---
title: "The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria"
author: "Quintilian"
translator: "Harold Edgeworth Butler"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 24 of 53
url: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/24/
cite: "Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria, section 24. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/24/"
---

# The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria

*Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler*

Twelve books on training a good man skilled in speaking, from the nursery to the forum.

> Latin: ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1002.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 24. Book VI · chapters 1–3

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/24/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/24/#p-N

[¶0] 1.46. The task of the peroration is not however confined to exciting pity in the judges: it may also be required to dispel the pity which they feel, either by a set speech designed to recall them from their tears to a consideration of the justice of the case, or by a few witticisms such as, “Give the boy some bread to stop him crying,” or the remark made by counsel to a corpulent client, whose opponent, a mere child, had been carried round the court by his advocate, “What am I to do? I can't carry you!”

> Latin: 1.46. autem commovere tantum miserationem sed etiam discutere epilogi est proprium cum oratione continua, quae motos lacrimis iudices ad iustitiam reducat, tum etiam quibusdam urbane dictis, quale est puero panem, ne ploret; et corpulento litigatori, cuius adversarius, item puer, circa iudices erat ab advocato latus: faciam? ego te baiulare non possum.

[¶1] 1.47. Such jests should not however descend to buffoonery. Consequently I cannot give my approval to the orator, although he was one of the most distinguished speakers of his day, who, when his opponent brought in some children to enhance the effect of his peroration, threw some dice among them, with the result that they began to scramble for them. For their childish ignorance of the perils with which they were threatened might in itself have awakened compassion.

> Latin: 1.47. haec tamen non debent esse mimica Itaque nec illum probaverim, quanquam inter clarissimos sui temporis oratores fuit, qui pueris ira epilogum productis talos iecit ira medium, quos illi diripere coeperunt; namque haec ipsa discriminis sui ignorantia potuit esse miserabilis;

[¶2] 1.48. For the same reason I cannot commend the advocate who, when his opponent the accuser produced a bloodstained sword in court, fled suddenly from the benches as though in an agony of terror, and then, when his turn came to plead, peeped out of the crowd with his head half covered by his robe and asked whether the man with the sword had gone away. For though he caused a laugh, he made himself ridiculous.

> Latin: 1.48. neque illum, qui, cum esset cruentus gladius ab accusatore prolatus, quo is hominem probabat occisum, subito ex subselliis ut territus fugit et, capite ex parte velato cum ad agendum ex turba prospexisset, interrogavit, an iam ille cum gladio recessisset. enim risum, sed ridiculus fuit.

[¶3] 1.49. Still, theatrical effects of the kind we are discussing can be dispelled by the power of eloquence. Cicero provides most admirable examples of the way in which this may be done both in the pro Rabirio where he attacks the production in court of the portrait of Saturninus in the most dignified language, and in the pro Vareno where he launches a number of witticisms against a youth whose wound had been unbound at intervals in the course of the trial.

> Latin: 1.49. tamen oratione eiusmodi scenae, egregieque Cicero, qui contra imaginem Saturnini pro Rabirio graviter et contra iuvenem, cuius subinde vulnus ira iudicio resolvebatur, pro Vareno multa dixit urbane.

[¶4] 1.50. There are also milder kinds of peroration in which, if our opponent is of such a character that he deserves to be treated with respect, we strive to ingratiate ourselves with him or give him some friendly warning or urge him to regard us as his friends. This method was admirably employed by Passienus when he pleaded in a suit brought by his wife Domitia against her brother Ahenobarbus for the recovery of a sum of money: he began by making a number of remarks about the relationship of the two parties and then, referring to their wealth, which was in both cases enormous, added, “There is nothing either of you need less than the subject of this dispute.”

> Latin: 1.50. et illi leniores epilogi, quibus adversario satisfacimus, si forte sit eius persona talis, ut illi debeatur reverentia, aut cum amice aliquid commonemus et ad concordiam hortamur. est genus egregie tractatum a Passieno, cum Domitiae uxoris suae pecuniaria lite adversus fratrem eius Ahenobarbum ageret; nam, cum de necessitudine multa dixisset, de fortuna quoque, qua uterque abundabat, adiecit: vobis minus deest, quam de quo contenditis.

[¶5] 1.51. All these appeals to emotion, although some hold that they should be confined to the exordium and the peroration, which are, I admit, the places where they are most often used, may be employed in other portions of the speech as well, but more briefly, since most of them must be reserved for the opening or the close. But it is in tile peroration, if anywhere, that we must let loose the whole torrent of our eloquence.

> Latin: 1.51. autem hos adfectus, etiamsi quibusdam videntur ira prooemio atque ira epilogo sedem habere, ira quibus sane sint frequentissimi, tamen aliae quoque partes recipiunt, sed breviores, ut cum ex iis plurima sint reservanda. At hic, si usquam, totos eloquentiae aperire fontes licet.

[¶6] 1.52. For, if we have spoken well in the rest of our speech, we shall now have the judges on our side, and shall be in a position, now that we have emerged from the reefs and shoals, to spread all our canvas, while since the chief task of the peroration consists of amplification, we may legitimately make free use of words and reflexions that are magnificent and ornate. It is at the close of our drama that we must really stir the theatre, when we have reached the place for the phrase with which the old tragedies and comedies used to end, “Friends, give us your applause.”

