---
title: "The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria"
author: "Quintilian"
translator: "Harold Edgeworth Butler"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 26 of 53
url: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/26/
cite: "Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria, section 26. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/26/"
---

# The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria

*Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler*

Twelve books on training a good man skilled in speaking, from the nursery to the forum.

> Latin: ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1002.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 26. Book VI · chapters 3–5

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/26/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/26/#p-N

[¶0] 3.84. There remains the prettiest of all forms of humour, namely the jest which depends for success on deceiving anticipations or taking another's words in a sense other than he intended. The unexpected element may be employed by the attacking party, as in the example cited by Cicero, “What does this man lack save wealth and—virtue?” or in the remark of Afer, “For pleading causes he is most admirably—dressed.” Or it may be employed to meet a statement made by another, as it was by Cicero on hearing a false report of Vatinius' death: he had met one of the latter's freedmen and asked him, “Is all well?” The freedman answered, “All is well.” To which Cicero replied, “Is he dead, then?”

> Latin: 3.84. genus decipiendi opinionem aut dicta aliter intellegendi, quae sunt in omni hac materia vel venustissima. et a lacessente poni solet, quale est, quod refert Cicero, huic abest nisi res et virus? aut illud Afri, in agendis causis optime vestitus; et in occurrendo, ut Cicero, audita falsa Vatinii morte, cum obvium libertum eius interrogasset, omnia? dicenti,, est?

[¶1] 3.85. But the loudest laughter of all is produced by simulation and dissimulation, proceedings which differ but little and are almost identical; but whereas simulation implies the pretence of having a certain opinion of one's own, dissimulation consists in feigning that one does not understand someone else's meaning. Afer employed simulation, when his opponents in a certain case kept saying that Celsina (who was an influential lady) knew all about the facts, and he, pretending to believe that she was a man, said, “Who is he?”

> Latin: 3.85. inquit. autem circa simulationem et dissimulationem risus est, quae sunt vicina et prope eadem; sed simulatio est certam opinionem animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se parum intelligere fingentis. Afer, cum in causa subinde dicentibus Celsinam de re cognovisse, quae erat potens femina: est, inquit, iste? Celsinam enim videri sibi virum finxit.

[¶2] 3.86. Cicero on the other hand employed dissimulation when Sextus Annalis gave evidence damaging to the client whom lie was defending, and the accuser kept pressing him with the question, “Tell me, Marcus Tullius, what have you to say about Sextus Annalis?” To which he replied by beginning to recite the Sixth book of the Annals of Ennius, which commences with the line,
Who may the causes vast of war unfold?
This kind of jest finds its most frequent opportunity in ambiguity, as for example, when Cascellius, on being consulted by a client who said, “I wish to divide my ship,” replied, “You will lose it then.”

> Latin: 3.86. Cicero, cum Sex. Annalis testis reum laesisset, et instaret identidem accusator ei,, M. Tulli, numquid potes de Sex. Annali? versus enim dicere coepit de libro Ennii annali sexto:
potis ingentis causas evolvere belli?

[¶3] 3.87. But there are also other ways of distorting the meaning; we may for instance give a serious statement a comparatively trivial sense, like the man who, when asked what he thought of a man who had been caught in the act of adultery, replied that he had been too slow in his movements.

> Latin: 3.87. sine dubio frequentissimam dat occasionem ambiguitas: ut Cascellio, qui consultatori dicenti, lividere volo,, inquit. averti intellectus et aliter solet, cum ab asperioribus ad leniora deflectitur: ut qui interrogatus, quid sentiret de eo, qui in adulterio deprehensus esset, fuisse respondit.

[¶4] 3.88. Of a similar nature are jests whose point lies in insinuation. Such was the reply which Cicero quotes as given to the man who complained that his wife had hung herself on a fig-tree. “I wish,” said someone, “you would give me a slip of that tree to plant.” For there the meaning is obvious, though it is not expressed in so many words.

> Latin: 3.88. confine est, quod dicitur per suspicionem: quale illud apud Ciceronem querenti, quod uxor sua ex fico sese suspendisset,, des mihi surculum ex illa arbore, ut inseram; intelligitur enim quod non dicitur.

[¶5] 3.89. Indeed the essence of all wit lies in the distortion of the true and natural meaning of words: a perfect instance of this is when we misrepresent our own or another's opinions or assert some impossibility.

> Latin: 3.89. hercule omnis salse dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est rectum verumque dicatur: quod fit totum fingendis aut nostris aut alienis persuasionibus aut dicendo quod fieri non potest.

[¶6] 3.90. Juba misrepresented another man's opinion, when he replied to one who complained of being bespattered by his horse, “What, do you think I am a Centaur?” Gaius Cassius misrepresented his own, when he said to a soldier whom he saw hurrying into battle without his sword, “Shew yourself a handy man with your fists, comrade.” So too did Galba, when served with some fish that had been partially eaten the day before and had been placed on the table with the uneaten sides turned uppermost: “We must lose no time,” he said, “for there are people under the table at work on the other side.” Lastly there is the jibe that Cicero made against Curius, which I have already cited; for it was clearly impossible that he should be still unborn at a time when he was already declaiming.

> Latin: 3.90. finxit Iuba, qui querenti, quod ab equo suo esset aspersus,? Tu, inquit, me Hippocentaurum putas? suam C. Cassius, qui militi sine gladio decurrenti, Heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris, inquit. Galba de piscibus, qui cum pridie ex parte adesi et versati postera die appositi essent,, alii subcenant, inquit. illud Cicero, ut dixi, adversus Curium; fieri enim certe non poterat ut, cum declamaret, natus non esset.

[¶7] 3.91. There is also a form of misrepresentation which has its basis in irony, of which a saying of Gaius Caesar will provide an example. A witness asserted that the accused attempted to wound him in the thighs, and although it would have been easy to ask him why he attacked that portion of his body above all others, he merely remarked, “What else could he have done, when you had a helmet and breastplate?”

