---
title: "The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria"
author: "Quintilian"
translator: "Harold Edgeworth Butler"
languages: [la, en]
shelf: "Classical Latin"
section: 8 of 53
url: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/8/
cite: "Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler, The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria, section 8. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/8/"
---

# The Orator’s Education · Institutio oratoria

*Quintilian, tr. Harold Edgeworth Butler*

Twelve books on training a good man skilled in speaking, from the nursery to the forum.

> Latin: ed. Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (canonical-latinLit, phi1002.phi001, CC BY-SA 4.0).

> English: Harold Edgeworth Butler, from the Perseus Digital Library (phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2). Notes are not included.

> Rows follow the references the two texts share (books, chapters and sections), cut where both reach the end of a sentence.

## 8. Book II · chapters 12–17

Source: https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/8/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/quintilian-institutio-oratoria/8/#p-N

[¶0] 12.11. But the ranters confer the title of force on that which is really violence. You may also occasionally find not merely pleaders, but, what is far more shameful, teachers as well, who, after a brief training in the art of speaking, throw method to the winds and, yielding to the impulse of the moment, run riot in every direction, abusing those who hold literature in higher respect as fools without life, courage or vigour, and calling them the first and worst name that occurs to them.

> Latin: 12.11. illi hanc vim appellant, quae est potius violentia; cum interim non actores modo aliquos invenias sed, quod est turpius, praeceptores etiam, qui brevem dicendi exercitationem consecuti omissa ratione ut tulit impetus, passim tumultuentur eosque, qui plus honoris litteris tribuerunt, ineptos et ieiunos et trepidos et infirmos, ut quodque verbum contumeliosissimum occurrit, appellent.

[¶1] 12.12. Still let me congratulate these gentlemen on attaining eloquence without industry, method or study. As for myself I have long since retired from the task of teaching in the schools and of speaking in the courts, thinking it the most honourable conclusion to retire while my services were still in request, and all I ask is to be allowed to console my leisure by making such researches and composing such instructions as will, I hope, prove useful to young men of ability, and are, at any rate, a pleasure to myself.

> Latin: 12.12. illis quidem gratulemur sine labor, sine ratione, sine disciplina disertis; nos, quando et praecipiendi munus iam pridem deprecati sumus et in foro quoque dicendi, quia honestissimum finem putabamus desinere dum desideraremur, inquirendo scribendoque talia consolemur otium nostrum, quae futura usui bonae mentis iuvenibus arbitramur, nobis certe sunt voluptati.

[¶2] 13.1. Let no one however demand from me a rigid code of rules such as most authors of textbooks have laid down, or ask me to impose on students of rhetoric a system of laws immutable as fate, a system in which injunctions as to the exordium and its nature lead the way; then come the statement of facts and the laws to be observed in this connexion: next the proposition or, as some prefer, the digression, followed by prescriptions as to the order in which the various questions should be discussed, with all the other rules, which some speakers follow as though they had no choice but to regard them as orders and as if it were a crime to take any other line.

> Latin: 13.1. autem a me exigat id praeceptorum genus, quod est a plerisque scriptoribus artium traditum, ut quasi quasdam leges inmutabili necessitate constrictas studiosis dicendi feram: utique prooemium et id quale, proxima huic narratio, quae lex deinde narrandi, propositio post hanc vel, ut quibusdam placuit, excursio, tum certus ordo quaestionum ceteraque, quae, velut si aliter facere fas non sit, quidam tanquam iussi sequuntur.

[¶3] 13.2. If the whole of rhetoric could be thus embodied in one compact code, it would be an easy task of little compass: but most rules are liable to be altered by the nature of the case, circumstances of time and place, and by hard necessity itself. Consequently the all-important gift for an orator is a wise adaptability since he is called upon to meet the most varied emergencies.

> Latin: 13.2. enim rhetorice res prorsus facilis ac parva, si uno et brevi praescripto contineretur; sed mutantur pleraque causis, temporibus, occasione, necessitate. ideo res in oratore praecipua consilium est, quia varie et ad rerum momenta convertitur.

[¶4] 13.3. What if you should instruct a general, as often as he marshals his troops for battle, to draw up his front in line, advance his wings to left and right, and station his cavalry to protect his flank? This will perhaps be the best plan, if circumstances allow. But it may have to be modified owing to the nature of the ground, if, for instance, he is confronted by a mountain, if a river bars his advance, or his movements are hampered by hills, woods or broken country.

> Latin: 13.3. si enim praecipias imperatori, quotiens aciem instruat, derigat frontem, cornua utrinque promoveat, equites pro cornibus locet? erit haec quidem rectissima fortasse ratio, quotiens licebit; sed mutabitur natura loci, si mons occurret, si flumen obstabit, collibus, silvis, asperitate alia prohibebitur;

[¶5] 13.4. Or again it may be modified by the character of the enemy or the nature of the crisis by which he is faced. On one occasion he will fight in line, on another in column, on one he will use his auxiliary troops, on another his legionaries; while occasionally a feint of flight may win the day. So, too, with the rules of oratory.

> Latin: 13.4. mutabit hostium genus, mutabit praesentis condicio discriminis; nunc acie directa nunc cuneis, Nunc auxiliis nunc legione pugnabitur, nonnunquam terga etiam dedisse simulata fuga proderit.

[¶6] 13.5. Is the exordium necessary or superfluous? should it be long or short? addressed entirely to the judge or sometimes directed to some other quarter by the employment of some figure of speech? Should the statement of facts be concise or developed at some length? continuous or divided into sections? and should it follow the actual or an artificial order of events? The orator will find the answers to all these questions in the circumstances of the case. So, too, with the order in which questions should be discussed, since in any given debate it may often suit one party best that such and such a question come up first, while their opponents would be best suited by another.

> Latin: 13.5. prooemium necessarium an supervacuum, breve an longius, ad iudicem omni sermone derecto an aliquando averso per aliquam figuram dicendum sit, constricta an latius fusa narratio, continua an divisa, recta an ordine permutato, causae docebunt. de quaestionum ordine, cum in eadem controversia aliud alii parti prius quaeri frequenter expediat.

