--- title: "Summa Theologica, First Half" author: "Thomas Aquinas" translator: "Fathers of the English Dominican Province" languages: [en] shelf: "Medieval" section: 450 of 1210 url: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/450/ cite: "Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica, First Half, section 450. Scriptura (scriptura.si), https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/450/" --- # Summa Theologica, First Half *Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province* God and creation, human action, law and grace, then faith, hope, charity and justice. ## 450. I–II · Q. 12, Art. 2: Whether intention is only of the last end? Source: https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/450/ · cite a paragraph as https://scriptura.si/works/thomas-aquinas-summa-theologica-first-half/450/#p-N [¶0] Whether intention is only of the last end? [¶1] Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end. [¶2] Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A 1, ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore intention always regards the last end. [¶3] Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention is too. [¶4] On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (Q 1, A 7). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false. [¶5] I answer that, As stated above (A 1, ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end. [¶6] Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry. [¶7] Reply to Objection 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part. [¶8] Reply to Objection 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing. ### I–II · Q. 12, Art. 3: Whether one can intend two things at the same time? [¶10] Whether one can intend two things at the same time? [¶11] Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other two things. [¶12] Objection 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time. [¶13] Objection 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time. [¶14] On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time. [¶15] I answer that, The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above (A 2), but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health. [¶16] But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time. [¶17] Reply to Objection 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated above (Q 1, A 5), one man cannot have several last ends. [¶18] Reply to Objection 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A 1, ad 3). Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others. [¶19] Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Q 12, A 10; FP, Q 58, A 2; FP, Q 85, A 4 it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.