13.26. With regard to my statement that the manner in which the accuser stated his charges was of importance, I would point out in this connexion that if he has spoken but feebly, we may repeat his actual words; while, if he has used bitter and violent language, we may restate the facts in milder terms, as Cicero does in the pro Cornelio, where he says, “He put his hand to the tablet containing the law”: and we may do this in such a way as to defend our client; for instance, if our client is addicted to luxury, we may say, “He has been charged with living in a somewhat too liberal style.” So, too, we may call a mean man thrifty and a slanderous tongue free. But we must never under any circumstances repeat our opponent's charges together with their proofs, nor emphasise any of his points by amplifying them, unless we do so with a view to making light of them, as for instance in the following passage: “You have been with the army, he says, and have not set foot in the forum for so many years, and do you now on returning after so long an interval seek to compete for a post of high dignity with those who have made the forum their home?”
13.26. et protinus cum quadam defensione, ut, si pro luxurioso dicendum sit, est paulo liberalior vita. et pro sordido parcum, pro maledico liberum dicere licebit. committendum nunquam est, ut adversariorum dicta cum sua confirmation reteramus, aut etiam loci alicuius exsecutione adiuvemus, nisi cum eludenda erunt: exercitum mihi fueris, inquit; tot annis forum non attigeris, ab fueris tamdiu et, cum tam longo intervallo veneris, cum his, qui in foro habitarunt, de dignitate contendas Praeterea in contradictione interim totum crimen exponitur, ut Cicero pro Scauro circa Bostarem facit veluti orationem diversae partis imitatus, aut pluribus propositionibus iunctis, ut pro Vareno, cum iter per agros et loca sola faceret cum Pompuleno, in familiam Ancharianam incidisse dixerunt, deinde Pompulenum occisum esse, illico eo fieri vellet.
13.28. Again, when we are replying to the accuser we may sometimes set forth the whole charge, as Cicero does in the pro Scauro with reference to the death of Bostar, where he virtually parodies the speech of his opponent, or we may take a number of points raised in the course of the accusation and put them together as in the pro Vareno: “They have asserted that, when he was journeying with Pompulenus through a lonely stretch of country, he fell in with the slaves of Ancharius, that Pompulenus was then killed and Varenus imprisoned on the spot until such time as this man should indicate what he wished to be done with him.” Such a procedure is useful, if the sequence of facts alleged by the prosecution is incredible, and likely to lose its force by restatement. Sometimes, on the other hand, we may destroy the cumulative force of a number of statements by refuting them singly; in fact this is generally the safest course. Sometimes, again, the different portions of our reply will be independent of one another, a case which requires no illustration. Common arguments are readily appropriated, not merely because they can be used by either party, but because they are of greater service to the speaker who is replying; for I shall not scruple to repeat the warning which I have often given already; the speaker who is first to employ such an argument makes it tell against himself.
13.28. est utile, si erit incredibilis rei ordo et ipsa expositione fidem perditurus. per partes dissolvitur, quod contextu nocet; et plerumque id est tutius. contradictiones natura sunt singulae; id exemplis non eget. bene apprehenduntur non tantum, quia utriusque sunt partis, sed quia plus prosunt respondenti. enim pigebit, quod saepe monui, referre; commune qui prior dicit, contrarium facit. enim contrarium, quo adversarius bene uti potest:
13.30. For an argument must needs tell against a speaker if it be one which his opponent can use with effect. “But, you say, it is not probable that a crime of this magnitude was designed by Marcus Cotta. Is it probable then that a crime of this magnitude was attempted by Oppius?” On the other hand it is a task for a real artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, in the speech of his opponent, though such inconsistencies are sometimes evident from the bare facts, as for instance in the case of Caelius, where Clodia asserts on the one hand that she lent Caelius money, which is an indication of great intimacy, and on the other hand that he got poison to murder her, which is a sign of violent hatred. Tubero similarly accuses Ligarius of having been in Africa, and complains that Ligarius refused to allow him to land in Africa.
13.30. enim non verisimile est, tantum scelus M. Cottam esse commentum.? hoc verisimile est, tantum scelus Oppium esse conatum? autem est invenire in actione adversarii quae contra semet ipsa pugnent aut pugnare videantur, quae aliquando ex rebus ipsis manifesta sunt, ut in causa Caeliana Clodia aurum se Caelio commodasse dicit, quod signum magnae familiaritatis est; venenum sibi paratum, quod summi odii argumentum est.
13.31. At times, however, some ill-advised statement by our opponent will give us an opportunity of demolishing his arguments. This is specially likely to occur with speakers who have a passion for producing impressive thoughts: for the temptation to air their eloquence is such that they take no heed of what they have said already, being absorbed by the topic immediately before them to the detriment of the interests of the case as a whole.
13.31. Tubero Ligarium accusat, quod is in Africa fuerit, et queritur, quod ab eo ipse in Africam non sit admissus. vero praebet eius rei occasionem minus considerata ex adverso dicentis oratio; quod accidit praecipue cupidis sententiarum, ut ducti occasione dicendi non respiciant quid dixerint, dum locum praesentem non totam causam intuentur.
13.32. What is there likely to tell so heavily against Cluentius as the stigma inflicted by the censors? What can be more damaging than the fact that Egnatius disinherited his son on the ground that lie had been bribed to give a false verdict in the trial in which Cluentius secured the condemnation of Oppianicus? But Cicero shows that the two facts tell against one another.
13.32. tam videri potest contra Cluentium quam censoria nota? tam contra eundem, quam filium ab Egnatio corrupti iudicii, quo Cluentius Oppianicum circumvenisset, crimine exheredatum?