[¶7] 13.6. For these rules have not the formal authority of laws or decrees of the plebs, but are, with all they contain, the children of expediency.

> Latin: 13.6. enim rogationibus plebisve scitis sancta sunt ista praecepta, sed hoc quidquid est utilitas excogitavit.

[¶8] 13.7. I will not deny that it is generally expedient to conform to such rules, otherwise I should not be writing now; but if our friend expediency suggests some other course to us, why, we shall disregard the authority of the professors and follow her.

> Latin: 13.7. negabo autem sic utile esse plerumque, alioqui nec scriberem; verum, si eadem illa nobis aliud suadebit utilitas, hanc relictis magistrorum auctoritatibus sequemur.

[¶9] 13.8. For my part above all things
This I enjoin and urge and urge anew
that in all his pleadings the orator should keep two things constantly in view, what is becoming and what is expedient. But it is often expedient and occasionally becoming to make some modification in the time-honoured order. We see the same thing in pictures and statues. Dress, expression and attitude are frequently varied.

> Latin: 13.8. id maxime praecipiam ac repetens iterumque iterumque monebo: res duas in omni actu spectet orator, quid deceat et quid expediat. autem saepe mutare ex illo constituto traditoque ordine aliqua et interim decet, ut in statuis atque picturis videmus variari habitus, vultus, status. recti quidem corporis vel minima gratia est;

[¶10] 13.9. The body when held bolt upright has but little grace, for the face looks straight forward, the arms hang by the side, the feet are joined and the whole figure is stiff from top to toe. But that curve, I might almost call it motion, with which we are so familiar, gives an impression of action and animation. So, too, the hands will not always be represented in the same position, and the variety given to the expression will be infinite.

> Latin: 13.9. nempe enim adversa sit facies et demissa brachia et iuncti pedes et a summis ad ima rigens opus. ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et adfectum. nec ad unum modum formatae manus et in vultu mille species.

[¶11] 13.10. Some figures are represented as running or rushing forward, others sit or recline, some are nude, others clothed, while some again are half-dressed, half-naked. Where can we find a more violent and elaborate attitude than that of the Discobolus of Myron? Yet the critic who disapproved of the figure because it was not upright, would merely show his utter failure to understand the sculptor's art, in which the very novelty and difficulty of execution is what most deserves our praise.

> Latin: 13.10. habent quaedam et impetum, sedent alia vel incumbunt; nuda haec, illa velata sunt, quaedam mixta ex utroque. tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? quis tamen, ut parum rectum, improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis abfuerit, in qua vel praecipue laudabilis est ipsa illa novitas ac difficultas?

[¶12] 13.11. A similar impression of grace and charm is produced by rhetorical figures, whether they be figures of thought or figures of speech. For they involve a certain departure from the straight line and have the merit of variation from the ordinary usage.

> Latin: 13.11. quidem gratiam et delectationem adferunt figurae, quaeque in sensibus quaeque in verbis sunt; mutant enim aliquid a recto atque hanc prae se virtutem ferunt, quod a consuetudine vulgari recesserunt.

[¶13] 13.12. In a picture the full face is most attractive. But Apelles painted Antigonus in profile, to conceal the blemish caused by the loss of one eye. So, too, in speaking, there are certain things which have to be concealed, either because they ought not to be disclosed or because they cannot be expressed as they deserve.

> Latin: 13.12. in pictura speciem tota facies; Apelles tamen imaginem Antigoni latere tantum altero ostendit, ut amissi oculi deformitas lateret.? non in oratione operienda sunt quaedam, sive ostendi non debent sive exprimi pro dignitate non possunt?

[¶14] 13.13. Timanthes, who was, I think, a native of Cythnus, provides an example of this in the picture with which he won the victory over Colotes of Teos. It represented the sacrifice of Iphigenia, and the artist had depicted an expression of grief on the face of Calchas and of still greater grief on that of Ulysses, while he had given Menelaus an agony of sorrow beyond which his art could not go. Having exhausted his powers of emotional expression he was at a loss to portray the father's face as it deserved, and solved the problem by veiling his head and leaving his sorrow to the imagination of the spectator.

> Latin: 13.13. fecit Timanthes, opinor, Cythnius in ea tabula, qua Coloten Teium vicit. cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxisset tristem Calchantem, tristiorem Vlixem, addidisset Menelao, quem summum poterat ars efficere, maerorem, consumptis adfectibus, non reperiens, quo digne modo patris vultum posset exprimere, velavit eius caput et suo cuique animo dedit aestimandum.

[¶15] 13.14. Sallust did something similar when he wrote “I think it better to say nothing of Carthage rather than say too little.” It has always, therefore, been my custom not to tie myself down to universal or general rules (this being the nearest equivalent I can find for the Greek catholic rules ). For rules are rarely of such a kind that their validity cannot be shaken and overthrown in some particular or other.

> Latin: 13.14. huic simile est illud Sallustianum, de Carthagine tacere satius puto quam parum dicere? quae mihi semper moris fuit, quam minime alligare me ad praecepta, quae καθολικά vocitant, id est (ut dicamus quomodo possumus) universalia vel perpetualia. enim reperitur hoc genus, ut non labefactari parte aliqua et subrui possit.

[¶16] 13.15. But I must reserve each of these points for fuller treatment in its proper place. For the present I will only say that I do not want young men to think their education complete when they have mastered one of the small text-books of which so many are in circulation, or to ascribe a talismanic value to the arbitrary decrees of theorists. the art of speaking can only be attained by hard work and assiduity of study, by a variety of exercises and repeated trial, the highest prudence and unfailing quickness of judgement.

> Latin: 13.15. de his plenius suo quidque loco tractabimus. nolo se iuvenes satis instructos, si quem ex his, qui breves plerumque circumferuntur, artis libellum edidicerint, et velut decretis technicorum tutos putent. labore, assiduo studio, varia exercitatione, plurimis experimentis, altissima prudentia, praesentissimo consilio constat ars dicendi.

