---
title: "The Histories · Ἱστορίαι"
author: "Polybius"
translator: "Evelyn S. Shuckburgh"
languages: [grc, en]
shelf: "Classical Greek"
section: 72 of 103
url: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/72/
cite: "Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, The Histories · Ἱστορίαι, section 72. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/72/"
---

# The Histories · Ἱστορίαι

*Polybius, tr. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh*

How did Rome conquer the known world in under fifty-three years? A Greek hostage who became Scipio’s friend explains, with the Punic Wars, Hannibal, the Roman constitution and the fall of Carthage.

> Greek: ed. Theodor Büttner-Wobst, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-greekLit, tlg0543.tlg001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, from the Perseus Digital Library (tlg0543.tlg001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 72. Book XVIII · chapters 29–42

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/72/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/polybius-histories/72/#p-N

[¶0] 29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissae projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer —
“So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm;”
“And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes”
“In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed”
“In order: in such serried rank they stood.”
And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

> Greek: 29. ὅτι μὲν ἐχούσης τῆς φάλαγγος τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν οὐδὲν ἂν ὑποσταίη κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐδὲ μείναι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῆς, εὐχερὲς καταμαθεῖν ἐκ πολλῶν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀνὴρ ἵσταται σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐν τρισὶ ποσὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐναγωνίους πυκνώσεις, τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισῶν μέγεθός ἐστι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν δεκατεττάρων, τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέτταρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ τοῖν χεροῖν διάστημα καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι τοὺς δέκα πήχεις προπίπτειν ἀνάγκη τὴν σάρισαν πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἑκάστου τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ὅταν ἴῃ διʼ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν προβαλόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβαίνει τὰς μὲν τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου καὶ τετάρτου πλεῖον, τὰς δὲ τοῦ πέμπτου ζυγοῦ σαρίσας δύο προπίπτειν πήχεις πρὸ τῶν πρωτοστατῶν, ἐχούσης τῆς φάλαγγος τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδιότητα καὶ πύκνωσιν κατʼ ἐπιστάτην καὶ κατὰ παραστάτην, ὡς Ὅμηρος ὑποδείκνυσιν ἐν τούτοις· ἀσπὶς ἄρʼ ἀσπίδʼ ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δʼ ἀνήρ· ψαῦον δʼ ἱππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλοισι νευόντων· ὣς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισι. τούτων δʼ ἀληθινῶς καὶ καλῶς λεγομένων, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν σαρίσας προπίπτειν πέντε, δυσὶ πήχεσι διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων κατὰ μῆκος.

[¶1] 30. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about. Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man—because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing,—it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily—seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

> Greek: 30. ἐκ δὲ τούτου ῥᾴδιον ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαβεῖν τὴν τῆς ὅλης φάλαγγος ἔφοδον καὶ προβολήν, ποίαν τινʼ εἰκὸς εἶναι καὶ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχειν, ἐφʼ ἑκκαίδεκα τὸ βάθος οὖσαν. ὧν ὅσοι τὸ πέμπτον ζυγὸν ὑπεραίρουσι, ταῖς μὲν σαρίσαις οὐδὲν οἷοί τʼ εἰσὶ συμβαλέσθαι πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον· διόπερ οὐδὲ ποιοῦνται κατʼ ἄνδρα τὴν προβολήν, παρὰ δὲ τοὺς ὤμους τῶν προηγουμένων ἀνανενευκυίας φέρουσι χάριν τοῦ τὸν κατὰ κορυφὴν τόπον ἀσφαλίζειν τῆς ἐκτάξεως, εἰργουσῶν τῇ πυκνώσει τῶν σαρισῶν ὅσα τῶν βελῶν ὑπερπετῆ τῶν πρωτοστατῶν φερόμενα δύναται προσπίπτειν πρὸς τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας. αὐτῷ γε μὴν τῷ τοῦ σώματος βάρει κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν πιεζοῦντες οὗτοι τοὺς προηγουμένους βιαίαν μὲν ποιοῦσι τὴν ἔφοδον, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῖς πρωτοστάταις τὴν εἰς τοὔπισθεν μεταβολήν. τοιαύτης περὶ τὴν φάλαγγα διαθέσεως καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὔσης, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως τὰς ἰδιότητας καὶ διαφορὰς ἐκ παραθέσεως. ἵστανται μὲν οὖν ἐν τρισὶ ποσὶ μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι· τῆς μάχης δʼ αὐτοῖς κατʼ ἄνδρα τὴν κίνησιν λαμβανούσης διὰ τὸ τῷ μὲν θυρεῷ σκέπειν τὸ σῶμα, συμμετατιθεμένους αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸν τῆς πληγῆς καιρόν, τῇ μαχαίρᾳ δʼ ἐκ καταφορᾶς καὶ διαιρέσεως ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην, προφανὲς ὅτι χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατʼ ἐπιστάτην καὶ κατὰ παραστάτην, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐχρηστεῖν πρὸς τὸ δέον. ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβήσεται τὸν ἕνα Ῥωμαῖον ἵστασθαι κατὰ δύο πρωτοστάτας τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν, ὥστε πρὸς δέκα σαρίσας αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν καὶ τὴν μάχην, ἃς οὔτε κόπτοντα τὸν ἕνα καταταχῆσαι δυνατόν, ὅταν ἅπαξ συνάψωσιν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, οὔτε βιάσασθαι ῥᾴδιον, μηδέν γε τῶν ἐφεστώτων δυναμένων συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς πρωτοστάταις μήτε πρὸς τὴν βίαν μήτε πρὸς τὴν τῶν μαχαιρῶν ἐνέργειαν. ἐξ ὧν εὐκατανόητον ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε μεῖναι κατὰ πρόσωπον τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἔφοδον οὐδέν, διατηρούσης τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ὡς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εἶπα.