> Latin: 3.91. et illa ex ironia fictio, qua usus est C. Caesar. cum testis diceret a reo femina sua ferro petita, et esset facilis reprehensio, cur illam potissimum partem corporis vulnerare voluisset: enim faceret, inquit, cum tu galeam et loricam haberes?

[¶8] 3.92. Best of all is it when pretence is met by pretence, as was done in the following instance by Domitius Afer. He had made his will long ago, and one of his more recent friends, in the hopes of securing a legacy if he could persuade him to change it, produced a fictitious story and asked him whether he should advise a senior centurion who, being an old man, had already made his will to revise it; to which Afer replied, “Don't do it: you will offend him.”

> Latin: 3.92. optima est simulatio contra simulantem, qualis illa Domitii Afri fuit: vetus habebat testamentum, et unus ex amicis recentioribus, sperans aliquid ex mutatione tabularum, falsam fabulam intulerat, consulens eum, an primipilari seni iam testato rursus suaderet ordinare suprema iudicia., inquit, facere; offendis illum.

[¶9] 3.93. But the most agreeable of all jests are those which are good humoured and easily digested. Take another example from Afer. Noting that an ungrateful client avoided him in the forum, he sent his servant to him to say, “I hope you are obliged to me for not having seen you.” Again when his steward, being unable to account for certain sums of money, kept saying, “I have not eaten it: I live on bread and water,” he replied, “Master sparrow, pay what you owe.” Such jests the Greeks style ὑπὸ τὸ ἦθος or adapted to character.

> Latin: 3.93. sunt autem ex his omnibus lenia et, ut sic dixerim, boni stomachi: ut Afer idem ingrato litigatori conspectum eius in foro vitanti per nomenclatorem missum ad eum, me, inquit, quod te non vidi? dispensatori, qui, cum reliqua non responderent, dicebat subinde, comedi; pane et aqua vivo,, redde quod debes. ὑπὸ τὸ ἦθος vocant.

[¶10] 3.94. It is a pleasant form of jest to reproach a person with less than would be possible, as Afer did when, in answer to a candidate who said, “I have always shown my respect for your family,” he replied, although he might easily have denied the statement, “You are right, it is quite true.” Sometimes it may be a good joke to speak of oneself, while one may often raise a laugh by reproaching a person to his face with things that it would have been merely bad-mannered to bring up against him behind his back. Of this kind was the remark made by Augustus, when a soldier was making some unreasonable request and Marcianus, whom he suspected of intending to make some no less unfair request, turned up at the same moment: “I will no more grant your request, comrade, than I will that which Marcianus is just going to make.”

> Latin: 3.94. gratus iocus, qui minus exprobrat quam potest, ut idem dicenti candidate, domum tuam colui, cum posset palam negare,, inquit, et verum est. de se dicere ridiculum et quod in alium si absentem diceretur urbanum non erat, quoniam ipsi palam exprobratur, movet risum: quale Augusti est, cum ab eo miles nescio quid improbe peteret et veniret contra Marcianus, quem suspicabatur et ipsum aliquid iniuste rogaturum: magis, inquit, faciam, commilito, quod petis, quam quod Marcianus a me petiturus est.

[¶11] 3.96. Apt quotation of verse may add to the effect of wit. The lines may be quoted in their entirety without alteration, which is so easy a task that Ovid composed an entire book against bad poets out of lines taken from the quatrains of Macer. Such a procedure is rendered specially attractive if it be seasoned by a spice of ambiguity, as in the line which Cicero quoted against Lartius, a shrewd and cunning fellow who was suspected of unfair dealing in a certain case,
Had not Ulysses Lartius intervened.
Or the words may be slightly altered, as in the line quoted against the senator who, although he had always in previous times been regarded as an utter fool, was, after inheriting an estate, asked to speak first on a motion—
What men call wisdom is a legacy,
where legacy is substituted for the original faculty.

> Latin: 3.96. urbanitatem et versus commode positi, seu toti ut sunt (quod adeo facile est, ut Ovidius ex tetrastichon Macri carmine librum in malos poetas composuerit), quod fit gratius, si qua etiam ambiguitate conditur: ut Cicero in Lartium, hominem callidum et versutum, cum is in quadam causa suspectus esset, si qua Ulixes intervasit Lartius;

[¶12] 3.97. Or again we may invent verses resembling well known lines, a trick styled parody by the Greeks. A neat application of proverbs may also be effective, as when one man replied to another, a worthless fellow, who had fallen down and asked to be helped to his feet, “Let someone pick you up who does not know you.”

> Latin: 3.97. seu verbis ex parte mutatis, ut in eum qui, cum antea stultissimus esset habitus, post acceptam hereditatem primus sententiam rogabatur, est, queam vocant sapientiam, pro illo, felicitas est; seu ficti notis versibus similes, quae παρῳδία dicitur.

[¶13] 3.98. Or we may shew our culture by drawing on legend for a jest, as Cicero did in the trial of Verres, when Hortensius said to him as he was examining a witness, “I do not understand these riddles.” “You ought to, then,” said Cicero, “as you have got the Sphinx at home.” Hortensius had received a bronze Sphinx of great value as a present from Verres.

> Latin: 3.98. proverbia opportune aptata: ut homini nequam lapso et, ut allevaretur, roganti, te qui non novit. historia etiam ducere urbanitatem eruditum est: ut Cicero fecit, cum ei testem in iudicio Verris roganti dixisset Hortensius, intelligo haec aenigmata. debes, inquit, cum Sphingem domi habeas; acceperat autem ille a Verre Sphingem aeneam magnae pecuniae.