[¶17] 13.16. But rules are helpful all the same so long as they indicate the direct road and do not restrict us absolutely to the ruts made by others. For he who thinks it an unpardonable sin to leave the old, old track, must be content to move at much the same speed as a tight-rope walker. Thus, for example, we often leave a paved military road to take a short cut or, finding that the direct route is impossible owing to floods having broken down the bridges, are forced to make a circuit, while if our house is on fire and flames bar the way to the front door, we make our escape by breaking through a party wall.

> Latin: 13.16. adiuvatur his quoque, si tamen rectam viam, non unam orbitam monstrent; a qua declinare qui crediderit nefas, patiatur necesse est illam per funes ingredientium tarditatem. et stratum militari labore iter saepe deserimus compendio ducti; et, si rectum limitem rupti torrentibus pontes inciderint, circumire cogemur, et, si ianua tenebitur incendio, per parietem exibimus.

[¶18] 13.17. The orator's task covers a large ground, is extremely varied and develops some new aspect almost every day, so that the last word on the subject will never have been said. I shall however try to set forth the traditional rules and to point out their best features, mentioning the changes, additions and subtractions which seem desirable.

> Latin: 13.17. fusum opus est et multiplex et prope cotidie novum, et de quo nunquam dicta erunt omnia. sint tamen tradita, quid ex his optimum, et si qua mutari, adiici, detrahi melius videbitur, dicere experiar.

[¶19] 14.1. Rhetoric is a Greek term which has been translated into Latin by oratoria or oratrix. I would not for the world deprive the translators of the praise which is their due for attempting to increase the vocabulary of our native tongue; but translations from Greek into Latin are not always satisfactory, just as the attempt to represent Latin words in a Greek dress is sometimes equally unsuccessful.

> Latin: 14.1. in Latinum transferentes tum oratoriam, tum oratricem nominaverunt. equidem non fraudaverim debita laude, quod copiam Romani sermonis augere temptarint. non omnia nos ducentes ex Graeco sequuntur sicut ne illos quidem, quotiens utique suis verbis signare nostra voluerunt.

[¶20] 14.2. And the translations in question are fully as harsh as the essentia and queentia of Plautus, and have not even the merit of being exact. For oratoria is formed like elocutoria and oratrix like elocutrix, whereas the rhetoric with which we are concerned is rather to be identified with eloquentia, and the word is undoubtedly used in two senses by the Greeks.

> Latin: 14.2. haec interpretatio non minus dura est quam illa Plauti essentia atque queentia, sed ne propria quidem; nam oratoria sic effertur ut elocutoria, oratrix ut elocutrix; illa autem de qua loquimur rhetorice talis est qualis eloquentia, nec dubie apud Graecos quoque duplicem intellectum habet.

[¶21] 14.3. In the one case it is an adjective i.e. ars rhetorica, the rhetorical art, like piratic in the phrase nauis piratica, in the other it is a noun like philosophy or friendship. It is as a substantive that we require it here; now the correct translation of the Greek grammatice is litteratura not litteratrix or litteratoria, which would be the forms analogous to oratrix and oratoria. But in the case of “rhetoric” there is no similar Latin equivalent.

> Latin: 14.3. uno modo fit appositum ars rhetorica ut navis piratica, altero nomen rei, qualis est philosophia, amicitia. ipsam nunc volumus significare substantiam ut grammatice litteratura est, non litteratrix quemadmodum oratrix, nec litteratoria quemadmodum oratoria; verum id in rhetorice non fit.

[¶22] 14.4. It is best therefore not to quarrel about it, more especially as we have to use Greek terms in many other cases. For I may at least use the words philosophus, musicus and geometres without outraging them by changing them into clumsy Latin equivalents. Finally, since Cicero gave a Greek title to the earlier works which he wrote on this subject, I may without fear of rashness accept the great orator as sufficient authority for the name of the art which he professed.

> Latin: 14.4. pugnemus igitur, cum praesertim plurimis alioqui Graecis sit utendum. certe et philosophos et musicos et geometras dicam, nec vim adferam nominibus his indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione. cum M. Tullius etiam in ipsis librorum, quos hac de re primum scripserat, titulis Graeco nomine utatur, profecto non est verendum, ne temere videamur oratori maximo de nomine artis suae credidisse.

[¶23] 14.5. To resume, then, rhetoric (for I shall now use the name without fear of captious criticism) is in my opinion best treated under the three following heads, the art, the artist and the work. The art is that which we should acquire by study, and is the art of speaking well. The artist is he who has acquired the art, that is to say, he is the orator whose task it is to speak well. The work is the achievement of the artist, namely good speaking. Each of these three general divisions is in its turn divided into species. Of the two latter divisions I shall speak in their proper place. For the present I shall proceed to a discussion of the first.

> Latin: 14.5. rhetorice (iam enim sine metu cavillationis utemur hac appellatione) sic, ut opinor, optime dividetur, ut de arte, de artifice, de opere dicamus. erit, quae disciplina percipi debet; ea est bene dicendi scientia. est, qui percepit hanc artem, id est, orator, cuius est summa bene dicere; opus, quod efficitur ab artifice, id est, bona oratio. omnia rursus diducuntur in species; sed illa sequentia suo loco, nunc quae de prima parte tractanda sunt, ordiar.

[¶24] 15.1. The first question which confronts us is “What is rhetoric?” Many definitions have been given; but the problem is really twofold. For the dispute turns either on the quality of the thing itself or on the meaning of the words in which it is defined. The first and chief disagreement on the subject is found in the fact that some think that even bad men may be called orators, while others, of whom I am one, restrict the name of orator and the art itself to those who are good. Of those who divorce eloquence from that yet fairer and more desirable title to renown, a virtuous life, some call rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a virtue, some a practice, some an art, though they will not allow the art to have anything in common with science or virtue, while some again call it a perversion of art or κακοτεχνία.

> Latin: 15.1. omnia, quid sit rhetorice. finitur quidem varie, sed quaestionem habet duplicem, aut enim de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprehensione verborum dissensio est. atque praecipua opinionum circa hoc differentia, quod alii malos quoque viros posse oratores dici putant; alii, quorum nos sententiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque, de qua loquimur, bonis demum tribui volunt. autem, qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda vitae laude secernunt, quidam rhetoricen vim tantum, quidam scientiam sed non virtutem, quidam usum, quidam artem quidem sed a scientia et virtute diiunctam, quidam etiam pravitatem quandam artis, id est κακοτεχνίαν nominaverunt.