[¶2] 31. Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

> Greek: 31. τίς οὖν αἰτία τοῦ νικᾶν Ῥωμαίους καὶ τί τὸ σφάλλον ἐστὶ τοὺς ταῖς φάλαγξι χρωμένους; ὅτι συμβαίνει τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἀορίστους ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τῆς δὲ φάλαγγος ἕνα καιρὸν εἶναι καὶ τόπων ἓν γένος, ἐν οἷς δύναται τὴν αὑτῆς χρείαν ἐπιτελεῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τις ἦν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις εἰς τοὺς τῆς φάλαγγος καιροὺς καὶ τόπους συγκαταβαίνειν, ὅτε μέλλοιεν κρίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων, εἰκὸς ἦν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι τὸ πρωτεῖον τοὺς ταῖς φάλαγξι χρωμένους· εἰ δὲ δυνατὸν ἐκκλίνειν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ῥᾳδίως, πῶς ἂν ἔτι φοβερὸν εἴη τὸ προειρημένον σύνταγμα; καὶ μὴν ὅτι χρείαν ἔχει τόπων ἐπιπέδων καὶ ψιλῶν ἡ φάλαγξ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐχόντων, λέγω δʼ οἷον τάφρους, ἐκρήγματα, συναγκείας, ὀφρῦς, ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι. πάντα γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα παραποδίζειν καὶ λύειν τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν ἱκανὰ γίνεται. διότι δʼ εὑρεῖν τόπους ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ σταδίους εἴκοσι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους, ἐν οἷς μηδέν τι τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, σχεδόν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τελέως σπάνιον, καὶ τοῦτο πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἔστω τόπους εὑρῆσθαι τοιούτους. ἐὰν οὖν οἱ [μὲν] πολεμοῦντες εἰς μὲν τούτους μὴ συγκαταβαίνωσι, περιπορευόμενοι δὲ πορθῶσι τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν τῶν συμμάχων, τί τῆς τοιαύτης ὄφελος ἔσται συντάξεως; μένουσα μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις αὑτῇ τόποις οὐχ οἷον ὠφελεῖν δύναιτʼ ἂν τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ἑαυτὴν σῴζειν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδαὶ κωλυθήσονται ῥᾳδίως ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ὅταν ἀκονιτὶ κρατῶσι τῶν ὑπαίθρων· ἐὰν δʼ ἀπολιποῦσα τοὺς οἰκείους τόπους βούληταί τι πράττειν, εὐχείρωτος ἔσται τοῖς πολεμίοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰς τοὺς ἐπιπέδους συγκαταβάς τις τόπους μὴ πᾶν ἅμα τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν τῆς φάλαγγος καὶ τὸν ἕνα καιρὸν ὑποβάλῃ, βραχέα δὲ φυγομαχήσῃ κατʼ αὐτὸν τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου καιρόν, εὐθεώρητον γίνεται τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐξ ὧν ποιοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι νῦν.

[¶3] 32. For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy’s reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others. I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

> Greek: 32. οὐκέτι γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων. οὐ γὰρ ἐξισώσαντες τὴν παράταξιν πᾶσιν ἅμα συμβάλλουσι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις μετωπηδὸν πρὸς τὰς φάλαγγας, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐφεδρεύει τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ συμμίσγει τοῖς πολεμίοις. λοιπόν, ἄν τʼ ἐκπιέσωσιν οἱ φαλαγγῖται τοὺς καθʼ αὑτοὺς προσβάλλοντες ἄν τʼ ἐκπιεσθῶσιν ὑπὸ τούτων, λέλυται τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ἴδιον· ἢ γὰρ ἑπόμενοι τοῖς ὑποχωροῦσιν ἢ φεύγοντες τοὺς προσκειμένους ἀπολείπουσι τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως, οὗ γενομένου δέδοται τοῖς ἐφεδρεύουσι τῶν πολεμίων διάστημα καὶ τόπος, ὃν οὗτοι κατεῖχον, πρὸς τὸ μηκέτι κατὰ πρόσωπον ὁρμᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρεισπεσόντας πλαγίους παρίστασθαι καὶ κατὰ νώτου τοῖς φαλαγγίταις. ὅταν δὲ τοὺς μὲν τῆς φάλαγγος καιροὺς καὶ τὰ προτερήματα ῥᾴδιον ᾖ φυλάξασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τῆς φάλαγγος ἀδύνατον, πῶς οὐ μεγάλην εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν προειρημένων; καὶ μὴν πορευθῆναι διὰ τόπων παντοδαπῶν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς χρωμένους φάλαγγι καὶ καταστρατοπεδεῦσαι, ἔτι δὲ τόπους εὐκαίρους προκαταλαβέσθαι καὶ πολιορκῆσαί τινας καὶ πολιορκηθῆναι καὶ παραδόξοις ἐπιφανείαις περιπεσεῖν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ πολέμου μέρη καὶ ῥοπὰς ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, ποτὲ μὲν ὁλοσχερεῖς, ποτὲ δὲ μεγάλας. ἐν οἷς πᾶσιν ἡ μὲν Μακεδόνων ἐστὶ σύνταξις δύσχρηστος, ποτὲ δʼ ἄχρηστος, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν φαλαγγίτην μήτε κατὰ τάγμα μήτε κατʼ ἄνδρα παρέχεσθαι χρείαν, ἡ δὲ Ῥωμαίων εὔχρηστος· πᾶς γὰρ Ῥωμαῖος, ὅταν ἅπαξ καθοπλισθεὶς ὁρμήσῃ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ὁμοίως ἥρμοσται πρὸς πάντα τόπον καὶ καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιφάνειαν. καὶ μὴν ἕτοιμός ἐστι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἄν τε μετὰ πάντων δέῃ κινδυνεύειν ἄν τε μετὰ μέρους ἄν τε κατὰ σημαίαν ἄν τε καὶ κατʼ ἄνδρα. διὸ καὶ παρὰ πολὺ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐχρηστίας διαφερούσης, παρὰ πολὺ καὶ τὰ τέλη συνεξακολουθεῖ ταῖς Ῥωμαίων προθέσεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡγησάμην εἶναι τὸ διὰ πλειόνων ποιήσασθαι μνήμην διὰ τὸ καὶ παρʼ αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν πολλοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων διαλαμβάνειν, ὅτε Μακεδόνες ἡττήθησαν, ἀπίστῳ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐοικέναι, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πολλοὺς διαπορήσειν διὰ τί καὶ πῶς λείπεται τὸ σύνταγμα τῆς φάλαγγος ὑπὸ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων καθοπλισμοῦ.