> Latin: 1.52. et, si bene diximus reliqua, possidebimus iam iudicum animos, et e confragosis atque asperis evecti tota pandere possumus vela, et, cum sit maxima pars epilogi amplificatio, verbis atque sententiis uti licet magnificis et ornatis. est commovendum theatrum. cum ventum est ad ipsum illud, quo veteres tragoediae comoediaeque cluduntur,.

[¶7] 1.53. In other portions of the speech we must appeal to the emotions as occasion may arise. For it would clearly be wrong to set forth facts calling for horror and pity without any such appeal, while, if the question arises as to the quality of any fact, such an appeal may justifiably be subjoined to the proofs of the fact in question.

> Latin: 1.53. aliis autem partibus tractandus erit adfectus, ut quisque nascetur, nam neque exponi sine hoc res atroces et miserabiles debent; cum de qualitate alicuius rei quaestio est, probationibus uniuscuiusque rei recte subiungitur.

[¶8] 1.54. When we are pleading a complicated case which is really made up of several cases, it will be necessary to introduce a number of passages resembling perorations, as Cicero does in the Vetrines, where he laments over Philodamus, the ships' captains, the crucifixion of the Roman citizen, and a number of other tragic incidents.

> Latin: 1.54. vero coniunctam ex pluribus causam agimus, etiam necesse erit uti pluribus quasi epilogis, ut ira Verrem Cicero fecit. et Philodamo et nauarchis et cruci civis Romani et aliis plurimis suas lacrimas dedit.

[¶9] 1.55. Some call these μερικοὶ ἐπίλογοι, by which they mean a peroration distributed among different portions of a speech. I should regard them rather as species than as parts of the peroration, since the terms epilogue and peroration both clearly indicate that they form the conclusion of a speech.

> Latin: 1.55. , qui hos μερικοὺς ἐπιλόγους vocent, quo partitam perorationem significant. non tam partes eius quam species videntur, siquidem et epilogi et perorationis nomina ipsa aperte satis ostendunt, hanc esse consummationem orationis.

[¶10] 2.1. II. The peroration is the most important part of forensic pleading, and in the main consists of appeals to the emotions, concerning which I have consequently been forced to say something. But I have not yet been able to give the topic specific consideration as a whole, nor should I have been justified in doing so. We have still, therefore, to discuss a task which forms tile most powerful means of obtaining what we desire, and is also more difficult than any of those which we have previously considered, namely that of stirring the emotions of the judges, and of moulding and transforming them to the attitude which we desire.

> Latin: 2.1. autem pars haec iudicialium causarum summe praecipueque constet adfectibus, et aliqua de iis necessario dixerim, non tamen potui ac ne debui quidem istum locum in unam speciem concludere. adhuc opus superest, cum ad obtinenda quae volumus potentissimum, tum supra dictis multo difficilius, movendi iudicum animos atque in eum quem volumus habitum formandi et velut transfigurandi. de re pauca, quae postulabat materia, sic attigi, ut magis quid oporteret fieri quam quo id modo consequi possemus, ostenderem.

[¶11] 2.2. The few remarks which I have already made on this subject were only such as were essential to my theme, while my purpose was rather to show what ought to be done than to set forth the manner in which we can secure our aim. I must now review the whole subject in a more exhaustive fashion. There is scope for an appeal to the emotions, as I have already said,1 in every portion of a speech. Moreover these emotions present great variety, and demand more than cursory treatment, since it is in their handling that the power of oratory shews itself at its highest. Even a slight and limited talent may, with the assistance of practice or learning, perhaps succeed in giving life to other departments of oratory, and in developing them to a serviceable extent. At any rate there are, and have always been, a considerable number of pleaders capable of discovering arguments adequate to prove their points. I am far from despising such, but I consider that their utility is restricted to providing the judge with such facts as it is necessary for him to know, and, to be quite frank, I regard them merely as suitable persons to instruct pleaders of real eloquence in the facts of a case. But few indeed are those orators who can sweep the judge with them, lead him to adopt that attitude of mind which they desire, and compel him to weep with them or share their anger.

> Latin: 2.2. altius omnis rei repetenda ratio est. et per totam, ut diximus, causam locus est adfectibus. et eorum non simplex natura nec in transitu tractanda, quo nihil adferre maius vis orandi potest. cetera forsitan tenuis quoque et angusta ingenii vena, si modo vel doctrina vel usu sit adiuta, generare atque ad frugem aliquam perducere queat; certe sunt semperque fuerunt non parum multi, qui satis perite, quae essent probationibus utilia, reperirent; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo, ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum, atque (ut dicam, quod sentio) dignos, a quibus causam diserti docerentur. vero iudicem rapere et, in quem vellet habitum animi, posset perducere, quo dicente flendum irascendumve esset, rarus fuit.