[¶25] 15.3. These persons have as a rule held that the task of oratory lies in persuasion or speaking in a persuasive manner: for this is within the power of a bad man no less than a good. Hence we get the common definition of rhetoric as the power of persuading. What I call a power, many call a capacity, and some a faculty. In order therefore that there may be no misunderstanding I will say that by power I mean δύναμις.

> Latin: 15.3. fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati. enim fieri potest ab eo quoque, qui vir bonus non sit. igitur frequentissimus finis, rhetoricen esse vim persuadendi. ego vim appello, plerique potestatem, nonnulli facultatem vocant; quae res ne quid adferat ambiguitatis, vim dico δύναμιν.

[¶26] 15.4. This view is derived from Isocrates, if indeed the treatise on rhetoric which circulates under his name is really from his hand. He, although far from agreeing with those whose aim is to disparage the duties of an orator, somewhat rashly defined rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, the “worker of persuasion”: for I cannot bring myself to use the peculiar derivative which Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus in the phrase suadae medulla, the “marrow of persuasion.”

> Latin: 15.4. opinio originem ab Isocrate (si tamen re vera Ars, quae circumfertur, eius est) duxit., cum longe sit a voluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprehendit, dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est πειθοῦς δημιουργόν; neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione, qua Ennius M. Cethegum medullam vocat.

[¶27] 15.5. Again Gorgias, in the dialogue of Plato that takes its title from his name, says practically the same thing, but Plato intends it to be taken as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero in more than one passage defined the duty of an orator as “speaking in a persuasive manner.”

> Latin: 15.5. Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro, qui nomine eius inscriptus est, idem fere dicit; sed hanc Plato illius opinionem vult accipi non suam. Cicero pluribus locis scripsit, officium oratoris esse dicere apposite ad persuadendum.

[¶28] 15.6. In his Rhelorica too, a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he makes the end to be persuasion. But many other things have the power of persuasion, such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual's great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person.

> Latin: 15.6. rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere. et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas, postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine voce, quo vel recordatio meritorum cuiusque vel facies aliqua miserabilis vel formae pulchritudo sententiam dictat.

[¶29] 15.7. Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence of Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honourable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused.

> Latin: 15.7. et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa veste cicatrices, quas is pro patria pectore adverso suscepisset, ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam sed oculis populi Romani vim attulit, quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc, ut absolveret reum, creditum est.

[¶30] 15.8. Again there is a speech of Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by the pity which he aroused not only by producing his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpicius Gallus.

> Latin: 15.8. Servium quidem Galbam miseratione sola, qua non suos modo liberos parvulos in contione produxerat, sed Galli etiam Sulpicii filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat, elapsum esse, cum aliorum monumentis tum Catonis oratione testatum est.

[¶31] 15.9. So also according to general opinion Phryne was saved not by the eloquence of Hyperides, admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed by drawing aside her tunic. And if all these have power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing, cannot adequately be defined as persuasion.

> Latin: 15.9. Phrynen non Hyperidis actione, quanquam admirabili, sed conspectu corporis, quod illa speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudaverat tunica, putant periculo liberatam. si omnia persuadent, non est hic, de quo locuti sumus, idoneus finis.

[¶32] 15.10. Consequently those who, although holding the same general view of rhetoric, have regarded it as the power of persuasion by speaking, pride themselves on their greater exactness of language. This definition is given by Gorgias, in the dialogue mentioned above, under compulsion from the inexorable logic of Socrates. Theodectes agrees with him, whether the treatise on rhetoric which has come down to us under his name is really by him or, as is generally believed, by Aristotle. In that work the end of rhetoric is defined as the leading of men by the power of speech to the conclusion desired by the orator.

> Latin: 15.10. diligentiores sibi sunt visi, qui, cum de rhetorice idem sentirent, existimaverunt eam vim dicendo persuadendi. finem Gorgias in eodem, de quo supra diximus, libro, velut coactus a Socrate facit; a quo non dissentit Theodectes, sive ipsius id opus est, quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, sive, ut creditum est, Aristotelis, in quo est, finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id, quod actor velit.

[¶33] 15.11. But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by speaking or lead others to the conclusion desired, as for example harlots, flatterers and seducers. On the other hand the orator is not always engaged on persuasion, so that sometimes persuasion is not his special object, while sometimes it is shared by others who are far removed from being orators.

> Latin: 15.11. ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum; persuadent enim dicendo vel ducunt in id quod volunt alii quoque, ut meretrices, adulatores, corruptores. contra non persuadet semper orator; ut interim non sit proprius hic finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis, qui ab oratore procul absunt.

[¶34] 15.12. And yet Apollodorus is not very far off this definition when he asserts that the first and all-important task of forensic oratory is to persuade the judge and lead his mind to the conclusions desired by the speaker. For even Apollodorus makes the orator the sport of fortune by refusing him leave to retain his title if he fails to persuade.

> Latin: 15.12. non multum ab hoc fine abest Apollodorus, dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id, quod velit; nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subiicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit.

[¶35] 15.13. Some on the other hand pay no attention to results, as for example Aristotle, who says “rhetoric is the power of discovering all means of persuading by speech.” This definition has not merely the fault already mentioned, but the additional defect of including merely the power of invention, which without style cannot possibly constitute oratory.

> Latin: 15.13. recesserunt ab eventu, sicut Aristoteles dicit: rhetorice est vis inveniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia. finis et illud vitium, de quo supra diximus, habet et insuper quod nihil nisi inventionem complectitur, quae sine elocutione non est oratio.

[¶36] 15.14. Hermagoras, who asserts that its end is to speak persuasively, and others who express the same opinion, though in different words, and inform us that the end is to say everything which ought to be said with a view to persuasion, have been sufficiently answered above, when I proved that persuasion was not the privilege of the orator alone.

> Latin: 15.14. Hermagorae, qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere, et aliis, qui eandem sententiam non iisdem tantum verbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum, satis responsum est, cum persuadere non tantum oratoris esse convicimus.