[¶14] 3.99. Effects of mild absurdity are produced by the simulation of folly and would, indeed, themselves, be foolish were they not fictitious. Take as an example the remark of the man who, when people wondered why he had bought a stumpy candlestick, said, “It will do for lunch.” There are also sayings closely resembling absurdities which derive great point from their sheer irrelevance, like the reply of Dolabella's slave, who, on being asked whether his master had advertised a sale of his property, answered, “He has sold his house.” Sometimes you may get out of a tight comer by giving a humorous explanation of your embarrassment, as the man did who asked a witness, who alleged that lie had been wounded by the accused, whether he had any scar to show for it.

> Latin: 3.99. illa constant stulti simulatione; quae, nisi fingantur, stulta sunt: ut, qui mirantibus, quod humile candelabrum emisset, erit, inquit. illa similia absurdis sunt acria, quae tanquam sine ratione dicta feruntur: ut servus Dolabellae, cum interrogaretur an dominus eius auctionem proposuisset,, inquit, vendidit. Deprehensi interim pudorem suum ridiculo aliquo explicant:

[¶15] 3.100. The witness proceeded to show a huge scar on his thigh, on which lie remarked, “I wish he had wounded you in the side.” A happy use may also be made of insult. Hispo, for example, when the accuser charged him with scandalous crimes, replied, “You judge my character by your own”; while Fulvius Propinquus, when asked by the representative of the emperor whether the documents which he produced were autographs, replied, “Yes, Sir, and the handwriting is genuine, too!”

> Latin: 3.100. ut, qui testem dicentem se a reo vulneratum interrogaverat an cicatricem haberet, cum ille ingentem in femine ostendisset,, inquit, oportuit. quoque uti belle datur: ut Hispo obiicienti atrociora crimina accusatori, ex te metiris, inquit. Fulvius Propinquus legato interroganti an in tabulis, quas proferebat, chirographus esset, verus, inquit, domine.

[¶16] 3.101. Such I have either learned from others or discovered from my own experience to be the commonest sources of humour. But I must repeat that the number of ways in which one may speak wittily are of no less infinite variety than those in which one may speak seriously, for they depend on persons, place, time and chances, which are numberless.

> Latin: 3.101. aut accepi species aut inveni frequentissimas, ex quibus ridicula ducerentur; sed repetam necesse est, infinitas esse tam salse dicendi quam severe, quas praestat persona, locus, tempus, casus denique, qui est maxime varius.

[¶17] 3.102. I have, therefore, touched on the topics of humour that I may not be taxed with having omitted them; but with regard to my remarks on the actual practice and manner of jesting, I venture to assert that they are absolutely indispensable. To these Domitius Marsus, who wrote an elaborate treatise on Urbanity, adds several types of saying, which are not laughable, but rather elegant sayings with a certain charm and attraction of their own, which are suitable even to speeches of the most serious kind: they are characterized by a certain urbane wit, but not of a kind to raise a laugh.

> Latin: 3.102. haec, ne omisisse viderer, attigi; illa autem, quae de usu ipso et modo iocandi complexus sum, audeo confirmare esse plane necessaria. adiicit Domitius Marsus, qui de urbanitate diligentissime scripsit, quaedam non ridicula, sed cuilibet severissimae orationi convenientia eleganter dicta et proprio quodam lepore iucunda; quae sunt quidem urbana sed risum tamen non habent.

[¶18] 3.103. And as a matter of fact his work was not designed to deal with humour, but with urbane wit, a quality which he regards as peculiar to this city, though it was not till a late period that it was understood in this sense, after the word Urbs had come to be accepted as indicating Rome without the addition of any proper noun. He defines it as follows:

> Latin: 3.103. enim ei de risu sed de urbanitate est opus institutum, quam propriam esse nostrae civitatis et sero sic intelligi coeptam, postquam Urbis appellatione, etiamsi nomen proprium non adiiceretur, Romam tamen accipi sit receptum.

[¶19] 3.104. “Urbanity is a certain quality of language compressed into the limits of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable to resistance or attack according as the person or circumstances concerned may demand.” But this definition, if we except the quality of brevity, includes all the virtues of oratory. For it is entirely concerned with persons and things to deal with which in appropriate language is nothing more nor less than the task of perfect eloquence. Why he insisted on brevity being essential I do not know, since in the same book he asserts that many speakers have revealed their urbanity in narrative. And a little later he gives the following definition, which is, as he says, based on the views expressed by Cato: “Urbanity is the characteristic of a man who has produced many good sayings and replies, and who, whether in conversation, in social or convivial gatherings, in public speeches, or under any other circumstances, will speak with humour and appropriateness. If any orator do this, he will undoubtedly succeed in making his audience laugh.”

> Latin: 3.104. sic finit: est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta et apta ad delectandos mouendosque homines in omnem adfectum animi, maxime idonea ad resistendum vel lacessendum, prout quaeque res aut persona desiderat. si brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis virtutes complexa sit. si constat rebus et personis, quod in utrisque oporteat dicere perfectae eloquentiae est. autem brevem esse eam voluerit, nescio, cum idem atque in eodem libro dicat fuisse in multis narrandi urbanitatem. post ita finit, Catonis (ut ait) opinionem secutus, homo erit, cuius multa bene dicta responsaque erunt, et qui in sermonibus, circulis, conviviis, item in contionibus, omni denique loco ridicule commodeque dicet. erunt, quicunque haec faciet orator.

[¶20] 3.106. But if we accept these definitions, we shall have to allow the title of urbane to anything that is well said. It was natural therefore that the author of this definition should classify such sayings under three heads, serious, humorous and intermediate, since all good sayings may be thus classified. But, in my opinion, there are certain forms of humorous saying that may be regarded as not possessing sufficient urbanity.

> Latin: 3.106. si recipimus finitiones, quidquid bene dicetur, et urbane dicti nomen accipiet. illi, qui hoc proposuerat, consentanea fuit illa divisio, ut dictorum urbanorum alia seria, alia iocosa, alia media faceret. est eadem omnium bene dictorum. mihi etiam iocosa quaedam videntur posse in non satis urbana referri.