13.33. “But, Attius, I would urge you to give the closest consideration to the following problem. Which do you desire to carry the greater weight—the judgment of the censors, or of Egnatius? If the latter, you regard the judgment of the censors in other cases as counting for little, since they expelled this same Gnaeus Egnatius, on whose authority you lay such stress, from his place in the senate. On the other hand, if you attach most weight to the judgment of the censors, I must point out that the censors retained the younger Egnatius, whom his father disinherited by an act resembling a censorial decision, in his position as senator, although they had expelled his father.” As regards errors such as the following, the folly shown in their commission is out of all proportion to the skill required to deal with them: I refer to mistakes such as advancing a disputable argument as indisputable, a controversial point as admitted, a point common to a number of cases as peculiar to the case in hand, or the employment of trite, superfluous, or incredible arguments.
13.33. haec Cicero pugnare invicem ostendit: tu, Atti, consideres, censeo, diligenter, utrum censorium iudicium grave velis esse an Egnatii. Egnatii, leave est, quod censores de ceteris subscripserunt. enim Egnatium, quem tu gravem esse vis, ex senatu eiecerunt. autem censorium, hunc Egnatium, quem pater censoria subscriptione exheredarit, censores in senate, cum pardem eiecissent, retinuerunt.
13.34. For careless speakers are liable to commit a host of errors: they will exaggerate a charge which has still got to be proved, will argue about an act when the question is who committed it, will attempt impossibilities, drop an argument as if it were complete, whereas it is scarcely begun, speak of the individual in preference to the case, and attribute personal faults to circumstances, as for instance if a speaker should attack the decemvirate instead of Appius.
13.34. magis vitiose dicuntur quam acute reprehenduntur, argumentum dubium pro necessario, controversum pro confesso, commune pluribus pro proprio, vulgare, supervacuum, constitutum contra fidem. et illa accidunt parum cautis, ut crimen augeant, quod probandum est; de facto disputent, cum de auctore quaeratur; impossibilia aggrediantur, pro effectis relinquant vixdum inchoata, de homine dicere quam de causa malint;
13.35. They will also contradict what is obvious, speak ambiguously, lose sight of the main issue of the case, or give replies which have no relation to the charges made. This latter procedure may, it is true, be occasionally employed when we have a bad case which requires to be supported by arguments drawn from matters foreign to the case. The trial of Verres provides an example; when accused of peculation it was alleged that he had shown courage and energy in his defence of Sicily against the pirates.
13.35. hominum vitia rebus adsignent, ut, si quis decemviratum accuset non Appium; manifestis repugnent; dicant, quod aliter accipi possit; summam quaestionis non intueantur, non ad proposita respondeant; quod unum aliquando recipi potest, cum mala causa adhibitis extrinsecus remediis tuenda est, ut cum peculatus reus Verres fortiter et industrie tuitus contra piratas Siciliam dicitur.
13.36. The same rules apply to objections which we may have to meet. But there is one point which requires special attention, since in such cases many speakers fall into two very different faults. For some even in the courts will pass by such objections when raised by their opponents as troublesome and vexatious details, and, contenting themselves with the arguments which they have brought ready-made from their study, will speak as if their opponent did not exist. This error is of course far more common in the schools, for there objections are not merely disregarded, but the subjects for declamation are generally framed in such a way that there is nothing to be said on the opposite side.
13.36. adversus contradictiones nobis oppositas praecepta sunt, hoc tamen amplius, quod circa eas multi duobus vitiis diversis laborant. quidam etiam in foro tanquam rem molestam et odiosam praetereunt, et iis plerumque, quae composita domo attulerunt, contenti sine adversario dicunt; et scilicet multo magis in scholis, in quibus non solum contradictiones omittuntur, verum etiam materiae ipsae sic plerumque finguntur, ut nihil dici pro parte altera possit.
13.37. On the other hand there are some who surfer from excess of zeal, and think it their duty to reply to every word and even every trifling reflexion, a task which is at once endless and superfluous. For it is not the case. but the pleader, whom they are refuting. Personally I should always prefer that a speaker should reveal his eloquence in such a way that, if what he says advances his case, the credit will be given to his talent and not to the nature of his case, while if what he says damages his case the blame will attach to the case and not to his powers.
13.37. diligentia lapsi verbis etiam uel sententiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quod est et infinitum et supervacuum; non enim causa reprehenditur sed actor; quem ego semper videri malim disertum, ut, si dixerit quod rei prosit, ingenii credatur laus esse non causae; si forte laedat, causae non ingenii culpa.
13.38. Consequently when we come across denunciations such as that directed against Rullus for the obscurity of his language, or against Piso for his utter incapacity as a speaker, or against Antony for his lack of taste and his complete ignorance both of words and things, we shall give then our sanction as reasonable concessions to passion and just resentment, and as useful in stirring up hatred against those whom it is desired to render unpopular.
13.38. illae reprehensiones aut obscuritatis, qualis in Rullum est, aut infantiae in dicendo, qualis in Pisonem, aut inscitiae rerum verborumque et insulsitatis etiam, qualis in Antonium est, animo dantur et iustis odiis, suntque utiles ad conciliandum iis, quos invisos facere volueris, odium.
13.39. The method of reply to our opponent's counsel should be on different lines. Sometimes however we are justified in attacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but also their character, their appearance, their gait or bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero does not confine himself to these topics, but even attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing to his heels: for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave embarrassment by his turbulent harangues.
13.39. respondendi patronis ratio; et aliquando tamen eorum non oratio modo, sed vita etiam, vultus denique, incessus, habitus recte incusari solet; ut adversus Quintium Cicero non haec solum, sed ipsam etiam praetextam demissam ad talos insectatus est. enim turbulentis contionibus Cluentium Quintius.
13.40. Sometimes, in order to dispel the unpopularity excited by bitter criticism, the latter may be disposed of by a jest, as for example Cicero disposes of Triarius. For to the allegation that the pillars destined for the house of Scaurus were carried on waggons through the city streets he replied, “I got my pillars from the quarries of Alba, and had them brought in panniers!” Such tactics are more readily allowed against an accuser, for the duties of counsel for the defence sometimes force him to make such personal attacks.
13.40. elevandae invidiae gratia, quae asperius dicta sunt, eluduntur, ut a Cicerone Triarius. cum Scauri columnas per urbem plaustris vectas esse dixit, porro, inquit, qui Albanas habeo columnas, clitellis eas apportavi. magis hoc in accusatores concessum est, quibus conviciari aliquando patrocinii fides cogit.