[¶37] 15.15. Various additions have been made to these definitions. For some hold that rhetoric is concerned with everything, while some restrict its activity to politics. The question as to which of these views is the nearer to the truth shall be discussed later in its appropriate place.

> Latin: 15.15. sunt his alia varie. enim circa res omnes, quidam circa civiles modo versari rhetoricen putaverunt; quorum verius utrum sit, in eo loco, qui huius quaestionis proprius est, dicam.

[¶38] 15.16. Aristotle seems to have implied that the sphere of the orator was all-inclusive when he defined rhetoric as the power to detect every element in any given subject which might conduce to persuasion; so too does Patrocles who omits the words in any given subject, but since he excludes nothing, shows that his view is identical. For he defines rhetoric as the power to discover whatever is persuasive in speech. These definitions like that quoted above include no more than the power of invention alone. Theodorus avoids this fault and holds that it is the power to discover and to utter forth in elegant language whatever is credible in every subject of oratory.

> Latin: 15.16. subiecisse oratori videtur Aristoteles, cum dixit vim esse videndi, quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile. Patrocles, qui non quidem adiicit in quaque re, sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit; vim enim vocat inveniendi, quod sit in oratione persuasibile; qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inventionem. vitium fugiens Theodorus vim putat inveniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione.

[¶39] 15.17. But, while others besides orators may discover what is credible as well as persuasive, by adding the words in every subject he, to a greater extent than the others, concedes the fairest name in all the world to those who use their gifts as an incitement to crime .

> Latin: 15.17. cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inveniat, adiiciendo in omni oratione magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae rei nomen.

[¶40] 15.18. Plato makes Gorgias say that he is a master of persuasion in the law-courts and other assemblies, and that his themes are justice and injustice, while in reply Socrates allows him the power of persuading, but not of teaching.

> Latin: 15.18. Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait, de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare; cui Socrates persuadendi, non docendi concedit facultatem.

[¶41] 15.19. Those who refused to make the sphere of oratory allinclusive, have been obliged to make somewhat forced and long-winded distinctions: among these I may mention Ariston, the pupil of the Peripatetic Critolaus, who produced the following definition, “Rhetoric is the science of seeing and uttering what ought to be said on political questions in language that is likely to prove persuasive to the people.”

> Latin: 15.19. vero non omnia subiiciebant oratori, sollicitius ac verbosius, ut necesse erat, adhibuerunt discrimina; quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hic finis est, scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis. scientiam, quia Peripateticus est, non, ut Stoici, virtutis loco ponit;

[¶42] 15.20. Being a Peripatetic he regards it as a science, not, like the Stoics, as a virtue, while in adding the words “likely to prove persuasie to the people ” he inflicts a positive insult on oratory, in implying that it is not likely to persuade the learned. The same criticism will apply to all those who restrict oratory to political questions, for they exclude thereby a large number of the duties of an orator, as for example panegyric, the third department of oratory, which is entirely ignored.

> Latin: 15.20. popularem autem comprehendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est adversus artem orandi, quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram. de omnibus, qui circa civiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant versari, dictum sit, excludi ab his plurima oratoris officia, illam certe laudativam totam, quae est rhetorices pars tertia.

[¶43] 15.21. Turning to those who regard rhetoric as an art, but not as a virtue, we find that Theodorus of Gadara is more cautious. For he says (I quote the words of his translators), “rhetoric is the art which discovers and judges and expresses, mith an elegance duly proportioned to the importance of all such elements of persuasion as may exist in any subject in the field of politics.”

> Latin: 15.21. Theodorus Gadareus, ut iam ad eos veniamus, qui artem quidem esse eam sed non virtutem putaverunt. enim dicit (ut ipsis eorum verbis utar, qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt), inventrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix decenti ornatu secundum mensionem eius, quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile, in materia civili.

[¶44] 15.22. Similarly Cornelius Celsus defines the end of rhetoric as to speak persuasively on any doubtful subject within the field of politics. Similar definitions are given by others, such for instance as the following:— “rhetoric is the power of judging and holding forth on such political subjects as come before it with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body and delivery of the words.”

> Latin: 15.22. Cornelius Celsus, qui finem rhetorices ait dicere persuasibiliter in dubia civili materia. sunt non dissimiles, qui ab aliis traduntur; qualis est ille, videndi et eloquendi de rebus civilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et eorum, quae dicet, pronuntiatione.

[¶45] 15.23. There are countless other definitions, either identical with this or composed of the same elements, which I shall deal with when I come to the questions concerned with the subject matter of rhetoric. Some regard it as neither a power, a science or an art; Critolaus calls it the practice of speaking (for this is the meaning of τριβή ), Athenaeus styles it the art of deceiving, while the majority, content with reading a few passages from the Gorgias of Plato, unskilfully excerpted by earlier writers, refrain from studying that dialogue and the remainder of Plato's writings, and thereby fall into serious error.

> Latin: 15.23. alia, sed aut eadem aut ex eisdem composita; quibus item, cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit, respondebimus. eam neque vim neque scientiam neque artem putaverunt, sed Critolaus usum dicendi (nam hoc τριβή significat), Athenaeus fallendi artem.

[¶46] 15.24. For they believe that in Plato's view rhetoric was not an art, but a certain adroitness in the production of delight and gratification, or with reference to another passage the shadow of a small part of politics and the fourth department of flattery.

> Latin: 15.24. autem, dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti neque hoc totum neque alia eius volumina evolvunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt, creduntque eum in hac esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem sed peritiam quandam gratiae ac voluptatis existimet;

[¶47] 15.25. For Plato assigns two departments of politics to the body, namely medicine and gymnastic, and two to the soul, namely law and justice, while he styles the art of cookery a form of flattery of medicine, the art of the slave-dealer a flattery of gymnastic, for they produce a false complexion by the use of paint and a false robustness by puffing them out with fat: sophistry he calls a dishonest counterfeit of legal science, and rhetoric of justice.

