---
title: "The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria"
author: "Quintilian"
translator: "Harold Edgeworth Butler"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 36 of 53
url: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/36/
cite: "Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria, section 36. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/36/"
---

# The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria

*Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler*

Twelve books on training a good man skilled in speaking, from the nursery to the forum.

> Latin: ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1002.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 36. Book IX · chapter 2

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/36/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/36/#p-N

[¶0] 2.19. Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough. “As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.?”

> Latin: 2.19. exemplis plena sunt omnia, sed unum interim sufficit:, quod ad me attinet, quo me vertam nescio. fuisse infamiam iudicii corrupti? et cetera.

[¶1] 2.20. This device may also be employed to cover the past; for we may equally pretend that we had felt hesitation on the subject. This figure is akin to that known as communication, when we actually take our opponents into consultation, as Domitius Afer does in his defence of Cloatilla. “She is so agitated that she does not know what is permitted to a woman or what becomes a wife. It may be that chance has brought you into contact with the unhappy woman in her helpless plight. What counsel do you give her, you her brother, and you, her father's friends?”

> Latin: 2.20. etiam in praeteritum valet; nam et dubitasse nos fingimus. A quo schemate non procul abest illa, quae dicitur communicatio, cum aut ipsos adversarios consulimus, ut Domitius Afer pro Cloatilla: trepida, quid liceat feminae, quid coniugem deceat; forte vos in illa solitudine obvios casus miserae mulieri obtulit; tu, frater, vos, paterni amici, quod consilium datis?

[¶2] 2.21. Or we may admit the judges to our deliberations, a device which is frequently called into play. We may say, “What do you advise?” or, “I ask you,” or, “What, then, should have been done?” Cato, for example, says, “Come now, if you had been in his place, what else would you have done?” And in another passage, “Imagine this to be a matter which concerns us all, and assume you have been placed in charge of the whole affair.”

> Latin: 2.21. aut cum iudicibus quasi deliberamus, quod est frequentissimum: suadetis? et interrogo, et tandem fieri oportuit? et Cato,, si vos in eo loco essetis, quid aliud fecissetis? alibi: rem agi putatote ac vos huic rei praepositos esse.

[¶3] 2.22. Sometimes, however, in such forms of communication we may add something unexpected, a device which is in itself a figure, as Cicero does in the Verrines: “What then? What think you? Perhaps you expect to hear of some theft or plunder.” Then, after keeping the minds of the judges in suspense for a considerable time, he adds something much worse. This figure is termed suspension by Celsus. It has two forms.

> Latin: 2.22. nonnunquam communicantes aliquid inexspectatum subiungimus, quod et per se schema est, ut in Verrem Cicero, deinde? quid censetis? fortasse aut praedam aliquam? Deinde, cum diu suspendisset iudicum animos, subiecit, quod multo esset improbius. Celsus sustentationem vocat.

[¶4] 2.23. For we may adopt exactly the opposite procedure to that just mentioned, and after raising expectation of a sequel of the most serious nature, we may drop to something which is of a trivial character, and may even imply no offence at all. But since this does not necessarily involve any form of communication, some have given it the name of paradox or surprise.

> Latin: 2.23. autem duplex; nam contra frequenter, cum exspectationem gravissimorum fecimus, ad aliquid quod sit leve aut nullo modo criminosum descendimus. quia non tantum per communicationem fieri solet, παράδοξον alii nominarunt, id est inopinatum.

[¶5] 2.24. I do not agree with those who extend the name of figure to a statement that something has happened unexpectedly to the speaker himself, like the following passage from Pollio: “Gentlemen, I never thought it would come to pass that, when Scaurus was the accused, I should have to entreat you not to allow influence to carry any weight on his behalf.”

> Latin: 2.24. non accedo qui schema esse existimant etiam, si quid nobis ipsis dicamus inexspectatum accidisse, ut Pollio, fore credidi, iudices, ut, reo Scauro, ne quid in eius iudicio gratia valeret, precarer.

[¶6] 2.25. The figure known as concession springs from practically the same source as communication; it occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury, or even in some cases of our opponents, as when Calvus says to Vatinius, “Summon all your assurance and assert that you have a better claim than Cato to be elected praetor.”

> Latin: 2.25. idem fons est illius, quam permissionem vocant, qui communicationis, cum aliqua ipsis iudicibus relinquimus aestimanda, aliqua nonnunquam adversariis quoque, ut Calvus Vatinio, frontem et dic te digniorem, qui praetor fieres, quam Catonem.

[¶7] 2.26. The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation. For we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief or indignation, or that we wish something, and so on. Hence we get passages like the following: “I am free, I breathe again,” or, “It is well,” or, “What madness is this?” or, “Alas! for these degenerate days!” or, “Woe is me; for though all my tears are shed my grief still clings to me deep-rooted in my heart,” or,
Gape now, wide earth.
To this some give the name of exclamation, and include it among figures of speech.

> Latin: 2.26. vero sunt augendis adfectibus accommodatae figurae, constant maxime simulatione. et irasci nos et gaudere et timere et admirari et dolere et indignari et optare, quaeque sunt similia his, fingimus. sunt illa, sum: respiravi; et habet; et amentia est haec? et O tempora, o mores! et Miserum me! consumptis enim lacrimis infixus tamen pectori haeret dolor; et
nunc hiscite terrae.

[¶8] 2.27. When, however, such exclamations are genuine, they do not come under the head of our present topic: it is only those which are simulated and artfully designed which can with any certainty be regarded as figures. The same is true of free speech, which Corificius calls licence, and the Greeks παῤῥησία. For what has less of the figure about it than true freedom? On the other hand, freedom of speech may frequently be made a cloak for flattery.

> Latin: 2.27. exclamationem quidam vocant ponuntque inter figuras orationis. quotiens vera sunt, non sunt in ea forma, de qua nunc loquimur, at simulata et arte composita procul dubio schemata sunt existimanda. idem dictum sit de oratione libera, quam Cornificius licentiam vocat, Graeci παῤῥησίαν. Quid enim minus figuratum quam vera libertas? Sed frequenter sub hac facie latet adulatio.

[¶9] 2.28. For when Cicero in his defence for Ligarius says, “After war had begun, Caesar, and was well on its way to a conclusion, I deliberately, of my own free will and under no compulsion, joined the forces of your opponents,” he has in his mind something more than a desire to serve the interests of Ligarius, for there is no better way of praising the clemency of the victor.

> Latin: 2.28. Cicero cum dicit pro Ligario, bello, Caesar, gesto iam etiam ex parte magna, nulla vi coactus consilio ac uoluntate mea ad ea arma profectus sum, quae erant sumpta contra te, non solum ad utilitatem Ligarii respicit, sed magis laudare victoris clementiam non potest.

[¶10] 2.29. On the other hand, in the sentence, “What else was our aim, Tubero, than that we might secure the power which he now holds?” he succeeds with admirable art in representing the cause of both parties as being good, and in so doing mollifies him whose cause was really bad. A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero's opinion demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιΐα This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory.

> Latin: 2.29. illa vero sententia, autem aliud egimus, Tubero, nisi ut, quod hic potest, nos possemus? admirabiliter utriusque partis facit bonam causam, sed hoc eum demeretur, cuius mala fuerat. adhuc audaciora et maiorum (ut Cicero existimat) laterum, fictiones personarum, quae προσωποποιΐαι dicuntur. namque cum variant orationem, tum excitant.

[¶11] 2.30. By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds); or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.

> Latin: 2.30. et adversariorum cogitationes velut secum loquentium protrahimus (qui tamen ita demum a fide non abhorrent, si ea locutos finxerimus, quae cogitasse eos non sit absurdum), et nostros cum aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus, et suadendo, obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus.

[¶12] 2.31. Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice. There are some authorities who restrict the term imepersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some translate by the Latin semnocinatio.

> Latin: 2.31. deducere deos in hoc genere dicendi et inferos excitare concessum est; urbes etiam populique vocem accipiunt. sunt quidam, qui has demum προσωποποιΐας dicant, in quibus et corpora et verba fingimus; sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt sermocinationem.

[¶13] 2.32. For my own part, I have included both under the same generally accepted term, since we cannot imagine a speech without we also imagine a person to utter it. But when we lend a voice to things to which nature has denied it, we may soften down the figure in the way illustrated by the following passage: “For if my country, which is far dearer to me than life itself, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth were to address me thus, 'Marcus Tullius, what dost thou?” A bolder figure of the same kind may be illustrated by the following: “Your country, Catiline, pleads with you thus, and though she utters never a word, cries to you, 'For not a few years past no crime has come to pass save through your doing!' ” It is also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of things, persons or utterances, or to marvel that the same is not the case with our adversaries or the judges; it is with this design that we use phrases such as “It seems to me,” or “Does it not seem to you?”

> Latin: 2.32. iam recepto more utrumque eodem modo appellavi. certe sermo fingi non potest, ut non personae sermo fingatur. in his, quae natura non permittit, hoc modo mollior fit figura: si mecum patria, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, si cuncta Italia, si omnis res publica sic loquatur, 'M. Tulli, quid agis?' Illud audacius genus: tecum, Catilina, sic agit et quodammodo tacita loquitur, 'Nullum iam aliquot annis facinus exstitit nisi per te.'

[¶14] 2.33. But such devices make a great demand on our powers of eloquence. For with things which are false and incredible by nature there are but two alternatives: either they will move our hearers with exceptional force because they are beyond the truth, or they will be regarded as empty nothings because they are not the truth.

> Latin: 2.33. etiam aut nobis aliquas ante oculos esse rerum, personarum, vocum imagines fingimus, aut eadem adversariis aut iudicibus non accidere miramur: qualia sunt mihi, et videtur tibi? magna quaedam vis eloquentiae desideratur. enim et incredibilia natura necesse est aut magis moveant, quia supra vera sunt, aut pro vanis accipiantur, quia vera non sunt.

[¶15] 2.34. But we may introduce not only imaginary sayings, but imaginary writings as well, as is done by Asinius in his defence of Liburnia: “Let my mother, who was the object of my love and my delight, who lived for me and gave me life twice in one day (and so on) inherit nought of my property.” This is in itself a figure, and is doubly so whenever, as in the present case, it imitates a document produced by the opposing party.

> Latin: 2.34. dicta autem quaedam, ita scripta quoque fingi solent, quod facit Asinius pro Liburnia: mea, quae mihi cum carissima, tum dulcissima fuit, quaeque mihi vixit bisque eodem die vitam dedit et reliqua; deinde exheres esto. cum per se figura est, tum duplicatur, quotiens sicut in hac causa ad imitationem alterius scripturae componitur.

[¶16] 2.35. For a will had been read out by the prosecution, in the following form: “Let Publius Novanius Gallio, to whom as my benefactor I will and owe all that is good, as a testimony to the great affection which he has borne me (then follow other details) be my heir.” In this case the figure borders on parody, a name drawn from songs sung in imitation of others, but employed by an abuse of language to designate imitation in verse or prose.

> Latin: 2.35. contra recitabatur testamentum: P. Novanius Gallio, cui ego omnia meritissimo volo et debeo pro eius animi in me summa voluntate et adiectis deinceps aliis, heres esto. esse quodammodo παρῳδή, quod nomen ductum a canticis ad aliorum similitudinem modulatis abusive etiam in versificationis ac sermonum imitatione servatur.

[¶17] 2.36. Again, we often personify the abstract, as Virgil does with Fame, or as Xenophon records that Prodicus did with Virtue and Pleasure, or as Ennius does when, in one of his satires, he represents Life and Death contending with one another. We may also introduce some imaginary person without identifying him, as we do in the phrases, “At this point some one will interpose,” or, “Some one will say.”

> Latin: 2.36. formas quoque fingimus saepe, ut Famam Vergilius, ut Voluptatem ac Virtutem (quemadmodum a Xenophonte traditur) Prodicus, ut Mortem ac Vitam, quas contendentes in satura tradit Ennius. et incertae personae ficta oratio, aliquis, et, Dicat aliquis.

[¶18] 2.37. Or speech may be inserted without any mention of the speaker, as in the line:
Here the Dolopian host
Camped, here the fierce Achilles pitched his tent.
This involves a mixture of figures, since to impersonalion we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking. At times impersonation takes the form of narrative. Thus we find indirect speeches in the historians, as at the opening of Livy's first book: “That cities, like other things, spring from the humblest origins, and that those who are helped by their own valour and the favour of heaven subsequently win great power and a great name for themselves.” Apostrophe also, which consists in the diversion of our address from the judge, is wonderfully stirring, whether we attack our adversary as in the passage, “What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, in the field of Pharsalus?”

> Latin: 2.37. et iactus sine persona sermo:
Dolopum manus., hic saeuus tendebat Achilles.
Quod fit mixtura figurarum, cum προσωποποιΐᾳ accedit illa, quae est orationis per detractionem; detractum est enim, quis diceret. interim προσωποποιΐα in speciem narrandi. apud historicos reperiuntur obliquae adlocutiones, ut in T. Livii primo statim, quoque ut cetera ex infimo nasci; deinde, quas sua virtus ac dii iuvent, magnas opes sibi magnumque nomen facere.

[¶19] 2.38. or turn to make some invocation such as, “For I appeal to you, hills and groves of Alba,” or to entreaty that will bring odium on our opponents, as in the cry, “O Porcian and Sempronian laws.” But the term apostrophe is also applied to utterances that divert the attention of the hearer from the question before them, as in the following passage:
I swore not with the Greeks
At Aulis to uproot the race of Troy.
There are a number of different figures by which this effect may be produced. We may, for instance, pretend that we expected something different or feared some greater disaster, or that the judges in their ignorance of the facts may regard some point as of more importance than it really is: an example of this latter device is to be found in the exordium to Cicero's defence of Caelius.

> Latin: 2.38. quoque a iudice sermo, qui dicitur ἀποστροφή mire movet, sive aduersarios invadimus: enim tuus ille, Tubero, in acie Pharsalica? sive ad invocationem aliquam convertimur: enim iam ego, Albani tumuli atque luci; sive ad invidiosam implorationem: O leges Porciae legesque Semproniae! illa quoque vocatur aversio, quae a proposita quaestione abducit audientem:
ego cum Danais Troianam excindere gentem
Aulide iuravi—. Quod fit et multis et variis figuris, cum aut aliud exspectasse nos aut maius aliquid timuisse simulamus aut plus videri posse ignorantibus, quale est prooemium pro Caelio.

[¶20] 2.40. With regard to the figure which Cicero calls ocular denonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύπωσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The following will show what I mean: “He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countenance.”

> Latin: 2.40. vero, ut ait Cicero, sub oculos subiectio tum fieri solet, cum res non gesta indicatur, sed ut sit gesta ostenditur, nec universa, sed per partes; quem locum proximo libro subiecimus evidentiae, et Celsus hoc nomen isti figurae dedit. allis ὑποτύπωσις dicitur proposita quaedam forma rerum ita expressa verbis, ut cerni potius videatur quam audiri: inflammatus scelere et furore in forum venit, ardebant oculi, toto ex ore crudelitas eminebat.

[¶21] 2.41. Nor is it only past or present actions which we may imagine: we may equally well present a picture of what is likely to happen or might have happened. This is done with extraordinary skill by Cicero in his defence of Milo, where he shows what Clodius would have done, had he succeeded in securing the praetorship. But this transference of time, which is technically called μετάστασις was more modestly used in vivid description by the old orators. For they would preface it by words such as “Imagine that you see”: take, for example, the words of Cicero: “Though you cannot see this with your bodily eyes, you can see it with the mind's eye.”

> Latin: 2.41. solum quae facta sint aut fiant, sed etiam quae futura sint aut futura fuerint imaginamur. tractat hoc Cicero pro Milone, quae facturus fuerit Clodius, si praeturam invasisset. haec quidem translatio temporum, quae proprie μετάστασις dicitur, ιν διατυπώσει verecundior apud priores fuit. enim talia, vos intueri, ut Cicero,, quae non vidistis oculis, animis cernere potestis.

[¶22] 2.42. Modern authors, however, more especially the declaimers, are bolder, indeed they show the utmost animation in giving rein to their imagination; witness the following passages from Seneca's treatment of the controversial theme in which a father, guided by one of his sons, finds another son in the act of adultery with his stepmother and kills both culprits. “Lead me, I follow, take this old hand of mine and direct it where you will.”

> Latin: 2.42. vero et praecipue declamatores audacius nec mehercule sine motu quodam imaginantur, ut et Seneca in controversia, cuius summa est, quod pater filium et novercam inducente altero filio in adulterio deprehensos occidit:, sequor; accipe hanc senilem manum et quocunque vis imprime.

[¶23] 2.43. And a little later, “See, he says, what for so long you refused to believe. As for myself, I cannot see, night and thick darkness veil my eyes.” This figure is too dramatic: for the story seems to be acted, not narrated.

> Latin: 2.43. post paulo,, inquit, quod diu non credidisti. vero non video, nox oboritur et crassa caligo. haec figura manifestius aliquid; non enim narrari res, sed agi videtur.

[¶24] 2.44. Some include the clear and vivid description of places under the same heading, while others call it topography. I have found some who speak of irony as dissimulation, but, in view of the fact that this latter name does not cover the whole range of this figure, I shall follow my general rule and rest content with the Greek term. Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they differ.

> Latin: 2.44. quoque dilucida et significans descriptio eidem virtuti adsignatur a quibusdam; alii τοπογραφίαν dicunt. Εἰρωνείαν inveni qui dissimulationem vocaret; quo nomine quia parum totius huius figurae vires videntur ostendi, nimirum sicut in plerisque erimus Graeca appellatione contenti. Εἰρωνεία quae est schema, ab illa, quae est tropos, genere ipso nihil admodum distat; (in utroque enim contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum est) species vero prudentius intuenti diversas esse facile est deprehendere., quod tropos apertior est et, quanquam aliud dicit ac sentit, non aliud tamen simulat.

[¶25] 2.45. In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. For the context as a rule is perfectly clear, as, for example, in the following passage from the Catilinarian orations. “Rejected by him, you migrated to your boon-companion, that excellent gentleman Metellus.” In this case the irony lies in two words, and is therefore a specially concise form of trope.

> Latin: 2.45. et omnia circa fere recta sunt: ut illud in Catilinam, A quo repudiatus ad sodalem tuum, virum optimum, Metellum demigrasti. duobus demum verbis est ironia, ergo etiam brevior est tropos.

[¶26] 2.46. But in the figurative form of irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. Thus, as continued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropes develops into this figure.

> Latin: 2.46. in figura totius voluntatis fictio est apparens magis quam confessa, ut illic verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus sermoni et voci et tota interim causae conformatio; cum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur, qualis est visa Socratis; nam ideo dictus εἴρων, agens imperitum et admiratorem aliorum tanquam sapientium; ut, quemadmodum ἀλληγορίαν facit continua μεταφορὰ sic hoc schema faciat tropos ille contextus.

[¶27] 2.47. There are, however, certain kinds of this figure which have no connexion with tropes. In the first place, there is the figure which derives its name from negation and is called by some ἀντίφρασις. Here is an example: “I will not plead against you according to the rigour of the law, I will not press the point which I should perhaps be able to make good ”; or again, “Why should I mention his decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by force, of certain inheritances?” or “I say nothing of the first wrong inflicted by his lust”; or “I do not even propose to produce the evidence given concerning the 600,000 sesterces”;

> Latin: 2.47. vero genera huius figurae nullam cum tropis habent societatem, ut illa statim prima, quae dicitur a negando, quam nonnulli ἀντίφρασιν vocant: agam tecum iure summo, non dicam, quod forsitan obtinerem; et ego istius decreta, quid rapinas, quid hereditatum possessiones datas, quid ereptas proferam? et Mitto illam primam libidinis iniuriam, et Ne illa quidem testimonia recito, quae dicta sunt de HS sescentis milibus, et dicere.

[¶28] 2.48. or “I might say, etc.” Such kinds of irony may even be sustained at times through whole sections of our argument, as, for instance, where Cicero says, “If I were to plead on this point as though there were some real charge to refute, I should speak at greater length.” It is also irony when we assume the tone of command or concession, as in Virgil's
Go!
Follow the winds to Italy;

> Latin: 2.48. generibus per totas interim quaestiones decurrimus: ut Cicero, ego si sic agerem, tanquam mihi modi esset diluendum, haec pluribus dicerem. Εἰρωνεία est, et cum similes imperantibus vel permittentibus sumus:
I, sequere Italiam venti;
et cum ea, quae nolumus videri in adversariis esse, concedimus eis.

[¶29] 2.49. or when we concede to our opponents qualities which we are unwilling that they should seem to possess. This is specially effective when we possess these qualities and they do not, as in the following passage,
Brand me as coward, Drances, since thy sword
Has slain such hosts of Trojans.
A like result is produced by reversing this method when we pretend to own to faults which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents, as for example,
'Twas I that led the Dardan gallant on
To storm the bridal bed of Sparta's queen!

> Latin: 2.49. acrius fit, cum eadem in nobis sunt et in adversario non sunt:
timoris
tu, Drance, quando tot caedis acervos
Teucrorum tua dextra dedit.
Quod idem contra valet, cum aut ea, quae a nobis absunt, aut etiam quae in aduersarios recidunt, quasi fatemur:
duce Dardanius Spartam expugnauit adulter.
Nec in personis tantum, sed et in rebus versatur haec contraria dicendi quam quae intelligi velis ratio, ut totum pro Quinto Ligario prooemium et illae elevationes:, O dii boni!

[¶30] 2.50. Further, this device of saying the opposite of what we desire to imply is not merely restricted to persons, but may be extended to things, witness the whole of the exordium of the pro Ligario and disparaging phrases such as “Forsooth,” “ye great gods!” or
Fit task, I ween, for gods! Another example is provided by the following passage from the pro Oppio, “What wondrous love! what extraordinary benevolence!” Akin to irony also are the following figures, which have a strong family resemblance: confession of a kind that can do our case no harm, such as the following: “You have now, Tubero, the advantage most desired by an accuser: the accused confesses his guilt ”; secondly, concession, when we pretend to admit something actually unfavourable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause, as in the following passage: “The commander of a ship from a distinguished city paid down a sum of money to rid himself of the fear of a scourging which hung over his head; it shows Verres' humanity ”; or again, in the pro Cluentio, where Cicero is speaking of the prejudice aroused against his client, “Let it prevail in the public assembly, but be silent in the courts of law”; thirdly, agreement, as when Cicero, in the same speech, agrees that the jury was bribed.

> Latin: 2.50. —
is superis labor est.
—et ille pro Oppio locus: O amorem mirum! O benivolentiam singularem! procul absunt ab hac simulatione res inter se similes, confessio nihil nocitura, qualis est: igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, confitentem reum; et concessio, cum aliquid etiam iniquum videmur causae fiducia pati: virgarum nauarchus nobilissimae civitatis pretio redemit: humanum est; et pro Cluentio de invidia: in contionibus, iaceat in iudiciis; tertia consensio, ut pro eodem, iudicium esse corruptum.

[¶31] 2.52. This last form of figure becomes more striking when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favour; but such an opportunity can only occur through weakness on the part of our opponent Sometimes we may even praise some action of our opponent, as Cicero does in his prosecution of Verres when dealing with the charge in connexion with Apollonius of Drepanum: “Nay, it is a real pleasure to me to think that you took something from him, and I say that you never did a juster action in your life.”

> Latin: 2.52. evidentior figura est, cum alicui rei assentimur, quae est futura pro nobis; verum id accidere sine adversarii vitio non potest. etiam velut laudamus, ut Cicero in Verrem circa crimen Apollonii Drepanitani: etiam, si quid ab eo abstulisti, et abs te nihil rectius factum esse dico. augemus crimina, quae ex facili aut diluere possimus aut negare, quod est frequentius quam ut exemplum desideret.

[¶32] 2.53. At times we may exaggerate charges against ourselves which we can easily refute or deny; this device is too common to require any illustration. At other times we may by this same method make the charges brought against us seem incredible just because of their gravity: thus Cicero in his defence of Roscius, by the sheer force of his eloquence, exaggerates the horror of parricide, despite the fact that it requires no demonstration.

> Latin: 2.53. hoc ipso fidem detrahimus illis, quod sint tam gravia, ut pro Roscio Cicero, cum immanitatem parricidii quanquam per se manifestam tamen etiam vi orationis exaggerat. Ἀποσιώπησις, quam idem Cicero reticentiam, Celsus obticentiam, nonnulli interruptionem appellant, et ipsa ostendit aliquid adfectus vel irae, ut.

[¶33] 2.54. Aposiopesis, which Cicero calls reticentia, Celsus obticentia, and some interruptio, is used to indicate passion or anger, as in the line:
Whom I—
But better first these billows to assuage.
Or it may serve to give an impression of anxiety or scruple, as in the following: “Would he have dared to mention this law of which Clodius boasts he was the author, while Milo was alive, I will not say was consul? For as regards all of us—I do not dare to complete the sentence.” There is a similar instance in the exordium of Demosthenes' speech in defence of Ctesiphon.

> Latin: 2.54. ego—sed motos praestat componere fluctus;
vel sollicitudinis et quasi religionis: huius ille legis, quam Clodius a se inventam gloriatur, mentionem facere ausus esset vivo Milone, non dicam console? de nostrum omnium — non audeo totum dicere; cui simile est in prooemio pro Ctesiphonte Demosthenis.

[¶34] 2.55. Again it may be employed as a means of transition, as, for example, “Cominius, however— nay, pardon me, gentlemen.” This last instance also involves digression, if indeed digression is to be counted among figures, since some authorities regard it as forming one of the parts of a speech. For at this point the orator diverges to sing the praises of Gnaeus Pompeius, which he might have done without any recourse to aposiopesis.

> Latin: 2.55. alio transeundi gratia: Cominius autem — tametsi ignoscite mihi, iudices. quo est et illa (si tamen inter schemata numerari debet, cum aliis etiam pars causae videatur) digressio; abit enim causa in laudes Cn. Pompeii, idque fieri etiam sine ἀποσιωπήσει potuit.

[¶35] 2.56. For as Cicero says, the shorter form of digression may be effected in a number of different ways. The following passages will, however, suffice as examples: “Then Gaius Varenus, that is, the Varenus who was killed by the slaves of Ancharius:—I beg you, gentlemen, to give careful attention to what I am about to say;” the second is from the pro Milone: “Then he turned on me that glance, which it was his wont to assume, when he threatened all the world with every kind of violence.”

> Latin: 2.56. brevior illa, ut ait Cicero, a re digressio plurimis fit modis. haec exempli gratia sufficient: C. Varenus, is qui a familia Anchariana occisus est; hoc, quaeso, iudices, diligenter attendite; et pro Milone aspexit me illis quidem oculis, quibus tum solebat, cum omnibus omnia minabatur.

[¶36] 2.57. There is also another kind of figure, which is not aposiopesis, since that involves leaving a sentence unfinished, but consists in bringing our words to a close before the natural point for their conclusion. The following is an example: “I am pressing my point too far; the young man appears to be moved”; or “Why should I say more? you heard the young man tell the story himself.” The imitation of other persons' characteristics, which is styled ἠθοποιί͂α or, as some prefer μίμησις may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds. If concerned with the latter, it closely resembles ὑποτύπωσις while the following passage from Terence will illustrate it as applied to words: “I didn't see your drift. 'A little girl was stolen from this place; my mother brought her up as her own daughter. She was known as my sister. I want to get her away to restore her to her relations.' ” We may, however, imitate our own words and deeds in a similar fashion by relating some act or statement, though in such cases the speaker more frequently does so to assert his point than for the sake of banter, as, for example, in the following, “I said that they had Quintus Caecilius to conduct the prosecution.”

> Latin: 2.57. alia non quidem reticentia, quae sit imperfecti sermonis, sed tamen praecisa velut ante legitimum finem oratio: ut illud urgeo, commoveri videtur adolescens; et plura? ipsum adolescentem dicere audistis. morum alienorum, quae ἠθοποιία vel, ut alii malunt, μίμησις dicitur, iam inter leniores adfectus numerari potest; est enim posita fere in eludendo, sed versatur et in factis et in dictis. factis, quod est ὑποτυπώσει vicinum; in dictis, quale est apud Terentium:
ego nesciebam, quorsum tu ires.
est abrepta, eduxit mater pro sua,
dicta est: cupio abducere, ut reddam suis.

[¶37] 2.59. There are other devices also which are agreeable in themselves and serve not a little to commend our case both by the introduction of variety and by their intrinsic naturalness, since by giving our speech an appearance of simplicity and spontaneity they make the judges more ready to accept our statements without suspicion.

> Latin: 2.59. nostrorum quoque dictorum factorumque similis imitatio est per relationem, nisi quod frequentius asseverat quam eludit: habere eos actorem Q. Caecilium. et illa iucunda et ad commendationem cum varietate tum etiam ipsa natura plurimum prosunt, quae simplicem quandam et non praeparatam ostendendo orationem minus nos suspectos iudici faciunt.

[¶38] 2.60. Thus we may feign repentance for what we have said, as in the pro Caelio, where Cicero says, “But why did I introduce so respectable a character?” Or we may use some common phrase, such as, “I didn't mean to say that.” Or we may pretend that we are searching for what we should say, as in the phrases, “What else is there?” or “Have I left anything out?” Or we may pretend to discover something suggested by the context, as when Cicero says, “One more charge, too, of this sort still remains for me to deal with,” or “One thing suggests another.”

> Latin: 2.60. Hinc est quasi paenitentia dicti, ut pro Caelio quid ego ita gravem personam introduxi? quibus utimur vulgo: incidi. cui quaerere nos, quid dicamus, fingimus: Quid reliquum est? et Num quid omisi et cum ibidem invenire, ut ait Cicero: etiam mihi relicum huiusmodi modi est; et ex alio succurrit mihi.

[¶39] 2.61. Such methods will also provide us with elegant transitions, although transition is not itself to be ranked among figures: for example, Cicero, after telling the story of Piso, who ordered a goldsmith to make a ring before him in court, adds, as though this story had suggested it to him, “This ring of Piso's reminds me of something which had entirely slipped my memory. How many gold rings do you think Verres has stripped from the fingers of honourable men?” Or we may affect ignorance on certain points, as in the following passage: “But who was the sculptor who made those statues? Who was he? Thank you for prompting me, you are right; they said it was Polyclitus.”

> Latin: 2.61. etiam venusti transitus fiunt; non quia transitus ipse sit schema, ut Cicero, narrato Pisonis exemplo, qui anulum sibi cudi ab aurifice in tribunali suo iusserat, velut hoc in memoriam inductus adiecit: modo me commonuit Pisonis anulus, quod totum effluxerat. mullis istum putatis hominibus honestis de digitis anulos aureos abstulisse? cum aliqua velut ignoramus: earum rerum artifice, quem? quemnam? admones, Polyclitum esse dicebant.

[¶40] 2.62. This device may serve for other purposes as well. For there are means of this kind whereby we may achieve an end quite other than that at which we appear to be aiming, as, for example, Cicero does in the passage just quoted. For while he taunts Verres with a morbid passion for acquiring statues and pictures, he succeeds in creating the impression that he personally has no interest in such subjects. So, too, when Demosthenes swears by those who fell at Marathon and Salamis, his object is to lessen the odium in which he was involved by the disaster at Chaeronea.

> Latin: 2.62. quidem non in hoc tantum valet. enim, dum aliud agere videmur, aliud efficimus, sicut hic Cicero consequitur, ne, cum morbum in signis atque tabulis obiiciat Verri, ipse quoque earum rerum studiosus esse credatur. Demosthenes iurando per interfectos in Marathone et Salamine id agit, ut minore invidia cladis apud Chaeroneam acceptae laboret.

[¶41] 2.63. We may further lend charm to our speech by deferring the discussion of some points after just mentioning them, thus depositing them in the safe keeping of the judge's memory and afterwards reclaiming our deposit; or we may employ some figure to enable us to repeat certain points (for repetition is not in itself a figure) or may make especial mention of certain things and vary the aspect of our pleading. For eloquence delights in variety, and just as the eye is more strongly attracted by the sight of a number of different things, so oratory supplies a continuous series of novelties to rivet the attention of the mind.

> Latin: 2.63. illa quoque iucundam orationem, aliqua mentione habita differre et deponere apud memoriam iudicis et reposcere quae deposueris, et iterare quaedam schemate aliquo, (non enim est ipsa per se iteratio schema) et excipere aliqua et dare actioni varios velut vultus. enim res varietate, et sicut oculi diversarum aspectu rerum magis detinentur, ita semper animis praestat, in quod se velut novum intendant.

[¶42] 2.64. Emphasis may be numbered among figures also, when some hidden meaning is extracted from some phrase, as in the following passage from Virgil:
Might I not have lived,
From wedlock free, a life without a stain,
Happy as beasts are happy?
For although Dido complains of marriage, yet her passionate outburst shows that she regards life without wedlock as no life for man, but for the beasts of the field. A different kind of emphasis is found in Ovid, where Zmyrna confesses to her nurse her passion for her father in the following words:
O mother, happy in thy spouse!

> Latin: 2.64. emphasis etiam inter figuras, cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur, ut apud Vergilium licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam Degere more ferae? quamquam enim de matrimonio queritur Dido, tamen huc erumpit eius adfectus, ut sine thalamis vitam non hominum putet, sed ferarum. apud Ovidium genus, apud quem Zmyrna nutrici amorem patris sic confitetur;
O, dixit, felicem coniuge matrem
Huic vel confinis vel eadem est, qua nunc utimur plurimum.

[¶43] 2.65. Similar, if not identical with this figure is another, which is much in vogue at the present time. For I must now proceed to the discussion of a class of figure which is of the commonest occurrence and on which I think I shall be expected to make some comment. It is one whereby we excite some suspicion to indicate that our meaning is other than our words would seem to imply; but our meaning is not in this case contrary to that which we express, as is the case in ironq, but rather a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover. As I have already pointed out, modern rhetoricians practically restrict the name of figure to this device, from the use of which figured controversial themes derive their name.

> Latin: 2.65. enim ad id genus, quod et frequentissimum est et exspectari maxime credo, veniendum est, in quo per quandam suspicionem quod non dicimus accipi volumus, non utique contrarium, ut in Εἰρωνείᾳ, sed aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum., ut supra ostendi, iam fere solum schema a nostris vocatur, et unde controversiae figuratae dicuntur.

[¶44] 2.66. This class of figure may be employed under three conditions: first, if it is unsafe to speak openly; secondly, if it is unseemly to speak openly; and thirdly, when it is employed solely with a view to the elegance of what we say, and gives greater pleasure by reason of the novelty and variety thus introduced than if our meaning had been expressed in straightforward language.

> Latin: 2.66. triplex usus est: unus si dicere palam parum tutum est, alter si non decet, tertius qui venustatis modo gratia adhibetur et ipsa novitate ac varietate magis, quam si relatio sit recta, delectat.

[¶45] 2.67. The first of the three is of common occurrence in the schools, where we imagine conditions laid down by tyrants on abdication and decrees passed by the senate after a civil war, and it is a capital offence to accuse a person with what is past, what is not expedient in the courts being actually prohibited in the schools. But the conditions governing the employment of figures differ in the two cases. For we may speak against the tyrants in question as openly as we please without loss of effect, provided always that what we say is susceptible of a different interpretation, since it is only danger to ourselves, and not offence to them, that we have to avoid.

