---
title: "The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria"
author: "Quintilian"
translator: "Harold Edgeworth Butler"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 35 of 53
url: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/35/
cite: "Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria, section 35. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/35/"
---

# The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria

*Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler*

Twelve books on training a good man skilled in speaking, from the nursery to the forum.

> Latin: ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1002.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 35. Book IX · chapters 1–2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/35/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/35/#p-N

[¶0] 1.1. In my last book I spoke of tropes. I now come to figures, called σχήματα in Greek, a topic which is naturally and closely connected with the preceding.

> Latin: 1.1. sit proximo libro de tropis dictum, sequitur pertinens ad figuras, quae σχήματα Graece vocantur, locus ipsa rei natura coniunctus superiori.

[¶1] 1.2. For many authors have considered figures identical with tropes, because whether it be that the latter derive their name from having a certain form or from the fact that they effect alterations in language (a view which has also led to their being styled motions ), it must be admitted that both these features are found in figures as well. Their employment is also the same. For they add force and charm to our matter. There are some again who call tropes figures, Artorius Proculus among them.

> Latin: 1.2. plerique has tropos esse existimauerunt, quia, sive ex hoc duxerint nomen, quod sint formati quodam modo, sive ex eo, quod vertant orationem, unde et motus dicuntur, fatendum erit esse utrumque eorum etiam in figuris, usus quoque est idem: nam et vim rebus adiiciunt et gratiam praestant. desunt qui tropis figurarum nomen imponant, quorum est C. Artorius Proculus.

[¶2] 1.3. Further the resemblance between the two is so close that it is not easy to distinguish between them. For although certain kinds differ, while retaining a general resemblance (since both involve a departure from the simple and straightforward method of expression coupled with a certain rhetorical excellence), on the other hand some are distinguished by the narrowest possible dividing line: for example, while irony belongs to figures of thought just as much as to tropes, periphrasis, hyperbaton and onomatopoea have been ranked by distinguished authors as figures of speech rather than tropes.

> Latin: 1.3. adeo similitudo manifesta est, ut ea discernere non sit in promptu. quo modo quaedam in his species plane distant, manente tamen generaliter illa societate, quod utraque res de recta et simplici ratione cum aliqua dicendi virtute deflectitur, ita quaedam perquam tenui limite dividuntur, ut cum ironia tam inter figuras sententiae quam inter tropos reperiatur, περίφρασιν autem et ὑπέρβατον et ὀνοματοποιίαν clari quoque auctores figuras verborum potius quam tropos dixerint. magis signanda est utriusque rei differentia.

[¶3] 1.4. It is therefore all the more necessary to point out the distinction between the two. The name of trope is applied to the transference of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the embellishment of style or, as the majority of grammarians define it, the transference of words and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to which they do not properly belong. A figure, on the other hand, as is clear from the name itself, is the term employed when we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary.

> Latin: 1.4. igitur tropos sermo a naturali et principali significatione translatus ad aliam ornandae orationis gratia, vel, ut plerique grammatici finiunt, dictio ab eo loco, in quo propria est, translata in eum, in quo propria non est; figura, sicut nomine ipso patet,conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione.

[¶4] 1.5. Therefore the substitution of one word for another is placed among tropes, as for example in the case of metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdochè, catachresis, allegory and, as a rule, hyperbole, which may, of course, be concerned either with words or things. Onomatopoea is the creation of a word and therefore involves substitution for the words which we should use but for such creation.

> Latin: 1.5. in tropis ponuntur verba alia pro aliis, ut in μεταφορᾷ, μετωνυμίᾳ, ἀντονομασίᾳ, μεταλήμψει, συνεκδοχῇ, καταχρήσει, ἀλληγορίᾳ, plerumque ὑπερβολῇ; namque et rebus fit et verbis. Ὀνοματοποιία fictio est nominis; ergo hoc quoque pro aliis ponitur, quibus usuri fuimus, si illud non fingeremus. Περίφρασις etiamsi frequenter et id ipsum, in cuius locum adsumitur, nomen complecti solet, utitur tamen pluribus pro uno.

[¶5] 1.6. Again although periphrasis often includes the actual word whose place it supplies, it still uses a number of words in place of one. The epithet as a rule involves an element of antonomasia and consequently becomes a trope on account of this affinity. Hyperbaton is a change of order and for this reason many exclude it from tropes. None the less it transfers a word or part of a word from its own place to another.

> Latin: 1.6. Ἐπίθετον quoniam plerumque habet antonomasiae partem, coniunctione eius fit tropus. hyperbato commutatio est ordinis, ideoque multi tropis hoc genus eximunt. tamen verbum aut partem eius a suo loco in alienum. nihil in figuras cadit.

[¶6] 1.7. None of these can be called figures. For a figure does not necessarily involve any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words. As regards irony, I shall show elsewhere how in some of its forms it is a trope, in others a figure. For I admit that the name is common to both and am aware of the complicated and minute discussions to which it has given rise. They, however, have no bearing on my present task. For it makes no difference by which name either is called, so long as its stylistic value is apparent, since the meaning of things is not altered by a change of name. For just as men remain the same, even though they adopt a new name, so these artifices will produce exactly the same effect, whether they are styled tropes or figures, since their values lie not in their names, but in their effect.