13.41. On the other hand there is no objection to complaining of the conduct of the advocates on either side, so long as our complaint follows accepted practice and does not overstep the limits imposed by good manners; I refer to complaints such as that our opponents have abridged, obscured or postponed the discussion of some point, or with deliberate cunning have avoided discussing it at all.
13.41. vero adversus omnes et recepta et non inhumana conquestio, si callide quid tacuisse, breviasse, obscurasse distulisse dicuntur.
13.42. A change in the tactics of defence is also often selected for censure. For example, Attius in his speech against Cluentius complains that Cicero insists on the letter of the law, and Aeschines in his speech against Ctesiphon complains that Demosthenes refuses to consider the legal aspect of the case. It is however necessary to issue a special warning to declaimers that they should not put forward objections that can easily be met or assume that their opponent is a fool. As it is, owing to our tendency to think that the subject-matter of our speech may be drawn from our own fancy, florid commonplaces and epigrams designed to bring down the house occur to our minds with the utmost readiness, with the result that we should do well to bear in mind the lines:A shrewd retort! Could it be otherwise?A foolish question makes for smart replies.
13.42. quoque permutatio reprehenditur saepe, ut Attius adversus Cluentium, Aeschines adversus Ctesiphontem facit, cum ille Ciceronem lege usurum modo, hic minime de lege dicturum Demosthenen queritur. vero inprimis sunt admonendi, ne contradictiones eas ponant, quibus facillime responderi possit, neu sibi stultum adversarium fingant. autem (quod maxime uberes loci popularesque sententiae nascuntur materiam dicendi nobis, quod volumus, ducentibus) ut non sit ille inutilis versus:male respondit, male enim prior ille rogarat.Fallet haec nos in foro consuetudo, ubi adversario, non ipsi nobis respondebimus.
13.43. But such a practice will be fatal in the courts, where we have to answer our opponent and not ourselves. It is said that Accius, when asked why he did not turn advocate in view of the extraordinary skill in making apt replies which his tragedies revealed, replied that in his plays the characters said what he himself wanted them to say, whereas in the courts his adversaries would probably say just what he least wanted them to say.
13.43. Accium interrogatum, cur causas non ageret, cum apud eum in tragoediis tanta vis esset optime respondendi, hanc reddidisse rationem, quod illic ea dicerentur quae ipse vellet, in foro dicturi adversarii essent quae minime vellet.
13.44. It is therefore ridiculous in exercises which prepare the student for the actual courts to consider what answer can be made before ever giving a thought to what the opposing counsel is likely to say. And a good teacher should commend a pupil no less for his skill in thinking out arguments that may be put forward for the opposite side than in discovering arguments to prove his own case.
13.44. est ergo in exercitationibus, quae foro praeparant, prius cogitare quid responderi quam quid ex diverso dici possit. bonus praeceptor non minus laudare discipulum debet, si quid pro diversa quam si quid pro sua parte acriter excogitavit.
13.45. Again, there is another practice which is always permissible in the schools, but rarely in the courts. For when we speak first as claimants in a real case, how can we raise objections, seeing that our opponent has so far said nothing?
13.45. aliud in scholis permittendum semper, in foro rarum. loco a petitore primo contradictione uti qui possumus, ubi vera res agitur, cum adversarius adhuc nihil dixerit?
13.46. Still, many fall into this error either because they have acquired the habit in declamation or simply owing to a passion for hearing their own voice, thereby affording fine sport to those who reply: for sometimes the latter will remark sarcastically that they never said anything of the kind and have no intention of saying anything so idiotic, and sometimes that they are grateful for the admirable warnings so kindly given by their opponent: but most often they will say, and this is the strongest line that they can take, that their opponent would never have replied to objections which had never been raised had he not realised that these objections were justified and been driven to admit it by his consciousness of the fact.
13.46. tamen plerique in hoc vitium vel consuetudine declamatoria vel etiam cupiditate dicendi, dantque de se respondentibus venustissimos lusus, cum modo, se vero nihil dixisse neque tam stulte dicturos; modo, bene admonitos ab adversario et agere gratias, quod adiuti sint, iocantur; frequentissime vero, id quod firmissimum est, nunquam iis responsurum adversarium fuisse, quae proposita non essent, nisi illa sciret vera esse et ad fatendum conscientia esset impulsus; ut pro Cluentio Cicero:
13.47. We may find an example of this in the pro Cluentio of Cicero: “You have frequently asserted that you are informed that I intend to base my defence on the letter of the law. Really! I suppose that my friends have secretly betrayed me, and that there is one among those whom I believe to be my friends who reports my designs to my opponent. Who gave you this information? Who was the traitor? And to whom did I ever reveal my design? No one, I think, is to blame. It must have been the law itself that told you.” But there are some who, not content with raising imaginary objections, develop whole passages on such themes, saying that they know their opponents will say this and will proceed to argue thus and thus.
13.47. hoc persaepe dixisti, tibi sic renuntiari, me habere in animo causam hanc praesidio legis defendere. est? ab amicis imprudentes videlicet prodimur? et est nescio quis de iis, quos amicos nobis arbitramur, qui nostra consilia ad adversarium deferat? hoc tibi renuntiavit? quis tam improbus fuit; cui ego autem narravi?, ut opinor, in culpa est; nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiarit.
13.48. I remember that Vibius Crispus in our own day disposed of this practice very neatly, for he was a humorous fellow with a very pretty wit: “I do not make those objections which you attribute to me,” he said, “for what use would it be to make them twice?”
13.48. quidam contradictione non contenti totos etiam locos explicant: scire se hoc dicturos adversarios et ita persecuturos. factum venuste nostris temporibus elusit Vibius Crispus, vir ingenii iucundi et elegantis: vero, inquit, ista non dico; quid enim attinet illa bis dici?
13.49. Sometimes however it may be possible to put forward something not unlike such objections, if some point included by our opponent in the depositions which he produces has been discussed among his advocates: for then we shall be replying to something which they have said and not to an objection which has been invented by ourselves; or again, this will be possible if the case is of such a nature that we are in a position to state certain definite objections which are absolutely essential to our opponent's case: for instance, if stolen goods have been discovered in a house, the accused must of necessity allege either that they were brought there without his knowledge or deposited with him or given to him and we may therefore answer all these points even although they have not been put forward.
13.49. tamen aliquid simile contradictioni poni potest, si quid ab adversario testationibus comprehensum in advocationibus iactatum sit; respondebimus enim rei ab illis dictae, non a nobis excogitatae; aut, si id genus erit causae, ut proponere possimus certa, extra quae dici nihil possit: ut, cum res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit, dicat necesse est reus aut se ignorante illatam aut depositam apud se aut donatam sibi; quibus omnibus, etiamsi proposita non sunt, responderi potest.
13.50. On the other hand, in the schools we are quite justified in answering both statements and imaginary objections; for by these means we shall train ourselves at one and the same time for speaking either first or second. Unless we do this, we shall have no chance of employing objections, since there is no adversary to whom we can reply.
13.50. in scholis recte et propositionibus et contradictionibus occurremus, ut in utrumque locum, id est primum et secundum, simul plurimum exerceamur. nisi fecerimus, nunquam utemur contradictione; non enim erit, cui respondeamus.
13.51. There is another serious fault into which pleaders fall: the anxious over-elaboration of points. Such a procedure makes his case suspect to the judges, while frequently arguments which, if stated without more ado, would have removed all doubt, lose their force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate preparations made for their introduction, due to the tact that the advocate thinks that they require additional support. Our orator must therefore adopt a confident manner, and should always speak as if he thought his case admirable. This quality, like all other good qualities, is particularly evident in Cicero.
13.51. et illud vitium nimium sollicite et circa omnia momenta luctantis; suspectam enim facit iudici causam, et frequenter, quae statim dicta omnem dubitationem sustulissent, dilata ipsis praeparationibus fidem perdunt, quia patronus et aliis crediderit opus fuisse. igitur orator prae se ferat semperque ita dicat, tanquam de causa optime sentiat;
13.52. For the extraordinary care which he takes gives the impression of confidence and carries such weight when lie speaks that it does not permit us to feel the least doubt and has all the force of genuine proof. Further, the advocate who knows what are the strongest points in his own and his opponent's case will easily be able to decide what points it will be most necessary for him to emphasise or to counter.
13.52. quod sicut omnia in Cicerone praecipuum est. illa summa cura securitatis est similis, tantaque in oratione auctoritas, ut probationis locum obtineat dubitare nobis non audentibus., qui scierit, quid pars adversa, quid nostra habeat valentissimum, facile iudicabit, quibus maxime rebus vel occurrendum sit vel instandum.
13.53. As regards order, there is no part of a case which involves less trouble. For, if we are prosecuting, our first duty will be to prove our own case, our second to refute the arguments brought against it. If, on the other hand, we are defending, we must begin by refutation.
13.53. quidem in parte nulla minus adfert laboris. si agimus, nostra confirmanda sunt primum, tum, quae nostris opponuntur refutanda; si respondemus, prius incipiendum est a refutatione.
13.54. But from our answers to objections fresh objections will arise, a process which may be carried to some length. The strokes of gladiators provide a parallel. If the first stroke was intended to provoke the adversary to strike, the second will lead to the third, while if the challenge be repeated it will lead to the fourth stroke, so that there will be two parries and two attacks. And tile process may be prolonged still further.
13.54. autem ex his, quae contradictioni opposuimus, aliae contradictiones, euntque interim longius; ut gladiatorum manus, quae secundae vocantur, fiunt et tertiae, si prima ad evocandum adversarii ictum prolata erat, et quartae, si geminata captatio est, ut bis cavere, bis repetere oportuerit; quae ratio et ultra ducit.
13.55. But refutation also includes that simple form of proof, which I described above, based on an appeal to the emotions and mere assertion; for an example see the words of Scaurus which I have already quoted. Nay, I am not sure that this form of proof is not actually of more frequent occurrence when something is denied. It is, however, specially important for both parties that they should see where the main issue lies. For it often happens that the points raised in pleading are many, although those on which a decision is given are few.
13.55. illam etiam, quam supra ostendi, simplicem ex adfectibus atque ex adfirmatione sola probationem recipit refutatio, qualis est illa Scauri, de qua supra dixi; quin nescio an etiam frequentior, ubi quid negatur. praecipue utrique parti, ubi sit rei summa. fere accidit, ut in causis multa dicantur, de paucis iudicetur.
13.56. Such are the elements of the methods of proof and refutation, but they require to be embellished and supported by the powers of the speaker. For although our arguments may be admirably adapted to express what we desire, they will none the less be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special effort to give them life.
13.56. his probandi refutandique ratio est, sed adiuvanda viribus dicentis et ornanda. enim sint ad dicendum, quod volumus, accommodata. ieiuna tamen erunt et infirma, nisi maiore quodam oratoris spiritu implentur.
13.57. Consequently the commonplaces on the subject of witnesses, documentary evidence, arguments and the like make a great impression on the minds of the judges, as also do those topics which are peculiar to the case, those I mean in which we praise or blame any action or show that it is just or unjust, or make it seem more or less important or more or less harsh than it really is. Of these topics some are adapted to the comparison of individual arguments, others to the comparison of a number, while others may serve to influence the success or failure of the whole case.
13.57. et illi communes loci de testibus, de tabulis, de argumentis aliisque similibus magnam vim animis iudicum adferunt, et hi proprii, quibus factum quodque laudamus aut contra, iustum vel iniustum docemus, maius aut minus, asperius aut mitius. iis autem alii ad comparationem singulorum argumentorum faciunt, alii ad plurium, alii ad totius causae inclinationem.
13.58. Some again prepare the mind of the judge, while others confirm it in opinions already formed. But such preparation or confirmation will sometimes apply to the whole case, sometimes only to particular portions, and must therefore be employed with due regard to circumstances.
13.58. quibus sunt qui praeparent animum iudicis, sunt qui confirment. praeparatio quoque aut confirmatio aliquando totius causae est, aliquando partium, et proinde, ut cuique conveniunt, subiicienda.
13.59. I am consequently surprised that there should be a violent dispute between the leaders of two opposite schools as to whether such commonplaces should be applied to individual questions (which is the view of Theodorus), or whether the judge should be instructed in the facts before any appeal is made to his feelings (the latter being the view of Apollodorus), as though no middle course were possible and no regard were to be had to the exigencies of the case itself. Those who lay down such rules have no experience of speaking in the actual courts, the result being that text-books composed in the calm leisure of the study are sadly upset by the necessities of forensic strife.
13.59. miror inter duos diversarum sectarum velut duces non mediocri contentione quaesitum, singulisne quaestionibus subiiciendi essent loci, ut Theodoro placet, an prius docendus iudex quam movendus, ut praecipit Apollodorus, tanquam perierit haec ratio media, et nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum. praecipiunt, qui ipsi non dicunt in foro, ut artes a securis otiosisque compositae ipsa pugnae necessitate turbentur.
13.60. For practically all those who have set forth the law of speaking as though it were a profound mystery, have tied us down not merely to fixed topics for argument, but to definite rules as to how we should draw our conclusions. propose after making a few preliminary remarks on the subject to give a frank expression of my own views, or in other words to set forth what I perceive to have been the practice of the most distinguished orators.
13.60. omnes fere, qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam mysteria tradiderunt, certis non inveniendorum modo argumentorum locis, sed concludendorum quoque nos praeceptis alligaverunt; de quibus brevissime praelocutus, quid ipse sentiam, id est quid clarissimos oratores fecisse videam, non tacebo.
14.1. Tile term enthymeme is applied not merely to the actual argument, that is to say, the matter adduced to prove something else, but also to its expression, the nature of which, as I have already pointed out, is twofold. It may be drawn from denial of consequents, when it will consist of a proposition immediately followed by a proof, as in the following passage from the pro Ligario; “At that point the justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was something to be said on both sides. But now we can only regard that cause as superior, which even the gods supported.” Here we have a proposition and a reason, but no formal conclusion: it is therefore tile incomplete syllogism known as an enthymeme.
14.1. enthymema et argumentum ipsum, id est rem, quae probationi alterius adhibetur, appellant et argumenti elocutionem, eam vero, ut dixi, duplicem: ex consequentibus, quod habet propositionem coniunctamque ei protinus probationem, quale pro Ligario, tum dubia, quod erat aliquid in utraque parte, quod probari posset; nunc melior ea iudicanda est, quam etiam dii adiuverunt; habet enim rationem et propositionem, non habet conclusionem.
14.2. It may on the other hand be drawn from incompatibles, in which case the proof will be much stronger; indeed some restrict the title of enthymeme to this form of argument. The following passage from the pro Milone of Cicero will provide a parallel: “You are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if you thought it within your power to do so.”
14.2. est ille imperfectus syllogismus. pugnantibus vero, quod etiam solum enthymema quidam vocant, fortior multo probatio est. est Ciceronis pro Milone: igitur mortis sedetis ultores, cuius vitam si pletis per vos restitui posse, nolitis.
14.3. This form of argument may even at times consist of a number of clauses, as in the following passage from the same speech: “Was he resolved then to kill to the dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to kill to the satisfaction of all? Are we to believe that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time and place and the risk involved to his own life, to kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he might have done so legally, at his own time and place and without the least danger to himself?”
14.3. quidem etiam aliquando multiplicari solet, ut est ab eodem et pro endem reo factum: igitur cum omnium gratia noluit, hunc voluit cum aliquorum querela? quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore, quem impune non est ausus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, cum periculo capitis non dubitavit occidere?
14.4. The most effective kind of enthymeme seems however to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition as in the following passage from Demosthenes: “For if at any time an act has been committed contrary to law and you have imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you should go scot free; on the contrary it is an additional reason why you should be condemned. For if any of those who transgressed the law had been condemned, you would not have proposed this, and further, if you are condemned, no one else will propose anything of the kind.”
14.4. autem videtur enthymematis genus, cum propositio dissimili vel contraria ratio subiungitur, quale est Demosthenis: enim, si quid unquam contra leges actum est, idque tu es imitatus, idcirco te convenit poena liberari; quin e contrario damnari multo magis. ut, si quis eorum damnatus esse, tu haec non scripsisses, ita, damnatus tu si fueris, non scribet alius.
14.5. As regards the epicheieme, some authorities hold that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. Cicero urges that there are not more than five at most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. But since at times the major premise does not require a reason nor the minor a proof, while occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, he holds that the epicheireme may consist of only four, three, or even two parts.
14.5. et quattuor et quinque et sex etiam factae sunt partes a quibusdam. Cicero maxime quinque defendit, ut sit propositio, deinde ratio eius, tum adsumptio et eius probatio, quinta complexio; quia vero interim et propositio non egeat rationis et adsumptio probationis, nonnunquam etiam complexione opus non sit, et quadripertitam et tripertitam et bipertitam quoque fieri posse ratiocinationem.
14.6. Personally however follow the majority of authorities in holding that there are not more than three parts. For it follows from the very nature of reasoning that there must be something to form the subject of enquiry and something else to provide the proof, while the third element which has to be added may be regarded as resulting from the agreement of the two previous elements. Thus the first part will be the major, the second the minor premise and the third the conclusion. For the confirmation and development of both premises may reasonably be included in the parts to which they belong.
14.6. et pluribus nihilominus auctoribus tres summum videntur. ita se habet ipsa natura, ut sit, de quo quaeratur et per quod probetur; tertium adiici potest velut ex consensu duorum antecedentium. erit prima intentio, secunda adsumptio, tertia connexio. confirmatio primae ac secundae partis et exornatio eisdem cedere possunt, quibus subiiciuntur.
14.7. Let us then take an example from Cicero of the epicheireme consisting of five parts. “Those things which are controlled by reason are better governed than those which are not.” This they call the first part and consider that it requires to be established by various reasons and a copious display of eloquence. Personally I hold that the whole of this together with its reason forms but one part. Otherwise, if the reason is to be treated as a separate part and if there are a variety of reasons, this will involve an addition to the number of parts. Next he produces the minor premise:
14.7. enim ex Cicerone quinque partium exemplum: gubernantur ea, quae consilio reguntur quam quae sine consilio administrantur. primam partem numerant; eam deinceps rationibus variis et quam copiosissimis verbis approbari putant oportere. ego totum cum sua ratione unum puto; alioqui si ratio pars est, est autem varia ratio, plures partes esse dicantur.
14.8. “But there is nothing better administered than the universe.” The proof of this minor premise is treated as the fourth part of the epicheireme. My criticism of this statement is identical with my criticism of the preceding.
14.8. deinde ponit: autem omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundus administratur. adsumptionis quarto in loco iam porro inducunt approbationem; de quo idem quod supra dico.
14.9. The fifth place they assign to the conclusion which either merely makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts ( i.e. “Therefore the universe is governed by reason” ) or after briefly bringing major and minor premise together adds what is deduced from them with the following result: “But if on the one hand things that are controlled by reason are better governed than things which are not and on the other nothing is better administered than the universe, then it follows that the universe is governed by reason.” As regards this part of the epicheireme I agree.
14.9. inducunt loco complexionem, quae aut id infert solum quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur, hoc modo, igitur mundus administratur; aut, unum in locum cum conduxit breviter propositionem et adsumptionem, adiungit quid ex his conficiatur, ad hunc modum: melius geruntur, quae consilio quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil autem omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundus administratur, consilio igitur mundus administratur. parti consentio.
14.10. I have said that the epicheireme consists of three parts: its form is not however invariable. There is firstly the form in which the conclusion is identical with what has already been stated in the major premise. “The soul is immortal, since whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the soul is immortal.” This process occurs not merely in individual arguments, but in whole cases, provided they are of a simple character, and also in questions.
14.10. tribus autem, quas fecimus, partibus non est forma semper eadem, sed una, in qua idem concluditur quod intenditur: immortalis est. quidquid ex se ipso movetur, immortale est; anima autem ex se ipsa movetur, immortalis igitur est anima. fit non solum in singulis argumentis sed in totis causis, quae sunt simplices, et in quaestionibus.
14.11. For cases and questions always have first a major premise, such as “You have committed sacrilege,” or “Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty of murder.” Second comes a reason, which is stated at greater length in cases and questions than in separate arguments, while finally comes the conclusion in which as a rule they set forth the point they have proved either by enumeration of particulars or in the form of a hasty conclusion. In this type of epicheireme the major premise is doubtful, since it is still under investigation.
14.11. et hae primam habent propositionem: commisisti; Non, quisquis hominem occidit, caedis tenetur, deinde rationem; (sed haec est in causis et quaestione longior quam in singulis argumentis) et plerumque summa complexione, vel per enumerationem vel per brevem conclusionem, testantur, quid effecerint. hoc genere propositio dubia est, de hac enim quaeritur.
14.12. There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force “Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us.” There is a third form in which the major premise and the conclusion are different. “All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate.” It may be thought that in this case there is no real major premise, since it would be possible to state the reasoning in the following form: “The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate,” etcetera.
14.12. est complexio non par intentioni sed vim habens parem: nihil ad nos, nam quod est dissolutum, sensu caret; quod autem sensu caret, nihil ad nos. alio genere non eadem propositio est quae connexio: animalia meliora sunt quam inanima, nihil autent melius est mundo, mundus igitur animal. potest videri deesse intentio. Potuit enim sic constitui ratiocinatio: est mundus, omnia enim animalia meliora sunt quam inanima et cetera.
14.13. This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires to be proved as in the following: “He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher”: for this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises must be established before we can arrive at the conclusion. Sometimes again the minor premise is an admitted fact, as for instance, “But all men wish to live a happy life,” while sometimes it requires to be proved, as for example the statement quoted above, “That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling,” since it is doubtful whether the soul is immortal after its release from the body or only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a minor premise, some a reason.
14.13. propositio aut confessa est ut proxima, aut probanda ut, beatam vitam vivere volet, philosophetur oportet, non enim conceditur; cetera sequi nisi confirmata prima parte non possunt. adsumptio interim confessa est ut, autem volunt beatam vitam vivere; interim probanda ut illa, est dissolutum, sensu caret; cum, soluta corpore anima an sit immortalis vel ad tempus certe maneat, sit in dubio. adsumptionem alii, rationem alii vocant.
14.14. There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.
14.14. autem nullo differt a syllogismis, nisi quod illi et plures habent species et vera colligunt veris, epichirematis frequentior circa credibilia est usus. si contingeret semper controversa confessis probare, vix esset in hoc genere usus oratoris. quo ingenio est opus, ut dicas:
14.15. For what skill does it require to say, “The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased,” or “I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me ”?
14.15. ad me pertinent, solus enim sum filius defuncti, vel solus heres, cum iure bonorum possessio testati secundum tabulas testamenti detur, ad me igitur pertinet.
14.16. But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says “You are not his son” or “You are illegitimate” or “You are not his only son”; or, again, “You are not his heir” or “The will is invalid” or “You are not entitled to inherit” or “You have co-heirs,” we must prove the validity of the reason on which we base our claim that the property should be adjudicated to us.
14.16. cum ipsa ratio in quaestionem venit, efficiendum est certum id quo probaturi sumus quod incertum est: ut si ipsa forte intentione dicatur aut filius non es aut non es legitimus aut non es solus, itemque aut non es heres, aut non iustum testamentum est, aut capere non potes, aut habes coheredes, efficiendum est iustum, propter quod nobis bona adiudicari debeant.