[¶21] 3.107. For to my thinking urbanity involves the total absence of all that is incongruous, coarse, unpolished and exotic whether in thought, language, voice or gesture, and resides not so much in isolated sayings as in the whole complexion of our language, just as for the Greeks Atticism means that elegance of taste which was peculiar to Athens.

> Latin: 3.107. meo quidem indicio illa est urbanitas, in qua nihil absonum, nihil agreste, nihil inconditum, nihil peregrinum neque sensu neque verbis neque ore gestuve possit deprehendi; ut non tam sit in singulis dictis quam in toto colore dicendi, qualis apud Graecos ἀττικισμὸς ille reddens Athenarum proprium saporem.

[¶22] 3.108. However, out of respect to the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the greatest learning, I will add that he divides serious utterances into three classes, the honorific, the derogatory and the intermediate. As an example of the honorific he quotes the words uttered by Cicero in the pro Ligario with reference to Caesar, “You who forget nothing save injuries.”

> Latin: 3.108. tamen iudicium Marsi, hominis eruditissimi, subtraham, seria partitur in tria genera, honorificum, contumeliosum, medium. honorifici ponit exemplum Ciceronis pro Ligario apud Caesarem, nihil soles oblivisci nisi iniurias;

[¶23] 3.109. The derogatory he illustrates by the words used by Cicero of Pompey and Caesar in a letter to Atticus: “I know whom to avoid, but whom to follow I know not.” Finally, he illustrates the intermediate, which he calls apophthegmatic (as it is), by the passage from Cicero's speech against Catiline where he says, “Death can never be grievous to the brave nor premature for one who has been consul nor a calamity to one that is truly wise.” All these are admirable sayings, but what special title they have to be called urbane I do not see.

> Latin: 3.109. et contumeliosi, quod Attico scripsit de Pompeio et Caesare,, quem fugiam; quem sequar, non habeo; et medii, quod ἀποφθεγματικόν vocat et est ita, cum dixerit, grave mortem accidere viro forti posse nec inmaturam consulari neque miseram sapienti. omnia sunt optime dicta; sed cur proprie nomen urbanitatis accipiant, non video.

[¶24] 3.110. If it is not merely, as I think, the whole complexion of our oratory that deserves this title, but if it is to be claimed for individual sayings as well, I should give the name only to those sayings that are of the same general character as humorous sayings, without actually being humorous. I will give an illustration of what I mean. It was said of Asinius Pollio, who had equal gifts for being grave or gay, that he was “a man for all hours,” and of a pleader who was a fluent speaker extempore, that “his ability was all in ready money.”

> Latin: 3.110. si non totius, ut mihi videtur, orationis color meretur, sed etiam singulis dictis tribuendum est, illa potius urbana dixerim, quae sunt generis eiusdem, quo ridicula dicuntur et tamen ridicula non sunt, ut de Pollione Asinio seriis iocisque pariter accommodato dictum est esse eum omnium horarum;

[¶25] 3.111. Of the same kind, too, was the remark recorded by Marsus as having been made by Pompey to Cicero when the latter expressed distrust of his party: “Go over to Caesar and you will be afraid of me.” Had this last remark been uttered on a less serious subject and with less serious purpose, or had it not been uttered by Pompey himself, we might have counted it among examples of humour.

> Latin: 3.111. et de actore facile dicente ex tempore, ingenium eum in numerato habere; etiam Pompeii, quod refert Marsus, in Ciceronem diffidentem partibus, ad Caesarem, me timebis. enim, si de re minore aut alio animo aut denique non ab ipso dictum fuisset, quod posset inter ridicula numerari.

[¶26] 3.112. I may also add the words used by Cicero in a letter to Caerellia to explain why he endured the supremacy of Caesar so patiently: “These ills must either be endured with the courage of Cato or the stomach of Cicero,” for here again the word “stomach” has a spice of humour in it. I felt that I ought not to conceal my feelings on this point. If I am wrong in my views, I shall not, at any rate, lead my readers astray, since I have stated the opposite view as well, which they are at liberty to adopt if they prefer it.

> Latin: 3.112. illud, quod Cicero Caerelliae scripsit reddens rationem, cur illa C. Caesaris tempora tam patienter toleraret, aut animo Catonis ferenda sunt aut Ciceronis stomacho; stomachus enim ille habet aliquid ioco simile., quae movebant, dissimulanda mihi non fuerunt; in quibus ut erraverim, legentes tamen non decepi, indicata et diverse opinione, quam sequi magis probantibus liberum est.

[¶27] 4.1. IV. With regard to the principles to be observed in forensic debate, it might seem that I should delay such instructions until I had finished dealing with all the details of continuous speaking, since such debates come after the set speeches are done. But since the art of debate turns on invention alone, does not admit of arrangement, has little need for the embellishments of style, and makes no large demand on memory or delivery, I think that it will not be out of place to deal with it here before I proceed to the second of the five parts, since it is entirely dependent on the first. Other writers have omitted to deal with it on the ground perhaps that they thought the subject had been sufficiently covered by their precepts on other topics.

> Latin: 4.1. praecepta poterant videri tunc inchoanda, cum omnia, quae ad continuam orationem pertinent, peregissem, nam est usus eius ordine ultimus; sed, cum sit posita in sola inventione neque habere dispositionem possit nec elocutionis ornamenta magnopere desideret aut circa memoriam et pronuntiationem laboret, prius quam secundam quinque partium, hanc quae tota ex prima pendet tractaturus non alieno loco videor; quam scriptores alii fortasse ideo reliquerunt, quia satis ceteris praeceptis in hanc quoque videbatur esse prospectum.

[¶28] 4.2. For debate consists in attack and defence, on which enough has already been said, since whatever is useful in a continuous speech for the purpose of proof must necessarily be of service in this brief and discontinuous form of oratory. For we say the same things in debate, though we say them in a different manner, since debate consists of questions and replies, a topic with which we have dealt fairly exhaustively in connexion with the examination of witnesses.