[¶4] 33. Philip having thus done all he could in the battle, but having been decisively beaten, after taking up as many of the survivors as he could, proceeded through Tempe into Macedonia. On the night previous to his start he sent one of his guard to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the king’s correspondence. And it was an act worthy of a king to retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty. For he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the possession of the Romans, they would give many handles to the enemy both against himself and his friends. It has, perhaps, been the case with others that in prosperity they could not use power with the moderation which becomes mortal men, while in disaster they displayed caution and good sense; but certainly this was the case with Philip. And this will be made manifest by what I shall subsequently relate. For as I showed without reserve the justice of his measures at the beginning of his reign, and the change for the worse which they subsequently underwent; and showed when and why and how this took place, with a detailed description of the actions in this part of his career; in the same way am I bound to set forth his repentance, and the dexterity with which he changed with his change of fortune, and may be said to have shown the highest prudence in meeting this crisis in his affairs. As for Flamininus, having after the battle taken the necessary measures as to the captives and the rest of the spoils, he proceeded to Larisa....

> Greek: 33. Φίλιππος δέ, τὰ δυνατὰ πεποιηκὼς πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα, τοῖς δʼ ὅλοις πράγμασιν ἐσφαλμένος, ἀναδεξάμενος ὅσους ἐδύνατο πλείστους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνασῳζομένων, αὐτὸς μὲν ὥρμησε διὰ τῶν Τεμπῶν εἰς Μακεδονίαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Λάρισαν ἔτι τῇ προτεραίᾳ νυκτὶ διεπέμψατό τινα τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν, ἐντειλάμενος ἀφανίσαι καὶ κατακαῦσαι τὰ βασιλικὰ γράμματα, ποιῶν πρᾶγμα βασιλικὸν τὸ μηδʼ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς λήθην ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ καθήκοντος· σαφῶς γὰρ ᾔδει διότι πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς δώσει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τῶν φίλων, ἐὰν κρατήσωσι Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν ὑπομνημάτων. ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέροις ἤδη τοῦτο συμβέβηκε, τὸ τὰς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιτυχίαις ἐξουσίας μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν ἀνθρωπίνως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς περιπετείαις εὐλαβῶς ἵστασθαι καὶ νουνεχῶς· ἐν τοῖς δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ Φίλιππον τοῦτο γέγονε. δῆλον δʼ ἔσται τοῦτο διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρμὰς ἐπὶ τὸ δέον αὐτοῦ σαφῶς ἐδηλώσαμεν, καὶ πάλιν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολήν, καὶ πότε καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ πράξεις μετʼ ἀποδείξεως ἐξηγησάμεθα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρὴ καὶ τὴν μετάνοιαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι καὶ τὴν εὐστοχίαν, καθʼ ἣν μεταθέμενος τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἐλαττώμασιν εὐλογιστότατα δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς καθʼ αὑτὸν καιροῖς. Τίτος δὲ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ποιησάμενος τὴν καθήκουσαν πρόνοιαν περί τε τῶν αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λαφύρων, ᾔει πρὸς Λάρισαν. — καθόλου τῇ περὶ τὰ λάφυρα πλεονεξίᾳ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν εἴτʼ οὐκ ἐβούλετο Φίλιππον ἐκβαλὼν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς Αἰτωλοὺς καταλιπεῖν δεσπότας τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

[¶5] 34. Flamininus was much annoyed at the selfishness displayed by the Aetolians in regard to the spoils; and had no idea of leaving them to be masters of Greece after he had deprived Philip of his supremacy there. He was irritated also by their braggadocio, when he saw that they claimed all the credit of the victory, and were filling Greece with the report of their valour. Wherefore, wherever he met them he behaved with hauteur, and never said a word on public business, but carried out all his measures independently or by the agency of his own friends. While the relations between these two were in this strained state, some few days after the battle Demosthenes, Cycliadas, and Limnaeus came on a mission from Philip; and, after considerable discussion with them, Flamininus granted an immediate armistice of fifteen days, and agreed to have a personal interview also with Philip in the course of them to discuss the state of affairs. And this interview being conducted in a courteous and friendly manner, the suspicions entertained of Flamininus by the Aetolians blazed forth with double fury. For as corruption, and the habit of never doing anything without a bribe, had long been a common feature in Greek politics, and as this was the acknowledged characteristic of the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus could so change in his relations with Philip without a bribe. They did not know the habits and principles of the Romans on this subject; but judging from themselves they concluded that there was every probability of Philip in his present position offering a large sum of money, and of Flamininus being unable to resist the temptation.

> Greek: 34. δυσχερῶς δʼ ἔφερε καὶ τὴν ἀλαζονείαν αὐτῶν, θεωρῶν ἀντεπιγραφομένους ἐπὶ τὸ νίκημα καὶ πληροῦντας τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀνδραγαθίας. διὸ καὶ κατά τε τὰς ἐντεύξεις ἀγερωχότερον αὐτοῖς ἀπήντα καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεσιώπα, τὰ δὲ προκείμενα συνετέλει καὶ διʼ αὑτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων φίλων. τοιαύτης δʼ οὔσης δυσχρηστίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, ἧκον πρεσβευταὶ μετά τινας ἡμέρας παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου Δημοσθένης καὶ Κυκλιάδας καὶ Λιμναῖος. πρὸς οὓς κοινολογηθεὶς ὁ Τίτος ἐπὶ πλεῖον μετὰ τῶν χιλιάρχων πεντεκαιδεχημέρους ἀνοχὰς ἐποιήσατο παραχρῆμα, συνετάξατο δὲ καὶ συμπορεύεσθαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ κοινολογησόμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν καθεστώτων ἐν ταύταις. γενομένης δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐντεύξεως φιλανθρώπου, διπλασίως ἐξεκάετο τὰ τῆς ὑποψίας κατὰ τοῦ Τίτου· ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῆς δωροδοκίας ἐπιπολαζούσης καὶ τοῦ μηδένα μηδὲν δωρεὰν πράττειν, καὶ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τούτου νομιστευομένου παρὰ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, οὐκ ἐδύναντο πιστεύειν διότι χωρὶς δώρων ἡ τηλικαύτη μεταβολὴ γέγονε τοῦ Τίτου πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον, οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ἀλλʼ ἐξ αὑτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον εἰκὸς ἦν προτείνειν πλῆθος χρημάτων διὰ τὸν καιρόν, τὸν δὲ Τίτον μὴ δύνασθαι τούτοις ἀντοφθαλμεῖν.