> Latin: 1.7. et propriis verbis et ordine collocatis figura fieri potest. autem ironia alia sit tropi, alia schematos, suo loco reddam. enim fateor esse commune et scio quam multiplicem habeant quamque scrupulosam disputationem; sed ea non pertinet ad praesens meum propositum. enim refert, quomodo appelletur utrumlibet eorum, si quid orationi prosit apparet, nec mutatur vocabulis vis rerum.

[¶7] 1.8. Similarly it makes no difference whether we call a basis conjectural or negative, or concerned with fact or substance, provided always that we know that the subject of enquiry is the same. It is best therefore in dealing with these topics to adopt the generally accepted terms and to understand the actual thing, by whatever name it is called. But we must note the fact that trope and figure are often combined in the expression of the same thought, since figures are introduced just as much by the metaphorical as by the literal use of words.

> Latin: 1.8. sicut homines, si aliud acceperunt quam quod habuerant nomen, iidem sunt tamen, ita haec, de quibus loquimur, sive tropi sive figurae dicuntur, idem efficient; non enim nominibus prosunt, sed effectibus; ut statum coniecturalem an infitialem an facti an de substantia nominemus, nihil interest, dum idem quaeri sciamus. ergo in his sequi maxime recepta et rem ipsam, quocunque appellabitur modo, intelligere. tamen notandum, coire frequenter in eadem sententia et tropon et figuram. enim translatis verbis quam propriis figuratur oratio.

[¶8] 1.10. There is, however, a considerable difference of opinion among authors as to the meaning of the name, the number of genera and the nature and number of the species into which figures may be divided. The first point for consideration is, therefore, what is meant by a figure. For the term is used in two senses. In the first it is applied to any form in which thought is expressed, just as it is to bodies which, whatever their composition, must have some shape.

> Latin: 1.10. autem non mediocris inter auctores dissensio, et quae vis nominis eius et quot genera et quae quamque multae sint species. primum intuendum est, quid accipere debeamus figuram. duobus modis dicitur: uno qualiscunque forma sententiae, sicut in corporibus, quibus, quoquo modo sunt composita, utique habitus est aliquis;

[¶9] 1.11. In the second and special sense, in which it is called a schema, it means a rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form, that is to say, a change analogous to that involved by sitting, lying down on something or looking back. Consequently when a student tends to continuous or at any rate excessive use of the same cases, tenses, rhythms or even feet, we are in the habit of instructing him to vary his figures with a view to the avoidance of monotony.

> Latin: 1.11. altero, quo proprie schema dicitur, in sensu vel sermone aliqua a vulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio, sicut nos sedemus, incumbimus, respicimus. cum in eosdem casus aut tempora aut numeros aut etiam pedes continuo quis aut certe nimium frequenter incurrit, praecipere solemus variandas figuras esse vitandae similitudinis gratia.

[¶10] 1.12. In so doing we speak as if every kind of language possessed a figure: for example cursitare and lectitare are said to have the same figure, that is to say, they are identical in formation. Therefore in the first and common sense of the word everything is expressed by figures. If we are content with this view, there is good reason for the opinion expressed by Apollodorus (if we may trust the statement of Caecilius on this point) to the effect that he found the rules laid down in this connexion quite incomprehensible.

> Latin: 1.12. quo ita loquimur, tanquam omnis sermo habeat figuram, itemque eadem figura dicitur cursitare qua lectitare, id est eadem ratione declinari. illo intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est. si contenti sumus, non immerito Apollodorus, si tradenti Caecilio credimus, incomprehensibilia partis huius praecepta existimavit.

[¶11] 1.13. If, on the other hand, the name is to be applied to certain attitudes, or I might say gestures of language, we must interpret schema in the sense of that which is poetically or rhetorically altered from the simple and obvious method of expression. It will then be true to distinguish between the style which is devoid of figures (or ἀσχημάτιστος ) and that which is adorned with figures (or ἐσχηματισμένη, ).

> Latin: 1.13. si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic appellandi sunt, id demum hoc loco accipi schema oportebit, quod sit a simplici atque in promptu posito dicendi modo poetice vel oratorie mutatum. enim verum erit, aliam esse orationem ἀσχημάτιστον id est carentem figuris, quod vitium non inter minima est, aliam ἐσχηματισμένην, id est figuratam.

[¶12] 1.14. But Zoilus narrowed down the definition, since he restricted the term schema to cases when the speaker pretends to say something other than that which he actually does say. 1 know that this view meets with common acceptance: it is, in fact, for this reason that we speak of figured controversial themes, of which I shall shortly speak. We shall then take a figure to mean a form of expression to which a new aspect is given by art.

> Latin: 1.14. id ipsum anguste Zoilus terminavit, qui id solum putaverit schema, quo aliud simulatur dici quam dicitur, quod sane vulgo quoque sic accipi scio; unde et figuratae controversiae quaedam, de quibus post paulo dicam, vocantur. figura sit arte aliqua novata forma dicendi. eius unum quidam putaverunt, in hoc ipso diversas opiniones secuti.