> Latin: 4.2. enim ex intentione ac depulsione, de quibus satis traditum est; quia, quidquid in actione perpetua circa probationes utile est, idem in hac brevi atque concisa prosit necesse est. alia dicuntur in altercatione, sed aliter, aut interrogando aut respondendo. rei fere omnis observatio in illo testium loco excussa nobis est.

[¶29] 4.3. But since this work is designed on an ample scale and since no one can be called a perfect orator unless he be an expert debater, we must devote a little special attention to this accomplishment as well, which as a matter of fact is not seldom the deciding factor in a forensic victory.

> Latin: 4.3. quia latius hoc opus aggressi sumus neque perfectus orator sine hac virtute dici potest, paululum impendamus huic quoque peculiaris operae, quae quidem in quibusdam causis ad victoriam vel plurimum valet.

[¶30] 4.4. For just as the continuous speech is the predominant weapon in general questions of quality (where the inquiry is as to whether an act was right or wrong), and as a rule is adequate to clear up questions of definition and almost all those in which the facts are ascertained or inferred by conjecture from artificial proof, so on the other hand those cases, which are the most frequent of all and depend on proofs which are either entirely inartificial or of a composite character, give rise to the most violent debates; in fact I should say that there is no occasion when the advocate has to come to closer grips with his adversary.

> Latin: 4.4. ut in qualitate generali, in qua rectene factum quid an contra sit quaeritur, perpetua dominatur oratio, et quaestionem finitionis actiones plerumque satis explicant et omnia paene, in quibus de facto constat aut coniectura artificiali ratione colligitur, ita in iis causis, quae sunt frequentissimae, quae vel solis extra artem probationibus vel mixtis continentur, asperrima in hac parte dimicatio est, nec alibi dixeris magis mucrone pugnari.

[¶31] 4.5. For all the strongest points of the argument have to be sharply impressed on the memory of the judge, while we have also to make good all the promises we may have made in the course of our speech and to refute the lies of our opponents. There is no point of a trial where the judge's attention is keener. And even mediocre speakers have not without some reason acquired the reputation of being good advocates simply by their excellence in debate.

> Latin: 4.5. et firmissima quaeque memoriae iudicis inculcanda sunt et praestandum quidquid in actione promisimus et refellenda mendacia. est denique qui cognoscit intentior. immerito quidam quanquam in dicendo mediocres hac tamen altercandi praestantia meruerunt nomen patronorum.

[¶32] 4.6. Some on the other hand think they have done their duty to their clients by an ostentatious and fatiguing display of elaborate declamation and straightway march out of court attended by an applauding crowd and leave the desperate battle of debate to uneducated performers who often are of but humble origin.

> Latin: 4.6. quidam litigatoribus suis illum modo ambitiosum declamandi sudorem praestitisse contenti cum turba laudantium destituunt subsellia pugnamque illam decretoriam imperitis ac saepe pullatae turbae relinquunt.

[¶33] 4.7. As a result in private suits you will generally find that different counsel are employed to plead and to prove the case. If the duties of advocacy are to be thus divided, the latter duty must surely be accounted the more important of the two, and it is a disgrace to oratory that inferior advocates should be regarded as adequate to render the greater service to the litigants. In public cases at any rate the actual pleader is cited by the usher as well as the other advocates.

> Latin: 4.7. videas alios plerumque iudiciis privatis ad actiones advocari alios ad probationem. si dividenda sunt officia, hoc certe magis necessarium est, pudendumque dictu, si plus litigantibus prosunt minores. publicis certe iudiciis vox illa praeconis praeter patronos ipsum, qui egerit, citat.

[¶34] 4.8. For debate the chief requisites are a quick and nimble understanding and a shrewd and ready judgment. For there is no time to think; the advocate must speak at once and return the blow almost before it has been dealt by his opponent. Consequently while it is most important for every portion of the case that the advocate should not merely have given a careful study to the whole case, but that he should have it at his fingers' ends, when he comes to the debate it is absolutely necessary that he should possess a thorough acquaintance with all the persons, instruments and circumstances of time and place involved: otherwise he will often be reduced to silence and forced to give a hurried assent to those who prompt him as to what he should say, suggestions which are often perfectly fatuous owing to excess of zeal on the part of the prompter. As a result it sometimes happens that we are put to the blush by too ready acceptance of the foolish suggestions of another.

> Latin: 4.8. est igitur inprimis ingenio veloci ac mobili, animo praesenti et acri. enim cogitandum, sed dicendum statim est et prope sub conatu adversarii manus exigenda. cum in omni parte huiusce officii plurimum facit, totas non diligenter modo sed etiam familiariter nosse causas, tum in altercatione maxime necessarium est, omnium personarum, instrumentorum, temporum, locorum habere notitiam; alioqui et tacendum erit saepe et aliis subiicientibus (plerumque autem studio loquendi fatue modo) accedendum; quo nonnunquam accidit, ut nostra credulitate aliena stultitia erubescamus.

[¶35] 4.9. Moreover, we have to deal with others beside these prompters who speak for our ear alone. Somego so far as to turn the debate into an open brawl. For you may sometimes see several persons shouting angrily at the judge and telling him that the arguments thus suggested are contrary to the truth, and calling his attention to the fact that some point which is prejudicial to the case has been deliberately passed over in silence.

> Latin: 4.9. tantum cum his ipsis monitoribus clam res erit; quidam faciunt aperte ut quoque rixentur. Videas enim plerosque ira percitos exclamantes, ut iudex audiat contrarium id esse, quod admoneatur, sciatque ille, qui pronuntiaturus est in causa, malum quod tacetur.

[¶36] 4.10. Consequently the skilled debater must be able to control his tendency to anger; there is no passion that is a greater enemy to reason, while it often leads an advocate right away from the point and forces him both to use gross and insulting language and to receive it in return; occasionally it will even excite him to such an extent as to attack the judges. Moderation, and sometimes even longsuffering, is the better policy, for the statements of our opponents have not merely to be refuted: they are often best treated with contempt, made light of or held up to ridicule, methods which afford unique opportunity for the display of wit. This injunction, however, applies only so long as the case is conducted with order and decency: if, on the other hand, our opponents adopt turbulent methods we must put on a bold front and resist their impudence with courage.