[¶12] 2.4. And yet it is this emotional power that dominates the court, it is this form of eloquence that is the queen of all. For as a rule arguments arise out of the case itself, and the better cause has always the larger number to support it, so that the party who wills by means of them will have no further satisfaction than that of knowing that his advocate did not fail him.

> Latin: 2.4. hoc est quod dominetur in iudiciis, haec eloquentia regnat. Namque argumenta plerumque nascuntur ex causa, et pro meliore parte plura sunt semper, ut, qui per haec vicit, tantum non defuisse sibi advocatum sciat.

[¶13] 2.5. But the peculiar task of the orator arises when the minds of the judges require force to move them, and their thoughts have actually to be led away from the contemplation of the truth. No instruction from the litigant can secure this, nor can such power be acquired merely by the study of a brief. Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal to the emotions will do more, for it will make them wish our case to be the better. And what they wish, they will also believe.

> Latin: 2.5. vero animis iudicum vis adferenda est et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est. non docet litigator, hoc causarum libellis non continetur. enim efficiant sane ut causam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus praestant ut etiam velint; sed id quod volunt credunt quoque.

[¶14] 2.6. For as soon as they begin to be angry, to feel favourably disposed, to hate or pity, they begin to take a personal interest in the case, and just as lovers are incapable of forming a reasoned judgment on the beauty of the object of their affections, because passion forestalls the sense of sight, so the judge, when overcome by his emotions, abandons all attempt to enquire into the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the tide of passion, and yields himself unquestioning to the torrent.

> Latin: 2.6. cum irasci, favere, odisse, misereri coeperunt, agi iam rem suam existimant; et, sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt, quia sensum oculorum praecipit animus, ita omnem veritatis inquirendae rationem iudex omittit occupatus adfectibus; aestu fertur et velut rapido flumini obsequitur.

[¶15] 2.7. Thus the verdict of the court shows how much weight has been carried by the arguments and the evidence; but when the judge has been really moved by the orator he reveals his feelings while he is still sitting and listening to the case. When those tears, which are the aim of most perorations, well forth from his eyes, is he not giving his verdict for all to see? It is to this, therefore, that the orator must devote all his powers,
There lie the task and toil!
Without this all else is bare and meagre, weak and devoid of charm. For it is in its power over the emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be found.

> Latin: 2.7. argumenta ac testes quid egerint, pronuntiatio ostendit; commotus autem ab oratore iudex, quid sentiat, sedens adhuc atque audiens confitetur. cum ille, qui plerisque perorationibus petitur, fletus erumpit, non palam dicta sententia est? igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus, hic labor est, sine quo cetera nuda, ieiuna, infirma, ingrata sint; adeo velut spiritus operis huius atque animus est in adfectibus. autem, sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci πάθος vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus, alteram Ἦθος cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus;

[¶16] 2.8. Emotions however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is called pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by adfectus (emotion): the other is called ethos, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent: it is however rendered by mores (morals) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us. But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects; for the term morals includes every attitude of the mind. The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill. Some add that ethos is continuous, while pathos is momentary. While admitting that this is usually the ease, I still hold that there are some subjects which demand that the more violent emotion should be continuous. But, although the gentler emotions require less force and impetus, they call for no less art and experience than the more vehement, and are demanded in a greater number of cases, indeed in a certain sense they are required in all.

> Latin: 2.8. mores appellantur, atque inde pars quoque illa philosophiae ἠθική moralis est dicta. ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur quam morum quaedam proprietas; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus mentis continetur. voluntatem complecti quam nomina interpretari maluerunt. igitur πάθος concitatos, Ἦθος mites atque compositos esse dixerunt; in altero vehementer commotos, in altero lenes; denique hos imperare, illos persuadere; hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere. quidam? Ἦθος perpetuum, πάθος temporale esse. ut accidere frequentius fateor, ita nonnullas credo esse materias, quae continuum desiderent adfectum. tamen minus artis aut usus hi leniores habent, virium atque impetus non tantundem exigunt. causis vero etiam pluribus versantur, immo secundum quendam intellectum in omnibus.

[¶17] 2.11. For as everything treated by the orator may be regarded from the ethical standpoint, we may apply the word ethos whenever he speaks of what is honourable and expedient or of what ought or ought not to be done. Some regard commendation and excuse as the peculiar spheres of ethos, but while I admit that they do fall within its sphere, I do not regard them as being alone in so doing.

> Latin: 2.11. cum ex illo ethico loco nihil non ab oratore tractetur, quidquid de honestis et utilibus, denique faciendis et non faciendis dicitur, Ἦθος vocari potest. commendationem atque excusationem propria huius officii putauerunt, nec abnuo esse ista in hac parte; sed non concedo ut sola sint. illud adhuc adiicio, πάθος atque Ἦθος esse interim ex eadem natura, ita ut illud maius sit, hoc minus, ut amor πάθος caritas Ἦθος interdum diversa inter se, sicut in epilogis, nam quae πάθος concitavit, Ἦθος solet mitigare.

[¶18] 2.12. Indeed I would add that pathos and ethos are sometimes of the same nature, differing only in degree; love for instance comes under the head of pathos, affection of ethos; sometimes however they differ, a distinction which is important for the peroration, since ethos is generally employed to calm the storm aroused by pathos. I ought however to explain what is meant by ethos in greater detail, since the term is not in itself sufficiently expressive of its meaning. The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in an orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognise it.