[¶6] 35. If I had been speaking of an earlier period, and expressing what was generally true, I should have had no hesitation in asserting of the Romans as a nation that they would not be likely to do such a thing,—I mean in the period before they engaged in wars beyond the sea, and while they retained their own habits and principles uncontaminated. But in the present times I should not venture to say this of them all; still, as individuals, I should be bold to say of the majority of the men of Rome that they are capable of preserving their honesty in this particular: and as evidence that I am making no impossible assertion, I would quote two names which will command general assent,—I mean first, Lucius Aemilius who conquered Perseus, and won the kingdom of Macedonia. In that kingdom, besides all the other splendour and wealth, there was found in the treasury more than six thousand talents of gold and silver: yet he was so far from coveting any of this, that he even refused to see it, and administered it by the hands of others; though he was far from being superfluously wealthy himself, but, on the contrary, was very badly off. At least, I know that on his death, which occurred shortly after the war, when his own sons Publius Scipio and Quintus Maximus wished to pay his wife her dowry, amounting to twenty-five talents, they were reduced to such straits that they would have been quite unable to do so if they had not sold the household furniture and slaves, and some of the landed property besides. And if what I say shall appear incredible to any one, he may easily convince himself on the subject: for though there are many controversies at Rome, and especially on this particular point, arising from the antagonistic parties among them, yet he will find that what I have just said about Aemilius is acknowledged by every one. Again, Publius Scipio, son by blood of this Aemilius, and son by adoption of Publius called the Great, when he got possession of Carthage, reckoned the wealthiest city in the world, took absolutely nothing from it for his own private use, either by purchase or by any other manner of acquisition whatever, although he was by no means a very rich man, but very moderately so for a Roman. But he not only abstained from the wealth of Carthage itself, but refused to allow anything from Africa at all to be mixed up with his private property. Therefore, in regard to this man once more, any one who chooses to inquire will find that his reputation in this particular is absolutely undisputed at Rome. I shall, however, take a more suitable opportunity of treating this subject at greater length.

> Greek: 35. ἐγὼ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀνωτέρω χρόνους καὶ κοινὴν ἂν ποιούμενος ἀπόφασιν ἐθάρρησα περὶ πάντων Ῥωμαίων εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν πράξαιεν τοιοῦτον, λέγω δὲ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς διαποντίοις αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρῆσαι πολέμοις, ἕως ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐθῶν καὶ νομίμων ἔμενον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νῦν καιροῖς περὶ πάντων μὲν οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαιμι τοῦτʼ εἰπεῖν· κατʼ ἰδίαν μέντοι γε περὶ πλειόνων ἀνδρῶν ἐν Ῥώμῃ θαρρήσαιμʼ ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι διότι δύνανται τὴν πίστιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει διαφυλάττειν. μαρτυρίας δὲ χάριν ὁμολογούμενα δύʼ ὀνόματα τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀδύνατα λέγειν. Λεύκιος μὲν γὰρ Αἰμίλιος ὁ Περσέα νικήσας, κύριος γενόμενος τῆς Μακεδόνων βασιλείας, ἐν ᾗ τῆς ἄλλης χωρὶς κατασκευῆς καὶ χορηγίας ἐν αὐτοῖς εὑρέθη τοῖς θησαυροῖς ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου πλείω τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων, οὐχ οἷον ἐπεθύμησε τούτων τινός, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ αὐτόπτης ἠβουλήθη γενέσθαι, διʼ ἑτέρων δὲ τὸν χειρισμὸν ἐποιήσατο τῶν προειρημένων, καίτοι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον βίον οὐ περιττεύων τῇ χορηγίᾳ, τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον ἐλλείπων μᾶλλον. μεταλλάξαντος γοῦν αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον οὐ πολὺ κατόπιν τοῦ πολέμου, βουληθέντες οἱ κατὰ φύσιν υἱοὶ Πόπλιος Σκιπίων καὶ Κόιντος Μάξιμος ἀποδοῦναι τῇ γυναικὶ τὴν φερνήν, εἴκοσι τάλαντα καὶ πέντε, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐδυσχρηστήθησαν ὡς οὐδʼ εἰς τέλος ἐδυνήθησαν, εἰ μὴ τὴν ἐνδουχίαν ἀπέδοντο καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ σὺν τούτοις ἔτι τινὰς τῶν κτήσεων. εἰ δέ τισιν ἀπίστῳ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐοικέναι δόξει, ῥᾴδιον ὑπὲρ τούτου λαβεῖν πίστιν· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀμφισβητουμένων παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιπαραγωγάς, ὅμως τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ὁμολογούμενον εὑρήσει παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁ ζητῶν. καὶ μὴν Πόπλιος Σκιπίων, ὁ τούτου μὲν κατὰ φύσιν υἱός, Ποπλίου δὲ τοῦ μεγάλου κληθέντος κατὰ θέσιν υἱωνός, κύριος γενόμενος τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἥτις ἐδόκει πολυχρημονεστάτη τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην εἶναι πόλεων, ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης οὐδὲν εἰς τὸν ἴδιον βίον μετήγαγεν, οὔτʼ ὠνησάμενος οὔτʼ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ κτησάμενος οὐδέν, καίπερ οὐχ ὅλως εὐπορούμενος κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ μέτριος ὢν κατὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν, ὡς Ῥωμαῖος. οὐχ οἷον δὲ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἀπέσχετο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθόλου τῶν ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης οὐδὲν ἐπιμιχθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον εἴασε βίον. περὶ δὲ τούτου πάλιν τἀνδρὸς ὁ ζητῶν ἀληθινῶς ἀναμφισβήτητον εὑρήσει παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὴν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δόξαν.