> Latin: 4.10. bonus altercator vitio iracundiae careat; nullus enim rationi magis obstat adfectus et fert extra causam plerumque et deformia convicia facere ac mereri cogit et in ipsos nonnunquam iudices incitat. moderatio ac nonnunquam etiam patientia. enim refutanda tantum quae ex contrario dicuntur, sed contemnenda, elevanda, ridenda sunt; nec usquam plus loci recipit urbanitas., dum ordo est et pudor; contra turbantes audendum et impudentiae fortiter resistendum.

[¶37] 4.11. For there are some advocates so brazen-faced that they bluster and bellow at us, interrupt us in the middle of a sentence and try to throw everything into confusion. While, then, it would be wrong to pay them the compliment of imitation, we must none the less repel their onslaughts with vigour by crushing their insolence and making frequent appeals to the judges or presiding magistrates to insist on the observance of the proper order of speaking. The debater's task is not one that suits a meek temper or excessive modesty, and we are apt to be misled because that which is really weakness is dignified by the name of honesty.

> Latin: 4.11. enim quidam praeduri in hoc oris, ut obstrepant ingenti clamore et medios sermones intercipiant et omnia tumultu confundant, quos ut non imitari sic acriter propulsare oportebit, et ipsorum improbitatem retundendo, et iudices vel praesidentes magistratus appellando frequentius, ut loquendi vices serventur. est res animi iacentis et mollis supra modum frontis, fallitque plerumque, quod probitas vocatur, quae est imbecillitas.

[¶38] 4.12. But the quality which is the most serviceable in debate is acumen, which while it is not the result of art (for natural gifts cannot be taught), may none the less be improved by art.

> Latin: 4.12. autem in altercatione plurimum acumen, quod sine dubio ex arte non venit (natura enim non docetur), arte tamen adiuvatur.

[¶39] 4.13. In this connexion the chief essential is never for a moment to lose sight either of the question at issue or the end which we have in view. If we bear this in mind, we shall never descend to mere brawling nor waste the time allotted to the case by indulging in abuse, while we shall rejoice if our adversary does so.

> Latin: 4.13. qua praecipuum est, semper id in oculis habere, de quo quaeritur et quod volumus efficere; quod propositum tenentes nec in rixam ibimus nec causae debita tempora conviciando conteremus gaudebimusque, si hoc adversarius facit.

[¶40] 4.14. Those who have given a careful study to the arguments that are likely to be produced by their opponents or the replies which may be made by themselves are almost always ready for the fray. There is, however, a further device available which consists in suddenly introducing into the debate arguments which were deliberately concealed in our set speech: it is a procedure which resembles a surprise attack or a sally from an ambush. The occasion for its employment arises when there is some point to which it is difficult to improvise an answer, though it would not be difficult to meet if time were allowed for consideration. For solid and irrefutable arguments are best produced at once in the actual pleading in order that they may be repeated and treated at greater length.

> Latin: 4.14. tempore fere parata sunt meditatis diligenter, quae aut ex adverse dici aut responderi a nobis possunt. tamen solet hoc quoque esse artis genus, ut quaedam in actione dissimulata subito in altercando proferantur; est inopinatis eruptionibus aut incursioni ex insidiis factae simillimum. autem tum faciendum, cum est aliquid, cui responderi non statim possit, potuerit autem, si tempus ad disponendum fuisset. quod fideliter firmum est a primis statim actionibus arripere optimum est, quo saepius diutiusque dicatur.

[¶41] 4.15. I think I need hardly insist on the necessity for the avoidance in debate of mere violence and noise and such forms of pleasantry as are dear to tile uneducated. For unscrupulous violence, although annoying to one's antagonist, makes an unpleasant impression on the judge. It is also bad policy to light hard for points which you cannot prove.

> Latin: 4.15. vix saltem praecipiendum videtur, ne turbidus et clamosus tantum sit altercator, et quales faceti sunt, qui litteras nesciunt. improbitas, licet adversario molesta sit, iudici invisa est. etiam diu pugnare in iis quae obtinere non possis.

[¶42] 4.16. For where defeat is inevitable, it is wisest to yield, since, if there are a number of other points in dispute, we shall find it easier to prove what remains, while if there is only one point at issue, surrender with a good grace will generally secure some mitigation of punishment. For obstinacy in the defence of a fault, more especially after detection, is simply the commission of a fresh fault.

> Latin: 4.16. , ubi vinci necesse est, expedit cedere; quia, sive plura sunt de quibus quaeritur, facilior erit in ceteris fides, sive unum, mitior solet poena irrogari verecundiae. culpam praesertim deprehensam pertinaciter tueri culpa altera est.

[¶43] 4.17. While the battle still rages, the task of luring on our adversary when he has once committed himself to error, and of forcing him to commit himself as deeply as possible, even to the extent at times of being puffed up with extravagant hopes of success, requires great prudence and skill. It is, therefore, wise to conceal some of our weapons: for our opponents will often press their attack and stake everything on some imagined weakness of our own, and will give fresh weight to our proofs by the instancy with which they demand us to produce them.

> Latin: 4.17. stat acies, multi res consilii atque artis est, ut errantem adversarium trahas et ire quam longissime cogas, ut vana interim spe exultet. quaedam bene dissimulantur instrumenta. enim et saepe discrimen omne committunt, quod deesse nobis putant, et faciunt probationibus nostris auctoritatem postulando.