> Latin: 15.25. et alio loco civilitatis particulae simulacrum et quartam partem adulationis, quod duas partes civilitatis corpori adsignet, medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem, duas animo, legalem atque iustitiam; adulationem autem medicinae vocet cocorum artificium, exercitatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur, legalis cavillatricem, iustitiae rhetoricen.

[¶48] 15.26. All these statements occur in the Gorgias and are uttered by Socrates who appears to be the mouthpiece of the views held by Plato. But some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute his opponents and are styled refutative, while others are for the purpose of teaching and are called doctrinal.

> Latin: 15.26. omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate, cuius persona videtur Plato significare quid sentiat; sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos, qui contra disputant, compositi, quos ἐλεγκτικούς vocant, alii ad praecipiendum, qui δογματικοί appellantur.

[¶49] 15.27. Now it is only rhetoric as practised in their own day that is condemned by Plato or Socrates, for he speaks of it as “the manner in which you engage in public affairs”: rhetoric in itself he regards as a genuine and honourable thing, and consequently the controversy with Gorgias ends with the words, “The rhetorician therefore must be just and the just man desirous to do what is just.”

> Latin: 15.27. Socrates autem seu Plato eam quidem, quae tum exercebatur, rhetoricen talem putat, nam et dicit his verbis τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς πολιτεύεσθε, veram autem et honestam intelligit. disputatio ilia contra Gorgian ita clauditur, οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;

[¶50] 15.28. To this Gorgias makes no reply, but the argument is taken up by Polus, a hot-headed and headstrong young fellow, and it is to him that Socrates makes his remarks about “shadows” and “forms of flattery.” Then Callicles, who is even more hot-headed, intervenes, but is reduced to the conclusion that “he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and possess a knowledge of justice.” It is clear therefore that Plato does not regard rhetoric as an evil, but holds that true rhetoric is impossible for any save a just and good man. In the Phaedrus he makes it even clearer that the complete attainment of this art is impossible without the knowledge of justice, an opinion in which I heartily concur.

> Latin: 15.28. quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuvenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem illa de simulacro et adulatione dicuntur. Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam, τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι, δίκαιον ἄνδρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων; ut appareat, Platoni non rhetoricen videri malum, sed eam veram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere.

[¶51] 15.29. Had this not been his view, would he have ever written the Apology of Socrates or the Funeral Oration in praise of those who had died in battle for their country, both of them works falling within the sphere of oratory.

> Latin: 15.29. autem in Phaedro manifestius facit, hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse; cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus. aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum, qui pro patria ceciderant, laudem scripsisset?

[¶52] 15.30. It was against the class of men who employed their glibness of speech for evil purposes that he directed his denunciations. Similarly Socrates thought it incompatible with his honour to make use of the speech which Lysias composed for his defence, although it was the usual practice in those days to write speeches for the parties concerned to speak in the courts on their own behalf, a device designed to circumvent the law which forbade the employment of advocates.

> Latin: 15.30. quae certe sunt oratoris opera. in illud hominum genus, quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur, invectus est. et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem, quam ei Lysias reo composuerat; et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus, quae illi pro se ipsi dicerent, erat moris, atque ita iuri, quo non licebat pro altero agere, fraus adhibebatur.

[¶53] 15.31. Further the teachers of rhetoric were regarded by Plato as quite unsuited to their professed task. For they divorced rhetoric from justice and preferred plausibility to truth, as he states in the Phaedrus.

> Latin: 15.31. quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni videbantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et veris credibilia praeferrent; nam id quoque dicit in Phaedro.

[¶54] 15.32. Cornelius Celsus seems to have agreed with these early rhetoricians, for he writes “The orator only aims at the semblance of truth,” and again a little later “The reward of the party to a suit is not a good conscience, but victory.” If this were true, only the worst of men would place such dangerous weapons at the disposal of criminals or employ the precepts of their art for the assistance of wickedness. However I will leave those who maintain these views to consider what ground they have for so doing.

> Latin: 15.32. autem illis superioribus videri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus, cuius haec verba sunt: simile tantum veri petit. paulo post: enim bona conscientia sed victoria litigantis est praemium. si vera essent, pessimorum hominum foret, haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuvare. illi rationem opinionis suae viderint.

[¶55] 15.33. For my part, I have undertaken the task of moulding the ideal orator, and as my first desire is that he should be a good man, I will return to those who have sounder opinions on the subject. Some however identify rhetoric with politics, Cicero calls it a department of the science of politics (and science of politics and philosophy are identical terms), while others again call it a branch of philosophy, among them Isocrates.

> Latin: 15.33. autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse virum bonum volumus, ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt, revertamur. autem quidam eandem civilitatem esse iudicaverunt; Cicero scientiae civilis partem vocat (civilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est); quidam eandem philosophiam, quorum est Isocrates.

[¶56] 15.34. The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself.

> Latin: 15.34. eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam. et orationis omnes virtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus.

[¶57] 15.35. The definition given by Chrysippus, who derived it from Cleanthes, to the effect that it is the science of speaking rightly, amounts to the same thing. The same philosopher also gives other definitions, but they concern problems of a different character from that on which we are now engaged. Another definition defines oratory as the power of persuading men to do what ought to be done, and yields practically the same sense save that it limits the art to the result which it produces.

> Latin: 15.35. valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe scientia recte dicendi. plures eiusdem, sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent. sentit et finis hoc modo comprehensus, persuadere quod oporteat, nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat.

[¶58] 15.36. Areus again defines it well as speaking according to the excellence of speech. Those who regard it as the science of political obligations, also exclude men of bad character from the title of orator, if by science they mean virtue, but restrict it overmuch by confining it to political problems. Albutius, a distinguished author and professor of rhetoric, agrees that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, but makes a mistake in imposing restrictions by the addition of the words on political questions and with credibility; with both of these restrictions I have already dealt.

> Latin: 15.36. bene Areus dicere secundum virtutem orationis. a rhetorice malos et illi, qui scientiam civilium officiorum eam putaverunt, si scientiam virtutem iudicant; sed anguste intra civiles quaestiones coercent. Albucius, non obscurus professor atque auctor, scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit, sed exceptionibus peccat adiiciendo circa civiles quaestiones et credibiliter; quarum utrique iam responsum est.