[¶7] 36. Titus then having appointed Philip a day for the congress, immediately wrote to the allies announcing when they were to appear; and a few days afterwards came himself to the pass of Tempe at the appointed time. When the allies had assembled, and the congress met, the Roman imperator rose and bade each say on what terms they ought to make peace with Philip. King Amynandros then delivered a short and moderate speech, merely asking that “they would all have some consideration for him, to prevent Philip, as soon as the Romans left Greece, from turning the whole weight of his anger upon him; for the Athamanes were always an easy prey to the Macedonians, because of their weakness and the close contiguity of their territory.” When he had finished, Alexander the Aetolian rose and complimented Flamininus for “having assembled the allies in that congress to discuss the terms of peace; and, above all, for having on the present occasion called on each to express his opinion. But he was deluded and mistaken,” he added, “if he believed that by making terms with Philip he would secure the Romans peace or the Greeks freedom. For neither of these was possible. But if he desired to accomplish both the design of his own government and his own promises, which he had given to all the Greeks, there was one way, and one only, of making terms with Macedonia, and that was to eject Philip from his throne; and this could easily be done if he did not let slip the present opportunity.” After some further arguments in support of this view he sat down.

> Greek: 36. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτων οἰκειότερον λαβόντες καιρὸν ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαστολήν. ὁ δὲ Τίτος ταξάμενος ἡμέραν πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις ἔγραψε παραχρῆμα, διασαφῶν πότε δεήσει παρεῖναι πρὸς τὸν σύλλογον, αὐτὸς δὲ μετά τινας ἡμέρας ἧκε πρὸς τὴν εἰσβολὴν τῶν Τεμπῶν εἰς τὸν ταχθέντα χρόνον. ἁθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου συναχθέντος ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων, ἀναστὰς ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἕκαστον ἐφʼ οἷς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον διαλύσεις. Ἀμύνανδρος μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς βραχέα διαλεχθεὶς καὶ μέτρια κατέπαυσε τὸν λόγον· ἠξίου γὰρ πρόνοιαν αὑτοῦ ποιήσασθαι πάντας, ἵνα μὴ χωρισθέντων Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἀπερείδηται τὴν ὀργὴν ὁ Φίλιππος· εἶναι γὰρ εὐχειρώτους Ἀθαμᾶνας αἰεὶ Μακεδόσι διά τε τὴν ἀσθένειαν καὶ γειτνίασιν τῆς χώρας. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Αἰτωλὸς ἀναστάς, καθότι μὲν ἥθροικε τοὺς συμμάχους ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν διαλύσεων διαβούλιον καὶ καθόλου νῦν ἑκάστους ἀξιοῖ λέγειν τὸ φαινόμενον, ἐπῄνεσε τὸν Τίτον, τοῖς δʼ ὅλοις πράγμασιν ἀγνοεῖν ἔφη καὶ παραπίπτειν αὐτόν, εἰ πέπεισται διαλύσεις ποιησάμενος πρὸς Φίλιππον ἢ Ῥωμαίοις τὴν εἰρήνην ἢ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν βέβαιον ἀπολείψειν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ εἶναι τούτων δυνατόν, ἀλλʼ εἰ βούλεται καὶ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος πρόθεσιν ἐπιτελῆ ποιεῖν καὶ τὰς ἰδίας ὑποσχέσεις, ἃς ὑπέσχηται πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, μίαν ὑπάρχειν ἔφη διάλυσιν πρὸς Μακεδόνας τὸ Φίλιππον ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς. τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι καὶ λίαν εὐχερές, ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρόν. πλείω δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν διαλεχθεὶς κατέπαυσε τὸν λόγον.

[¶8] 37. Flamininus here took up the argument, and said that “Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but also as to the object which he proposed to himself, and above all as to the true interests of Greece. For it was not the Roman way to utterly destroy those with whom they had been at open war. A proof of his assertion might be found in the war with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; for though the Romans had received the severest provocation at their hands, and afterwards had it in their power to do absolutely what they pleased to them, yet they had adopted no extreme measures against the Carthaginians. For his part, moreover, he had never entertained the idea that it was necessary to wage an inexpiable war with Philip; but on the contrary had been prepared before the battle to come to terms with him, if he would have submitted to the Roman demands. He was surprised, therefore, that those who had taken part in the former peace conference should now adopt a tone of such irreconcilable hostility. Have we not conquered? (say they). Yes, but this is the most senseless of arguments. For brave men, when actually at war, should be terrible and full of fire; when beaten, undaunted and courageous; when victorious, on the other hand, moderate, placable, and humane. But your present advice is the reverse of all this. Yet, in truth, to the Greeks themselves it is greatly to their interest that Macedonia should be humbled, but not at all so that she should be destroyed. For it might chance thereby that they would experience the barbarity of Thracians and Gauls, as has been the case more than once already.” He then added that “the final decision of himself and Roman colleagues was, that, if Philip would consent to fulfil all the conditions formerly enjoined by the allies, they would grant him peace, subject, of course, to the approval of the Senate: and that the Aetolians were free to take what measures they chose for themselves.” Upon Phaeneas attempting to reply that “Everything done hitherto went for nothing; for if Philip managed to extricate himself from his present difficulties, he would at once find some other occasion for hostilities,”—Flamininus sprang at once from his seat, and said, with some heat, “Cease this trifling, Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks.”