[¶13] 1.15. Some writers have held that there is only one kind of figure, although they differ as regards the reasons which lead them to adopt this view. For some of them, on the ground that a change of words causes a corresponding change in the sense, assert that all figures are concerned with words, while others hold that figures are concerned solely with the sense, on the ground that words are adapted to things. Both these views are obviously quibbling.

> Latin: 1.15. hi, quia verborum mutatio sensus quoque verteret, omnes figuras in verbis esse dixerunt; illi, quia verba rebus accommodarentur, omnes in sensibus. utraque manifesta cavillatio est.

[¶14] 1.16. For the same things are often put in different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are changed, while a figure of thought may include several figures of speech. For the former lies in the conception, the latter in the expression of our thought. The two are frequently combined, however, as in the following passage: “Now, Dolabella, [I have no pity] either for you or for your children”: for the device by which he turns from the judges to Dolabella is a figure of thought, while iam iam ( “now” ) and liberum ( “your children” ) are figures of speech.

> Latin: 1.16. ut eadem dici solent aliter, manetque sensus elocutione mutata, et figura sententiae plures habere verborum figuras potest. est enim posita in concipienda cogitatione haec in enuntianda; sed frequentissime coeunt, ut in hoc iam, Dolabella, neque me tui neque tuorum liberum. oratio a iudice aversa in sententia, iam iam et liberum in verbis sunt schemata. plurimos enim, quod sciam, consensus est duas eius esse partes, διανοίας, id est mentis vel sensus vel sententiarum, nam his omnibus modis dictum est, et λέξεως id est verborum vel dictionis vel elocutionis vel sermonis vel orationis;

[¶15] 1.17. It is, however, to the best of my knowledge, generally agreed by the majority of authors that there are two classes of figure, namely figures of thought, that is of the mind, feeling or conceptions, since all these terms are used, and figures of speech, that is of words, diction, expression, language or style: the name by which they are known varies, but mere terminology is a matter of indifference. Cornelius Celsus, however, to figures of thought and speech would add those produced by “glosses”; but he has merely been led astray by an excessive passion for novelty. For who can suppose that so learned a man was ignorant of the fact that “glosses” and “reflexions” both come under the heading of thought? We may therefore conclude that, like language itself, figures are necessarily concerned with thought and with words.

> Latin: 1.17. nam et variatur et nihil refert. Cornelius tamen Celsus adiicit verbis et sententiis figuras colorum, nimia profecto novitatis cupiditate ductus. quis ignorasse eruditum alioqui virum credat, colores et sententias sensus esse? sicut omnem orationem ita figuras quoque versari necesse est in sensu et in verbis.

[¶16] 1.19. As, however, in the natural course of things we conceive ideas before we express them, I must take figures of thought first. Their utility is at once great and manifold, and is revealed with the utmost clearness in every product of oratory. For although it may seem that proof is infinitesimally affected by the figures employed, none the less those same figures lend credibility to our arguments and steal their way secretly into the minds of the judges.

> Latin: 1.19. vero natura prius est concipere animo res quam enuntiare, ita de iis figuris ante est loquendum, quae ad mentem pertinent; quarum quidem utilitas cum magna, tum multiplex, in nullo non orationis opere vel clarissime lucet. etsi minime videtur pertinere ad probationem, qua figura quidque dicatur, facit tamen credibilia quae dicimus et in animos iudicum, qua non observatur, irrepit.

[¶17] 1.20. For just as in sword-play it is easy to see, parry, and ward off' direct blows and simple and straightforward thrusts, while side-strokes and feints are less easy to observe and the task of the skilful swordsman is to give the impression that his design is quite other than it actually is, even so the oratory in which there is no guile fights by sheer weight and impetus alone; on the other hand, the fighter who feints and varies his assault is able to attack flank or back as he will, to lure his opponent's weapons from their guard and to outwit him by a slight inclination of the body. Further, there is no more effective method of exciting the emotions than an apt use of figures.

> Latin: 1.20. ut in armorum certamine adversos ictus et rectas ac simplices manus cum videre, tum etiam cavere ac propulsare facile est, aversae tectaeque minus sunt observabiles, et aliud ostendisse quam petas artis est, sic oratio, quae astu caret, pondere modo et impulsu proeliatur; simulanti variantique conatus in latera atque in terga incurrere datur et arma avocare et velut nutu fallere.

[¶18] 1.21. For if the expression of brow, eyes and hands has a powerful effect in stirring the passions, how much more effective must be the aspect of our style itself when composed to produce the result at which we aim? But, above all, figures serve to commend what we say to those that hear us, whether we seek to win approval for our character as pleaders, or to win favour for the cause which we plead, to relieve monotony by variation of our language, or to indicate our meaning in the safest or most seemly way.

> Latin: 1.21. vero adfectus nihil magis ducit. si frons, oculi, manus multum ad motum animorum valent, quanto plus orationis ipsius vultus ad id, quod efficere intendimus, compositus? tamen ad commendationem facit, sive in conciliandis agentis moribus sive ad promerendum actioni favorem sive ad levandum varietate fastidium sive ad quaedam vel decentius indicanda vel tutius.

[¶19] 1.22. But before I proceed to demonstrate what figures best suit the different circumstances, I must point out that their number is far from being as great as some authorities make out. For I am not in the least disturbed by the various names which the Greeks more especially are so fond of inventing. First of all, then, I must repudiate the views of those who hold that there are as many types of figure as there are kinds of emotion, on the ground, not that emotions are not qualities of the mind, but that a figure, in its strict, not its general sense, is not simply the expression of anything you choose to select.

> Latin: 1.22. antequam, quae cuique rei figura conveniat, ostendo, dicendum est nequaquam eas esse tam multas quam sint a quibusdam constitutae. enim me movent nomina illa, quae fingere utique Graecis promptissimum est.

[¶20] 1.23. Consequently the expression in words of anger, grief, pity, fear, confidence or contempt is not a figure, any more than persuasion, threats, entreaty or excuse. But superficial observers are deceived by the fact that they find figures in all passages dealing with such themes, and select examples of them from speeches; whereas in reality there is no department of oratory which does not admit such figures. But it is one thing to admit i>figure and another to be a figure; I am not going to be frightened out of repeating the term with some frequency in my attempt to make the facts clear. My opponents will, I know, direct my attention to special figures employed in expressing anger, in entreating for mercy, or appealing to pity, but it does not follow that expressions of anger, appeals to pity or entreaties for mercy are in themselves figures.

> Latin: 1.23. omnia igitur illi, qui totidem figuras putant quot adfectus, repudiandi, non quia adfectus non sit quaedam qualitas mentis, sed quia figura, quam non communiter, sed proprie nominamus, non sit simplex rei cuiuscunque enuntiatio. in dicendo irasci, dolere, misereri, timere, confidere, contemnere non sunt figurae, non magis quam suadere, minari, rogare, excusare. fallit parum diligenter intuentes, quod inveniunt in omnibus his locis figuras et earum exempla ex orationibus excerpunt. enim pars ulla dicendi est, quae non recipere eas possit. aliud est admittere figuram, aliud figuram esse. enim verebor explicandae rei gratia frequentiorem eiusdem nominis repetitionem.

[¶21] 1.25. Cicero, it is true, includes all ornaments of oratory under this head, and in so doing adopts, as it seems to me, a middle course. For he does not hold that all forms of expression are to be regarded as figures, nor, on the other hand, would he restrict the term merely to those expressions whose form varies from ordinary use. But he regards as figurative all those expressions which are especially striking and most effective in stirring the emotions of the audience. He sets forth this view in two of his works, and that my readers may have the opportunity of realising the judgment of so high an authority, I subjoin what he says verbatim. In the third book of the de Oratore we find the following words: “As regards the composition of continuous speech, as soon as we have acquired the smoothness of structure and rhythm of which I have spoken, we must proceed to lend brilliance to our style by frequent embellishments both of thought and words. For great effect may be produced by dwelling on a single point, and by setting forth our facts in such a striking manner that they seem to be placed before the eyes as vividly as if they were taking place in our actual presence. This is especially effective in stating a case or for the purpose of illuminating and amplifying the facts in course of statement, with a view to making our audience regard the point which we amplify as being as important as speech can make it. On the other hand, as opposed to this procedure we may often give a rapid summary, suggest more than is actually said, may express ourselves tersely in short, clean-cut sentences and disparage, or, what is much the same, mock our opponent in a manner not inconsistent with the precepts given us by Caesar. Or we may employ digressions and then, after thus delighting our audience, make a neat and elegant return to our main theme. We may set forth in advance what we propose to say, mark off the topics already treated from those which are to follow, return to our point, repeat it and draw our formal conclusions. Again, with a view to augmenting or attenuating the force of some point, we may exaggerate and overstate the truth: we may ask questions, or, what is much the same, enquire of others and set forth our own opinion. There is also available the device of dissimulation, when we say one thing and mean another, the most effective of all means of stealing into the minds of men and a most attractive device, so long as we adopt a conversational rather than a controversial tone. Hesitation may be expressed between two alternatives, our statement may be distributed in groups or we may correct ourselves, either before or after we have said something or when we repel some allegation against ourselves. We may defend ourselves by anticipation to secure the success of some point which we propose to make or may transfer the blame for some action to another. We may confer with our audience, admitting them as it were into our deliberations, may describe the life and character of persons either with or without mention of their names, a device which is one of the greatest embellishments of oratory and specially adapted to conciliate the feelings, as also frequently to excite them. Again by the introduction of fictitious personages we may bring into play the most forcible form of exaggeration. We may describe the results likely to follow some action, introduce topics to lead our hearers astray, move them to mirth or anticipate the arguments of our opponent. Comparisons and examples may be introduced, both of them most effective methods; we may divide, interrupt, contrast, suppress, commend. Our language may be free or even unbridled with a view to heighten our effects, while anger, reproach, promises that we shall prove our case, entreaty, supplication, slight deviations from our proposed course (which must be distinguished from the longer digressions mentioned above), exculpation, conciliation, personal attacks, wishes and execrations are all of value. The above include practically all the devices of thought which may be employed for the adornment of our speech. As regards diction, this may either be employed like weapons for menace and attack, or handled merely for the purpose of display. For example, sometimes the repetition of words will produce an impression of force, at other times of grace. Again, slight changes and alterations may be made in words, the same word may be repeated sometimes at the beginning of a sentence and sometimes at the end, or the sentence may be made to open and close with the same phrase. One verb may be made to serve the purpose of a number of clauses, our words may be worked up to a climax, the same word may be repeated with a different meaning or reiterated at the opening of one sentence from the close of the preceding, while we may introduce words with similar terminations or in the same cases or balancing or resembling each other. Other effects may be obtained by the graduation or contrast of clauses, by the elegant inversion of words, by arguments drawn from opposites, asyndeton, paraleipsis, correction, exclamation, meiosis, the employment of a word in different cases, moods and tenses, the correspondence of subsequent particulars with others previously mentioned, the addition of a reason for what is advanced, the assignment of a reason for each distinct statement; again we may employ concession and another form of hesitation, introduction of the unexpected, distinction by heads, another form of correction, local distribution, rapid succession of clauses, interruption of clauses, imagery, answering our own questions, immutation, the appropriate distinction of one proposition from another, effective arrangement, reference, digression and circumscription. These (and there may be yet more like them) are the various devices for the embellishment of our style, either by the cast of our thought or the conformation of our language.” Most of these statements are repeated by Cicero in the Orator, but not all, while his language is somewhat more precise, since after dealing with figures of speech and of thought he adds a third section, concerned, as he himself says, with the other excellences of style.