[¶59] 15.37. Finally those critics who hold that the aim of rhetoric is to think and speak rightly, were on the correct track. These are practically all the most celebrated and most discussed definitions of rhetoric. It would be both irrelevant and beyond my power to deal with all. For I strongly disapprove of the custom which has come to prevail among writers of text-books of refusing to define anything in the same terms as have been employed by some previous writer. I will have nothing to do with such ostentation.

> Latin: 15.37. et illi voluntatis, qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putaverunt. sunt fere fines maxime illustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur. omnes quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum, cum pravum quoddam, ut arbitror, studium circa scriptores artium extiterit, nihil eisdem verbis, quae prior aliquis occupasset, finiendi, quae ambitio procul aberit a me.

[¶60] 15.38. What I say will not necessarily be my own invention, but it will be what I believe to be the right view, as for instance that oratory is the science of speaking well. For when the most satisfactory definition has been found, he who seeks another, is merely looking for a worse one. Thus much being admitted we are now in a position to see clearly what is the end, the highest aim, the ultimate goal of rhetoric, that τέλος in fact which every art must possess. For if rhetoric is the science of speaking well, its end and highest aim is to speak well.

> Latin: 15.38. enim non utique quae invenero sed quae placebunt, sicut hoc, rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam; cum reperto quod est optimum, qui quaerit aliud, peius velit. approbatis, simul manifestum est illud quoque, quem finem vel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quod τέλος dicitur, ad quod omnis ars tendit; nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia, finis eius et summum est bene dicere.

[¶61] 16.1. There follows the question as to whether rhetoric is useful. Some are in the habit of denouncing it most violently and of shamelessly employing the powers of oratory to accuse oratory itself.

> Latin: 16.1. quaestio, an utilis rhetorice. quidam vehementer in eam invehi solent, et, quod sit indignissimum, in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi viribus:

[¶62] 16.2. “It is eloquence” they say “that snatches criminals from the penalties of the law, eloquence that from time to time secures the condemnation of the innocent and leads deliberation astray, eloquence that stirs up not merely sedition and popular tumult, but wars beyond all expiation, and that is most effective when it makes falsehood prevail over the truth.”

> Latin: 16.2. eloquentiam esse, quae poenis eripiat scelestos, cuius fraude damnentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur; cuius denique tum maximus sit usus, cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet.

[¶63] 16.3. The comic poets even accuse Socrates of teaching how to make the worse cause seem the better, while Plato says that Gorgias and Tisias made similar professions.

> Latin: 16.3. et Socrati obiiciunt comici docere eum, quomodo peiorem causam meliorem faciat, et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato.

[¶64] 16.4. And to these they add further examples drawn from the history of Rome and Greece, enumerating all those who used their pernicious eloquence not merely against individuals but against whole states and threw an ordered commonwealth into a state of turmoil or even brought it to utter ruin; and they point out that for this very reason rhetoric was banished from Sparta, while its powers were cut down at Athens itself by the fact that an orator was forbidden to stir the passions of his audience.

> Latin: 16.4. his adiiciunt exempla Graecorum Romanorumque et enumerant, qui perniciosa non singulis tantum sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia turbaverint civitatium status vel everterint, eoque et Lacedaemoniorum civitate expulsam et Athenis quoque, ubi actor movere adfectus vetabatur, velut recisam orandi potestatem.

[¶65] 16.5. On the showing of these critics not only orators but generals, magistrates, medicine and philosophy itself will all be useless. For Flaminius was a general, while men such as the Gracchi, Saturninus and Glaucia were magistrates. Doctors have been caught using poisons, and those who falsely assume the name of philosopher have occasionally been detected in the gravest crimes.

> Latin: 16.5. quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia. et dux Flaminius et Gracchi, Saturnini, Glauciae magistratus, et in medicis venena et in his, qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur, gravissima nonnunquam flagitia deprehensa sunt.

[¶66] 16.6. Let us give up eating, it often makes us ill; let us never go inside houses, for sometimes they collapse on their occupants; let never a sword be forged for a soldier, since it might be used by a robber. And who does not realise that fire and water, both necessities of life, and, to leave mere earthly things, even the sun and moon, the greatest of the heavenly bodies, are occasionally capable of doing harm.

> Latin: 16.6. aspernemur; attulerunt saepe valetudinis causas. tecta subeamus; super habitantes aliquando procumbunt. fabricetur militi gladius; potest uti eodem ferro latro. nescit, ignes, aquas, sine quibus nulla sit vita, et (ne terrenis immorer) solem lunamque, praecipua siderum, aliquando et nocere?

[¶67] 16.7. On the other hand will it be denied that it was by his gift of speech that Appius the Blind broke off the dishonourable peace which was on the point of being concluded with Pyrrhus? Did not the divine eloquence of Cicero win popular applause even when he denounced the Agrarian laws, did it not crush the audacious plots of Catiline and win, while he still wore the garb of civil life, the highest honour that can be conferred on a victorious general, a public thanksgiving to heaven?

> Latin: 16.7. igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem caecus ille Appius dicendi viribus diremisse? aut non divina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus honor victoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit?

[¶68] 16.8. Has not oratory often revived the courage of a panic-stricken army and persuaded the soldier faced by all the perils of war that glory is a fairer thing than life itself? Nor shall the history of Sparta and Athens move me more than that of the Roman people, who have always held the orator in highest honour.

> Latin: 16.8. perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu revocat oratio et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem vita potiorem esse persuadet? vero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis moverint quam populus Romanus, apud quem summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit.

[¶69] 16.9. Never in my opinion would the founders of cities have induced their unsettled multitudes to form communities had they not moved them by the magic of their eloquence: never without the highest gifts of oratory would the great legislators have constrained mankind to submit themselves to the yoke of law.

> Latin: 16.9. nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut vaga ilia multitudo coiret in populos, nisi docta voce commota; nec legum repertores sine summa vi orandi consecutos, ut se ipsi homines ad servitutem iuris astringerent.