> Greek: 37. ὁ δὲ Τίτος ἀναδεξάμενος ἀστοχεῖν αὐτὸν ἔφησεν οὐ μόνον τῆς Ῥωμαίων προαιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ προθέσεως καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφέροντος. οὔτε γὰρ Ῥωμαίους οὐδενὶ τὸ πρῶτον πολεμήσαντας εὐθέως ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν τούτους· πίστιν δʼ ἔχειν τὸ λεγόμενον ἔκ [τε] τῶν κατʼ Ἀννίβαν καὶ Καρχηδονίους, ὑφʼ ὧν τὰ δεινότατα παθόντας Ῥωμαίους, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένους κυρίους ὃ βουληθεῖεν πρᾶξαι κατʼ αὐτῶν ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲν ἀνήκεστον βουλεύσασθαι περὶ Καρχηδονίων· καὶ μὴν οὐδʼ αὐτὸς οὐδέποτε ταύτην ἐσχηκέναι τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὅτι δεῖ πολεμεῖν πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον ἀδιαλύτως· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἐβουλήθη ποιεῖν τὰ παρακαλούμενα πρὸ τῆς μάχης, ἑτοίμως ἂν διαλελύσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν. διὸ καὶ θαυμάζειν ἔφη πῶς μετέχοντες τότε τῶν περὶ τῆς διαλύσεως συλλόγων ἅπαντες νῦν ἀκαταλλάκτως ἔχουσιν. "ἢ δῆλον ὅτι νενικήκαμεν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γʼ ἐστὶ πάντων ἀγνωμονέστατον· πολεμοῦντας γὰρ δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας βαρεῖς εἶναι καὶ θυμικούς, ἡττωμένους δὲ γενναίους καὶ μεγαλόφρονας, νικῶντάς γε μὴν μετρίους καὶ πραεῖς καὶ φιλανθρώπους. ὑμεῖς δὲ τἀναντία παρακαλεῖτε νῦν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι ταπεινωθῆναι μὲν ἐπὶ πολὺ συμφέρει τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχήν, ἀρθῆναί γε μὴν οὐδαμῶσ". τάχα γὰρ αὐτοὺς πεῖραν λήψεσθαι τῆς Θρᾳκῶν καὶ Γαλατῶν παρανομίας· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη καὶ πλεονάκις γεγονέναι. καθόλου δʼ αὐτὸς μὲν ἔφη καὶ τοὺς παρόντας Ῥωμαίων κρίνειν, ἐὰν Φίλιππος ὑπομένῃ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἐπιταττόμενα, διδόναι τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτῷ, προσλαβόντας καὶ τὴν τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην· Αἰτωλοὺς δὲ κυρίους εἶναι βουλευομένους ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ Φαινέου μετὰ ταῦτα βουλομένου λέγειν ὅτι μάταια πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ γέγονε· τὸν γὰρ Φίλιππον, ἐὰν διολίσθῃ τὸν παρόντα καιρόν, ἤδη πάλιν ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ποιήσεσθαι πραγμάτων· ὁ Τίτος αὐτόθεν ἐξ ἕδρας καὶ θυμικῶς "παῦσαι" φησὶ "Φαινέα, ληρῶν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὕτως χειριῶ τὰς διαλύσεις ὥστε μηδὲ βουληθέντα τὸν Φίλιππον ἀδικεῖν δύνασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας."

[¶9] 38. After this they separated for that day. On the next the king arrived: and on the third, when all the delegates were met for discussion, Philip entered, and with great skill and tact diverted the anger which they all entertained against him. For he said that “He conceded the demands made on the former occasion by the Romans and the allies, and remitted the decision on the remaining points to the Senate.” But Phaeneas, one of the Aetolians present, said: “Why then, Philip, do not you restore to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotid Thebes, and Echinus?” Whereupon Philip bade them take them over. But Flamininus here interposed, and forbade the Aetolians to take over any of the towns except Phthiotid Thebes; “for upon his approaching this town with his army, and summoning it to submit to the Roman protection, the Thebans had refused; and, as it had now come into his hands in the course of war, he had the right of taking any measures he chose regarding it.” Phaeneas and his colleagues indignantly protested at this, and asserted that it was their clear right to recover the towns previously members of their league, “first on the ground that they had taken part in the recent war; and secondly in virtue of their original treaty of alliance, according to which the movable property of the conquered belonged to the Romans, the towns to the Aetolians.” To which Flamininus answered that “they were mistaken in both points; for their treaty with Rome had been annulled when they abandoned the Romans, and made terms with Philip: and, even supposing that treaty to be still in force, they had no right to recover or take over such cities as had voluntarily put themselves under the protection of Rome, as the whole of the cities in Thessaly had done, but only such as were taken by force.”

> Greek: 38. καὶ τότε μὲν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐχωρίσθησαν. τῇ δʼ ὑστεραίᾳ παραγενομένου τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ πάντων εἰς τὸν σύλλογον ἁθροισθέντων, εἰσελθὼν ὁ Φίλιππος εὐστόχως καὶ συνετῶς ὑπετέμετο τὰς πάντων ὁρμάς· ἔφη γὰρ τὰ μὲν πρότερον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἐπιταττόμενα πάντα συγχωρεῖν καὶ ποιήσειν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν διδόναι τῇ συγκλήτῳ τὴν ἐπιτροπήν. τούτων δὲ ῥηθέντων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἀπεσιώπησαν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν Φαινέας "τί οὖν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀποδίδως, Φίλιππε" ἔφη "Λάρισαν τὴν Κρεμαστήν, Φάρσαλον, Θήβας τὰς Φθίας, Ἐχῖνον"; ὁ μὲν οὖν Φίλιππος ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ Τίτος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν οὐδεμίαν, Θήβας δὲ μόνον τὰς Φθίας· Θηβαίους γὰρ ἐγγίσαντος αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ παρακαλοῦντος σφᾶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν οὐ βουληθῆναι· διὸ νῦν, κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχειρίων ὄντων, ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν ἔφη βουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἂν προαιρῆται. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Φαινέαν ἀγανακτούντων, καὶ λεγόντων ὅτι δέον αὐτοὺς εἴη, πρῶτον μέν, καθότι συνεπολέμησαν νῦν, κομίζεσθαι τὰς πόλεις τὰς πρότερον μεθʼ αὑτῶν συμπολιτευομένας, ἔπειτα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συμμαχίαν, καθʼ ἣν ἔδει τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἑλόντων τὰ μὲν ἔπιπλα Ῥωμαίων εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πόλεις Αἰτωλῶν, ὁ Τίτος ἀγνοεῖν αὐτοὺς ἔφη κατʼ ἀμφότερα. τήν τε γὰρ συμμαχίαν λελύσθαι, καθʼ ὃν καιρὸν τὰς διαλύσεις ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐγκαταλείποντες Ῥωμαίους, εἴ τε καὶ μένειν ἔτι τὴν συμμαχίαν, δεῖν αὐτοὺς κομίζεσθαι καὶ παραλαμβάνειν, οὐκ εἴ τινες ἐθελοντὴν σφᾶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν ἐνεχείρισαν, ὅπερ αἱ κατὰ Θετταλίαν πόλεις ἅπασαι πεποιήκασι νῦν, ἀλλʼ εἴ τινες κατὰ κράτος ἑάλωσαν.

