brought from Italy, at a distance of somewhat more than a stade. His wings he strengthened with cavalry, stationing the Numidian allies on the left wing, and the Carthaginian horsemen on the right. He ordered each officer to address his own men, bidding them rest their hopes of victory on him and the army he had brought with him; while he bade their officers remind the Carthaginians in plain terms what would happen to their wives and children if the battle should be lost. While these orders were carried out by the officers, Hannibal himself went along the lines of his Italian army and urged them “to remember the seventeen years during which they had been brothers-inarms, and the number of battles they had fought with the Romans, in which they had never been beaten or given the Romans even a hope of victory. Above all, putting aside minor engagements and their countless successes, let them place before their eyes the battle of the River Trebia against the father of the present Roman commander; and again the battle in Etruria against Flaminius; and lastly that at Cannae against Aemilius, with none of which was the present struggle to be compared, whether in regard to the number or excellence of the enemy’s men. Let them only raise their eyes and look at the ranks of the enemy; they would see that they were not merely fewer, but many times fewer than those with whom they had fought before, while, as to their soldierly qualities, there was no comparison. The former Roman armies had come to the struggle with them untainted by memories of past defeats: while these men were the sons or the remnants of those who had been beaten in Italy, and fled before him again and again. They ought not therefore,” he said, “to undo the glory and fame of their previous achievements, but to struggle with a firm and brave resolve to maintain their reputation of invincibility.” Such were the addresses of the two commanders.
11. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πόπλιος τοιαύτην ἐποιήσατο τὴν παραίνεσιν. ὁ δʼ Ἀννίβας τὰ μὲν θηρία πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ὄντα πλείω τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπέστησε, περὶ μυρίους ὄντας καὶ δισχιλίους τὸν ἀριθμόν. οὗτοι δʼ ἦσαν Λιγυστῖνοι, Κελτοί, Βαλιαρεῖς, Μαυρούσιοι. τούτων δὲ κατόπιν παρενέβαλε τοὺς ἐγχωρίους Λίβυας καὶ Καρχηδονίους, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἥκοντας μεθʼ αὑτοῦ, πλεῖον ἢ στάδιον ἀποστήσας τῶν προτεταγμένων. τὰ δὲ κέρατα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων ἠσφαλίσατο, θεὶς ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ λαιὸν τοὺς συμμάχους Νομάδας, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν τοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἱππεῖς. παρήγγειλε δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας ἕκαστον παρακαλεῖν, ἀναφέροντας τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἐφʼ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰς μεθʼ αὑτοῦ παραγεγενημένας δυνάμεις· τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἡγουμένους τὰ συμβησόμενα περὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι καὶ τιθέναι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐὰν ἄλλως πως ἐκβῇ τὰ τῆς μάχης. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐποίουν τὸ παραγγελθέν. Ἀννίβας δὲ τοὺς μεθʼ αὑτοῦ παραγεγονότας ἐπιπορευόμενος ἠξίου καὶ παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑπτακαιδεκαέτους συνηθείας, μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν προγεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγώνων· ἐν οἷς ἀηττήτους γεγονότας οὐδʼ ἐλπίδα τοῦ νικᾶν οὐδέποτʼ ἔφη Ῥωμαίοις αὐτοὺς ἀπολελοιπέναι. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἠξίου λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν χωρὶς τῶν κατὰ μέρος κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναριθμήτων προτερημάτων τήν τε περὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν μάχην πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ νῦν ἡγουμένου Ῥωμαίων, ὁμοίως τὴν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ πρὸς Φλαμίνιον μάχην, ἔτι δὲ τὴν περὶ Κάννας γενομένην πρὸς Αἰμίλιον, ἃς οὔτε κατὰ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὔτε κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀξίας εἶναι συγκρίσεως πρὸς τὸν νῦν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον. καὶ ταῦτα λέγων ἀναβλέπειν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε καὶ τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων κατοπτεύειν τάξιν· οὐ γὰρ οἷον ἐλάττους, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέρος εἶναι τῶν τότε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγωνισαμένων, ταῖς γε μὴν ἀρεταῖς οὐδὲ σύγκρισιν ἔχειν. ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ ἀηττήτους ὄντας ἐξ ἀκεραίου διηγωνίσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐκγόνους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ λείψανα τῶν ἡττημένων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ πεφευγότων αὐτὸν πλεονάκις. διόπερ [ᾤετο] δεῖν μὴ καταλῦσαι μήτε τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν μήτε τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος δόξαν καὶ προσηγορίαν, ἀλλʼ ἀγωνισαμένους εὐψύχως βεβαιῶσαι τὴν διαδεδομένην περὶ αὐτῶν φήμην, ὡς ὄντων ἀηττήτων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τοιαῦτα παρεκάλεσαν ἀμφό τεροι.