[¶44] 4.18. It may even be expedient to yield ground which the enemy thinks advantageous to himself: for in grasping at the fancied advantage he may be forced to surrender some greater advantage: at times, too, it may serve our purpose to give him a choice between two alternatives, neither of which he can select without damage to his cause. Such a course is more effective in debate than in a set speech, for the reason that in the latter we reply to ourselves, while in the former our opponent replies, and thereby delivers himself into our hands. It is, above all, the mark of a shrewd debater to perceive what remarks impress the judge and what he rejects: this may often be detected from his looks, and sometimes from some action or utterance.

> Latin: 4.18. etiam dare aliquid adversario quod pro se putet, quod apprehendens maius aliquid cogatur dimittere; duas interim res proponere quarum utramlibet male sit electurus; quod in altercatione fit potentius quam in actione, quia in illa nobis ipsi respondemus, in hac adversarium quasi confessum tenemus.

[¶45] 4.19. Arguments which help us must be pressed home, while it will be wise to withdraw as gently as possible from such as are of no service. We may take a lesson from doctors who continue or cease to administer remedies according as they note that they are received or rejected by the stomach. Sometimes, if we find difficulty in developing our point, it is desirable to raise another question and to divert the attention of the judge to it if this be feasible.

> Latin: 4.19. inprimis acuti videre, quo iudex dicto moveatur, quid respuat; quod et vultu saepissime et aliquando etiam dicto aliquo factove eius deprehenditur. instare proficientibus et ab iis, quae non adiuvent, quam mollissime pedem oportet referre. hoc medici quoque, ut remedia proinde perseverent adhibere vel desinant, ut illa recipi vel respui vident.

[¶46] 4.20. For what can you do, if you are unable to answer an argument, save invent another to which your opponent can give no answer? In most respects the rules to be observed in debate are, as I have said, identical with those for the cross examination of witnesses, the only difference lying in the fact that the debate is a battle between advocates, whereas cross-examination is a fight between advocate and witness. To practise the art of debate is, however, far easier. For it is most profitable to agree with a fellow-student on some subject, real or fictitious, and to take different sides, debating it as would be done in the courts. The same may also be done with the simpler class of questions.

> Latin: 4.20. , si rem evolvere propositam facile non sit, inferenda est alia quaestio, atque in eam iudex, si fieri potest, avocandus. enim, cum respondere non possis, agendum est, nisi ut aliud invenias, cui adversarius respondere non possit? plerisque idem est, ut dixi, qui circa testes locus et personis modo distat, quod hic patronorum inter se certamen, illic pugna inter testem et patronum. vero huius rei longe facilior. est utilissimum, frequenter cum aliquo, qui sit studiorum eorundem, sumere materiam vel verae vel etiam fictae controversiae, et diversas partes altercationis modo tueri; quod idem etiam in simplici genere quaestionum fieri potest.

[¶47] 4.22. I would further have an advocate realise the order in which his proofs should be presented to the judge: the method to be followed is the same as in arguments: the strongest should be placed first and last. For those which are presented first dispose the judge to believe us, and those which come last to decide in our favour.

> Latin: 4.22. illud quidem ignorare advocatum volo, quo quaeque ordine probatio sit apud iudicem proferenda; cuius rei eadem quae in argumentis ratio est, ut potentissima prima et summa ponantur. enim ad credendum praeparant iudicem, haec ad pronuntiandum.

[¶48] 5.1. V. Having dealt with these points to the best of my ability, I should have had no hesitation in proceeding to discuss arrangement, which is logically the next consideration, did I not fear that, since there are some who include judgment under the head of invention, they might think that I had deliberately omitted all discussion of judgment, although personally I regard it as so inextricably blent with and involved in every portion of this work, that its influence extends even to single sentences or words, and it is no more possible to teach it than it is to instruct the powers of taste and smell.

> Latin: 5.1. pro nostra facultate tractatis non dubitassem transire protinus ad dispositionem, quae ordine ipso sequitur, nisi vererer ne, quoniam fuerunt qui iudicium inventioni subiungerent, praeterisse hunc locum quibusdam viderer, qui mea quidem opinione adeo partibus operis huius omnibus connexus ac mixtus est, ut ne a sententiis quidem aut verbis saltem singulis possit separari, nec magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor.

[¶49] 5.2. Consequently, all I can do is now and hereafter to show what should be done or avoided in each particular case, with a view thereby to guide the judgment. What use then is it for me to lay down general rules to the effect that we should not attempt impossibilities, that we should avoid whatever contradicts our case or is common to both, and shun all incorrectness or obscurity of style? In all these cases it is common sense that must decide, and common sense cannot be taught.

> Latin: 5.2. nos, quid in quaque re sequendum cavendumque sit, docemus ac deinceps docebimus, ut ad ea iudicium dirigatur. igitur, ne, quod effici non potest, aggrediamur, ut contraria vitemus et communia, ne quid in eloquendo corruptum, obscurum sit? oportet ad sensus, qui non docentur.

[¶50] 5.3. There is no great difference, in my opinion, between judgment and sagacity, except that the former deals with evident facts, while the latter is concerned with hidden facts or such as have not yet been discovered or still remain in doubt. Again judgment is more often than not a matter of certainty, while sagacity is a form of reasoning from deep-lying premises, which generally weighs and compares a number of arguments and in itself involves both invention and judgment.

> Latin: 5.3. multum a iudicio credo distare consilium, nisi quod illud ostendentibus se rebus adhibetur, hoc latentibus et aut omnino nondum repertis aut dubiis. iudicium frequentissime certum est, consilium vero est ratio quaedam alte petita et plerumque plura perpendens et comparans habensque in se et inventionem et iudicationem.

[¶51] 5.4. But here again you must not expect me to lay down any general rules. For sagacity depends on circumstances and will often find its scope in something preceding the pleading of the cause. For instance in the prosecution of Verres Cicero seems to have shown the highest sagacity in preferring to cut down the time available for his speech rather than allow the trial to be postponed to the following year when Quintus Hortensius was to be consul.