[¶10] 39. The other members of the congress were delighted at this speech of Flamininus. But the Aetolians listened with indignation; and what proved to be the beginning of serious evils was engendered. For this quarrel was the spark from which, not long afterwards, both the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus flamed out. The principal motive of Flamininus in being thus forward in coming to terms was the information he had received that Anticchus had started from Syria with an army, with the intention of crossing over into Europe. Therefore he was anxious lest Philip, catching at this chance, should determine to defend the towns and protract the war; and lest meanwhile he should himself be superseded by another commander from home, on whom the honour of all that he had achieved would be diverted. Therefore the terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that he should have four months’ suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus at once the two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some others of his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was to restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the parties then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose the settlement....

> Greek: 39. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ὁ Τίτος ἤρεσκε ταῦτα λέγων, οἱ δʼ Αἰτωλοὶ βαρέως ἤκουον καί τις οἷον ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγεννᾶτο μεγάλων· ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τούτου τοῦ σπινθῆρος μετʼ ὀλίγον ὅ τε πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ὅ τε πρὸς Ἀντίοχον ἐξεκαύθη πόλεμος. τὸ δὲ συνέχον ἦν τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς τοῦ Τίτου πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις, ἐπυνθάνετο τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἀπὸ Συρίας ἀνῆχθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως, ποιούμενον τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην. διόπερ ἠγωνία μὴ ταύτης ὁ Φίλιππος τῆς ἐλπίδος ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἐπὶ τὸ πολιοφυλακεῖν ὁρμήσῃ καὶ τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον, εἶθʼ ἑτέρου παραγενηθέντος ὑπάτου τὸ κεφάλαιον τῶν πράξεων εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἀνακλασθῇ. διὸ συνεχωρήθη τῷ βασιλεῖ, καθάπερ ἠξίου, λαβόντα τετραμήνους ἀνοχὰς παραχρῆμα μὲν δοῦναι τῷ Τίτῳ τὰ διακόσια τάλαντα καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν υἱὸν εἰς ὁμηρείαν καί τινας ἑτέρους τῶν φίλων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅλων πέμπειν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ διδόναι τῇ συγκλήτῳ τὴν ἐπιτροπήν. καὶ τότε μὲν ἐχωρίσθησαν πιστωσάμενοι περὶ τῶν ὅλων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐφʼ ᾧ Τίτον, ἐὰν μὴ συντελῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς διαλύσεις, ἀποδοῦναι Φιλίππῳ τὰ διακόσια τάλαντα καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οἱ μὲν συνεργοῦντες, οἱ δʼ ἀντιπράττοντες τῇ διαλύσει. — τί δήποτʼ ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπατώμενοι πάντες οὐ δυνάμεθα λῆξαι τῆς ἀνοίας;

[¶11] 40. Why is it that, though deceived again and again by the same things and persons, we are unable to abandon our blind folly? For this particular kind of fraud has often been committed before now, and by many. That other men should allow themselves to be taken in is perhaps not astonishing; but it is wonderful that those should do so who are the authors and origin of the same kind of malpractice. But I suppose the cause is the absence of that rule so happily expressed by Epicharmus: ““Cool head and wise mistrust are wisdom’s sinews.”...”

> Greek: 40. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ γένος τῆς ῥᾳδιουργίας πολλάκις ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἤδη γέγονε· καὶ τὸ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις διαχωρεῖν ἴσως οὐ θαυμαστόν, τὸ δέ, παρʼ οἷς ἡ πηγὴ τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπάρχει κακοπραγμοσύνης. ἀλλʼ ἔστιν αἴτιον τὸ μὴ πρόχειρον ὑπάρχειν τὸ παρʼ Ἐπιχάρμῳ καλῶς εἰρημένον νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασʼ ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τᾶν φρενῶν. — Μεδίων, πόλις πρὸς τῇ Αἰτωλίᾳ. Πολύβιος ὀκτωκαιδεκάτῳ. … κωλύειν δὲ τὸν Ἀντίοχον παραπλεῖν, οὐκ ἀπεχθείας χάριν, ἀλλʼ ὑφορώμενοι μὴ Φιλίππῳ συνεπισχύσας ἐμπόδιον γένηται τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίᾳ. — ὅτι Ἀντίοχος ὁ βασιλεὺς πάνυ ὠρέγετο τῆς Ἐφέσου διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν, τῷ δοκεῖν μὲν κατὰ τῆς Ἰωνίας καὶ τῶν ἐφʼ Ἑλλησπόντου πόλεων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἀκροπόλεως ἔχειν θέσιν, κατὰ δὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἀμυντήριον ὑπάρχειν ἀεὶ τοῖς Ἀσίας βασιλεῦσιν εὐκαιρότατον. — ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος ἐν τῷ ιη# λόγῳ.

[¶12] 41. [They endeavoured] to prevent Antiochus from sailing along their coast, not from enmity to him, but from a suspicion that by giving support to Philip he would become an obstacle in the way of Greek liberty.... King Antiochus was very desirous of possessing Ephesus, owing to its extremely convenient position; for it appeared to occupy the position of an Acropolis for expeditions by land and sea against Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and to be always a most convenient base of operations for the kings of Asia against Europe.... Of King Attalus, who now died, I think I ought to speak a suitable word, as I have done in the case of others. Originally he had no other external qualification for royalty except money alone, which, indeed, if handled with good sense and boldness, is of very great assistance in every undertaking, but without these qualities is in its nature the origin of evil, and, in fact, of utter ruin to very many. For in the first place it engenders envy and malicious plots, and contributes largely to the destruction of body and soul. For few indeed are the souls that are able by the aid of wealth to repel dangers of this description. This king’s greatness of mind therefore deserves our admiration, because he never attempted to use his wealth for anything else but the acquisition of royal power,—an object than which none greater can be mentioned. Moreover he made the first step in this design, not only by doing services to his friends and gaining their affection, but also by achievements in war. For it was after conquering the Gauls, the most formidable and warlike nation at that time in Asia, that he assumed this rank and first puts himself forward as king. And though he obtained this honour, and lived seventy-two years, of which he reigned forty-four, he passed a life of the utmost virtue and goodness towards his wife and children; kept faith with all allies and friends; and died in the midst of a most glorious campaign, fighting for the liberty of the Greeks; and what is more remarkable than all, though he left four grown-up sons, he so well settled the question of succession, that the crown was handed down to his children’s children without a single dispute....