> Latin: 2.67. his, quod est primum, frequens in scholis est. et pactiones deponentium imperium tyrannorum et post bellum civile senatus consulta finguntur et capitale est obiicere anteacta, ut, quod in foro non expedit, illic nec liceat. schematum condicio non eadem est. enim apertum, quod modo et aliter intelligi possit, in illos tyrannos bene dixeris, quia periculum tantum, non etiam offensa vitatur. si ambiguitate sententiae possit eludi, nemo non illi furto favet.

[¶46] 2.68. And if the danger can be avoided by any ambiguity of expression, tile speaker's cunning will meet with universal approbation. On the other hand, the actual business of the courts has never yet involved such necessity for silence, though at times they require something not unlike it, which is much more embarrassing for the speaker, as, for example, when he is hampered by the existence of powerful personages, whom he must censure if he is to prove his case.

> Latin: 2.68. negotia nunquam adhuc habuerunt hanc silentii necessitatem; sed aliam huic similem, verum multo ad agendum difficiliorem, cum personae potentes obstant, sine quarum reprehensione teneri causa non possit.

[¶47] 2.69. Consequently he must proceed with greater wariness and circumspection; since the actual manner in which offence is given is a matter of indifference, and if a figure is perfectly obvious, it ceases to be a figure. Therefore such devices are absolutely repudiated by some authorities, whether the meaning of the figure be intelligible or not. But it is possible to employ such figuress in moderation, the primary consideration being that they should not be too obvious. And this fault can be avoided, if the figre does not depend on the employment of words of doubtful or double meaning, such, for instance, as the words which occur in the theme of the suspected daughter-in-law: “I married the wife who pleased my father.”

> Latin: 2.69. hoc parcius et circumspectius faciendum est, quia nihil interest, quomodo offendas, et aperta figura perdit hoc ipsum quod figura est. a quibusdam tota res repudiatur, sive intelligatur sive non intelligatur. licet modum adhibere; in primis, ne sint manifestae. erunt autem, si non ex verbis dubiis et quasi duplicibus petentur, quale est in suspecta nuru, uxorem, quae patri placuit;

[¶48] 2.70. It is important, too, that the figure should not depend on ambiguous collocations of words (a trick which is far more foolish than the last); an example of this is to be found in the controversial theme, where a father, accused of a criminal passion for his unmarried daughter, asks her for the name of her ravisher. “Who dishonoured you?” he says. She replies: “My father, do you not know?”

> Latin: 2.70. aut, quod est multo ineptius, compositionibus ambiguis, ut in illa controversia, in qua infamis amore filiae virginis pater raptam eam interrogat, a quo vitiata sit, te, inquit, rapuit?, pater, nescis?

[¶49] 2.71. The facts themselves must be allowed to excite the suspicions of the judge, and we must clear away all other points, leaving nothing save what will suggest the truth. In doing this we shall find emotional appeals, hesitation and words broken by silences most effective. For thus the judge will be led to seek out the secret which he would not perhaps believe if he heard it openly stated, and to believe in that which he thinks he has found out for himself. But however excellent our figures, they must not be too numerous.

> Latin: 2.71. ipsae perducant iudicem ad suspicionem, et amoliamur cetera, ut hoc solum supersit; in quo multum etiam adfectus iuvant et interrupta silentio dictio et cunctationes. enim fiet, ut iudex quaerat illud nescio quid ipse, quod fortasse non crederet, si audiret, et ei, quod a se inventum existimat, credat.

[¶50] 2.72. For overcrowding will make them obvious, and they will become ineffective without becoming inoffensive, while the fact that we make no open accusation will seem to be due not to modesty, but to lack of confidence in our own cause. In fact, we may sum up the position thus: our figures will have most effect upon the judge when he thinks that we use them with reluctance.

> Latin: 2.72. ne si optimae quidem sint, esse debent frequentes. densitate ipsa figurae aperiuntur, nec offensae minus habent, sed auctoritatis; nec pudor videtur, quod non palam obiicias, sed diffidentia. summa, sic maxime iudex credit figuris, si nos putat nolle dicere.

[¶51] 2.73. I myself have come across persons whom it was impossible to convince by other means: I have even come across a much rarer thing, namely, a case which could only be proved by recourse to such devices. I was defending a woman who was alleged to have forged her husband's will, and the heirs were stated to have given a bond to the husband on his deathbed, which latter assertion was true.

> Latin: 2.73. et in personas incidi tales et in rem quoque, quod est magis rarum, quae obtineri nisi hac arte non posset. tuebar, quae subiecisse dicebatur mariti testamentum, et dicebantur chirographum marito exspiranti heredes dedisse; et verum erat.

[¶52] 2.74. For since the wife could not legally be appointed his heir, this procedure was adopted to enable the property to be transferred to her by a secret conveyance in trust. Now it was easy for me to secure the woman's acquittal, by openly mentioning the existence of the bond; but this would have involved her loss of the inheritance. I had, therefore, to plead in such a way that the judges should understand that the bond had actually been given, but that informers might be unable to avail themselves of any statement of mine to that effect. And I was successful in both my aims. The fear of seeming to boast my own skill would have deterred me from mentioning this case, but for the fact that I wished to demonstrate that there was room for the employment of these figures even in the courts.

> Latin: 2.74. , quia per leges institui uxor non poterat heres, id fuerat actum, ut ad eam bona per hoc tacitum fideicommissum pervenirent. caput quidem tueri facile erat, si hoc diceremus palam, sed peribat hereditas. ergo fuit nobis agendum, ut iudices illud intelligerent factum, delatores non possent apprehendere ut dictum; et contigit utrumque. non inseruissem, veritus opinionem iactantiae, nisi probare voluissem in foro quoque esse his figuris locum. etiam, quae probare non possis, figura potius spargenda sunt.

[¶53] 2.75. Some things, again, which cannot be proved, may, on the other hand, be suggested by the employment of some figure. For at times such hidden shafts will stick, and the fact that they are not noticed will prevent their being drawn out, whereas if the same point were stated openly, it would be denied by our opponents and would have to be proved.

> Latin: 2.75. enim nonnunquam telum illud occultum, et hoc ipso, quod non apparet, eximi non potest; at si idem dicas palam, et defenditur et probandum est.

[¶54] 2.76. When, however, it is respect for some person that hampers us (which I mentioned as the second condition under which such figures may be used), all the greater caution is required because the sense of shame is a stronger deterrent to all good men than fear. In such cases the judge must be impressed with the fact that we are hiding what we know and keeping back the words which our natural impulse to speak out the truth would cause to burst from our lips. For those against whom we are speaking, together with the judges and our audience, would assuredly be all the more incensed by such toying with detraction, if they thought that we were inspired by deliberate malice.

> Latin: 2.76. autem obstat nobis personae reverentia, (quod secundum posuimus genus) tanto cautius dicendum est, quanto validius bonos inhibet pudor quam metus. vero tegere nos iudex quod sciamus et verba vi quadam veritatis erumpentia credat coercere. quanto magis aut ipsi, in quos dicimus, aut iudices aut adsistentes oderint hanc maledicendi lasciviam, si velle nos credant? quid interest quomodo dicatur, cum et res et animus intelligitur?

[¶55] 2.77. And what difference does it make how we express ourselves, when both the facts and our feelings are clearly understood? And what good shall we do by expressing ourselves thus except to make it clear that we are doing what we ourselves know ought not to be done? And yet in the days when I first began to teach rhetoric, this failing was only too common. For declaimers selected by preference those themes which attracted them by their apparent difficulty, although as a matter of fact they were much easier than many others.

> Latin: 2.77. dicendo denique proficimus, nisi ut palam sit facere nos quod ipsi sciamus non esse faciendum? praecipue prima, quibus praecipere coeperam, tempora hoc vitio laborarunt. enim libenter tales controversias, quae difficultatis gratia placent, cum sint multo faciliores.

[¶56] 2.78. For straightforward eloquence requires the highest gifts to commend itself to the audience, while these circuitous and indirect methods are merely the refuge of weakness, for those who use them are like men who, being unable to escape from their pursuers by speed, do so by doubling, since this method of expression, which is so much affected, is really not far removed from jesting. Indeed it is positively assisted by the tact that the hearer takes pleasure in detecting the speaker's concealed meaning, applauds his own penetration and regards another man's eloquence as a compliment to himself.

> Latin: 2.78. rectum genius adprobari nisi maximis viribus non potest; haec deverticula et anfractus suffugia sunt infirmitatis, ut qui cursu parum valent, flexu eludant, cum haec, quae adfectatur, ratio sententiarum non procul a ratione iocandi abhorreat. etiam, quod auditor gaudet intelligere, et favet ingenio suo et alio dicente se laudat.

[¶57] 2.79. Consequently it was not merely in cases where respect for persons prevented direct speaking (a circumstance which as a rule calls for caution rather than figures ) that they would have recourse to figurative methods, but they made room for them even under circumstances where they were useless or morally inadmissible, as for example in a case where a father, who had secretly slain his son whom he suspected of incest with his mother, and was accused of ill-treating his wife, was made to bring indirect insinuations against his wife.

> Latin: 2.79. non solum, si persona obstaret rectae orationi, (quo in genere saepius modo quam figuris opus est) decurrebant ad schemata, sed faciebant illis locum etiam, ubi inutiles ac nefariae essent, ut si pater, qui infamem in matrem filium secreto occidisset, reus malae tractationis iacularetur in uxorem obliquis sententiis. quid impurius, quam retinuisse talem?

[¶58] 2.80. But what could be more discreditable to the accused than that he should have kept such a wife? What could be more damaging than that he who is accused because he appears to have harboured the darkest suspicions against his wife, should by his defence confirm the charge which he is required to refute? If such speakers had only placed themselves in the position of the judges, they would have realised how little disposed they would have been to put up with pleading on such lines, more especially in cases where the most abominable crimes were insinuated against parents.

> Latin: 2.80. porro tam contrarium quam eum, qui accusetur, quia summum nefas suspicatus de uxore videatur, confirmare id ipsa defensione, quod diluendum est? si iudicum sumerent animum, scirent, quam eiusmodi actionem laturi non fuissent, multoque etiam minus, cum in parentes abominanda crimina spargerentur.

[¶59] 2.81. However, since we have lighted on this topic, let us devote a little more time to considering the practice of the schools. For it is in the schools that the orator is trained, and the methods adopted in pleading ultimately depend on the methods employed in declamation. I must therefore say something of those numerous cases in which figures have been employed which were not merely harsh, but actually contrary to the interests of the case. “A man condemned for attempting to establish himself as tyrant shall be tortured to make him reveal the names of his accomplices. The accuser shall choose what reward he pleases. A certain man has secured the condemnation of his father and demands as his reward that he should not be tortured. The father opposes his choice.”

> Latin: 2.81. quatenus huc incidimus, paulo plus scholis demus. et in his educatur orator, et in eo, quomodo declamatur, positum est etiam, quomodo agatur. ergo de iis quoque, in quibus non asperas figuras, sed palam contrarias causae plerique fecerunt: adfectatae damnatis torqueatur, ut conscios indicet; accusator eius optet, quod volet. quidam damnavit, optat, ne is torqueatur; paler ei contra dicit.

[¶60] 2.82. Everyone who pleaded for the father indulged in figurative insinuations against the son, on the assumption that the father would, when tortured, be likely to name him as one of his accomplices. But what could be more foolish? For as soon as the judges grasp their point, they will either refuse to put him to the torture in view of his motive for desiring to be tortured, or will refuse to believe any confession he may make under torture. But, it will be urged, it is possible that this was his motive.

> Latin: 2.82. se tenuit agens pro patre, quin figuras in filium faceret, tanquam illum conscium in tormentis nominaturus. quid stultius? cum hoc iudices intellexerint, aut non torquebitur, cum ideo torqueri velit, aut torto non credetur.