> Latin: 2.12. tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari videtur. Ἦθος quod intelligimus quodque a dicentibus desideramus, id erit, quod ante omnia bonitate commendabitur, non solum mite ac placidum, sed plerumque blandum et humanum et audientibus amabile atque iucundum, in quo exprimendo summa virtus ea est, ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodammodo agnoscantur.

[¶19] 2.14. This kind of ethos should be especially displayed in cases where the persons concerned are intimately connected, whenever we tolerate or pardon any act or offer satisfaction or admonition, in all of which cases there should be no trace of anger or hatred. On the other hand the moderation shown by a father to his son, a guardian to his ward or a husband to his wife will differ from that which is shown by an old man to a youthful stranger who has insulted him or by a man of high rank to his inferior, since in the former cases they emphasise their affection for the wrongdoer and there is no desire to do anything that will excite dislike against them save by the manifestation of the fact that they still love them; while in the one case the offended party should be no more than provoked, in the other he should he really deeply moved. Of the same character, though less violent, is the emotion to be shown when we ask pardon for the errors of the young, or apologise for some youthful amour.

> Latin: 2.14. est sine dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas, quotiens ferimus, ignoscimus, satisfacimus, monemus, procul ab ira, procul ab odio. tamen alia patris adversus filium, tutoris adversus pupillum, mariti adversus uxorem moderatio est (hi enim praeferunt eorum ipsorum, a quibus laeduntur, caritatem, neque alio modo invisos eos faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur), alia, cum senex adolescentis alieni convicium, honestus inferioris fert; hic enim tantum concitari, illic etiam adfici debet.

[¶20] 2.15. Sometimes again gentle raillery of another's passion may derive its tone from ethos, though only to a partial extent. More closely dependent on ethos are the skilful exercise of feigned emotion or the employment of irony in making apologies or asking questions, irony being the term which is applied to words which mean something other than they seem to express.

> Latin: 2.15. et illa ex eadem natura, sed notus adhuc minoris, veniam petere adulescentiae, defendere amores. etiam lenis caloris alieni derisus ex hac forma venit, sed his non ex locis tantum. aliquanto magis propria fuit virtus simulationis, satisfaciendi rogandi εἰρωνεία quae diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit.

[¶21] 2.16. From the same source springs also that more powerful method of exciting hatred, when by a feigned submission to our opponents we pass silent censure on their violence. For the very fact of our yielding serves to demonstrate their insupportable arrogance, while orators who have a passion for abuse or are given to affect freedom of speech fail to realise that it is a far more effective course to make your antagonist unpopular than to abuse him. For the former course makes our antagonists disliked, the latter ourselves.

> Latin: 2.16. etiam ille maior ad concitandum odium nasci adfectus solet, cum hoc ipso, quod nos adversariis summittimus, intellegitur tacita impotentiae exprobratio. eos graves et intolerabiles id ipsum demonstrat, quod cedimus, et ignorant cupidi maledicendi aut adfectatores libertatis plus invidiam quam convicium posse; nam invidia adversarios, convicium nos invisos facit.

[¶22] 2.17. The emotion of love and longing for our friends and connexions is perhaps of an intermediate character, being stronger than ethos and weaker than pathos. There is also good reason for giving the name of ethos to those scholastic exercises in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards and superstitious persons according as our theme may require. For if ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is engaged in portraying such character.

> Latin: 2.17. iam paene medius adfectus est ex amoribus et ex desideriis amicorum et necessariorum, nam et hoc maior est et illo minor. parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ἤθη dixerimus, quibus plerumque rusticos, superstitiosos, avaros, timidos secundum condicionem propositionum effingimus. si ἤθη mores sunt cum hos imitamur, ex his ducimus orationem.

[¶23] 2.18. Finally ethos in all its forms requires the speaker to be a man of good character and courtesy. For it is most important that he should himself possess or be thought to possess those virtues for the possession of which it is his duty, if possible, to commend his client as well, while the excellence of his own character will make his pleading all the more convincing and will be of the utmost service to the cases which he undertakes. For the orator who gives the impression of being a bad man while he is speaking, is actually speaking badly, since his words seem to be insincere owing to the absence of ethos which would otherwise have revealed itself.

> Latin: 2.18. Ἦθος omne bonum et comem virum poscit. virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, approbare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur. proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem. qui, dum dicit, malus videtur, utique male dicit; non enim videtur iusta dicere, alioqui Ἦθος videretur.

[¶24] 2.19. Consequently the style of oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and persuasively, and therefore the intermediate style of oratory is most suitable.

> Latin: 2.19. ipsum etiam dicendi genus in hoc placidum debet esse ac mite; nihil superbum, nihil elatum saltem ac sublime desiderat; proprie, iucunde, credibiliter dicere sat est, ideoque et medius ille orationis modus maxime convenit.

[¶25] 2.20. The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by emotion, is of a different character, and I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate to such appeals and I have already spoken on the subject in discussing the exordium and the peroration.

> Latin: 2.20. est huic, quod πάθος dicitur, quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus; et, ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile. pars circa iram, odium, metum, invidiam, miserationem fere tota versatur. quibus ex locis ducenda sint, et manifestum omnibus et a nobis in ratione prooemii atque epilogi dictum est. metum tamen duplicem intelligi volo, quem patimur et quem facimus, et invidiam;

[¶26] 2.21. I wish however to point out that fear is of two kinds, that which we feel and that which we cause in others. Similarly there are two kinds of invidia (hatred, envy), to which the two adjectives invidus (envious) and invidious (invidious, hateful) correspond. The first supplies an epithet for persons, the second for things, and it is in this latter connexion that the orator's task is even more onerous. For though some things are hateful in themselves such as parricide, murder, poisoning, other things have to be made to seem hateful.

> Latin: 2.21. namque altera invidum, altera invidiosum facit. autem hominis, illud rei est; in quo et plus habet operis oratio. quaedam videntur gravia per se, parricidium, caedes, veneficium;

[¶27] 2.22. This latter contingency arises when we attempt to shew that what we have suffered is of a more horrible nature than what are usually regarded as great evils. Vergil will provide an example in the lines:—
blest beyond all maidens Priam's child,
Beneath Troy's lofty bulwarks doomed to die
Upon the tomb of him that was thy foe.
For how wretched was the lot of Andromache, if Polyxena be accounted happy in comparison with her!

> Latin: 2.22. quaedam efficienda sunt. autem contingit, cum magnis alioqui malis gravius esse id quod passi sumus, ostenditur; quale est apud Virgilium:
O felix una ante alias Priameïa virgo,
ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altis
mori—
(quam miser enim casus Andromachae, si comparata ei felix Polyxena);

[¶28] 2.23. Again the same problem arises when we endeavour to magnify our wrongs by saying that other far lesser ills are intolerable; e.g. “If you had merely struck him, your conduct would have been indefensible. But you did more, you wounded him.” However I will deal with this subject more fully when I come to speak of amplification. Meanwhile I will content myself with the observation that the aim of appeals to the emotion is not merely to slew the bitter and grievous nature of ills that actually are so, but also to make ills which are usually regarded as tolerable seem unendurable, as for instance when we represent insulting words as inflicting more grievous injury than an actual blow or represent disgrace as being worse than death.

> Latin: 2.23. aut cum ita exaggeramus iniuriam nostram, ut etiam quae multo minora sunt intoleranda dicamus: pulsasses, defendi non poteras; vulnerasti. haec diligentius, cum de amplificatione dicemus. Interim notasse contentus sum, non id solum agere adfectus, ut, quae sunt, ostendantur acerba ac luctuosa, sed etiam ut, quae toleranda haberi solent, gravia videantur: ut cum in maledicto plus iniuriae quam in manu, in infamia plus poenae dicimus quam in morte.

[¶29] 2.24. For the force of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of the facts lead him, but awakens emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest. This is known as deriosis, that is to say, language giving additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful, an accomplishment in which Demosthenes created immense and special effect.

> Latin: 2.24. in hoc eloquentiae vis est, ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat, in quod ipsa rei natura ducetur, sed aut, qui non est, aut maiorem quam est, faciat adfectum. est illa, quae δείνωσις vocatur, rebus indignis, asperis, invidiosis addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit.

[¶30] 2.25. If I thought it sufficient to follow traditional rules, I should regard it as adequate treatment for this topic to omit nothing that I have read or been taught, provided that it be reasonably sound. But my design is to bring to light the secret principles of this art, and to open up the inmost recesses of the subject, giving the result not of teaching received from others, but of my own experience and the guidance of nature herself.

> Latin: 2.25. tradita mihi sequi praecepta sufficeret satisfeceram huic parti, nihil eorum quae legi vel didici, quod modo probabile fuit, omittendo; sed eruere in animo est quae latent, et penitus ipsa huius loci aperire penetralia, quae quidem non aliquo tradente, sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi. enim, quantum ego quidem sentio, circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur ipsi.

[¶31] 2.26. The prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel those emotions oneself. It is sometimes positively ridiculous to counterfeit grief, anger and indignation, if we content ourselves with accommodating our words and looks and make no attempt to adapt our own feelings to the emotions to be expressed. What other reason is there for the eloquence with which mourners express their grief; or for the fluency which anger lends even to the uneducated, save the fact that their minds are stirred to power by the depth and sincerity of their feelings? Consequently, if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge.

> Latin: 2.26. et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio, si verba vultumque tantum, non etiam animum accommodarimus. enim aliud est causae, ut lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare videantur et ira nonnunquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat, quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum? in iis, quae esse verisimilia volemus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur adfectibus, et a tali animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudicem volet.

[¶32] 2.27. Will he grieve who can find no trace of grief in the words with which I seek to move him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring under the emotion which he demands from his audience? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eyes are dry? It is utterly impossible.

> Latin: 2.27. ille dolebit, qui audiet me, qui in hoc dicam, non dolentem? irascetur, si nihil ipse, qui in iram concitat se idque exigit, similia patietur? siccis agentis oculis lacrimas dabit? non potest.