> Greek: 41. ὅτι Ἄτταλος ἐτελεύτησε τὸν βίον· ὑπὲρ οὗ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰθίσμεθα ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτου νῦν ἐπιφθέγξασθαι τὸν ἁρμόζοντα λόγον. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἐφόδιον ὑπῆρξε πρὸς βασιλείαν τῶν ἐκτός, πλοῦτος δὲ μόνον, ὃς μετὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ τόλμης χειριζόμενος ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγάλην παρέχεται χρείαν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιβολήν, ἄνευ δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τοῖς πλείστοις κακῶν παραίτιος πέφυκε γίνεσθαι καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπωλείας. καὶ γὰρ φθόνους γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ πρὸς διαφθορὰν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς μεγίστας ἔχει ῥοπάς. ὀλίγαι δέ τινές εἰσι ψυχαὶ παντάπασιν αἱ ταῦτα δυνάμεναι διωθεῖσθαι τῇ τοῦ πλούτου δυνάμει. διὸ καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου ἄξιον ἀγασθῆναι τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, ὅτι πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπεβάλετο χρήσασθαι τοῖς χορηγίοις ἀλλὰ πρὸς βασιλείας κατάκτησιν, οὗ μεῖζον ἢ κάλλιον οὐδὲν οἷόν τʼ ἐστὶν οὐδʼ εἰπεῖν· ὃς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνεστήσατο τῆς προειρημένης ἐπιβολῆς οὐ μόνον διὰ τῆς εἰς τοὺς φίλους εὐεργεσίας καὶ χάριτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων. νικήσας γὰρ μάχῃ Γαλάτας, ὃ βαρύτατον καὶ μαχιμώτατον ἔθνος ἦν τότε κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ταύτην ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσατο καὶ τότε πρῶτον αὑτὸν ἔδειξε βασιλέα. τυχὼν δὲ τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης καὶ βιώσας ἔτη δύο πρὸς τοῖς ἑβδομήκοντα, τούτων δὲ βασιλεύσας τετταράκοντα καὶ τέτταρα, σωφρονέστατα μὲν ἐβίωσε καὶ σεμνότατα πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ τέκνα, διεφύλαξε δὲ τὴν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ φίλους πίστιν, ἐναπέθανε δʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς καλλίστοις ἔργοις, ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τέτταρας υἱοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ καταλιπὼν οὕτως ἡρμόσατο τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὥστε παισὶ παίδων ἀστασίαστον παραδοθῆναι τὴν βασιλείαν.

[¶13] 42. After Marcus Marcellus had entered upon the consulship the ambassadors from Philip, and from Flamininus and the allies, arrived at Rome to discuss the treaty with Philip; and after a lengthened hearing the confirmation of the terms was decreed in the Senate. But on the matter being brought before the people, Marcus Claudius, who was ambitious of being himself sent to Greece, spoke against the treaty, and did his best to get it rejected. The people however ratified the terms, in accordance with the wish of Flamininus; and, upon this being settled, the Senate immediately despatched a commission of ten men of high rank to arrange the settlement of Greece in conjunction with Flamininus, and to confirm the freedom of the Greeks. Among others Damoxenus of Aegium and his colleagues, envoys from the Achaean league, made a proposal in the Senate for an alliance with Rome; but as some opposition was raised to this at the time, on account of a counter-claim of the Eleians upon Triphylia, and of the Messenians, who were at the time actually in alliance with Rome, upon Asine and Pylus, and of the Aetolians upon Heraea,—the decision was referred to the commission of ten. Such were the proceedings in the Senate....

> Greek: 42. ὅτι ἐπὶ Μαρκέλλου Κλαυδίου ὑπάτου παρειληφότος τὴν ὕπατον ἀρχὴν ἧκον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην οἵ τε παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις οἵ τε παρὰ τοῦ Τίτου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὑπὲρ τῶν πρὸς Φίλιππον συνθηκῶν. λόγων δὲ πλειόνων γενομένων ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ, ταύτῃ μὲν ἐδόκει βεβαιοῦν τὰς ὁμολογίας· εἰς δὲ τὸν δῆμον εἰσενεχθέντος τοῦ διαβουλίου Μάρκος, αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμῶν τῆς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαβάσεως, ἀντέλεγε καὶ πολλὴν ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν εἰς τὸ διακόψαι τὰς συνθήκας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ὅ γε δῆμος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Τίτου προαίρεσιν ἐπεκύρωσε τὰς διαλύσεις. ὧν ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν εὐθέως ἡ σύγκλητος ἄνδρας δέκα καταστήσασα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς χειριοῦντας τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετὰ τοῦ Τίτου καὶ βεβαιώσοντας τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. ἐποιήσαντο δὲ λόγους ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ περὶ τῆς συμμαχίας οἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρέσβεις, οἱ περὶ Δαμόξενον τὸν Αἰγιέα· γενομένης δʼ ἀντιρρήσεως κατὰ τὸ παρὸν διὰ τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον Ἠλείους μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς Τριφυλίας, Μεσσηνίους δʼ ὑπὲρ Ἀσίνης καὶ Πύλου, συμμάχους τότε Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχοντας, Αἰτωλοὺς δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἡραιῶν πόλεως, ὑπέρθεσιν ἔλαβε τὸ διαβούλιον ἐπὶ τοὺς δέκα. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν σύγκλητον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἦν.