--- title: "Summa Theologica, First Half" author: "Thomas Aquinas" translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province" languages: [en] shelf: "Medieval" section: 291 of 1210 url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/291/ cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, First Half, section 291. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/291/" --- # Summa Theologica, First Half *Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province* God and creation, human action, law and grace, then faith, hope, charity and justice. ## 291. I · Q. 83, Art. 3: Whether free-will is an appetitive power? Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/291/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/291/#p-N [¶0] Whether free-will is an appetitive power? [¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. [¶2] Objection 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. [¶3] Objection 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. [¶4] On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power. [¶5] I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. [¶6] Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power. [¶7] Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. [¶8] Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. ### I · Q. 83, Art. 4: Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? [¶10] Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will? [¶11] Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will. [¶12] Objection 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. [¶13] Objection 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. [¶14] On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. [¶15] I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q 64, A 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q 79, A 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one. [¶16] Reply to Objection 1: {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. [¶17] Reply to Objection 2: Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said. [¶18] Reply to Objection 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.