[¶33] 2.28. Fire alone can kindle, and moisture alone can wet, nor can one thing impart any colour to another save that which it possesses itself. Accordingly, the first essential is that those feelings should prevail with us that we wish to prevail with the judge, and that we should be moved ourselves before we attempt to move others.

> Latin: 2.28. incendit nisi ignis nec madescimus nisi humore nec res ulla dat alteri colorem quem non ipsa habet. est igitur, ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud iudicem volumus, adficiamurque antequam adficere conemur.

[¶34] 2.29. But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There are certain experiences which the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes.

> Latin: 2.29. quomodo fiet, ut adficiamur? neque enim sunt motus in nostra potestate. etiam de hoc dicere. φαντασίας Graeci vocant, nos sane visiones appellemus, per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur.

[¶35] 2.30. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word εὐφαντασίωτος and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or daydreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it may be possible to turn this form of hallucination to some profit.

> Latin: 2.30. quisquis bene conceperit, is erit in adfectibus potentissimus. quidam dicunt εὐφαντασίωτον, qui sibi res, voces, actus secundum verum optime finget; quod quidem nobis volentibus facile continget. vero inter otia animorum et spes inanes et velut somnia quaedam vigilantium ita nos hae de quibus loquor imagines prosequuntur, ut peregrinari, navigare, proeliari, populos alloqui, divitiarum, quas non habemus, usum videamur disponere, nec cogitare sed facere: hoc animi vitium ad utilitatem non transferemus?

[¶36] 2.31. I am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connexion? Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy, or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken body fall? Will not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death-rattle, be indelibly impressed upon my mind?

> Latin: 2.31. hominem occisum queror; non omnia, quae in re praesenti accidisse credibile est, in oculis habebo? non percussor ille subitus erumpet? non expavescet circumventus? exclamabit vel rogabit vel fugiet? non ferientem, non concidentem videbo? non animo sanguis et pallor et gemitus extremus, denique exspirantis hiatus insidet?

[¶37] 2.32. From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write—
Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall
And all the thread was spilled,
Or, In his smooth breast the gaping wound
or the description of the horse at the funeral of Pallas, “his trappings laid aside”? And how vivid was the image of death conceived by the poet when he wrote- “And dying sees his own dear Argive home”? Again, when we desire to awaken pity, we must actually believe that the ills of which we complain have befallen our own selves, and must persuade our minds that this is really the case.

> Latin: 2.32. ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere; et adfectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur. non ex his visionibus illa sunt; manibus radii, revolutaque pensa? — patens in pectore vulnus? equus ille in funere Pallantis,—positis insignibus?? non idem poeta penitus ultimi fati concepit imaginem, ut diceret:

[¶38] 2.34. We must identify ourselves with the persons of whom we complain that they have suffered grievous, unmerited and bitter misfortune, and must plead their case and for a brief space feel their suffering as though it were our own, while our words must be such as we should use if we stood in their shoes.

> Latin: 2.34. dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos? vero miseratione opus erit, nobis ea, de quibus queremur, accidisse credamus atque id animo nostro persuadeamus. illi simus, quos gravia, indigna, tristia passos queremur, nec agamus rem quasi alienam, sed adsumamus parumper illum dolorem. dicemus, quae in nostro simili casu dicturi fuissemus.

[¶39] 2.35. I have often seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, leave the theatre still drowned in tears after concluding the performance of some moving role. But if the mere delivery of words written by another has the power to set our souls on fire with fictitious emotions, what will the orator do whose duty it is to picture to himself the facts and who has it in his power to feel the same emotion as his client whose interests are at stake?

> Latin: 2.35. ego saepe histriones atque comoedos, cum ex aliquo graviore actu personam deposuissent, flentes adhuc egredi. in alienis scriptis sola pronuntiatio ita falsis accendit adfectibus, quid nos faciemus, qui ilia cogitare debemus ut moveri periclitantium vice possimus?

[¶40] 2.36. Even in the schools it is desirable that the student should be moved by his theme, and should imagine it to be true; indeed, it is all the more desirable then, since, as a rule in scholastic declamations, the speaker more often appears as the actual litigant than as his advocate. Suppose we are impersonating an orphan, a shipwrecked man, or one in grave peril. What profit is there in assuming such a rôle unless we also assume the emotions which it involves? I have thought it necessary not to conceal these considerations from my reader, since they have contributed to the acquisition of such reputation for talent as I possess or once possessed. I have frequently been so much moved while speaking, that I have not merely been wrought upon to tears, but have turned pale and shown all the symptoms of genuine grief.

> Latin: 2.36. in schola quoque rebus ipsis adfici convenit easque veras sibi fingere, hoc magis quod illic ut litigatores loquimur frequentius quam ut advocati. agimus et naufragum et periclitantem, quorum induere personas quid attinet, nisi adfectus adsumimus? dissimulanda mihi non fuerunt, quibus ipse, quantuscunque sum aut fui, pervenisse me ad aliquod nomen ingenii credo; frequenter motus sum, ut me non lacrimae solum deprehenderent, sed pallor et veri similis dolor.