> Latin: 1.25. dabunt mihi aliquam in irascente, deprecante, miserante figuram, scio; sed non ideo irasci, misereri, deprecari figura erit. Cicero quidem omnia orationis lumina in hunc locum congerit, mediam quandam, ut arbitror, secutus viam: ut neque omnis sermo schema iudicaretur neque ea sola, quae haberent aliquam remotam ab usu communi fictionem, sed quae essent clarissima et ad movendum auditorem valerent plurimum; quem duobus ab eo libris tractatum locum ad litteras subieci, ne fraudarem legentes iudicio maximi auctoris. tertio de Oratore ita scriptum est: perpetua autem oratione, cum et coniunctionis levitatem et numerorum, quam dixi, rationem tenuerimus, tum est quasi luminibus distinguenda et frequentanda omnis oratio sententiarum atque verborum. et commoratio una in re permultum movet et illustris explanation rerumque, quasi gerantur, sub aspectum paene subiectio, quae et in exponenda re plurimum valet et ad illustrandum id quod exponitur et ad amplificandum, ut iis qui audient illud quod augebimus, quantum efficere oratio poterit, tantum esse videatur; et huic contraria saepe percursio est et plus ad intelligendum quam dixeris significatio et distincte concisa brevitas et extenuatio, et huic adiuncta illusio; a praeceptis Caesaris non abhorrens, et ab re digressio, in qua cum fuerit delectatio, tum reditas ad rem aptus et concinnus esse debebit; propositioque, quid sis dicturus, et ab eo quod est dictum seiunctio, et reditus ad propositum et iteratio et rationis apta conclusio; tum augendi minuendive causa veritatis superlatio atque traiectio, et rogatio atque huic finitima quasi percontatio expositioque sententiae suae; tum illa, quae maxime quasi irrepit in hominum mentes, alia dicentis ac significantis dissimulatio, quae est periucunda, cum in oratione non contentione sed sermone tractatur; deinde dubitatio, tum distributio, tum correctio, vel ante vel post quam dixeris vel cum aliquid a te ipso reicias. etiam est ad id quod aggrediare, et reiectio in alium; communicatio, quae est quasi cum iis ipsis apud quos dicas deliberatio; morum ac vitae imitatio vel in personis vel sine illis, magnum quoddam ornamentum orationis et aptum ad animos conciliandos vel maxime, saepe autem etiam ad commovendos; personarum ficta inductio vel gravissimum lumen augendi; descriptio, erroris inductio, ad hilaritatem impulsio, anteoccupatio; tum duo illa, quae maxime movent, similitudo et exemplum; digestio, interpellatio, contentio, reticentia, commendatio. quaedam libera atque etiam effrenatior augendi causa; iracundia, obiurgatio, promissio; deprecatio, obsecratio, declinatio brevis a proposito, non ut superior illa digressio, purgatio, conciliatio, laesio, optatio atque exsecratio. fere luminibus illustrant orationem sententiae. autem ipsius tanquam armorum est vel ad usum comminatio et quasi petitio vel ad venustatem ipsa tractatio. et geminatio verborum habet interdum vim, leporem alias, et paululum immutatum verbum atque deflexum, et eiusdem verbi crebra tum a primo repetitio, tum in extremum conversio, et in eadem verba impetus et concursio et adiunctio et progressio, et eiusdem verbi crebrius positi quaedam distinctio et revocatio verbi, et illa quae similiter desinunt aut quae cadunt similiter aut quae paribus paria referuntur aut quae sunt inter se similia. etiam gradatio quaedam et conversio et verborum concinna transgressio, et contrarium et dissolutum, et declinatio et reprehensio, et exclamatio et imminutio; et quod in multis casibus ponitur et quod de singulis rebus propositis ductum refertur ad singula, et ad propositum subiecta ratio et item in distributis supposita ratio; et permissio et rursus alia dubitatio et improvisum quiddam; et dinumeratio et alia correctio et dissipatio, et continuatam et interruptum, et imago et sibi ipsi responsio, et immutatio et diiunctio, et ordo et relatio, et digressio et circumscriptio. enim sunt fere atque horum similia vel plura etiam esse possunt, quae sententiis orationem verborumque conformationibus illuminent. sunt in Oratore plurima non omnia tamen et paulo magis distincta, quia post orationis et sententiarum figuras tertium quendam subiecit locum ad alias, ut ipse ait, quasi virtutes dicendi pertinentem:

[¶22] 1.37. “And those other embellishments which are derived from the arrangement of words contribute greatly to the adornment of our style. They may be compared to what we term the decorations of the forum or a richly-ornamented stage, since they not only adorn, but stand out conspicuously in the midst of other ornaments. The principle governing the use of embellishments and decorations of style is the same: words may be repeated and reiterated or reproduced with some slight change. Sentences may repeatedly commence or end with the same word or may begin and end with the same phrase. The same word may be reiterated either at the beginning or at the conclusion, or may be repeated, but in a different sense. Words may have the same inflexion or termination or be placed in various antitheses, our language may rise by gradations to a climax, or a number of words may be placed together in asyndeton without connecting particles. Or we may omit something, while making clear the reason for such omission, or correct ourselves with apparent censure of our carelessness, may utter exclamations of admiration or grief, or introduce the same word repeatedly in different cases. The ornaments of thought are, however, more important. They are so frequently employed by Demosthenes that some critics have held that it is in them that the chief beauty of his style resides. And in truth there is hardly a topic in his speeches which is not distinguished by some artificial treatment of the thought, and it must be admitted that speaking involves the embellishment of all, or at any rate most of our thoughts with some form of ornament. As you, Brutus, have such an admirable knowledge of all these methods, it would be waste of time for me to cite all their names or to give illustrations. I shall therefore content myself merely with indicating this topic. Our ideal orator then will speak in such a manner that he will cast the same thought into a number of different forms, will dwell on one point and linger over the same idea. he will often attenuate some one point or deride his opponent, will diverge from his theme and give a bias to his thought, will set forth what he intends to say, after completing his argument will give a brief summary, will recall himself to the point which he has left, repeat what he has said, complete his proof by a formal conclusion, embarrass his opponent by asking questions or answer himself in reply to imaginary questions; will desire his words to be taken in a different sense from their literal meaning, will hesitate what argument or form of statement to prefer, will classify and divide, will deliberately omit and ignore some point, and defend himself by anticipation; will transfer the blame of some charge brought against him to his opponent, will often take his audience, and sometimes even his opponent into consultation, will describe the character and talk of particular persons, will put words into the mouths of inanimate objects, divert the minds of the audience from the point at issue, often move them to merriment or laughter, anticipate objections, introduce comparisons, cite precedents, assign and distribute different sentiments to different persons, silence interrupters, assert that there are certain things of which he prefers not to speak, warn his audience to be on their guard against certain things, or venture on a certain licence of speech. Again, he will wax angry, sometimes indulge in rebuke, entreaty or supplication, will clear away unfavourable impressions, swerve a little from his point, utter wishes or execrations, or address his audience in terms of familiar intimacy. There are also other virtues at which he should aim, such as brevity, if his theme demands it, while he will often set forth topics in such vivid language as almost to present them to the very eyes of his audience, or will exaggerate his subject beyond the bounds of possibility. His meaning will frequently be deeper than his words seem to indicate, his tone will often be cheerful, and he will often mimic life and character. In fact, as regards this department of oratory, of which I have given you the substance, lie must display eloquence in all its grandest forms.”