14.17. But when a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the major premise and the reason would suffice. “Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed.” Hence it has been asserted that the form of enthymeme which is based on denial of consequents resembles a reason. But sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single proposition as in the example just quoted, “The laws are silent in the midst of arms.”
14.17. tum est necessaria illa summa connexio, cum intervenit ratio longior; alioqui sufficient intentio ac ratio: enim leges inter arma nec se expectari iubent, cum ei, qui exspectare velit, ante iniusta poena luenda sit quam iusta repetenda. id enthymema, quod est ex consequentibus, rationi simile dixerunt. et singula, interimque recte, ponuntur, ut ipsum illud leges inter arma;
14.18. We may also begin with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech: But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed? 'The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the reason placed third, as in the phrase, “When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.”
14.18. et a ratione incipere fas est, deinde concludere, ut ibidem: duodecim tabulae nocturnum furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo defenderet, interfici impune voluerunt, quis est qui, quoquo modo quis interfectus sit, puniendum putet? hic adhuc et rursus rationem tertio loco posuit, cum videat aliquando gladium nobis ab ipsis porrigi legibus.
14.19. On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance: “How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim?” Next comes the reason: “What is the object of our escorts and our swords?” Last comes the conclusion resulting from the major premise and the reason: “Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them.”
14.19. constantem partis duxit ordinem: vero et latroni quae potest inferri iniusta nex? hoc intentio; comitatus nostri, quid gladii volunt? hoc ratio; habere certe non liceret, si uti illis nullo pacto liceret, hoc ex ratione et intentione connexio.
14.20. This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the major premise or the minor or the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The major premise is refuted in the following case: “I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me.” For the very first question in the defence of Milo is “whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day.”
14.20. generi probationis tribus occurritur modis, id est per omnes partes. enim expugnatur intentio aut adsumptio aut conclusio, nonnunquam omnia. expugnatur: occidi eum, qui insidiatus sit. prima statim quaestio pro Milone est, an ei fas sit lucem intueri qui a se hominem necatum esse fateatur.
14.21. The minor premise is refuted by all the methods which we mentioned in dealing with refutation. As to the reason it must be pointed out that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is not true, but may on the other hand sometimes be false although the proposition is true. For example, “Virtue is a good thing” is true, but if the reason, “Because it brings us wealth,” be added, we shall have an instance of a true major premise and a false reason.
14.21. adsumptio omnibus iis quae de refutatione diximus. ratio quidem nonnunquam est vera, cum eius propositio vera non sit; interim verae propositionis falsa ratio est. bonum est, verum est; si quis rationem subiiciat, quod ea locupletes faciat, verae intentionis falsa sit ratio. autem aut vera negatur, cum aliud colligit quam id quod ex prioribus efficitur, aut nihil ad quaestionem dicitur pertinere.
14.22. With regard to the conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it infers something which does not logically result from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. The truth is denied in the following case: “We are justified in killing one who lies in wait for us; for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though he were an enemy: therefore Milo was justified in killing Clodius as an enemy.” The conclusion is not valid, since we have not yet proved that Clodius lay in wait for him But the conclusion that we are therefore justified in killing one who lies in wait for us is perfectly true, though irrelevant to the case, for it is not yet clear that Clodius lay in wait for Milo.
14.22. est vera sic: iure occiditur; nam cum vitae vim adferat ut hostis, debet etiam repelli ut hostis; recte igitur Clodius ut hostis occiditur est; non utique, nondum enim Clodium insidiatorem ostendimus. fit vera connexio, igitur insidiator ut hostis occiditur; nihil ad nos, nondum enim Clodius insidiator apparet.
14.23. But while the major premise and the reason may both be true and the conclusion false, yet if both are false, the conclusion can never be true.
14.23. ut potest vera esse intentio et ratio et tamen falsa connexio, ita, si illa falsa sunt, nunquam est vera connexio.
14.24. Some call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, while others regard it as a part of the syllogism, because whereas the latter always has its premises and conclusion and effects its proof by the employment of all its parts, the ethymeme is content to let its proof be understood without explicit statement.
14.24. ab aliis oratorius syllogismus, ab aliis pars dicitur syllogismi, propterea quod syllogismus utique conclusionem et propositionem habet et per omnes partes efficit, quod proposuit, enthymema tantum intelligi contentum sit.
14.25. The following is an example of a syllogism: “Virtue is the only thing that is good, for that alone is good which no one can put to a bad use: but no one can make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good.” The enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of consequents. “Virtue is a good thing because no one can put it to a bad use.” On the other hand take the following syllogism. “Money is not a good thing; for that is not good which can be put to a bad use: money may be put to a bad use; therefore money is not a good thing.” The enthymeme draws its conclusion from incompatibles. “Can money be a good thing when it is possible to put it to a bad use?”
14.25. talis: bonum virtus, nam id demum bonum est, quo nemo male uti potest; virtute nemo male uti potest, bonum est ergo virtus. ex consequentibus: est virtus, qua nemo male uti potest. contra, est bonum pecunia; non enim bonum, quo quis male uti potest; pecunia potest quis male uti, non igitur bonum est pecunia. ex pugnantibus: bonum est pecunia, qua quis male uti potest?—Si pecunia, quae est in argento signato, argentum est, qui argentum omne legavit, et pecuniam, quae est in argento signato, legavit;
14.26. The following argument is couched in syllogistic form: “If money in the form of silver coin is silver, the man who bequeathed all his silver to a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined silver: but he bequeathed all his silver: therefore he included in the bequest all money in the form of coined silver.” But for the orator it will be sufficient to say, “Since he bequeathed all his silver, he included in his bequest all his silver money.”
14.26. argentum autem omne legavit, igitur et pecuniam, quae est in argento, legavit, habet formam syllogismi. satis est dicere, argentum legaverit omne, pecuniam quoque legavit, quae est in argento.