[¶41] 3.1. I now turn to a very different talent, namely that which dispels the graver emotions of the judge by exciting his laughter, frequently diverts his attention from the facts of the case, and sometimes even refreshes him and revives him when he has begun to be bored or wearied by the case. How hard it is to attain success in this connexion is shown by the cases of the two great masters of Greek and Roman oratory.

> Latin: 3.1. diversa virtus, quae risum iudicis movendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat. sit autem in ea difficultas, vel duo maxime oratores, alter Graecae alter Latinae eloquentiae principes, docent.

[¶42] 3.2. For many think that Demosthenes was deficient in this faculty, and that Cicero used it without discrimination. Indeed, it is impossible to suppose that Demosthenes deliberately avoided all display of humour, since his few jests are so unworthy of his other excellences that they clearly show that he lacked the power, not merely that he disliked to use it.

> Latin: 3.2. plerique Demostheni facultatem defuisse huius rei credunt, Ciceroni modum. videri potest noluisse Demosthenes, cuius pauca admodum dicta nec sane ceteris eius virtutibus respondentia palam ostendunt, non displicuisse illi iocos, sed non contigisse.

[¶43] 3.3. Cicero, on the other hand, was regarded as being unduly addicted to jests, not merely outside the courts, but in his actual speeches as well. Personally (though whether I am right in this view, or have been led astray by an exaggerated admiration for the prince of orators, I cannot say), I regard him as being the possessor of a remarkable turn of wit. For his daily speech was full of humour, while in his disputes in court and in his examination of witnesses he produced more good jests than any other, while the somewhat insipid jokes which he launches against Verres are always attributed by him to others and produced as evidence: wherefore, the more vulgar they are, the more probable is it that they are not the invention of the orator, but were current as public property. I wish, however, that Tiro, or whoever it may have been that published the three books of Cicero's jests, had restricted their number and had shown more judgment in selecting than zeal in collecting them.

> Latin: 3.3. vero non solum extra iudicia, sed in ipsis etiam orationibus habitus est nimius risus adfectator. quidem, sive id recte iudico sive amore immodico praecipui in eloquentia viri labor, mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas. et in sermone cotidiano multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam quisquam dixit facete, et ipsa ilia, quae sunt in Verrem dicta frigidius, aliis adsignavit et testimonii loco posuit; ut, quo sunt magis vulgaria, eo sit credibilius ilia ab oratore non ficta sed passim esse iactata.

[¶44] 3.5. For he would then have been less exposed to the censure of his calumniators, although the latter will, in any case, as in regard to all the manifestations of his genius, find it easier to detect superfluities than deficiencies. The chief difficulty which confronts the orator in this connexion lies in the fact that sayings designed to raise a laugh are generally untrue (and falsehood always involves a certain meanness), and are often deliberately distorted, and, further, never complimentary: while the judgments formed by the audience on such jests will necessarily vary, since the effect of a jest depends not on the reason, but on an emotion which it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe.

> Latin: 3.5. libertus eius Tiro aut alius, quisquis fuit, qui tris hac de re libros edidit, parcius dictorum numero indulsissent et plus iudicii in eligendis quam in congerendis studii adhibuissent: minus obiectus calumniantibus foret, qui tamen nunc quoque, ut in omni eius ingenio, facilius, quod reici quam quod adiici possit, invenient. autem summam rei difficultatem primum, quod ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est (hoc semper humile), saepe ex industria depravatum, praeterea nunquam honorificum; tum varia hominum iudicia in eo, quod non ratione aliqua sed motu animi quodam nescio an enarrabili iudicatur.

[¶45] 3.7. For I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation, though many have attempted to do so, of the cause of laughter, which is excited not merely by words or deeds, but sometimes even by touch. Moreover, there is great variety in the things which raise a laugh, since we laugh not merely at those words or actions which are smart or witty, but also at those which reveal folly, anger or fear. Consequently, the cause of laughter is uncertain, since laughter is never far removed from derision.

> Latin: 3.7. enim ab ullo satis explicari puto, licet multi temptaverint, unde risus, qui non solum facto aliquo dictove, sed interdum quodam etiam corporis tacta lacessitur. non una ratione moveri solet, neque enim acute tantum ac venuste sed stulte, iracunde, timide dicta aut facta ridentur; ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est, quod a derisu non procul abest risus.

[¶46] 3.8. For, as Cicero says, “Laughter has its basis in some kind or other of deformity or ugliness,” and whereas, when we point to such a blemish in others, the result is known as wit, it is called folly when the same jest is turned against ourselves. Now, though laughter may be regarded as a trivial matter, and an emotion frequently awakened by buffoons, actors or fools, it has a certain imperious force of its own which it is very hard to resist.

> Latin: 3.8. enim, ut Cicero dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine, quae cum in aliis demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos dicentes recidunt, stultitia vocatur. videatur autem res levis et quae ab scurris, mimis, insipientibus denique saepe moveatur, tamen habet vim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repugnari minime potest.