> Latin: 1.37. reliqua, ex conlocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum adferunt ornatum orationi. enim similia illis quae in amplo ornatu scenae aut fori appellantur insignia, non quia sola ornent, sed quod excellant. ratio est horum quae sunt orationis lumina et quodam modo insignia, cum aut duplicantur iteranturque verba aut leviter commutata ponuntur, aut ab eodem verbo ducitur saepius oratio aut in idem coniicitur aut utrumque, aut adiungitur idem iteratum aut idem ad extremum refertur, aut continenter unum verbum non eadem sententia ponitur, aut cum similiter vel cadunt verba vel desinunt; aut multis modis contrariis relata contraria, aut cum gradatim sursum versus reditur, aut cum demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicuntur, aut cum aliquid praetereuntes, cur id faciamus, ostendimus, aut cum corrigimus nosmet ipsos quasi reprehendentes, aut si est aliqua exclamatio vel admirationis vel conquestionis, aut cum eiusdem nominis casus saepius commutantur. ornamenta maiora sunt; quibus quia frequentissime Demosthenes utatur, sunt qui patent, idcirco eius eloquentiam maxime esse laudabilem. vere nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur, nec quicquam est aliud dicere nisi omnes aut certe plerasque aliqua specie illuminare sententias. cum tu optime, Brute, teneas, quid attinet nominibus uti aut exemplis? notetur locus. igitur dicet ille, quem expetimus, ut verset saepe mullis modis eadem et in una re haereat in eademque commoretur sententia. etiam ut extenuet aliquid; saepe ut irrideat; ut declinet a proposito deflectatque sententiam; ut proponat quid dicturus sit; ut, cum transegerit iam aliquid, definiat; ut se ipse revocet, ut quod dixerit iteret; ut argumentum ratione concludat; ut interrogando urgeat; ut rursus quasi ad interrogata sibi ipse respondeat; ut contra ac dicat accipi et sentiri velit; ut addubitet quid potius aut quo modo dicat; ut dividat in partes; ut aliquid relinquat ac negligat; ut ante praemuniat; ut in eo ipso, in quo reprehendatur, culpam in adversarium conferat; ut saepe cum iis qui audiunt, nonnunquam etiam cum adversario quasi deliberet; ut hominum mores sermonesque describat; ut muta quaedam loquentia inducat; ut ab eo quod agitur auertat animos; ut saepe in hilaritatem risumve convertat; ut ante occupet quod videat opponi; ut comparet similitudines; ut utatur exemplis; ut aliud alii tribuens dispertiat; ut interpellatorem coerceat; ut aliquid reticere se dicat; ut denuntiet quid caveant; ut liberius quid audeat; ut irascatur etiam, ut obiurget aliquando; ut de precetur, ut supplicet, ut medeatur; ut a proposito declinet aliquantum; ut optet, ut exsecretur, ut fiat iis apud quos dicet familiaris. alias etiam dicendi quasi virtutes sequetur, brevitatem, si res petet, saepe etiam rem dicendo subiiciet oculis, saepe supra feret quam fieri possit; significatio saepe erit maior quam oratio, saepe hilaritas, saepe vitae naturarumque imitatio. in gerere (nam quasi silvam vides) omnis eluceat oportet eloquentiae magnitudo.

[¶23] 2.1. The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.

> Latin: 2.1. cui latius complecti conformationes verborum ac sententiarum placuerit, habet quod sequatur nec adfirmare ausim quicquam esse melius; sed haec ad propositi mei rationem legat. mihi de his sententiarum figuris dicere in animo est, quae ab illo simplici modo indicandi recedunt; quod item multis doctissimis viris video placuisse.

[¶24] 2.2. On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?

> Latin: 2.2. tamen illa, etiam quae sunt alterius modi lumina, adeo sunt virtutes orationis ut sine iis nulla intelligi fere possit oratio. quomodo iudex doceri potest, si desit illustris explanatio, propositio, promissio, finitio, seiunctio, expositio sententiae suae, rationis apta conclusio, praemunitio, similitudo, exemplum, digestio, distributio, interpellatio, interpellantis coercitio, contentio, purgatio, laesio?

[¶25] 2.3. Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?

> Latin: 2.3. vero agit omnino eloquentia detractis amplificandi minuendique rationibus? prior desiderat illam plus quam dixeris significationem, id est ἔμφασιν, et supralationem veritatis et traiectionem; haec altera extenuationem deprecationemque. adfectus erunt vel concitati detracta voce libera et effrenatiore, iracundia, obiurgatione, optatione, exsecratione? vel illi mitiores, nisi adiuvantur commendatione, conciliatione, ad hilaritatem impulsione?

[¶26] 2.4. What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

> Latin: 2.4. delectatio aut quod mediocriter saltem docti hominis indicium, nisi alia repetitione, alia commoratione infigere, digredi a re et redire ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traiicere, quae relinquenda, quae contemnenda sint iudicare? est in his orationis atque actus, quibus detractis iacet et velut agitante corpus spiritu caret.

[¶27] 2.5. But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

> Latin: 2.5. cum adesse debent, tum disponenda atque varianda sunt, ut auditorem, quod in fidibus fieri videmus, omni sono mulceant. ea plerumque recta sunt nec se fingunt, sed confitentur. autem, ut dixi, figuras, quod vel ex proxima doceri potest.

[¶28] 2.6. What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

> Latin: 2.6. enim tam commune quam interrogare vel percontari? utroque utimur indifferenter, quanquam alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi. ea res, utrocunque dicitur modo, etiam multiplex habet schema. enim ab iis, quibus acrior ac vehementior fit probatio, quod primo loco posuimus.

[¶29] 2.7. A simple question may be illustrated by the line:
But who are ye and from what shores are come?
On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples: “What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus?” and “How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?” and “Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare?” with the whole passage that follows.

> Latin: 2.7. est sic rogare,
vos qui tandem? quibus aut venistis ab oris?
Figuratum autem, quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi, enim tuus ille, Tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? et, tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? et, tua consilia non sentis? et totus denique hic locus.

[¶30] 2.8. How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said, “You have abused our patience a long time,” and “Your plots are all laid bare.” We may also ask what cannot be denied, as “Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice?” Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms, “How is it possible?” “How can that be?”

> Latin: 2.8. enim magis ardet quam si diceretur, abuteris patientia nostra, et tua consilia. etiam quod negari non possit, tandem causam C. Fidiculanius Falcula? aut ubi respondendi difficilis est ratio, ut vulgo uti solemus, modo?

[¶31] 2.9. Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea:
What lands dost bid me seek?
Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil:
Alas, what lands, lie cried,
What seas can now receive me?
Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence: “Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection.” In fact questions admit of infinite variety.