14.27. I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules still leave scope for free exercise of the judgment. For although I consider that there are occasions when the orator may lawfully employ the syllogism, I am far from desiring him to make his whole speech consist of or even be crowded with a mass of epicheiremes and enthymemes. For a speech of that character would resemble dialogues and dialectical controversies rather than pleadings of the kind with which we are concerned, and there is an enormous difference between the two.
14.27. mihi videor sacra tradentium artes, sed consilio locus superest. ego, ut in oratione syllogismo quidem aliquando uti nefas non duco, ita constare totam aut certe confertam esse aggressionum et enthymematum stipatione minime velim. enim et dialecticis disputationibus erit similior quam nostri operis actionibus, quae quidem inter se plurimum differunt.
14.28. For in the former we are confronted with learned men seeking for truth among men of learning; consequently they subject everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention and judgment, calling the former τοπική or the art of selecting the appropriate material for treatment, and the latter κριτική or the art of criticism.
14.28. in illis homines docti et inter doctos verum quaerentes minutius et scrupulosius scrutantur omnia, et ad liquidum confessumque perducunt, ut qui sibi et inveniendi et iudicandi vindicent partes, quarum alteram τοπικήν alteram κριτικήν vocant.
14.29. We on the other hand have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth and justice.
14.29. ad aliorum iudicia componenda est oratio, et saepius apud omnino imperitos atque illarum certe ignaros litterarum loquendum est, quos nisi et delectatione allicimus et viribus trahimus et nonnunquam turbamus adfectibus, ipsa, quae iusta ac vera sunt, tenere non possumus.
14.30. Eloquence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken up into conclusive inferences which are generally expressed in the same monotonous form: on the contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its severity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness boredom.
14.30. et speciosa et imperiosa vult esse eloquentia; quorum nihil consequetur, si conclusionibus certis et in unam prope formam cadentibus concisa et contemptum ex humilitate et odium ex quadam severitate et ex copia satietatem et ex similitudine fastidium attulerit.
14.31. Eloquence therefore must not restrict itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed through narrow pipes like the water of fountains, but flow as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys; and if it cannot find a channel it must make one for itself. For what can be more distressing than to be fettered by petty rules, like children who trace the letters of the alphabet which others have first written for them, or, as the Greeks say, insist on keeping the coat their mother gave them. Are we to have nothing but premises and conclusions from consequents and incompatibles? Must not the orator breathe life into the argument and develop it?
14.31. ergo non semitis sed campis, non uti fontes angustis fistulis colliguntur sed ut beatissimi amnes totis vallibus fluunt, ac sibi viam, si quando non acceperit, faciat. quid illa miserius lege velut praeformatas infantibus litteras persequentium et, ut Graeci dicere solent, quem mater amictum dedit, sollicite custodientium: propositio ac conclusio ex consequentibus et repugnantibus?
14.32. Must lie not vary and diversify it by a thousand figures, and do all this in such a way that it seems to come into being as the very child of nature, not to reveal an artificial manufacture and a suspect art nor at every moment to show traces of an instructor's hand? What orator ever spoke thus? Even in Demosthenes we find but few traces of such a mechanism. And yet the Greeks of to-day are even more prone than we are (though this is the only point in which their practice is worse than ours) to bind their thoughts in fetters and to connect them by an inexorable chain of argument, making inferences where there was never any doubt, proving admitted facts and asserting that in so doing they are following the orators of old, although they always refuse to answer the question who it is that they are imitating. However of figures I shall speak elsewhere.
14.32. inspiret? non augeat? non mille figuris variet ac verset? ut ea nasci et ipsa provenire natura, non manu facta et arte suspecta magistrum fateri ubique videantur? unquam sic dixit orator? apud ipsum Demosthenen paucissima huius generis reperiuntur? apprehensa Graeci magis (nam hoc solum peius faciunt) in catenas ligant et inexplicabili serie connectunt, et indubitata colligunt et probant confessa et se antiquis per hoc similes vocant, deinde interrogati nunquam respondebunt, quem imitentur. de figuris alio loco.
14.33. For the present I must add that I do not even agree with those who hold that arguments should always be expressed in language which is not only pure, lucid and distinct, but also as free as possible from all elevation and ornateness. I readily admit that arguments should be distinct and clear, and further that in arguments of a minor character the language and words should be as appropriate and as familiar as possible.
14.33. illud adiiciendum, ne iis quidem consentire me, qui semper argumenta sermone puro et dilucido et distincto ceterum minime elato ornatoque putant esse dicenda. ea distincta quidem ac perspicua debere esse confiteor, in rebus vero minoribus etiam sermone ac verbis quam maxime propriis et ex usu;
14.34. But if the subject be one of real importance every kind of ornament should be employed, so long as it does nothing to obscure our meaning. For metaphor will frequently throw a flood of light upon a subject: even lawyers, who spend so much trouble over the appropriateness of words, venture to assert that the word litus is derived from eludere, because the shore is a place where the waves break in play.
14.34. at si maior erit materia, nullum iis ornatum, qui modo non obscuret, subtrahendum puto. et saepe plurimum lucis adfert ipsa translatio, cum etiam iuris consulti, quorum summus circa verborum proprietatem labor est, litus esse audeant dicere, qua fluctus eludit.
14.35. Further, the more unattractive the natural appearance of anything, the more does it require to be seasoned by charm of style: moreover, an argument is often less suspect when thus disguised, and the charm with which it is expressed makes it all the more convincing to our audience. Unless indeed we think that Cicero was in error when he introduced phrases such as the following into an argumentative passage: “The laws are silent in the midst of arms,” and “A sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.” However, we must be careful to observe a happy mean in the employment of such embellishments, so that they may prove a real ornament and not a hindrance.
14.35. quid est natura magis asperum, hoc pluribus condiendum est voluptatibus; et minus suspecta argumentatio dissimulatione, et multum ad fidem adiuvat audientis voluptas. forte existimamus Ciceronem haec ipsa mala in argumentatione dixisse, silere leges inter arma, et gladium nobis interim ab ipsis porrigi legibus. tamen habendus istis modus, ut sint ornamento non impedimento.