[¶47] 3.9. It often breaks out against our will and extorts confession of its power, not merely from our face and voice, but convulses the whole body as well. Again, it frequently turns the scale in matters of great importance, as I have already observed: for instance, it often dispels hatred or anger.

> Latin: 3.9. etiam invitis saepe, nec vultus modo ac vocis exprimit confessionem, sed totum corpus vi sua concutit. autem saepe (ut dixi) maximarum momenta vertit, ut cum odium iramque frequentissime frangat.

[¶48] 3.10. A proof of this is given by the story of the young men of Tarentum, who had made a number of scurrilous criticisms of Pyrrhus over the dinner table: they were called upon to answer for their statements, and, since the charge was one that admitted neither of denial nor of excuse, they succeeded in escaping, thanks to a happy jest which made the king laugh: for one of the accused said, “Yes, and if the bottle hadn't been empty, we should have killed you!” a jest which succeeded in dissipating the animosity which the charge had aroused.

> Latin: 3.10. sunt iuvenes Tarentini, qui multa de rege Pyrrho sequius inter cenam locuti, cum rationem facti reposcerentur et neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu sunt et opportune ioco elapsi. unus ex iis,, inquit, nisi lagona defecisset, occidissemus te; eaque urbanitate tota est invidia criminis dissoluta.

[¶49] 3.11. Still, whatever the essence of humour may be, and although I would not venture to assert that it is altogether independent of art (for it involves a certain power of observation, and rules for its employment have been laid down by writers both of Greece and Rome), I will insist on this much, that it depends mainly on nature and opportunity.

> Latin: 3.11. hoc, quidquid est, ut non ausim dicere carere omnino arte, quia nonnullam observationem habet, suntque ad id pertinentia et a Graecis et a Latinis composita praecepta, ita plane adfirmo, praecipue positum esse in natura et in occasione.

[¶50] 3.12. The influence of nature consists not merely in the fact that one man is quicker or cleverer than another in the invention of jests (for such a power can be increased by teaching), but also in the possession of some peculiar charm of look or manner, the effect of which is such that the same remarks would be less entertaining if uttered by another.

> Latin: 3.12. natura non tantum in hoc valet, ut acutior quis atque habilior sit ad inveniendum (nam id sane doctrina possit augeri), sed inest proprius quibusdam decor in habitu ac vultu, ut eadem illa minus alio dicente urbana esse videantur.

[¶51] 3.13. Opportunity, on the other hand, is dependent on circumstances, and is of such importance that with its assistance not merely the unlearned, but even mere country bumpkins are capable of producing effective witticisms: while much again may depend on some previous remark made by another which will provide opportunity for repartee. For wit always appears to greater advantage in reply than in attack.

> Latin: 3.13. vero et in rebus est cuius est tanta vis, ut saepe adiuti ea non indocti modo, sed etiam rustici salse dicant, et in eo cum quis aliquid dixerit prior. enim longe venustiora omnia in respondendo quam in provocando.

[¶52] 3.14. We are also confronted by the additional difficulty that there are no specific exercises for the development of humour nor professors to teach it. Consequently, while convivial gatherings and conversation give rise to frequent displays of wit, since daily practice develops the faculty, oratorical wit is rare, for it has no fixed rules to guide it, but must adapt itself to the ways of the world.

> Latin: 3.14. difficultati, quod eius rei nulla exercitatio est, nulli praeceptores. in conviviis et sermonibus multi dicaces, quia in hoc usu cotidiano proficimus. urbanitas rara nec ex arte propria sed ad hanc consuetudinem commodata.

[¶53] 3.15. There has, however, never been anything to prevent the composition of themes such as will afford scope for humour, so that our controversial declamations may have an admixture of jests, while special topics may be set which will give the young student practice in the play of wit.

> Latin: 3.15. autem vetabat et componi materias in hoc idoneas, ut controversiae permixtis salibus fingerentur, vel res proponi singulas ad iuvenum talem exercitationem. illae ipsae ( dicta sunt ac vocantur), quas certis diebus festae licentiae dicere solebamus, si paulum adhibita ratione fingerentur, aut aliquid in his serium quoque esset admixtum, plurimum poterant utilitatis adferre;

[¶54] 3.16. Nay, even those pleasantries in which we indulge on certain occasions of festive licence (and to which we give the name of mots, as, indeed, they are), if only a little more good sense were employed in their invention, and they were seasoned by a slight admixture of seriousness, might afford a most useful training. As it is, they serve merely to divert the young and merrymakers. There are various names by which we describe wit, but we have only to consider them separately to perceive their specific meaning. First, there is urbanitas, which I observe denotes language with a smack of the city in its words, accent and idiom, and further suggests a certain tincture of learning derived from associating with well-educated men; in a word, it represents the opposite of rusticity. The meaning of venustus is obvious;

> Latin: 3.16. quae nunc iuvenum vel sibi ludentium exercitatio est. autem nominibus in eadem re vulgo utimur; quae tamen si diducas, suam quandam propriam vim ostendent. et urbanitas dicitur, qua quidem significari video sermonem praeferentem in verbis et sono et usu proprium quendam gustum urbis et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas. esse, quod cum gratia quadam et venere dicatur, apparet.