> Latin: 2.9. qui fieri potest? aut invidiae gratia, ut Medea apud Senecam, peti terras iubes? aut miserationis, ut Sinon apud Vergilium,
quae me tellus, inquit, quae me aequora possunt?
aut instandi et auferendae dissimulationis, ut Asinius,? furiosum, inquam, non inofficiosum testamentum reprehendimus.

[¶32] 2.10. They may serve our indignation, as in the line:
Are any left
That still adore Juno's divinity?
Or they may still express wonder, as in:
To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,
Accursed greed of gold?
Again, at times they may express a sharp command, as in:
Will they not rush to arms and follow forth
From all the city?

> Latin: 2.10. hoc plenum est varietatis; nam et indignationi convenit:
quisquam numen Iunonis adoret?
et admirationi:
non mortalia pectora cogis,
sacra fames?

[¶33] 2.11. Or we may ask ourselves, as in the phrase of Terence, “What, then, shall I do?” A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied, “And what is more, I had done him no harm.” Or the purpose may be to elude a charge, a very common form of reply. The advocate says, “I ask if you killed the man?” The accused replies, “He was a robber.” The advocate asks, “Have you occupied the farm?” The accused replies, “It was my own.”

> Latin: 2.11. est interim acrius imperandi genus:
arma expedient totaque ex urbe sequentur?
et ipsi nosmet rogamus, quale est illud Terentianum igitur faciam? aliqua etiam in respondendo figura, cum aliud interroganti ad aliud, quia sic utilius sit, occurritur, tum augendi criminis gratia, ut testis in reum rogatus, an ab reo fustibus vapulasset, innocens, inquit; tum declinandi, quod est frequentissimum:, an occideris hominem; respondetur,; An fundum occupaveris; respondetur,.

[¶34] 2.13. Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the Eclogues of Virgil, when one shepherd asks:
Did I not see you, villain, snare a goat
Of Damon's?
the other replies:
I vanquished him in song, and should he not
Pay me the prize, my due?

> Latin: 2.13. confessionem praecedat defensio, ut apud Vergilium in Bucolicis dicenti,
ego te vidi Damonis, pessime, caprum
insidiis?
occurritur:
mihi cantando victus non redderet ille?
Cui est confinis dissimulatio, non alibi quam in risu posita ideoque tractata suo loco.

[¶35] 2.14. Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory reply, which is employed solely with the purpose of raising a laugh, and has therefore been treated in its appropriate place. If it were meant seriously, it would be tantamount to a confession. Further, there is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect. Take as an example the following passage from the pro Ligario, where Cicero says, “Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.”

> Latin: 2.14. serio si fiat, pro confessione est. et interrogandi se ipsum et respondendi sibi solent esse non ingratae vices, ut Cicero pro Ligario, quem igitur hoc dico? apud eum, qui, cum hoc sciret, tamen me, antequam vidit, rei publicae reddidit.

[¶36] 2.15. A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the pro Caelio. “Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?' ” with the whole passage that follows. Then comes his reply, “Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc.” A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself. For example, “Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want.” This is a figure which some call suggestion.

> Latin: 2.15. pro Caelio ficta interrogatione: aliquis, Haec igitur est tua disciplina? sic tu instituis adulescentis? et totus locus.:, si quis, iudices, hoc robore animi atque hac indole virtutis ac continentiae fuit, et cetera. diversum est, cum alium rogaveris, non exspectare responsum sed statim subiicere: tibi deerat? at habebas; pecunia superabat? at egebas. schema quidam per suggestionem vocant.

[¶37] 2.16. Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance, “Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion?” There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several. Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it, πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the exordium.

> Latin: 2.16. et comparatione: igitur facilius suae sententiae rationem redderet? aliis modis tum brevius, tum latius, tum de una re, tum de pluribus. vero in causis valet praesumptio, quae πρόλημψις dicitur, cum id quod obiici potest occupamus. neque in aliis partibus rarum est et praecipue prooemio convenit.

[¶38] 2.17. However, it forms a genus in itself, and has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius, where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of prediction, as in the phrase, “For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge.” Again, there is a form of self-correction, such as, “I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far.” And, most frequent of all, there is preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.

> Latin: 2.17. , quanquam generis unius, diversas species habet. enim quaedam praemunitio, qualis Ciceronis contra Q. Caecilium, quod ad accusandum descendat qui semper defenderit; quaedam confessio, ut pro Rabirio Postumo, quem sua quoque sententia reprehendendum fatetur, quod pecuniam regi crediderit; quaedam praedictio, ut enim non augendi criminis gratia; quaedam emendatio, ut, ignoscatis mihi, si longius sum evectus; frequentissima praeparatio, cum pluribus verbis, vel quare facturi quid simus vel quare fecerimus, dici solet.

[¶39] 2.18. Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case, “Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime,” while the same effect may be produced by qualification, as in the following sentence, “Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.”

> Latin: 2.18. quoque vis ac proprietas confirmatur vel praesumptione: illa non poena, sed prohibitio sceleris fuit; aut reprehensione:, inquam, si hoc eos nomine appellari fas est. aliquam fidem veritatis et dubitatio, cum simulamus quaerere nos, unde incipiendum, ubi desinendum, quid potissimum dicendum, an omnino dicendum sit?