[¶70] 16.10. Nay, even the principles which should guide our life, however fair they may be by nature, yet have greater power to mould the mind to virtue, when the beauty of things is illumined by the splendour of eloquence. Wherefore, although the weapons of oratory may be used either for good or ill, it is unfair to regard that as an evil which can be employed for good.

> Latin: 16.10. ipsa vitae praecepta, etiamsi natura sunt honesta, plus tamen ad formandas mentes valent, quotiens pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis illuminat., etiamsi in utramque partem valent arma facundiae, non est tamen aequum id haberi malum, quo bene uti licet.

[¶71] 16.11. These problems, however, may be left to those who hold that rhetoric is the power to persuade. If our definition of rhetoric as the science of speaking well implies that an orator must be a good man, there can be no doubt about its usefulness.

> Latin: 16.11. haec apud eos forsitan quaerantur, qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi vim rettulerunt. vero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis vir bonus, utilem certe esse eam confitendum est.

[¶72] 16.12. And in truth that god, who was in the beginning, the father of all things and the architect of the universe, distinguished man from all other living creatures that are subject to death, by nothing more than this, that he gave him the gift of speech.

> Latin: 16.12. hercule deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi, nullo magis hominem separavit a ceteris, quae quidem mortalia essent, animalibus, quam dicendi facultate.

[¶73] 16.13. For as regards physical bulk, strength, robustness, endurance or speed, man is surpassed in certain cases by dumb beasts, who also are far more independent of external assistance. They know by instinct without need of any teacher how to move rapidly, to feed themselves and swim.

> Latin: 16.13. corpora quidem magnitudine, viribus, firmitate, patientia, velocitate praestantiora in illis mutis videmus, eadem minus egere adquisitae extrinsecus opis. et ingredi citius et pasci et tranare aquas citra docentem natura ipsa sciunt.

[¶74] 16.14. Many too have their bodies clothed against cold, possess natural weapons and have not to search for their food, whereas in all these respects man's life is full of toil. Reason then was the greatest gift of the Almighty, who willed that we should share its possession with the immortal gods.

> Latin: 16.14. pleraque contra frigus ex suo corpore vestiuntur, et arma iis ingenita quaedam et ex obvio fere victus, circa quae omnia multus hominibus labor est. igitur nobis praecipuam dedit eiusque nos socios esse cum dis immortalibus voluit.

[¶75] 16.15. But reason by itself would help us but little and would be far less evident in us, had we not the power to express our thoughts in speech; for it is the lack of this power rather than thought and understanding, which they do to a certain extent possess, that is the great defect in other living things.

> Latin: 16.15. ipsa ratio neque tam nos iuvaret neque tam esset in nobis manifesta, nisi, quae concepissemus mente, promere etiam loquendo possemus, quod magis deesse ceteris animalibus quam intellectum et cogitationem quandam videmus.

[¶76] 16.16. The construction of a soft lair, the weaving of nests, the hatching and rearing of their young, and even the storing up of food for the coming winter, together with certain other achievements which we cannot imitate, such as the making of honey and wax, all these perhaps indicate the possession of a certain degree of reason; but since the creatures that do these things lack the gift of speech they are called dumb and unreasoning beasts.

> Latin: 16.16. et mollire cubilia et nidos texere et educare fetus et excludere, quin etiam reponere in hiemem alimenta, opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia (qualia sunt cerarum ac mellis) efficere, nonnullius fortasse rationis est; sed quia carent sermone, quae id faciunt, muta atque irrationalia vocantur.

[¶77] 16.17. Finally, how little the heavenly boon of reason avails those who are born dumb. If therefore we have received no fairer gift from heaven than speech, what shall we regard as so worthy of laborious cultivation, or in what should we sooner desire to excel our fellow-men, than that in which mankind excels all other living things?

> Latin: 16.17. homines, quibus negata vox est, quantulum adiuvat animus ille caelestis? si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus, aut in quo malimus praestare hominibus, quam quo ipsi homines ceteris animalibus praestant, eo quidem magis, quod nulla in arte plenius labor gratiam refert?

[¶78] 16.18. And we should be all the more eager to do so, since there is no art which yields a more grateful recompense for the labour bestowed upon it. This will be abundantly clear if we consider the origins of oratory and the progress it has made; and it is capable of advancing still further.

> Latin: 16.18. adeo manifestum erit, si cogitaverimus, unde et quo usque iam provecta sit orandi facultas; et adhuc augeri potest.

[¶79] 16.19. I will not stop to point out how useful and how becoming a task it is for a good man to defend his friends, to guide the senate by his counsels, and to lead peoples or armies to follow his bidding; I merely ask, is it not a noble thing, by employing the understanding which is common to mankind and the words that are used by all, to win such honour and glory that you seem not to speak or plead, but rather, as was said of Pericles, to thunder and lighten?

> Latin: 16.19. ut omittam, defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum, populum, exercitum in quae velit ducere, quam sit utile conveniatque bono viro, nonne pulchrum vel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu verbisque, quibus utuntur omnes, tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae, ut non loqui et orare sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgurare ac tonare videaris?

[¶80] 17.1. However, if I were to indulge my own inclinations in expatiating on this subject, I should go on for ever. Let us therefore pass to the next question and consider whether rhetoric is an art.

> Latin: 17.1. non erit, si exspatiari in parte hac et indulgere voluptati velim. igitur ad eam quaestionem, quae sequitur, an rhetorice ars sit.

[¶81] 17.2. No one of those who have laid down rules for oratory has ever doubted that it is an art. It is clear even from the titles of their books that their theme is the art of rhetoric, while Cicero defines rhetoric as artistic eloquence. And it is not merely the orators who have claimed this distinction for their studies with a view to giving them an additional title to respect, but the Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers for the most part agree with them.

> Latin: 17.2. quidem adeo ex iis, qui praecepta dicendi tradiderunt, nemo dubitavit, ut etiam ipsis librorum titulis testatum sit, scriptos eos de arte rhetorica; Cicero vero eam, quae rhetorice vocetur, esse artificiosam eloquentiam dicat. non oratores tantum vindicarunt, ut studiis aliquid suis praestitisse videantur, sed cum iis philosophi et Stoici et Peripatetici plerique consentiunt.