> Latin: 5.4. ne de hoc quidem praecepta in universum exspectanda sunt. ex re sumitur cuius locus ante actionem est frequenter; nam Cicero summo consilio videtur in Verrem vel contrahere tempora dicendi maluisse quam in eum annum, quo erat Q. Hortensius consul futurus, incidere.

[¶52] 5.5. And again in the actual pleading sagacity holds the first and most important place. For it is the duty of sagacity to decide what we should say and what we should pass by in silence or postpone; whether it is better to deny an act or to defend it, when we should employ an exordium and on what lines it should be designed, whether we should make a statement of facts and if so, how, whether we should base our plea on law or equity and what is the best order to adopt, while it must also decide on all the nuances of style, and settle whether it is expedient to speak harshly, gently or even with humility.

> Latin: 5.5. in ipsis actionibus primum ac potentissimum obtinet locum; nam, quid dicendum, quid tacendum, quid differendum sit, exigere consilii est; negare sit satis an defendere, ubi prooemio utendum et quali, narrandumne et quomodo, iure prius pugnandum an aequo, qui sit ordo utilissimus, tum omnes colores, aspere an leniter an etiam summisse loqui expediat.

[¶53] 5.6. But I have already given advice on all these points as far as each occasion permitted, and I shall continue to do the same in the subsequent portions of this work. In the meantime, however, I will give a few instances to make my meaning clearer, since it is not possible, in my opinion, to do so by laying down general rules.

> Latin: 5.6. haec quoque, ut quisque passus est locus, monuimus, idemque in reliqua parte faciemus; pauca tamen exempli gratia ponam, quibus manifestius appareat quid sit, quod demonstrari posse praeceptis non arbitror.

[¶54] 5.7. We praise Demosthenes for his sagacity because when he urged a policy of war upon the Athenians after they had met with a series of reverses, he pointed out that so far their action had been entirely irrational. For they might still make amends for their negligence, whereas, if they had made no mistakes, they would have had no ground for hopes of better success in the future. Again, since he feared to give offence if he taxed the people with lack of energy in defending the liberties of their country, he preferred to praise their ancestors for their courageous policy.

> Latin: 5.7. consilium Demosthenis, quod, cum suaderet bellum Atheniensibus parum id prospere expertis, nihil adhuc factum esse ratione monstrat. enim emendari negligentia; at, si nihil esset erratum, melioris in posterum spei non erat ratio.

[¶55] 5.8. Thus lie gained a ready hearing, with the natural result that the pride which they felt in the heroic past made them repent of their own degenerate behaviour. If we turn to Cicero, we shall find that one speech alone, the pro Cluenltio, will suffice to provide a number of examples. The difficulty is to know what special exhibition of sagacity to admire most in this speech. His opening statement of the case, by which he discredited the mother whose authority pressed so hardly on her son? The fact that he preferred to throw the charge of having bribed the jury back upon his opponents rather than deny it on account of what he calls the notorious infamy of the verdict? Or his recourse, last of all, to the support of the law in spite of the odious nature of the affair, a method by which lie would have set the judges against him but for the fact that he had already softened their feelings towards him? Or the skill which lie shows in stating that he has adopted this course in spite of the protests of his client?

> Latin: 5.8. , cum offensam vereretur, si obiurgaret populi segnitiam in asserenda libertate rei publicae, maiorum laude uti maluit, qui rem publicam fortissime administrassent. et faciles habuit aures, et natura sequebatur, ut meliora probantes peiorum paeniteret. Ciceronis quidem vel una pro Cluentio quamlibet multis exemplis sufficiet oratio. quod in eo consilium maxime mirer? primamne expositionem, qua matri, cuius filium premebat auctoritas, abstulit fidem? an quod iudicii corrupti crimen transferre in adversarium maluit quam negare propter inveteratam, ut ipse dicit, infamiam? an quod in re invidiosa legis auxilio novissime est usus, quo genere defensionis etiam offendisset nondum praemollitas iudicum mentes? an quod se ipsum invito Cluentio facere testatus est?

[¶56] 5.10. What again am I to select as an outstanding instance of his sagacity in the pro Milone? The fact that he refrains from proceeding to his statement of facts until he has cleared the ground by disposing of the previous verdicts against the accused? The manner in which he turns the odium of the attempted ambush against Clodius, although as a matter of fact the encounter was a pure chance? The way in which he at one and the same time praised the actual deed and showed that it was forced upon his client? Or the skill with which he avoided making Milo plead for consideration and undertook the role of suppliant himself? It would be an endless task to quote all the instances of his sagacity, how he discredited Cotta, how he put forward his own case in defence of Ligarius and saved Cornelius by his bold admission of the facts. It is enough, I think, to say that there is nothing not merely in oratory, but in all the tasks of life that is more important than sagacity and that without it all formal instruction is given in vain, while prudence unsupported by learning will accomplish more than learning unsupported by prudence.

> Latin: 5.10. pro Milone? quod non ante narravit, quam praeiudiciis omnibus reum liberaret? quod insidiarum invidiam in Clodium vertit, quanquam revera fuerat pugna fortuita? quod factum et laudavit et tamen voluntate Milonis removit? quod illi preces non dedit et in earum locum ipse successit? est enumerare, ut Cottae detraxerit auctoritatem, ut pro Ligario se opposuerit, Cornelium ipsa confessionis fiducia eripuerit.

[¶57] 5.11. It is sagacity again that teaches us to adapt our speech to circumstances of time and place and to the persons with whom we are concerned. But since this topic covers a wide field and is intimately connected with eloquence itself, I shall reserve my treatment of it till I come to give instructions on the subject of appropriateness in speaking.

> Latin: 5.11. dicere satis habeo, nihil esse non modo in orando, sed in omni vita prius consilio, frustraque sine eo tradi ceteras artes, plusque vel sine doctrina prudentiam quam sine prudentia facere doctrinam. etiam orationem locis, temporibus, personis est eiusdem virtutis. hic quia latius fusus est locus mixtusque cum elocutione, tractabitur cum praecipere de apte dicendo coeperimus.