12. All arrangements for the battle being complete, and the two opposing forces of Numidian cavalry having been for some time engaged in skirmishing attacks upon each other, Hannibal gave the word to the men on the elephants to charge the enemy. But as they heard the horns and trumpets braying all round them, some of the elephants became unmanageable and rushed back upon the Numidian contingents of the Carthaginian army; and this enabled Massanissa with great speed to deprive the Carthaginian left wing of its cavalry support. The rest of the elephants charged the Roman velites in the spaces between the maniples of the line, and while inflicting much damage on the enemy suffered severely themselves; until, becoming frightened, some of them ran away down the vacant spaces, the Romans letting them pass harmlessly along, according to Scipio’s orders, while others ran away to the right under a shower of darts from the cavalry, until they were finally driven clear off the field. It was just at the moment of this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous pursuit. While this was going on, the opposing lines of heavy infantry were advancing to meet others with deliberate step and proud confidence, except Hannibal’s “army of Italy,” which remained in its original position. When they came within distance the Roman soldiers charged the enemy, shouting as usual their war-cry, and clashing their swords against their shields: while the Carthaginian mercenaries uttered a strange confusion of cries, the effect of which was indescribable, for, in the words of the poet, the“voice of all was not one —”“nor one their cry:”“But manifold their speech as was their race.”
12. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἑκατέροις ἦν εὐτρεπῆ τὰ πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, πάλαι τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἱππέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολιζομένων, τότε παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων Ἀννίβας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἅμα δὲ τῷ πανταχόθεν τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς βυκάνας ἀναβοῆσαι τινὰ μὲν διαταραχθέντα τῶν θηρίων ἐξ αὐτῆς ὥρμησε παλίσσυτα κατὰ τῶν βεβοηθηκότων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Νομάδων· τῶν περὶ τὸν Μασαννάσαν ταχέως ἐψιλώθη τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ συμπεσόντα τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων γροσφομάχοις ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χωρίῳ τῶν παρατάξεων πολλὰ μὲν ἔπασχε κακά, πολλὰ δʼ ἐποίει τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἕως ὅτου πεφοβημένα τὰ μὲν διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐξέπεσε, δεξαμένων αὐτὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀσφαλῶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόνοιαν, τὰ δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος παραφυγόντα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων συνακοντιζόμενα τέλος εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐξέπεσεν, ὅτε δὴ καὶ Λαίλιος ἅμα τῇ περὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ταραχῇ συμβαλὼν ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν τοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἱππεῖς προτροπάδην. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐκθύμως· τὸ δʼ ὅμοιον ἐποίει καὶ Μασαννάσας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀμφότεραι βάδην ἀλλήλαις καὶ σοβαρῶς ἐπῄεσαν, πλὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας μετʼ Ἀννίβου παραγεγονότων· οὗτοι δʼ ἔμενον ἐπέχοντες τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόπον. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν ἀλλήλων, οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια συναλαλάξαντες καὶ συμψοφήσαντες τοῖς ξίφεσι τοὺς θυρεοὺς προσέβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀδιάκριτον ἐποίουν τὴν φωνὴν καὶ παρηλλαγμένην· οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦν κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ὁ αὐτὸς θροῦς οὐδʼ ἴα γῆρυς, ἄλλη δʼ ἄλλων γλῶσσα, πολύκλητοι δʼ ἔσαν ἄνδρες, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἐξηριθμησάμην.
13. The whole affair being now a trial of strength between man and man at close quarters, as the combatants used their swords and not their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled them to wound a considerable number of the Romans. The latter, however, trusting to the steadiness of their ranks and the excellence of their arms, still kept gaining ground, their rear ranks keeping close up with them and encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians did not keep up with their mercenaries nor support them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way: and, believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side, fell upon the men on their rear as they were retreating, and began killing them; whereby many of the Carthaginians were compelled to meet a gallant death in spite of themselves. For as they were being cut down by their mercenaries they had, much against their inclination, to fight with their own men and the Romans at the same time; and as they now fought with desperation and fury they killed a good many both of their own men and of the enemy also. Thus it came about that their charge threw the maniples of the hastati into confusion; whereupon the officers of the principes caused their lines to advance to oppose them. However, the greater part of the mercenaries and Carthaginians had fallen either by mutual slaughter or by the sword of the hastati. Those who survived and fled Hannibal would not allow to enter the ranks of his army, but ordered his men to lower their spears and keep them back as they approached; and they were therefore compelled to take refuge on the wings or make for the open country.
13. πάσης δʼ οὔσης ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατʼ ἄνδρα τῆς μάχης [διὰ τὸ μὴ δόρασι μηδὲ ξίφεσι χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους], τῇ μὲν εὐχερείᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ προεῖχον οἱ μισθοφόροι τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον τῶν Ῥωμαίων, τῷ δὲ τῆς συντάξεως ἀκριβεῖ καὶ τῷ καθοπλισμῷ πιστεύοντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐπέβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἅμα δὲ τοῖς μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ἑπομένων καὶ παρακαλούντων τῶν κατόπιν, τοῖς δὲ μισθοφόροις τῶν Καρχηδονίων οὐ συνεγγιζόντων οὐδὲ παραβοηθούντων, ἀλλʼ ἀποδειλιώντων ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πέρας ἐνέκλιναν οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ δόξαντες ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι προφανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ἐπιπεσόντες κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας ἔκτεινον τούτους. ὃ καὶ πολλοὺς ἠνάγκασε τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀνδρωδῶς ἀποθανεῖν· φονευόμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐμάχοντο παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν προαίρεσιν ἅμα πρός τε τοὺς ἰδίους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. ποιούμενοι δὲ τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκστατικῶς καὶ παρηλλαγμένως οὐκ ὀλίγους διέφθειραν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων. καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ συνέχεαν ἐπιπεσόντες τὰς τῶν ἁστάτων σημαίας· οἱ μέντοι τῶν πριγκίπων ἡγεμόνες συνθεασάμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς ἐπέστησαν τὰς αὑτῶν τάξεις. τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τὸ μὲν ὑφʼ αὑτῶν, τὸ δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν ἁστάτων αὐτοῦ κατεκόπη. τοὺς δὲ διασῳζομένους καὶ φεύγοντας οὐκ εἴασε καταμιγῆναι ταῖς δυνάμεσιν Ἀννίβας, ἀλλὰ προβαλέσθαι παραγγείλας τοῖς ἐπιστάταις ἐκώλυσε μὴ παραδέξασθαι τοὺς ἐγγίζοντας. ὅθεν ἠναγκάσθησαν οὗτοι μὲν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὰ κέρατα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων εὐρυχωρίας, γενομένου δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου τῶν καταλειπομένων στρατοπέδων πλήρους αἵματος, φόνου, νεκρῶν, πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγῷ τὸ τῆς τροπῆς ἐμπόδιον·